ML20236J349
| ML20236J349 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1987 |
| From: | Mavroules N HOUSE OF REP. |
| To: | Zech L NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236J309 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8708060149 | |
| Download: ML20236J349 (44) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- i Congit%% of tf)e 1Bnittb htated
%)ouse of .Representatibeg EHasWngton, D.C. 20515 l
May 15, 1987 Mr. Lando Zech l Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Chairman:
As Members of Congress, we are seriously concerned about the possible licensing and subsequent operation of the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant while serious allegations of faulty workmanship and construction remain unaddressed. At the request of lawmakers and representatives from Maine, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, we feel compelled to call upon the NRC to order an independent investigation into the assertions I contained in the enclosed materials. The purpose of the investigation should be to conclusively answer ) all questions raised within the submissions. Only with such an investigation will you be able to end the controversy and contention that surrounds the licensing of the Seabrook Station. Only with such an investigation will you be able to restore public confidence in the process and the project. And only with I such an investigation will all interested parties.be able to accept once and for all that Seabrook is either safe or otherwise. By heeding our call and instituting an independent investigation, you avail yourself the opportunity to protect and preserve both the integrity of the process, and the public health and safety. j We thank you for your anticipated courtesy and look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience. Sincerely, 870B060149 870731 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR
+
Kicholas Mavroules, M.C.' Edward J. Markdy,MJ{'. l 1: s S Silvio O. Conte,'M.C. M/
/Coe Moakley, M.g# F
1 . 1 l Chairman Zech May 15, 1987 l Page Two L. l l Barney' Frank, M.C. GerrJ/ E. S tT2dd s , M . C .
,ff Chester E. Atkins, M.C. oseph't. Kenned.' M.C.
)
l l i
Employee's I,egal Project
'. P.O. Box 633 Amesbury, M A 01913 (617)388-9620 ,
1 INFORMATION GIVEN TO JACQUE DURR, NRC EWINEER, BY THE EMPLOYEE'S LEEAL I PRCUECI' DURIM APRIL 20, 1987 INTERVIEW i The following is an outline of affidavits, statements, and results of phone conversations with forner Seabrook Station enployees presented to Jacque l Durr, Nuclear Regulatory Commission engineer for Region I, during an interview with the Employee's Legal Project on April 20, 1987. The information contained in these af fidavits and statenents reveals l certain recurring thenes in failures concerning the safety of Seabrook Station's design, construction, and documentation. These failures occurred in Quality Assurance and Quality Control (including that for vendors), Training, Document Control, and the failures apply to all aspects of the plant. It has been the experience of the aqployee's Legal Project that problens 1 l raised as exanples of generic and far-reaching violations of safety I requirements are treated as " isolated instances" by the NRC. This was the I case with the 61 allegations from foraer Seabrook Station workers given to the NRC by the ELP last fall and dealt with in NRC inspection No. 50-443/86-
- 52. It is the position of the ELP that failures of Quality Assurance, Quality control, Training, and Document Control, are not isolated instances, but are pervasive throughout the plant. I In the past, at other nuclear plants, problems identified by the NRC as
" isolated cases" have later proved to be major problens. For instance, {
recently the Peach Bottom nuclear plant was shut down because operators l were found to be sleeping on the job. According to press reports, this l problem was identified in 1985, was designated an isolated instance, and no I action was taken at the time. The following is an outline of additional information the ELP has gathered from former Seabrook employees which substantiates the need for a comprehensive, independent investigation of the plant 's const ruction, design, and documentation. The NRC does not have the resources necessary to undertake such an investigation itself. It should be noted that a number of former employees of Seabrook Station are willing to pass on information they have about safety probleas in the plant, but are reluctant to give their nanes or identifying data for fear of retribution and blackballing. This applies especially to people who are still involved with the nuclear industry. Many of them, however, are willing to cooperate with an independent investigation. They are aware of instances where the NRC has either inadvertently or deliberately compromised confidentiality of informants, but believe an independent body would not do so. It is the nature of the ELP that Information cones in bits and pieces, because informants come to the ELP one by one. However, each new informant has information which substantiates previous information, thus providing a picture of an unsafe plant and of an inadequate regulatory process. Only an independent investigation can dispell that picture. 1
1 1 4 A. Statement of a welder and pipefitter, assigned to weld pipes using a process for which he was not properly trained. Believes welds in the 4 service water lines are suspect, and can specifically identify three welds l he knows are bad. B. Review of NRC Report No. 50-443/84-12' by alleger: Dravo shop welds in the turbine building were defective and uncorrected. Calls into question the vendor quality assurance program. C. A Pullman-Higgins welder's affidavit states inadequacies in welding and pipe work were comon. Welds weren't properly identified, weld inspections were inadequate, and training for welders was inadequate. Many welds were done without preheating, creating porosity in the welds. Installation mistakes occurred because blueprints were frequently incorrect. Thousands of arc strikes occurred. Pipe and pipe supports were assembled using the wrong materials: when the proper material couldn't be located according to the required nunter, other sterial would be used after the identification number was ground out and te scribed. Sledgehammers and come-alongs were used to force pipes into place. D. The four primary coolant pumps were not installed according to design, possibly causing stress on the welds at the reactor and the pumps. Although the engineers accepted the situation "as built" and the imC says this is not a problem, an unbiased, second opinion is in order. E. A former Perini employee who workea in the document control department states blueprints were not updated, co-workers were untrained, didn't know how to read blueprints, and put incorrect numbers on blueprints. A quality assurance person in charge of CAD welding for containment appeared to be always drunk, and consistently reported incorrect figures. F. A former laborer says b1Leprints did not mtch the as-built plant, and blueprints were destroyed in the blueprint room. G. A former ironworker states in an affidavit that work done by I inexperienced " permit" workers frequently had to be redone. He saw concrete poured when the temperature was too low, creating a cold seam. Blueprints were very difficult to interpret. Design problems and inexperienced workers led to serious cost overruns. H. An anonymous letter received by the ELP in April, 1987, deals with current training on how to report problems and asks the question: If NYH employees are only now receiving this training, does this inply that they ' have not, all along, been knowledgeable about how to correctly report problems? I. A former inspector states there were an exceptionally large number of
" accept-as-is" engineering dispositions to change the plant 's design to reflect what had been built, particularly toward the end of construction.
