ML20236C051

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Proposed Tech Spec Changes Re ESFAS & Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations
ML20236C051
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 07/22/1987
From:
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20236C035 List:
References
NUDOCS 8707290325
Download: ML20236C051 (13)


Text

_ _ _ _

ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT V0GTLE - UNIT 1 NRC DOCKET 50-424 OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68 BASIS FOR PROPOSED CHANGES I

PROPOSED CHANGE 1

)

Revise Tables 3.3-2, 3.3-3, and 4.3-2 to delete references to containment i phase "A" isolation on high containment area radiation (monitors RE-0005 and j RE-0006).

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Background

Four area radiation monitors are located inside the containment building to I continuously indicate radiation levels at the operating deck. These monitors i function as part of the Area Radiation Monitoring System (ARMS) as discussed  !

in Section 12.3.4 of the FSAR. They are considered to be safety-related and are Class 1E qualified.

In addition to their ARMS function, these monitors function as part of the  !

Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS). The low-range monitors,  !

RE-0002 and RE-0003, are used to initiate containment ventilation system isolation. The high-range monitors, RE-0005 and RE-0006, are used to initiate  !

phase "A" containment isolation. In their role of initiating containment l isolation, monitors RE-0005 and RE-0006 provide redundancy to the automatic '

containment isolation initiated by any signal which initiates safety injection. These signals are:

- manual safety injection actuation

- high containment pressure  !

- low pressurizer pressure

- low steamline pressure Containment isolation may also be initiated manually.

0433m El-1 07/22/87 SL-2917 8707290325 870722 DR ADOCK 0500g4

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ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

BASIS FOR PROPOSED CHANGES The Technical Specifications contain limiting conditions for operation (LCO) and surveillance requirements for monitors RE-0005 and RE-0006. Specification 3/4.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, requires that both channels be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. With one channel inoperable, Action 27 requires that the inoperable channel be restored to operable. status within 7 days or that the plant be in at least hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, at least hot standby within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and cold shutdown within the subsequent 24 l hours. Specification 3/4.3.3.1, Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations, {

lists monitors RE-0005 and RE-0006 and refers to the ESFAS specification for (

LCO and surveillance requirements. Specification 3/4.3.3.6, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, includes monitors RE-0005 and RE-0006 and specifies LCO and surveillance requirements consistent with an accident monitoring function.

Equioment Status l On Thursday, July 16, 1987 Monitor RE-0006 was declared inoperable. In accordance with Action 27 of Technical Specification 3.3.2, a 7 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered and efforts were undertaken to repair the monitor. This specification requires plant shutdown should the monitor not be restored to OPERABLE status by Thursday, July 23, 1987 at approximately 2140 hrs. CDT. ,

l Restoration Effort Monitor RE-0006 was declared inoperable due to an intermittent " low fail" alarm on the Safety Related Display Console. This indicates a possible interruption of current through the monitor loop. The channel was placed in  !

bypass and current monitored overnight. Current readings indicated an I intermittent loss of continuity. On Friday, July 17, components in the ,

monitor loop located outside containment were tested in an attempt to locate i the fault. A faulty cable connector at a pre-amplifier assembly in the I control building was found and repaired. On Saturday, July 18, entry was made into containment to test cables for continuity, with satisfactory results. On Sunday, July 19, as a cable was being terminated at its inboard containment penetration, a mechanical failure of the connector occurred. Since that time, efforts have been directed at developing a procedure, locating the necessary parts, and preparing the connector for repair. On-site sources, as well as vendors and other utilities were contacted resulting in the parts being obtained by Wednesday, July 22. Repair of the connection will be attempted on July 22; however, GPC estimates that the LC0 may expire before the repair and the required functional testing can be completed.

0433m El-2 07/22/87 SL-2917

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ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued) ,

l BASIS FOR PROPOSED CHANGES Basis for ProDosed Technical Sofcification Change GPC has reviewed the safety functions of high-range radiation monitors RE-0005 '

and RE-0006 to determine the impact of their inoperability on plant safety. i This review included a review by Westinghouse and covered all postulated accidents for which the monitors would be called upon to function. l Containment phase "A" isolation on high radiation is not a protective function and is not used as a basis in the FSAR Chapter 15 accident analyses. Phase "A" isolation initiation by radiation monitors RE-0005 and RE-0006 is redundant to other. features that isolate containment (as discussed above).

