ML20235B384
| ML20235B384 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 09/14/1987 |
| From: | Beyea J, Leaning J, Sholly S, Thompson G MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#387-4443 OL, NUDOCS 8709240084 | |
| Download: ML20235B384 (171) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
,87 SEP 15 P136 l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BeforeAdministrativeJudgesb Helen F.
Hoyt, Chairperson Gustave A.
Linenberger, Jr.
Dr. Jerry Harbour
)
)
In the Matter of
)
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW
)
Docket Nos.
)
50-443-444-OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
(Off-site EP)
)
September 14, 1987
)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C.
SHOLLY ON THE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. JAN BEYEA ON POTENTIAL RADI ATION DOSAGE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENTS THAT FORM THE BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. GORDON THOMPSON ON POTENTI AL RADI ATION RELEASE SEQUENCES, AND DR. JENNIFER LEANING ON THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF THOSE DOSES Department of the Attorney General Commonwealth of Massachusetts One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108-1698 (617) 727-2265 6
8709240084 870914 h
PDR ADOCK 05000443 T
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before Administrative Judges:
Helen F.
Hoyt, Chairperson
'Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
Dr. Jerry Harbour
)
)
In the Matter of
)
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW
)
Docket Nos.
)
50-443-444-OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
(Off-site EP)
)
September 14, 1987
)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS TESTIMONY OF ST EV EN C. SHOLLY ON THE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. JAN SEYEA DN POTENTIAL RADI ATION DOSAGE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENTS THAT FORM THE BASIS FOR THE 'JRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. GORDON THOMPSON ON POTENTIAL RADIATION RELEASE SEQUENCES, AND DR. JENNIFER LEANING ON THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF THOSE DOSES l
l l
l Department of the Attorney General Commonwealth of Massachusetts i
One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108-1698 (617) 727-2265 l
4 i
L
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 9efore Administrative Judges:
Helen F.
Hoyt, Chairperson Gustave A.
Linenberger, Jr.
Dr. Jerry Harbour
)
)
In the Matter of
)
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW
)
Docket Nos.
)
50-443-444-OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
(Off-site EP)
)
September 14, 1987
)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C.
SHOLLY ON THE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. JAN BEYEA ON POTENTIAL RADIATION DOSAGE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENTS THAT FORM THE BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. GORDON THOMPSON ON POTENTIAL RADIATION RELEASE SEQUENCES, AND DR. JENNIFER LEANING ON THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF THOSE DOSES I.
IDENTIFICATION OF WITNESSES Q.
Please state your names, positions, and business addresses.
A.
(Sholly) My name is Steven C.
Sholly.
I am an Associate Consultant with MHB Technical Associates of San Jose, California.
A.
(Beyea) My name is Dr. Jan Beyea, I am the Senior Energy Scientist for the National Audubon Society in New York City.
A.
(Leaning) My name is Dr. Jennifer Leaning, I am Chief l
i of Emergency Services for the Harvard Community Health Plan in Boston, Massachusetts, and instructor in medicine at Harvard Medical School.
A.
(Thompson) My name is Dr. Gordon Thompson.
I am Executive Director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Q.
Briefly summarize your experience and professional qualifications.
A.
(Sholly) I received a B.S.
in Education from Shippensburg State College in 1975 with a major in Earth and Space Science and a minor in Environmental Education.
I have seven years experience with nuclear power matters.
In particular, for four and one-half years I was employed by the Union of Concerned Scientists where I worked on matters related to the development of emergency plans for commercial nuclear power plants and the application of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) to the analysis of safety issues related to commercial nuclear power plants.
I have been a consultant with MHB Technical Associate for two years, during which time I have been involved in a variety of projects related to the safety and economics on nuclear power plants, including the evaluation,
of severe accident issues for light water nuclear power plants i
generally, and for the Seabrook Station, Unit 1, specifically.
I have testified as an expert witness in proceedings before the-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other bodies, including the safety hearings on Indian Point Units 2 and 3 (Docket Nos. 50--247-SP and 50-286-SP), the licensing hearings on Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 (Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414), and the licensing hearings on the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (Docket No. 50-322-OL'-3).
I have also provided expert testimony before the Sizewell B Public Inquiry in the United Kingdom.
I have served as a member of a peer review panel on regulatory applications of PRA (NRC report NUREG-1050), as a member of the Containment Performance Design Objective Workshop (NRC report NUREG/CP-0084), as a member of the Committee on ACRS Effectiveness, and as a panelist at the Severe Accident Policy Implementation External Events Workshop, Annapolis, Maryland (presentation on seismic risk assessment, 1987; forthcoming Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report).
The details of my education, experience, and professional qualifications are included in my resume, which is contained in attachments to this testimony.
(Beyea) I received my doctorate in nuclear physics from Columbia University in 1968.
Since then I have served as an Assistant Professor of physics at Holy Cross College in
]
l Worcester, MA; as a member for four years of the research staff
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of the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton University; and, as of May 1980, as the Senior Energy Scientist for-the National Audubon Society.
While at Princeton University, I worked with Dr. Frank von Hippel to prepare a critical quantitative analysis of attempts to model reactor accident sequences.
The lessons learned from this general study of nuclear accidents and the computer codes written to model radioactivity releases were then applied by me to specific problems at the request of governmental and non-governmental bodies around the world.
I have written major reports on the safety of specific nuclear facilities for the President's Council on Environmental Quality (TMI reactor), for t.he New York State Attorney General's Office (Indian Point),
4 1
for the Swedish Energy Commission (Barsebeck reactor), and the state of Lower Saxony (Gorbleben Waste Disposal Site).
I have also examined safety aspects of specific sites for the California Energy and Resources Commission, the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office and the New York City Council.
While at Princeton, I wrote a computer program useful for reactor emergency planning for the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.
This program, appropriately modified, has been used for some of the calculations presented in this testimony.
After joining the National Audubon Society, I continued to work as an independent consultant on nuclear safety issues.
I participated in a study, directed by the Union of Concerned d
Scientists at the request of the Governor of Pennsylvania, cr erning the proposed venting of krypton gas at Three Mile Island.
The U.S.C.
study, for which I made the radiation dose calculations, was the major reason the Governor gave for approving the venting.
I participated in the international exercise on consequence modelling (Benchmark Study) coordinated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development (0.E.C.D.).
Scientists and engineers from fourteen countries around the world calculated radiation doses following hypothetical " benchmark" releases using their own consequence models.
Participants from the United States, in addition to myself, included groups from Sandia Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Batelle Pacific-Northwest, and Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc.
I also served as consultant from the environment community to the N.R.C.
in connection with their development of " Safety Goals for Nuclear Power Plants."
At the request of the Three Mile Island Public Health Fund, j
I supervised a major review of radiation doses from the Three Mile Island Accident.
This report, "A Review of Dose Assessments at Three Mile Island and Recommendations for Future Research" was released in August of 1984.
Subsequently, I organized a workship on TMI Dosimetry, the proceedings of which were published in early 1986.
In 1986, I developed new dose models for the Epidemiology Department of Columbia University.
These models are being used
- to assess whether or not the TMI accident is correlated with excess health effects in the local population.
The new computer models account for complex terrain, as well as time varying meteorology (including changes in wind direction).
Insights gained from this project have been applied to the Seabrook situation.
In addition to reports written about specific nuclear facilities, an article of mine on resolving conflict at the Indian Point reactor site, an article on emergency planning for reactor accidents, and a joint paper with Frank von Hippel of princeton University on failure modes of reactor containment syste!as have appeared in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
I have also prepared risk studies covering sulfer emissions from coal-burning energy facilities.
And I have managed a project that analyzed the side effects of renewable energy sources.
I regularly testify before congressional committees on energy issues and have served on several advisory boards set up j
by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment.
j I currently participate in a number of ongoing efforts aimed at promoting dialogue between environmental organizations and industry.
I was assisted in the early stages of my studies of Seabrook by Brian Palenik, who has worked with me on other reactor studies in the past.
In subsequent answers to questions, I will use the pronoun, "we,"
to describe our <
l collective efforts.
However, all work was carried out either by me or under my direct supervision.
Brian Palenik received his Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering degree with honors from Princeton University.
While an undergraduate at Princeton, Mr. Palenik worked with me on "The Consequences of Hypothetical Major Releases of Radioactivity to the Atmosphere from Three Mile Island"--my report to the President's Council on Environmental Quality.
After graduation, Mr. Palenik joined the staff of National Audubon's Policy Research Department.
While there, he and I wrote, "Some Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Indian Point and Their Implications for Emergency Planning," as part of our testimony before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, July 1982.
Mr. Palenik is currently a graduate student in the Civil Engineering Department at M.I.T.
i A complete resume is included in the attachments to this 1
testimony.
(Thompson)
I received a Ph.D in applied mathematics from Oxford University in 1973.
Since then I have worked as a consulting scientists on a variety of energy, environment, and international security issues.
My experience has included technical analysis and presentation of expert testimony on issues related to the safety of nuclear power facilities.
In 1977, I presented testimony before the Windscale Public
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\\
l Inquiry in Britain, addressing safety aspects of nuclear fuel
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l I i
7 reprocessing.
During 1978 and 1979, I participated in an I
international scientific review of the proposed Gorleben nuclear' fuel center in West Germany, this review being sponsored by the government of Lower Saxony.
Between 1982 and 1984, I coordinated an investigation of safety issues relevant to the proposed nuclear plant at Sizewell, England.
This plant will have many similarities to the Seabrook plant.
The investigation was sponsored by a group of local governments in Britain, under the aegis of the Town and Country Planning Association.
This investigation formed the basis for testimony before the Sizewell Public Inquiry by myself and two other witnesses.
From 1980 to 1985, first es a staff scientist and later as a consultant, I was associated with the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), at their head office in Cambridge, MA.
On behalf of UCS, I presented testimony in 1983 before a licensing board of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), concerning the merits of a system of filered venting at the Indian Point nuclear plants.
Also, I undertook an extensive review of NRC research on the reactor accident " source term" issue, and was co-author of a major report published by UCS on this subject (Sholly and Thomps.on, 1986).
{
I Currently, I am one of three principal investigators for an emergency planning study based at Clark University, Worcester, l
MA.
The object of the study is to develop a model emergency
)
i plan for the Three Mile Island nuclear plant.
Within this I
I
! i 3
m effort, my primary responsibilities are to address the characteristics of severe reactor accidents.
My other research interests include:
the efficient use of energy; supply of energy from renewable sources; radioactive waste management; the restraint of nuclear weapons proliferation; and nuclear arms control.
I have written and made public presentations in each of these areas.
At present, I am Executive Director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies, Cambridge, MA.
This organization is devoted to research and public education on the efficient use of natural resources, protection of the environment, and the furtherance of international peace and security.
A detailed resume is included in the attachments to this.
(Leaning) I received an M.D.
from the University of Chicago Pritzker School of Medicine in 1975 and completed a residency in internal medicine and a fellowship in emergency medicine at Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston, Massachusetts.
For six years from 1978 through 1984 I practiced emergency medicine as an attending physician at Mount Auburn Hospital, one of the Harvard teaching hospitals.
Since 1984 I have served as Chief of Emergency Services for the Harvard Community Health Plan, i
responsible for the organization and delivery of emergency services to the approximately 300,000 members enrolled in he Plan.
Since 1979 I have actively pursued an interest in disaster medicine, with a particular focus on emergency response to radiation disasters, whether resulting from accidents at nuclear power plants or from explosions of nuclear weapons.
In 1980 I participated in a five-day course at Oak Ridge, Tennessee in the management of radiation emergencies.
I have lectured extensively on the organization of disaster response, the assessment of radiation injury, and the management of mass casualties.
For the last three years I have taught the acute radiation and emergency response sections of the Harvard
' Medical School course on nuclear war.
I am the author of several publications on radiation injury and medical response, including a chapter on the health effects of radiation in a book I co-edited, entitled The Counterfeit Ark.
I serve as co-chair of the Governor's Advisory Committee on the Impact of the Nuclear Arms Race on Massachusetts and am a member of the Board of Directors of the Disaster Management Center at the l
l University of Wisconsin.
The details of my education, 1-training, and professional experience are contained in my resume, which is included in the attached to this testimony.
1 II.
CONTENTIONS 1
Q.
To what contentions does your testimony refer?
A.
(All) Town of Hampton revised contention VIII, SAPL revised contention 16 and NECNP contention RERP-8.
These contentions and their bases are set out in full in l
l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
s Exhibit-2.
Our testimony also addresses matters raised in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) June 4, 1987
" current" positi.on on these contentions.
In addition, our testimony bears on aspects of other contentions in this proceeding.
Q.
What is the purpose of your testimony and how does it relate to the specific contentions cited here?
A.
(All) These three interrelated contentions and the FEMA position on them all concern the issue of protection from radiological releases of the beach populations in the vicinity of the Seabrook Plant.
Our testimony first describes the standard guidance used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and FEMA for the initiation and dur.ation of radiological releases to be considered in emergency planning.
Then, and using postulated accidents at Seabrook consistent with the spectrum of accident scenarios called for in the NRC guidance, the testimony estimates and describes the radiation dosages which could affect the beach populations near the Seabrook Plant site.
We then describe the health consequences of those dosages on the beach population.
The testimony as a whole demonstrates that NHRERP Rev. 2 is fundamentally flawed and is of no real or practical use because the beachgoing public in the vicinity of the Seabrook plant I
will not be adequately protected in the event of an emergency.
In particular, this testimony shows that because of the size of the beach population in the immediate vicinity of the plant )
i
site, the long evacuation times, and the lack of effective sheltering, many thousands of individuals will die, suffer serious injuries or face the prospect of increased likelihood of cancer if one of the accidents required to be planned for by the NRC occurs.
Thus, because of the radiation dosages that would reach the beach populati'on, there is no reasonable assurance that NHRERP Rev 2 can and will be implemented to provide adequate protection to the public in the event of an accident.
III.
OVERVIEW Q.
Please summarize your portion of this testimony.
A.
(Sholly) My testimony describes the technical basis for tha current NRC emergency planning rules.
The testimony discusses the use in the NRC reports NUREG/CR-1311, NUREG-0396, and NUREG-0654, of the risk assessment results for the Surry Unit 1 plant (as set forth in the NRC report WASH-1400) to derive dose-distance relationships for a spectrum of accidents, including severe accidents beyond the design basis of light water nuclear power plants.
The testimony further describes the nature of that spectrum of accidents, including release characteristics, release frequencies, and ancertainies.
Finally, the testimony describes how the risk-based insights from the Surry Unit I risk assessment were utilized by the NRC to arrive at the generic emergency planning zone distances and other guidance contained in the rules and in the applicable NRC guidance documents (including NUREG-0654, Rev. 1).
12 -
A.
(Beyea) The situation around the Seabrook Nuclear Power plant is unusual in the context of emergency planning for nuclear plants, because large populations make use of nearby beaches in the summertime.
In order to determine the extent of protection afforded the summer beach population by current emergency plans, we have modelled the radiation doses to the population that would follow releases of radioactivity from the Seabrook plant.
A range of releases has been studied, patterned after the range used in the NRC's report, NUREG-0396.
In NUREG-0396, a set of generic accident sequences (PWRl-PWR9) were defined that apply to pressurized water reactors'like the Seabrook plant.
These sequences span the entire range of physically-plausible release scenarios, making
.them usefc1 for assessing, at least on a theoretical basis, the effectiveness of emergency plans.
For my testimony, we have chosen accident sequences that are similar to the NRC's generic versions, but which take into account reactor-specific differences at Seabrook.
In order to understand the conditions under which the population would not be protected from "early death" (death within 60 days of the release), doses were modelled for these release categories using a range of weather parameters, plutae rise heights, and dose contribution assumptions.
The results indicate that the potential consequences of severe accidents increase greatly during the summer months, due to the increased population in the area and the unique conditions of a beach _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
release:
Beach-goers caught in the open would not be shielded from radiation, and could be expected, by our calculations, to receive doses as much as five times higher than generally considered in nuclear emergency planning.
This means that certain accident releases, not normally projected to cause early fatalities, are projected to do so in the Seabrook case.
As a result, it is necessary to consider a range of accident scenarios, from those with very small releases to those with very large releases.
In addition to the risk of early death, we have considered other potential accident consequences, including delayed cancer incidence.
These potential outcomes dominate the risk for accident releases in classes PWR4-PWR9.
The proximity of the Reactor to an unshielded summer beach population makes the Seabrook case a special and difficult one for emergency planning.
The doses that would be received following a range of releases at the Seabrook site, with emergency plans in effect, are higher than doses that would be received at most other sites in the complete absence of emergency planning.
Our results demonstrate that, with current plans, the immediate safety of the beach population is threatened for a wide range of releases and meteorological conditions.
For the accidents studies in our testimony, many thousand of people could receive life-threatening doses.
I - - - _
A.
(Thompson) The. issues I address are:
( l')
The potential for an atmospheric release, similar to l
that designated as PWR1 in the Reactor Safety Study, to occur from a steam explosion or high-pressure melt ejection event.
(2)
The range of variation of two parameters which affect plume rise during a "PWRl-type" release, specifically the location of containment breach and the thermal energy release rate for the plume.
(3) The potential for "PWR1-type" releases to contain greater amounts of certain isotopes, such as those of
't' ruthenium, than other categories of releases.
A.
(Leaning) The purpose of my testimony is to discuss what is known about the acute and long-term health consequences that can be expected to befall human beings exposed to ionizing radiation in the range of dose levels that might eventuate from a nuclear power plant accident such as those described in the testimony of Mr. Sholly, Dr. Beyea and Dr. Thompson.
I describe the kinds of injuries that would be received by the i
population in both the short and long term.
IV.
SYNOPSIS OF WASH-1400 SURRY ANALYSIS Q.
Please identify and describe the nature of the NRC report WASH-1400.
A.
(Sho11y), WASH-1400 (N.C. Rasmussen, et al., Reactor Safety Study:
An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S.
l Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory i _ _ _ _ - _ - - -.
