ML20236E404
| ML20236E404 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 04/04/1989 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8904210164 | |
| Download: ML20236E404 (24) | |
Text
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DUKE POWER GOMPANY P.O. BOX 33189 CHARLOTTE. N.C. 28942 HAL B. TUCKER Tzt.senows F508 Pasemany (704) 373-4831 l
April 4, 1989 Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, N.W.
- Atlanta, GA 30303
Subject:
M c G u i r e A l e r t o f-M a r c h 7 - 8, 1989 Critique with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on March 14, 1989
Dear Sir:
A critique was held to discuss the response of Duke Power and the NRC to the Alert at McGuire Nuclear Station March 7-8, 1989.
The attached Memorandum for File documents our understanding of the ' major points of discussion and the action items from the critique.
We would like your concurrence on those action items which involve the NRC.
For items 2 and 4, we would like to know who will have the lead for. the NRC.
We would like to pursue these action items to improve the coordination in emergency response efforts between Duke Power and the NRC.
Very truly yours, dk/
l
/
c v
Hal B. Tucker HBT/EMK/be(\\hbt.sig)
Attachment xc:(with attachment)
Incident Response Director, NRC Region II Al Gibson (NRC, Region II)
P. K. VanDoorn CM File #1510 Y 2IolG 4. 2 q g N
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March 23, 1989 l
MEMORANDUM FOR FILE
Subject:
McGuire Alert of 3/7-8/89 Critique with Nuclear Regulatory Commissicn on 3/14/89 A critique was held on March 14, 1989 to dircuss the response of Duke Power and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to the Alert at McGuire Nuclear Station on March 7 through 8, 1989.
lists those present at the critique.
The following is a summary of the major points of discussion and the action items arising from.the critique.
SUMMARY
OF DISCUSSION O
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN NRC AND DUKE The communication problems between the NRC and Duke Power were discussed.
The NRC (Region 2) experienced difficulty understanding plant rresponse and Duke's management of the plant during the event.
They had questions about cur procedures and choices of actions, such as our choice of cool down method, steam generator blow down flow path, and primary-to-secondary differential pressure.
They also had questions about why we were doing what we were doing.
The NRC felt that they used restraint in their asking of questions of the Emergency Coordinator.
They said that in a more severe event, the NRC would have been asking even more questions.
Tony McConnell of Duke Power said that taking time to answer their questions interfered with his rcle as Emergency Coordinator.
Duke suggested that the region work more through the Resident Inspectors who were on-site in the Technical Support Center (TSC).
In addition, perhaps more contact could occur between technical contacts at the TSC, and once it is activated, the Crisis Management Center (CMC).
Another suggestion was for Duke to designate a contact in the TSC, other than the Emergency Coordinator, to handle communications with the NRC.
This person would hr.ve to have a background equivalent to a Senior Reactor Operator license, and be familiar with Duke Power's Emergency Procedures.
8 INTEGRATION OF NRC AND DUKE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS AND PROCEDURES The need to integrate the NRC's and Duke's emergency response teams was identified.
We need to review and coordinate our plans and procedures, especially where communications are concerned.
In this particular event, the NRC did not fully activate their Emergency Response Teams.
We had not drilled in this mode of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _
e
" partial activation" before.
The past drills did not reflect how the interface actually took place in this actual event.
Duke needs to know better how the NRC will actually respond during events.
We need to set up additional links between the NRC and technical contacts in the TSC and CMC.
A specific example identified was whether the TSC or the CMC should have the lead on handling communications via the Emergenc?
Notification System (ENS) once the CMC is activated.
Our procedures call for the CMC to take over those communications once the CMC is activated.
However, the NRC expressed a i
preference for the TSC to maintain the lead role.
The need for additional drills, once the plans have been coordinated, was identified.
Both Duke and the NRC agreed that additional practice would help to establish the communications channels.
9 DEFINITION OF RELEASE The definition of " radioactive release" during an emergency situation was discussed.
The NRC questioned whether the release actually ended at 2349 on 03/07/89 as stated in a Duke Power news release.
