ML20235L826
| ML20235L826 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1987 |
| From: | Frank Akstulewicz Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Mroczka E CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8710050613 | |
| Download: ML20235L826 (6) | |
Text
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i' September 30, 1987 Docket'No.:.'50-213 DISTRIBUTION 3 Docket File '
EJordan
'NRC/LoEa1 PDR JPartlow:
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Mr. Edward J. Mroczka, Senior Vice President ISAPD File TBarnhart-(4)
Nuclear Engineering and Operations DCrutchfield WJones Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company FSchroeder ACRS (10)
- Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 _
MShuttleworth Tech Br Post Office Box 270 FAkstulewicz DHagan x0GC-Beth
. Jones W
Dear Mr. Mroczka:
EButcher GPA/PA ARM /LFMB
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY-Re:
Haddam Neck Plant By letters dated September 16, 1985, February 6, 1986, April'30, 1986, June 10, 1986 June 13, 1986 and September 9, 1986, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company submitted, in support of several exemption requests, a revised fire protection analysis. The staff has completed its preliminary review and has determined that additional information is necessary in order to complete its' review. to this letter contains our request for additional information.
1 The staff requests that you provide responses to these requests within 90 days of receipt of this. letter.
If this schedule is not possible, please have your licensing department contact me to establish a new response date.
The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L.96-511..
Sincerely, original signed by Francis M. Akstulewicz, Jr, Project Manager Integrated Safety Assessment Project Directorate Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V and Special Projects J
Enclosure:
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'4 Mr. Edward J. Mroczka Haddam Neck Plant Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company cc: ' Gerald Garfield, Esquire Kevin McCarthy, Director Day, Berry & Howard Radiation Control Unit Counselors at Law Department of Environmental ~
City Place Protection 3
Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3499 State Office Building Hartford, Connecticut 06106 Superintendent Richard M. Kacich, Manager Haddam Neck Plant Generation Facilities Licensing RFD #1 Northeast Utilities Service Company Post Office Box 127E Post Office Box 270 East Hampton, Connecticut 06424 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 q
Wayne D. Romberg Donald O. Nordquist, Director
.Vice President, Nuclear Operations Quality Services Department Northeast Utilities Service Company Northeast Utilities Service Department Post Office Box 270 Post Office Box 270.
Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 Hartford, Connecticut- 06141-0270 Board of Selectmen Town Hall Haddam, Connecticut 06103 4
Bradford S. Chase, Under Secretary Energy Division Office of Policy and Management 80 Washington Street Hartford, Connecticut 06106 Resident Inspector Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station l
c/o U.S. NRC P. O. Box 116 East Haddam Post Office East Haddam, Connecticut 06423 Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 l
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'n REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION HADDAM NECK PLAPT
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APPENDIX R, FIRE PROTECTION - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY In order to complete our review of the Appendix R post-fire safe and alternate shutdown capability at Haddam Neck, the staff finds that additional information is required as indicated below.
The licensee ray provide separate responses to these requests, or may refer to previous documentation to complete their response to the staffs request.
1.
Your recent submittals of September 16, 1985, February 6,1986, April 30, 1986, June 10, 1986, June 13, 1986 and September 9,1986 concerning post-safe and alternate shutdown do not address the following concerns:
(a High/lo pressure interfaces (b
Communication between operators (c
Time required to attain cold shutdown (d)
Instrumentation for process monitoring I
(e) Repairs required, if any i
(f) Emergency diesel generator fuel supply and replacement time (a) Protection of reactor coolant pump seals l
(h) Procedures for attaining hot standby and cold shutdown Provide the above indicated information.
2.
Provide examples of the results of your review of breaker coordination to ensure protection acainst associated circuit concerns.
3.
Your fire protection reanalysis (June 13, 1986 submittal) does not show that you have examined post-fire shutdown with and withcut offsite power available.
Provide information to show that you have considered both cases.
4.
In Appendix F of your letter of September 16, 1985, you noted that the atmospheric dump valve (ADV) had " limited beat removal capacity" and therefore, additional steam relief paths may be needed for the required hot shutdown heat removal service.
You also noted that the ADV may not be available after a control room fire. However, in Section IV, subsection " Main Steam / Auxiliary feedwater," of your June 13, 1986 reanalysis no mention is made of loss of the ADV in a control room fire.
There is also ne definite statement as to what process is available to remove the steam generated during shutdown except in the paragraph discussing the Terry turbine in which you mention a heat sink via the turbine exhaust. Later, however, i: the section related to a turbine bu]1 ding fire, you note the "--adequate capacity of the ADV, steam cenerator vents, and auxiliary feedwater steam turbine exhausts."
Explain these apparent discrepancies and show any corrections, as necessary to the previous discussion.
, 5.
Your June 13, 1986 letter seems to lack explicitness.
