ML20236D402

Intervenor Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law.* Aspect of Surveillance Should Not Be Left Up to Option of Licensee Since No Other Way to Determine If Gaps Being Formed in Panels.W/Certificate of Svc

ML20236D402
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	03/14/1989
From:	Rich C RICH, C.
To:
References
CON-#189-8284 88-560-01-LA, 88-560-1-LA, OLA, NUDOCS 8903230088
Download: ML20236D402 (19)

Text

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA g,pg.

j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1 ali C BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 19 MAR 14 P4 :07 In the Matter of: ) 0Frit : .

) Docket No. 50-335'b b h h ' f'0 '

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY )

) ASLBP No. 88-560-01 LA (St. Lucie Plant, Unit No.1) )

INTERVENOR'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ,

I. Introduction and Background

1. On June 12, 1987, Florida Power and Light Company (hereinafter "FPL" or " Licensee") requested a license amendment to allow for expansion of spent fuel pool ctorage capacity at its St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 1 (St. Lucie 1).' The amendment sought to increase the capacity of the spent fuel pool at St. Lucie 1 from 728 to 1706 fuel assemblies.

2. On August 31, 1987, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (hereinafter "NRC" or " Commission) published a notice referencing FPL's application for an amendment, noting.that the Commission had made a proposed finding of no significant hazards consideration, and offering the opportunity for a public hearing. On September 30, 1987, Intervenor addressed a letter to the Secretary of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission requesting that a public hearing be held concerning the spent fuel pool expansion amendment. In responsive pleadings filed November 4 and 9, 1987, both the NRC staff and FPL pointed out that the letter failed to meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. $ 2.714 and that, therefore, the request should be denied. Thereafter, pursuant to a Board memorandum and Order dated 13 November 1987, Intervenor submitted l

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f on 15 January 1988, a " Request for Hearing and Petition for Leave'to Intervene" 1 l

f (hereinafter " Amended Petition"). The Amended Petition contained sixteen $

contentions which'Intervenor proposed be admitted in this proceeding.

Following completion of its review, the NRC Staff determined

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that the requested amendment involved no significant hazards consideration, and issued Amendment No. 91 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 on 11 March 1988, accompanied by a Safety Evaluation (hereinaf ter "SE") . Thereafter, on 20 April 1988, and following a prehearing conference held on 29 March 1988, the Board issued a Memorandum and Order granting Intervenor's Amended Petition to Intervene and admitting Intervenor's Contentions 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11 and 15, f

The Atomic Safety renumbered respectively as Admitted Contentions 1 through 7.

and Licensing Appeal Board subsequently affirmed that decision.

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4. Contention 5 was dismissed, subsequently, in a Memorandum and Order dated 31 May 1988, because Intervenor failed to indicate that he intended to pursue the contention.

5. On 24 June 1988, Intervenor requested that Contention 2 be withdrawn because of the removal of the temporary. crane in the spent Juel pool storage  !

i area. Upon consideration of the Intervenor's request, the Board issued an order on 27 July 1988, dismissing Contention 2, "with prejudice and moot".

6. On 14 October 1988, the Board issued a Memorandum 'and Order in response to Licensee's Motions for Summary Disposition.

In that order the Board ruled that a hearing would take place on the following, remaining contentions:

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• Contention 3 - The possible materials degradation and failure that might occur in Boraflex panels due to heat and radioactivity

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generated in the spent fuel pool have not been adequately considered J l or analyzed.

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. contention 6~- The proposed'use of Boraflex in.the'high density b O ' spent fuel storage. racks designed and fabricated by the Joseph'

• Oats Corporation is essentially.a new and unprovenLtechnology. ,

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%- , * : Contention 7 -

a) The mechanisms which prevent the erroneous insertion of; .

fuel _ assembly into a storage cell' such that the prescription .