He believes this was to speed up construction and to save money. He saw cracks in the equipment vault leaking water. He believes there is exposed
, rebar in the cooling tunnels, and the tunnels have voids in the concrete, and places where the concrete is too thin. A quality assurance inspector believes the core barrel is cracked.
2
4 J. Phone conversations with four former Quality Assurance engineers , revealed: 1. Problems with document traceability, installation of improper hardware, lack of weld safety, inability to trace materials back to vendors, and harassment when raising safety questions. 2. People hired to inspect work they had performed, large numbers of Nonconformance Reports voided when procedures were rewritten to accept the nonconforming condition, materials traceability problem, and equipment renumbered to conform to specifications. 3. Inspector forced by a supervisor to cancel a Non-Conformance Report on a procedural violation. 4. All large bore pipe welds may be welded beyond the pipe thickness eximum, improperly certified welds, poor quality assurance. 5. A former UE&C manager knows of massive destruction and theft of documents during the 1984 Reduction In Force. K. An anonymous phone call to the ELP from a former carpenter revealed inproper gauge sheetmetal in the air conditioning system of the equipment vault and containment; wracking of the Waste Process Building during hot functional tests due to use of improper guage of structural steel in the main skeleton; flooding of an emergency cooling punp which was never stripped and cleaned; inproper construction of conponents of motors for circulating emergency cooling water which was never corrected; the cooling tower concrete was poured in two layers, and the layers are not structurally attached to each other; a weld rejected by an inspector was pencilled in 'with graphite by the welder and then passed inspection. L. A former carpenter states there was an incident of cold pulling in the middleof}983. M. A former carpenter knows of a two-by-four board left in the missile shield of Unit I containment after concrete was poured.. 3
A. POOR SERVICE WATER PIPE WELDS In 1980, I was trained at the United Engineering School of Welding. This was l an off site training center manned by union personnel and funded by UE&C. It's purpose was to train and familiarize welders with certain pipe welding and fit-up procedures; from there individuals would go to the Seabrook Station's welding test shop and be certified for their particular veld procedures. At that time UE&C and Pullman-Higgins had expressed their concerns over the local union's failure to u.eet their present personnel quota for production demands. It was necessary then to qualify as many welders as possible to meet , desired production mildstones. l The standard pipe test was a six inch schedule 80 carbon steel coupon, which , I was to be fitted with a six inch carton steel Kellogg insert. The " weld-out" ' ! was a shielded tungsten ine.rt gas root-pass followed by a 7018 manual stick l filler veld-out. After two attempts at this particular procedure, I was certified to weld all carbon steel standard pipe vall. I remained on first shift for approximately one week, where I received a vague and rather confusing indoctrination. I was then transferred to second shift ehere I was assigned to the service water pipe grew;. I was designated'a l fitter and assigned to my first 24 inch carbon steel standard wall pipe. This was the first exposure I ever had had with large diame,te.rtpipe. We service water joints were fitted together with a factory installed carbon steel backing ring. I had never encountered this particular fit-up procedure before and therefore had no idea how to weld it,but the apparent difficulties where irmdiately obvious. We fitted ends had serious mi snatch in both the high-low (the outside diameters of the two fitted spool pieces) and the factory installed. backing ring. The sidewalls of the fitted pipes could be made to conform by the utilization of pipe alignment clamps. These clamps could be fastened around the pipes and the screw-dogs tightened into position. The fitter would then attempt to force the mismatch into synnetry by wrenching pressure to specific screw-dogs. Zf this were accomplished, the velder would then be instructed to place his tack-welds over the mismatch of the backing ring. This was in an effort to keep the pipe-joint in fit-up specifications and Quality Assurance parameters. It was sometimes necessary to concentrate tack-welds in many areas in order to achieve this. If the " fit-up and tack" inspection passed, the next difficulty came in eelding-out the excessive gaps created during the fit-up on the backing ring.
"Pennit velders" having less experience would always be assigned the worst side of the veld by their foreman while more experienced union welders always knew what side to take first. Attempting to weld gaps like these usually required a welding technique known as " bridge welding". 21s usually resulted in " burn-through" of the backing ring, ano slag entrapment between the root-pass and the backing ring.
POOR SERlf7CE WATER PXPE hTim - Continued e Another serious probim was condensate in the piping itself. There is a deleterious effect on the 7018 filler metal when it emes in contact with moisture. It produces a porosity in the deposited metal which usually penetrates through the entire area of the exposed root. 'Ihe condensation was created by the warm air, caused by welding, coming in contact with the cold surface of the interior pipe wall. This temperature differential was created by one area of the pipe being sheltered while the remaining pipe was expoced g to the ambient outside air temperature. 'Ihe porosity was usually encountered at the botta of the pipe, where the condensate would generally concentrate.- 'Ihe porosity would normally present itself through the root and hot-pass of this area but generally the fill-pass would deposit enough metal to cover it. Frm these observations, it is my opinion that these welds are extreely suspect and should be categorically reviewed. O t
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- 11. Allegation - Turbine Building Pipina Shop Weld Defect Inspection No. 84-12 "While working in Turbine Building No. 1, the crew received many l l prefabricated sections of welded pipe made by Dravo. Many times the
! joints did not meet ASME codes. l One May 11, 1982, I was assisting another welder on line EX-412s-01-Rev.1, field veld No. 108, a 10" weld outlet (WOL) off a 24" carbon steel line, when I noticed a Dravo shop veld defect. Informed the Quality Assurance Inspector about a one-inch lack of fusion zone on the interior of the root pass. However, I was told "A Dravo shop veld is not our concern". 11.4 Findings - l The radiograph taken to supplement the ultrasonic evaluation exhibited one 5/16" long indication which did not correspond to the root pass
.4 interiore. surface.
