ML20236G480
| ML20236G480 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/09/1987 |
| From: | Naidu K, Stone J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18041A154 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900219 NUDOCS 8708040280 | |
| Download: ML20236G480 (9) | |
Text
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ORGANIZATION: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA REPORT INSPECTION lhSPECTIOld N0.: 99900219/87-01 DATES: 05/12-14, 27-28/87 ON-SITE HOURS: 30 COhhtbFUhUthLL AbbHLdd: beheral t.lecir1c L,ompany Breaker Plant Operations ATTN:
P. J. Shaffer, General Manager 6901 Elmwood Avenue Philadelphia, Pennsyvlania 19162 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTACT:
J. Simpson TELEPHONE NUMBER:
215-726-2796 huCLEAR INDUSihY ACTIV11Y: Medium voltage circuit oreakers uno switcogear enclosures.
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ASSIGtjED INSPECTOR:
dh 7 cf / 57 K. R. Naidu, Program Development and Reactive Date Inspection Section (PDRIS)
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APPROVED BY:
Jam (A C. Stone, Chief, PDRIS, Vendor Inspection Branch Date INSPECTION BASES AND SCOPE:
A.
BASES:
10 CFR Part 21, Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.
B.
SCOPE: Obtain additional information on the 10 CFR Part 21 item reported by Arizona Nuclear Power Project, review corrective actions taken to resolve a 10 CFR Part 21 report on 4.16Kv circuit breaker and review the e
implementation of the QA program in selected areas.
~iLANTSITEAPPLICABILITY: Shoreham (50-322); P610 Verde (50-530).
i kokBO40280 97o7pg 99900h99 ENVCENE PDR
ORGANIZATION: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA j
REPORT INSPECTION NO.-
99900219/87-01 RFSUtTS:
PW 9 M 0 A.
VIOLATIONS:
j I
No violations were identified during this inspection.
B.
N0kCONFORMANCES:
C' Contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVIII and Section XVIII of the GE Breaker Plant Operations Quality Assurance Manual paragraph 3.2, quarterly process audits were not performed in areas other than Box Barrier Assembly and the manufacture of Rachet Wheels.
C.
UNRESOLVED ITEMS:
No unresolved items were identified during this inspection.
D.
INS?ECTION FINDINGS AND OTHER COMMENTS:
1.
Background Information General Electric Company (GE), Breaker Plant Operations (Bl0),
division manufactures medium voltage magna-blast circuit breakers (CB). Until approximately 1984, BP0 supplied CBs to GE, Burlington, Iowa for installation in metal clad switchgear cubicles. GE BurlinC'.on prepared Engineering Summary (ES) documents which listed all components assembled in the switchgear cubicle,s. These ESs were trvisferred to BP0 beginning of 1985. During the manufacture and supply of switchgear cubicles, when components were substituted due to inadequate environmental qualifications, ESs were revised; h> wever, the revised ESs were inadequately j
controlled. Obsolete copies of ESs were available at BP0 and appeared to have been used by Arizona Nuclear Power Project (ANPP) to order spare parts.
2.
Review of 10 CFR Part 21 Report On November S, 1565, Arizona Nuclear Power Project (ANPP), the owner of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) notified j
the NRC of a potential defect in the procurement of components j
/ rom the GE Switchgear Division in Philadelphia. Specifically, FVNGS identified that GE was processing their Class 1E purchase l
l orders (PO) for safety related Class 1E components as commercial j
[
grade components.
This potential defect was observed during an 1
audit contiucted by ANPP's agent, Bechtel Procurement Supplier Quality Department (PSQD) on October 16-17, 1965. ANPP took I
timely corrective action by withholding shipments of components 1
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l ORGANIZATION: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.-
99900219/S7-01 RESULTS:
PAGF 3 nf 4 _
1 to PVNGS as appropriate. During a followup audit conducted 1
during March, 1986, ANPP/PSQD determined that the incorrect P0 j
processing was attributed to GE neither meeting nor passing all the ANPP P0 requirements to participating subvendors. Tne results l
of a reaudit, performed in September 1986, by ANPP, indicated that GE neither implemented all the proposed corrective actions nor completed review of all ANPP spare parts pus prior to June 1985.
W The adverse findings identified by ANPP/PSQD audits and GE's.
l corrective actions to correct the adverse findings are as folif;ws:
a.
BP0 personnel in Marketing and Order entry were not familiar
?
in processing Class lE component orders. Additionally, the l
GE district office in Phoenix did not forward all the quality I
requirements to BP0; instead they translated ANPP P0s to internal " Requisitions" and forwarded only the " Requisitions" to BPO. During the preparation of " Requisitions," the quality requirements were not included.