Commission, WASH-1400, NUREG-75/014, October 1975) represents a probabilistic risk assessment of two nuclear power plants, namely Surry Unit 1 and Peach Bottom Unit 2.
The report consists of a Main Report and eleven Appendices.
WASH-1400 represents tr.e first comprehensive application of probabilistic risk assessment methods to the analysis of the risks posed by commercial nuclear power plants.
That is, WASH-1400 includes system analyses, source term estimates, and accident consequence estimates.
In the parlance of the NRC's PRA Procedures Guide, WASH-1400 is a Level 3 PRA of two plants.1!
Q.
Please briefly describe the Surry Unit 1 nuclear power plant and compare its design with that of Seabrook Station, Unit 1.
A.
(Sholly) The Surry Unit 1 nuclear power plant is a three-loop, Westinghouse pressurized water reactor with dry, subatmospheric containment.
The Surry Unit 1 plant has a design thermal power level of 2441 megawatts, and entered commercial operation in December 1972.
Surry Unit 1 is operated by Virginia Power Corporation under operating license DPR-32, issued on May 25, 1572.
Seabrook Station Unit 1 is a four-loop, Westinghouse pressurized water reactor with a large, 1/
Jack W.
Hickman, et al. PRA PROCEDURES GUIDE:
A Guide to the Performance of Probabilistic Risk Assessments for Nuclear Power Plants, American Nuclear Society and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, prepared for the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR 2300, January 1983, pages 2-2 to 2-3.
dry containment.
Seabrook has a design thermal power level of 3650 megawatts.
Q.
Please summarize the results of the WASH-1400 analysis of the Surry Unit 1 plant.
A.
(Sholly) The WASH-1400 report calculated a median core I
melt frequency for Surry Unit 1 of about 5 x 10-5 per reactor-year (or about 1 in 20,000 per reactor-year).2/
The NUREG-1500 analysis estimated the core melt frequency for Surry to be 2.6 x 10-5 per reactor year.
See, NUREG-1150, draft, page 3-2.
The dominant accident sequences for Surry Unit 1 which contributed to this core melt frequency are identified along with their estimated sequence frequencies in Table A, which is attached to this testimony.
WASH-1400 also defined nine release categories or source terms which defined the release characteristics and release frequencies for Surry Unit 1.
These release categories were designated PWR-1 through PWR-9.
Release categories PWR-1 through PWR-7 correspond to 2/
The Surry core melt frequency estimate in WASH-1400 has 4
been cited as several different values.
For instance, the NUREG-1150 report cites a value of 4.6 x 10-5 per reactor year.
See M.L.
Ernst, et al., Reactor Risk Refernce Document, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1150, Vol.
1,
" Main Report", draft for comment, February 1987, page 3-12 (hereinafter "NUREG-1150 draft)
A technical report supporting NUREG-1150 cites 4.4 x 10-S er reactor-year.
- See, p
Robert C.
Bertucio, et al., Analysis of Core Damage Frequencg From Internal Events:
Surry Unit 1, Sandia National Laboratories, prepared for the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-4550, SAND 86-2084, Vol.
3, November 1986 page V-68.
In fact, as indicated in Exhibit 3, attached to this testimony, if one adds the point estimate frequencies for the WASH-1400 dominant accident sequences, one obtains a core melt frequency of 1.2 x 10-4 per reactor-year.
l j
core melt accidents.
Release Categories PWR-8 and PWR-9 are non-core melt accidents, and are roughly equivalent to the design basis accident with (PWR-8) and without (PWR-9) containment spray operation.
The Surry release categories ace described and their characteristics and estimated frequencies defined in Table B, which is attached to this testimony.
Many 4 the NASH-1400 release categories (especially PWR-1 through PWR-4) could result in significant ground contamination offsite should accidents leading to such releases occur.
V.
USE OF WASH-1400 RESULTS IN NUREG-0396 Q.
Please identify and describe NUREG-0396.
A.
(Sholly) NUREG-0396 (Task Force on Emergency Planning, Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016, December, 1987) set a revised planning basis for commercial nuclear power plants.
In essence, NUREG-0396 concluded that a spectrum of accidents should be used in developing a planning basis.3/
3/
H.E. Co.llins, B.K. Grimes & F.
Galpin, et al., Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Emergency ResponsePlans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants, Task Force on Emergency Planning, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016, December 1978, page 24 (hereinafter "NUREG-0396"). - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _
NUREG-0396 recommended the establishment of two generic emergency planning zones (EPZs) for nuclear power olants; a plume exposure pathway EPZ about 10 miles in radius and an ingestion exposure pathway EPZ about 50 miles in radius.
These EPZs were designated as "the areas for which planning is recommended to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to prctect the public in the event of an accident."A!
A significant part of the basis for these planning zone distances was derived from accident consequence analyses (specifically dose-distance calculations) using the WASH-1400 release categories and frequencies for Surry Unit 1.
Q.
Please describe how the WASH-1400 tesults for Surry Unit I were utilized in NUREG-0396.
A.
(Sholly) The Task Force on Emergency planning, which wrote NUREG-0396, utilized the Surry Unit 1 results from NASH-1400 to perform consequence calculations to " illustrate the likelihood of certain offsite dose levels given a core melt accident."1!
While the Task Force members debated various aspects of the WASH-1400 report and considered its results to have limited use for plant-and site-specific factors, it was judged to provide "the best currently available source of information on the relative likelihood of large accidental 4/
Id. at 11.
5/
Id. at 6.
i
) 4
releases of radioactivity given a core melt event."5#
WASH-1400 results for Surry were also utilized to provide guidance concerning the timing of radiological releases resulting from core melt accidents, and the radiological characteristics of such releases.2/
The planning basis distance, the time dependent characteristics of potential releases and exposures, and the kinds of radioactive materials that can potentially be released to the environment were identified by the Task Force as the three planning basis elements needed to scope the planning effort.8/
WASH-1400 results for Surry Unit 1 were used to define all three of the planning basis elements in NUREG-0396.
Q.
Please describe the rationale used by the Task Force in establishing the size of the EPZs recommended in NUREG-0396.
A.
( S ho ll.y ) The Task Force on Emergency Planning considered a number of possible rationales, including risk, probability, cost effectiveness, and the accident consequence spectrum.
Following a review of these rationales, "The Task Force chose to base the rationale on a full spectrum of
. accidents and corresponding consequences tempered by probability considerations."E/
The rationale used by 6/
Id. at 6.
7/
Id. at 18-23.
8/
Id. at 8.
9/
Id. at 15. _ _
l the Task Force in establishing the EPZ planning distances is more fully described in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0396.
I l
Q.
Please describe the spectrum of accidents considered by the Task Force in NUREG-0396.
A.
(Sholly) The Task Force on Emergency Planning considered a complete spectrum of accidents, including those discussed in environmental reports prepared by utilities as part of the operating license review (the so-called Class 1 through Class 8 accidents), accidents postulated for the purpose of evaluating plant design (design basis accidents in the Final Safety Analysis Report), and the spectrum of accidents identified in the WASH-1400 report.
The Task Force concluded that the Class 1 through class 8 accident discussions in environmental reports were too limited in scope and detail to be useful in emergency planning, and instead relied on design basis accidents and the WASH-1400 release categories.
la/
Q.
Please describe specifically how the Surry Unit 1 results from WASH-1400 were used by the Task Force.
A.
(Sholly) Concurrently with the operation of the Task Force, a report was being prepared for the NRC by Sandia Laboratories (now Sandia National Laboratories) which examined offsite emergency response measures for core melt accidents.
10/
Id. at 1-4. _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1 This report, designated SAND 78-0454, was published in June 1978.11/
The Sandia report grouped the WASH-1400 release categories for Surry Unit 1 into " Melt-Through" and
" Atmospheric" release groups (based on the location of containment failure identified for the WASH-1400 release categories).
Surry release categories PWR-1 through PWR-5 consist of accidents in which the containment was concluded to fail directly to the atmosphere as a result of structural failure or containment isolation failure.
These release categories were grouped into the " Atmospheric Release" class.
Surry release categories PWR-6 and PWR-7 consist of accidents in which the containment base was penetrated by core debris.
These release categories were grouped into the " Melt-Through Release" class.
The likelihood of the " Atmospheric" and " Melt-Through" classes were estimated by summing the probabilities of the contributing WASH-1400 release categories; " Atmospheric" releases were estimated to have a frequency of 1.4 x 10-5 per reactor-year, and " Melt-Through" releases were estimated to have a frequency of 4.6 x 10-5 perreactor-yekh[
11/
David C.
Aldrich, Peter E.
McGrath & Norman C. Rasmussen, Examination of Offsite Radiological Protective Measures for Nuclear Reactor Accidents Involving Core Melt.
Sandia Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Iegulatory Commission, SAND 78-0454, June 1978 (hereinafter
" SAND 78-0454").
This report was reissued as NUREG/CR-1131 in October 1979 following the Three Mile Island accident.
12/
Id. at 43. _--__-____a
The characteristics of these release classes were then used as input to the WASH-1400 accident consequence code, referred to as CRAC (Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences).
The calculations were carried out using meteorological data from one reactor site and an assumed uniform population density of 100 persons per square mile.13/
The CRAC code calculations implemented for the Sandia study used hourly weather data for one year and 91 accident start times (a four day, thirteen-hour shift was assumed to take place for each start time; this results in each hour of the day being represented in 24 samples and a total of 91 samples are taken from one year's data).1A!
The wind direction is assumed to be held constant during and following the release; other weather changes are modeled as indicated in the data.15/
A revised model of public evacuation (ultimately implemented in CRAC2, an improved version of the code) wasalsoushh[
The most frequently cited curve in NUREG-0396 which was derived from the Surry Unit 1 risk study results is a curve which plats the probability of whole-body dose versus
~;
13/
Id. at 36.
14/
Acd5tding to a recent Brookhaven National Laborator'y repo't,l weather data from a typical year for New York City'were used intcalculations.
- See, W.T.
pratt & C.
Hofmayer, et al.,
Technidal Evaluation of the EPZ Sensitivity Study for Seabrook, Brookh.$ven National Laboratory, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regula':.ory Commission, March 1987, page 6-2.
y 15/
61drich, et al.,
suora note 11, at 37-39..
16/
Id. at 59. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
distance.
(This curve, Figure 1-11 from NUREG-0396, is attached to this testimony as part of Table C).
The curves on this figure were not calculated directly by the CRAC code, i
however.
As explained in a recent Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) report, these curves were interpolated.
BNL used the newer CRAC2 code to recalculate the does vs. distance curves.
The results of these calculations are shown in Table D, which is attached to this testimony (this calculation is only for the 200 rem whole-body curve).
Q.
What results from the Sandia study were used in NUREG-03967 A.
(Sholly) NUREG-0396 contains a series of figures which are drawn from the Sandia report.
These figures are Figures 1-11 through 1-18.
These figures are reproduced as Table C, attached to this testimony.
VI.
USE OF WASH-1400 INSIGHTS IN S ETTING EPZ DISTANCES Q.
Please describe the insights from NUREG-0396, Figures 1-11 through 1-18, that were drawn by the Task Force on Emergency Planning.
A.
(Sholly) The Task Force derived a number of insights from Figures 1-11 through 1-18.
These insights were set forth in terms of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
" Protective Ation Guide" (PAG) doses.
PAGs are expressed in units of radiation dose (rem) which " represents trigger levels or initiation levels, which warrant pre-selected protective _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - - _ -
actions for the public if the projected (future) dose received l
by an individual in the absence of a protective action exceeds the PAG."11!
The EPA PAGs used by the Task Force were those for whole-body exposure and thyroid exposure.
These PAGs have a range of 1-5 rem whole-body and 5-25 rem to the thyroid.
According to EPA guidance, the lower dose in the PAG range is to be used if "there are no major local constraints in providing protection at that level, especially to sensitive populations."
If local constraints make the lower value impractical to use, in no case should the higher value be exceeded in determining the need for protective action.18/
Based on the figures, the Task Force concluded that given a core melt accident, there is about a 70% chance of exceeding the whole-body PAG doses at two miles, a 40% chance of exceeding the whole-body PAG does at ten miles.
Similarly, given a core melt accident, there is a near 100% chance of exceeding the 10-rem thyroid PAG dose at one mile, about an 80%
chance at ten miles, and about a 40% chance at 25 miles.
Based in significant part of these observations, the Task Force recommended that EPZs of 10 miles be established for the plume exposure pathway and 50 miles 11/
4 I
1 l
17/
Collins, et al.,
suora note 3, at 3.
j i
18/
Office of Radiation Programs, t4anual of Protective Action i
Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, U.S.
l Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-520/1-75-001, September 1975, Revised June 1980, page 2.5.
19/
Collins, et al., suora note 3, at 1-41 and 1-43.
I -_
for the injection exposure pathway.2q/
Q.
Please describe how NUREG-0396 is related to the NRC's emergency planning regulations.
A.
(Sholly) In October 1979, the Commission endorsed a policy of having a " conservative emergency planning policy in addition to the conservatism inherent in the defense-in-depth philosophy," and stated that a 10-mile plume EPZ and a 50-mile 4
injection EPZ should be established around each nuclear power 1!
Subsequently, these EPZs were codified in the NRC plant.
emergency planning rule when the final rule was adopted in 1980.21!
Indeed, NUREG-0396 is explicitly referenced in the final rule.23/
NUREG-0654, which provides detailed guidance for the preparation and evaluation of radiological emergency plans for nuclear power plant accidents, also references the NUREG-0396 report.
NUREG-0654 states that the 10-mile radius plume EPZ was based prinarily on four considerations:SA/
20/
Id. at 1-37, 1-41, and 1-43, 21/
Federal Register 61123, 23 October 1979.
22/
Federal Register 55402, 55406, 55411, 19 August 1980.
]
23/
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section 1, fn 2.
24/
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluction of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.
i 1, November 1980, page 12.
) _ - _ _
a.
projected doses from'the traditional design basis accidents 43uld not exceed Protective Action Guide levels outside the zone; b.
projected doses from most core melt accidents would not exceed Protective Action Guide levels outside the zone; c.
for~the worst core melt accidents, immediate life threatening doses yould generally not occur outside the zone; d.
detailed planning-within 10 miles would provide a substantial base for expansion of response efforts in the event that this proved necessary.
Quite clearly, two of these four considerations (i.e.,
considerations "b"
and "c",
above) are derived from the NUREG-0396 evaluation of doses from core melt accidents (which is based on the Surry analysis in NASH-1400).
In addition, NUREG-0654 guidance on the timing and duration of releases and radiological characteristics of the releases is also derived from the NUREG-0396 evaluation of core melt accidents (which is based on the Surry analysis in NASH-1400).
VII.
CONCLUSION REGARDING THE TECHNICAL BASES FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING.
Q.
What is your conclusion concerning the degree to which j
the'NRC's emergency planning requirements are based on the analysis of Surry in WASH-14007 A.
(Sholly) It is evident, based.on the above, that the current planning basis in MRC emergency planning regulations for nuclear power plants is substantially based on dose / distances.asights derived from the risk assessment of
{
a
Q Surry performed in WASH-1400.
Thus, the" spectrum of accidents" which were considered in establishing'the EPZ distances in the NRC emergency planning rules explicity included core melt accidents (up to and including those core melt accidents which were predicted to result in early containment failure and a large radiological release to the environment).
A site-specific analysis which examines dose-distance relationships based on similar accidents would therefore provide useful information concerning the effectiveness of offsite emergency planning measures for the Seabrook site.
Q.
Have you reviewed the release categories utilized by Dr. Jan Beyea in his calculations as set forth in his testimony in this proceeding?
A.
(Sholly) Yes.
Q.
Are the release categories utilized by Dr. Beyea consistent with the spectrum of releases utilized by the NRC in setting the technical basis for the emergency planning zones?
A.
(Sholly) Yes, Dr. Beyea's release categories are very similar to the PWR-1 through PWR-9 release categories utilized in the NUREG-0396 report, which sets for the technical basis for the NRC's emergency planning zones.
Q.
Does this conclude your testimony?
A.
(Sholly) Yes..'
l l
I VIII.
RADIATION RELEASES FROM A CEABROOK ACCIDENT f
I Q.
Dr. Beyea, before presenting the results of your calculations, describe in general terms how radioactive material is released :o the environment and dispersed.
A.
(Beyea) For a large release of radioactive material to occur following an accident, a " release pathway" from the reactor core to the environment is required.
(See testimony of Steven Sholly.)
One set of these pathways is generated by failure of the reactor's pressure vessel followed by failure of the containment building surrounding the vessel due to overpressurization.
Researchers have outlined some, though not all, possible sequences and conditions for these failures.
Other pathways include releases occurring through a containment penetration system.
Massive steam generator failure due to aging steam generator tubes might lead to a large release through the secondary cooling system.
A so-called check-valve failure could connect the containment directly to the environment.
If a large release of radioactive material to the environment occurs, the material sill leave the reactor as a
" plume" of gases, aerosols and water droplets.
Most of the large releases discussed in our testimony are assumed to occur over a period of thirty to sixty.ninutes; a few are assumed to take longer. a
This escaping plume will rise to a height which is dependent on such variables as 1) the amount of heat released in the accident, 2) the weather condition 3xistia; at the time, and
- 3) whether or not the reles se t akes' place at the top or bottom of the structure.
As will be shown later, there is no satisfactory formula that predicts the magnitude of olume rise.
The plume will be carried by the prevailing wind.
Under the action of wind fluctuations and other weather conditions, the plume will spread in both the horizontal and vertical directions.
that the average concentration of radioactive material the plume will decrease with time as it travels away from actor.
(See Figure I)
After a snort time, t"e expanding edge.of the plume will " touch" ground, ari the non-gaseous radio ctive aerosols will be dispersed along the g round, on vege:.itior., buildings, cars, people, etc.
The rate at which naticial is removed from the plume, referred to as the deposition rate or "valoci /", will also cause the concentration of material in the plune to decrease with time.
