ML20235G751
| ML20235G751 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/06/1987 |
| From: | Josiger W POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | Russell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| IP3-WAJ-037Z, IP3-WAJ-37Z, NUDOCS 8707140366 | |
| Download: ML20235G751 (26) | |
Text
7 Indian Point 3 Nucle r Power Plant P.O. Box 215 Buchanan, New Ybrk 10511 914 739.8200
- > NewYorkPbwer 4# Authority July 6, 1987 IP3-WAJ-037Z IP3-87DC-156H Docket No. 50-286+-
License No. DPR-64 Mr. William T. Russell, Regional Administrator Region 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Subject:
Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.59 Changes. Tests and Experiments
Dear Mr. Russell:
The following constitutes th'e 1986 Annual Report on changes, tests and experiments for Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant as required by 10CFR50.59.
The Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR50.59 (a) specifies that changes to the facility as described in the safety analysis report, changes in the procedures as described in the safety analysis report and the conduct of tests or experiments not described in the safety analysis report may be made without prior Commission approval provided the proposed change, test or experiment does not involve a change in the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license or constitute an unreviewed safety question.
A description of such changes, procedures and tests performed at Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant for the period of January 22,.1986 to January 22 1987 and a summary of the safety evaluations of each are contained in Attachment I.
l-8707140366 870706 PDR ADOCK 05000206 Y l(A P
PDR l
7______
l July 6, 1987 Mr. William T. Russell, Regional Administrator Page Two Each has been reviewed to ensure that the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment j
important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report has not been increased, the possibility f or an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report has not been created, or the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.
It was concluded that the changes, tests and experiments do not constitute any unreviewed safety questions.
Sincerely, MO
'g W.
osi,er R ident ana er
~ ndian P in 3 Nuclear Power Plant WA.
.jm: Report
Enclosures:
Attachment I cc:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Original)
Documents Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 IP3 Resident Inspector's Office a_________-_____-____
-m--------,-,.
4 e
a d
.t ATTACHMENT I l
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I 1
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Modification 80-03-055 RPI - Modification to the Power Supply Of The Rod Position Indication System (RPIS)
The purpose of this modification was to modify the electrical feeder to the Rod Position Indication System (RPIS) in order to provide continuous rod position indication to the control room operators during station blackout conditions.
This was achieved via a new SKVA, 480-120V power supply and a transfer switch which allows transferring to the normal or backup power supplies.
The Rod Position Indication System was originally supplied power via MCC 39 or D.C.
Power Panel 31 through the Rod Position Inverter.
The Rod Position Inverter did not perform its function satisfactorily (distorted output sign-wave) which necessitated MCC 39 to be the sole source of power to the RPI system.
As a re sult, if a loss of outside power condition were to occur, all RPI would have been lost until MCC 39 was reset.
In an effort to ease the operation of the plant during such a scenario, this modification facilitated the installation of a new power supply to the RPI system which originates from MCC 36C. MCC 360 does not strip from the 480 volt buses during an SI, NON-SI blackout or an SI-blackout condition, and thereby provides continuous rod position indication.
MCC 36C feeds a new 5KVA, 480-120 Volt stepdown transformer which supplies the RPI system through a double pole, double throw 60 amp selector switch.
The selector switch affords the option of supplying the RPI system from MCC 39 in the event MCC 36C is unavailable.
The electrical separation criteria has been maintained for this modification and MCC 36C contains the necessary capacity to operate the. additional loads introduced by mhe RPI system.
The equipment needed for this modification does not interact with the safety related functions of any other system under a seismic event.
The supply fuse located in compartment 2BL of MCC 36C provides the Category I classification boundary for this modification.
Fuses installed for this modification are sized such that a postulated failure at the DPDT selector switch does not cause a degradation of either MCC 39 or the safety related MCC 36C. The installation of cable in the trays has been identified as Category I which insured proper installation and electrical separation.
Modification 91-03-019 AS - Steam Reboiler System This modification involved the installation of a steam reboiler, including the associated piping, valves, instrumentation and controls, which utilizes turbine cycle steam for the generation of secondary steam to supply the Auxiliary Steam System. The Steam Reboiler is designed to operate in lieu of the House Service Boiler whenever the Turbine Cenerator is in service.
The Steam Reboiler is used to supply saturated steam at 65 psig to the plant's Auxiliary Steam System.
During normal operating conditions, second stage extraction steam from the high pressure tu rbine is directed to the pressure control valve.
The pressure control valve modulates the extraction steam flow to maintain a constant steam pressure of 65 psig in the reboiler shell.
During turbine start-up or when extraction steam pressure is low, main steam is utilized as a back-up source to supply steam to the tube side of the reboiler.
Page 1 of 23
The steam reboiler is manually operated from a local control panel.
The reboiler automatically trips when one of the following occurs:
n.
high steam pressure to reboiler tubes b.
Iow water level in reboiler shell c.
radiation monitor.R-15 detects high radiation The system has been designed in accordance with the design criteria for existing
" Balance of Plant" systems. All piping was desigted arid installed in accordance with the requirements of ANSI B31.1.
Electrical tie-ins to the turbine trip signals and condenser air ejector radiation signals are appropriately isolated using Category I relays.
Channel separation has been maintained and cable tray fill is in accordance with the IP 3 cable and conduit schedule.
Modification 81-3-064 INST - CCR Toxic Gas Detection System The purpose of this modification was to install a gas detection system which provides indication in the Control Room of the Control Room's oxygen, chlorine and anhydrous ammonia levels.
The Control Room atmosphere is monitored for low oxygen levels and for high levels of chlorine and ammonia.
The system consists of a central control and alarm panel located in the Control Room that provides continuous indication of oxygen, chlorine and ammonia levelc.
Detectors are located by the fire protection display and control panel in the Control Room in order to monitor the atmosphere in the operator's area.
The oxygen detectors are provided for the detection of CO gas, which is heavier 2
than air, and will displace oxygen.
An oxygen detector was also installed in the locker room at the rear of the Control Room which also alarms in the Control Room.
The chlorine detector is set to alarm at 1 ppm concentration, and the ammonia detector at 25 ppm.
These values are the Threshold Limit Value - Time Weighted Average (TLV-TWA), "The time-weighted average concentration for a normal 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> workday and a 40 hour4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> workweek, to which nearly all workers may be repeatedly exposed, day after day, without adverse effect."
In addition, the chlorine detector has a high alarm set at 5 ppm.
The oxygen detectors will alarm at 19.5%.
An additional toxic monitor system has been provided under MOD 85-3-151 INST consisting of separate chlorine, ammonia, and carbon dioxide diffusing type probes located at the CCR Air Conditioning Units outside air intake duct, This system provides for the monitoring of the Operators area in the Control Room and provides further protection against toxic gases that may be introduced through other possible paths into the CCR.
