ML20235W154
| ML20235W154 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1989 |
| From: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235W101 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8903100520 | |
| Download: ML20235W154 (10) | |
Text
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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.1 The reactor mode switch shall be OPERABLE and locked in the Shutdown or Refuel position.
When the reactor mode switch is locked in the Refuel position:
a.
A control rod shall not be withdrawn unless the Refuel position one-rod-out interlock is OPERABLE.
b.
CORE ALTERATIONS shall not be performed using equipment associated with a Refuel position interlock unless at least the following associ-ated Refuel position interlocks are OPERABLE for such equipment.
1.
All rods in.
,/
lm 2.
Refuel platform position.
1 3.
Refuel platforf heist:! fuel-loaded.
4.
Service platform hoist fuel-loaded.
APPLICABILITY:
OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5* #
ACTION:
a.
With the reactor code switch not locked in the Shutdown or Refuel position as specified, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and lock the reactor code switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position.
b.
With the one-rod-out interlock inoperable, lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.
c.
With any of the above required Refuel position equipment interlocks inoperable, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS with equipment associated with the inoperable Refuel position equipment interlock.
- See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.1 and 3.10.3.
- The reactor shall be maintained in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure boits less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.
h3 20 890227.
P CK 05000354 PNU HOPE CREEK 3/4 9-1
V, REFUELING OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 2.
Verifying the detectors are inserted to the normal operating level, and-3.
During CORE ALTERATIONS, verifying that the detector of an OPERABLE SRM channel is located in the core quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed and another is located in an
^
L adjacent quadrant.
b.
Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST:
1.
Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to the start of CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2.
At least once per 7 days.
INSERT 2,
c.
Verifying that the channel count rate is at leasY[0.7 cpsh 1.
Prior to control rod withdrawal, 2.
Prior to and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during CORE ALTERATIONS ***
and 3.
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ***.
{.
d.
Unless adequate shutdown margin has been demonstrated per Specification 3.1.1, verifying that the RPS circuitry " shorting links" have been removed, within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> prior to and'at least -
ence per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during the time any control rod is withdrawn.**
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- Except as noted in Specifications 3.9.2.d and 3.9.2.e."" Mot required fo l
HOPE CREEK 3/4 9-4 Amendment No. 14 l
- ,e, q
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REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.6 REFUELING PLATFORM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION INSERT 3
3.9.6 TherefuelingplatformshallbeOPERABLE):ndu;;dforhndlingf;;!
/ :sse;;tlie; cr centr:1 red: ::ithin the res ter pre::ure ve:::1.
APPLICABILITY:
During handling of fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor pressure vessal.
ACTION:
With the requirements for refueling platform OPERABILITY not satisfied, suspend use of any inoperable refueling platform equipment from operations involving the handling of control rods and fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel after placing the load in a safe condition.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS INSEgr 4.9.6[herefuelingplatforImainhoisti sed for handling of control rods or fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 7 days prior to the start of such operations by:
e a.
Demonstrating operation of the overload cutoff on the main hoist when the load exceeds 1200 + 0, -50 pounds.
,g g Demonstrating operation of the main hoist uptravel sto when uptravel I
bringsflthe tcp cf ecti'/e fuel te 9 feet belet the neree' s ter !?>e!.F # -
IN5sV Demonstrating operation of the slack cable cutoff on the main hoist 7
when the load is less than 50 1 10 pounds.
YY Demonstra. ting operation of the loaded rod block interlock on the main INSEEr hoist when the load exceeds)486f t 50 pounds.
~
8 I
l j g Demonstrating operation of the redundant loaded interlock on the main hoist when the load exceeds 550 1 50 pounds.
I HOPE CREEK 3/4 9-8
t l
kEFUELING OPERATIONS SURVEltLA'NCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) s 4.9.6.2 The r (ueling platform frame-mounted auxiliary hoist us for handling of control rods M hin the reactor pressure vessel shall be d onstrated OPERABLE within 7 days prior o the use of such equipment by:
a.
Demonstrating eration of the overload cuto on the frame mounted hoist when the 1 d exceeds 500 1 50 poun b.
Demonstrating operati of the uptrav mechanical stop on the frame mounted hoist when uptra 1 brings e grapple to 8 feet below the normal water level.