1 Fo: the most ene_ge' release
.tegor.es, trticularly the steam explosion categories which c, e rapid tise of gases into the atnosphere, there is the possic;;ity that escaping water l
vapor may condense to significant amounts of (radioactive) rain.
The plume may disperse radioactive material along the ground for more than a hundred miles if there is no reversal of wind direction.
Much of the area where the plume has passed l,
1 I
l J
)
I i
WIND DIRECTION i
REACTOR INVISIBLE CLOUD OF MOVING RADIOACTIVITY 4
REGION OF DEPOSITED R A DIC ACTIVITY TOP VIEW OF PLUME FIGURE I i
will be contaminated for decades and " permanent" evacuation of i
the original population will be required there.
In addition, as muca as 10 percent of the material will be resuspended by the act;on of wind and blown about in succeeding weeks.21/
The area
>f contamination will increase, causing residents who live outside the initial plume path to be exposed to radiation.
Immediately after the release, the plume will be visible, due to the escape of large amounts of cloud-forming water droplets.
As the plume travels downwind and as the water droplets evaporate, the plume will most likely disappear from view, making it impossible for anfone without instruments to know where radioactivity is heading.
Q. How does the population receive radiation doses?
A.
The population in the area under the plume would receive radiation doses via three dose pathways.26/
most (See Figure II):
1 From external radiation received directly from the radioactive plume itself.
(In the 25/
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study, (Washington, D.C.,
WASH-1400 or NUREG-75/014, 1975).
The Reactor Safety Stud; assumed a 50 percent retention rate for radioactivity depos.:ed on vegetation.
[See Appendices E and K]
Although most of this loss is probably caused by subsequent rain, experimental data indicates that removal begins immediately after deposition.
This initial loss must be due to wind action.
Ten percent removal by wind seems a reasonable estimate.
26/
See Volume VI of WASH-1400, s u _o r a. d
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most serious accidents, the. main part of the plume is projected to pass by very quickly, within one half to one hour, well before any signif; cant evacuations of beach populations could occur.)
- 2) From radiation received following inhalation.
The inhalation pathway would be the most important contributor to the thyroid dose.
It could also be the major contributor to early health effects for accident sequences in which large quantities of ruthenium are released (PWR-1 type releases),
i.e. steam explosion or high-pressure melt ejection.
- 3) From radiation received from material deposited on the ground or other surfaces (cars, skin etc.)'.
It is this " ground dose" which would usually be the ?.ost important contrib. or to early fatalities because it would continue after the plume has passed.
j Even if evacuation is too slow to prevent j
i l
inhalation of radiation, evacuation is still
)
{
needed after the plume passes by to stop the 1
'l accumulation of " ground dose"; the faster the evacuation, the lower the total " ground dose".
We have concentrated on these three pathways in our testimony, using standari methodology to calculate doses whenever '
possible.
Because generic models do not consider beach-situations, it was necessary to make special calculations for contributions to ground dose not normally considered in accident computer codes, but which are of special concern to unshielded beach populations.
For instance, beach users caught in the plume would likely receive significant doses from radioactivity deposited on their skin and hair.
Other important dose pathways exist for persons not under the original plume.
These include inhalation and ground dose from resuspended and redeposited radioactivity.
(As has been stated earlier, as much as 10 percent of the plume's material may be resuspended within a few weeks.)21!
Also of concern is radiation from contaminated vehicles and personal possessions brought to emergency reception centers.
- Finally, doses are also possible though ingestian of contaminated food or water.
Q.
In what units are doses measured?
.\\.
(3eyea) Doses to organs or to the whole body are measured in "rens," an indication of the amount of biologically-damaging energy absorbed by tissue or cone.
The units are useful because a dose in rer.s can be used to project the likelihcad that an exposed person will be injured.
H/
N A S il-14 0 0, suora. ___ -__
C.
What are the dose levels that enter into your calculations?-
A.,
(Beyea) The health consequences of radiation i
depend upon the magnitude of the dose received.
Radiation 1
doses'to the whole body on the order of 100 rems or higher
--doses that occur-relatively close to the plant--lead to immediate sickness (e.g., nausea) and "early death."
At a dose of 125 rems for example, 50 percent of exposed persons would suffer from nausea.23/
Although not fatal oy itself, nausea and vomiting should be considered in emergency planning--especially in estimating evacuation times.
It is quite conceivable that outbreaks of nausea could precipitate panic in an evacuating population, thereby interfering with an orderly escape.
"Early death," a technical term in the radiological health field, refers to death withi-sixty days of exposure to a given dose.
The threshold for early deaths is between 100 and 200 rems to the whole body, while the probability of early death increases with increasing dose and changes with " supportive" 21/
medical treatment 28/
See Volume VI of WASH-1400.
29/
In this proceeding, we do not testify as expert witnesses in the biological effects of radiation.
Instead, we have relied on the testimony of Jennifer Leaning and standard references to convert doses to health effects.
" Supportive" treatment is defined in the R3 actor Safety Study Appendix VI, FI as such procedures as reverse isolation, sterilization of all objects in patient's room, use of laminar-air-flow systems, large doses of antibiotics, and transfusions of whole-blood packed cells or platelets. _- - __-___ ____.
.c
'I standard practice, we have taken,200 rem as a reference dose to indicate the onset of significant probability of early death.
.Q.
How;have you modelled the plume movement and dose pathways?
.A.
(Beyea)DThe plume movement and the three major dose a
30/
pathways discussed previously'have been modelled by us in
]
several computer programs.
The programs have been checked-1 against other consequence codes in use around the world.21/
The' original programs have been cited in other, reports,21/
30/. The major sources of radiation that contribute to early death or delayed cancer are inhaled radioio'ine, as well as d
external radiat' ion.(whole-body gamma) from the plume and from contaminated ground.
In the case of.PWR1 releases, there are situations where-inhaled isotopes such as Ruthenium can cause pulmonary syndrome, leading to early death.
31/
International Exercise in consequences Modelling (Benchmark Study), sponsored by the Organization of Economic Cooperation'and Development (0.E.C.D.), Nuclear Energy Agency, 38 Boulevard Suchet, 75016 Paris, France.
32/
Jan 3eyea, Program BADAC-1, "Short-Term Doces Following a
- ~
Hypothetical Core Meltdown (with Breach of Containment)"
(1978), prepared for the New Jersey Departm+:nt of Environmental Protection.
Jan Beyea and Frank-von Hippe, "Some Long-Term Consequences of Hypothetical Major Releases of Radioactivity to the Atmospherre from'Three Mile Island," report to the President's Council on
. Environmental Quality, Center for Environmental Sr: dies, Princeton Universtry, (1979), Appendix E.
A detailed discussion of the basic dose calculations used in these programs can be'found in the Appendices of "A Study of the Consequences of Hypothetical Reactor Accidents at Barseback," Jan Beyea (Stockholm:
Swedish Energy Commission, 1978).
-(footnote continued) 35 -
i
l i
while some modifications have been made for this study.11/
)
It was not necessary for these proceedings to use our most recent set of, programs which directly include time-varying j
weather such as changing wind speed and changing turbulence.
In the Seabrook beach case, doses are so high that these smaller probability events do not dominate the risk.
The dose to the population caught directly in the plume for the release categories under consideration has been calculated by these programs as a function of time after release for a range of weather conditions and for a range of model parameters.
Ranges of model parameters were used because the appropriate values of parameters are currently uncertain.
The basic modelling used is similar to the approach take by radiological protection agencies around the world, includ g
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and tqe New Hampshire Department of Public Health.
(footnote continued)
Brian Palenik and Jan Beyea, "Some consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Indian Point and Their Implications for Emergency Planning," direct testimony on behalf of New York State Attorney General, Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), New York Public Interest Research Group (NYPIRG), New York City Audubon Society, before NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, July, 1982.
33/
For this study, we have used appropriate dose scaling factors, as discussed in detail later, to include dose contributions from material deposited directly o. the cars and skin of eva'cuees.
34/
D.V.
Pergola, R.B Harvey, Jr.,
J.G.
Parillo, "S3 Metpac, A Computer Software Package Which Evaluates the Consequences of an Off-Site Radioactive Release Ntitten for the Seabrook j
Station Site at Saabrook, New Hampshire" (Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Framingham, Mass., May 1986) ______ - _____-____-_ _ -
The only specialized aspects of our calc;1ations involve the following:
1)
Radiation shielding:
Radiation sh; eld;.ng factors for cars used in the 1975 Reactor Safety Study have been updated to account for changes in car construction that have been nade to improve fuel economy in the intervening years.
2)
Accounting for dispersion over water.
Certain beach sites, like Seabrook, have water between them and the reactor.
We have made adjustments for decreased dispersion using standard methodology.35/
- 3) Radion:tiviry deposited on vehicle surfaces:
In some of ou: calculations, we have accounted for radioactivity that would be deposited on cars caught in tne plame.
This radioactivity could cause a si nificant dose to riders and should not be ignored.
- 4) Radioactivity deposited on the skin and clothing of beach-goers:
In some of our calculations, we have accounted for radioactivity that would be deposited on beach occupants while standing either on the beach, in parking lots, or outside their cars waiting for traffic to move.
Although not generally a major 35/
In such a case (Seabrook Seach), we have shifted dispersion parameters by one stabililty class.
I I -
l i
l' effect to be considered at other sites, we have found that the dose from skin contamination is significant 1
at Seabrook because of the 1.:.5e beach population s
that co
.d be caught outdoors.
l Because doses from contaminated skin and vehicles have not to our knowledge been considered in past consequence modelling, I
our calculations have been presented with and without their inclusion.
Their impact is to increase, in comparison to other sites, the number of meteorological conditions during which a
early death would occur.
O, In what ways have your calculations taken into account the uncertainties in the current state of consequence modelling?
A.
(Beyea)
Plume Rise The treatment of plume rise due to thermal buoyancy illustrates the current uncertainty that exists in dose.
calculations due to inadequate knowledge of model parameters.
Since calculated doses can be very sensitive to whether or not the edge of the plume has " touched" ground, knowledge of the initial rise of the plume can be critical for projecting doses.
Yet, lack of understanding, both experimental and s
theoretical, about plume rise makes prediction of this parameter difficult.
Figure III shows the enormous range in airborne concentration of radioactivity (and therefore inhalation and ground doeas) predicted for the same release of radioactivity l
by modellers from different countries under one set of weather conditions.36/
Most of this range arises because of different predictions of plume rise.
These results from the international exercise in consequence modelling demoristrate that dose predictions from a particular computer code may be highly uncertain within about 20 miles from the reactor if based on one set of model parameters.
(Output from the computer codes used to develop our testimony were included in this consequence modelling exercise.)
If a range of weather conditions is examined, the range of dosea predicted by different computer codes shows much less of a spread.
It is for this reason that we considered a range of weather conditions in this study rather than relying exclusively on predictions using one set of model parameters.
The dose ranges usei in our testimony fall well witbin the full range given in Figure III.
At Seabrook, plume rise is a critical issue only for the PdR1-type releases.
The other releases are not characterized by significant thermal bouyancy to make it an issue.
36/
Figure III has been taken from S.
Vogt, CNSI Ben
' ark Stpdy of Consequence Models, International Comparison of 'iod
_s Established for the Calculation of Consequences of Accidents in Reactor Risk Studies, Comparison of Results Concerning Problem 1. SINDOC(81) 43.
..F N RE III. RA:lGE OF AIR C0? icd';TRAT:0NS OF RADI0ACTIV TI PREDICTED BY DIFFERENT MODELLERS IOR THE SAME RELEA5E $CENAR;0.
(MG T OF THE VARI ATIOff IS DUE TO VARI Ai;C'. IN THE TREATMENT OF PLUME RISE. i'
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Deoosition Velocity A range of deposition velocities has not been examined in this testimony.
(Deposition. velocity governs the rate at which radioactive material deposits on surfaces).
Like plume rise, this parameter is also uncertain, but does not have a critical impact on any of our calculations.
For simplicity we have used a mi:-range value of I cm/sec.37/
0 3a Breezes Because of the complexity involved in modelling sea b-
'2es, we have treated them qualitatively.
To obtain an understanding of the sea breeze phenomenon, it is useful to begin with a simple case, where the inland wind speed is very low.
A circulating cell structure would result from daytime heating of the land, extending-many miles over both land and sater.11!
.n t h is - la. Sl e, t'e wind would blow toward the reac;or ay from the beac; jet radioactivity would stili reacn the beach for e;rher low-rising
'r high-rising plumes, as radioactivity became eatraine
'n the ce., and circu:_ated t
within it.
However, in this scenario, because it wocid take 3everal hour 3 for tna radioactivity to reach the beach, it is 3'
A complete discuscion of thir carameter can be found in the 33r?eback Study, suara, f
C.S. Keen, " Sea 3reezes - n the Complex Terrain of the cape n.
ula," in Third Conference Meteorology of the Coastal Zone t
t Ame ican ' meteorological Society, Boston, !1 a s s., January 1984, pp.
.2^-134)..
not possiole to say, w : ho'; t detailed study, whether or not the radioactivity would arrive before the beach goers had le t.3E#
In many c:her sea-breeze cases, the inland wind wou 3 oe too strong to ignore.
The resulting structures can be ve:
complex, either causing plumes to rise above the be ch and reduce doses or to slow plumes down, oroducing higher doses.
If the inland wind is very strong, it will eliminate the cell structure entirely or arive it offshore.
In general, turbulence at the beach should increase under sea breeze conditions, leading to the possibility that above-ground plumes aill ce orought quickly to the ground (fumigated) once the region of excess turbulence has been reached.
The possibility muc: be considered that a moisture-laden plume could produce its own rain, following rapid mixture with cold, tarbulent ses air that would be fil'ed with salt
]
particles capable af nucleating water droplets.
Pain would oe 39/
.v A. Lyons, " Lectures on Air Pollution and Environmental Impact Analysis," American Meteorological Society, Boston, Mass., 1975.
See also, S.J.
Mass and P.R.
- Harrison,
" Dispersion Over Water:
A Case Study of a Non-Buoyant P l'J n e in the Santa Barbara Channel, California," in Joint Conference on Applications of Air Pollution Meteorology, Nov. 29-Dec.
2, 1977 (American Meteorological Society, Boston, Mass., pp. 12-15).
See also, S. Barr, W.E.
Clements, "Di f #'.'sion Modeling :
Principles of Application," in Atmospheric Science and Power Production, (Report 30E/ TIC-27601, Department of Inergy,
)
Nashington, O.C.,
- 1984, p.
613). -
extremely serious for the beach goers, because unusually large amounts of radioactivity would be carried to ground level along with the 3rops.
In considering the various meteorological combinations that could occur, it is possi.ble to find some conditions that increase doses at tha beach and some conditions that dectease doses--sometime during the course of the same day.
In light of this variation, we have assumed that our calculations without sea breeze effects represent a mid-range case.
Q.
What are the characteristics of the release types you have considered and why have you chosen to use them?
e A.
(Beyea) 3ecause the number of possible accident sequences is very large, it would be prohibitive to perform conseonence calculation' for every possibility.
- Instead, followt.ngstandardpractich,wehavepickedsurrogaterelease cate'gories that are intended to span the range of possibilities.,
As mentponed in the aummary, releases have been chosen that generally "all :nto the release categories used in t
NUREG-0396, but which take into account site-specific differences.
The basic reference documents utilized relating to nite-specific accident sequences'at the Seabrook Plant are 1);the Licensee's Seabrook Probabalistic Safety Assessment
-(F3A),1S!
1 40/
Plckard,,Lowe and Giftick, Seabrook Station Probabilistic i.
Safety Assessment, 6 volumes, December, 1983, n-1
and the review of the PSA carried out by analysts at Brookhaven National Laboratories for the NRC.S1!
In our study, we.have generally accepted the Brookhaven recommendations, although for completeness we have considered some PSA categories without modification.
In such cases, we have included them as part of our generic release categories.
In the release categories used for our testimony, we have picked one specific sequence to define the release magnitude for each category.
However, it is important to bear in mind that the probability of the category is not the probability of the specific accident analyzed.
The true probability is the sum of the probabilities of all accident sequences, known or unknown, that have similar release magnitudes.
- 1. Category 1 (PWRl-type): Early Containment Failure with Core Oxidation $
This category is represented by an "S1" sequence as defined in the Seabrook (PSA).
Also included in this category is a high-presure melt ejection sequence.
One of the questions raised by the Brookhaven review of the PSA concerns the assumed rate at
. hich heat would be released during an w
accident--a variable which governs plume rise.
The PSA assumes uniformly high values.
In particular, for the S1 case, the PSA assumes such a high release of thermal energy that the plume passes high overhead, causing relatively low doses to the beach population, according to 41/
M.
Khatib-Rahbar, A.K.
- Agrawal, H.
Ludewig, N.T.
- Pratt, "A Review of the Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety Assessment:
Containment Failure Modes and Radiological Source Term," Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, Long Island, prepared for U.S.
NRC, draft, September, 1985.
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study, (Washington, D.C.,
NASH-1400 or NUREG-75/014, 1975).
j 4
l l
l i
conventional consequence models.
As indicated by Gordon Thompson it will not be possible to resolve this discrepancy since a large range of heat rates is possible, depending on the dynamics of the accident.
Because the Brookhaven assumption on heat rates represents a mid-range value in the spectrum found by Thompson, we have used it in our calculations of doses from S1 raleases, recognizing that the actual doses could be significantly higher or lower.
- 2. Catego:y 2 (PWR2-type):
Severe Containment Bypass.
We include in this category an "s6V-total" sequence ac defined by analysts at Brookhaven.
In this release category, a direct pathway to the atmosphere is opened as a result of containment bypass.
43% of radioiodine, 43%
of radiocesium, and 40% of radiotellurium in the core are projected to escape.
In addition to the " interfacing systems accidents" used to define this accident in the PSA, we include in this category thermally-induced steam generator tube failures.