'of Standard Review Plant Section 9.1'2, . part III.2.b, that it'not be possible for "A fuel assembly ... (to) be inserted anywhere other than a design location," has:not been' demon-strated; and b) It:has not been shown why criticality will not occur in the spent fuel pool in the absence of a moderator.

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7. Hearing were held in Stuart, Florida over three days beginning on

24. January 1989, and a schedule set for the filing of proposed-findings of fact'and conclusions of law by.all parties.

8. This decision is based upon the' record'in this proceeding, including that developed'during the hearings held on 24-26 January 1989. We have accorded

. appropriate weight to the testimony of the witnesses based on their knowledge, I skill and experience or lack thereof.- We will now set forth our resolution of each of the matters remaining at11ssue in this proceeding. Any proposed finding of

~ fact or conclusion of: law submitted by the parties not incorporated into this decision is rejected as being unsupported in law or fact or as unnecessary to this decision.

II. ANALYSIS A. Contentions 3 and 6

9. In our Memorandum and Order (Rulings on Motions for Summary Disposition) o t dated 14 October 1988, (hereinafter "SD order"), we granted summary disposition .

of Contention 3 with respect to all of the non-Boraflex issues, but denied s

. ummary disposition as to the Boraflex issues. SD Order at 38. We denied f

Licensee's Motion for summary disposition of Contention 6, pertaining to Boraflex, l

in toto. Id. at 39. .As a result of our rulings, and as indicated earlier, the Boraflex contentions which remained for hearing may be stated as follows:

• Contention 3 - The possible materials degradation'  !

and failure that might occur in Boraflex panels due to heat and radioactivity generated in the spent fuel pool have not been adequately considered or analyzed.

• Contention 6 - The proposed use of Boraflex in the j high density spent fuel storage racks designed and fabricated by the Jospeh Oat Corporation is essentially a new and unproven technology.

Because the issues rasied by these contentions deal exclusively.with the use of Boraficx as a neutron absorber in high density spent fuel storage racks, and largely overlap,.the contentions will be considered together. I l

1) Use of Boraflex la the St. Lucie 1 spent fuel racks

10. Neutron attenuation in the St. Lucie 1 spent fuel racks is l accomplished by a neutron absorber material, known as Boraflex. Boraflex, when it retains material integrity, is an effective entrapper of neutrone. .

I However, if gaps develop in the Boraflex, the material loses its ability to attenuate the neutrons and therefore, function as a poison. (Singh, Tr. 198 at 12) In order to maintain its neutron attenuating ability i Boraflex must maintain uniform dispersion of the boron carbide particles 1 in the polymer. (Gingh, Tr. 344 at 15)

11. The function of the Boraflex is to provide a boron curtain I

between fuel assemblies. (Singh, Tr. 196) The presence of the Boraflex is essential to maintaining a k-eff of less than 0.95 in the St. Lucie 1 spent  !

fuel pool under normal conditions. The presence of gaps in the Boraflex increases the k-eff in the pool. (Singh, Tr. 187 at 11)

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12. The St. Lucie i spent fuel racks are of a two-region design utilizing a different B-10 loading in each region, i

13. The primary concerns of the Intervenor in this proceeding were thats a) not enough is known about the effects of heat and/or radioactivity in a spent fuel pool environment on the Boraflex over the required service life of the material to allow the use of Boraflex as a neutron absorber; and b) the storage racks themselves, including the manner in which the Boraflex is held in place in the racks, were of a new and completely untested and unproven design. We would note at the outset that the term "new and unproven techno-logy" is somewhat imprecise and subjective. When we admitted Contention 6, we understood its gravamen to be that there was insufficient information available -- as a result of both testing and in-service experience -- to support a findhg that the utilization of Boraflex as a neutron absorber in the st.

Lucie 1 spent fuel racks for at least the next twenty years provides reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered.

14. In considering whether the license amendment granted by the NRC staff may remain in ef fect, we must determine, for each of the factual issues reamining in dispute, whether the preponderance of the evidence affirmatively supports the Licensee's position. On the basis of the record before us, we conclude that it does not.