The Gas Detection System as described provides to the Control Room Operators information as to the quality of their environment.
This allevs the operators to take appropriate action to insure the atmosphere will remain healthy or, if need be, take proper precautions.
This modification is not located near safety related equipment nor does it affect any safety related equipment.
Page 2 of 23 j
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Modification 82-03-108 IA - Tie-In To Instrument Air System For Condensate
_ Polisher Isolation Valve Nos. CD-A0V-178, CD-A0V-180, and Bypass Valve No.
CD-A0V-179.
This modification connected three (3) pneumatic valve operators to an existing spare connection on the instrument air header in the Turbine Building.
These l,
valves provide isolation and bypass of the condencate polishing system.
The modification included P tie-in to an existing (spare) 1-inch valved connection on the Turbine Building instrument air header, and installed a 1-inch i
copper air supply line with branch connection and isolation valves for three new i
air-operated valves.
Tne installation includes all necessary piping, tubing, H
l fittJngs, and supports for connecting to the existing instrument air system.
r 3
t sj The modification does not degrade the function of the instrument air system.
1 The pipe, tubing, fittings, and valves used in the modification maintain the pressure boundary of the existing system.
Failure of the branch connections
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will neither damage any safety-related equipment nor prevent the safe shutdown of rbe unit.
This modificat. ion has neither affected t!+ environtbental impact of the plant nor degraded the Security Plan. All work has been performed in accordance with ANSI j
B31.1. Code for Power Piping.
Modification 83-03-017 EL - Power Feed To New Telephone PBX System This modification provided power to the new telephone PBX system.
The power required was 220V single phase from a transformer fed by 480V MCC 36C.
This MCC is equipped with a feed from diesel generator No.
31,. thus the telephone PBX system has an emergency backup power supply.
The fuses in a Category I disconnect switch installed in MCC 36C are the boundary between the Category I and Non-Category I portions.
In case,of a fault occurrence in the Non-Category I portion of the circuit, the fuses protect the Category I portion of the circuit.
A load evaluation has been completed which verifies that the diesel generator or the MCC will not be overloaded with this additional load.
In addition, the conduit penetrating the control building has been scaled to maintain the existing fire barrier to the Category I area.
Page 3 of 23
Modification 83-03-039 RCS - Replace.nent of Pr'essuriger Pressure Transmitters l
This modification replaced the original pressurizer pressure transmitters, (PT-455, 456, 457 & 474) and associated piping, valves, conduits and wiring.
The subject transmitters provide input to the following:
1.
Pressurizer pressure indicators and alarm.
2.
Reactor trip circuitry 3.
Reactor Coolant System pressure control circuitry.
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The original transmitters were supplied by Foxhoro for narrow range pressure indicators and control. The new transmitters have been supplied by Foxboro and are functionally equivalent to the original ones.
Along with replacing the transmitters, the valve manifolds and transmitters conduits were replaced to improve the overall integrity of the system.
Site testing and Wyle Laboratory test report #45592-4 for the new Foxboro transmitters indicate that the expected output drift is within 11% as opposed to y
20.5% previously published.
An analysis' has demonst' rated that the t1%
inaccuracy is acceptable for the protection cirguits.
It was determined that the original setpoints were still conservative and were within Technical Specification limits.
The new transmitters are qualified to IEEE 323-1971 and IEEE 344-1971 and are equal to or better than the original transmitters.
The amplifiers on the new transmitters were replaced which will upgrade their qualifications to IEEE 323-1974 and IEEE 344-1975 standards.
Evaluatic,n of new transmitters inaccuracy has determined that no Technical Specifications changes are required.
Modification 84-03-031 MS - Replace Limit Switches on MSIV-31, 32, 33, 34 This modification was installed to replace existing limit switches located outside containment in the main steam isolation area with environmentally and seismically qualified limit switches.
I The previously existing NAMCO limit switches, Model No. SL-3-B2-W, were replaced by qualified and sealed NAMCO limit switches Model No. EA750-50100.
There are (2) limit switches associated with the control of each MSIV.
The new limit switches are functionally the same as the previously existing limit switches (i.e., DPDT switches, etc.).
The main difference between the old-and the new limit switches is that the old NAMCO limit switches may not have been qualified while the new devices are qualified to IEEE-STD-323-1974 and sealed with conax seal assemblies for sustained operation in an accident environment that envelopes the IP-3 environmental profile outside containment.
The limit switches are also seismically qualified to IEEE-STD-344-1975 and are seismically mounted in the same location as the old devices so that the original design has not been degraded.
Page 4 of 23
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Modification 84-03-061 WDS-C - Waste Gas Analyzer Selective Manual Sampling j
This modification involved the installation of manually operated selector switches to allow for a manual sampling mode for the Waste Gas Analyzer.
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Manually operated electrical switches were installed in the circuits of the following solenoid valves; 265, 1284, 1285, 1286, 1600B, 1600F, 1600G, 1600H, 1600J and 1600K.
A switch was also installed in the circuit of relay GAXI.
Relay GAXI actuates valves PCV-1036B, PCV-1037B, PCV-1038B and PCV-1039B. These switches allow manual selection of the Waste Gas System to sample gases in the following tanks:
1 (PCV-1036B, or 1037B, or 1038B, or 1039B) and 1600F - large gas decay tanks 1284 & 1600J - C.V.C.S. Waste Holdup Tank #33 128: & 1600H - C.V.C.S. Waste Holdup Tank #32 1286 & 1600G - C.V.C.S. Waste Holdup Tank #31 265 & 1600B - Volume control Tank #31 1600K - Small gas decay tanks The nine switches were mounted in a switchbox, which is installed on the west wall in the chemistry sampling room on the 55' elevation in the PAB.
The Waste Gas Analyzer is controlled by an automatic programmer.
If this programmer were to fail, the automatic sampling capability for the Waste Gas System would be unavailable.
The mounting of the switch box has been seismically analyzed and the cable between the switchbox and Waste Gas Analyzer Panel was installed in conduit to preclude cross channelization.
Electrical DC load remains unchanged because the new circuitry utilizes the existing power lead to the solenoid valves.
This modification improves the sampling capability of the Waste Gas System by allowing manual samples to be obtained easily in the event that the automatic Waste Gas ~ Analyzer is unavailable.
Each switch operating two valves does not increase the probability of a single failure causing two sampling valves to remain open.
In the existing sequencer a single relay controls two valves.
The manual switches use separate. contact blochs for each of the valves. A failure of one contact block does not lead to the failure of the other.
s Page 5 of 23
4 Modification 85-03-028 FP Test Connections For Calibration of Fire Water l
L Storage Tanks' Level Transmitters
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This modification enables level transmitters LT-1649 and LT-1673 to be calibrated while in place.