We also specifically analyze the PWR2 release o : pressurization scenario utilized in the R320 tor Safety Study and NUREG-0396.
Note that this rlease category is generally similar to the preceeding rapid bypass category represented by S6V-total.
- 3. Category 3 (PWR3-type)
Slow Containment Bypass.
The Seabrook PSA modelled a containment bypass release as a " puff" release in which radioactivity is assumed to escape at different times, for periods of varying duration.
We refer to this release category in the Tables with the notation used in th* PSA to label the first and most dangerous puft (S6V-1).
Brookhaven, in its review of the PSA assumed radioactivity would be assumed to escape over a period of one hour.
For our testimony, we have made consequence calculations using both sets of assumptions.
S6V-total in Category 2 represents the Brookhaven approach; S6V-1 in Category 3 represents that taken in the PSA. - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ -
l
- 4. Category 4: (PNR4-PNR9 -types)
The less severe accidents-utilized in NUREG-0396 are grouped in this category.
Although such accidents can cause doses in excess of protective action guidelines and can increase I
delayed cancer risks in exposed populations, l
they are not generally projected to lead to early health affects.
A summary of the characteristics of the first three release categories is given in Table 1.
Q.
What Special Characteristics Around Seabrook Affect The Consequences Of a Release There?
A.
(Beyea) Our investigation of the consequences of releases of radioactivity.at Seabrook concentrates on the summer months.
The potential consequences, especially with respect to early death from a serious accident at the Seabrook plant, increase greatly during these months due to a large summer population in the area.
These summer residents, day visitors, etc. increase the exposed population, and by increasing the evacuation time necessary to clear the ares, they increase the potential time exposure.
Furthermore, the consequences to a beach area population may be greater than the consequences to an inland population under similar conditions due to a lack of shielding normally provided by buildings.
The addition of increased consequences due to material deposited directly on the skin of a beach population must also be considered for the Seabrook plant.
Taken together, these factors make summer release scenarios at Seabrook worthy of.___ ________ - _____
TABLE 1 RELEASE PARAMETERS PWR1 PWR2 PWR.
Steam Containment Ove r-Containment Explosion Bypass pressurization Bypa ss
)arning Time 0.3 1.0
- 1. 0 '
1.7 olease Duration (hrs) 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 alease Time (hrs) 1.4 2.5 2.5 2.2 Bergy Release Rate (million BTU /hr) 520 low
- 170 lew-lume Rise (m)**
200-850 30 80-300 30
@ lease Fractions Noble Gases
.94
.97 0.90
.'5 Iodine
.75
.43 0.7 Cesium 75
.43 0.5 Telurtum
.3:
.40 0.3
- 1 4
B a r t u r.
.093
.049 0.06
. ' ' 4 Ruthenium
.46
.033 0.02 C04.
La n t ha nide s
.0028
.0053 0.004
.2004.
Brookha/en s'.: gests 2 much lower release ratio than does the Se ab roa < FSA.
> wever, the plume rise is low in both cases.
>Calculattena ';r atar'
.ty classes A-E.
Plume rise varies ilthin ar
{
peause of d i f f.- : nt wind speeds.
Variations for S6V releases are l
tey can be ignored.
For an Si relea se, the following values apply i
.i t n d Speed Stability Class
_2 m/sec 4 m/sec 9 m/se:
A-D 950 m 440 m 230 m E
350 280 230 1j
special consideration, and we have included them in our investigation of the potential consequences of accidents at Seabrook.
Figure IV shows the location of the Seabrook beaches.
It should be noted thv..ar the most severe accident categories considered, as will be discussed below, doses are so far above threshold for overcast conditions, that early deaths are possible at any time of the year.
Nevertheless, the number
.of people who would die would increase greatly during the summer.
Furthermore, intermediate accidents--those that would usually not cause early deaths--would be expected to cause early deaths at the beaches.
In other words, during the summer, there is a much wider spectrum of accidents that can cause early fatalities.
Q.
What are the assumptions behind the evacuation times you have used?
A.
(Beyea) At some point during the operation of a reactor, the nuclear facility operator (NFO) may notify the appropriate state and local officials of an " unusual event," an occurrence that may lead to an eventual release of radioactivity.
Depending on the seriousness of the event or of following events, a higher emergency level may be reached.
The NFO may eventually recommend, in consultation with officials and technical support staff, that an evacuation is necessary of all or part of the surrounding population.
The appropriate - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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FICURE TV. SEABE00K A';D AREA BEACHES
)
l
local officials,.who may or may not have received prior warning, are then notified, and the emergency warning system will presumably be activated as soon as possible.
l Time elapses between an initial indication to the operator and the moment county officials begin notification of the-population.
CONSAD.(a consulting-firm to FEMA) estimated this time to take 19-78 minutes during the day and 50 minutes at 32/
Their review of historical data shows these kinds night.
of estimates can range from one to many hours for a range of natural disasters and false alerts.
Our work here assumes 45 minutes.
In addition, some time will be needed to actually notify the population that an evacuation is needed.
We take 15 minutes for this time, so that evacuation is assumed to begin one hour (45 43 15 minutes) after.the decision is made to evacuate.
We also assume that the NFO receives an indication of a pending release before the release.
This warning rime is taken j
as 18 minutes for a steem explosion, one hour for a rapid-containment bypass (S6V-total), one hour for a PWR-2 release.
j and 1.7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> for a slow containment bypass (S6V-1).
These are the assumptions made by the analysts (Brookhaven, Seabrook.PSA, Reactor Safety Study) who devised the release categories 42/
CONSAD Research Corportion, "An Assessment of Evacuation Time Around the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station," June 20, 1980; revised June 23, 1980, p.
2.7-2.9 _ _ _ _ _ _
studied.
When the or.e hour delay involved in starting the actual evacuation is accounted for, the results are as I
follows.
Steam explosion: evacuation starts 42 minutes after radioactivity begins escaping.
PWR-2 and rapid containment bypass (S6V-total):
evacuation starts at the same time as radioactivity begins to escape.
Slow containment bypass (S6V-1):
Evacuation starts 42 minutes before radioactivity begins to escape.
The evacuation time estimates themselves are based on assumptions about conditions during the evacuation, the state of readiness of an evacuation system, etc.
These assumptions vary, leading to differences in evacuation times.
The evacuation times for five earlier studies of a Seabrook area evacuation are listed in Table 2.
Some of the evacuation times in the table for a two mile radius (and five mile radius) appear to be for a selective evacuation from within that radius.
We nave used five hours as a representative estimate for beach site evacuation.
Current emergency plans at Seabrook call for notification of beach populations at an earlier stage in an accident than for the general population.
However, for P'4R1-PWR3 categories, there is doubt as to how nuch time would actually be gained by this procedaral modification.
Although we have not taken credit for extra warning time to the beach population, our results can be easily modified to do so.
It is only necessary to relabel the evacuation time assigned to our tables.
In
TABLE 2 l
i SEABROOK EVACUATION CLEAR TIME ISTIMATES SUMMER DAY SCENARIO
~
RADIUS DEGREES HMM Vorhees Maguire NRC*
KLD 0-2 360 4:50 5:10 4:40 0-3 180 East 5:20 0-5 340 5:50
- :10-5:40 6:20 0-10 360 6:05 5:10-6:10 0
11:25 6:40 a) Time (Hours: minutes) foi the population to clear the indicated area after notification.
b) " Preliminary Evacuation Clear Time Estimates for Areas Near-See
+.,e Station," HMM Document No. C-90-024A, HMM Associates, Inc.,
May 1980.
c) " Final Report, Estimate of Evacuation Times," Alan M.
Vorhees :
Asscciates, July ;?s0.
d) "Eiergency P l a n n i n.]
Zo:
evacuation C. ear T1 u satimates.
C.E.
- Maquire, Inc.,
Feoruary 1953.
e)
"An Independu t Assessment of Evacuation Time Es tima te s for a P e a r:
Population scenario in the Emergency Planning Zone cf the E+abrook Nuclear Power Station,"
M.P.
Mueller, et al, Pacific Marthwest Laboratory. NUR EG 'CR-2 903 PNL-4290.
f) " Evacuation Pian Update, Progress Repert No.
3,"
KLD Ass:c: ites, a o' Broadway, HuntinJtan Station, NY !!'46, Januaray 20, 139-, Taoie 19, Scenario 1A.
Tnese calcu la tion s refer to the beach population, but assuma the entire five alle population is evacuated officially and that 2i' of the popa.ation tryond five alles evacuates spontaneously.
It is further assumed that neaches are at 80% of capacity and that efficials attempt to notify cne beach populatio,. at the Site Alert stage, ;5 minutes before a General Site eme rgen cy is called.
To make these estimates consistent witn the assumptions used in our c alcu la tion s,
.5 minutes should be added to tne numbers shown.
On the other hand, l :'
minutes should be subtracted to avoid double counting the delay associated witn not: fying beach occupants, which is already included in the KLD time estimates.
I
other words,.if beach populations are assumed to begin evacuating 15-minutes earlier than normal, the equivalent evacuation time in our calculations would be 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> minus 15 minutes, not 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
According to testimony by Thomas Adler in this proceeding, actual evacuation times from the contaminated area would be much, much longer.
Some of the persons exposed in an accident will therefore likely receive larger doses than presented in our tables.
Our tables, therefore, lead to conservative estimates of the numbers of persons exposed to possible early death.
Q.
Is the population around Seabrook subjected to possible "early death" for releases during the summer?
A.
(Beyea) We have investigated the conditions under which the nearest beach population, at 2 miles and 4 miles, might be exposed to doses at a threshold level for early death (200 rem) for the release categories discussed previously.
According to standard references (see Moeller, et al.)A !
As indicated in the testimony of Jennifer Leaning, at 200 rem, a few percent of exposed persons would die within a two month period, a few percent of women under 40 would be permanently 43/
J.S.
- Evans, D.W.
- Moeller, D.W.
Cooper, " Health Effects Model for Nuclear Power Plant Accident Consequences Analyses," (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, j
D.C., NUREG/CR-4214, 1985) The "LD50" for nausea is given as
)
1.4 Gy in Table 1.3, page II-29.
1.4 Gy equals about 125 l
rem.
Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.,
1980.
j 4 l
\\
i
~ 1;;
sterilized, with'a;few percent more would develop cataracts.
Table'3 illustrates-some of our findings for 2' miles.
Weather stability class, wind speed, and the time it would take for.the beach population to' receive a 200 rem dose under those conditions are listed..
We have found these-estimates for two sets of assumptions.
The first set assumes that all the population-is inside cars when the release occurs.so that skin and clothes do not get contaminated.
Doses are also reduced because of the partial shielding provided by the car between the radioactivity on the ground.
The fractional decrease in dose from shielding, here referred to as a ' dose scaling.
factor", is calculated to'be.53.78 for.this set of assumptions.
Thef time it takes for a person in a car waiting within the plume.to receive-a 200 rem dose'is then listed in the table.
We assume that vehicles remain stalled in traffic within contaminated ground and then move rapidly out of the crea once the roads are cleared at the'end of five hours.
We also assume that a person once evacuated receives no additional dose once outside the plume path.
On the basis of our consideration of a Seabrook-type evacuation, we have decided to also use a second set of assumptions.
Some of the population will not have reached their vehicles before plume passage.
(Maguire, for example, assumes up to an hour for the beach population to " mobilize" _ _ _ _
TABLE 3
. EXPOSURE OF 2-MILE BEACH POPULATION TO RISK OF EARLY DEATH ON A SUMMER TAY (SKIN AND CAR DEPOSITION NOT INCLUDED) b Time in Hours te Reach Risk of 200~Rnm Early Deach?
Stab # Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 Liity Speed S6V-S6V-
)
_, )
llas s (m/sec)
S1 Total S6V-1 S1 tot.
S6V-1 A
2
- 14. -21 18.
->24
>24 50%.
N N
chance A
4 20.
->24
>24
>24 N
N A
8
>24
>24
>24 N
N B
2
>24 5.
-7
>24 Y
N B
4 9.5-14
- 13. -19
>24 N
N B
8
- 14. -21
>24
>24 N
N C
2
>24
<1
- 19. -24 Y
N C
4
>24 2.6-3.7
>24 Y
N C
8 7.7-12 8.3-12
>24 N
N D
2
>24 (1
S.
-7.0 25%
Y Y
chance D.
4 24
<1 12.
-17 Y
N D
8
>24 1.
- 1.5
>24 Y
N B) The populatton two miles from the plant, but not directly across the lagoon.
Times would be shorter for populations with water between them and the reacto r due to reduced d is pe rs io ns.
B) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by their venicles.
Ground shielding factors are assumed to range from 0.53 to 0.78, depending on the type of automobile.
See Question 13 for f urthe r deta ils.
- ) Pasquill stability class.
9)
"Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher.
An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed.
A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached.
In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
J
- 9) If the plume rises high, as at Chernobyl, the population will be j
protected against early death for this release.
Otherwise, the q
population will be exposed to risk of e arly dea th.
(Both the I
thermal release rate and the plume rise equation are uncertain.
)
See text of question 12 for discussion of probabilities in table.)
i
l l
l itself for an evacuation.)AA!
Of'those that do reach their vehicles before plume passage, some will leave their windows open and some will not enter their cars until traffic starts to
)
move.
Thus, some of the population will have radioactive l
l material deposited directly on their skin and hair.
We refer j
to the dose from this material as a " skin deposition" dose.
l l
Similarly, we take into account material deposited directly on j
l cars in the plume and the dose resulting from this material l
1 (a " car deposition" dose).
For this second set of assumptions, we have estimated that the dose to a person shielded by a car, but exposed to both skin deposition and car deposition doses, would be 1.0 to 1.3 times the dose to an unshielded person exposed to a plane of contaminated ground (see below).
The dose scaling factor range is thus 1.0-1.3 Results using this range are shown in Table 4.
A great deal of information is contained in Tables 3, 4 and similar Tables to be presented later.
Consider, for example, D-stability conditions.
Note that the times shown refer to
" clearing" time, that is the time for the last person in the area to be evacuated.
But even a 1-hour evacuation time, which might apply to the earliest evacuees, is insufficient to keep 44/
C.E. Maguire, Inc., " Emergency Planning Zone Evacuation Clear Time Estimates," February 1983. _ _ _ _
l
)
l TABLE-4 l
EXPOSURE OF 2-MILE BEACH POPULATION T'O RISK OF EARLY DEATH ON A SUMMER DAY INCLUDES DOSE FROM SKIN & CAR DEPOSITION b)
Time in Hours to Reach Risk of d) 200 Rem Ear'y Death?
@ tab'#'
Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 Ality Speed S6V-S6V-glass (m/sec)
S1,)
total S6V-1 S1 tot.
__, )
A 2
8.2-11 11-14
>24 50%
N N
chance A
4
- 12. -15
>24
>24 N
N A
8
>24
>24
>24 N
N B
2
- 19. -24 3.1-4
>24 Y
N l
B 4
5.5-7.3 7.8-10
>24 N?
N B
8 8.4-11 17.4-23
>24 N
N C
2
>24
<1
- 12. -15 Y
N t
C 4
>24 1.7-2
>24 Y
N C
8 4.4-5.9 5.
-6.5
>24 Y
N D
2
>24
<1 3.5-4.2 25%
Y Y
chance D
4
>24
<1 7.6-9.6 Y
N?
D 8
>24
<1 17.4-22.5 Y
N e) 'The population two miles from the plant, but not directly across the lagoon.
Times would be shorter for populations with water between them and the reactor due to reduced dispersions.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by their vehicles.
They are assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive material deposited on the car and directly on the individual.
The effective ground shielding factors range from 1.0 to 1.3, depending on the type of automobile.
See Question 13 for further details.
- ) Pasquill stability class.
S)
"Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher.
An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumec.
A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached.
In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
D) If the plume rises high, as at Chernobyl, the popula t io n w ill be protected against early death for this release.
Otherwise, the population will be exposed to risk of early death.
(Both tne thermal release rate and the plume rise equation are u n c e r.t a i n.
See text of question 12 f or dis cussion o f p robabili ties in table.)
doses below 200 rem for an S6V-Total release.
On the other i
hand, the first of the evacuees to leave during an S6V-1
)
release would escape a 200-rem dose, j
If the time to reach a 200-rem dose shown in the tables is compared with a 5-hour evacuation time, one arrives at a I
"yes/no" indication of whether or not the population at 2 miles is exposed to risk of early death.
This is noted in the last set of columns in each table.
Some of the entries are marked with a question mark.
A
. question mark indicates that even though doses do not reach the.200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached early in the evacuation.
In such cases, a 5-hour evacuation time calculate'd from traffic models may be optimistic.
Because we were unable to determine a quantitative estimate of the likely delay in evacuation that would result from cases of nausea, we have not been able to do more than indicate uncertainty.
Note that no entries are shown in the Tables for a PRW-2 release.
The results turned out to be so similar to, or worse than, the SV6-total release that it was not necessary to include separate entries.
Several caveats about the tables should be k'ept in mind, especially when exposure of the population is indicated.
First of all, risk of early death is much higher for persons very close to the plant where doses reach high levels very rapidly. L_________________-.---
Second, we have not looked at' slower wind speeds for the
.various stability classes nor have we examined changing weather conditions.
Both of these situations can lead to p
higher doses.
Thus, Tables 3 and 4 do not include the worst possible weather conditions but only the most probable.
A third caveat is that, while D conditions generally represent overcast days, we have not looked at actual precipitation conditions that sometimes catch populations on the beach.
The time..for a dose to reach 200 rem is greatly decreased in this case (for the same wind speed) due.to the increased deposition of radioactive material.
Evacuation time is also increased.
.On the other hand, overcast conditions in the morning would deter people from' coming to the beach.,The lower populations would mean reduced clear time estimates.
Recall, however, that there is a multi-hour underestimate of clear times in our work for most of the beaches (see Adler).
In any case, doses tend to be so high under D-conditions for the S6-V total release that reduced clear times are insufficient to provide protection.
