ML20235M578

Responds to NRC Re Weaknesses Noted in Requalification Program Rept 50-333/87-16.Corrective Actions:Addl Emphasis Placed on Control Room Annunciation Associated W/Remote Shutdown Panels

ML20235M578
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	07/10/1987
From:	Radford Converse POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
JAFNPP-87-0552, JAFNPP-87-552, NUDOCS 8707170242
Download: ML20235M578 (7)

Text

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James A. Fit:Petrick j Nuc:aar Power Plant P.O. Box 41 I lycoming, New Wrk 13093  !

315 342.3840

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July 10, 1987 JAFNPP-87-0552 I

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 'i ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 i

SUBJECT:

REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM REPORT NO. 1 50-333/87-16 l i

REFERENCE:

(1) USNRC Region I letter dated June 10, 1987 )

from S.J. Collins to R.J. Converse

Subject:

Requalification Program Report No. 50-333/87-16 i i

This subject report, transmitted by Reference (1), contains the NRC )

Staff's evaluation of the FitzPatrick Operator Licensing Requalification Program. The evaluation identified both strengths and weaknesses in the FitzPatrick Program. As requested by Reference 1, this letter responds:

to the weaknesses identified during the conduct of the NRC administered requalification examination.

I. IDENTIFIED WEAKNESSES l

l A. WEAKNESS:

l l l "The examiners identified a generic weakness among the Reactor Operators wh11e administering the operating examinations. The weakness involved verifying (from the Main Control Room) that the remote 02-ADS-71 panel was energized, as required by F-AOP-36, " Stuck Open Relief Valve". When asked, several on-shift personnel were also unaware of the control room an-nunciator used to verify the status cf the remote ADS panel."

RESPONSE

Additional emphasis will be placed on control room annuncia-  ;

tion associated with the remote shutdown panels. This will be done in classroom training and procedural walkthroughs of the plant shutdown from outside the control room. This procedure and the ADS System are also scheduled in the on-shift assignment for the present training cycle. Both classroom training and walkthroughs 4

will be completed by August 28, 1987.

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0.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

'Page B. WEAKNESS:

"One (1) Reactor Operator and one (1) Senior Reactor Operator were identified as potential failures on the operating exami-nation, their individual performance deficiencies were dis-cussed. The Chief Examiner requested the licensee to take immediate actions to verify the watchstanding capabilities of these two license holders in accordance with ITP-5 which describes the JAFNPP NRC-approved Requalification Program."

RESPONSE

One SRO, holding a staff license, failed one category of the written examination - Technical Specification usage and interpreta-tion. This individual, who has no watchstanding' duties, was placed in an accelerated requalification program which has been completed.

As this area was noted as a generic strength among remaining SRO's, this weakness is not programmatic.

One RO failed the operating examination. In accordance with plant procedure ITP-5, an oral interview was conducted by the Operations Superintendent to determine the licensed operator's qualification for watchstanding duties. The basis for this interview was identi-fied at the May 8, 1987 exit. The Interview identified minor weaknesses which were remediated at the time of the interview.

Two Reactor Operators failed the written examination with less than 80% overall. Both reactor operators were removed from watchstanding duties. Individual accelerated requalification programs, consisting of approximately 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> in one case and 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> in the second case, were completed. A second requalification examination was completed satisfactorily.

These individuals have been returned to watchstanding duty.

Review of both the NRC and Authority administered requalification examination results indicated generic weaknesses among the reactor operators including:

(1) Reactor water level density compensation for FWLC (2) ADS override switch operation indication and an-nunciation (3) Reactivity coefficients (Doppler)

(4) Nuclear instrument gamma compensation (5) Electrical distribution (6) RWM, RBM (7) Exposure guidelines

j U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D.C.

Page I (8) E0P curves / bases / entry conditions (9) ODSO 2 and 4 (10) Technical Specification operability requirements- l (11) A0P-43 controls and annunciation i (12) New log rad monitors (13) RPS - scram air system (14) Alternate control rod insertion (15) Immediate operator actions In accordance with ITP-5, " Licensed. Operator Requalification",

these areas vill receive additional emphasis during the conduct of the scheduled operator requalification program lecture series and )'

on-shift training.

C. WEAKNESS "The examiners identified several deficiencies in the train-ing material provided for the preparation of the exams."

These included:

1. " Instructor outlines referenced Student Guides which were not provided to the examiners." .l

2. "The ADS Operating Procedure referenced OP-1 for in-structions to manually blow down the RPV; however, OP-1 contains no such instruction."

