ML20236F691
| ML20236F691 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200003 |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1998 |
| From: | WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236F689 | List: |
| References | |
| GW-GJR-100, NUDOCS 9807020290 | |
| Download: ML20236F691 (62) | |
Text
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STEP DESCRIPTION TA%LE FOR AE-1
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STEP 14 A/
STEP:
Check IRWST Level
' PURPOSE:
To verify the containment sump recirculation valves are automatically opened to align the plant in the recirculation mode BASIS:
On low level in the IRWST, the containment sump recirculation valves are automatically opened to align the plant in the recirculation mode. In this mode, water is recirculated from the containment sump through the containment sump recirculation lines into the reactor vessel under either gravitational force or by using the normal residual heat removal system. This step verifies that the containment sump recirculation valves tre open. Note that if the isolation valves in both containment recirculation paths do not open, the normal residual heat removal system pump may need to be throttled to prevent pump cavitation.
ACTIONS:
Determine if IRWST level is less than (L11)%
Verify containment sump recirculation valves are open Manually align valves as necessary i-INSTRUMENTATION:
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Indication for:
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. IRWST ievel Containment sump recurulation valve position CONTROUEOUIPMENT:
Containment sump recirculation valve controls
. KNOWLEDGE:
N/A-l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
I (L11) IRWST level for transferring nonnal residual heat removal system to containment sump 4
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e STEP DESCRIPTION TACLE FOR AE 1 STEP 15 l
STEP:
Check If Intact SGs Should Be Depressurized To RCS Pressure 1
PURPOSE:
To cool down and depressurize the secondary side if intact SG pressures are greater than RCS pressure BASIS:
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At this point, the RCS pressure is below the cut-in pressure of the normal residual heat removal system and the plant is on recirculation. However, the secondary side may still be relatively hot and at a pressure significantly higher than the RCS. If this is the case, the operator should cool down and depressurize the secondary side by dumping steam from any intact SGs to aid in further cooldown and depressurization of the RCS. Steam should be dumped to the condenser if possible, or directly to atmosphere using intact SG PORVs. To minimize offsite radiation dose, the operator is instructed not to dump steam from a SG with high radioactivity.
ACTIONS:
Determine if RCS pressure is less than intact SG pressures Determine if SGs radiation is normal Isolate feedwater flow to a SG with high radioactivity Dump steam to condenser from intact SGs until SG pressures are less than RCS pressure Dump steam to atmosphere using intact SG PORVs until SG pressures are less than RCS pressure INSTRUMENTATION:
Indication for:
RCS pressure SG pressure SG radiation (blowdown radiation monitors, SGS main steamline radiation monitors, and turbine island vent discharge radiation monitors)
CONTROUEOUIPNENT:
Controls for:
Steam dump to condenser SG PORV Isolating SG feedwater flow -
KNOWLEDGE:
The operator should be aware if fuel damage is suspected (from hi h core exit thermocouple F
indications or from primary coolant samples), the secondary side pressure should be kept above the primary side pressure. This will muumize radiological releases that can occur due to possible primary-to-secondary leakage that is within the plant Technical Specification limits.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Means to check SGs secondary side radiation to indicate a SGTR.
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR l
AP600 SHUTDOWN EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES SDF-0.1 AP600 SHUTDOWN SAFETY STATUS TREE DURING SHUTDOWN Rev.6 l
May 29,1998
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WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY ENERGY SYSTEMS NUCLEAR PROJECTS DIVISION P.O. BOX 355 PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA 15230 oA2064wWy6\\sdf 01.wpf;1b461698
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i TABLE OF CONTENTS Section g
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1-1 i
2.0 DESCRIPTION
2-1 3.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF STATUS TREE 3-1 3.1 Detailed Description of Status Tree Blocks 3-1 i
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
v The Status Tree SDF-0.1, SHUTDOWN SAFETY STATUS TREE, provides a systematic method 'to l
explicitly, determine the status of the plant during shutdown conditions after entering Mode 5. This tree requires no operator action other than monitoring a limited set of plant parameters and comparing them to reference values within the tree.
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This tree represents the Critical Safety Functions that are of concem during plant shutdown and, as I
. such, is always monitored anytime the plant is in a shutdown condition after entering Mode 5. The tree can direct operators to any.of six Shutdown Guidelines (SDGs).
l-he AP600 shutdown emergency response guidelines (ERGS) were developed using the same philosophy and methodology that was used for developing the at-power ERGS for the AP600. Since there was no corresponding generic guidance for shutdown conditions for operating plants, the shutdown guidelines for AP600 are first of a kind guidance and focus on protecting the general public by monitoring and protecting the plant critical safety functions. The same barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system and containment building) protect the public whether the plant is at power or is shutdown. Thus the critical safety functions which are used to monitor plant conditions during.
accidents for at-power conditions (operating modes 1,2, 3, and 4) were used as the basis for developing a monitoring tool to detect challenges to the plant safety state for the remaining shutdown
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conditions (modes 5 and 6). Each symptom (question in the status tree) for each at-power critical f
4 safety function status tree and the underlying intent of that safety function was evaluated with respect to shutdown conditions. He resultant was a single status tree for shutdown operations during modes 5 and 6 that represents all six of the critical safety functions. Additional attention was given to the '
prevention of boiling in the reactor core and establishing containment closure early if boiling in the reactor core cannot be prevented because these are the prime issues being addressed by the USNRC and operating plants for shutdown operations. De following thought process was used for arriving at the single shutdown status tree and the symptoms used to determine if there is a challenge to shutdown plant safety.
1.'
Review of the at-power suberiticality status tree for shutdown conditions showed that since the reactor is already shutdown, only decay heat is generated. (Note that the check that the reactor is below 5% power in the at-power ERGS is to assure that only decay heat is generated by the stactor since safety systems are designed for decay heat removal only.) Rus, the only concern applicable during modes 5 and 6 is inadvertent criticality. A flux doubling alarm is provided for the AP600 design to identify a loss of shutdown margin which precedes sn inadvertent criticality while nuclear flux is well below the point of adding heat into the system. An orange path is designated for this condition since prompt operator action should be initiated to reestablish shutdown margin and prevent the return to criticality.