The same is true for the S1 release for low thermal release rates and low plumes rise.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the population's exposure may be increased if the shown evacuation times are, for whatever reason, longer than assumed here.
l
-s3-
-_______z
'In any case, the results of Tables 3 and 4 can be combined with weather frequency data (Table 15)-to show that for the
~
~ 6V-total release which represents the severe-containment-S bypass categories, if the 2-mile beach population, is downwind, l
I it will be exposed to risk of early death'under meteorological
{
conditions that would be expected to occur about 70-75% of the time.
In contrast, the results in Tables 3 and 4 for the slow-containment-bypass release, S6V-1, indicate that the population at 2 miles is generally not exposed to early death for this release.
Surprisingly, the SI-steam-explosion release, which i
represents the largest release of all, in some circumstances I
might causes fewer problems for the beach population at 2 miles than the'PWR-3 type release.
The reason for this is t' hat the projected plume rise may be so great, as occurred at Chernobyl, that the plume passes high over the nearby populations.
We estimate a 50-percent chance that this will be the case for A, B and C stability conditions and a 75-percent chance during D conditions.
Our rationale is that the height to which any radioactive plume rises is uncertain, as was discussed i
earlier.
Should the true plume rise be a factor of two less than the mid-range value predicted by standard plume rise formulas, which is within the range of uncertainty (see Fig. 5), early s
Figure 5 VARIATION IN PLUME RISE ACCORDING TO SOME WELL-KNOWN FORMULAS 10000 i~F/f
,s>-
I 100 4,)
10 1
10 100 1000
%. h The vertical line at-Q =150 megawatts corresponds to an sI h
release.
At this heat rate, the spread in predictions made by different formula is about a factor of two.
The graph has been taken from G.A. Briggs, " Plume Rise Predictions" in Lectures on Air Pollution and Environmental Impact Analyses, American Meteorological Society, 45 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. 02108 U.S.A.,
1975.
We quote from page 60: "It is no wonder that so many plumq rise formulas have been developed.
What is particularly distressing is the degree to which they diverge on predicting Ah for a given source and given conditions."
i
i deaths from external gamma exposures become frequent for A,
B, and C stability classes.
It would also be borne in mind that the PNR-1 releases are projected to include copious amounts of isotopes that can give high lung doses.
Thus, 1-day lung dose can contribute to early death when whole body dose is below 200 rem.
When these factors are all included, the combined uncertainty is so broad that it is a toss up (50%) as to whether or not early deaths would occur following an S1 release for A, B,
and C stability classes.
As for D-stability class, two independent events must conspire to produce early deaths:
both the heat rate must be low and a low plume rise formula must be correct.
As a result, w'e estimate that there is a 25%
l chance that doses will exceed 200 rem to the whole body or the l
equivalent 1 day 1>-
dose under D-stability class for this release.
]
It should also ve recognized that a real accident may be less severe than the S1-case assumes.
Paradoxically, because of lower plume rise, ar 11 breach of containment following a steam explosion could be. ore severe than a large breach as far as nearby populations are concerned.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that turbulent interaction with the sea breeze and/or condensation of radioactive rain could bring radioactivity down to ground 1
level.
An enormous amount of radioactivity would be passing I
+
l
'l l
overhead t even a relatively weak' meteorological process, one normally.not considered'in reactor accident d{spersion modelling, could couple the upper air with air at ground level, i
causing high' doses.
Note that we'have not shown results for' release classes PWR4 through PWR9.
Athough these releases can cause. doses in excess of protective action guides, they rarely lead to doses in excess of 200 rem.
Doses for those categories are dominated by noble gases, so that ground deposition can be ignored.
As-a result, the dose ends after plume passage.
Without effective sheltering,-.the only emergency measure that has any impact on doses for'these release classes is pre-plume evacuation.
IX.
RADIATION DOSES FROM A SEABROOK ACCIDENT Q.
How were your dose scaling factors 1obtained?
A.
(Beyea) The basic dose scaling factor, with car and skin deposition ignored, was calculated to have a range.of 0.59-0.78, assuming that an evacuee is inside a car in the plume deposition area.
This range represents an updating of the 0,4-7 shielding factor range used in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).
Cars are lighter today (and will be more so in the future) compared to the 1975-vehicles analyzed in the Reactor Safety Study.
Assuming that vehicles involved -
~
,n
^
M 91 30% lighter.than 1975 Kin an~ evacuation will'be1 vehicles,AE/-the appropriate ~ shielding factor range turns 4
.out to be.0.~58-0.7215/
The relative contribution of various doses, including
-car and sk'in deposition doses, can be obtained as follows.
Dose per un t time (Relative to dose from a flat, i
contaminatedLplane):Al/
A) to person standing on contaminated beach, i8/.
parking lot, road, etc.
1.0 X Sg B). Dose inside car.from contaminated ground 1.0 X Sc11/
45/
Due especially to.the decrease in the amount of-steel
- used in U.S.-built. cars, the material weight of U.S.
cars dropped 15% between 1975 and 1981 and is projected to drop another 15% by 1985.
(Table. 4.3,=p.
122, Transportation Energy Data Book, edition 6, G.
Kulp, M.C. Holcomb, ORNL-5883 (special), Noyes Data Corporation.)
46/
Shielding' varies exponentially with mass per unit area.
Thus (.4).7 = 0.53;~(.7).7 = 0.78.
47/
In the absence of detailed calculations, we assume that absorption effects in air can be handled by neglecting all absorption at distances less than 100 meters and by treating absorption beyond 10.0 meters as total.
Thus, we replace the exact problem of a contaminated plane of infinite extent by a finite circular surface of radius 100 meters.
Since the integral over the disk turns out to be logarithmic with radial distance, the total dose is insensitive to the cutoff distance chosen.
These calculations are conservative.since they ignore ground scattering effect which increase relative dosen from deposition close to the receptor.
Deposition is assumed to proceed uniformly on any external surface regardless of the surface's orientation.
Thus, a square centimeter of ground is assumed to receive the same contamination as a square centimeter of skin.
i8/
Shielding factor, Sg = 0.47-0.85 (Ref. 22).
49/
Shielding factor, Sc = 0.53-0.78 (Ref. 22). - _ _ _
___m s
C) Dose'inside car from radioactivity-deposite'd on'outside of vehicle
.22 X Sc 10b D) Dose inside car from radioactivity deposited on inside of vehicle with open windows
.04
.211/
E) Dose from' skin. contaminated while 12/
outside vehicle
.35 F) Dose from skin contaminated while inside vehicles with open windows
.1713f 5
5,0/
Based on numerical integration over an idealized automobile, deposition is assumed to take place on the underside of the' vehicle as well as on the top surface.
51/- This case would occur 1) if windows had been left open, or 2) if-evacuees reached their vehicles and opened windows before plume passage were complete.
The low number corresponds to low wind speeds; the high number corresponds to high wind speeds.
52/
An estimate of the relative contribution of skin contamination to.the total dose can be obtained by replacing the complex shape of the human body with a set of bounding.
geometic surfaces:
- 1) sphere:
the' dose rate at the center of a sphere contaminated with N curies of radioactivity per square centimeter is 43% of the dose rate 1 meter above a circle of 100 meter radius that has also been contaminated with N curies per unit area.
~
Although a cylindrical model would be more accurate, the results will not differ by a large amount, as shown below.
- 2) right circular cylinder:
numerical integration in the case of a cylinder with radius 1/10th of the length indicates that the average centerline dose is approximately 17%
greater than the sphere center dose discussed previously.
For a cylinder with radius 1/Sth of the length, the average centerline dose is slightly less than the sphere case.
The results of these rough calculations suggest that direct contamination of people must make a significant contribution to the l
total dose.
We take the numerical relationship to be 35%, that is, the skin contribution is assumed to be 35% of the dose from contaminated ground.
53/
We take this dose to be half of the value for a person standing in the open, assuming that half of a person's surface area is pressed against a seat and, therefore, not subject to deposition.
. SL.
l 1
s-The total do e can'be obtained'by multiplying-each of the 1
above dose components by the amount of time spent under each set iof conditions.
Unfortunately, there are a number of time parameters'that:must, in principle, be specified to calculate a dose precisely.
Rather than make a complex model, we have i
chosen to simplify the calculations by ignoring a number of effects that should tend to cancel:
- 1) We ignore the finite duration of the' plume,.that is, we assume radioactivity is deposited instantaneously.
This I
is equivalent to adding 30 minutes to the evacuation
. clear time for S6V releases, 15 minutes for the S1 release.
- 2) We ignore doses from skin and car received after evacuees reach reception centers.
This neglected dose should compensate for the above simplification.
- 3) In cases when skin contamination is assumed to take place, we assume that at least some evacuees remain j
outside vehicles during the entire time that the plume passes.
This appears to be a reasonable assumption, given the fact that traffic will be stalled and it will be uncomfortable inside vehicles that do not have air I
conditioning.
- 4) In cases when car deposition is included, we assume that a significant number of evacuees who leave their
)
vehicles to cool off (while waiting for traffic to move) will stand next to, or lean on, a contaminated vehicle.
). _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
t The net result is that we numerically calculate doses to l
beachgoers in one of two ways:
When skin dep0aition is neglected, we assume that the last group of evacuees remains inside i
or close to cars, stalled in traffic, while exposed to contaminated ground.
Doses do not begin to accumulate until the wind carries the plume to the vehicle.
Doses continue to accumulate until the clear time is reached, at which point evacuees are assumed to leave, contaminated ground instantaneously and exit their vehicles.
When skin deposition is not neglected, evacuees are assumed to receive the above dose plus the dose from skin contamination that is accumulated up until the clear time.
These assumptions lead to an effective dose shielding factor range of 1.0-1.3, when skin contamination is included, and a range of 0.65-0.95 when it is not.
In our judgment, the net effect of these simplifications is to underestimate the high end of the dose spectrum.
Tables 10, 17, and 18 (to be presented later) were calculated for winter populations, which are initially indoors.
In these cases we have assumed cloud and inhalation sheltering factors of around 0.75.
We have also assumed, for simplicity, a building shielding factor range that is identical to the automobile case (0.53-0.78).
Q.
How many people are located near the plant?
A.
(Beyea) The size of the beach area population around Seabrook is uncertain.
One estimate of this population has been made by Public Service of New Hampshire and is found in Figure 6.
Although its accuracy is uncertain, this estimate i
[10605[
16289 1 N
- 334, p
NNW 4264 NNE l
1234 33658 3613 10039 1
115101
{7678]
{
NW NE 1414 10 uus 12900 1185 216 3427 1
i WNW 2893 1224 8022 ENE I8254l 3624 371 ppq 6052 0
,r 731 2
627 1425 3
/\\
z g(,
W
(( /
2919 4154 Y
l 0
o
'77 N
'[knAA L
5147 T
f g, g 0
7431 9707 2194 0
WSW J
~?N L-ESE 2853 13299 Qiggj 2963
[4277]
11191 O
SW i
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3-l24101 l 401 14274 6303 2 3 i2l A
Nj',,
IN81 T
g I otal Segraient Po pulailo'n 0 to 10 kilos h5876}
~:
b~
POPULAil0N TOTALS RING dlLES POPU 10N TOTAL MIL E S Q7,j(L,^'[0 7
r O _. 2 27896 o.2
/iove 25 60237 o*s 88133
~
~
S to pgogi o.to 118094 10-B 47632 0-B 225726
~
Figure 6 Scenarios 3 and 4:
Summer Weekday Population l
t 10-52 i
/
)
i
/
i l
>does; indicate that a substantial number of people are located within;two miles'of_the plant.
Estimates'by other witnesses in this1 proceeding are=much' higher.
'The number of: persons 'who would be located within a plume obviously varies not only with wind direction but also with stability class and distance from the plant.
At two miles the f ' plume could be. viewed as being between a 29-wedge (A stability class) and a 13-wedge (D stability class)EA/ compared to the J
'22.5 population wedges in the table.
W O._
How large are doses likely to be and how do they compare [with doses that would be received at other sites?
A.
(Beyea).In order to gain a better appreciation of the higher risk faced'by the beach population (higher than that-faced by residents at comparable distances at other sites for.
comparable releases), we present a series of. Tables that show radiation doses likely-to be received under various scenarios.
Table 8 shows the highest-risk case, which applies to the Seabrook beach population that is separated from the reactor by a lagoon.
(Because plumes disperse less over water, the plume is more concentrated by the time it reaches the population than j
had it travelled over, land.)
1 The doses shown apply to a person assumed to leave the contaminated area after 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
The doses are truly enormous for'the S6V-Total telease. -(Note that a 500-rem dose has a Si/
Wedges are assumed to have plume widths of 3 times the horizontal dispersion coefficient.
P' !
TAE' DOSES RECEIVED ON A SUMMER DAY BY HIGHEST-RISK POPULATION ON SEABROOK BEACH (SKIN & CAR DEPOSITION DOSE INCLUDED)
Dose 5 Hrs After b)
Evacuation starts Risk of d)
(In Rem)
Early Death?
itab #' Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3
.11 t y -
Speed S6V-S6V-l lass (m/sec)
S1*'
total S6V-1 5'1 * '
tot.
S6V-1 A
2 63-74 230-270
<50 N
Y N
FF 4
160-190 120-150
<50 N?
N?
N A.
8 120-140 65-76
<50 N?
N N
B 2
<50 580-6 85-98 N
Y N
8 4
<50' 320-380 48-55 N
Y N
B 8
180-220 1 7 0 - 2 C..
<50 Y
Y N
C 2
<50 1600-1900
'30-270 N
Y Y
t C
4 900-1100 130-150 N
Y N
C 8
490-590 70-83 N
Y N
D 2
2700-3200 379-448 N
Y Y
D 4
1600-1900 22;-264 N
Y Y
1 D
8 840-1000 120-143 N
Y N?
l I
a) The pcpulation at 2 mi. with bay water between reac.or and beach.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by their vehicles.
They are assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive ma er:.al deposited on the car and d;rectly on the individual.
The effective g round shielding factors range from 1.0 to 1.3, depending on the type of automobile.
See Question 13 for further details, c) Pasquill stability class.
Dispersion parameters were shifted by one stability class to account for reduced diapersion over water.
(See W.A.
Lyons, " Turbulent Diffucion and Pollutant Transport in Shoreline Environments", in Lectures on Air Poj. l u t i o n and E!.vironmental Impact Analyses, American Meteorological Society, 45 Beacon Street, Boston, MA 02108, (1985).
Pagea 141, 142, and l
especially Figure 25 on Page 149.)
d)
"Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or hiqher.
An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed.
A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached.
In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation t i.n e may be suspect.
- 9) Assuming mid-range plume rise.
I
_J
n
(.
E
,6 mortality rate greater than 70t..)
As discussed;oelow, doses exceed t'te threshold for, meteorological conditinns that hold' I
M
. 93% of the time.
The doses 'for dn $6V-1 release are smalle ?.han for p
1 S6V-Total, but stilliexceedJireshold for -meteorological "ponditions that hold about 33% of the time.
Doses shown for the high-rising S1 release have been calculated using rt standard plume rice for*.aule, acfthey almost always remain belowthbshold.' (However, ac mentioned earlier, the
{
occurrence of :t low-rising plume is expected frequently?
For this reasoi1g Ye cbntinue
".o list probability values I
1 under the yes/no columns in Thble 8 that indicate whether or l
l not'.there is a, cisk of early death.)
Not all of the 2-mile.ceach population is separa$ed from the reactor by water.
Table 9 shoEc'tne results for-Mpulations separated' by land.
The dosec.are still extraordinarily high for the S6V-Total release, but are significaf.ily less-serious for a+ S(V-1 release.
It i.i.of interest to compare these results.with doses that'whuld be g.
accumv11,t.ec; at; P,he median reactor site around'the United i,
StaUhd.
The resunc.ade shown in Table 10.
We have'tsken.,
1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for the evacuation clear time wit.hin 2 miles, based on an NRC estimate of the median time.55/
- J i
m._ _
(
d' 55/
T. Urbatiin II, "An Analysis of Svacuation Time
/
Estimates' Arouw) 52 Nuclear Power Plants," Nuclear g
s F.ewlatory Commission Washington, NUBEG/CR-1856 (1981),
c Vol I, m ole 10, p. 21.
l 4
, f
,, i
TABLE 9 DOSES RECEIVED ON A SUMMER DAY BY 2-MILE BEACH PCPULATION (SKIN & CAR DEPOSITION DOSE INCLUDED) l Dose 5 Hrs After
)
Evacuation starts Risk of d)
(In Rem)
Early Death?
Stab #' Wind PWR1' PWR2 PWR3
'ility Speed S6V-S6V-Class (m/sec) 51*'
total S6V-1 S1*'
~
tot.
S6V-1 A
2 122-143 95-110
<50 N
N N
A 4
92-109 50-59
<50 N
N N
A 8
53-62
<50
<50 N
N N
B 2
63-74 230-270
<50 N
Y N
B 4
160-190 120-150
<50 N?
N?
N B
8 120-140 65-76
<50 N
N N
C 2
<50 580-680 85-98 N
Y N
C 4
<50 320-380 48-55 N
Y N
C 8
180-220 170-200
<50 Y
Y N
D 2
<50 1600-1900 230-270 N
Y Y
D 4
<50 900-1100 130-150 N
Y N
D e
<50 490-590 70-83 N
Y.
N a) The population two miles from the plant, but not directly across the lagoon.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by their vehicles, They are assumed to recet"e a dose component from radioactive material deposited on the car and directly on the individual.
The effective ground shtolding factors range from 1.0 to 1.3, depending on the type of aut.mobtie.
See Question 13 for further details.
c) Pasquill stability class.
ld )
"Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher.
An evacuation
}
time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed.
A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached.
In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
I) Assuming mid-rango plume rise.
