ML20235K923

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 110 to License DPR-72
ML20235K923
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River 
Issue date: 02/16/1989
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20235K908 List:
References
NUDOCS 8902270302
Download: ML20235K923 (4)


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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.110 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, ET AL.

l CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT NO. 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT i

DOCKET NO. 50-302 INTRODUCTION By letter dated April'15,1987, Florida Power Corporation (FPC, or the licensee) requested an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TSs) appended to Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 for the Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant (CR-3). The proposed amendment would revise the surveillance requirements of paragraph 4.5.2.f to allow testing of the high and low pressure injection systems in Modes 3, 4, 5, or 6 rather than in Mode 6 only. ~

EVALUATION The surveillance requirement 4.5.2.f requires verification that each automatic valve in the Emergency Core Cooling System flow path actuate to its correct positionandthateachHighPressureInjection(HPI)andLowPressure Injection (LPI) pump start automatically on receipt of a high or low pressure sdfety injection test signal. This surveillance requirement is required to be performed at 18 month intervals in Mode 6.

The licensee has requested that the TS surveillance requirement to test high and low pressure injection pumps and valves during Mode 6 be changed to allow the testing to be accomplished during Modes 3, 4, 5, or 6 because testing in Mode 6 only is not always feasible due to perieds between refueling outages extending to greater than 18 months.

Additionally, by providing the flexibility to perform this testing during several modes, the licensee can better optimize outage time.

The original requirement to perform the HPI and LPI testing while in Mode 6 was placed in TS to satisfy the licensee commitments for low Temperature Overpressurization Protection (LTOP). Testing the HPI pumps while the reacter vessel head was removed assured that a reactor vessel overpressure condition would not occur.

In Licensee Event Report (LER) 84-23, Revision 1, dated February 10, 1986, the licensee revised its original commitments regarding LTOP providin'g justification to allow HPI pump testing per TS 4.5.2.f in Modes 3, 4, 5, or 6.

The B&W Standard Technical Specifications (STS) permit such testing "during shutdown" (i.e., modes 3, 4, 5, and 6). Testing in these modes is acceptable, providing adequate precautions are taken to assure LTOP is provided.

The licensee has shown full understanding of the necessary precautions as demonstrated by the following commitments in LER 54-23, Revision 1:

1.

Crystal River Unit 3 will manually enable the power operated relief valve (PORV) low pressure setpoint (550 psig) during cooldown at 250 F and enable the PORV normal pressure setpoint (-2450 psig) during heatup at 280*F.

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2.

Motor operated valves'(MOVs) MUV-23, MUV-24, MUV-25, and MUV-26 will be closed and de-energized with' their circuit breakers " red tagged" in the

" locked reset" position to the Nuclear Shift Supervisor whenever the reactor coolant temperature is below 265'F.

If maintenance, testing, or other plant conditions require operation of these valves, the following requirements will be met:

Double valve isolation on the main and recirculation discharge lines a.

is maintained between injection trains, and b.

The HPI pump in the affected train is de-energized with its circuit breaker " locked out" and " red tagged" to the Nuclear Shift Supervisor, and c.

liie HPI pump suction or discharge valve in the affected train is de-energized with its circuit breaker in the " locked reset" position and " red +.agged" to the Nuclear Shift Supervisor.

3.

No testing of the HPI pumps (normal operation of a single makeup pump is exempt) will be performed when the reactor coolant temperature is below 280*F unless double valve isolation is maintained between the RCS and all flow paths from the pump (s) being tested.

4.

CR-3 will maintain the pressurizer level at or below 180 inches during cooldowns and heatups w1en the reactor coolant pressure is below 550 psig dnd above 100 psig; pressurizer level will be maintained below 270 inches when the reactor pressure is below 100 psig.

The licensee states all administrative commitments for LTOP are incorporated into procedures and controlled by the procedure review and change process.

In addition, the commitment tracking system is utilized with each procedure change to ensure that comitments are not modified unintentionally. Testing using these procedures has been successfully performed in the past.

Based on our review, we conclude that the proposed TS (supported by the licensee's commitments, the procedures implementing them, and the controls thereon) provide reasonable assurance that the LTOP will be provided and that HPI and LPI may be safety tested in Modes 3, 4, 5, or 6, as permitted by the STS.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment involves a change in surveillance requirements. We have deter-mined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a l

proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards considera-tion and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10CFR51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

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CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) public such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Connission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated:

February 16, 1989 Principal Contributors:

S. G. Tingen H. Silver l

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DA'TED: February 16, 1989 l.

1 AMENDMENT NO. 110 TO FACILITY OPERATIllG LICENSE NO. DPR-72-CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 tllDiEkillijiMFQ NRC~&* Local PDRs PDII-2 Reading S. Varga, 14/E/4 l

G. Lainas, 14/H/3 I

H. Berkow l

D. Miller H. Silver i

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D. Hagan, 3302 MNBB E. Jordan, 3302 MNBB l

B. Grimes, 9/A/2 T. Meek (4), P1-137 Wanda Jones, P-130A ACRS (10), 11/F/23 E. Butcher GPA/PA ARM /LFMB B. Wilson, R-II cc:

Plant Service list

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