ML20235Y143

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Notice of Violation from Insp on 870506-0612.Violation Noted:Special Test Instruction STI-17 Performed on 870422 to Test Certain Silcone Rubber Insulated Conducters W/O Requiring Technicians to Disconnect Conax Connectors
ML20235Y143
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 07/20/1987
From: Zech G
NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
To:
Shared Package
ML20235Y130 List:
References
50-327-87-30, 50-328-87-30, NUDOCS 8707250113
Download: ML20235Y143 (3)


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ENCLOSURE 1 L

NOTICE OF VIOLATION Tennessee Valley Authority Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328 Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79 During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on May 6, through June 12, 1987, violations of NRC requirements were identified. The violations involved: a failure to establish and implement specific procedures; and a failure of the Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB) to properly conduct reviews and implement charter requirements.

In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1987), the violations are listed below:

A.

Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1 states that written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering surveillance and test activities of safety related equipment.

1.

Special Test Instruction (STI)-17 was established to demonstrate, through DC high voltage tests, the integrity of the insulation on selected 1E cables in a vertical drop configuration.

Contrary to the above, STI-17 was inadequately established, in that on April 22, 1987, it was performed to test certain Silicone Rubber insulated conductors without requiring the technicians to disconnect the lower rated Conax connectors that were inadvertently left in the circuit.

2.

Surveillance Instruction (SI)-196, Periodic Calibration of Upper Head Injection System Instrumentation, Step 3.4, states that during the performance of the stroke timing test, "The three (3) valves not under test should be closed, gagged, and the gag motors de-energized."

Contrary to the above, during a May 27, 1987 performance of SI-196, valve 2-FCV-87-21 was stroke time tested in Section 6 cf the procedure and the gag motors to 2-FCV-87-22, 23 and 24 were not de-energized.

3.

Work Plan (WP) 12298, following cable rerouting in the Unit 2 west valve room, specified testing to be performed in order to verify the proper functioning of valve 2-FCV-1-16. Accordingly, steps 5, 6 and 9 of the specified test required che following:

Step 5 Start handcranking 2-FCV-1-16 to the open position.

At approximately 5% valve travel from the closed position, verify the red and green lights are on.

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Tennessee Valley Authority 2

Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328 Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79 Step 6 Continue handcranking 2-FCV-1-16 to the open position.

At approximately 95% valve travel from the closed position, verify the following.

Red light on, green light off.

Status monitor relay Al-6 is de-energized.

Status monitor relay.Al-5 is still energized.

Open motor starter has dropped out..

Step 9 With the close motor starter still picked up, verify the following sequence of steps for 2-FCV-1-16.

a.

Momentarily open the contacts on limit switch 4

(LS)-8 and verify the close motor starter does l

not drop out.

b.

Momentarily open the torque switch close contacts and verify the close motor starter does not drop out.

c.

Simultaneously open the contacts on LS-8 and the torque switch close contacts and veri fy the close motor starter drops out.

Contrary to the above, on May 29, 1987, steps 5 and 6 were performed with the valve being operated mar.ually without indication of the approximate (5% and 95%) valve position.

Contrary to the above, on May 29, 1987, steps 9.a and 9.c were performed utilizing the wrong Limit Switch (LS-15 instead of LS-8) and a test deficiency was not written.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

B.

TS Section 6.5.2 requires that the Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB) review specific activities and be cognizant over certain audit activities.

This TS also requires that a ' quorum be present to conduct these activi-ties.

TS 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be established and imple-mented for activities recommended in Appendix "A"

of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978, which includes administrative procedures.

The established administrative guidance in Revision 12 of the NSRB charter requires that meeting minutes and review results be issued within 114 days to the Manager of Power with copies to the General Manager and the TVA Board.

Contrary to the above, the requirements of the TS are not being satisfied, in that, the current practice af using a ballot method (in lieu of discussion in a formal meeting) to conduct the TS required reviews and audit oversight does not ensure a quorum is present for those reviews and does not provide the required oversight.

Tennessee Valley Authority 3

Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328 Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 License Nos. OPR-77 and DPR-79 Contrary to the above, the requirements of the NSRB charter are not being implemented, in that, the current practice.is for the NSRB Chairman to provide meeting minutes and board recommendations only to the Manager, Office of Nuclear Power, and not to the TVA Board.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Tennessee Valley Authority is hereby required to submit to this Office within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice a written statement or explanation in reply including (for each violation):

(1) admission or denial of the violation, (2) the reason for the violation if admitted, (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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6L Garyh.Zech,AssistantDirector, Inspection Programs Division of TVA Projects Office of Special Projects Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this[ day of July 1987

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