G
TABLE 10 DOSES RECEIVED BY 2-MILE POPULATION AT A MEDIAN REACTOR SITE IN THE UNITED STATES (CAR DEPOSITION DOSE INCLUDED)
Dose 1.5 Hrs Afterb)
I Evacuation Starts Risk of
)
d)
( I r4 Rem)
Early Death?
j Stab #' Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 ility Speed 56V-S6V-
__,)
)
Class (m/sec)
S1 total S6V-1 S1 tot.
S6V-1 A
2 53-60
<50
<50 N
N N
r A
4
<50
<50
<50 N
N N
A 8
<50
<50
('
N N
N B
2 (50 95-110 e
N N
N B
4 71-82 52-58
<50 N
N N
B 8
52-61
<50
<50 N
N N
C 2
<50 220-250 450 N
Y N
w C
4
<50 130-140
<50 N
N?
N C
8 78-91 67-76
<50 N
N N
D 2
<50 540-610 77-87 N
Y N
D 4
320-370
<50 N
Y N
D 8
170-200
<50 N
Y N
a) The population two miles from the plant.,
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by buildings and their vehicles.
They are assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive matertal deposited on the car, but they are not assumed to have had their skin contaminated.
The effective ground shielding factors range from 0.65 to 0.95, depending on the type of automobile.
Cloud and inhalation shielding factors are taken to be 0.75.
See Question 13 for further details.
- ) Pasquill sL. ;tlity class.
3)
"Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher.
An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed.
A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached.
In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect, a) A s s um i r.g a mid-range plume rise.
Table 10 shows that doses,.even for S6V-Total, get very high only for two meteorological conditions (D-stability, wind speeds 2 and 4 meters /second).
Doses for the other releases never rise above early-death threshold.
In general, doses at these other sites are less than one-fifth the doses for the highest-risk Seabrook beach case.
Q.
Are the beach populations beyond two miles exposed to risk of early death during a summer day?
A.
(Beyea) Yes, certainly for an S6V-Total release.
Tables 11 and 12 show the calculated results for beach populations at 4 miles and an evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
Note that the beach population is not protected for a low-rising S1 release either.
Additional insight into how far from the reactor threshold deses are likely to occur for an S6V-Total release can be gained from examining Table 13.
It shows early death radii for D-stability class and a five-hour evacuation time.
This means that an individual remaining in the plume at a radius given in the last column of the table for five hours under the given weather conditions will receive at least a 200-rem dose.
These are the individuals who have not been able to evacuate earlier due to traffic congestion, etc.
It should be noted, however, that individuals at this radius who have evacuated earlier may still receive a 200-rem dose due to the continuing dose contribution from material deposited on their skin and car.
Similarly, individuals beyond the early death radius for a. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
TABLE 11 DOSES RECEIVED ON A SUMMER DAY BY 4-MILE BEACH POPULATION" (SKIN AND CAR DEPOSITION DOSES INCLUDED)
Dose 5 Hrs After b)
Evacuation Starts Risk of d)
(In Rem)
Early Death?
$ tab #' Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 slity Speed S6V-S6V-
?lces (m/sec)
S1,)
__, )
total S6V-1 Si tot.
S6V-1 A
2 61-71 48-55
<50 N
N N
A 4
<50
<50
<50 N
N N
A 8
<50
<50
<50 N
N N
B 2
82-96 59-69
<50 N
N N
B-4 64-75
<50
<50 N
N N
B 8
<50
<30
<50 N
N N
C 2
<50 160-190
<50 N
N?
N C
4-98-120 97-110
<50 N
N N
C 8
93-110 52-61
<50 N
N N
D 2
<50 540-640 77-89 N
Y N
O 4
<50 340-410 50-58 N
Y N
D-d
<50 190-230
<50 N
Y N
e) Tne population 4 miles from the plant.
b) Pe sons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by their vehicles.
They are assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive material deposited on the car and directly on the ind iv id ua l.
The effective ground shielding factors. range from 1.0 to 1.3, depending on the type of automobile.
See Question 13 for further details.
c) Pasquill-stability class.
l 6)
"Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher.
An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed.
A question mark by an entry indicates nat even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached.
In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
- 2) Assuming a mid-range plume rise.
____,__m-
TABLE 12 EXPOSURE OF 4-HILE BEACH POPULATION"' TO RISK OF EARLY DEATH ON A SUMMER DAY (SKIN & CAR DEPOSITION DOSES INCLUDED)
Time in hours to Reach Risk of 200 Rem Early Death?
Stab # Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 ility Speed S6V-S6V-
@ lass (m/swe)
S1*'
~
total S6V-1 S1
tot.
S6V-1 A
2-19-24 23.
->24
>24 N
N N
A 4
>24
>24
>24 N
N N
A 8
>24
>24
>24 N
N N
B 2
13-17
- 18. - 23
>24 N
N N
1 B
4 18-24
>24
>24 N
N N
B 8
>24
>24
>24 N
N N
C 2
>24 5.4-6.7 12-15
?!
Y N
C 4
11-14 10.5-13.5 23->24 N
N N
C 8
12-15 21.6->24
>24 N
N N
D 2
>24
<1 3.5-4.2 N
Y Y
D 4
>24 1.7-2 6.8-8.6 N
Y N?
D d
>24 4-5.2 14-18 N
Y N
e) The popu.ation 4 miles from the plant.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by their vehicles.
They are assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive material deposited on the car and directly on the individual.
The effective g ro u nd shielding factors range from 1.0 to 1.3, depending on the type of automobile.
See Question 13 for further details, c) Pasquill stability class.
6)
"Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher.
An evacuaLion time of 5 hou rs is assumed.
A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached.
In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
- 9) Assuming a mid-range plume rise.
given set of conditions are not necessarily protected-from a i
200-rem. dose, because we have not accounted'for the doses they might receive outside the plume from skin and car deposition material.
.As noted previously, if evacuation times for the' beaches l
l beyond 2 miles are longer than 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, as is documented by l
Adler, the consequences of these releases for'a given set of conditions will be more serious.
The early death radii will be larger and many more people will be exposed.
Q.
How would a summer evening scenario affect your results?
l A.
(Beyea) There is evidence that there would still be a substantial population on or near the beaches on summer j
evenings.
Although evacuation times might be reduced due to a smaller evacuating population, it is not clear that this reduction would be enough to ensure that no early deaths occurred in the population-especially since night-time plumes are more concentrated and therefore are more dangerous.
In order to investigate the consequences of a summer evening scenario, we have obtained an estimate from our model of the j
doses at 2 miles which would be received for typical evening j
weather scenarios assuming a clear time of 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
We have assumed, in contrast to the summer scenario, that the population is wearing more clothes and could remove them after 1
exposure to reduce the skin deposition dose.
While it is very
]
uncertain how much this would reduce the skin deposition dose, !
we have also assumed for simplicity that removing clothes would eliminate it, including the contribution from contaminated hair.
We have still assumed a dose component from material deposited on cars.
(The dose scaling factor range for this scenario becomes.65.95.)
The results of'our mode 1~are shown in Table 13a.
The time to reach 200 rem is usually one hour or less for the S6V-total release, which means that any reduction of evacuation times during the evening is not going to protect the population for this release category.
Q.
How frequently do the various weather conditions occur?
A.
(Beyea) The frequencies of the Pasquill stability classes, as reported in the SB 1&2, ER-OLS,Eb! are given in Table 14.
The frequencies of the A,B, and C stability classes increase during the summer months, with C the most-frequent of the three.
D and E are the dominant stability classes.
Although not indicated in the Table (which is based on 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> data), C and D stability classes would probably dominate during daytime hours because the E, F, and G stability classes tend to occur primarily in the evening or early morning hours.
l The consequences during C, De and E classes are all serious in terms of early death.
Consequences would also be serious l
56/
Public Service of New Hampshire, "Seabrook Station -
Units 1 & 2, Environmental Report, Operating License Stage,"
Figure 2.1-19.
i
~65-
TABLE 13 EARLY DEATH RADII FOR A 5-HOUR EVACUATION TIME ON A SUMMER DAY S6V-TOTAL RELEASE EARLY DEATH STABILITY WIND SPEED RADIUS CLASS (m/sec)
(miles)"
.9 B
2 2-3 B
4 1-2 B
8 1-2 C
2 3-4 C
4 2-3 C
8 1-2 D
2 7-8 0
4 6-7 D
8 4-5 a)
An individual in the plume at this radius under the given conditions will receive, assuming a five-hour clear time, at least a 200 rem dose.
Individuals at this radius who have evacuated earlier l
may still receive at least a 200 rem dose due to the continuing dose
{
contribution from material deposited on their skin and car.
Individuals at f arther distances may still receive 200 rem doses due to skin and car deposition doses after leaving the plume.
A dose scaling factor range of 1.0-1.3 is assumed.
This is equivalent to assuming 1) that some individuals are caught in the open during plume passage, 2) that the last to evacuate are stuck in traffic and j
opend the full five hours in contaminated ground, and 3) that all doses cease after five hours.
See Question 13 for further details.
j
TABLE 13a DOSES RECEIVED ON A SUMMER EVENING BY'TWO-MILE BEACH POPULATION #
(CAR DEPOSITION DOSE INCLUDED, NOT SKIN DOSE)
Dose 3 Hrs After b)
Evacuation starts Risk of d)
(In Rem)
Early Death?
Stab- ' Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3
'ility Speed 56V-S6V-Class (m/sec)
S1')
total S6V-1 S1*I tot.
S6V-1 D
2
<50 820-970 120-140 N
Y N
D 4
480-560 72-81 N
Y N
D 8
260-310
<50 N
Y N
E 2
1300-1600 200-220 N
Y y
E 4
790-950 120-130 N
Y N
E 8
430-520 64-73 N
Y N
a) The population 2 miles from the plant, not directly across the lagoon.
Doses would be higher should the plume be blowing over the lagoon.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by their vehicles.
They are assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive material deposited on the car.
No skin dose is included on the assumption that a) clothes keep radioactivity from reaching skin; and b)that clothes are discarded once evacuees enter their cars.
The effective ground shielding factors range from 0.65 to 0.95, depending on the type of automobile.
See Question 13 for further details.
c) Pasquill stability class.
d)
"Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher.
An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed.
A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached.
In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
e) Assuming a mid-range plume rise.
i l
l i
l
TABLE 14 FREQUENCY OF PASQUILL STABILITY CLASSES AT SEABROOK(a)
(Values in % of Time) i Month A
B C
D E
F G
Apr 1979 1.27 2.11 3.8C 49.65 29.40 7.88 5.91 May 1.20 2.86 4.82 52.86 26.51 5.27 6.48 Jun 2.92 6.69 12.26 39.83 25.49 6.13 6.69 Jul 4.90 6.94 11.56 29.12 28.84 12.65 5.99 Aug 2.91 4.71 9.97 43.07 26.59 7.34 5.40 Sep 1.25 7.64 11.81 30.69 27.36 10.83 10.42 Oct 0.81 2.96 5.79 39.30 34.05 10.09 7.00 Nov 0.00 0.56 4.76 43.92 34.83 9.37 6.57 Dec 0.00 0.41 2.70 47.03 41.35 5.81 2.70 Jan 1980 0.13 1.88 6.59 51.88 30.38 5.78 3.36 Feb 0.44 2.03 5.37 50.36 34.69 5.66 1.45 Mar 10.68 1.64 5.34 43.15 24.66 6.03 8.49 Yearly 2.22 3.37 7.08 43.31 30.38' 7.76 5.87 a)
Period of Record:
April 1979 - March 1980.
Stability class calculated using 43'-209' delta temperature.
Source:
SB 182, ER-OLS, Table 2.3-24.
TABLE 15 JOINT FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIC: OF WIND SPEED, AND 3
STABILITY CLASS FOR SEABROOK (209-FOOT LEVEL)
APRIL '79 - MARCH '80 Stability Class Wind Speed (mph)
Wind Speed (m/sec)
% Within Class A
<4
<1.0 1.04 4-7 1.8-3.1 8.85 8-12 3.6-5.3 31.77
>12
>5.3 58.33 B
<4
<1.8 1.03 4-8 1.8-3.1 10.65 8-12 3.6-5.3 42.:7
>12
>5.3 46
.5 C
<4
<1.8 2.29 4-7 1.8-3.1 17.5!
8-12 3.6-5.3 36.50
>12
>5.3 43.6 D
<4
<1.8 3.34 4-7 1.8-3.1 17.92 8-12 3.6-5.3 36.70
<12
>5.3 42.03 d
E
<4
<1.8 4.57 4-7 1.8-3.1 16.78 8-12 3.6-5.3 44.32
>12
>5.3 34.33 a) Source:
SB 1&2, ER-OLS, Table 2.3-27.
b) Frequency distribution would vary with measurement level and season.
1 for F and G conditions though we have not considered them.
l our results are not based on an infrequently occurring l
weather scenario.
The distribution of wind speeds within the stability classes is given in Table 15.E2/
Note that these distributions are not disaggregated by season, and the summer distribution might be different.
Although the frequency data given in Tables 14 and 15 are not precisely applicable to earlier tables, it is possible to use the information to make a rough assessment of the probability that the population would not be protected from early death should a severe release occur with the wind blowing toward a beach.
For instance, it was indicated in Table 9 that for an S6V-total release, the 2-mile beach population on a summer day was not protected from early death under C and D conditions.
These meteorological conditions are likely to l
occur 75% of the time during summer days.EE/ The probability is even higher for the highest-risk Seabrook beach population
-- around 93%.
Q.
What about the S6V-1 release?
57/
New Hampshire Emergency Response Plan, Rev.
2.,
Vol.
6, i
- p. 10-52.
58/
Assuming that C and D stability classes occur with a 75% probability on a summer day (E, F,
and G do not occur during the day and about one half of the D percentages in Table 14 occur at night.)
A.
In this case, a similar analysis suggests that doses exceeding threshold would occur about one-third of the time for the highest-risk population at Seabrook beach, if it were downwind.EE/
Q.
How many people would be contaminated during a summer release?
A.
(Beyea) It must be recognized that, based on Tables 6, 9, and 11, thousands of people 7.1ght be exposed to life-threatening doses should a release occur on a summer day.
In order to put some bounds on the health consequences to a beach area population, we have done a simple calculation of the number of people who might be contaminated due to a release at Seabrook.
An unknown fraction of this number would receive doses at or above 200 rem.
The others might suffer a range of consequences, from nausea within a few hours to cancer many years in the future.
The lower bound to this limit is zero; that is, with enough warning time, it is possible that no one will be contaminated.
l The maximum number of persons contaminated within ten miles j
l i
59/
The S6V-1 column in Table 8 indicates that the early death threshold would occur for 1) D stability class and wind speeds of 2 and 4 m/sec, and 2) C stability class and wind speeds around 2 m/sec.
According to Table 15, the D wind speeds would occur 60% of the time, while the C wind speeds would occur 18% of the time.
The net result, based on the data for summer months in Table 14, is a 28% chance of early death threshold under l
D conditions and a 5% chance under C conditions. )
during an accident on a summer weekday is listed in Table 16, for a low estimate of weekday population taken from New l
Hampshire Seabrook Plan.
(See testimony of other experts in this proceeding for an explanation of why the actual population may be cons.iderably higher.)
The table shows a range of between 10,000 and 23,000 people who may be exposed.
The' table assumes no one within ten miles will have had sufficient time to evacuate before passage of the plume.
The purpose of the table is basically to show the size of the population that may be of immediate concern--those persons within ten miles who will know they may have been exposed, later will presumably learn that they have been exposed, and who will wonder what the potential consequences will be.
The maximum number is so large that it is questionable whether medical facilities will be adequate to treat those seeking treatment.
(See the Testimony of Jennifer Leaning).
Q.
Is the population exposed to "early death" during other times of the year?
A.
(Beyea) Yes.
We prepared Tables 17 and 18 in a manner similar to those for a summer day beach scenario and found that the population is not always protected from "early death" (200 rem) at two and four miles for the' rapid bypass sequence, S6-V total, although the population is protected for other sequences considered.
For those tables we examined evacuees who would take abnut three hours to evaculate as shown in Table 19.
During plume _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ -
TABLE 16 VARIATION IN POPULATION EXPOSED IN SSE SECTOR WITHIN 10 MILES ON A SUMMER WEEKDAY PLUME ANGLE #)
STABILITY CLASS AT 5 MILES (d eg r ee s )
MAXIMUM EXPOSED POPULATION ;
A 26 23,000 B
20 18,000 C
15 13,000 0
11 10,000 a) Assumes a plume angle of three times the horizontal dispersion coefficient.
b) Calculated as the population in the SSE sector (20,000) according to figure 6 multiplied by the ratio of plume angle to 22.5 degrees.
Minimum populatio n could be zero if the wind were blowing towards the ocean and there were sufficient warning time of a release.
TABLE 17 DOSES RECEIVED AT 2 MILES ON AN OFF-SEASON WEEKDAY" (CAR DEPOSITION DOSE INCLUDED) 3'Mrs.After b)
Dose Evacuation ~ starts Risk of d)
L (In Rem)
'Early Death?
Stab # Wind:
PWR1 PWR2 PWR3-
-ility speed S6V-S6V-4 Class (m/sec)
S1
total S6V-1 31*'
~
tot.
S6V-1 A:
2:
62-73 48-55
<50 N
N N
'A.
4 47-56
<50 N
N N
-j A
8
<50 N
N.
N' B
2 110-140 N
N N
B 4
83-94 62-72 N
N N
B 8
60-73
<50 N
N N
C 2
<50 270-320 N
Y N.
C 4
<50 150-180 N
N?
N C
8
.93-110 81-94 N
N N
D 2,
<50 690-940 97-120 N
Y N'
D 4
<50 410-490 59-68 N
Y N.
D.
9
<50 220-270
<50 N
Y N
a) The resident population two miles from the plant.
b)- Persons caught in the plume.are assumed to be partially shielded (from contaminated ground by buildings and their vehicles.
They ara assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive material de ::o s i t ed on the car.