2) Test and in-service experience with Boraflex as a neutron absorber

15. The Boraflex in the St. Lucie 1 racks is subjected to heat and radiation. The water in the St. Lucie 1 spant fuel pool, containing a

concentra tion of about 1720 ppm soluble boron, is generally maintained at approximately 100* F. We do not know whether this is a higher temperature than Boraflex has previously been exposed to in-service. As temperature is suspected as being an environmental factor contributing to degradation of the Boraflex., (Exhibit #1, 5-28) we view our lack of precise information concerning this parameter a significant shortcoming in proving the suitability of this material for use in this pool.

16. Except in certain areas set aside for accelerated testing, the Boraflex in the St. Lucie 1 storage racks will be exposed to radiation doses of less than 1011 rads through the expiration of St. Lucie 1 operating license.

17. Before approving the use of Boraflex as a neutron absorber in spent fuel storage racks, the NRC Staff required testing under physical conditions which greatly exaggerated the severity of the environment in some instances and inadequately represented the severity of the environment to which the material would be exposed in actual use in other instances. The heat aging tests conducted on the Bucaflex by the manufacturer himself 5ere conducted on l unirradiated samples. (Wing, Tr. 436 at 4) We accept EPRI's characterization of these studies , therefore, as, "...not particularly meaningful since the  ;

material tested was unirradiated." (Exhibit #1, pg. 4-9). As neither Licensee nor staff provided us with any other data as to the suitability of this material when exposed to elevated temperatures and radiation for ex tended period of times, we cannot conclude that the material is capable of performing its intended function.

18. Extensive radiation tests on Boraflex have been conducted 1

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by the manufacturer on small, s, ample coupons at the University of Michigan's for Nuclear' Reactor, first in 1979-1981 as part of the qualification of l Boraflex for use as a neutron absorber in spent fuel racks; and subsequently, following the discovery of gaps in Boraflex used in the Quad Cities spent fuel storage racks, to determine the dimensional changes of Boraflex under controlled conditions. Licensee's witness, Dr. Turner, prepared and analyzed the data from these tests. His results were presented in a document i i i identified in the hearings as Exhibit #9.

19. Licensee's data revealed that dimensional changes in width averaged 10 rads gamma. (Turner, l 4% or more when subject to the cumulative dose of 5x10 Tr. 387 at 4-15) This is the dose that the Boraflex would be expected to I

receive during its residence in the spent fuel pool. (Turner, Profiled l l

l Testimony, pg. 11) l i

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20. We would just like to make note of the fact here that Dr. Turner himself expressed little. confidence in the results of his test data evaluation. l (Turner, Tr. 407 at 5) The designer of the racks also indicated that all test data available at this point relies on coupon tests utilizing coupons that are too small to provide accurate measurements. (Singh, Tr. at 17)

The manufacturer of the material, Bisco, reached this name conclusion and is sponsoring an additional series of tests utilizing larger coupons. l We would agroo with EPRI's conclusion that a reasonable expectation of l

shrinkage by the Boraflex while in service is at least 3-4%. This is the conclusion EPRI made when evaluating the data as presented by Dr. Turner in his study. (Cxhibit #1, pg. 4-21)

21. We have been presented will little evidence of the suitability of

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the material,,Boraflex, for use in a spent fuel pool application. In his profiled testimony Licensee indicated that, " Substantial information to

,the performance characteristics of Boraflex has been developed from l testing." These results, apparently demonstrated the sui.tability of Boraflex as'a neutron absorber. (Singh, Prefiled Testimony pg. 13) When asked in the hearing to identify this information, Licensee referred to the EPRI document he submitted and identified at this hearing as Exhibit #1.