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The present configuration is designed with each level transmitter located
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directly. adjacent to its tank isolation valve.
The modification inserted a short spool piece 'between the isolation valve an1 the transmitter with provisions for a vent (for pressure testing) and.a' drain.
This spool serves to
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allow adjustable pressurization of the level transmitter in order to calibrate I
'the instrument.
Existing control cable, heat-tracing and insulation was extetyled to cover the extension via the new spool piece.
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l There is currently no pipe support for the; nozzles containing the level transmitters.
After evaluating the maximun allowable load, the current load, and the additional weight of the fabricated pipe spool, further support was deemed unnecessary.
l This modification facilitates plant operations by providing test connections that allow for in place calibration of the Fire Water Storage Tanks Level Transmitters, thereby ensuring compliance with Technical Specifications.
The addition of the pipe spool does not affect the operation of the level transmitters.
Section 3.14 of the Technical Specifications calls for two fire protection tanks to be in service with a minimum of 300,000 gallons each.
Should one or both tanks be out of service, a maximum of seven days will be allowed before a special report to the NRC Must be filed. This modification was performed on one tank at a time.
Operations provided an alternate means of monitoring the water level of each of the Fire Protection Tanks during this modification, thus assuring cdequate fire protection per the Technical Specifications.
Modification 85-03-033 EL - Elimination of Rate of Change Circuits In The Overpressurization System j
This modification installed wiring in the Overpressurization System to eliminate sthe input signals to the " Rate of Press. Change Armed" and "Hi Rate of Press.
Change" circuits.
Wiring was installed in OPS racks H1, H2 and H3 from terminal 1 to terminal 9 on Distribution block DB-4.
This eliminates input signals to bistables PC413C and PC413D, PC433C and PC433D, and PC443C and PC443D, respectively. These bistables feed the relays that actuate the " Rate of Press. Change Armed" and "Hi Rate of Press. Change" circuit.
The Overpressurization System Racks were manufactured with a " Rate of Press.
Change Armed" (1/2 logic) and "Hi Rate of Press. Change" (2/2 logic) circuit for each channel.
Bistables in Racks H1, H2 and H3 were intended to actuate on a sudden pressure change (60 psi /sec), thus lighting an annunciator and sounding an alarm in the Central Control Room on panel SCF.
An evaluation was made during the installation of this system that the " Rate of Press. Change Armed" and "Hi Rate of Press. Change" circuit were not needed and jumper 302 was installed to eliminate the input signal to these circuits.
Eliminating the signal to these histables by installing wiring does not degrade the Overpressurization Systems function as outlined in the FSAR or violate any Technical Specifications.
Page 6 of 23
Modification 85-03-060 TR Modification of Cooling Fan Control Wiring For Station Service Transformers, SST 2, 3, 5, and 6
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This modification insures operation of the cooling fans, on Station Service Transformers SST 2, 3, 5, and 6 dependent on temperature instead of transformer load.
An "SC" current relay in each station service transf ormer (SST) is designed to
{
close at 100% load and open at 95% load. This relay provided the only automatic control of the SST cooling fane and therefore the fans would only operate when the transformers attained 100% load.
By removing a wire between T2 and T17 and adding a wire between T2 and T5, the SST cooling fans operate when thermal device "49Tl" is activated.
By epntrolling the Station Service Transformer cooling fans off the thermal device "49T Fan Contact 1", the fans operate when the transformer's temperature limit is reached.
Bypassing the current relay "SC" contact makes the fan operation completely independent of load capacity and ensures that the transformer temperature is less than the maximum allowed.
No electrical loads have been added or remoyed,_ therefore no circuit loading problems have been created.
The change in fan operations from load control to temperature control is in accordance with the transformer vendor's procedure and none of the original design criteria has been violated.
Modification 85-03-094 MULT - Replacement of Solenoid Valves On Steam Generator Blowdown and Sampling Valves and The Demineralized Water Supply Isolation Valves The purpose of this modification was to replace existing solenoid valves located in the pipe penetration area, which are associated with the steam generator blowdown and sampling valves and also the demineralized isolation valves with both environmentally and seismically qualified solenoid valves.
The modification was partially completed in 1985 with the replacement of the Steam Generator Blowdown and Sampling Valves and was addressed in the 1985 Annual Report. The balance of the completion of this modification addresses the installation of the demineralized water isolation valves.
The Demineralized Water Isolation solenoid valves were replaced with ASCO Model No. NP8344 series valves which are functionally the same as the valves (i.e.,
125 VDC Coil, 4-way, cv, etc.) except do not have the pilot feature for closing the valve in the event of an air supply depressurization. This function will be provided by a pressure switch (Static "C." ring model No. 6N6-B3-NX-CIA-JJTTX7) in the air supply piping to the valve. The switch contacts are wired in series with the solenoid coil, thus upon a loss of air pressure the contacts will open and de-energize the solenoid valve causing the isolation valve to close.
The new valves, as well as the pressure switches are qualified to IEEE 323-1974, for sustained operation in an accident environment that envelopes the Indian Point #3 pipe penetration arca environmental profile.
The new solenoid valves and pressure switch are also seismically qualified to IEEE-STD 344-1975 and were installed so as not to degrade their seismic qualification.
Page 7 of 23
Modification 85-03-095 FCU - Replacement of TE-1203 Thermocouple I
i This modification provided for the replacement of the fan cooler unit air inlet thermocouple (TE-1203-1. TE-1203-2, TE-1203-3, TE-1203-4, and TE-1203-5).
The new thermocouple (TC) are operationally identical to those previously installed. The only difference between the two models is that the replacements
.have a stainless steel protection tube where the previous were fiberglass.
The V.C. ambient temperature monitoring system is a non-Category I system which
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provides remote. temperat.ure indication and control signals ' for the fan cooler
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unit service water st ppfy.
Normal operating eV.C. temperature is maintained by autmoatically increasing or decreasing' service water flow in response to thermocouple output.
During an accident condition a signal independent of the thermocouple is gene rated to fully open the service water flow valves.
6 The junction materials of the replacement thermocouple are identical to those of the existing mode: s.
Therefore, system operation has not been affected.
The installation does not affect other plant systems.
The new thermocouple are mounted in the same location as the originals, maintaining existing Class III seismic standards.
The installation of the new thermocouple is operationally acceptable and consistent with plant standards and requirements.
Modification 85-03-118 HV - Flux Map Transfer Device Drip Shield This modification was installed to protect the Flux Map 10 Path Rotary Transfer Devices and the Seal Table from moisture droplets dripping down from the air duct which provides ventilation to the Incore Instrumentation Room in the V.C.
Installation of a drip pan directly underneath the air duct register collects the moisture and drains it to the floor below.