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- 2. Review of the at-power core cooling status tree showed that the core cooling safety function is L
applicable but due to the initial energy levels, elevated core exit temperatures are not expected for o:no64=wv6wr-01.wyt;n>461998 1-1 REVISION: 6
a long period of time. As long as water level is maintained above the reactor core, heat can be removed to prevent core heatup to temperatures that could possibly damage the core. Adequate water level to maintain core cooling can be determined by either pressurizer level (if the RCS is closed) or hot leg level (if the RCS is at reduced inventory operations). Since the primary system is at a low temperature (and saturation pressure) condition, the prime recovery strategy would be to restore water level over the reactor core by any means possible. No higher prioritization symptoms are necessary (such as core exit temperature symptoms that prioritize FR-C.1 and FR-C.2 in the at-power ERGS) since primary pressure at saturated conditions is low enough for all possible injection paths to physically inject. An orange path is designated for this condition since prompt operator action should be initiated. To prevent heat up and possible high saturation pressures, the core cooling safety function challenged was prioritized first on the shutdown status tree. Injection of borated water is desired to prevent and/or mitigate a simultaneous loss of shutdown margin as discussed in item i earlier.
3.
Review of the at-power heat sink status tree showed that the main heat sink during shutdown conditions in modes 5 and 6 is the normal residual heat removal system (RNS). If the RNS is lost, prompt mitigating actions must be taken by the operator. An orange path is designated for this condition since pron.pt operator action should be initiated to reestablish RNS cooling or provide alternate ways of removing core decay heat. This symptom is checked just after the shutdown core cooling status check since primary system inventory is needed for the operation of the RNS pumps. It is also prioritized just behind the challenge to the core cooling function since the primary system will start to heat up on the loss of RNS while more time is available to the operator for addressing a loss of shutdown margin and containment closure (containment closure actions are also in the guideline for addressing the loss of RNS). Loss of the ability for RNS to remove heat from the primary system is addressed as its own symptom by means of a check on RCS temperature being maintained within a small band when no heatup or cooldown is in progress.
l 4.
Review of the at-power integrity status tree showed that the only challenge to primary system integrity during operating modes 5 and 6 is system oveipressurization. Since the primary system is already at a low temperature, a significant rapid cooldown cannot occur. The cold overpressure limits are checked and if exceeded, prompt operator action is required.
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- 5. Review of the at-power containment status tree showed that rapid containment overpmssure during modes 5 and 6 cannot occur due to the initial low energy condition of the primary system.
The main function for containment is to prevent radiation releases during an accident. During the shutdowr. conditions of modes 5 and 6, the containment building may be open to allow easy access for maintenance activities. The intent of the containment function can be maintained if
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containment closure is initiated upon indication of abnormal radiation in containment (Note that containment closure is initiated in the guidelines for loss of inventory and loss of RNS in anticipation of the possible release of radiation into containment). Therefore only containment l
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radiation is monitored on the shutdown ERG status tree. Abnormal radiation will require prompt operator action to establish containment closure.
- 6. - Review of the at-power inventory status tree showed that normal primary system inventory could vary during modes 5 and 6 depending on whether or not the plant is in reduced inventory operations. The inventory status tree for the at-power ERGS checks if pressurizer level is normal during operation is modes 1,2,3 or 4. Normal water level for operation in modes 5 and 6 is either pressurizer level (if the RCS is closed) ce < >t leg level (if the RCS is at reduced inventory operations). Since departure from the normal primary inventory is check already in the shutdown status tree to verify adequate core cooling capability, no additional checks are made to specifically address the inventory function.-
Since the plant is in a shutdown and low energy state in modes 5 or 6, the symptoms for determining a challenge to the plant safety state are different because they are tailored to the shutdown plant conditions. The priority between functions is also different. The top priority is given to core cooling (inventory on the core) since loss of inventory can result in core boiling in a short period of time since there is less water to absorb core heat and the subsequent loss of RNS due to inadequate water level in the reactor coolant system. Second priority is given to heat sink (loss of RNS) which'will also result in a heatup of the primary water. Third priority is given to' containment (abnormal radiation) so that prompt closure of containment will be achieved prior to any prolonged releases to the environment. Fourth priority is given to subcriticality (loss of shutdown margin) since more time
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is available before a reactivity accident causes either boiling in the core or releases to containment than in the previous accidents. 'Ihe fifth priority is given to integrity (cold overpressurization) since it is less likely to result in core boiling or quick radiation releases outside the containment. The sixth priority is given to the loss of heat sink due to support system failures (unexpected heatup of the RCS) since the expected heatup rate of the primary system would be small. All six of the functional challenges require prompt operator action to mitigate them.
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1 l
BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR AP600 i
SHUTDOWN EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES i
SDG-1 l
O V
AP600 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RNS DURING SHUTDOWN 4
Rev.6 i
May 29,1998 I
I WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY ENERGY SYSTEMS NUCLEAR PROJECTS DIVISION P.O. BOX 355 PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA 15230 o:\\newproj2\\2064w\\rev6\\SDG-1.wpf:Ib-061698
l TABLE OF CONTENTS Section
,P_ age
1.0 INTRODUCTION
11
2.0 DESCRIPTION
2-1 3.0 RECOVERY / RESTORATION TECHNIQUE 3-1 3.1 High-Level Action Summary 3-1 3.2 Key Utility Decision Points 3-3 4.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF GUIDELINE 4-1 4.1 Detailed Description of Steps, Notes, and Cautions 4-1 4.2 Step Sequence Requirements 4-46 O
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3J Key Utility Decision Points
- 'Ihere are two key utility decision points in this guideline. The first is when the operator must initiate actions to protect personnel inside containment. In Steps 11 and 27, the operator is instmeted to evacuate non-essential personnel inside containment. The operator will have to determine which personnel must be evacuated from containment at this time in the guideline. The second is if core cooling cannot be re-established. If cooling of the core cannot be re-established and plant conditions continue to degrade, the operator will have to decide whether to initiate additional actions. Additional actions possible would include the use of hydrogen igniters, cavity flooding, PCCS operation and
' implementation of the Severe Accident Management Guidelines.
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STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR SDG 1 i
O STEP 11 j
),EE Initiate Actions To Protect Personnel Working In Containment PURPOSE:
To ensure personnel inside containment are protected from a potential adverse -
radiological environment E6.S.I1*
When the core stans boiling, steam and/or gases may be released into contamment through vents in the RCS. The release of steam into contamment can create a habitability (temperature) concem for operators who may be in the area to perform recovery actions. The potential exists for release of radioactive materials from the RCS into containment causing a personnel contamination problem.
Any non essential personnel inside contamment should be' evacuated. As an additional precautionary measure, essential personnel entering contamment may need to take additional protective measures such as respirators, breathing air or special protective clotting. Containment radiation should be periodically monitored and at some point, it may be necessary to evacuate essential personnel from contamment, ACTIONSi Initiate actions to protect personnel working in contamment O',
INS 11tUMEWATION:
Containment radiation monitoring.
CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
I N/A i
KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDmONAL INFORMATION:
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N/A I
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4 STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR SDG 1 STEP 12 STEP.
Initiate Actions To Establish Containment Closure PURPO_S_E:
To establish a boundary to prevent the release of fission products BASIS:
Since RNS cooling has been lost, and initial attempts to restore RNS cooling have been unsuccessful, actions must be taken to address the possibility of core uncovery and subsequent fuel damage du to RCS inventory loss. Since.so of the three radiological barriers may be open (the RCS'and containment), actions must be taken to close containment and provide a barrier to the release of radioactive materials should the event proceed to core damage. Containment closure must be accomplished before the onset of core damage. Once containment closure is initiated, closure should continue until controlled and stable decay heat removal has been restored (either RNS cooling or stable heat removal via the secondary plant) and the RCS is returned to a controlled and stable condition.
Instrument air to containment is also closed since it is a potential relief path that is open during outages.
ACTIONS:
Initiate actions to establish containment closure INSTRUMENTATION:
N/A f&fUROIJEOUIPMENT:
f N/A l
KNOWLEDGE:
Means to establish containment closure ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Specific guidelines for establishing containment closure during typical shutdown conditions.
Containment closure as discussed in this step includes establishing the desired position of available containment isolation valves to minimize release outside containment.
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STEP DESCRIPHON TABLE FOR SDG-1 l
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STEP 13 j g STEP:
Stan Available Containment Fan Coolers PURPOSE:
To ensure all available containment fan coolers are nuunng to remove contamment heat BASIS:
L The intent of this step is to remove heat from containment resulting fmm coolant boiling off in the L
RCS. Note that steam vented off via ADS stages 1,2 and 3 will be condensed and captured via the ADS spargers in the IRWST. Therefore, until the IRWST starts steaming, the heat load on the contamment fan coolers should be minimal.
ACTIONS:
i Start available containment fan coolers i
l INSTRUMENTATION:
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Contamment fan cooler instnamentation
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l CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
Controls for containment fan coolers KNOWLEDGE:
l N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A l
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STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR SDG 1 STEP 14 STEP:
Evaluate Long Term PMnt Status PURPOSE:
To determine long term plant status and additioral recovery actions BASIS:
This step instructs the operator to determine if any additional actions are necessary to protect the core and prevent releases. If core cooling cannot be restored, the operator should consider additional actions such as operation of the hydrogen igniters, flooding the cavity, using the PCCS for containment protection and even implementation of the Severe Accident Management Guidelines.
Steps 13 and 3 form a loop of recovery actions with open RCS conditions. Since RNS cooling has not been re-established, as evaluated in Step 8, the operator is sent back to the beginning of this loop to re-evaluate the status of RCS cooling and restoration of RNS cooling of the RCS.
ACTIONS:
Retum to Step 3 INSTRUMENTATION:
N/A CONTROUEOUIPMENT:
N/A KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A O
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STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR SDG 1 i
f STEP 28 STEP.
Initiate Actions To Establish Containment Closure PURPOSE:
To establish a boundary to prevent the release of fission products i
BASIS:
Since RNS cooling has been lost, and initial attempts to restore RNS cooling have been unsuccessful, actions must be taken to address the possibility of core uncovery and subsequent fuel damage due to RCS inventory loss. Since two of the three radiological barriers may be open (the RCS and containment), actions must be taken to close containment and provide a barrier to the release of radioactive materials should the event proceed to com damage. Containment closure must be accomplished before the onset of core damage. Once containment closure is initiated, closure should j
continue until controlled and stable decay heat removal has been restored (either RNS cooling or stable heat removal via the secondary plant) and the RCS is retumed to a controlled and stable condition.
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Instrument air to containment is also closed since it is a potential relief path that is open during outages.
ACTIONS:
Initiate actions to establish containment closure fi INSTRUh"ENTATION:
-s N/A l
CONTROUEOUIPMENT:
l N/A 1
KNOWLEDGE:
Means to establish containment closure i
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Specific guidelines for establishing containment closure during shutdown conditions and using the passive core cooling systems (i.e., PXS/PRHR and PCC). Containment closure as discussed in this step includes establishing the desired position of available containment isolation valves to minimize release outside containment.
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STEP DESCRIPHON TABLE FOR SDG 1 STEP 29 l
l STEP:
Start Available Containment Fan Coolers PURPOSE:
To ensure all available contamment fan coolers are nmnmg to remove containment heat BASIS:
The intent of this step is to remove heat from containment resulting from the IRWST boiling off to contamment. Note that subcooled PRHR cooling will occur, and steam vented off via ADS stages 1, 2 and 3 will be condensed and captured via the ADS spargers in the IRWST. Therefore, until the IRWST starts steaming, the heat load on the containment fan coolers should be minimal.
ACTIONS:
Start available containment fan coolers INSTRUMENTATION:
Contamment fan cooler instrumentation CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
Controls for contamment fan coolers KNOWLEDGE:
N/A I
ADDITIONAL ihTf2MATION:
N/A i'
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STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR SDG 1 I
STEP 30 STEP.
Evaluate Long Term Plant Status PURPOSE:
To determine long term plant status and additional recovery actions BASIS:
This step instmets the operator to determine if any additional actions are necessary to protect the core
. and prevent releases. If core cooling cannot be restored, the operator should consider additional actions such as operation of the hydrogen igniters, flooding the cavity, using the PCCS for containment protection and even implementation of the Severe Accident Management Guidelines.
Steps 15 to 29 form a loop of recovery actions with closed RCS conditions. Since RNS cooling has not been re-established, as evaluated in Step 24, the operator is sent back to the beginning of this loop to re-evaluate the status of RCS cooling and restoration of RNS cooling of the RCS.
ACTIONS:
Return to Step 15 INSTRUMENTATION:
N/A
.).
CONTROUEOUTPMENT:
N/A KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDfTIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A i
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4.2 Step Sequence Requirements This section consists of a table which presents the existin.g guideline sequence and idendfies the interchangeability of guideline steps for the benefit of the procedure writer.
The Step Sequence Table for SDG-1 is provided on the following page. The interchangeability of guideline steps is identified by the numbers in the column to the right of each guideline step.
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STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR SDG-1
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STEP SEQUENCE FOR SDG-1
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STEP jiEOUENCE 1.
Check If RNS Pumps Should Be Stopped 1
2.
Verify RCS Drain Path Isolation 2
- 3. Check RCS Status - OPEN 3
4.
Verify Stage 1,2 and 3 ADS Valves-OPEN 4
5.
Refill RCS 5
6.