11.5 Conclusion 1 The disposition of the 5/16" radiographic indication is an unresolved item pending licensee evaluation (50-443/84-12-2). i
.. the 5/16" long radiographic indication exceeds the ANSI B31.1 standard allowable was linear indication length of 1/4" that would apply if fradiography required." i RESPONSE 70 NRC FINDItCS_:
The interpretation of the radiograph is incorrect. The defect was on the interior of the root pass. 'Ihis inconsistency with radiograph iriterpretations is indicative to the same renderings given on the steam generator nozzles. Giving support to the theory that most radiographic renderings are a matter of interpretation subject to experience. In Report No. Q-1-84-020, I also mentioned that Brian Kennedy, a Pullman-Higgins QA Inspector, informed me that a Travo shop weld was not their concern and I did not have to worry about it. The NRC has made no mention as to whether an interview was conducted with Brian Kennedy in regards to his attitude t.owards other related material other than Pullman-Higgin's.
.I also observed a number of improper welds f abricated b) Dravo manufacturers, vath excessive mismat.ch in the radioactive tunnel. I made management aware of these infractions, but the attitude was the same as above "a Dravo weld is not our concern".
! C AFFIDAVIT I am a former employee of Pullman Higgins at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant, and after being duly sworn, state as follows:
- 1. I am 24 years old and have been a resident of New Hampshire most of my life.
- 2. In 1980, I entered.a 12 week welding course, known to be one of the best in the nation, and learned the welding trade. !
- 3. I was hired by Pullman Higgins on or about July of '
19E2 and worked for PH at the Seabrook Plant until about April of 1985 except for the layoffs during that time, which totalled about three months.
- 4. I worked under PH which had the piping contract for the plant until a short time after United Engineers had begun to replace PH. My job responsibilities included welding pipes and pipe suoports, working in pipe support fabrication, and j preparing piping systems for welding. I l
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- 5. It was a common everyday occurrence to see l inadequacies in the piping and welding work around me. I worked in every part of the plant, Unit I and Unit II.
6." One inadequacy that seemed to be rampant was that although pipes were supposed to be capped off when left overnight, or as unfinished work in progress, .they were very often not capped at all. All kinds of debris was left in the pipes. On one occasion, a very large pipe wrench was left in a pipe in the waste treatment building. The horizontal pipes which are open ended became a place for workers to rest things end place things, sometimes their own personal articles, sometimes debris. The debris would consist of wood, tools, ; clothing, and the pipes that were supposed to be capped off I would just be open. Often the tradesmen would simply forget that something was left in the pipes when the joints were j 1 welded and some tradesmen would put matter in the pipes ! blatantly because of that "this job sucks" attitude which I 3 can't emphasize enough was an overwhelming attitude throughout the plant, j
- 7. Underlying the entire attitude of nearly all of the !
men was the feeling "I just don't give a damn. I don't c a'r e . i This job sucks." Nobody was happy with their job because you j wete constantly running scared. "Here come the gold hats" everybody would always say. People were getting fired every . day and we were being pushed without anybody paying attention l to whether we were being conscientious and trying to do a good job. Nobody cared. We were handled poorly. Tne idea that we were working on a nuclear power plant got lost in the shuffle and instead, the work crews developed a feeling of being pushed around by the supervisors and the foremen, and ultimately began to ignore all the safety requirements and procedures. They just didn't care. ' i
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- 8. For instance, 2 witnessed several laborers on cement crews literally throw debris into the cement as it was being poured around containment II. I am not an experft on cement, but I would assume that this would not be a good occurrence in the foundation of the the nuclear reactor building, because in my mind, debris makes voids and leads to cracks. j l
- 9. Pipes would be rusty and pitted on the inside wall of j the pipes, some extremely bad, and they were used anyway, i Welds were not painted to preserve them. It was common to see !
unpainted rusty welds with welder's stencils not even etched l into the weld area for ID. On one occasion, another welder ' told me that he was told to go etch his stencil on welds he didn't do. The welder refused.
- 10. All over the plant one would see hold tags placed on j machinery for various reasons. If something wasn't going'as l planned on the design, it would be put on hold. There were .
hundreds of NCR's (Nonconformance reports) written up on l Systems that were installed incorrectly that didn't meet ASME codes. The NCR's were written on those mistakes that inspectors were lucky enough to see. A lot of times, the workers would force things, to "make them right" to avoid an NCR. I ! l l 11. On many occasions,~oad welds would be covered up by l l being welded over. Whatever reason for the bad weld was, the i basic attitude of a lot of welders was "to hell with it, who I will ever know, this weld will never break" I can say I did not 1 meet but a hand full of welders at Seabrook that had adequate ! experience and knowledge of metallurgy. These workers with 1 that "to hell with it" attitude, obviously didn't because bad welds do in fact break.
- 12. Many of my co-workers didn't have the faintest idea !
how to read blueprints which led to location mistakes in the { piping installations and hanger installations. l
- 13. Blueprints were wrong at times. They would show incorrect systems, in that when a blueprint called for an installation of a system in the designated area, we would go to this area and there would be various other systems already i there, resulting in drastic changes.
)
- 14. Out in front of the Seabrook gate local 131 Pipe Fitters ran a welding school which I went to for two and a half ;
weeks. A lot of the people in there ware friends and family members of the union supervisors and " higher ups". Often these people had no prior welding experience whatsoever, and they would just put them through th. program at times when there was a high demand for welders. It is impossible to become a good welder in the amount of time that the school gave them to
" pass" the test. ;
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- 15. On one occasion, I witnessed a welder welding stainless steel when he hadn't been qualified to do so because his buddy took off for awhile and told this guy to finish the job. The unqualified welder finished the job and etched the qualified welder's stencil on it, and later said "nobody will know, it was damned good practice for me.".
- 16. One event that I thought was very significant was that a crane operator, operating a cherry picker was rigging a heavy valve inside containment I at ground level. He obviously was doing something wrong in ' operating the crane because the weight of the valve was too much and the crane and the valve tipped over with a loud bang. Big Wigs were up at the plant for quite a long time checking for damage. I heard nothing more about it. I wonder where that valve is located now.
- 17. I was familiar with a few of the welding inspectors who would regularly be high on pot. Believe me, the inspector is the bottom line. He is the one who says "yes" or "no".