The pan is fabricated f rom 12 Gauge 304 SS Sheet Metal and is securely fastened with bolts to existing P1001 Double Channel Unistrut located immediately beneath the duct opening.
A 3/4 drain was routed to the VC sump at elevation 46'.
The drip shield was fabricated from materials consistent with those currently used in the plant.
The installation of the drip shield and drain piping does not interfere with existing equipment.
The drip pan is supported from existing P1001 Double Channel unistrut which is supporting two (2) 4" electrical conduits.
The additional weight is insignificant and does not affect the seismic integrity of the unistrut supports.
However, should the drip pan come loose and fall in the vicinity of the 10 Path Rotary Transfer Devices, there is no impact on the Seal Table Pressure Boundary Interface.
The Seal Table Guide tube thimble seals form the seismic Class I boundary and Safety Related Pressure Boundary Interface while the 10 Path Rotary Transfer Devices located directly above are not safety related.
New supports were installed for the drain line running from the drip pan to the floor.
The 3/4" drain line is light wall SS tubing and supported approximately every 10' slong its vertical run.
No potential system interaction exists with the drain line and other components in the event of a' seismic occurrence.
Page 8 of 23
Modification 85-03-134 STR Replace Steam Generator Support Hydraulic Restraints This modification replaced the original Steam Generator Support ITT Grinnell hydraulic restraints with an improved hydraulic restraint supplied by Taylor Devices.
The original Steam Generator Support liydraulic Restraints were of a standard design that was available during the plant's design period.
This standard design was not conducive to in-place testing, was not temperature compensated, included seal materials. which may restrict usable
- life, and in sone installations (justified by Westinghouse during construction) had a limited capacity margin to sbsorb design load changes.
I This modification eliminated these concerns by installing properly sized hydraulic restraints which are of a design which incorporates a balanced rod to prevent head wear, an internal pressurized reservoir to eliminate external reservoir and air entrapment concerns, temperature compensating features which maintain rated lock-up over a wide range of temperatures, and hytrel seals which ensures an extended seal life.
The supporting calculations were reviewed by Westinghouse to verify the adequacy of the snubber attachment brackets and the resistance of the snubber attachment bracket to bolt pull out was verified by checking the shear area of the bracket plate.
3 Page 9 of 23
Modification 85-03-148 STR - Installation Of Opening And Door In PAB Reactor Cavity Drain Down Filter Room This modification provides access to the pipe chase area located adjacent to the Reactor Cavity Drain Down Filter Room on the 15' elevation of the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB). This new access allows the manhole in the Electrical Tunnels to be sealed off such that access to the pipe chase is controlled through the PAB.
The North wall of the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) was cut to install a l
door, ventilation and electrical penetrations.
This door leads to a piping chase which exists under the Electrical Tunnels adjacent to the PAB.
This piping chase will be converted under a future revision / modification as an accessible room for future use.
The opening was cut approrfmately 3'-5" x
8'-4",
with steel plates bolted through the two (2) foot thick concrete vall on each side of the wall above the door.
These plates are designed to carry the additional stresses due to the new opening in the wall and provide the future location for ventilation and electrical penetrations A three (3) hour fire rated door was installed in the opening which limits the access to the new room.
The new door assembly, which includes pre-drilled frame, hinges, automatic closure and latching mechanism, was srpplied with a U.L. J abel.
The opening in the North wall of the Reactor Cavity Drain Down Filter Room was evaluated and the result of the analysis was that there was no effect on the integrity of the PAB by the subject opening.
While the wall has been analyzed as able to withstand the additional stresses due to the new opening under seismic loading, installation of the two (2) reinforcement plates above the opening re-established the design safety factor that existed prior to cutting this opening.
Also, the flooding analysis addressed in Section 16.1. 3 of the FSAR was not affected by this installation, t
All work associated with this modification, with the exception of the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated aoor, was installed in accordance with Category I procedures.
The installation of the fire rated door was determined to be Category M, and was installed in accordance with the appropriate QA procedures for Category M and per the manufacturer's recommendation, i
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Page 10 of 23
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- Modification 85-03-151 INST - Toxic Gas Monitor Installation CCR Ventilation System This modification was installed to ensure that the control room operators are
- adequately protected against the effects of accidental release of toxic gases as required by NUREG-0737.
NUREG-0737,Section III.D.3.4 requires " Control Room operators to be adequately protected against. the effects of accidental release of toxic and radioactive gases and that the nuclear power plant can be safely shutdown under design basis accident conditions" (Criterion 19
" Control Room", of Appendix "A",
" General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants",
to 10 CFR Part 50).
This modification installed a toxic gas monitor redundant to the existing one in the control room.
Separate chlorine, ammonia and carbon dioxide diffusion type probes have been provided to detect the presence of these gases in the outside air intake.
An air sample is extracted from the outside air intake duct, analyzed in an air tight enclosure, and exhausted back t*o the air intake. The detector and monitor are mounted in the air conditioning equipment room in the Control Building at E1. 15'-0".
The monitors analyze the intake air for gases and if a concentration greater than the setpoint is detected, an alarm is initiated to the Control Room Operator.
The analyzers are set at set points as recommended by the manufacturer and which meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.78.
An alarm on panel SM was provided which alarms on detection of these toxic gases, equipment trouble or loss of power.
In addition, continuous digital LED readout is provided in the air conditioning equipment room for each detector.
Calibration and testing is provided as recommended by the manufacturer in the service and operation vendor manuals.
The toxic gas monitor has been classified as Non-Category I but has been mounted seismically in order to eliminate any potential system interaction with a Category I System and/or component.
The power supply to the toxic gas monitoring cabinets is f rom a non-safety related power source.
Additionally, the tie-ins to the CCR HVAC system duct are classified as Category I.
The control cable is run from the toxic monitors to the HVAC control panel located in the air conditioning room and has been seismically field run in i
conduit.
Spare cable in the control panel running to the Control Room was wired to a Control Room annunciator panel which provides the operators with alarm annunciation upon high toxic gaseo.
The existing cable from the air conditioning room control panel to the' annunciator panel in the Control Room has l
been pulled through cable trays and was installed in accordance with the appropriate procedures for maintaining the Site Electrical Separation Criteria.
Upon a toxic gas detection alarm, the operator is able to place the air conditioning mode selector switch in the " Recirculation" mode to stop intake of l
outside air.
This action closes the existing dampers A and B which meets the i
criteria (GDC-19) for control room habitability due to a toxic gas release and protects the operators from the gases before they reach their toxicity limit in the Control Room.
I Page 11 of 23
Based upon the above discussion, the modification does not affect the safe
' operation of the HVAC system or the plant during the " Normal" and " Incident"
. modes of operation.