Identify And Isolate Any RCS Leakage 6
7.
Check RCS Hot Leg Level - GREATER THAN (SLO 2))
7 8.
Try To Restore RNS Flow 8
- 9. Check If Fourth Stage ADS Should Be Actuated 9
- 10. Check IRWST Level 10
- 11. Initiate Actions To Protect Personnel Working In Containment 11
- 12. Initiate Actions To Establish Containment Closure 11
- 13. Start Available Containment Fan Coolers 11
- 14. Evaluate Long Tenn Plant Status 12
- 15. Check If CMTs Should Be Actuated 13
- 16. Verify PRHR Actuated 14
- 17. Check If ADS Should Be Actuated 15
- 18. Check If Fourth Stage ADS Should Be Actuated 16
- 19. Check IRWST Level 17
- 20. Evaluate Long Term Plant Status 18 l
21 Go To Appropriate Plant Procedure 19
- 22. Maintain PRZR Level - GREATER THAN (SLO 2) 20 A
- 23. Check If CMT Injection Should Be Isolated 21 l
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STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR SDG 1
- 24. Try To Restore RNS Flow 22
- 27. Initiate Actions To Protect Personnel Working In (.nainment 24 1
- 28. Initiate Actions To Establish Containment Closure 24
- 29. Start Available Containment Fan Coolers 24
- 30. Evaluate Long Term Plant Status 25 O
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR AP600 SHUTDOWN EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES SDG-2 l
AP600 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RNS DURING SHUTDOWN Rev.6 May 29,1998 l
l WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY ENERGY SYSTEMS NUCLEAR PROJECTS DIVISION P.O. BOX 355 PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA 15230 I
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l TABLE OF CONTENTS Section g
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.]
2.0 DESCRIPTION
2-1 3.0 RECOVERY / RESTORATION TECHNIQUE
'3-1 l
3.1 High Level Action Summary 31 3.2 Key Utility Decision Points 3-3 i
i j
4.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF GUIDELINE 4-1 4.1 Detailed Description of Steps, Notes, and Cautions 4-1 4.2 Step Sequence Requirements 4-34 O
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4 STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR SDG 2 STEP 16 STEP:
Initiate Actions To Protect Personnel Working in Contamment PURPOSE:
To ensure personnel inside containment are protected from a potential adverse radiological environment E.6.S.lE
- When the core starts boiling, steam and/or gases may be released into contamment through vents in the RCS.. The release of steam into contamment can create a habitability (temperature) concem for operators who may be in the area to perform recovery actions. The potential exists for release of radioactive materials from the RCS into containment causing a personnel contamination problem.
Any non essential personnel inside contamment should be evacuated. As an additional precautionary measure, essential personnel entering contamment may need to take additional protective measures such as respirators, breathing air or. special protective clothing. Containment radiation should be periodically monitored and at some point, it may be necessary to evacuate essential personnel from i
contamment.
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ACTIONS:
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Initiate actions to protect personnel working in containment INSTRUMENTATION:
Contamment radiation monitoring 1
CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
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'N/A KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A l
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STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR SDG 2 STEP 11 STEP:
Initiate Actions To Establish Containment Closure PURPOSE: To establish a boundary to prevent the release of fission products BASIS:
Since RNS cooling has been lost, and initial attempts to restore RNS cooling have been unsuccessful, actions must be taken to address the possibility of core uncovery and subsequent fuel damage due to RCS inventory loss. Since two of the three radiological barriers may be open (the RCS and containment), actions must be taken to close containment and provide a barrier to the release of radioactive materials should the event proceed to core damage. Containment closure must be accomplished before the onset of core damage. Once containment closure is initiated, closure should continue until controlled and stable decay heat removal has been re:,tored (either RNS cooling or stable heat removal via the secondary plant) and the RCS is retumed to a controlled and stable condition.
Instrument air to containment is also closed since it is a potential relief path that is open during outages.
ACTIONS:
Initiate actions to establish containment closure INSTRUMENTATION:
N/A CON'IROL EOUIPMENT:
N/A KNOWLEDGE:
Means to establish containment closure ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Specific guidelines for establishing containment closure during typical shutdown conditions.
Containment closure as discussed in this step includes establishing the desired position of available containment isolation valves to minimize release outside containment.
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STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR SDG-2 STEP 20 STEP:
Initiate Actions To Establish Containment Closure PURPOSE:
To establish a boundary to prevent the release of fission products BASIS:
Since RNS cooling has been lost, and initial attempts to restore RNS cooling have been unsuccessful, actions must be taken to address the possibility of core uncovery and subsequent fuel damage'due to RCS inventory loss. Since two of the three radiological barriers may be open (the RCS and containment), actions must be taken to close containment and provide a barrier to the release of radioactive materials should the event proceed to core damage. Containment closure must be accomplished before the onset of core damage. Once containment closure is initiated, closure should
' continue until controlled and stable decay heat removal has been restored (either RNS cooling or stable heat removal via the secondary plant) and the RCS is retumed to a controlled and stable condition.
Instrument air to containment is also closed since it is a potential relief path that is open during -
j outages.
ACTIONS:
Initiate actions to establish containment closure INSTRUMENTATION:
N/A CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
N/A KNOWLEDGE:
Means to establish containment closure ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Specific guidelines for establishing containment closure during shutdown conditions and using the
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passive core cooling systems (i.e., PXS/PRHR and PCC). Containment closure as discussed in this step includes establishing the desired position of available containment isolation valves to minimize release outside containment.
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STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FO'l SDG-2 STEP 21 STEP:
Stan Available Containment Fan Coolers PURPOSE:
To ensure all available containment fan coolers are runnmg to remove containment heat BASIS:
The intent of this step is to remove heat from contamment resulting from the IRWST boiling off to containment. Note that subcooled PRHR cooling will occur, and steam vented off via ADS stages 1.
2 and 3 will be condensed and captured via the ADS spargers in the IRWST. Therefore, until the IRWST stans steaming, the heat load on the containment fan coolers should be minimal.