To preclude repetition of the above, the district offices are now required to forward the customer P0s for nuclear applications to BPO. BP0 developed the following procedures:
QAI 108, Revision 1, dated September 16, 1986, titled, " Order Processing - BP0 Nuclear Switchgear Replacements." This procedure outlines the requirements to process safety-related spare parts. The BP0 shop orders for items for safety related applications which are manufactured by BP0 are prefixed with 1
903.
Additionally, the catalogue numbers for components procured from GE subsidiaries, are suffixed with 1E. The catalogue numbers for items procured from other thar. GE subsidiaries are prefixed with E.
Additional codes are used on purchase orders when Certificates of Compliance (CoC) l are required to certify that components meet the various i
applicable IEEE standards.
l QAI 109, Revision 2, dated May 20, 1987, titled, " Nuclear c
Related Material Quality Assurance Approval." This procedure establishes the requirements to ensure that material supplied to BP0 is suiteble for Class 1E application, including receipt inspection of procured Class lE material during which the components are inspected and verified to have CoCs.
i BP0 procedure 110 titled, " Training of Per sonnel Involved In Nuclear Orders" outlines the requirements to train those
i ORGANIZATION: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.-
99900719/87-01 RESulTS:
P AGr_.4, M Q individuals involved in processing nuclear orders, manufacturing, inspecting and testing safety-related components. Documentation i
on training is required to be maintained for 5 years.
Training records indicate that various personnel received I
training on the above procedures.
I i
b.
ANPP determined that some of the components supplied by GE did not have the proper certification. The following are the contributing causes:
1)
The personnel GE assigned to process ANPP P0s did not-have prior experience in processing Class 1E P0s.
2)
Personnel knowledgeable in these activities were not-in the review cycle.
3)
ANPP ordered some spares for circuit breakers which GE could not supply as Class lE items.
Instead, GE would furnish the spare parts as components for use in Class lE equipment. GE stated that individual comaonents in.
,j the 4.16kV circuit breaker (CB) or the switc1 gear cubicle I
were not qualified to IEEE 323 & 344 since GE qualified the entire CB or switchgear cubicle with the CB. Therefore,-
GE considers it appropriate to certify that the ordered cpare part was manufactured to the original drawings and therefore is suitable for use in Class lE equipment.
Due to the above, either CoCs were not specified in the P0s or were shipped to GE with the component and the CoCs were misplaced. Therefore, GE was unable to substantiate qualification on some of the components.
GE provided ANPP with a list for which GE could not substantiate qualification due to lack of documentation.
4)
GE did not respond in a timely manner to develop written procedures to correct adverse audit findings.
GE marketing had committed to ANPP that all ANPP PCs, including those P0s initiated by Bechtel Power Corporation, agent for ANPP, would be reviewed-to determine whether GE adequately conveyed the quality requirements to their subvendors. GE stated that due to delays in the transfer of dccuments from their Burlington plant to BP0 and manpower shortage, they were unable to meet the commitments in a timely manner.
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1 I
6 ORGANIZATION: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA REPOR1 INSPECTION.
NO.-
44000[19/87-Q RFMll TQ PW A nf o 5)
GE, while centralizing their computer files to improve-their efficiency, inadvertently deleted a prefix code that triggers a note in preparing a PC to r. subvendor to require compliance with appropriate IEEE standards.
c.
Corrective action taken by GE BPD appears to be adequate.
i BP0 has not experienced problems since they started sunplying renewal spare parts in 1985 for complete switchgear cubicless The spare parts intended for ANPP are in an access controlled crea. GE stated that ANPP intends to cancel the previous P0s
.I ard issue new P0s. Pending receipt of ANPPs new P0r, GE intends to hold the material at BPO.
3.
Review of Purchase =0rders The inspector reviewed two sets of P0s issued by ANPP that speci-I fied safety related co:nponents.
The first set, distinguished with a suffix F, was prepared by Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC) as an agent for ANFP. The second set, without a suffix was preparea by ANPP personnel. The inspector determined the following:
1 a.
The P0s required GE BP0 to supoly Class 1E components such i
as taedium voltage circuit breakers (CBs) and spare parts for CBs which are manufactured by GE BP0, and miscellaneous components such as relays, terminal blocks, etc. tMich are net manufactured by GE BPO. The terminology used in the P0sspecifying safety-related components appears to hcVe causeo some confusion. The GE BP0's distinction between
" Class 1E components" and " components for Class 1E use" was not conveyed to ANPP when the P0s were issued. The broad classification is discussed later in this paragraph.
b.