Upon alarm actuation the operator initiates the
" Recirculation" mode which closes dampers A and B and puts the ventilation system in 100% recirculation.
The new toxic gas monitoring system does not alter the safe operation of the air conditioning system, since it provides an alarm function only.
Modification 85-03-158 PW - Conductivity Monitoring Upgrade For The Water Treatment Facility 1
l This modification upgrades the conductivity monitoring technique of the Anion and Mixed Bed Resin Exchangers and the final effluent discharge of the Water Treatment Facility.
1 The new conductivity monitoring equipment works in conjunction with the existing Water Treatment Control Panel instrumentation and controls.
The new monitoring method incorporates nine digital indicators (housed in a new panel) which contain relay contacts for initiation of discharge valve closure for the Train 1 and 2 Anion & Mixed Bed Resin Exchangers and the final effluent on a high conductivity condition.
In addition, each digital indicator supplies a 0-1 Volt D.C.
signal which' drives a new strip chart recorder located on the Water Treatment Control Panel.
The digital indicators are utilized in conjunction with a two position maintained operator switch and an indicator light.
The switch bypasses the digital indicators' capability of automatically closing the associated discharge valves on a high conductivity condition if in bypass.
However, additional existing auto closure features associated with each discharge valve are still enabled when automatic control is selected on the Water Treatment Control Panel.
The indicator light associated with the new two position switch illuminates when the bypass mode is selected.
The additional supplied loads are within the design capacity afforded by the 120 V.A.C. power panel located in the Water Treatment Control Panel.
Modification 85-03-163 CVCS - Vibration Reduction vor PT-142 This modification was installed to prevent recurrent vibration induced damage to the root stop branch connection off charging line No. 19 associated with PT-142.
This modification provides two means by which vibration induced failure around the root stop is reduced.
First, a brac9 was installed which clamps the 3/4" root stop valve to the 3" charging line No. 19.
This dampens the amplitude of vibration induced into the root stop valve from line 19.
Second, a flexible metal hose was installed downstream of the root stop as part of the instrument tubing run.
This prevents vibration induced failure to the Root Stop/ Tubing Interface Connection.
The root stop branch connection off the 3" charging line No. 19 associated with PT-142 has experienced recurring leakage.
The cause has been attributed to vibration induced through the charging line from the positive displacement charging pumps. The installation of the brace and flexible metal hose serves to reduce the possibility of any recurring vibration induced leakage at this location.
Since the associated charging line is seismic Class I,
a seismic analysis was performed to determine that the additional weight associated with the mounting of the brace was acceptable.
Also, the flexible metal hose meets the pressure / temperature rating of the associated line No. 19.
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Modification 85-03-164 FP - Modification of FP Hangers In The Diesel Generator Building This modification facilitates the repair of Fire Protection surport/ hanger H&R-1-11-U located in each of the three Diesel Bays so that they can be properly reset.
During the course of an inspection of the EDG Day Tank Area of IP-3,.a problen was identified involving the installation of seismic supports. associated with the water spray fire protection system in the Diesel Generator Building.
In order to implement proper repairs, it had been determined that these hangers be modified by chifting them two inches above their present position and by lengthening one of their members attached to the piping system as a result of the two inch shift.
i Between one and two of the four supporting anchor bolts on each of these three pipe support base plates were found to be skewed, thus raising questions as to the hanger's true load capacity.
Also, the base plate associated with the EDG
- 33 hanger was not flush with the adj acent wall.-
The probable cause of the hangers' improper positioning was that the bolts were deflected by underlying rebar in the adjacent wall.
By shifting these hangers up, the new anchor bolting enables the hangers to be installed properly and set flush against the wall.
This modification facilitated proper repair of the support and re-established the load-to-capacity ratio as originally intended for this support.
The repair did not violate the original seismic analysis for this system.
Modification 85-03-166 SWS - Replacement Of Level Controls On The Instrument Air And Conventional Plant Closed Cooling Systems
-l This modification replaced the existing level controls on the expansion / replenishment tanks for the Instrument Air and Conventional Plant i
Closed Cooling System.
The installation is consistent with original Plant Design Criteria and has not in any way degraded the existing closed cooling system.
The new level controllers were installed in the same Jocations as the previous controllers.
A pneumatic switch in each controller opens a city water make-up valve when the water level falls below the set point in its tank. The new level controllers maintain the water level in each tank as specified in their original design.
The instrument Air Closed Cooling System is a Seismic Class 1 piping system and is classified as Category I.
All new piping added per this modification is in accordance with Class I design criteria and Pipe Specification 9321-05-248-32.
The new level control is physically smaller than the old controller.
In order to facilitate mounting it, approximately five feet of 1 1/2 inch pipe was removed and replaced with 1 inch pipe. The mounting of the new level controller is seismically qualified on the basis of a seismic analysis and does not degrade the integrity of the Instrument Air Closed Cooling System.
The Conventional Plant Closed Cooling System portion of the modification is Seismic Class III and is Non-Category I.
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.On either system a failure of the'1evel control would have the same effect and
'is as follows:.
1.
Pneumatic switch fails open.
Under this condition the city water make-up valve would ' remain open and continue to fill the tank.
This would continue until the water reached the overflow pipe and then would flow off to the drain system.
2.
Penumatic switch fails closed.
In this case, the city water make-up valve would not open when water level falls below its set poir.t.
However, make-up water is only needed to maintain the system full as cooldown occurs and to make up for normal leakage.
A complete cooldown would only occur when the systems.that use the Closed Cooling Systems. are ' shutdown. :The tank level is monitored of ten enough to prevent a loss of level from normal leakage.
Mo,dification 85-03-167 WDS - Elimination Of The Waste Evaporator Package In The PAB The Caste Evaporator Package has been eliminated because the unit process rate of 2gpm has been proven to be inadequate to handle the liquid waste flow from the plant and was not ured.
Therefore, the system was dismantled in order to provide space for other needs.
equihment associated with the Waste Evaporator Package has been All of the removed f rom the' PAB through the block wall located in the Waste Evaporator Room.
This includes the lines' entering ard discharging from the package, as well as the Waste Evaporator Package itself.
These lines included the liquid waste, auxiliary component cooling water, auxiliary steam and condensate, nitrogen and ' primary water. -These lines were Seismic Class I,
II and III.
Also, all associated heat tracing and the power supply for the package supplied from MCC-37 has been removed.
The normal flow path of processing liquid waste is through a contractor supplied demineralized package located on site.
An alternate path is to process the liquid waste at Con Edison's Unit 1 facility. These methods have been proven to be a safe and effective means of processing the liquid waste. The flow path to the Waste Evaporator Package was not used to process the waste so it has been eliminated.
The package did not serve any other purpose, and was therefore, unnecessary.