ACTIONS:
Start available containment fan coolers INSTRUMENTATION:
Contamment fan cooler instrumentation CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:
Controls for containment fan coolers KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A e
O sDG2 0731%
4-32 REVIsloN: 2
i'O BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR AP600 l
SHUTDOWN F,MERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE I
SDG-3 AP600 RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT RADIATION i
DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 l
May 29,1998 l
l WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC ENERGY SYSTEMS NUCLEAR PROJECTS DIVISION P.O. BOX 355 PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA 15230 o:\\2064w\\rev6\\sdg-3.wpf. lb-061698
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r~~T TABLE OF CONTENTS Section g
1.0 INTRODUCTION
11
2.0 DESCRIPTION
2-1 3.0 RECOVERY / RESTORATION TECHNIQUE 3-1 3.1 High-Level Actica Summary 3-1 3.2 Key Utility Decision Points 3-2 4.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF GUIDELINE 41 4.1 Detailed Description of Steps, Notes, and Cautions 4-1 4.2 Step Sequence Requirements 47 t\\_,1 l
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3.0 RECOVERY / RESTORATION TECHNIQUE
%d The objective of the recovery / restoration technique incorporated into guideline SDG-3 is to provide actions to respond to high containment radiation during plant shutdown.
The following subsections provide a summary of the major action categories of operator actions and the key utility decision points for guideline SDG-3, RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT RADIATION DURING SHUTDOWN.
3.1 High Level Action Summary
. A high level summary of the actions performed in SDG-3 is given on the following page in the form of major action categories. These are described below in more detail.
Initiate Actions To Establish Containment Closure Actions are initiated to establish containment closure to prevent the potential release of radioactivity through any containment openings that were established for the shutdown condition.
(
Verify Containment Air Filtration System Isolation b
The isolation of the containment ventilation penetrations (i.e. containment supply and exhaust air dampers) is verified to prevent the potential release of radioactivity from the containment.
Start Available Containment Fan Coolers Containment fan coolers are started to provide cooling of the containment atmosphere.
Determine If Any Additional Actions Are Necessary The operator is instructed to determine if any additional actions are necessary to address the containment high radiation level. This information may be needed to determine potential offsite releases.
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MAJOR ACTION CATEGORIES IN SDG-3 Initiate Actions To Establish Containment Closure Verify Containment Air Filtration System Isolation Start Available Containment Fan Coolers
=
Detennine If Any Additional Actions Are Necessary a
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c:co64*vev6\\sds-3.wpf.lb-061698 3-2 REVISION: 6
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l 3.2 Key Utility Decision Points
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t There is one key uti!!ty decision point in this guideline when the operator must determine an appropriate course of action. In Step 4, the operator :s instructed to determine if any additional actions are necessary to address the containment high radiation level. The operator will determine if any additional actions are to be taken at this time in the guideline. Examples of additional actions would be use of hydrogen igniters, cavity flooding and initiation of the Severe Accident Management l
Guidelines.
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4.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF GUIDELINE This section provides a very detailed discussion of the generic guideline SDG-3 to facilitate EOP writing and training efforts. By presenting guideline background infonnation in greater detail through the use of a structured format (i.e., step description tables, step sequence tables, and logic diagrams), plant applicability can be more easily determined. The separate and unique subsections containing this information follow.
4.1 Detailed Description of Steps, Notes, and Cautions This section contains a one-page (or mom) step description table for each separate guideline step, note, and caution. Notes and cautions are always presented relative to the step they precede.
The Step Description Tables for the steps and associated notes and cautions of gaideline SDG-3 are pmsented on the following page.
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SDG3 073196 41 REVism 2 I
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STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR SDG 3 STEP 1 STEP:
Initiate Actions To Establish Containment Closure PURPOSE:
To establish a boundary to prevent the release of fission products BASIS:
Actions are initiated to establish containment closure to prevent the potential release of radioactivity through any containment openings that were established for the plant shutdown condition. Since all actions are local, the operator must contact the appropriate plant personnel and tell them to close all containment openings. Instrument air to containment is also closed since it is a potential relief path that is open during outages.
ACTIONS:
Initiate actions to establish containment closure INSTRUMENTATION:
N/A CONTROIJEOUIPMENT:
N/A KNOWLEDGEj:
N/A 3
l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Include AP600 specific details for establishing containment closure l
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.$.2 REVISION: 6
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR SDG 3 l
(-
v STEP 2 - NOTE ll NOTE:
VFS should remain operating with the attemate barrier in place until containment closure is established.
PURPOSE:
To remind the operator that the VFS, together with an alternate barrier, provides defense in depth during movement ofirradiated fuel in containment.
. B.61LS:
If the containment is open, the VFS, together with an alternate banier, provide defense in depth for a fuel handling accident. With the VFS operating and the attemate barrier in place until containment
. closure is established, this defense in depth function is maintained.
ACTIONS:
N/A INSTRUMENTATION:
N/A CONTROUEOUIPMENT:
-N/A KNOWLEDGE:
-N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A I
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oA2064wevtw.3.wpt:1bo61698 4-3 REVISION: 6 s
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR SDG-3 STEP 2 STEP Verify Containment Air Filtration System Isolation PJJRPOSE:
To ensure containment ventilation penetrations are isolated EASIS:
This step instructs the operator to verify that isolation of the ventilation penetrations has occurred to prevent potential release of radioactive materials from containment ACTIONS:
Determine if containment supply and exhaust air dampers are closed Close dampers INSTRUMENTATION:
Containment supply and exhaust air dampers position indications
=
CONTROIJEOUIPMENT:
Containment supply and exhaust air dampers controls KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A 9
c:uo64w\\rev6\\sdg-3.wpf: l b-061698 44 REVISION: 6
STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR SDG 3 l
l l
,G STEP 3 l
l STEP:
Start Available Containment Fan Coolers
[
PURPOSE:
To ensure operation of the containment fan coolers for containment cooling l
BASIS:
I The containment purge and exhaust system provides outside air to the containment durin personnel habitability. Containment fan coolers may or may not be operating for containm
. Since the containment purge and exhaust system is isolated in this guideline, the containment fan coolers are staned to provide cooling of the containment atmosphere.
ACTIONS:
Start containment fan coolers INSTRUMENTATION:
Containment fan cooler status indication CONTROUEOUTPMENT:
(]
Containment fan cooler controls
'O KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A fO I
o32064wirev6\\sdg 3.wpf:1b-061698 45 REvtsloN: 6
STEP DESCRIPTION TABcf FOR SDG-3 STEP 4 STEP:
Determine If Any Additional Actions Are Necessary l
PURPOSE:
To determine if any additional actions are necessary to address the containment high I
radiation level BASIS:
This step instructs the operator to determine if any additional actions are necessary to address the radiation level inside containment. He operator is responsible for providing any further actions to address the radiation hvel, if appropriate. Examples of additional actions would be use of hydrogen igniters, cavity flooding and initiation of the Severe Accident Management Guidelines.
ACTIONS:
Determine if any additional actions are necessary INSTRUMENTATION:
N/A CONTROIJEOUIPMENT:
N/A KNOWLEDGE:
N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A O
c:u0f4w\\rev6sdg-3*pf:lt>061698 46 REVISION: 6
STEP DESCRIPTION TAILE FOR SDG-3 STEP 5 STEP.