(Singh, Tr. 334, at 20) However, throughout the hearing both of Licensee's witnesses, Dr. Singh and Turner, repeatedly discounted the validity of the  !

conlusions reached by this study. (Singh, Tr.192, at 14-25) Licensee restricts the applicability.of the EPRI study, and correctly in our mind, of because of the lack information concerning the various parameters of the different studies that were evaluated. (Singh, Tr.155 at 5-25) . Licensee's other witness himself rejects many of the conclusions reached in the EPRI study.

(Turner, Tr. 390 at 10). This Board does not know whether we are being asked to accept or reject in whole or in part the EPRI study. The mere existence of data does not prove the suitability of this material. The data must be shown to be correctly arrived at and applicable to the instant case. Licensee does'not feel that either of these conditions have been met in the case of i the EPRI study.  ;

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22. The NRC staff was of no assistance in aiding the Board in evaluating f I

the usefulness of the data presented by Licensee. Their lack of familiarity l with the data was glaring as noted at the hearing. (Cotter, Tr. 477 at 2)

23. All parties seemed to agree that there was no data available to warrant the life of the Boraflex for its intended service life. Turner,

Tr. 370 at 19, 372 at 5, 394 at 12). Despite Licensee's protestations to ,

do otherwise, we would also agree with EPRI's conclusion on this point.

There is no way to predict the synergistic effects of long-term exposure to radiation and heat in an aqueous pool environment. (Wing, Tr. 548 at 6)

Licensee seems to admit that there is no proof that the material will be able to perform its intended function over the expected life. (Turner, Profiled Testimony pg. 14 at 5) When asked to clarify his statement as to whether he really tueant to say that this was proven, Dr. Turner responded that he did not mean to say that it was proven. (Turner, Tr. 379 at 12).

24. We agree with the conclusions reached by the EPRI study known as Exhibit:#1. 1) No means of mechanical or adhesive restraint should be used so that the material can undergo shrinkage in a stress free condition thereby precluding the potential for gap formation. 2) Oversize panels should be provided to compensate for the effect of shrinkage on the reactivity of the fuel / rack system. (Exhibit #1, pg. 6-4)

3) Rack design

25. Since Boraflex has begun to be used as a fixed, neutron absorber in spent fuel pool racks, it has been noted that gaps have developed in some', full-length, in-service panels. Some of these racks have been manufactured by the Joseph Oat Corporation with the assistance of Holtec International. As a result, the suggestion has been made that new designs anticipato and accomodate what is now considered, expected shrinkage which can lead to gaps. (Turner, Tr. 139 at 14, 377 at 13). The manufacturer of the racks at St. Lucie 1 admits that his original rack were not designed with the expectation that shrinkage would occur and that gaps would develop.

l Therefore, his designs did not accomodate this occurence. (Singh, Tr.197 at 12-15)  ;

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26. The racks to be used in St. Lucie 1, Region 1 are designed to initiate gaps in the Boraflex as an essential aspect of the design. (Singh, Tr. 311 at 18-23, Turner, Tr. 394 at 21). The gap formation is promoted by  !

l precise points of restraint at up to 20 points along the longitudinal edge of the Boraflex sheet. (Singh, Tr. 560 at 10, 564 at 4). The object of this design is to accomodate shrinkage by relieving stress by the formation of gaps at precise, axial locations. (Singh, Tr. 415 at 14-25) However, Licensee admits that the probability that any gap will form at an expected i

location is only 50%.(Singh, Tr. 418 at 20). The object of this design is to promote the formation of a greater. number of smaller gaps as opposed to j the formation of a few, much larger gaps.

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27. The manufacturer admits to the construction of only one other l in-service rack even similar or identical in design, as concerns the manner in which the Boraflex is held or restrained in the racks, to that being l

utilized in St. Lucie 1, region 1. This is Diablo Canyon. (Singh, Tr.

l 301 at 4, 313 at 22). 11owever, the manufacturer was not even sure that the Boraflex sheets in use at Diable Canyon included the scallop cutouts inLthe Boraflex as is found in St. Lucie 1 racks.(Singh, Tr. 315 at 20)

28. We do have some test data from Diable Canyon on the in-service l performance of the Boraflex, but we have no idea at all what levels of exposure the material suffered. (Singh, Tr.178 at 2) . The data, therefore, which was not made available to the Board anyway, is of no use.