The effective ground shielding factors ra:.ge from 0.65 to 0.95, depending on - the type of automobile.
-Cl;2d~and inhalation s hie ld in g factors are taken to be 0.75.
See
~ LQuestion 13 for further details, c)- Pesqu111 stability class.
d)
"Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher.
An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed.
A question mark by an entry indicates that even.though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached.
In such cases, the assumed 5-hou r eva cua tion ' time may be suspect.
e) Assumes mid-range plume rise.
\\
passage, residents were assumed to be inside buildings with cloud and inhalation shielding factors of 0.75.We assumed a t
ground-dose. scaling factor of 0.65-0.95, implying that the evacuees were in cars within the plume, and that the cars had radioactive material deposited on them.' No skin deposition dose was assumed.
Although Table 17 shows several " unprotected" cases for the rapid bypass' sequences at two miles, it'should be noted that the actual doses above threshold would be considerably higher in the summer time. ' Doses to the highest-risk beach population would be about four times as high as those projected for an off-season accident.
(At four miles the corresponding ratio would be two to one.)
As a result of these higher doses, the total number of injuries would be greater in the summer even if the-exposed populations were the same.
Furthermore, because the population during the off-season scenarios is smaller than for summer scenarios, fewer people would receive radiation doses during off-season scenarios.
Therefore, there would be less of a chance that medical facilities would be overwhelmed, and more of a chance that most of tho'se exposed to doses about 200 rem would receive the
" supportive" medical treatment that would be needed to raise the early death threshold above 200 rem.
This would be particularly important for the 4-mile case shown in Table 18.
Q.
What difficulties are associated with reducing the health consequences of a large release at Seabrook? _ _ _ _ _
4 TABLE 18 DOSES RECEIVED AT 4 MILES ON AN OFF-SEASCN. WEEKDAY (CAR DEPOSITION DOSE ~ INCLUDED) l l-Dose 3 Hrs After b)
Evacuation Starts Risk of d)
(In Rem)
Early Death?
- 9 tab "' Wind '
PWR1 PWR2
'PWR3 ility Speed S6V-S 6 V --
@ lass (m/sec)
. ST
- I.
total S6V-l' T1*)
tot.
S6v-1 A-2
<50
<50
<50 N
N.
N LA-4 N
N-N A
8 N
N N
B 2
"~
N N
N B
4 N
N N-B.
8 N
N N
C 2
78-92 N
N N
C 4
50 47-55 N
N N
C 8-47-56
<50 N
N N
D
-2
<50 240-280 N
Y N
D 4
160-190 N
N?
N D'
8 93-100 N
N N
a) The' resident population f ou r miles from the plant.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by buildings and their vehicles.
They are assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive material deposited on the car.
The effective ground shielding factors range from 0.65 to 0.95, depending on the type of automobile.
-Cloud and inhalation shielding factors are taken to be 0.75.
See Question 13 for further details, c).Pasquill stability class.
d)
"Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher.
An evacuation time of.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is. assumed.
A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached.
In such cases, the assumed 5-hou r evacua tion time may be suspect.
e) Assumes mid-range plume rise.
x
l TABLE 19 SEABROOK EVACUATION CLEAR TIME ESTIMATES"l OFF-SEASON WEEKDAY SCENARIO RADIUS DEGREES HMM Vorhees#
Maguire NRC" 0-2 360 3:10 0-5 360 3:10 0-10 360 4:30 3:40 3:00 6:45 a) Time (Hours: minutes) for the population to clear the indicated area after notification.
b) " Preliminary Evacuation Clear Time Estimates for Areas Nea r Seabrook Station," HMM Document No. C-80-024A, HMM As soc ia te s, Inc.,
May 20, 1980.
c) " Final Report. Estimate of Evacuation Times," Alan M.
Vorhees &
Associates, July 1980.
d) " Emergency Planning Zone Evacuation Clea r Time Estimates,"
C.E.
- Maquire, Inc.,
February 1983.
e) Letter to Mitzie Solberg, Emergency Preparedness Development Branch, U.S.
N.R.C.
from A.E.
De s ros ie rs, Health Physics Technology Section, Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, August 20, 1982.
1 I
)
)
A.
(Beyea) Limited options exist for reducing the severity of accidents at Seabrook.
None of the extraordinary emergency measures that we, or other-nuclear analysts have.been able to devise are likely to eliminate or effectively reduce the serious radiation doses that would result from.a range of releases at Seabrook.
I (A)
Possibility of reducing skin and car deposition dose.
Our work here has shown that skin and car deposition doses could make important contributions to the total dose i
to an individual, but no. consideration has been given to reducing these doses in emergency planning.
We have d
considered whether or not extraordinary emergency measures could be taken to protect against.them.
For instance, evacuees could be instructed to leave the evacuation vehicle as soon as possible, to shower (skin and hair) as soon as possible, and perhaps to remove hair with scissors.
i 1
Automated car spraying devices could be installed near important beach exit points in an attempt to remove some of the material from cars as soon as possible, thus reducing doses to the occupants.
The effectiveness of various methods for removing radioactive aerosols from skin, hair, and cars must be investigated, however, before credit can be taken for them.
The logistics of washing every car in the beach area would be formidable and would likely add to evacuation times.
(Removal of aerosols is complicated by the fact'that radi.oactive aerosols attach themselves too
.strongly to clean surfaces to be removed easily.
On the other hand, the fraction depositing on dirty or oily surfaces could be removed at the same time as dirt and oil were removed.)
All these measures, if they worked, could be helpful in reducing the number of delayed cancers-that would show up in later years.
However, their implementation would not change the significance of our tables with respect to early health offects. -This is because post-evacuation doses are not even considered in our calculations and because not all cars could be decontaminated.
Also, populations are not protected, even when car deposition doses are excluded.
j
)
B) Possibility of relying on shelters.
In principle, one way to reduce the chances of early death occurring in the beach population would be to provide shielding by means of sheltering, especially from ground dose, while people wait for roads to clear.
However, shelrers would only be useful if they are suitably massive, which seems doubtful in this case.5E/
Serious questions exist as to whether they 60/
Z.G.
Burson and A.E. Profio, " Structure Shielding from CToud and Fallout Gamma Ray Sources for Assessing the Consequences of Reactor Accidents," EG & G, INc., Los Vegas, Nev., EGG-1183-1670.
..---------.--_-_-_o
would actually be used by a majority of the population.
As is indicated by the testimony of other experts in this proceeding, sheltering is not a realistic option for the beach populations.
The possibility of having beach occupants shield themselves by immersing themselves in ocean water has been rejected by us because of the low temperature of the water.
~
On the other hand, it would be physically possible for exposed persons to partially shield themselves from ground dose by covering themselves with sand prior to evacuation.
However, the notion that people will wait away from their cars buried in the sand or immersed in the water while traffic congestion clears seems grotesquely unrealistic.
C) Possibility of evacuating on foot or by bike.
The beach population might be instructed to walk out of the area.
If the release has occurred, has blown towards the beaches, and has been confined to a relatively narrow area, this might be the best strategy to reduce doses from a theoretical nuclear physics perspective.
In this way, no one would wait within the plume area accumulating doses from the radioactive material on he ground or on cars.
Our calculations show that a person walking out in certain circumstances would have received, about five hours after the release, between a 30 to 40% lower dose than a person who has remained in a car i ___-
within the plume while trying to evacuate.5A!
However, this type of forced march strategy flounders when faced with normal human behavior.
providing bicycles for beachgoers might be a strategy since l
it would offer the hope of relatively rapid escape.
Nevertheless, it is not clear what percentage of beachgoers would utilize the bikes and what the traffic impact would be.
In fact, access to bikes might increase the disorderliness of the ejaculation.
For example, consider those beachgoers who opted for driving (with or without official permisssion), only to return for bicycles after being stuck in traffic for an hour or so.
Their abandoned automobiles could well block traffic for those remaining.
Certainly no credit could be given in emergency planning for reliance on bicycles without a I
full-scale test of the process.
Yet, a convincing test would 1
be impossible.
How could a test reliably simulate the stress I
i and fear that would be generated in a real accident?
61/
We calculated the dose to an individual on the beach who waits for about one and a half hours after the release (dose scaling factor of 1.35), who then leaves the plume, but accumulates doses from skin deposition (dose scaling factor.35).
We also calculated the dose to an individual in a car within the plume, accumulating doses from the plume on skin and car deposition material (dose scaling factor of 1.0-1.3).
By comparing the doses for about five hours after the release, we found a 30-40 percent lower dose for those individuals walking out. - - _ - - _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ -
D)
Possibility of pre-distributing potassium iodide.
The value of pre-distributing potassium iodide near nuclear power plants has been discussed by us previously.
- However, i
pre-distribution will not work for a transient beach population, unless the authorities are willing to hand out tablets every day to everyone who visits the beaches.
- Also, potassium iodide would be of limited usefulness for the high-dose scenarios that would develop at Seabrcok beaches.
Q.
What about the probability of the releases discussed in your testimony?
A.
(Beyea) PWRl-PNR9 releases are established by NUREG-0396 as the spectrum of releases that must be considered in emergency planning for nuclear power plants.
The NRC took the probability and credibility of these accidents classes into account in developing NUREG-0396.
Every emergency plan, therefore, must address the entire range of these releases, and should also examine the site-specific equivalent of these generic releases.
Q.
What is your overall assessment of the doses that might be delivered at Seabrook?
A.
(Beyea) The summer Seabrook situation is the worst case I have ever examined in connection with emergency planning or hypothetical reactor accidents.
The.dosen that would be received following a range of releases at the Seabrook site, even with the proposed emergency plans in effect, are higher _ _ _ _ _
/*
E N'
m.
S l
than doses that'would ce' received at most.other sites in the y
a complete absence of emergency planning.
j o
Q.
Dr. Beyea, doesEthat complete your testimony?
H A.
(Beyea) Yes, it does.
./]
X.,PWR-1 RELEASES AT SEABROOK J'
O.
Dr.. Thompson, what is the basis for your statements in your testimony?
A.
(Thompson) As mentioned earlier, I havejco-authored '
a review (Sholly and Thompson,'1986) of various " source term" issues.
This, review was being current through mid-1985.
I used that review and thehocuments cited within, it as a basis for my statements.
In addition, I have studied a variety of more recent documents, which collectively form the remaining basis for my statements.
These more recent documents include the draft NRC report NUREG-1150 (NRC, 1987a) and thefdocuments generated as a l
result of a January 1987 technical meeting sponsored by the NRC (Kouts, 1987; NRC 1987b).
(See attached references.)
Q.
Please describe the potential for a "PWRl-type" release.
A..
(Thompson) The Reactor Safety Study (NRC, 1975) i described the PWR1 release category as being " characterized by a core meltdown followed by a steam explosion on contact of molten fuel with the residual water in the reactor
_ 4
7 vessel."
More recent work has identified the potential for a similar release through a different mechanism--high-pressure melt ejection.
In this case, molten core material is expelled from the reactor vessel under pressure of steam-and gases within the vessel.
\\
Q.
Where might the containment breach occur during an accident sequence leadingfto a "PWR l-type" release?
A.
(Thompson) For'either steam explosion or high-pressure melt. ejection sequences, the location of the breach cannot be predicted.
The breach might occur anywhere from the base of the containment wall to the containment dome.
In addition, a co-existing bypass pathway could lead
- to some release through buildings adjacent to the main containment building.
Q.
Plense describe the range of thermal energy release-rates which could be experienced during a "PWR 1-type" release.
A.
(Thompson) This range is illustrated by Figure 7, which fs drawn from the Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety 1sseqement (PLG, 1983).
For present purposes, release category S1 is relevant.
The table shows that the estimated, energy release fate for this release category could vary from 21,000 million BTU per hour to 60 million BTU per hour, according to the size of the containment leak area.
Present knowledge of containment failure modes is l
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'4 to'enchancsd< release of cartai.n ihotcpes including thos5 of t >
v-ruthenium, solyt'denium and. tellurium.
O.
Mr. Thctmpsor,. does t:iis complete your. ' testimony.?
A.
(Thompson) Yes, it does.
t
' XI. - EEALTE EFFECTS FROM RADIATION DOSCE FROM AN ACCIDENT AT SEA'3ROO%.
Q.
How 0063 radiation :upse injury?
A.-
(Lenning) The radiaticn emitted f cmn.a nuclear power riant accidett,is called ictizing ndie. tion because it contains energy sufhcient to remove.one or more electroria frqm an atom and thus change its electric charge.
This phocessofionizationcr?stesani.onwhichischemically reactive and can damage living tissue.
The cctent of the damage depends upon the intensity of thb energy deliveted.
. 1
--.u.
and the radiation sensitivity of the target cell.
In general, those cells that divide most rapidly or are metabolically most active are the most radiosensitive.
Bone mnrrow, lymph tissue, and gastrointestinal epithelium are emong the tissues most susceptible to radiation injury.
At the lower range of energy intensity and cell consitivity, radiation may affect a cell by reducing its functional capacities or by altering its genetic material and thus possibly inducing malignant changes in later cell lines.
At higher tanges, radiation may destroy the cell's capacity to replicate.
At still higher ranges, radiation may result in the death of that particular cell or organ.62/
O.
What radiation exposure level are considered safe?
A.
(Leaning) Residents in the United States currently receive radiation from a variety of background and man-made sources, resulting in an annual exposure of approximately 0.05 to 0.3 rads.
Much controversy is attached to what effects low levels of radiation may exert in inducing cancer and genetic defects among exposed populations.
It is prudent to begin from the perspective that any level of radiation may carry some risk.
The question is the magnitude of this risk and its relationship to other risks individuals or societies may incur.
62/
Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Ridiation (BEIR III), The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation:
1980, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.,
1098, pp. 11-35. _____________________ -
I l
The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCEP) has established guidelines that define the permissible limits for additional radiation exposure (over and above current background levels).
A member of the general public may receive an additional 0.5 rems (for these i
purposes, 1 rad equals 1 rem) per year; and a worker in a peace-time industry may receive an tdditional 5 rems per year.f3/
Q.
What is known about the health consequences of exposure to high levels of radiation?
A.
(Leaning) There is also much uncertainty in the scientific and medical community about the health consequences of exposing human populations to radiation at higher dose levels.
The principal reason for this uncertainty is that our data on human response at these higher ranges is very meagre.
Our main source for data comes from the populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, each exposed in 1945 to an airburst of a nuclear bomb and each still part of an ongoing thorough epidemiological study.
Three other pop ~ulations also exposed to radiation at relatively high levels and also undergoing prospective investigation are the approximately 5,000 radium dial painters of the 1920's; the 253 residents of the Rongelap and Utrik Atolls in the Marshall Islands, exposed to fallout
$3/
10 C.F.R. Part 20, S 1959..
from the 15 megaton BRAV thermonuclear ~ test in 1954; a Utah 3
population exposed at school age to fallout from above-ground tests conducted in'the years 1951 to'1958; and the.135,000 people downwind from Chernobyl, exposed in 1986 to plume and fallout. effects from the world's most serious nuclear power accident known to have occurred.to date.
Other data results from occupational exposures (uranium miners), from industrial accidents, and from the experience of patients involved in medical therapeutic protocols.
The circumstances surrounding the radiation exposures of the majority of people:in these populations precluded comprehensive, accurate, and detailed data collected during the initial events that created the exposure andLduring the first few days thereafter.
In retrospective analysis it has usually been impossible to define with any precision the following key variables:
the nature and intensity of the radiation received, the duration of exposure, and the relative individual susceptibility to a given dose received.
Within the limits of the data available, a few central general points about health consequences of radiation exposure have been identified and substantiated.
Four main factors are involved:
radiation quality, radiation dose, radiation dose rate, and the age of the exposed population.
Radiation quality Linear energy transfer (LET) is the term used to describe radiation quality and refers to the density with _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _
which radiation ionizes matter per unit distance traveled.
Alpha radiation, with high LET, ionizes more densely per unit distance traveled than does gamma or beta radiation.
This quality-is frequently specified in terms of its different biological effects on differene tissues.
The relative biological effectiveness, or RBE, of a given kind of radiation is directly related to its LET.
The higher the LET, the greater the RBE.
Alpha radiation has an RBE of 10 to 20, beta and gamma of 1.
These differences translate into the difference between a rad dose and a dose expressed in rems.
A rad, (or radiation absorbed dose) reflects only the amount of radiation absorbed by tissue.
A rem, (or roentgen equivalent man), expresses the biological impact of that dose on. human tissues.
For a given rad dose of radiation whose RBE is 1, as with gamma radiation, a rad equals a rem.
For a given rad dose of radiation whose RBC is 10, as with alpha radiation, a rad equals 10 rems.
In situations where it is difficult to estimate the various components of the radiation released, it is the convention to assign an RBE of 1 to the radiation dose, according to which rads are equal to rems.
Such a convention underestimates the actual biological effects of the dose received.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
l r
?
Radiation dose The existing data on radiation exposure indicates that most people who receive. radiation doses below 200 rems will l
survive, in the short-term, and that most people exposed to radiation doses in excess of 500 rems will die.
Much controversy surrounds the issue of where to assign with more precision the threshold for what is termed the LD50/60, or the lethal dose for 50 percent of the people exposed, l
followed for 60 days from time of exposure.
(Deaths occurring after that period are assumed to result from other causes.)
One estimate for the LD50/60, arising from study l
of people exposed in industrial accidents and in medical protocols, established the range of 360 to 450 rada, depending on whether_the dose is measured directly at the organ target level (the midline dose) or at the body surface.5A/
In the WASH-1400 report, the LD50/60 was l
estimated to be 340 rads, given minimal support to victims, and 510 rads, if supportive treatment were extended.
(Supportive treatment is described as including " barrier l
nursing, copious antibiotics, and transfusions of whole blood, packed cells, or platelets.")5E!
Figure 8, from 64/
Clarence C. Lushbaugh, " Human Radiation Tolerance," in 4
Space Radiation Biology and Related Topics, Cornelius A.