There was an unbelievable amount of favoritism among inspectors i and welders. If they had an attitude about you, like they i didn't like you, they would make it very hard for you. Shoot your welds down constantly, but if you had a name and . inspectors liked you, they wouldn't even look at the weld. l They would just ask for the weld slip, sign it and leave. This would lead to frustration and anger. 18t I could go on for quite some time about drug abuse at the plant. I would just say that workers regularly had been drinking or under the influence of just about anything you could think of. At the same time, all of these substances were l readily available for sale. There was no problem getting any kind of drug.
- 19. To illustrate the attitude of the workers I on one occasion saw a laborer urinating down a riser pipe that was uncapped. That particular riser pipe went uncapped for many days.
l
- 20. There were literally thousands upon thousands of are strikes on pipes. In the areas where I worked, pipes would be lined with them. Some of the are strikes were enormous, some were small, but whatever the size, they are not healthy for metal, especially pipes carrying substances. An arc striks occurs when a welding rod, which is attached to its holder, touches the metal surface for a brief moment. No Welding occurs, just a touch to the metal with a rod. This leaves pits in the metal surface and these pits can be very deep. It fractures the metal. If workers had to clean up all arc strikes at the plant it would take a year or more.
- 21. Sometimes welders would make a mistake, cause an arc strike, and the pipe fitter would grind it out. Since the arc strikes go deep in the metal, they would grind below the minimum wall thickness of the pipe and then the welder would clad weld on the low spc: to build it up and the pipe fitter or welder would then grind it down smooth.
- 22. I remember myself and several people working rid,iculously long hours being extremely burnt out, but still pushing on because we were basically forced to work these long overtime hours or there was the reality of being fired. You either accepted the overtime demands of the foremen or you were 'out the gate" as we would call it. This was a big reason for the "this job sucks" attitude that was so prevalent. There was a serious degeneration in the morale throughout the plant and the supervisors failed to correct it.
- 23. Workers would have a hard time finding correct materials (steel) for a certain hanger (pipe support). The ISO had a bill of materials on it. These gave sizes and descriptions of metals to be used on that particular hanger and also traceability numbers which was the ID number on the metal. If a worker couldn't find the correct metal and numbers, they would take other metal, cut it to the correct size, grind off that metal ID number and then airscribe on the hanger the correct ID for the hanger to be installed.
- 24. A lot of times when we were putting piping together, the " isometric sheets" (blueprints) would tell us the materials needed. If we couldn't find the " traceability numbers
- which were scribed on the materials, we would just find another piece of material, grind off the numbers and rescribe the correct traceability numbers. I talked with other people who had done this. I myself did it seven or eight times. We had to in order to get the job done. Sometimes the foreman gave the okay to do so..
- 25. One problem with the piping that was rampant was that it was always out of plumb. This makes it difficult to get a good weld with an even gap for proper penetration and an ability to fit up the weld, do the root pass, do the hot pass and do the final weld as many joints required. Sometimes the gaps because of the cocked ends would be enormous. On many
( other occasions where the pipes didn't match up, we would literally use sledgehammers or comealongs to bring the ends i together, causing the pipes to be under great stress at the moment they were tacked and welded, and leaving these stress . patterns in the welded joint. l
- 26. It was a very common fact that many welds which I witnessed, were welded wet. This means that no preheat was used on the material before being welded. Welding wet metal creates porousity in the weld and is not a proper nor adequate procedure. porousity is a hole or holes in the weld that go deep in the weld, usually appearing throughout the entire weld from top to bottom. I
- 27. About the time that United Engineering was appearing on the scene, the pullman Higgins crew that I was on was no longer allowed to do ASME welds. We could just do the B-31.1 welds. I believe that the same condition existed throughout 1 4-1
the rest of the plant and I assume that this happened because PH was doing such a poor job. There was friction between PH and UENC, each trying to put the blame on the other during the transition period and from my own viewpoint, I didn't see that UENC did any better or safer job, nor did they develop a better attitude among the tradesmen.
- 28. The welding rod room had PH employees both young and old who seemed to always be confused about their job gesponsibilties. It seemed there would be confusion among the rod room personnel when there were 50 welders hanging around outside waiting for their paperwork to go do their job. I would take paperwork that wasn't even completed back to my job area only to be informed of the inadequacy and then having to
! go back to the rod room to have it straightened out. Most times it wasn't. There were alsc times when I would go to the god room with a slip for a certain job, the rod room personnel would say they didn't have the paperwork for it, it would have ! been lost or whatever. All these occurrences would happen daily, sometimes several times a day.
- 29. ,In the rod room, PH employed people to handle the I
paperwork, and the union provided a Pipe Fitter for dispensation of welding rod into the welder's portable oven. On many occasions, I saw paperwork people handing welding rod into the, ovens. I ' On my oath _(f' pi STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ROCKINGHAM, SS November C , 1986 On this 6th day of November, personally appeared before me, the undersigned officer, the aoove referred person, who after being duly sworn subscribed the above Afffidavit "On my oath" and stated that the above allegations in fact were true to the best of his knowledge and belief. ( h fr ._ Nc gry run1;c/Just1de of the Peac 5 l-- v i
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';5 has asked me to write you to explain my sketch of the as-built condition of the primary loop system at Seabrook Station.