29. Oddly enough, Licensee feels that a lack of information regarding in-service performance is proof of its adequacy. (Singh, Tr. 179 at 1-9)

.- f We wholeheartedly reject this, 'no news is good news' theory of proof advanced by Licensee. We. prefer to proceed upon a more solid evidentiary footing when the public health and safety is so clearly at stake.

30. Licensee admits this is a new design in order to accomodate the important new design factor of anticipated shrinkage. (Turner, Tr. 377 at 10-18).

31. The URC staff had no idea of the nature or intent of the manufacturer's design of the St. Lucie 1, region 1 racks. This misunderstanding included not only the project manager, Mr. Tourigny, but also the primary NRC witness

! at the hearing, Dr. Wing. (Tourigny, Tr. 491 at 3, 493 at 25) ( Wing, Tr.

- 457 at 15, 475 at 9, 462 at 7). Mr. Tourigny was not even aware of the presence of the scalloped cutouts in the Boraflex.(Tourigny, Tr. 539 at 11)

The NRC staff approval of this rack design was based on their incorrect understanding or the new rack design. (Tourigny, prefiled Testimony, pg. 11, A.4) The new manufacturing process utilized in the St. Lucie 1, I

region 1 racks does not avoid manufacturing processes that could pinch the Boraflex. The rack design, in fact, guarantess the formation of gaps.

The NRC staf f approved the rack design on the premise that nct gaps would form. The analysis of the NRC staff of the racks being utilized at St.

Lucie 1 is of absolutely no use to the Board in this case.  !

32. If the material, Boraflex,only shrinks 2%, mechanical restraint of the material will occur. (Singh, Tr. 565 at 1) This restraint will promote the formation of gaps.

4) Effect of reactivity of gaps in the Doraflex panels in the St. Lucie 1 spent fuel racks.

33. The Board has only one analysis of the effect of gap formation l

I in the St. Lucie 1 spent fuel pool. That analysis was done by the Licensee

and not even reviewed by the NRC staff. (Tourigny, Tr. 496 at 8) Again, this is because the NRC staff did not understand the object of the design of the racks and thererore, did not consider the presence of gaps in their l l

criticality analysis.;Tourigny, Tr. 496 at 19) Therefore, the Staff did not even review any generic studies that took into account the presence of gaps. Staff witness, Dr. Kopp , claimed be reviewed generic studies that i

led him to believe that the presence of gaps would not lead to a k-eff of higher than 0.95. However, Dr. Kopp was not even aware of the center-to-center spacing of the St. Lucie 1, region 1 racks or the enrichment of the fuel used in those studies. Without a precise knowledge of at least these parameters, we can see no value at all in any conclusions offered to this Board by this witness. Therefore, we find ourselves in the uncomfortable position of having to rely solely upon the Licensee for proof that gaps will not lead to a k-eff that is greater than 0.95.

We have no independent review of the criticality analysis performed by Dr. Turner.

34. Licensee states that a worst case as concerns gap formation is the formation of 1/2 inch gaps located every 12 inches along the vertical plane of the Boraflex sheet. Since the staff did no analysis of gap formation, we do not know whether this is true or not. Additionally, we do not know that gaps will form precisely as described by Licensee. Since no other rack design has deliberately promoted the formation of gaps, this Board would like some assurance that any combination of gaps, as far as size and location, that could result from this design will not allow criticality to exceed 0.95. We find such assurances completely lacking.