Go To Appropriate Plant Procedure -
PURPOSE:
To direct the operator to the proper procedure following completion of the steps in this guideline BASIS:
Now that the guideline steps have been completed, the operator should continue plant cperation and/or recovery going to the appropriate nonnal plant procedure or abnormal plant procedure.
ACTIONS:
Go to appropriate plant procedure INSTRUMENTATION:
N/A CONTROL >EOUIPMENT:
N/A KNOWLEDGE:
.. {
N/A
- ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
N/A 1
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'4 7 REVISION: 6 t
4.2 Step Sequence Requirements This section consists of a table which presents the existing guideline sequence and identifies the allowed interchangeability of guideline steps for the benefit of the EOP writer.
The Step Sequence Table for SDG-3 is provided on the following page. The i..terchangeability of guideline steps is identified by the numbers in the column to the right of each guideline step.
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' STEP SEQUENCE FOR SDG-3 l
l STEP SEOUENCE 1.
Initiate Actions To Establish Containment Closure 1
2.
Verify Containment Air Filtration System Isolation 1
L 3.
Start Available Containment Fan Coolers 2
4.
Determine If Any Additional Actions Are Necessary 3
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5.
Go To Appropriate Plant Procedure 4
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oro64.wv6ws-3.wpr:1t>o6169s 49 REVISION: 6
Number Title Rev./Date SDG-1 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RCS INVENTORY DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 g()
5/29/98 A.
PURPOSE The purpose of this guideline is to provide the actions necessary for maintaining core cooling and protecting the reactor core in the event that PRZR level is lost 1
during shutdown operations when the RCS is intact or RCS level is too low to support operation of the RNS pumps during operation in reduced inventory conditions in the RCS.
1 B.
SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS This guideline is entered from SDF-0.1, SHUTDOWN SAFETY Critical Safety Function Status Tree on an ORANGE condition.
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Numbir Title Rev./Date SDG-1 RESPONSE TO LOSS Of RCS INVENTORY DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 5/29/98 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1
Check If RNS Pumps Should Be Stopped:
a.
RNS pumps - ANY RUNNING a.
Go to Step 2.
b.
RCS hot leg level - LESS b.
Continue with Step 2. H RCS THAN (SLO 2) level decreases to less than (SLO 2) and RNS pumps start to cavitate, M stop RNS pumps.
c.
RNS pumps - CAVITATING c.
Continue with Step 2. H RNS pumps start to cavitate, M stop RNS pumps, d.
Stop RNS pumps 2
Verify RCS Drain Path Isolation Manually close valves as necessary.
e RNS IRWST return valve e Letdown NOTE The RCS is considered open when an opening ex1 sis that cannot be closed from the control room such as a SG manway.
3 Check RCS Status - OPEN E reduced inventory operations were in progress, M go to Step
- 4. H E01, M 90 to Step 15.
4 Verify Stage 1, 2 and 3 ADS Manually open valves as Valves - OPEN necessary.
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Page 2 of 13
l Number Title Rev./Date SDG-1 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RCS INVENTORY DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 k]J r
5/29/98 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
{
l CAUTION e
Personnel working in containment should be Warned before refilling the RCS to avoid inadvertent contamination of personnel working near RCS
\\
openings.
Only borated water should be added to the RCS to maintain adequate shutdown margin.
l
)
If RCS hot leg level remains less than (SLO 2) for e
greater than 30 minutes, automatic alignment for IRWST injection should be verified.
5 Refill RCS -
1 a.
Refill RCS using CVS makeup a.
IE Cvs makeup can HQI be f
pumps as necessary established, IHEN refill the RCS using any of the
[ Include additional AP600 following:
e details in E0Ps]
e CMTs.
-OR-Gravity feed using the e
IRWST to RNS suction line.
-OR-J e
Gravity feed using the e
IRWST in.jection line.
b.
Refill RCS until RCS hot leg level greater than (SLO 2) 6 Identify And Isolate Any RCS
, Leakage 7
Check RCS Hot Leg Level - GREATER Continue with Step 9. WHEN RCS THAN (SLO 2) hot leg level greater than (SLO 2), IHEN do Step 8.
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Page 3 of 13
4 Number Title Rav./Date SDG-1 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RCS INVENTORY DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 5/29/98 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION Starting an RNS pump may result in an RCS level decrease due to shrink or void collapse.
8 Try To Restore RNS Flow:
a.
Start one RNS pump
[ Include additional AP600 e
details in E0Ps]
b.
Maintain RCS hot leg level -
GREATER THAN (SLO 2) c.
RNS flow - RESTORED c.
Go to Step 9.
d.
Establish desired RCS cooldown rate e.
Go to appropriate plant procedure l
9 Check If Fourth Stage ADS Should Be Actuated:
i a.
CMT level - LESS THAN (SLO 5) a.
Perform the following:
- 1) lf CMT level decreases to less than (SLO 5), M do Steps 9b and c.
- 2) If RCS hot leg level indication decreases to less than (SLO 4), M manually actuate fourth stage ADS and do Steps 9b and c.
- 3) Continue with Step 10.
b.
Verify fourth stage ADS b.
Manually open valves as isolation valves - OPEN necessary, c.
Verify IRWST injection c.
Manually open valves as isolation valves - OPEN necessary.
Page 4 of 13
Number T1t1e Rev./Date SDG-1 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RCS INVENTORY DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6
^
5/29/98 b
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 10 Check IRWST Level:
a.
IRWST level - LESS THAN a.
Perform the following:
(SLO 6)
- 2) Go to Step 11.
b.
Verify containment sump b.
Manually align valves as recirculation valves - OPEN necessary.
11 Initiate Actions To Protect Personnel Working In Containment:
a.
Evacuate non-essential personnel in containment b.
Periodically monitor containment radiation conditions 12 Initiate Actions To Establish
' Containment Closure:
J Equipment hatch e
e Personnel hatch Instrument Air to Containment Containment purge and exhaust e
system
[ Include additional AP600 l
details in E0Ps]
13 Start Available Containment Fan Coolers O
l V l
Page 5 of 13
Number Title Rev./Date SDG-1 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RCS INVENTORY DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 5/29/98 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 14 Evaluate Long Term Plant Status a.
Determine if additional accident management actions are necessary:
Hydrogen igniter e
operation Cavity flooding e
PCCS operation e
Implementation of Severe e
Accident Management Guidelines
[ Include additional AP600 e
details in E0Ps]
b.
Return To Step 3 15 Check If CMTs Should Be Actuated:
a.