I l All the components of this system, which includes the Reactor, four Steam Generators and four Primary Coolant ' ' Pumps, were initially set to a tolerance of 0.001" (one thousandth of one inch). All the connecting piping was pre-heated before any welding was done. This was done to assure that there was no stress in the entire system. Due to a misinterpretation in measuring the lengths of pipe leading from the reactor to the steam generators i and pumps, the column bases were set 3/4" further from the reactor than design had called for. ! l When the cross-over piping was installed, the pipe was l found to be too close to one of the pump columns. The I space was less than one inch where six inches of inau- i lation had to be installed. ' l The decision was made to move the offending leg six inches installed. toward the reactor to allow the insulation to be This is the case with all four pumps. As you can see in my sketch, when the pumps are installed ! according to design, the pipe from the reactor expands i i when hot approximately two inches and the pumps rise 3 ! uniformly about 0.008',' causing no stress on the system. l i
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In the as-built condition, however, the rear legs of the pump cause a rise of about 0.015" while the front leg (column) lowers the pump approximately 0.036" making a total difference of about 0.051". This would tend to make the pipe leading to the reactor deflect (bend) approximately 1/8" (0.125"). Since this pipe is quite rigid, most of the stress would, I believe, fall on the welds at the pump and the reactor. This condition would also cause a slight twist in the cross-over piping. While I was at Seabrook I discussed this situation with several of the engineers and since that time 1 have talked with the NRC inspector. All of these people have told me that this was not a problem. While they are probably correct, I feel that an unbiased second opinion may be in order. I hope this explains the sketch satisfactorily but if there are further questions, please feel free to let me know. sinn.. 3.. _er' T ( csys ces .. 1 6
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i AFFIDAVIT OF -. __ i 1 was employed as a laborer by Perini from March 23, 1982 through the April 1984 layoff. I 1 am currently . l t My date of birth is October 22, 1959. I currently reside at J l From through , I was on active duty in the Navey; and from to I was in the active reserves. I received an honorable discharge i from the Navy. i 1 1 When I got out of the military, I went to the local Union Hall in ! Portsmouth and was signed on by Perini. To obtain my job, I gave $100 to
]
the Union steward through a third party. j From the time I began at the plant on March 23, 1982 through September i 1982, I had a good foreman who worked us hard and kept the crew pretty busy. There were people on the crew who smoked pot at lunch. We were working on the Containment 2 area, preparing it for concrete pours. That foreman was good and clean. He was an exception. ; Whem that foreman left, a person about 34 took over who could not control ! the crew. We went to the No. 2 turbine building to assist in pours and to do bushing. We also did general labor work. Two members of my crew got caught smoking pot during that period of time and were' fired for that reason. We did not have very much work to do on that job, and we were advised to pick up buckets full of wires, pouc them out again, and pick them up again just to look busy. There were alot more people working in that area than were needed. There seemed to be at least twice as many than were needed. When we were there, you could smoke a joint or drink on the job. A number of people drank at lunch. At that time, I saw people take coke and valium on the job. A number of the iron workers got stoned. I saw lots of people drinking alot. Right before Christmas , alot of people got layed off. Around Christmas 1982, most of the people working on Containment 2 were layed off or transferred over to Unit 1. I was transferred to Unit 1. I went to work in a waste process building. Again, in the waste process building, there were many more people than were needed to do the work. I saw a number of pipefitters stoned and doing lines of cocaine on the job. They did this prior to working on the pipes. Also, they did it during their breaks while they were working. They were not the only workers that I observed dfoing drugs. I also saw welders, carpenters, and laborers drunk and stoned on the job. I have a very vivid memory of one inspector for UE6C who was drunk a good percentage of the time, and I also observed him smoking grass. I saw him coming back from lunch totally drunk
Affidavit of Page 2 on a number of occasions. Also, on a number of occasions he was drunk when he did inspections. My observations of this inspector were in 1983 and 1984. In approximately January or February of 1984, he was fired, and I had observed his drinking and drug use for 6 or 8 months. I do not believe he was fired for drug or alcohol use, but for timeliness with regard to reporting to work. A friend of mine, who is an inspector for UE6C, told ne that the company got bonuses if the inspectors put their signature on inspections to say that everything was all right. Beca.use of the situation, the supervisor pressured them to put their names on the line even if it was not all right and had not been done by the book. They were encouraged to cut corners to get by. It is my understanding from my friend that this was across the board with regard to Perini inspectors at least. to Perini. I am not sure if the bonus went to UE&C or I believe that at least fifty percent (50%) of the people on site used drugs and alcohol. It was the norm to drink at lunch or at work. The inspector (the one who told me about the bonuses) also advised me that at one time he worked second shift in the blue print room. When revi-sions to the blueprints came through, sometimes a group of them had been sitting around smoking pot and were really stoned. They did not want to bother with the revised blueprints so they would throw the revised blueprints into the shredder; then, if they were called on it, they would say they never got them. A data processor told me that the blueprints were really screwed up. To sub-stantiate that further et one time I was working second shift as a laborer. i ' 1 was asked to go out with three electrical engineers to dig up an electrical manhole. The manhole cover was supposed to be on the northerly side of the No. 1 turbine. There was a blueprint shack just opposite the No. 2 turbine on the northerly side also. I went down with the three electrical engineers and dug for three hours. The engineers kept going back and checking the blueprints and telling me to dig in another place. We never did find the manhole cover. In fact, after three hours, they called in a consulting engineer, and I dug for another hour. Finally, they gave up and hoped it would be fc ad on a later shift. I dug holes in an area that was at least 10' x 20' in size. It may have been larger, but it has been awhile; so, I am not exactly certain. I saw people dealing coke and marijuana on site. I only saw someone on my crew bring in acid one time. In the Fall of 1982 when I was working on the No. 2 turbine, one guy on our crew brought in some little blue pills. He took some of the pills before lunch, and then, he went out and drank at lunch. When I came back, he could not talk or walk. We had him lay down and tried to make him rest so he would not hurt himself. We also were worried that the supervisor might see him.