35. We would just like to point out again that this rack design found

.g in St. ~Lucie 1, region 1 goes directly against one of only two recommendations L .

t that EPRI concludes their entire study with. That is:

no means of mechanical or adhesive restraint should be used so that the material can ut Sergo shrin:. age in a stress free condition thereby precluding the potential  ;

for gap formation. (Exhibit #1, pg. 6-4)

36. This Board cannot rely solely upon the extensive experience of the Joseph oat Corporation and Holtec International in the fabrication and design of spent fuel storage racks which use Boraflex. Despite the fact {

that it was, "...as logical as gravity is.", that the Boraflex would form gaps when it shrank, the fabricators original design did not take.this design factor into account.(Singh, Tr. 197 at 4). Licensee has provided  ;

this Board with no independent analysis to prove that their new design will l perform as intended. Despite their extensive experience, they are abandoning their previous designs in favor of this new,' untested design.

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_B1 Contention'7 Contention 7 reads as follows: J 37.

That the increase of the spent fuel. pool capacity,;

which includes fuel rods that are more enriched, will cause the requirements of ANSI-NI6-1975 not to be met- i and will increase the probability that a criticality acci- '

. l dent will occur in the spent fuel pool and will exceed 10 CFR part 50, A 62 criterion.

As indicated in Part I, supra, the issues pertinent to the contention which' remained for hearing after our ruling on the Licensee's' Motion for summary disposition can be stated as follows:

j a) The mechanisms which prevent the erroneous insertion of a fuel assembly into a storage cell,'such that the prescription of Standard ReUlew Plan (SRP) Section 9.1.2, Part III.2.b, that it not be possible for "a fuel assembly

. . . (to) ne inserted anywhere other than a design location,"

has not been demonstrated: and b) It has not been shown why criticality will not occur [

in the spent fuel pool in the absence of a moderatcr. i

38. The reactivity of spent fuel assemblies is affected primarily by three factors: a) the quantity and enrichment of the uranium-235 in the fuel, b)' the quantly of plutonium that ih produced during the fission process in the fuel while in the reactor core, and c) the quantity of neutron-I absorbing material (poisons) present. The reactivity of' fuel elements in a  !

spent fuel pool can be decreased by natural decay of the U-235 and Pu-239 present in the used fuel. The half-life of Pu-239 is much shorter than that of U-235 at a mere 25,000 years. We do not anticipate any detectable decrease in the radioactivity of the used fuel assemblies due to natural decay of either of these two elements.

39. In the absence of a moderator, the fuel could relocated to the 1

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bottom of the pool along with the zirconium cladding, which would probably j have been turned into zirconium oxide. (Turner, Tr. 76 at 10) Neither Licensee nor staff had any idea how much fuel would be present in the spent L

fuel pool if the pool were to be considered full. (Turner, Tr. 65 at 15)

(Kopp, Tr. 128 at 2) Neither Licensee nor staff had any idea how much plutonium would be present in pool if the pool were to be considered to have all 1706 assemblies in the pool. (Turner 66 at 3) (Kopp, Tr. 127 at 23)

Neither Licensee nor staff had any idea how much zirconium would be present in a fully loaded spent fuel pool at St. Lucie 1. (Turner, Tr. 79 at 3) (Kopp, Tr. 125 at 12) Both Licensee and staff admit that an unknown amount of zirconium oxide would act as a moderator to an unknown degree. (Turner, T.

79 at 20) (Kopp, Tr.125 at 9) Therefore, a moderator of some degree would be present in some unknownconfiguration at the bottom of the St. Lucie 1 spent fuel pool in' the absence of the moderator, water. Staff did no analsysis, nor did it examine any analysis of a batch of spent fuel in a configuration where it has relocated to the bottom of a pool with zirconium oxide mixed in with it. (Kopp, Tr. 125 at 20) This Board has no way of determining whether the fuel would go critical in this configuration or not. In the absence of proof to the contrary, we must conclude that Licensee has failed to meet his affirmative burden of proof on this issue. l