The Seismic Class I and II lines that were cut and capped are still supported seismically (as per the original design conditions) and do not affect any safety related systems.
The block wall in the Waste Evaporator Room was temporarily removed to allow for the removal of the equipment.
Cable trays previsouly supported off the block wall have been permanently supported from approved locations in accordance with Electrical Workmanship Standard EI-6009.
Those cables spsred in existing cable trays do not significantly increase the i
weight in the trays.
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Modification 85-03-169 IA - liigh Pressure Steam Dump Actuating Air System Improvement The purpose of this modification was to ensure that the high pressure Steam Dumps do not open unless a valid signal exists.
This was accomplished by installing a time delay relay for vent valve SV-4, which precludes any pressure build-up which may occur when an arming signal is initiated.
Solenoid valve SV-2 is an internal pilot operated valve which requires air pressure at the inlet in order to be maintained in the closed position. Without this pressure, when a Steam Dump Arming Signal opens the air supply valve SV-1, a possibility exists for valve SV-2 to initially allow pressure to build-up downstream causing the Dump Valve to cycle open.
In order to preclude inadvertent opening of the Steam Dump, a time delay relay has been installed for vent valve SV-4, which vents the system long enough for SV-2 to close.
The required delay time has been determined for each Dump Valve per field verified test conditions.
The installation of this modification does not effecc the ability of the Dump Valves to operate in any of the modes required.
This modification neither prevents nor causes the Steam Dump to open in any way other than original design.
This modification ensures that the steam dumps do not cycle open when they receive an arming signal. This precludes possible inadvertent actuation of the ll. P. Steam Dumps that may result in the generation of a liigh Steam Flow Safety Injection Actuation Signal under full plant load conditions.
Modification 85-03-172 COND - Ammonia Injection System This modification was installed to maintain secondary side pil levels within the specified limits by returning ammonia, removed by the condensate polisher, to the Condensate System.
The Ammonia Injection System consists of a 5000 gallon nominal storage tank containing approximately a 29.4% ammoni.a by weight, 3 chemical feed pumps, control panel, associated valves and pipiag.
The tank is located outside the west wall of the llouse Service Boiler Building and the chemical injection pumps in the southwest corner of the water factory 15' elevation.
The system is operated manually and utilizes power from 480V MCC B located at the 15' elev. of the llouse Service Boiler Annex Building.
In order to limit the ammonium hydroxide tank refill frequency, a 26* Baum solution is used.
At this concentration, the supply lasts approximately 6 to 8 weeks and rer!uires no freeze protection.
l The incorporation of this modification does not adversely af fect the operation of the condensate system or feedwater systems as it 1.surns ammonia to these systems which is removed by the condensate polishing process.
A potential rupture of a 5000 gallon nominal ammonium hydroxide storage tank had been evaluated in February 1986 by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation.
This report supplements the probability analysis of the control room l
l habitability report in August 1985.
It was concluded that there would be no adverse affects on control room habitability.
(Stone & Webster Report No.
l 00987-151-4-1-N1).
Further, this system has been designed so as to comply with standard industry practices for transportation, storage, and handling of I
potentially hazardous chemicals.
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It has been determined that the surcharge loading of the ammonium hydroxide l
storage tank and foundation is within the bearing capacity of the soil.
l Underground utilities such as Fire Protection and Service Water were determined l
to be unaffected.
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The installation of the Ammonia Injection System does not violate the current State Pollution Discharge Elimination System (SPDES).
In the event of a spill, the dike surrounding the Ammonium Hydroxide Storage Tank will contain the spill and its discharge to the river can be controlled so as to comply with the SPDES limits.
Modification 85-03-175 SEC - Motorola Security Base Transceiver - CCR Handset Addition This modification added one desk top handset to the Sacurity Base Transceiver located on the Reactor Operators desk in the Central Control Room.
The new handset is a Motorola Model T1926B Remote Desk Set.
This set is compatible with the existing Motorola Security Base Transceiver.
The audio cable has been routed in a separate conduit from the base transceiver up to the Reactor Operator's desk.
All new cabling to the CCR was installed in accordance with existing approved procedures and specifications.
The handset is powered from an existing computer uninterruptible power supply outlet in the RO desk.
The circuit has sufficient power for this load.
Modification 86-03-020 FE - Elimination Of The Flash Evaporator Electrical Package In The Turbine Building El. 15' This modification addressed the removal of the Flash Eiaporator System to provide space for the Steam Generator Blowdown Recovery System.
The Flash Evaporator was located on a steel frame at the 15 foot elevation of the heater bay.
It was designed to produce 56,000 lb. /hr. of distillate when the turbine was operating at maximum output and the raw water temperature was 70*F.
A control panel was provided on the 15' elev. for the equipment associated with the evaporator and contained the motor controls and annunciator alarms for the evaporator.
In accordance with this modification the electrical package of the Flash Evaporator was eliminated.
This included the elimination of the control panel, removal of all cables from MCC-32 and MCC-33 which feed the Flash Evaporator components, removal of cables from 120VAC distr. panel, 118VAC instrument bus and 125 VDC distr. panel.
The elimination of the Flash Evaporator decreases the electrical load on MCC-32 and MCC-33.
The loads on 120 VAC distribution panel,118 VAC instrument and 125 VDC distribution panel are also decreased.
The Flash Evaporator is Seismic Class III, therefore, the elimination of the Flash Evaporator has not affected the seismic integrity of the facility.
The removal of the flash evaporator has no adverse effects on plant operation.
The water which was to be supplied by the flash evaporator is supplied from the other sources.
The Flash Evaporator is classified an non-Category I.
However, removing cables from cable trays, elimination of cables from distribution panels, and removing cables through CCR fire barrier floor and cable spreading room made this modification Category I.
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Modification 86-03-015 INST - Standardizing Of Grounding In Foxboro Racks This modification removed the unnecessary grounds on the Foxboro control instrumentation wiring originally installed on computer input points.
These grounds potentially could have led to failures in the control circuitry if a second ground developed.
It also ensured that the shielding of the instrumentation wiring is grounded in a standard manner.
The design philosophy at the time of plant design / construction was to ground the negative side of the signal loop in one place.
This was done to eliminate / reduce interference in signals to the computer inputs.
Since the old and new plant cenputers have good common mode rejection, the grounds on the input signal loopo are unnecessary.
All wiring changee were made within each Foxboro rack and were designed to maintain the plant electrical separation criteria.
No electrical loads have been added or removed, therefore, no electrical loading problems were created.
Modification 86-03-029 HD - Temporary Installation Of Product Corrosion Samplers The purpose of this modification was to install the Product Corrosion Samplers required to process samples from various non-Category.I lines draining into and discharging from the Heater Drain Tank.
The samples are tested for iron and copper contaminants.