~ i l Affidavit l i Page 3 , On the first day of safety indoctrination 1982, we were told that the I quickest way to get fired was to take the cover off the water cooler because j in the past people had urinated and defecated in them. After that. I would ! never drink out of a cooler unless it was in a really well lit open area. As a laborer, I had to go around and clean up a number of areas. I frequently smelled urine in the dark areas and also occasionally ran into , human excrement. It was very common to throw garbage from your lunch any- i where and everywhere'on the site. ! Fifty percent of the people working on the site at least are not from f the New Hampshire area. 1 When I was at the waste process plant, my forenan who had previously I been a supervisor offered me a drink and once took me to lunch at the South Seas. He drank constantly at lunch and was frequently drunk on the job. 1 Frequently I worked overtime. ! We did not work overtime because there l was alot of work to do and we really generally stood around most of the time we were at work on overtime and did nothing. Obviously, this boredom l created more of an incentive for people to smoke grass and drink on the job j site. Alot of times when we worked overtime we weren't assigned to our regular
- foreman nor were we in our normal area. The attitude seemed to be i sort of devil-may-care and nobody really cared about doing anything. l There was alot of drug and alcohol abuse on overtime. ,
t i I once saw eight carpenters build a ladder about 20' long. It took I j eight people a whole day to build that ladder. It was just a temporary ladder. I was assigned to tend them and of course I didn't have to do 1 anything 'cause they weren't doing anything either. ! One shift with overtime I remember reading a book and completing an i entire book during my work hours. I remember one shift when I was I assigned to ten carpenters on overtime for two hours, all of us stretching i out and just sleeping for that period of time. We were of course paid time I and a half for our efforts. i Alot of time on regular shifts we all just stood around day dreaming, waiting till the shift was over. We received good pay. We got $10.00 an 1 hour for unskilled labor, $15.00 an hour for overtime and $20.00 an hour on Sundays. They didn't give out Sundays too often, but when they did, nobody did anything on Sundays either. They tried to give overtime to people who put in their 40. I found a marijuana plant growing at No. 2 turbine. There was lots of theft. I 1 I
fidavic Page 4 l
With regard to the dogs, I saw dogs come in to the building. However, it was announced that the dogs were coming and when it was announced people i scattered all over the p1&ce and hid dope and coke and whatever. I never i saw the dogs find anything. 1 On the minus 31 level of the waste process building there are huge cracks all the way down the walls with something white seeping through. It might be sea water or salt. I'm not sure, but they came down on a number of occasions when I was there and bushed it out and patched them up.. This never seemed to solve the problem and the cracks would reappear. i 1 DATED:_ January 21 , 1987 II
)
STATE OF NEW llAMPSHIRE 'g i ROCKINGHAM, SS. J Oau , a u. Jl , 1987 Sub' scribed and sworn to, before me, L4 Al u < .t/ ,
~
Notary Riblic ' CYflTHIA N!X. Notary Pubue My Commission EVfacamion cxciten nya u, ,989
N AFFIDAVIT I, Michael T. Goodridge, under oath do depose and say as follows: '
- l. I live at 105 Perry Road, Salisbury, Massachusetts. I was employed at the Seabrook Station as an ironworker for five (5) years; for three (3) of those years I was in a supervisory position as a foreman. I worked for three (3) years laydown area.
in actual construction and for two (2) years in the ' I worked on all aspects of ironwork: reinfor-cement, structural erection ana welding.
- 2. I was hired in 1978 through the Ironworkers Local 474 out of Manchester, New Hampshire. At the time I had been a member of Local 351 in Lawrence, Massachusetts for five (5) years.
- 3. At the time I was hired, Local 474 only had a couple of hundred members. Since their membership was inadequate to supply the job at Seabrook, Local 351 out of Lawrence was contacted to supply workers. As a union member I was aware that even with recruiting members from other unions, Local 474 could not supply enough workers for the Seabrook Station job and that the contractor, with the agreement of the union, hired people who were not members of the union and had no construction experience. These workers were employed on " permits" at full journeyman's wages.
I
- 4. I was initially hired as a rodman to install reinforcing steel in the Waste Processing Building and at other locations on the site. My foreman was . After a few months I became a foreman and reported to the general fore-man, .
My crew worked primarily on the Cooling Tower but we also worked at various locations on the site hanging pre-fabricated cuttains. After approximately one and one-half (ll) years I went into structural ironwork, per-formitig all aspects including erection, decking, and detail work, including welding. After approximately four (d) months I became the foreman for the structural iron crew and remained in that position until I terminated my employment at Seabrook Station. As a foreman, I reported to the general > foreman on the site.
- 5. I always worked on the first snift. My crew often had to redo the reinforcing bar work which had been dene by the second and third shifts because these shifts contained the largest concentration of the inexperienced " permit" workers, and because there was little communication between the general foremen of the different shifts, and no communication between the foremen of the different shifts.
l Page 2
- 6. Either myself or a member of my cc-r would have to remain on l site while concrete was poured in order to correct any {
problems during the pouring, such ns reinforcing bars coming loose.
- 7. I saw concrete poured.when tim temperature was too low thereby creatino a cold saam.
- 8. I have personal knowledgs of raintorcing bars in th'e Cooling Tower that did not have concrete covering which mat the desiga specifications.
- 9. I have personal knowledge of reinforcing dowels in the !
Cooling Tower which were crooked or out of loca tion af ter the ) concrete was poured around them. This would necessitate a I non-conformance report being <;enerated and comatimos the correct ive action ta en would be t.o leave the covolc as built, or we were sometimes told ta bend tna doweln to make them fit. lu. The blueprints that x !' used wre very difficult to interpret even for people on the general fore.aan level. Thin was b,ecause tne print was inadequate and the blueprints store of a different ctyle than what many of the workers and foremen were accustomed to. Sometimes the foreman would get the engineers, the qaneral foreman or quality assurance personc to interpret the blueprints; e.ometimes the foreman would make his own deter.nination of what the blueprinte, meant.
- 11. My crew often experienced conflicts in attemptine to follow the clueprinta. For example, the prints would show sleeves which were cupposad to go in a particular location, but we would find tnat there was already somethinq else in that location. The <Meign conflicts led to cost overruns because the work had to oe stoppeJ while t. he .section was re-designed.
- 12. Several f actors would cont ribut e to cost overruns. For example, in the field, worker; would run into a problem following the blueprints or another design conflict. Using the i r knowl-edge f rom pa s t conat ruct ion work, tne worker would inform the quality assurance era.; or tne engineers how the problem could beat ba resolved. Work would ntop on that por-tion of the construction. A :ew day., to a few weeks later the engineer > would come back and tell the workers to go ahead and clo hat the worker >, had nuggested in the first place.
c. Page 3
- 13. I could not plan on a full day's work for my crew at Seabrook Station. Becauce of delays incurred in resolving design ;
conflicts or other problems, some crews had no work to do for ' several days at a time. The workers could not be hired and fired on a regular basis so they were just kept on payroll. ! In filling out time sheets, I sometimes had to make things up to say that certain work took longer than it actually did. This was a consistent problem at the Seabrook Station, which Perini had no incentive to remedy as they were hired on a cost-plus basis.
- 14. Another factor leading to cost overruns was the amount of work which had to be redone. For example, the Waste Processing Building had twenty-five (25) ton columns which l had to be replaced because the base plates at the bottom were l improperly installed. I
- 15. I saw drug and alcohol usage by workers on the site prac-
, tically every day. l l 16. It was common knowledge on the site that an inspector was l caught using the same x-ray on different welds. e Signed under the pains and penalties of perjury this 17th day of April, 1987.