40. Standard review plan 9.1.2.III.2 (a) states that: Criticality infor-mation in the SAR must show that the center to center spacing between fuel assemblies in the storage racks is sufficient to maintain the array when fully loaded and flooded with non-borated water in the sub-critical condition"

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41. The only practical way to detect gap formation in an in-service, Boraflex panel is to do' blackness testing, in the absence of a rack design .,

i that allows the panels to be removed. (Kopp, Tr. 552 at 4)

III. Conclusions of Law 7

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Based on the foregoing findings of fact and upon consideration V, i of the entire evidentiary record in this proceeding, we make.the following l conclusions of law

1. Licensee's rack design, which is guaranteed to create gaps in the Boraflex material, is of a type which has never been utilized before.

2. There exists no data at all which confirms that the rack and the l

Boraflex material will perform as described by the Licensea.

3. The NRC staff has done no analysis of a rack design which deliberately promotes the forming of gaps. This design goes directly against the recommendations that are a result of all previous experience with Boraflex.

This Board is being asked to rely solely upon the assurances of the Licensee and the manufacturer of the racks as to the acceptability of the design.

This is an untenable position.

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4. FP&L has clearly failed to meet its burden of proof in this case. l A lack of evidence confirming the contrary position is no substitute for a substantial body of evidence proving Licensee's assertions.

5. The Boraflex is expected to undergo dimensional changes that exceed 2.5%. This is greater than the acceptance criteria for continued use as established in the Safety Evaluation Report.

4 IV. Order

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Wherefore, in-accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Rules of Practice of the Commission, and based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, IT IS ORDERED that License Amendment No. 91 to License No. DPR-67, issued by the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation on 11 March 1988, authorizing the expansion of the St. Lucie 1 i

spent fuel pool, shall be suspended with the following conditions.

The Staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall evaluate 1

the rack design of the St. Lucie I racks taking into account the fabricator's  ;

intentions. That issto promote the formation of gaps in the region 1 racks.

That the Staff of the Nuclear Regulatoy Commission shall do an analysis of i

gap formation in Boraflex in the presence of fuel of 4.5 weight percent U-235 to determine the most conservative configuration of gap size and location in order to provide this Board with th) assurance that such a configuration will not allow k-eff to exceed 0.95 in a normal condition, without taking into account the prer.en'ce of borated water.

That if such an analysis is shown to confirm the suitability of the rack design in the instant case, then blackness testing of the material should be incorporated as an essential part of the technical specifications of the license amendment. This aspect of surveillance should not be left up to the option of the Licensee. There is no other way to determine if gaps are being formed in the panels.

! .f ect lly sub#dtted, Resp!

l il'l, l A i Campbell Rich Pro' Se Litiga,nt 4626 SE Pilot Ave.

Stuart, Fl. 34997 407 286 5724

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l UNITED STATES OF. AMERICA ,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION UWI' l

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ,89 MAR 14 P4 :08

) Of f!LT .. m v.,

In the Matter of

) Docket No.: 50-335N hjjj C FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY )

) ASLBP No.: 88-560-01-LA (St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 1) )

l CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of Findings of Fact and Conclusions.of Law  ;

dated 10 March 1989, were served on tho.following by deposit in overnight mail and first class mail on the date shown below B. Paul Cotter, Jr. Chairperson Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

. Richard F. Cole i Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licen' sing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Glenn O. Bright Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555  !

Michael A. Bauser, Esq.

Harold F. Reis, Esq.

Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.

1615 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Adjudicatory File Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 (2 copies) i

fif t 4:

V secretary ,

U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission

' Washington, D.C. . 20555 Atttn Chief, Docketing and Service Section (Original plus two copies)

Patricia Jehle Office of General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission '

Washington, D.C. 20555-A

. / l g,I l

C mpbell Rich Pro Se Litig' ant 4626~SE Pilot Avenue 4 Stuart, Florida 34997 407 286 5724 i

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