PRZR level - LESS THAN a.
Go to Step 22.
(SL01) b.
CMT injection valves - OPEN b.
Manually open valves as necessary.
16 Verify PRHR Actuated:
Actuate PRHR Initiation. 1E valves will ROI open. IliEN Verify PRHR isolation valves -
manually open valves as OPEN necessary.
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4 Number Title Rev,/Date SDG-1 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RCS INVENTORY DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 g-5/29/98 V)
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 17 Check If ADS Should Be Actuated:
a.
CMT level - LESS THAN (SLO 3) a.
H RCS hot leg level indication greater than (SLO 4), M go to Step 22.
H HQI, M manually actuate ADS.
l b.
Verify first stage ADS b.
Manually open valves as i
isolation valves - OPEN necessary.
c.
Check second stage ADS c.
M (ST01) seconds have valves - OPEN elapsed from first stage ADS signal, M verify second l
stage ADS valves open. H HQI, M manually open second stage ADS valves as necessary.
T d.
Check third stage ADS d.
M (ST02) seconds have valves - OPEN elapsed from second stage ADS signal, M verify third stage ADS valves open.
H HQI, M manually open third stage ADS valves as necessary.
e.
Align RNS to inject into RCS 1
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e Numbor Title Rev./Date SDG-1 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RCS INVENTORY DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 5/29/98 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 18 Check If Fourth Stage ADS Should Be Actuated:
a.
CMT level - LESS THAN (SLOS) a.
Perform the following:
- 2) IE RCS hot leg level indication decreases to less than (SLO 4), IliEN manually actuate fourth stage ADS and do Steps 18b and c.
- 3) Continue with Step 19.
b.
Verify fourth stage ADS b.
Manually open valves as isolation valves - OPEN necessary.
O c.
Verify IRWST injection c.
Manually open valves as isolation valves - OPEN necessary.
19 Check IRWST Level:
a.
IRWST level - LESS THAN a.
Perform the following:
(SLO 6) l
- 1) WiiEN IRWST level less l
than (SLO 6), IHEH do Step 19b.
- 2) Go to Step 27.
b.
Verify containment sump b.
Manually align valves as recirculation valves - OPEN necessary.
20 Evaluate Long Term Plant Status 21 Go To Appropriate Plant Procedure I
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(
Number Title Rev./Date RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RCS INVENTORY DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 SDG-1
,q 5/29/98 V
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l
CAUTION Personnel working in containment should be warned before refilling the RCS to avoid inadvertent contamination of personnel working near RCS openings.
Only borated water should be added to the RCS to maintain adequate shutdown margin.
22 Maintain PRZR Level - GREATER l
THAN (SLO 1) a.
Maintain PRZR level using a.
If CVS makeup can H0I be CVS makeup pumps as established. IHEN maintain i
necessary PhiR level using any of the
[ Include additional AP600 e
details in E0Ps]
e CMTs.
-0R-O Gravity feed using the e
,V IRWST to RNS suction line.
-0R-Gravity feed using the e
IRWST injection line.
23 Check If CMT Injection Should Be Isolated j
l l
a.
PRZR level - GREATER THAN a.
Continue with Step 24. WHEN l
(SLO 1)
PRZR level greater than l
(SLO 1), IHEN do Step 23b.
l b.
Close CMT injection valves rmv)
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Number Title Rev./Date SDG-1 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RCS INVENTORY DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 5/29/98 O
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION Starting an RNS pump may result in an RCS level decrease due to shrink or void collapse.
24 Try To Restore RNS Flow:
a.
RCS hot leg level - GREATER a.
Go to Step 25.
THAN (SLO 2) b.
Start one RNS pump
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
c.
Try to maintain PRZR level -
GREATER THAN (SLO 1) d.
RNS flow - RESTORED d.
Go to Step 25.
e.
CMTs - ISOLATED e.
Return to Step 22.
f.
PRHR - ISOLATED f.
Close PRHR isolation valves.
g.
Establish desired RCS cooldown rate h.
Go to appropriate plant procedure 25 Establish RCS Heat Sink Using SGs:
a.
SGs - ANY AVAILABLE a.
Perfonn the following:
- 1) Try to restore SGs to service.
- 2) Go to Step 26.
b.
Feed SGs as necessary to establish and maintain SG level c.
Page 10 of 13
Number Title Rev./Date SDG-1 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RCS INVENTORY DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 5/29/98 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED I
26
_ Establish RCS Heat Sink Using PRHR:
a.
PRHR - AVAILABLE a.
Continue with Step 27. Try to restore PRHR. WHEN PRHR available, E EN do. Steps 26b and c.
b.
[ Include additional AP600 e
details in E0Ps]
c.
PRHR cooling - IN SERVICE c.
If RCS temperature increases to greater than (ST03) F before a heat sink is established, E EN open all ADS valves.
A\\) '
27 Initiate Actions To Protect Personnel Working In Containment:
a.
Evacuate non-essential personnel in containment b.
Periodically monitor containment radiation conditions 28 Initiate Actions To Establish Containment Closure:
Equipment hatch e
e Personnel hatch Instrument Air to Containment Containment purge and exhaust l
e I
system
[ Include additional AP600 e
details in E0Ps]
(3 i
V f
Page 11 of 13 1
Numb:r Title Rev./Date SDG-1 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RCS INVENTORY DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 5/29/98 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 29 Start Available Containment Fan Coo 1ers 30 Evaluate Long Term Plant Status a.
Determine if additional accident management actions are necessary:
Hydrogen igniter e
operation Cavity flooding e
PCCS operation e
Implementation of Severe e
Accident Management Guidelines
[ Include additional AP600 a
details in E0Ps]
b.
Return To Step 15
- END -
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l Num'>er Title Rev./Date
)
SDG-1 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RCS INVENTORY DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 l
5/29/98 FOOTNOTES l
Refer to SD GUIDELINE FOOTNOTE DEFINITION Document for a description of all footnoted parameters used in this guideline.
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Page 13 of 13
Number Title Rev./Date SDG-2 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RNS DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 5/29/98 A.
PURPOSE The purpose of this guideline is to provide the actions necessary for maintaining core cooling and protecting the reactor core in the event that RNS cooling is lost.
B.
SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS This guideline is entered from SDF-0.1, SHUTDOWN SAFETY Critical Safety Function Status Tree on an ORANGE condition.
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Page 1 of 8
Naber Title Rev./Date SDG-2 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RNS DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 5/29/98 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1
Check Reactor Cavity Level -
Go to Step 4. OBSERVE NOTE PRIOR FLOODED TO STEP 4.