For postulated accidents, one of these other features would initiate phase "A" isolation prior to initiation by monitors RE-0005 and RE-0006.

Indeed, phase "A" isolation by these radiation monitors is not included in the Westinghouse standard design basis, and therefore, not included in the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-0472). Inclusion of this feature in the Vogt?e design, therefore, represents what we believe to be a unique application.

Based on the above, GPC believes that removal of the phase "A" containment

( isolation function of monitors RE-0005 and RE-0006 from the VEGP containment l 1 solation system is justified. He are therefore proposing to physically remove this feature from the containment isolation system and remove references to this function from the Technical Specifications. He note that the accident monitoring function of monitors RE-0005 and RE-0006 is not affected by the proposed change and will be maintained in accordance with Specification 3/4.3.3.6. He also note that containment purge and vent valve isolation on high containment radiation as required by NUREG-0737 Item II.E.4.2(7) is unaffected by the proposed change. This function is provided by monitors RE-0002, RE-0003, RE-2565A, RE-25658, and RE-2555C which remain in the Technical Specifications.

GPC will revise the VEGP FSAR to reflect the removal of the phase "A" isolation on high containment area radiation following NRC review and approval of the change.

Justification for Emergency Recuest The inability to repair the radiation monitor loop results in the existence of an exigent situation. Pursuant to Action Statement 27, the plant will be required to proceed to shutdown on Thursday, July 23, 1987 if the monitor is not restored to an OPERABLE status.

0433m El-3 07/22/87 SL-2917 >

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ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

BASIS FOR' PROPOSED CHANGES I GPC has undertaken a concerted effort to effect: repair of.this monitor while ]

, on-line. This effort is continuing and may result in restoration of ' the i L monitor to an OPERABLE status prior to expiration 'of. the LCO. However, it is  !

not possible to predict whether or not these-actions will' be successful. GPC is, . therefore, making' this application for an amendment to the' Technical Specifications on an " emergency" basis pursuant tr ;0.CFR 50.91(a)(5).

In the event the NRC can not process the proposed Technical Specification changes prior to' expiration of. the LCO, GPC is requesting a temporary waiver of 'the requirements of- Action 27 until the NRC processing can be completed. y The preceding evaluation - has shown that no significant safety impact would j result from the proposed changes. Redundant and diverse signals are'available to ensure' containment isolation when required. GPC therefore feels that, in the event a temporary waiver of compliance is necessary, compensatory measures are not needed.

l PROPOSED CHANGE 2 Revise Item la of Tables 3.3-4 and 4.3-3 to reflect the removal of containment )

area high range radiation monitors RE-0005 and RE-0006 -from specification 3/4.3.2.

BASIS This change is proposed to achieve consistency within ' the Technical I Specifications. Specification 3/4.3.3.1, Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations, lists containment area high range radiation monitors RE-0005 and 'i RE-0006 in Tables 3.3-4 and 4.3-3. Reference is made in those. tables to the l ESFAS specification for limiting conditions for operation (LCO) 'and '

i surveillance requirements. Specification 3/4.3.3.6 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, lists monitors RE-0005 and RE-0006 in Table 3.3-8 and l specifies' LCO and surveillance requirements based on an accident monitoring function. Since proposed change 1 removes the ESFAS function of these monitors from the Technical. Specifications, Tables 3.3-4' and 4.3-3 are revised accordingly' to refer to the Accident Monitoring Instrumentation' specification. a for LCO and surveillance requirements. Items originally included in the ESFAS specification .but not addressed in the Accident Monitoring Instrumentation j specification are maintained in the tables.  :

0433m El-4 07/22/87 SL-2917 n

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ENCLOSURE 2 1 PLANT V0GTLE - UNIT 1 'l NRC DOCKET 50-424 OPERATING. LICENSE NPF-68  ;

10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION Pursuant ~ to 10 CFR 50.92, ' Georgia Power Companyohas evaluated the ' attached proposed amendment to- the VEGP Unit 1 Technical Specifications and has 1

i determined that its implementation would not involve 'significant hazards considerations. The basis for this determination is as follows.  ;

PROPOSED CHANGE 1 i

Revise ' Tables 3.3-2, 3.3-3, and 4.3-2 to remove . references .to' phase "A" <

containment isolation on a high containment area radiation signal (monitors l RE-0005 and RE-0006). l 1