/' '
(s By: Mt, af C , Michael T. Goo dridge " l COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS Essex, ss. April 17, 1987 i The personally appeared the above-named MICilAEL T. GOODRIDGE l and acknowledged the foregoing instrument to be his free act and ' deed, before me , i 9M. k"MA Notary Public My commission expires: i J
'3 T, DURING.THE PERIOD 04/02/87 THROUGH 04/09/87 PSNH/NHY EMPLOYEES PROCEDURE". RECEIVED TRAINING ON THE "NEW CORRECTIVE ACTION THE COURSE WAS TAUGHT BY ,
AND DEALT WITH THE VARIOUS TYPES OF FORMS TO USE TO REPORT DIFFERENT TYPES OF PROBLEMS. WHILE STRICTLY SPEAKING THE FORMAL " CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCEDURE" MAY BE NEW, MANY OF THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENT FORMS SUCH AS NONCONFORMANCE REPORTS, 10CFR21 REPORTS, AND WORK REQUESTS ARE NOT NEW. IF NHY EMPLOYEES ARE ONLY NOW RECEIVING THIS TRAINING, DOES THIS IMPLY THAT THEY HAVE NOT, ALL ALONG, BEEN KNOWLEDGEABLE ASQUT HOW TO CORRECTLY REPORT PROBLEMS? DID MR. VASSALLO OBSERVE, DURING THE COURSE, THAT THE EMPLOYEES WERE DEFICIENT WHEN THEY SHOULD BE USED, IN KNOWLEDGE OF THE VARIOUS FORMS, WHO SHOULD FILL THEM OUT? g p((h ' 64o 8 '5 L'$al Pcqject 4/o/t/ F I
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Anonymous , Interview With Former Painting Inspector g Seabrook Station by I the Employee's Legal Project
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- 1. He said engineers wrote Engineering Change Authorizations (ECAs) to change the design to fit was was already built He felt there were too mny ECAS written toward the end of construction, and believes there were an exceptionally large number of " accept as is" dispositions written at the i end of construction to speed up construction and to save money. At the end of contracts, for exanple, in instrumentation, there were a lot of design changes written to speed things up.
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- 2. He saw cracks in the equipment vault which were leaking water as late as 1986.
- 3. He said that in the tunnels there was exposed rebar, there were major l voids in the concrete, and some concrete was too thin. Hot salt water is i very corrosive, and he thinks this could be a problem. j
- 4. He said construction people frequently worked with outdated blueprints; this was a particular problem with Pullman-Higgins, the piping contractor.
He said a lot of engineers couldn't tell you where something was supposed to go.
- 5. There~was a lot of bulling around in the pipes. They always had come- I alongs and chainfalls around.
- 6. A quality assurance man in Pull mn-Higgins believed the core barrel was crcckeh. The QA person reported this to the company, and engineers responded to his concern, but the QA inspector was never satisfied that the i core barrel was not cracked.
- 7. United Engineers and Constructors put a lot of stress on inspectors, and New Hampshire Yankee people didn't think much inspection was required. If a quality control person was not satisfied with a disposition by an engineer, they could write a Request For Information (RFI), but it usually didn't go any further even if the OC person didn't understand or agree with the response to the RFI. Generally, no one went to the NRC, even if they were dissatisfied with a response to an RFI.
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T. Phone Conversations with Pour Forner Pullman-Higgins Quality Assurance Engineers by,the Employee's Legal Project i Because these engineers still work in the nuclear industry, they refuse to reveal their identities for fear of being blackballed.
- 1. A. In a number of instances, he could not locate purchase orders with the name of the aenufacturer and supplier, and believes no one was keeping very good track of purchase orders and other traceability documentation.
l L. Design requirements were changed after Nonconformance Reports (NCRs) l ' were filed. Improper hardware was installed, passed on, and subsequently, the inproper hardware became the standard. C. He is concerned about the use of galvanized steel in instrumentation and piping. Even when the galvanizing is ground off, he believes high levels of lead and zinc are left in the base material. Galvanized steel is unacceptable for ASME applications. l D. He was told by his supervisor that Class II and Class III supports did not have to neet ASME specifications. He could not find that assertion documented anywhere, and believes, based on that theory, that the welds at Seabrook Station are not certifiably safe. E. ASME Class I supports were installed inside the reactor vessel, somewhere near the reactor internals, and were faulty. The heat numbers on these supports were not recorded. F. When he raiseo issues which concerned him about the plant 's safety to the allegations organization, he received unsatisfactory responses, so did not bother to report other violations he saw to that organization. All of the probleas he encountered were docunented, although they were not resolved to his satisfaction.
- 2. A. Two men who had perforned electrical work at Seabrook Station for Fishback Electrical were subsequently hired by New Hampshire Yankee as Quality Assurance engineers to review work they had performed.
B. There was a process called "greylining" where procedures were rewritten after a Nonconformance Report was issued. The NCR was then voided. In 1986, there was an extraordinary number of NCRs voided. C. There was a materials traceability problem. Certain valves on the steam generator lacked the engraved manufacturer's number. D. United Engineers and Constructors engaged in a practice of renumbering equipaent to conform to specification. This practice was referred to as " cannibalizing the material," and also "retagging." He knows of at least 60 pieces of "retagged" equipnent in the Unit I deisel generator system. 1
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- 3. A. On one particular weld whose documentation he inspected, inspection procedure was violated. He wrote a Nonconformance Report on the violated procedure, but the Quality Assurance supervisor cancelled the NCR. This was ;
one of twenty to thirty procedural violations in weld inspections he I discovered. l l
- 4. A. In some cases some welders were instructed by NCR dispositions in l repair of large bore pipe to weld the pipes beyond their thickness naxinum.