For example, in discussing blowdown trip valves (BDTV), you note that the operator has the o? tion to close manual valves to eliminate blowdwn in the case of a switcigear room fire.
Further, for the RHR system, you note that one RHR pump must be available by protecting its cable or separating the cable from the other RHR pump's cable.
In these and other cases you do not state, specifically, whether the blowdown from one or more Ifnes must be stopped, nor do you mention which RHR pump will be protected against a switchgear room fire.
Provide more specific information regarding the particular train or sy; tem required to bring the plant to cold shutdown in the event of a fire.
6.
Show that you have the ability to shut the plant down in the event a postulated control room fire damages each of the following individually:
a)
Main control board b)
Auxiliary control boards, c)
Safety system lockout display panel You should assume that the control room becomes uninhabitable for at least one hour after the postulated fire in each case.
7.
In ycur fire protection reenalysis of June 13, 1986, you do not discuss which systems are used to provide for the following needs throughcut the shutdown process:
a.
Reactor coolant inventory control, b.
Reactivity control, c.
Prfinary system pressure d.
Heat removal (hot and cold shutdown)
(1) From primary system (RCS),
(2) From secondary system, Support system functions such as heating, ventilating and air e.
conditioning, as required.
Provide this infonnation for each area which contains eouipment and cabling for which you take credit for bringing the plant to ccid shutdown after a fire.
8.
In Section 4.3.2 of your June 13, 1986 submittal relating to the CVCS, you state "--Essentially the same components are impacted by these fires as by a control room fire.
-- loss of operability for the majority of the components."
Use of the words " essentially", and " majority" do not contain sufficient information so as to permit a detailed review of this area. Provide detailed infounation ir this section showing what failures occur as a result of a fire. Then, review your entire June 13, 1986 submittal and provide such detailed infonnation as is necessary to pennit the staff to miew the entire sutunittel.
1
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13, 1986 submittal relating to the CVCS you
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9.
In Section '4.3.8 of. your June state that manual action is required to open the pressurizer auxiliary
. spray Mov to collepse the pressurizer steam bubble during the cooldown process. Discuss at what point you plan to collapse the steam babble in the ev'ent of a fire in the cab'e vault (FA-R-1) or containment (FA-R-3).
Explain whether a fire in any other plant area would change the point at which bubble' collapse. initiation would occur.
10.
In the sheet entitled " Summary of Circuit Failure Analysis by Fire Area"
'for the RHR system in your June 13,.1986 submittal, you show that RHR components feil' in an area (Y-14) other than those which you discuss in Section 3.3, " Appendix R Fire Impacts and Compensatory Measures." This appears to be true for other systems es well. Discuss where this applies and provide assurance that safe shutdown can be effectec' in all areas in which fires may occur.
i.
- 11.. Your approach to spurious signals / operation.seems to be inconsistent with the staff position. On pages 3 and 4 of the section " Main Steam / Auxiliary Feedwater" of your June 13, 1986 submittal you state:
Page 3 "A fire in area S-2 causes MOV-160 to spuriously fail. closed and MOV-35 to spuriously fail spen."
Page 4 "The Terry turbine steam admission valves are manually opened by the operator at-the Terry turbine to compensate for loss of operability or spurious actuation.
In the first case, you seem to be postulate a simultaneous detrimental spurious action (closure of MOV-160) and corrpensatory beneficial one (opening i
of MOV-3S). The staff's position continues to be that no credit can be taken i
for a damage state resulting from a fire nor are two(2) or more simultaneous spurious signals postulatec'.
In the second case you seem to equate loss of operability and spurious action. Destruction of power and/or power circuits results in inoperability. Spurious action would occur as a result of a hot short in a fire.
On the basis of the above, show that you have properly considered spurious action in all areas where a fire could affect equipment required for safe shutdown. Such consideration should include wire-to-wire end cable to cable faults.
12.
In your August 19, 1986 submittal entitled, "Haddam Neck Plant - Action l
Items Resulting from Appendix R Inspection of June 16-20, 1986" you noted l
a temporary arrangement for monitoring the following plant parameters in the cable vault in the event of a control room fire:
Pressurizer Pressure Pressurizer Level Steam Generator 1, 2, 3 & 4 Pressure Steam Generatcr 1, 2, 3 & 4 level (wide range)
Reactor Coolant System I, 2, 3 & 4 T at Reactor Coolant Syst.em 1, 2, 3 3 4 cold
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4 Does the use of this instrumentation require some means of transferring from control room circuits to the cable vault in order to effect suitable monitoring? If so, show that a control room fire would not affect such trans fer.
Show, also, how protection is afforded inadvertent transfer during nomal operation.
Further, show that a cable vault fire would not result in loss of sufficient control room instrumentatfor to achieve a safe shutdown.
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