Demonstrating operation of ge ntrol rod block interlock on the c.
frame mounted hoist when te l oad ceeds 400 1 50 pounds.
4.9.6.3 The refueling platfor monorail mounte uxiliary hoist used for handling of control rods wi in the reactor pressu vessel shall be demon-strated OPERABLE within 7 ays prior to the use of su equipment by:
a.
Demonstrat' g operation of the overload cutoff o the monorail hoist when th oad exceeds 500 1 50 pounds.
b.
Demonstrating operation of thq uptravel mechanical stop n the mono-11 hoist when uptravel brinds the grapple to 8 feet belo the normal water level.
c.
Demonstrating operation of the control rod block interlock on the monorail hoist when the load exceeds 400 1 50 pounds.
1 l
HOPE CREEK 3/4 9-9
o l
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES ggggy 3/4.9.6 REFUELING PLATFORM 9
The OPERABILITY requirements ensure that% 2) the refueling p platr u'T8trie-5 1 control rods and fuel assemblies with e
Tctor pressure vessel, (2) each cr has suff t-assemblies and control rods A capacity for handling fuel protected from Ve Tifting force in the eventternals and pressure vessel are
+r jaged og 11fting operations.
vertently en-N 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel assembly over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array.
This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses.
3/4.9.8 and 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and WATER LEVEL - SPENT 5TORAGE POOL The restrictions on einfeue water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly.
This minious water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.
3/4.9.10 CONTROL R00 REMOVAL These specifications ensure that maintenance or repair of control rods or control rod drives will be perfomed under conditions that limit the probability of inadvertent criticality.
The requirements for simultaneous removal of more than one control rod are more stringent since the SHUTOOWN MARGIN specification provides fo'r the core to remain subcritical with only one control rod fully withdrawn.
3/4.9.11 #ESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND C0OLANT CIRCULATION The requirement that at least one residual heat removal loop be OPERABLE or that an alternate method capable of decay heat removal be demonstrated and that an alternate method of coolant sixing be in operation ensures that (1) suf-ficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140*F as required during REFUELING, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation would be available through the reactor core to assure accurate temperature indication and to distribute and prevent stratification of the poison in the event it becomes necessary to actuate the standby liquid control systas.
The requirement to have two shutdown cooling mode loops OPERA 8LE when there is less than 22 feet 2 inches of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and 22 feet 2 inches of water above the reactor vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequate time is* provided to initiate alternate methods capable of decay heat removal or asergency procedures to cool the core.
HOPE CREEK 8 3/4 9-2
L.
p *> j.-
4 INSERTS-FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.9
' INSERT 1 main hoist _
INSERT.2' 3 cps INSERT'3' with the main hoist to be used for. handling fuel assemblies or control rods'within the reactor pressure' vessel and the frame-mounted or monorail-mounted auxiliary hoists to be used for l
handling control rods within the reactor pressure vessel.
INSERT 4 hoists INSERT S b.
Demonstrating operation of the overload cutoff on.the frame-mounted and monorail-mounted auxiliary hoists when-the' load exceeds 500 t 50 pounds.
INSERT 6 the point where the grapple attaches to the' fuel bundle to 6 feet 6 inches,
+3,
-0 inches below the normal water level.
INSERT 7 d.
Demonstrating operation of the frame-mounted and monorail-mounted auxiliary hoists' uptravel stops when uptravel brings the point-where the grapple attaches to a control rod to 6 feet,
+1,
-0 feet below the normal water level.
INSERT 8 535 l
Page 1 of 2
s
(
INSERT FOR BASES SECTION 3/4.9.6
- 4 INSERT 9 (1) the refueling platform will be used for handling fuel assemblies and control rods, with limits placed upon auxiliary hoists' usage, within the reactor pressure vessel, (2) each crane and hoist has sufficient load capacity for handling the loads withing its permitted usage, (3) the core internals are protected from excessive lifting force in the event that they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations, (4) the core internals are protected from a fuel bundle or control rod drop with more impact energy than that assumed in the accident analyses, (5) refueling interlocks and rod blocks are initiated to prevent conditions that could result in 1
criticality during refueling operations.
s Page 2 of 2
t 4
ATTACHMENT 3 ANALYSIS OF REFUELING BRIDGE UPTRAVEL LIMITS Using the data provided in Figure 1 of this analysis, a comparison of the kinetic energy at impact, on fuel resident in the reactor pressure vessel, of a dropped fuel bundle (from UFSAR analysis-assumed height) and of a dropped control rod assembly (from the height that would be permitted by the monorail mounted and frame mounted auxiliary hoists up-travel limits proposed by this amendment request) demonstrates the acceptability of the proposed change in up-travel stop setpoint for these auxiliary hoists in TS 3/4.9.6.