Stainless steel Whitey regulating valves serve as sample taps from the various lines.
Stainless steel tubing was field routed from the sample valves to Product Corrosion Samplers.
The samplers are located directly west of column BB -19 n the 15' elevation of the Turbine Building.
1 Water is required to cool the samples below 100*F, and is provided from an existing city water line running along column A-20.
Copper tubing was field routed from the supply line to the samplers.
The Product Corrosion Samplers and associated tubing are for temporary use only.
The samplers and tubing were removed following completion of testing.
- However, the sample taps will remain in place for future use.
All tubing was field routed and does not interfere with existing piping / equipment.
Tubing support spans are in accordance with installation specifications.
Materials including valves, tubing and fittings are in accordance with applicable plant specifications and calculations show that sufficient cooling water is provided from the existing city water line.
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Modification ~ 86-03-034 FE - Flash Evaporator - Mechanical Demolition 1
The purpose of this modification was to demolish and remove the Flash Evaporator and associated mechanical components in order to provide space for future modifications.
l The flash evaporator was designed to provide distillate for make-up water to the l
Reactor Coolant Syntem and the Condensate System. However, the flash evaporator was not capable of providing the high quality make-up water required.
]
Demineralized make-up water for the Reactor Coolant System and the Condensate System is supplied by the IP-3 water factory and other sources.
The demolition work associated with this modification involved the removal of the Flash Evaporator and related pumps, tanks, piping and valves.
In addition, miscellaneous access platforms and supporting steel including equipment baseplates and anchor bolts were removed.
Connecting piping from the Service Water
- System, Condensate
- System, Extraction Steam System and other balance-of plant systems was cut and capped.
The power, control and instrumentation cables for the Flash Evaporator and related components was decoupled and removed in accordance with modification procedure MOD 86-03-020 FE.
The flash evaporator and associated mechanical components are classified as non-Category I.
In addition, all interconnecting piping with existing.
balance-of-plant systems is also non-Category I.
All piping interconnections with existing balance-of-plant systems have been cut and capped such that the pipe support designs for these systems remained unchanged and the operation of these systems remains unrestricted.
,Furthermore, since the Flash Evaporator is not utilized, its removal has had no adverse affect on plant operation.
Modification 86-03-042 FW - Modification Of Relief Valve CD-99 Vent Piping The purpose of this modification was to reduce the stress acting on the fitting associated with the 1 inch branch connection off the suction piping of the Main Boiler Feed Pumps and the inlet piping to relief valves CD-99.
Modification of the Relief Valves' Vent Piping consisted of replacing the valves' inlet piping with a larger diameter (2" vs. 1") and heavier walled fittings, the fabrication of a drip shield at the valves' outlet, and the installation of a slip joint at the CD-99 discharge piping to accommodate thermal growth during system heatup.
Vibration loads and thermal expansion at the 1" CD-99 fitting had previously caused failure of the socket weld and consequent condensate leakage.
Replacement of the inlet pipe and the fitting with 2" heavier walled fittings provides a stronger joint.
Provisions for a slip joint at the 2 inch CD-99 discharge pipe reduces the stress at the joint by allowing axial movement of the piping in response to thermal growth of the 24" MBFP Suction Piping.
Installation of the new piping and fittings was in accordance with plant specifications and installation documents.
The net load at the joint is less with he new design and new supports were provided for the relief valve discharge piping. The new piping design does not interfere with existing piping and is easily removable to allow Eciler Feed Pump maintenance and repair.
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Modification 86-03-046 AS - Main Condenser Steam Space Priming Jet Back-up Steam Supply This modification provides the capability to draw a vacuum in the Main Condenser
.when main steam is not available.
House Auxiliary Steam is now utilized as back-up steam for the Main Condenser Priming Jets.
The previous auxiliary steam tie-in for the Flash Evaporator (which has been removed) is now used for the supply line.
Isolation between the Main and Auxiliary Steam Systems is accomplished with a check valve and a manual valve rated for Main Steam requirements.
In order to draw vacuum when Main Steam is unavailable, Auxiliary Steam was also supplied to the Turbine Gland Seal System.
This was accomplished via a tie-in to the Auxiliary Steam Supply line for the Waterbox Lif ting Jets.
The tie-in was accomplished using a check valve and a manual isolation valve.
Using House Auxiliary Steam as the supply for the Main Condenser Priming Jets and the Turbine Gland Seal System enables a vacuum to be drawn when Main Steam is not available.
This allows condenser leak testing to take place prior to start-up and reduces the time required for start-up, and also reduces oxygen in
.the condensate system during start-up.
Prior to the completion of this modification, the House Auxiliary Steam System was placed on an AVT chemistry program.
This program is compatible with the cheinistry program in use for the Condensate System.
These system ' tie-ins have been designed to preclude backfeeding of the House Auxiliary Steam System from the Main Steam System, and are in accordance with i
the requirements of B31.1, Power Piping Code.
Modification'86-03-058 PW - Modify Support PW-H&R-26U This task modified damaged support PW-H&R-26U to attain the capability of withstanding a Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) per the original design.
The subject support is a Seismic Class II boundary for Primary Water Line #450.
The support was damaged during the mid-cycle outage when valve 239H, (drain i
valve for the RCP Seal Injection Filter), was installed.
The present design I
incorporated anchoring the support to the floor on the 15' El. in the Primary
)
Auxiliary Building.
The modified design anchored the support on an adjacent wall due to damaged concrete below the cid support.
The modified support has been evaluated to be able to withstand a DBE as per the original design. All materials used were Category I.
This revised pipe support design incorporates the original design configuration, (i.e.,
the pipe is anchored by a tightly installed "U" bolt).
The revised support serves the same function as the original support; (i.e., classified as Seismic Class II).
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Modification 86-03-074 COND - Condensate Polisher System Improvements For Partial Flow Operation i
This modification was installed to provide the ability to direct only a portion of the condensate flow through the Condensate Polisher.
Partial flow is accomplished by opening the System Bypass Valve, A0V 519, and running a booster pump to draw condensate through the polisher beds.
In order to accomplish this, the " service-bypass" switch was replaced with a 3-position switch " Bypass-Partial Flow-Full Flow".
When the switch is in " Bypass" or " Full Flow", there is no change in the way the system previously operated.
With the switch in " Partial Flow",
the following changes in the control circuitry occur:
1.
The interlock which prevents Booster Pump operation when the System Bypass Valve (A0V-519) is open is bypassed.
This interlock was installed in order to prevent Booster Pump runout, which is now prevented by throttling the Booster Pumps Common Discharge Valve, MOV-522.
Variable position control of this valve is installed in the CCR, and position is based on Booster Pump Amperage.
2.
The auto start circuitry for the Standby Booster Pumps can be defeated.