2 Try To Restore RNS Flow a.
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
b.
RNS flow - RESTORED b.
Align fuel pool cooling system to cool reactor cavity.
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
If fuel pool cooling can HDI be aligned to cool reactor cavity, ItiEN perform the following:
- 1) Establish containment integri ty.
- 2) Establish a long term makeup source of water for the reactor cavity.
3 Go To Appropriate Plant Procedure NOTE The RCS is considered open when an opening exists that cannot be closed from the control room such as a SG manway.
4 Check RCS Status - OPEN Go to Step 14.
5 Check RCS Hot Leg Level - GREATER Go to SDG-1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF THAN (SLO 2)
RCS INVENTORY DURING SHUTDOWN, STEP 1.
l 6
Verify Stage 1, 2 and 3 ADS Manually open valves as Valves - OPEN necessary.
Page 2 of 8
o NLsnb2r Title Rev./Date SDG-2 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RNS DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6
{
,e 5/29/98 1
L)
STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION Personnel working in containment should be warned before reftlling the RCS to avoid inadvertent contamination of personnel working near RCS openings.
c Only borated water should be added to the RCS to maintain adequate shutdown margin.
7 Maintain RCS Hot Leg Level -
GREATER THAN (SLO 2) a.
Maintain RCS hot leg level a.
.1E CVS makeup can RQI be using CVS makeup pumps as used, IllEN maintain RCS hot necessary leg level using any of the I
following:
i
[ Include additional AP600 l
e 1
details in E0Ps]
. CMTs.
{
-0R-(m)
Gravity feed using the e
IRWST to RNS suction line.
3
-0R-Gravity feed using the IRWST injection line.
8 Identify And Isolate Any RCS Leakage l
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _~
Number Title Rey,/Date SDG-2 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RNS DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 5/29/98 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION Starting an RNS pump may result in an RCS level decrease due to shrink or void collapse.
9 Try To Restore RNS Flow:
a.
Start one RNS pump
[ Include additional AP600 e
details in E0Ps]
b.
Maintain RCS hot le GREATER THAN (SLO 2)g level -
c.
RNS flow - RESTORED c.
Go to Step 10.
d.
Establish desired RCS cooldown rate e.
Go to appropriate plant procedure 10 Initiate Actions To Protect Personnel Working In Containment:
a.
Evacuate non-essential personnel in containment b.
Periodically monitor containment radiation conditions 11 Initiate Actions To Establish Containment Closure:
Equipment hatch Personnel hatch e
Instrument Air to containment e
Containment purge and exhaust o'
system
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
Page 4 of 8
Number Title Rev./Date SDG-2 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RNS DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 5/29/98 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 12 Start Available Containment Fan Coolers 13 Return To Step 4 14 Check PRZR Level - GREATER THAN i
(SLO 1)
Go to SDG-1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RCS INVENTORY DURING SHUTDOWN, STEP 1.
CAUTION Personnel working in containment should be warned before refilling the RCS to avoid inadvertent contamination of personnel working near RCS openings.
Only borated water should be added to the RCS to maintain adequate shutdown margin.
15 Maintain PRZR Level Greater Than (SLO 1) Using CVS Makeup Pumps As Necessary CAUTION Starting an RNS pump may result in an RCS level decrease due to shrink or void collapse.
16 Try To Restore RNS Flow:
a.
Start one RNS pump
[IncludeadditionalAP600 e
details in E0Ps]
b.
Maintain PRZR level -
GREATER THAN (SL01) c.
RNS flow - RESTORED c.
Go to Step 17.
d.
Establish desired RCS cooldown rate e.
Go to 6ppropriate plant procedure O
Page 5 of 8
Ntsnbir Title Rev./Date SDG-2 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RNS DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 1
5/29/98 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 17 Establish RCS Heat Sink Using SGs a.
SGs - ANY AVAILABLE a.
Perform the following:
- 1) Try to restore SGs to service.
- 2) Go to Step 18.
b.
Feed SGs as necessary to establish and maintain SG 1evel c.
18 Establish RCS Heat Sink Using PRHR:
a.
PRHR - AVAILABLE a.
Continue with Step 17. Try to restore PRHR. M PRHR available, E do Steps 18b, c and d.
b.
[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]
c.
PRHR cooling - IN SERVICE c.
Perform the following:
- 1) IE RCS temperature increases to greater than (ST03) F before a heat sink is established, M open all ADS valves.
- 2) Go to Step 19.
d.
Check PRZR level - GREATER d.
Continue with Step 19. M THAN - (SLO 1)
PRZR level greater than (SLO 1), M do Step 18e.
e.
Close all ADS valves O
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Nurnb:r Title Rev./Date SDG-2 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RNS DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 O
5/29/98 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 19 Initiate Actions To Protect Personnel Working In Containment:
a.
Evacuate non-essential personnel in containment b.
Periodically monitor containment radiation conditions 20 Initiate Actions To Establish Containment Closure:
l Equipment hatch e
Personnel hatch e
1 Instrument Air to containment O
Containment purge and exhaust e
V system
[ Include additional AP600 J
e details in E0Ps]
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21 Start Available Containment Fan Coolers 22 Return To Step 14
- END -
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(
a Number Title Rev /Date SDG-2 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF RNS DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 5/29/53 FOOTNOTES Refer to SD GUIDELINE FOOTNOTE DEFINITION Document for a description of all footnoted parameters used in this guideline.
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o Number Title Rev./Date SDG-3 RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT RADIATION DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 5/29/98 A.
PURPOSE The purpose of this guideline is to provide actions for responding to high radiation in containment.
B.
SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS This guideline is entered from SDF-0.1, SHUTDOWN SAFETY Critical Safety Function Status Tree on an ORANGE condition.
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O sdg3 6/4/98 Page 1 of 3 1
- ,l Number Vitle Rev./Date SDG-3 RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT RADIATION DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6 5/29/98 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1
Initiate Actions To Establish Containment Closure:
1 Equipment hatch e Personnel hatch Instrument Air to Containment
[ Include additional AP600 e
details in E0Ps]
NOTE VFS should remain operating with the alternate barrier in place untti containment closure is established.
2 Verify Containment Air Filtration System Isolation O
3 Start Available Containment Fan Coolers 4
Determine If Any Additional Actions Are Necessary 5
Go To Appropriate Plant Procedure
- END -
O sdg3 6/4/98 Page 2 of 3
s.,
,F Ntaber Title Rev./Date SDG-3 RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT RADIATION DURING SHUTDOWN Rev. 6
,\\
5/29/98 FOOTNOTES l
NONE USED IN THIS GUIDELINE l
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