Eaergency Notification Forms used for notifying the state and counties were marked "no release" after 2349.
The NRC felt that saying "no release" was misleading.
The NRC pointed out that additional releases were made during the day as the damaged steam generator was cooled down and drained down.
These were not explicitly reported.
Because the radiation levels were l
comparable to normal, everyday releases, Duke stated that it would have been more misleading to report to the state, counties, and the public that the releases were still occurring.
Duke agreed that there is currently no clear definition as to what should be reported as a release during an emergency.
The releases which occurred during the event were within limits for normal operation under McGuire's Technical Specifications.
We only reported as releases those which occurred during the initial transient following the tube rupture.
Duke Power agreed that we need to better define what constitutes l
a " radioactive release."
This definition, which will be used in j
making Emergency Notifications and Press Releases will need to l
take into account the information required by the States and l
Counties in their role of public protection.
Duke Power requested that the NRC consider providing generic guidance to the industry on this subject.
(
EANDLING OF PRESS RELEASES There was a discussion as to how News Releases should be reviewed and approved when the NRC has not dispatched a Site Team.
Both sides recognized the need to tell a consistent story to the media.
Press releases were reviewed with the Cenior Resident Inspector at McGuire-The NRC indicated that either Region 2 or l
1 l l 1
l.
Headquarters (whoever is the NRC lead contact at the time) would l
like to see (although not necessarily approve) press releases l
before they are issued.
The NRC agreed that Duke Power should have the same opportunity to review their press releases.
ACTION ITEMS 1.
Duke Power and'the NRC will compare Emergency Plans as'they relate to communications, and define communication links, as i
l appropriate.
Duke Power and the NRC will censider developing a drill to test these communication links once they are established.
Ron Harris was assigned the lead for Duke Power.
Tom Decker (NAC Region 2).ind Kim VanDoorn (SRI -- McGuire) were given the lead for the NRC.
2.
Duke Power will define " radioactive release" as it relates to accident conditions, and determine how this information should be entered on Emergency Notifications Forms.
The NRC will consider developing generic guidance on the definition of " radioactive release."
Ron Harris was assigned the lead for Duke Power.
3.
Duke Power will consider the need for holding joint news conferences with the NRC during events.
Mary Cartwright was assigned the lead for Duke Power.
4.
Duke Power and the NRC will look at how to coordinate news releases when the NRC Site Team has not arrived at the Technical Support Center or Crisis Management Center.
Mary Cartwright was assigned the lead for Duke Power.
k' E. M. Kuhr, Emergency Planner Nuclear Technical Services EMK/s xc: CM File #1510 - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ -
8 ATTACHMENT 1 Attendance -- NRC Critique for McGuire Alert of 3/7-8/89 March 14, 1989 Name Organization / Title Tina Kuhr Duke Power / Emergency Planner Brad McRee Duke Power / Emergency Plann7r Tony L. McConnell Duke Power / Station Manager Ronald E.
Harris Duke Power / System Emergency Planner M.
D. McIntosh Duke Power / General Manager Nuclear Support P. K. VanDoorn NRC/ SRI McGuire P. M. Abraham Duke Power / Design Engineering Randy Leonard Duke Power /McGuire Becky Hasty Duke Power /McGuire Jane Reeside Duke Power /McGuire Robert Sharpe Duke Power /McGuire Mary Cartwright Duke Power / Corporate Communications Mary Boyd Duke Power / Corporate Communications Participating By Telephone Al Gibson NRC/ Region 2 Tom Peeples NRC/ Region 2 Bill Heil NRC/ Region 2 Coddle Julian NRC/ Region 2 I
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EMERGENC7 PROCEDURES
- ERG DEVIATION DOCUMENT Projected Schedule for Completion Deviation document scheduled completion is June 30, 1989.
It was Duke's opinion that a deviation document did exist and that we shared Catawba's documentation. This was based on the fact that both sites share a common design and similar safety analysis.