As indicated in the ANPP's final 50.65(e) report dated January 7.,1987, liarathon type short circuiting terminal boards (SCTB) were erroneously ordered in oro of the P0s.
SCTBs are exclusively psed to terminate current transformers, i
The error occurred because ESs were not kept current by GE Buritngton after matcrial was revised. For instance, ESs 0269A7315 and 0269A7316 prepared in 1977 list items 971 and 973 as Marathon SCTDs. On April 15, 1980, these two ESs were revised deleting items 971 and 973 and adding 991 and 993 specifying GE type SCTEs. Other ESs 269A 7311, 7312, 7313 and 7314 were not corrected to show that GE
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ORGANIZATION:. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 1
?
REPORT INSPECTION Nn.-
9090n?19/A7-n1 RF901TS*
par,F (; nf Q l
type SCTBs were furnished in the switchgear cui)icles instead of Marathon SCTBs. Marathon type SCTBs ere not qualified l
for safety-related use, j
BP0 supplies components that they manufacture under a controlled quality assurance program as Class lE componer.s. BP0 i;upplies procured commercial grade components as " qualified for Class lE use," after verification as described below.
s c.
In summary, the components ordered can be broadly classified as follows:
1)
Items manufactured at GE BP0 censisting of CBs, replacement spare components for CBs and stationary switchgear cubicles GE supplies CBs as Class 1E components and spare parts as I
l
" qualified for Class 1E use." The GE certification l
methodology is discussed in paragraph 4.
2)
Items which BP0 purchases from other GE plants. For example, GE Neter & Control Business Department supplies i
relays, terminal boards and switches. GE Sommersworth, i
located in New Hampshire, supplies current transformers.
l GE Nuclear Energy Business Operations (NEBO), San Jose, y
California, supplies items such as low voltage molded case CBs, push buttons and transducers. Devices which are received with a serialized number are supplied as Class 1E devices. Other components are supplied as " qualified for l
Class 1E use."
l 3)
GE purchases relays and other equipment manufactured by Agastat, Brown Boveri and Westinghouse. GE requires CoCs a
for these items. Some of the manufacturers serialize their caponents and reference the serial number in the CoC. GE supplies these components as Class lE with CoCs j
to certify that they meet tie relevant IEEE standards if I
applicable.
l 4.
GE Certification Methodology for Spare Parts GE BP0 manufactures spare parts in accordance with drawings originally used to manufacture the part. The spare part can consist of an individual part or an assembly of a spare part and a Class lE component. The following are typical examples.
l l.
1 l
i
.o ORGANIZATION: GEFERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
' PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA J
1 REPORT INSPECTION NO.*
94900?'9/A7-01 RFStH TS-PMW 7 nf 4 a.
Auxiliary switch and plunger assembly identified as part number 6353570G012. GE certifies this part as " Qualified for Class 1E 4
use" component.
Thi.-
= ment consists of an auxiliary switch assembled on a plunger as' embly in such a rianner that when the s
CB operates, the plunger changes the state of the auxiliary switch contacts. The plunger assembly is manufactured by~BP0
(
in accordance with original design drawing and is considered a commercial grade component. The auxiliary switch is procured as a Class 1E component. After assenbling the plunger mechanism and the auxiliary switch, GE designates the entire assembly as-
" Qualified for Class 1E use."
b.
Rear Busing part number 0845D0124G01.. This component is one of the three rear primary disconnect bushings. BP0 manufactures this component as a commercial grade component and certifies it " Qualified for Class 1E Use," based on the premisis that it was manufactured to same requirements as the component which was installed a the switchgear which su::cessfully withstood the IEEE 323 & 344 qualifications.
c.
Position Switch Operator (PS0) part number 0168C3344 group 002.
This component is a welded assembly which actuates a switch.
The function of the switch is to indicate whether the CB is connected or disconnected to the busbar. BP0 considers this component as a commercial. grade item and certifies that it is qualified for Class 1E use because it is manufactured in accordance with a drawing that was originally used.to make a similar component. The similar component was used in the switchgear assembly which successfully withstood the seismic qualification.
5.
Review of 10 CFR Part 21 Report On February 19, 1987, GE BPO notified the NRC that a AM-4.16-250-9HB type circuit breaker (CB) failed to trip electrically at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, owned by Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO). The plant was in mode 5 (cold shut down). The CB powered a
the "D" RHR pump motor and did not trip during surveillance testing.