Auto-start of the Booster Pumps is not desirable when the discharge valve is throttled, and is not required when the System Bypass Valve (A0V-519) is open.
3.
A limit switch prevents full closure of the valve (MOV-522) to ensure the pump is not dead headed.
The Condensate Polisher was designed for full condensate flow.
It has been determined that plant chemistry can be maintained with reduced flow through the polisher.
Full flow is still desirable for initial clean-up during start-up and at other times when chemistry falls below specifications.
The following benefits have been realized by using the polisher in " partial flow":
1.
The number of mixed bed regeneration is greatly reduced, yielding in:
a.
Reduced usage of acid and caustic b.
Peduced manpower Requirements c.
Reduced oxygen transients d.
Reduced possibility of Sulfate throws e.
Reduced need for resin replacement 2.
The auto start circuitry for the Standby Booster Pumps can be defeated.
Auto-start of the Booster Pumps is not desirable when the discharge valve is throttled, and is not required when the System Bypass Valve (A0V-519) is open.
3.
A limit switch (on MOV-522) was placed in the circuit.
The limit switch prevents full closure of the valve (MOV-522) to ensure the pump is not dead headed.
4.
Reduces electrical consumption.
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- The existing. Condensate Polisher trip signals and protective actions are not affected by-this modification.
This modification has not compromised the ability for the' Condensate System to perform its intended function.
The wiring installed / modified conforms to the plant electrical separation criteria.
One switch has been replaced in the Control Room on Panel SD.
This switch is of the same manufacturer and type previously installed, and is mounted consistent with IP-3 installation practices.
Therefore, the existing structures, system or components are not degraded.
Modification 86-03-089 FP - Additional Emergency Lighting For Appendix "R"
Paragraph III.J of Appendix "R" to 10CFR50 requires emergency lighting to be "provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto".
The additional emergency lighting units which have been installed will be used only when there is a loss of power to any individual lighting unit or units that illuminate equipment or space that requires emergency illumination.
Each emergency lighting unit is comprised of a minimum 8-hour rated battery operated lighting unit with a charger for operation on 120VAC.
Additionally, each unit consists of 2-12 watt' halogen lamps.
These. emergency lighting battery packs are supplied from " normal" lighting branch circuits. No unit is supplied from a locally switched circuit.
Power is supplied from various lighting panels:
For. the unit in the Turbine Building, power is supplied from Lighting Panel No. 32; for the unit in the PAB, elev. 41'-0", power is supplied from Lighting Panel No. 310; for the unit in the PAB, elev. ' 54'-9", power is supplied from Lighting Panel 314; and for the units in the coatrolled passageway between the HP check point and the PAB power is supplied from Lighting Panels 311 and 311A.
Cable has been installed in new conduit from the lighting unit / splice boxes to new terminal boxes, and from the new terminal boxes to existing lighting splice boxes. All new cable splices and terminations were installed per specification EI-6009.
The installation of the emergency lights is part of the requirements of Appendix "R" to 10CFR50, committed to by the Authority.
The portion of this modification that involved the seismic supports of the emergency lighting units in Category I areas is defined as Category I and was, therefore, installed in accordance with approved applicable procedures.
All other portions of the modification are Category M.
These emergency lights operate when required to ensure illumination of access and egress routes to equipment and for the equipment or panel required to be operated during safe shutdown operations for the plant. The units automatically energize when the normal lighting circuits or panel for that area is de-energized.
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Nuclear Safety Evaluation 86-03-108 MTG - Repairs to Nos. 31, 32, and 33 L. P.
Turbine Spindles
.This Nuclear Safety Evaluation.86-3-108 MTG evaluated the repairs to Nos. 31, 32, and 33 Low-Pressure ' (LP) Turbine Spindles due to an unscheduled outage on July 6. 1986.
- L-P Turbine Spindles Nos. 31, 32, and 33 were removed from service due to a thrown blade which was identified from governor end of Disc #6 on L-P Turbine Spindle No. 31.
Subsequent field examinations identified blade foil, cracks on Disc #6 governor ends L-0 blades of L-P turbine spindle No. 31 and disc serrations on all No. 6 discs of all three L-P turbine spindles.
Further inspections of the other discs and blades in L-P Turbine Spindle No. 31 did not exhibit any other indications; therefore, a good confidence level was established that the area of concern was bounded'only to the L-0 blades and Disc
- 6 generator and governor ends in all three spindles.
The repairs to Nos. 31, 32 and 33 L-P Turbine Spindles incorporated three repair methods for returning these turbines to service.
The repair method for No. 31 L-P Turbine Spindle was a restacking of both Disc
- 6 governor and generator ends with two spare bladed discs. These spare bladed discs were fully examined by magnetic particle and liquid penetrant and only minor weld repair to a few blades was necessary to restore these discs and blades for operational service.
The repair to L-P Turbine Spindle No. 32 was to replace the universal rotor with an existing spare spindle.
Previous ultrasonic, magnetic particle, and liquid penetrant ruminations verified that this spare spindle can be used for a limited service life 'of.98 years due to a keyway crack of.530 inches in the l
Disc #2 generator end.
The.98 years calculation is in accordance with the latest NRC criteria per MSTG-1-P alternate method.
L-P Turbine Spindle No. 33's repair method was to remove the L-0 blades and associated stationary blades and replace the stationary blades with baffles at both ends of the turbine.
The use of these baffles in place of the stationary and L-0 blades was to simulate an as-near-normal operating condition for the I
remaining blades in the turbine.
An engineering design review was performed verifying the material selected, welding, design fit, pressure drop calculations and stress levels as all acceptable. The reuse of the discs with disc serration cracking has been determined also as acceptable since all blading has been removed, therefore, no operating and moment stresses from the blades will occur causing a disc serration failure during operations.
l Page 22 of 23
Modification 86-03-111 FP _ Main Transformers Fire Protection System:
Coatrol Room Alarm Improvement' The purpose of this modification was to provide Control Room indication of a
- fire on or about the Main Transformers during all modes of operation.
The logic for discharge of the Main Transformers Deluge System requires a heat detector actuated and the transformer not energized.- The permissive relay for this logic (transformer energized /de-energized) had previously been installed in the heat detection circuit.
This caused a side effect of blocking the Control Room alarm in the event of a fire when the transformer was energized.
This modification relocated the permissive relay (transformer energized /de-energized) to the deluge valve actuation circuit.
The required logic (as above) has been retained, and the alarm in the Control Room is available at all times.
The subject modification has not effected the operation of the Main Transformers Fire Protection Deluge System, but enhances the early detectien and subsequent extinguishing of a transformer fire.
All wiring changes were internal to the Deluge System local relay panel, and did not violate the plant elect rical separation criteria.
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