Safety Injection Initiation i
McGuire has changed the threshold for manual initiation of safety injection. The previous threshold was pressurizer level less than five percent after a second charging pump was started and cold leg injection valves were opened; the new threshold is pressurizer level decreasing after a second charging is started and injecting through the normal charging flow path.
Other Procedure Enhancements I.
Procedure changes already completed A.
OP/1,2/A/6100/02, " Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown" l
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1.
Revised procedure step to more clearly allow l
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cooldown initiation prior to meeting the Shutdown l
Margin for Cold Shutdown as long as Shutdown Margin is maintained throughout the cooldown.
B.
OP/0/A/6100/06, " Reactivity Balance Calculation" l
1.
Revised procedure step to more clearly allow cooldown initiation prior to meeting the Shutdown Margin for Cold Shutdown as long as Shutdown Margin is maintained throughout the cooldown.
II.
Procedure changes to be completed by May 1, 1989 A.
AP/1,2/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps - Case 1 Steam Generator Tube Leakage" 1.
Revised procedure to require operator to initiate manual Safety Injection and go to EP/1,2/A/5000/01 instead of manually opening NI-9A and NI-10B (NC Cold Leg Injection from NV) when maximum charging is not maintaining pressurizer level.
a t
2.
Revised subsequent actions to more clearly.
resemble EP/1,2/A/5000/04, " Steam Generator Tube Rupture".
3.
Revised the last step to direct the operator to cooldown the ruptured Steam Generator usingL EP/1,2/A/5000/4.1, "SGTR Cooldown Using Steam Dump", EP/1,2/A/5000/4.2, "SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill" or EP/1,2/A/5000/4.3, "SGTR Cooldown Using Blowdown".
4.
Added new step to begin unit load reduction.
5.
Added new step and enclosure to minimize secondary contamination.
6.
Added Caution to allow operator to exceed 50*F/hr cooldown rate.
7.
Added step to isolate blowdown on the ruptured steam generator.
B.
AP/1,2/A/5500/10, "NC System' Leakage Within the Capacity'of Both NV Pumps - Case 2 Reactor Coolant System Leakage" 1.
Revised procedure to require operator to initiate manual Safety Injection and go to EP/1,2/A/5000/01, " Safety Injection" instead of manually opening NI-9A and NI-10B (NC Cold Leg Injection from NV) when maximum charging is not-maintaining pressurizer level.
2.
Revised subsequent actions to more closely resemble EP/1,2/A/5000/2.2, " Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization" III. Procedure changes to be implemented with the Emergency and Abnormal Procedure total reissue currently scheduled for June 30, 1989 (waiting on simulator for validation)
A.
EP/1,2/A/5000/04, " Steam Generator Tube Rupture" 1.
All Reactor Coolant Pumps are left. operating for cooldown.
2.
New enclosure for minimizing secondary contamination.
B.
EP/1,2/A/5000/4.2, "SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill" 1.
Revised procedure step to more clearly allow cooldown initiated as long as Shutdown Margin is maintained throughout the cooldown.
2.
Revised procedure-to stop the reactor coolant pump on the ruptured Steam Generator after placing residual heat. removal in service..This helps maintain ruptured Steam Generator pressure elevated and hence Reactor Coolant System' pressure to allow Reactor Coolant Pumps on the intact' steam generators to be operated untii the Reactor Coolant System Temperature is less 160'F.
C.
EP/1,2/A/5000/4.3, "SGTR Cooldown Using Blowdown" 1.
Revising entire procedure to utilize normal Blowdown instead of the Blowdown Recycle System.
D.
AP/1,2/A/5500/01, " Reactor Trip" 1.
_ Deleting procedure and incorporating Reactor Trip in EP/1,2/A/5000/01, " Safety' Injection".
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l Steam Generator Tube Rupture Outage Response
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- SGTR Outage Team
- Ongoing Outage Activities
- Explanation of Ruptured Tube
- Engineering Analysis i
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- Rupture Identification
-Non-destructive Examination 1
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- Er.gineering Analysis
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- Steam Generator 1B i.