BASIS I

This change does not involve significant hazards considerations. for' the l following reasons:

1. The change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. Phase "A" - containment isolation on a high containment area radiation signal is not required to. mitigate the  !

consequences of any accident or malfunction analyzed for Plant Vogtle. No credit is taken for this isolation signal in the accident analyses described in Chapter 15 of the VEGP FSAR. Containment phase "A" isolation at VEGP is initiated by the redundant and diverse signals which initiate safety inj ection, i.e., manual _ safety injection initiation, 'high containment pressure, low pressurizer pressure, and low steam line pressure. Phase "A" isolation. can also be initiated manually. In all accidents and malfunctions analyzed for VEGP, phase "A" isolation is initiated by one of_ these signals before the high area radiation isolation setpoint is. reached. Removal of phase "A" isolation on high containment area radiation from the VEGP containment isolation system -design 'will therefore have no significant safety consequences.

2. The' change does not create the possibility of an accident different from any previously analyzed. No new system configuration or failure mode. is  ;

l' created by the change. The high containment area radiation . input to the VEGP containment isolation system will be ' physically removed such that- an '

unanalyzed malfunction of .the containment isolation system. could not occur. Operation of the containment isolation system using other  :

automatic or manual initiation signals is not affected by the change.

0433m E2-1 07/22/87 SL-2917 i

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ENCLOSURE 2 (Continued) 10 CFR 50.92-EVALUATION

3. The margin of safety is -not reduced by the change. Phase."A" containment 7 . isolation on a high containment area' radiation signal is. not a protective function. It is not required and' takes no part 'in the mitigation of any accident or malfunction analyzed for VEGP. Redundant and diverse signals  ;

ensure phase "A" isolation in accordance with the FSAR Chapter 15 safety analyses.

PROPOSED CHANGE 2-Revise Item la of. Tables 3.3-4 and 4.3-3 to reflect the removal of containment area high range radiation monitors -RE-0005 and RE-0006 from . specification 3/4.3.2.

BASIS This change is proposed to achieve consistency within the Technical Specifications. It is - therefore consistent with. Item (i) of " Examples of Amendments That Are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant- Hazards Considerations", listed on page 7751 of the Federal Reaister, March 6,1986.

This change does not involve significant hazards considerations for the' following' reasons:

1. The proposed change does not increase the probability or consequences of.

an accident previously analyzed 'oecause it 'is an administrative change which corrects a reference to achieve internal consistency.- The change neither produces any mechanism to increase the probability .of accidents previously analyzed nor does it affect the capability for~ mitigation.

l 2. The proposed change does not create .the possibility of an accident 'of a different kind than any previously analyzed. because it .i s an administrative change which does not introduce any new failure mode or system configuration.

3. The proposed change does not reduce a margin of safety because the change specifies appropriate equipment surveillance requirements -to ensure ' that .

g the required function will be performed.

1

0433m E2-2 07/22/87

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l ENCLOSURE 3 PLANT V0GTLE - UNIT 1  !

NRC DOCKET 50-424 i OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68 INSTRUCTIONS FOR INCORPORATION The proposed amendment to the VEGP Unit 1 Technical Specifications (Appendix A l to Operating License NPF-68) would be incorporated as follows: 1 i

Remove Page Insert Page 3/4 3-18 3/4 3-18 3/4 3-27 3/4 3-27 3/4 3-29 3/4 3-29 -

3/4 3-38 3/4 3-38 I 3/4 3-46 3/4 3-46 3/4 3-48 3/4 3-48 I

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ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued) j 41

- ACTION 24.- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the T Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48' hours .or declare the associated valve inoperable 'l and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.5.  !

i ACTION 25 - With the number of 0PERABLE channels one less than the Channels OPERABLE. requirement, be in at-least HOT STANOBY'within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; howeyer, one channel may be-bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance: testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

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ACTION 26 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less.than'th Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel {

to OPERABLE status'within.7 days or within the next 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />s:

(1) For the Control' Room Emergency ventilation initiate and-maintain operation of the Control Room Emer,gency Ventila-tion System.in the Emergency mode. With two channels inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> initiate-and maintain operation' -'

of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System in the Emergency mode.

(2) For the Fuel Handling Building Post-Accident Ventilation-System take the ACTION required by Specification 3.9.12.

ACTION 27 - Not Used.

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l ACTION 28 - Not Used.

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