Formula for Kinetic Energy At Impact acapired by dropped qb.iect:
KE = dpE = (sass of *)(acceleration - gravity)(distance dropped) where:
- = (fuel bundle + grapple assembly) in case 1, and (control rod assembly
+
hoist attachment) in case 2.
KE = Kinetic Energy PE = potential Energy Case 1.
Euel bundle a.
Dropped from analysis-assumed height (HCGS-UPSAR, Revision 1, Section 15.7.4) of 32.95 ft.
o 32 ft/sec*
KE = (617 + 350)1b x
32.95 ft 32 lb, ft/sec2,1 b f
= 31,870 ft-lb 7 b.
Dropped from actual main hoist uptravel stop limit height allowed by TS of 31.42 ft.
2 32 ft/sec KE = (617 + 350)lb x
x 31.42 ft 2
32 lb, ft/sec 1bf 30,380 ft-lb
=
f page 1 of 3
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'RefuelingiPlatfore1 Attachment'3 l
LCase : 2.,
Control' Rod Assembly l,
a..
Dropped from actual auxiliary hoists' uptravel'stop limit height permitted by proposed TS change - 32.5 ft.
2-32 ft/see RKE = (180 + 80)lb x
x 32.5 ft 2
32 lb, ft/sec 1b f.
= 8,450T t-lb f
f l
Conclusion
-A' control rod assembly or a fuel bundle dropped from the hoist
' limits proposed, or in any way affected, by this Technical Specifications amendment. request will result in less impact
-energy (kinetic' energy gained) than the l
impact. energy calculated for a. fuel bundle' drop from the height assumed in the fuel l'
handling accident analysis.provided in HCGS-UFSAR, Revision 1, Section'15.7.4.
-Additionally,. based on our calculations of' radiation dose rates for a control' rod assembly hoisted to our proposed uptravelElimit and a fuel bundle lifted to.the existing TS main hoist uptravel' stop setpoint,ane have determined that the' dose' rate on the refueling platform from a control rod assembly hoistedito the proposed allowable uptravel setpoint is roughly half.of that from a fuel' bundle raised to its current uptravel limit (which is not-affected by this change request) and both of those calculated
. dose' rates are well within acceptable levels.
Page 2 of 3
% G 't FIGURE 1 ANALYSIS OF REFUELING PLATFORM UPTRAVEL LIMITS FUEL CONTROL BUNDLE ROD MISCELLANEOUS DATA ELEVATION 200' (Normal Water Level)
FUEL BUNDLE 4
4 4
Weight....... 617 lb Length....... 14'8" Grapple Wt... 350 lb V
_y' '
}l, Analyzed drop height U-l in Section 15.7.4 of TAF HCGS-UFSAR, Rev. 1 "Catt!.e Chute" is 32.95 feet.
T CONTROL ROD ASSEMBLY h
Chute Floor f>
L Weight....... 180 lb p
ll4 Length....... 14'6" y
3 Grapple Wt.... 80 lb 17 7,' 4,",
3 178
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d f
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147'4" Height of N
fuel in vessel
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{pQjM LIMIT AT LIMIT AT CURRENT PROPOSED fO;
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FUEL BUNDLE TECH. SPEC.
TECH. SPEC.
1 A Grapple Attachment to Normal Water Level......... 6'6"....... 6'6"+3"/-0" B Top of Active Fuel to Normal Water Level.......... 8'0"....... 8'0"+3"/-0" C Cattle Chute clearance............................0'8"
....... 0'8"+0"/-3" D Bundle Drop Height...............................31'5"
...... 31'5"+0"/-3" CONTROL ROD ASSEMBLY E Grapple Attachment to Normal Water Level.........
8'0"....... 6'0"+1'/-0" F Cattle Chute clearance...........................
0'0"
........l'4"+0"/-l' G Assembly Drop Height.............................30'6"
...... 32'6"+0"/-l' Page 3 of 3 i
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