3. "Several JAFNPP system lesson plans have conflicting isolation and actuation setpoints for RPV water level."

4. "Several JAFNPP system lesson plans were presented in outline form; that is, they contained headings without i supporting text."

l RESPONSE: l

1. Student guides are typically portions of the applicable lesson plan including, as a minimum, student learning objectives and  !

applicable tables, drawings and list of references. The JAF training staff does not utilize a prepared set of system student guides or system descriptions. System description.

information is found in each operating procedure and is referenced in each lesson plan.

2. The ADS operating procedure (F-0P-68) has been revised to reference F-EOP-1 (EOP Cautions).

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

Page 3. The conflicting information, concerning isolation and l actuation setpoints for RPV water level, have been corrected, j A Frogram Revision Action System, implemented at JAF in April, 1987, will minimize this type of discrepancy in the future as well as assuring timely implementation of lesson plan changes.

4. All lesson plans identified as discrepant by the NRC have been  !

reviewed by the JAF training staff with the following results:

- 5 lesson plans have been corrected. _t

- 20 lesson plans are entered in the program revision action system to be completed before the next scheduled classroom presentation. i 21 lesson plans, although in outline format, adequately address the JAF job analysis and do not require changes.

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The JAF training staff uses outline format lesson plans exclusively and relies heavily on controlled plant refer-ence materials in the classroom as the source of know-ledge. This is to ensure that once in-plant, operators are familiar with and will utilize only controlled plant procedures for facility operation and maintenance. This philosophy is consistent with the Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) process endorsed by both INPO and the NRC.

l II. GENERAL RESPONSE l

l In accordance with ITP-5, " Licensed Operator Requalification", the NRC written and oral examinations were reviewed by participating licensed operators and the attached feedback is provided for NRC examination bank correction.

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.  ;

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l In addition, the Authority requests that future written and oral examination results be transmitted together to the site to ensure a more complete accelerated requalification program for those indi- l viduals having ident1fied weaknesses. With one exception, all accelerated requalification programs had been compAeted before the site received the oral examination results.

1 l Since y, 40 l(4ClG(/L RADFORD J. CONVERSE RESIDENT MANAGER RJC:DFS:me 1 cc: S. J. Collins (USNRC - Region I)

D. Simpson D. Lindsey G. Smith (WPO)

DCC File Attachment Examination Bank Feedback

ATTACHMENT I EXAMINATION COMMENTS Question 3.05c The question is looking for the effect of placing the Sequence Mode Selector Switch to Normal. This action alone will cause nothing to occur. If the Rod Sequence Selector Switch is also placed in Normal, then RSCS will enforce group notch control.

REF: SDLP-3E, Page 9,Section V.B.4 QUESTION 3.06 The answer key was looking for a response which stated only a slight change in level will occur (steady-state to steady-state).

All operators are taught that a level error of approximately 12 inches will be established. All responded in the same correct manner.

This change of 12 inches is based on the actual three element control system installed at FitzPatrick. Details are available if required.

Question 4.03 The answer key states chat after "A" RFP trips, level will de-crease. However "B" RFP is still' running at rated conditions, the l plant has scrammed due to the turbine trip on high level, water level should not decrease.

Question 5.02b l This question wording solicits a response looking at the 6CPR value l versus AMCPR. Answer key should be revised as follows:

l "The operating MCPR limit provides adequate margin to OTB (onset of transition boiling) such that during any analyzed transient, the l resulting ACPR would not result in OTB" or decreasing MCPR below l the safety limit value.

Lesson Plan H-228.9 page 32 has been revised to include the alter-nate answer, the plant reload analysis supports this position.

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-l General A number of questions on both the R0 and SRO exams required licensees to have control room instrument power supplies memorized. This is j not and has not been required knowledge level for JAF operators.

The plant is too large and integrated for this to be effective.

Control room panels are labeled below each indicator for operator assistance inthis area. The site requests that questione soliciting specific power supply memorization of control room indications and j controls be eliminated from future examinations. '

Questions 1.04 and 5.04 were asked in a manner which put the operators very close to a cross-over point. This adds confusion to the question because the examinee may answer the question in two i ways (most cases in direct opposition to each other). Therefore, if possible, since the concepts are the important factor, have greater variation between points or key the examination to allow multiple answers thereby eliminating potential double jeopardy grading.

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