The CB had to be manually tripped to stop the pump motor.
LILCO reported this matter as an abnormal occurrence on February 10, 1967.
A weld failure in the trip crank was the cause of the failure of the CB to trip, The trip crank, identified as-105C9316 group one is a linkage component between the~ armature of the shunt trip solenoid coil and the CB trip latch. The weld that secures a pin to the trip crank failed. With this weld broken, the CB cannot be
- o 4
ORGANIZATION: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA REPORT RF9t?t TS r parJ R nf 0 INSPECTION Nn.'
QQQnn71Q/R7-n1 electrically tripped and has to be manually triaped. LILC0 removed the CS from service, disassembled the trip cranc and sent it to GE i
Philadelphia. On March 3 and 11, 1987, GE sent 4 and 10 spart trip l
cranks respectively to Shoreham.
On February 11, 1987, a GE service representative visited Shoreham and confirmed that the CB could not-be electrically tripped. The failed CB was identified to be serial
(
number 256A4664-012 and was manufactured in 1975 at BP0. GE devised i
a go-no-go test procedure (TP) to inspect the integrity of the trip crank without disassembling the breaker. On March 9, 1987, the TP i
was implemented at Shoreham to inspect the CBs.
Eight of the remaining 85 CBs were judged to fail the go-no-go test criteria of the TP were returned to GE BPO.
It should be noted that failure of i
the test criteria does not necessarily indicate that the weld failed.
I Three of the eight trip cranks returned from Shoreham were subjected to 10,000 cycles of operation without failure. The TP was implemented at Turkey Point nuclear power station and no trip cranks were j
rejected.
BP0 consulted a metallurgist to analyze the part failure. Fre-q liminary results indicated that the failed trip crank was observed to be bent in a direction other than the direction of the load.
GE does not consider the single failure at Shoreham a generic issue and does not plan to issue a Service /.dvisory Letter at this time.
GE plans to inspect an additional 100 CBs. GE proposed to inspect the CBs at Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant in the near future.
GE BP0 stated that in 1986, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) contacted them on similar problems in their 4kV switchgear installed at Watts Bar nuclear power plant. BPO sent TVA 17 trip cranks.
BP0 did not receive the replaced trip cranks from TVA and therefore could not determine.whether there was a problem at Watts Bar.
l 1
6.
Review of QA Program Implementation q
The implementation of the QA program at BP0 was verified in the l
following areas:
a.
A plant tour of the manufacture of CBs and switchgear cubicle assembly indicated that:
1)
Parts were controlled and stored in bins which were adequately identified.
3 2)
The calibration of test equipment was current.
,w,..:
a 4
ORGANIZATION: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PHILADELPHIA PENNSYLVANIA-1 1
I I
REPORT INSPECTION NO.!
99900719187-01 RESul TS
- Ptt,F 4 nf Q i
3)
Material for Class lE use were stored in an access I
controlled room.
4)
M&terial intended for ANPP were stored in an access controlled enclosure.
d E)
In-process inspections were being conducted as required.
l b.
Discussions with marketing and buyers indicated that'they l
were trained and knuwiedgeable in the requirements for parts l
intended for nuclear power plants.
c.
In the area of audits, QA had not perforned quarterly audits as stated in Section XVIII of their QA manual. Parkgrech 3.0 states, in part, " Audits shril be performed in the following areas: Products, processes, and systems." Paragraph 3.3 states process audits shall be conducted qt:arterly to measure the effectiveness of a manufacturing process (i.e., welding, stamping, painting, test, etc.) in meeting quality requirements.
The inspector determined that to date in 1987, only two audits were performed: Process P8B-HB14 to manufacture "Rachet Wheels" was audited on April 21, 1981 and Process P12-HC47 to manufacture " Box Barrier" assembly was audited un April 14, i
1987. The inspector informed the BP0 QA manager that failure l
to perform quarterly audits was a nonconformance contrary to l
Criterion XVIII of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.
(99900219/87-01-01)
E.
EXIT INTERVIEW:
The inspector met with individuals mentioned in Section F and discussed the scope and findings of the inspection.
F.
PERSONS CONTACTED:
P. J. Shaffer, General Manager c
R. H. Miller, Engineering Manager J. Simason, Quality Assurance Manager C. Lamaardo, Marketing Manager E. Luggan, Mechanical Engineer.
F. Broztek, Quality Assurance Engineer C Ju.cieri, Marketing i
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