He observed this himself, and also spoke with various people who had also , l noted this practice. This nay mean that all large bore pipe welds are welded beyond the pipe thickness maximum. B. In researching the documentation on this issue he was harrassed and ultimately fired. l C. He believes the entire Seabrook Project is filled with welds which are not properly certified. I I D. He is very concerned that Quality Assurance at Seabrook Station is l poor. For instance, he believes the Quality Assurance supervisor was inept. I He does not believe weld inspection requirements were adhered to, e l l
- 5. This person worked for United Engineers and Constructors in a managenent positi6n until 1984. During the major Reduction In Force in 1984, he knows nanagement people who worked in the offices were carrying boxes of '
documents offsite to their hones. People were also throwing documents away. This went on for at least a week, perhaps two, until management discovered the problem and searched the garbage in an attenpt to recover the docunents. He believes this would certainally create traceability problems. 2
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b Anonymous Phone conversation with Employee's Legal Project he caller was a carpenter at Seabrook Station from 1980 to June 1986. He observed the following problems:
- 1. The air conditioning system maintains the temperature in the equipment l vault and containment. There are four-by-six-foot ducts which start at -61 l elevation in the equipment vault and go to the roof of the Primary ;
Auxiliary Building. They provide cooling for all the buildings around the l containment building. It took six to seven months to install the ducts, and ! everything was sealed with silicon. Just as the very last bolt was sealed, l an engineer told the sheetmetal workers the wrong gauage of steel was used I for the ducts. It was never changed.
- 2. The Waste Process Building (the tank farm) stores chemicals like boron, etc., to control a reaction. November,1985, during the hot functional tests, the pressure in containment was brought up to 160 pounds per square i inch, and everything expanded. The tank farm building (about 100 feet by 150 feet) has walls of poured. concrete and steel. An inproper thickness of structural steel was used in the main skeleton. The building wracked about ,
eight inches (as if someone put their hands on opposite corners and ' twisted). They welded more plates of steel to the girders to reinforce it. During the test, you could see the pipes moving, and there was a lot of banging and popping.
- 3. In the D]uipment vault, at elevation -61, he and his partner were told l to put in a bulkhead at the bottom. There are three compartments, front, i middle, tnd back; three cells on one side, three on the other. In the southwest cell, at the very back, there is a $50,000 Westinghouse pump the size of a car. It is an emergency cooling pump. He and his partner were i told to build a bulkhead between the motor and the other two cells. This l was to separate the motor from the other two cells so when water was forced through the system to clean it, the notor would not get wet.
They built a watertight bulkhead, but someone forgot to close a sunphole in j the floor, which is a three-foot-by-eight-foot trough. That hole is ! connected to all cells, so when the system was flooded, so was the motor. i He worked in the equipment vault for six months after that incident, and although the mi11 wrights were supposed to strip and clean the motor,, they i never did, at least not in the six months thereafter.
- 4. In the Waste Process Building, at the bottom, there are three cells. 4 There is a two-and-a-half-foot diameter steel pipe which descends, does a )
90-degree turn, then runs flat. In the elbows of the pipe, there are GE or Westinghouse 200-horsepower motors to circulate cooling water. Were are { three such motors on sleds (two-and-a-half-foot by six-foot or eight-foot 1 flat heavy steel beds). The sleds are supported at six points on steel { springs. This is so when the pipe expands and pushes the motors' shafts down, the sleds collapse with the pipes' expansion. The sleds did not work , properly, and the shafts on all three motors were bent. The mi11 wrights l were supposed to replace the sleds, but never did. These motors, which will ; not run correctly if the shafts are bent, are critical cooling components.
- 5. When the cooling towers were completely built, it was discovered that '
the walls were not thick enough. Rather than chip off the concrete to 1 i _______________._______a
l j attach new rebar to the old rebar before pouring the additional layer of concrete, they used Hilte bolts (or shields). They drilled a hole in the concrete, and attached rebar to the bolts, so there are actually two ! separate walls. Structurally, they are not attached to each other, although to the naked eye you can't tell. q
- 6. During the cold functional test, all the lines were under eighty pounds -
of pressure. His partner was moving a ladder and accidently hit a small ; metal valve on a one-and-a-half-inch line. Water came sputting out. In the j
- twenty-five to thirty seconds it, took to close the valve, the place was teeming with supervisors and engineers. In thirty seconds, that one-and-a-half-inch line reduced the pressure in the system to twenty pounds. It was an unmarked valve; anyone could turn it. '
- 7. In the equipment vault, an inspector rejected a weld, telling the welder it was not properly done. The inspector told the welder to fix it and walked away. The welder took a graphite pencil and penciled in the weld.
When the inspector returned and examined the weld, he said, "Now that's ! what I call a good job." The pencil filled in the weld's porosity. Although j this incident occurred in 1982 or 1983, it so inpressed him that he could j point out the pipe and the exact weld, i l 1 i l i l 1 I I 2 A
L. Statement g Mike Herd, P.O. Box 494, Gloucester, Massachusetts , I was a carpenter at Seabrook Station from the Spring of 1981 to the Fall of 1982. During that time, I saw a 2 by 4 spreader which was left in the containment wall of the missile shield after the concrete was poured. The spreader was at the level of the roofline of the Puel Storage Building and slightly to the right facing the containment. (See sketch). I I i t l l l JW1
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h.' N. ' i April-17, 1987 My name is 1 esute at j , New Hanpshire. I worked as a carpenter at /Waurook station from June, i 1982 to December 1983. l I am not against nuclear power, nor am I opposed to the Seabrook nuclear plant. I am concerned about the plant 's piping. In the summer or fall of 1983, when I was working in the i Tirergency ventilation Area (elevation 21), a crew was caught
. stretching pipe in 'an area below elevation 21. I believe they q were working on the Main Steam Feed, West <
(nort hwsut azimuth). They had heated the pipe and stretched it using d come-along. < At the time, all the pipefitters and carpenters in the area were discussing the incident. The crew which was caught was fired,, i i with the exception of the gold hat responsible who wqe sn oken down to foreman (he had only been a gold hat one montth), :-ind one j i crew stretching. menber who had refused to participat e in the pipe ,-
' I am concerned about :nis incident because, before they were J caughti. this crew may have stretched other pipe. Were all the pipes this crew worked on rechecked? , ,
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'Ihe above information is true to the best of my knowledge.
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STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE Rockingham County Personally appeared the above named who swore that the above knowledge and belief statement , before is true me, and correct to the best of his i
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