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- 100% Full-Length Bobbin Coil-All S/G's
- Rotating Pancake Coil on Defects of Interest
- VisualInspection
-ID
- OD by removing adjacent tube 1
-UT
- SelectedTubes 1
Destructive Examination
- Tubes Pulled I
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- R19 C24 -for visualinspection l
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- R18 C25 -ruptured tube i
- R13 C34 -indication ofinterest -
- Metallurgical Examination
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- Visual
-RT
-Electron Microscope
- Chemical
- Physical Properties
Engineering Analysis
- Thermal-Hydraulic
- FlowInduced Vibration
- Materials - Evaluation of specific tubing properties
- Rupture Mechanics (Failure Analysis)
- 1. 4 Tenative Outage P;an for Unit 2-t.
- Outage Scheduled to start July 5,1989
- Perform 100% full-length bobbin coil on all S/G's
- RPCon areas ofinterest
McGuire Nuclear Station S/G Tube Plugs
-Types of Plugs
- Susceptible Heat
- Response
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[ :. &.
Total Number of Tubes Plugged MNS Uniti MNS Unit 2 "A" S/G 180 191 "B" S/G 193 191 "C" S/G 169 198 "D" S/G 228 163 Total 770 743
Type of Plug Used at McGuire
- Rolled
-B & W
- Ribbed
-B & W
- Westinghouse l
- Welded
- Westinghouse l
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._.________________-____________.___._______w
Plugs from Susceptible Heats in MNS B&W Unit 1 -
Unit 2 Heat No.W592-1 Ribbed 8
4 Heat No.W592-1 Rolled 156 302 Westinghouse Heat No. NX3279 0
0 Heat No.NX3%2 0
0 Heat No.NX3513 0
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McGuire Nuclear Station Res3onse
- All B & W Ribbed Plugs from Heat No. W592 will be removed from service
- Eddy Current Tested all Hot Ieg B & W Rolled Plugs from Heat No. W592-1
- 6 Hot leg Rolled Plugs exhibited PWSCC
- No PWSCC at pressure boundry roll transition
- 1 Hot Leg rolled plug exhibited O.D. scratch
- All 7 plugs removed l
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A.
g AIT ISSUES 1
1)
NRC Position that " Operator had a lack of confidence'that certain systems would function as designed".
s This involved specific components on 2 systems, the RN system and the BB j
system.
j During the operator interviews, the AIT apparently interpreted some comments made by the operators to mean that the operators lacked confidence in certain RN system valves to respond reliably during SI events. RN system valves have an excellent history of reliable performance during SI events. The operators were using an example of an unusual single train SI actuation to illustrate to the AIT that an SI. actuation is a major plant transient that should not be manually initiated on a casual or " knee jerk" basis.
The operators had no intentions of conveying a lack of confidence in the RN system to perform as designed during an SI actuation.
The operators and TSC were appropriately concerned about placing the BB system demineralized HX in service because of a stated maintenance concern over the reliability of the HX tubes.
The tubes had experienced flow vibration failures in the past and tube stabilization bars were being fabricated to remedy the problem. The bars had not yet been delivered from the vendor. This system is small, will only pass small BB flow rates and would have limited effectiveness in a tube rupture event. This system is being supplemented by the current addition of a new, large capacity blowdown demineralized system. This new system will be placed into service, and addressed in our procedures. This should resolve operator and NRC concerns over reliability and effectiveness of this system.
2)
Substantial deviation from Westinghouse ERG's (Addressed in presentation on ERG deviation document)
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%4 DISTRIBUTION FOR MEETING SUtt.ARY DATED: May 17, 1989 Facility : McGuire Units 1&2*
~ Dockets file NRC & Local PDRs PDII-3 Reading J. Sniezek, 12-G-18 D. Matthews M. Rood D. Hood OGC-WF E. Jordan, MNBB-3302 flRC Participants ACRS (10)
R. Borchardt
- Copies sent to persons on facility service list I
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