Tobias and Paul Todd, eds., Academic Press, New York, 1974,
~
pp. 494-499.
4 65/
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study:
An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S.
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, WASH-1400 (NUREG 75/014),
Washington, D.C.,
1975, Appendix VI, 9-3.
)
FIGURE 8 Estimated Dose-Response Curves for LD50/60' mm i
1 99 9 os s ge es
,5 w
2e 1 M A
B C
~
8 g 70
'j so I; so t ai 2 es 3
ao 5
30 5En -
1 8
10 -
2 5 -
X 4
2 -
- o. s '-
o.2 0.1 c as 0.01 o
2co 400 00 soo 1000 troo 1400 Dose (raos6 Estimated dose-response curves for 50% mortality in 60 days with minimal treatment (curve A), supportive treatment (curve B), and heroic treatment (curve C)..
Origin if data points:
1, NCRP Report 42 (converted to reds using factor given in NCRP Rsport 42); 2, Lanc-horn (1957, Table 12, estimate for " normal man 7")
3, Marshall Islanders (protracted exposure); 4, r ; 3ia -
tion therapy sertes, 22 patients (Rider and Hasseida 4,
1968); 5, clinical group III accident patients (Thora and Wald, 1959, with newer cases added); 6, Pittsburth accelerator accident patient (E.D. Thomas, 1971 dala, 1
1975): 7, 37 leukemia patients (E.D. Thomas, 1975 :
I 8, "best estimate" of the Biomedical and Environm3ntal Assessment Group at the Brookhaven National Laboratory.
Source: WASH-1400, Appendix VI, 9-4.
t_
the WASH-1400 study, illustrates the various dose-response curves as derived from a range of exposure experiences analyzed in arriving at this overall summary estimate.
Another authoritative review of the existing database has stated that the LD50/60 for humans is approximately 250 rems, measured as a midline dose.j6/
See Figure 9.
A recent re-analysis of the Hiroshima data has prompted the suggestion that for populations in war or major disasters (who may already be debilitated and for whom medical support would be minimal) the LD50/60 may lie within the range of 150 to 250 rems.51!
To the extent that the dosimetry estimates from Chernobyl are reliable, experience from that accident indicates that all people exposed to levels of 200 rads or less survived, and that death occurred to the majority of people exposed to levels of 600 rads or more, despite the advanced technical support they received j8/
36/
Joseph Rotblat, Nuclear Radiation-in Warfare, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oelgeschlager, Gunn
& Hain, Inc., Cambridge, Mass., 1981, pp. 34-35.
11/
Joseph Rotblat, " Acute Radiation Mortality in a Nuclear War," The Medical Implications of Nuclear War, Fredric Solomon and Robert Q. Marston, eds., Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.,
1986, pp. 233-250.
68/
Roger E. Linnemann, " Soviet Medical Response to the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident," Journal of the American Medical Association 258 (1987):
637-43. _______ _ -
FIGURE 9 Probability of Death from Acute Effects 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
1 I :
- I I I I
10 0 10 0 x
d" f
A JF T
I 80 i
80 1 I J
E I
I i
/
To To
}
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I I
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6 15 i
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g I
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f i
i i i 40 l:
ll; 40 I.
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, f i K I
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- 71 I.
FI l t
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i
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1 2
3 4
6 7
Dose (midhne tissue)(Gy)
I Source:
Rotblat, 1981, 35.
1
_a
Dose rate The literature suggests that a given dose of radiation will inflict more severe immediate damage if given all at once, in a single dose, than if fractionated and given in multiple, smaller doses over time.
The dose franctionation o
effect pertains only to the acute effects of radiation, owever.
For long-term effects like cancer induction, it may be in fact that dose fractionation enchances development of malignant cell transformation.61/
Fractionating a given dose reduces prompt effects because it is thought that all biological systems have inate mechanisms which can serve to repair cellular damage and compensate to some extent for the initial radiation injury received.
Estimates vary as to the rate at which biological repair can be predicted to occur.
Very large doses of radiation will overwhelm any biological repair mechanisms.
Below lethal thresholds, different species, different individuals within a species, and different tissues within each individual all have different rates of repair.
Age of exposed population l
Children in all stages of development--those in utero, infants, and toddlers--are known to be particularly q
l 69/
John B. Little, " Cellular Effects of Ionizing Radiation," New England Journal of Medicine 278 (1968):
308-15, 369-73T Arthur C. Upton, "The Biological Effects of Low-Level Ionizing Radiation, Scientific American 21s (1982):
41-9. - _ _ _ - _ -
_ - _ - _ - - _ -- - - - - - - - - - -=
--- j
sensitive to the acute effects of radiation and to the induction of long-term sequelae.
It has also been suggested that the elderly are also more susceptible to acute radiation.
The data are too limited, however, to allow a quantitative adjustment of the LD50/60 for people at either end of the age spectrum.1E!
Q.
How does radiation injure people?
A.
(Leaning) There are three main ways in which radiation can injure people:
whole body irradiation, external contamination, and internal contamination.
Depending on the type and severity of exposure, people can experience a range of acute, intermediate, and long-term effects.
Early radioactive fallout from a nuclear power plant accident primarily exposes people to risk from whole body irradiation and external contamination.
Internal contamination becomes a hazard if air containing radioactive particles is inhaled or if food or water containing radioactive particles is ingested.
Q.
Describe whole-body radiation and its treatment.
70/
H. Aceto, et al., " Mammalian Radiobiology and Space Flight," in Tobias and Todd, eds., p. 374.
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), Radiological Factors Affecting Decision-Making in a Nuclear Attack, NCRP Report No. 421, Washington, D.C.,
November 15, 1974, p.
42 Rotblatt, 1981, p.
53.
A.
(Leaning)
Acute effects of whole body irradiation occur when the whole body, or most of it, is subjected to external radiation doses in excess of 20 rads.21/
The time of onset and the severity of this initial or prodromal stage of radiation exposure indicates the intensity of dose received and helps predict whether or not the course will progress to one of the three recognized acute radiation syndromes.
The sympton of mildest exposure within this prodromal complex is anorexia, occurring within minutes to hours of exposure.
With larger doses of radiation, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea may occur.
Fatigue is also considered one of the 21/
Lushbaugh, 1974, pp. 485-486 For discussion of whole body irradiation, see:
Ibid., pp. 476-488 G.A. Andrews, "The Medical Management Accidental Total-Body Irradiation," in The Medical Basis for Radiation Accident Preparedness, K.F. Hubner and S.A.
Fry, eds.,
Elsevier/ North-Holland, New York, 1980, pp. 297-3210.
H. Fanger and C.C. Lushbaugh, " Radiation Death from Cardiovascular Shock Following Criticality Ancient,"
Archieves of Pathology 83 (1967):
446-60.
Stuart C. Finch, " Acute Radiation Syndrome," Journal of the American Medical Association 258 (1987):
664-667 Robert Peter Gale, "Immediate Medical Consequences of Nuclear Accidents," Journal of the American Medical Association 259 (1987):
625-628.
J.S. Karas and J.B. Stanbury, " Fatal Radiation from an Accidental Nuclear Excursion," New England Journal of Medicine (1959):
421-47.
G.E. Thomas, J r., and N. Wald, "The Diagnosis and Management of Accidental Radiation Injury," Journal of Occupational Medicine (1959):
421-47.
symptoms in.this complex.
Since individuals vary-widely in response to a given radiation dose, the symptom complex is best described in terms of statistical probability.
Table 20 shows the percentage of people who will experience one or more of the prodromal symptoms at a given level of radiation exposure.
If exposed to radiation in the lower range of these dose levels, an individual would experience these prodromal symptoms for several days and would then recover.
The symptoms of people exposed to doses in the higher range would, after a latency period of relative well-being that might last for days or weeks, then progress to one of the three acute radiation syndromes described below.
The clinical manifestations of these syndromes overlap.
In general,' larger doses of radiation will result in more rapid onset of more severe symptoms, a)' Hematopoietic syndrome Hematologic abnormalities predominate at doses between 200 and 600 rads.
The hematologic picture yields important information on prognosis and therapy.
Lymphocytes in the peripheral blood plummet almost immediately.
Changes in other white blood cells, in platelets, and in capacity to make new red blood cells will also be seen.
From a l
hematological standpoint, the peak risk of death from l
l r
l l
1 infection and hemorrhage occurs about three weeks from time i
of exposure, when the worse declines in platelets and white
{
l blood cells converge.
Depending upon dose received, l
individual susceptibilities, and extent of intensive care, recovery may or may not proceed for that point on.
b) Gastrointestinal (GI) syndrome Within a few days to a few weeks of exposures to 700 rads and above, loss of GI mucosa and bone marrow depression contribute to a clinical picture marked by sudden onset of nausea, vomiting, and bloody diarrhea.
These symptoms can progress to intense fluid loss, electrolyte imbalances, and severe hemorrhage from all mucosal surfaces.
Death ensues from infection or hemorrhage.
c) Neurovascular syndrome Neurovascular symptoms arise from exposure to over 2,000 rads and occur within the first hour to first two days.
Victims initially experience confusion, drowsiness, and weakness.
Delirium and convulsions then ensue, followed within a matter of hours to days by death from cerebral edema (brain swelling).
Treatment of whole-body irradiation a) Triage.
Since the treatment of people exposed to whole-body irradiation depends upon the dose of radiation received, the first task involves efforts to estimate exposure.
In disaster settings, where large numbers of people may have been exposed, the task becomes one of TABLE 20 Radiation Doses Producing Symptoms of Exposure Prodrome j
(in rads) d Pmentage of Exposed Papadation Symptom 10 %
50%
90 %
Anorema 40 100 240 Nausea 50 170 320 Vomiting' 60 210 380 Diarrhea 90 240 390 3
(
i Source:
W.N. Langham, ed., Radiobiological Factors in Manned Space Flight, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.,
1967, 248; cited in Rotblat, 1981, 33.
').
< triage, or sorting people into exposure categories on the basis of their. presenting symptoms.
Since many people in these circumstances will be agitated and anxious, it may be difficult in the first few hours to sort out psychological factors from those induced by radiation.
However, although nausea, vomiting, and. diarrhea are normal physiological responses to stress of any kind, the time from exposure to onset of vomiting appears to be still the most reliable indication of severity of dose received.
Redness of the conjunctiva and skin erythema may appear within several hours to days of exposure, but these findings have variable thresholds and, from the perspective of early triage, are less useful as indicators of_ exposure levels.
Epilation of any significance usually arises from exposures over 200 rads, but because its occurrence lags until two to three weeks from' time of exposure it also cannot be relied upon to guide initial triage efforts.
Specific laboratory studies and careful questioning of exposed individuals are the techniques yielding the most useful information.
Both of these interventions can be invoked if the number of people exposed are relatively few and time permits.
Determining the precise location of the individual at key points in time and the exact timing of onset of symptoms will help define the dose received.
Results of a baseline complete blood count and chromosomal analysis, if resources are available to permit these tests, will also serve to define the exposure level.
Based on this information, treatment protocols can be instituted, b) Treatment.
An individual exposed to 500 to 1000 rads and who received intensive care therapy might recover, I
although he or she would require a protracted convalescence of two to six months.
Intensive care in this context would need to include reverse isolation techniques, matched allogeneic bone marrow transplant, fluid resuscitation, antibiotics, white cell, red cell, and platelet transfusions--performed in a setting with skilled hematology, oncology and burn unit capabilities.
The medical interventions needed in this setting fall into the category termed " heroic" by the WASH-1400 report and characterize the response given to the Soviet victims of the Chernobyl accident.
Soviet physicians have testified that the effort to care for the 200 most exposed victims of the Chernobyl disaster stressed their entire national health care system to the limits of its capacity.72/
Teaching hospitals in the greater Boston area could probably each
^
absorb approximately 5 to 10 such patients, with a total treatment potential of about 50 to 100 victims.
72/
H. Jack Geiger, "The Accident at Chernobyl and the Medical Response,"_ Journal of the American Medical Association 256 (1987):
609-12.
i People exposed to doses _of 1,000 rads or.more would present with extensive GI hemorrhage in the first four days after the event and would have little chance of survival, even if treated most aggressively and appropriately.
With exposure under 500 rads, intravenous fluid and l
electrolyte therapy with parenteral-antibiotics might support patients through the initial stages of fluid loss and,'if bone marrow depression were not too severe, chances e
of recover would be good.
A suggested protocol for treatment of an individual exposed to a potentially lethal radiation dose is found on Table 21.
Q.
Describe external contamination and its tr.eatment.
A.
(Leaning) External contamination.
When radioactive material emitted from either a nuclear power plant accident or as fallout after the explosion of nuclear weapon is deposited on the skin or clothing, external contamination is said to have taken place.73/
73/
For discussion of external contamination, see:
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Manual on Early Medical Treatment of Possible Radiation Injury, Safety Series No. 47, IAEA, Vienna, 1978, pp. 33-36, 60-62.
R.V. Leonard and R.C. Ricks, " Emergency Department Radiation Recident~ Protocol," Annals of Emergency Medicine 9 (1980):
462-70.
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCNP), Management of Persons Accidentally Contaminated with Radionuclides, NCRP Report No. 65, NCRP, Washington, D.C.,
1980, pp. 113-119.
G.A. Poda, " Decontamination and Decorporation:
The Clinical Experience," in Hubner and Fry, eds., pp. 327-332, t
TABLE 21 Treatsnent Protocol for Potentially I, ethal Radiation Exposure immaliately after diagnosis of exposure to 100 rad or more:
Avoid hospitahzing patient except in sterile environment facility. Look for preexisting infections and obtam cultures of suspicious areas-consider especially canous teeth, gingivae, skin, and vagina. Culture a clean-caught urine specimen. Culture stool specimen for identification of all organisms; run appropriate sensitivity tests for Steph. aureus and Gram-negative rods. Treat any infection that is discovered. Start oral nystatin to reduce Candida organisms. Do HLA
' g of patient's family, especially siblings, to select HLA-matched leu te and platelet donors for later need.
if granulocyte count falls to less than 1500/mm':
Start oral antibiotics-vancomycin 500 mg liquid P.O. q. 4 hr, gentamy.
cin 200 mg liquid P.O. q. 4 hr, nyststin 1 x 10' units liquid P.O. q. 4 hr,4 x 10' units as tablets P.O. q. 4 hr. Isolate patient inlaminar flow room or life island. Dady antiseptic bath and shampoo with chlorhexidine gluco-nate. Trim finger and toenails carefully and scrub area daily. For female patients, daily Betadine doucne and insert one nystatin vaginal tablet b.i.d. Culture nares, oropharynx, urine, stool, and skin of groins and axillae twice weekly. Culture blood if fever over 101 degrees F.
If granulocyte count falls to less than 750/mnr':
In the presence of fever (101'F) or other signs of infection give antibiotics while waiting results of new cultures (especially blood cults:res). The regimen sug6ested is ticarcillin 5 gm q. 6 hr I.V., gentamycm 1.25 mgm/kg q. 6 hr 1.V, For severe infection not responding within 24 hrs, give supplemental white cells, and if platelet count is low give platelets
)
from preselected matched donors. When cultures are reported, modify antibiotic regime appropriately. Watch for toxicity from antibiotics, and reduce medications as soon as practicable When granulocyte count rises to oter 1000/mm' and is clearly improving:
Discontinue isolation and antiseptic baths, antibiotics: continue nystatin for 3 additional days.
1 Source: Andrews, in Hubner and Fry, eds., 307.
\\
The health risk of such contamination varies with the kind of contaminating particle and the duration of exposure.
If the contaminating particles emit gamma radiation, then skin and organs in the path of the gamma radiation will be exposed to a given dose.
If the individual is effectively covered in gamma-emitting particles, the health consequences to that person are the same as if the person had been exposed to a whole body radiation dose.
That person should also be considered a danger to others, in that until decontaminated he constitutes a source of radioactivity.
If the person is contaminated with beta particles, the radiation is delivered over a very small distance (measured in millimeters) with with relatively high intensity.
Beta burns are local radiation skin burns created by exposure of skin to beta particles.
These burns can inflict extensive damage to local tissues, and, if the dose is sufficiently severe, could produce elements of the whole body radiation syndrome.
' Alpha particles exert effects over even smaller distances than beta particles (measured inmicrometers) but at much higher levels of intensity.
Alpha radiation is most damaging to humans when ingested or inhaled internally.
The time consumed and number of personnel required to decontaminate a large number of people exposed to external 1
contamination can be envisioned by considering the medical _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
protocol currently recommended for the external decontamination of one person.
See Table 22.
C.
Describe internal contamination and its treatment.
A.
(Leaning) l Internal contamination.
Whenever radioactive material is inhaled or ingested, internal contamination occurs.24/
Inhalation of aerosolized radioactive particles, consumption of particles dusting food or water, and absorption of particles through mucus membranes or wound surfaces may all contribute to the internal body burden of radioactivity.
If a large-scale release of radioactivity has taken place, food chain contamination, incorporating radioactivity in concentrated forms into the food supply, creates an additional and more long-term' source of internal contamination.
This form of contamination adds to whatever radiation dose an individual may have received from whole body irradiation or from external contamination with radioactive particles.
ine amount of radiation a person received from inhalation or ingestion of radioactive particles depends on complex interactions between the physical and chemical properties of 24/
For discussion of internal contamination, see:
IAEA, pp. 39-42.
NCRP, Report No. 65, pp. 20-29.
G.L. Voelz, " Current Approaches to the Management of Internally Contaminated Persons," in Hubner and Fry, eds.,
pp. 315-316. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ -
TAELE 22 Protocol for External Decontamination
- 1. Decont2msnation site requirements Separate entrance and isolated air and water systems; Dramage sluicing table; Personnel dressed in water-repellent disposable total garb, including masks and gloves; Labels for radioac!ve areas; a
Beta and gamma Geiger counters, hand held, battery-operated (alpha very difficult to get and maintain).
- 2. Procedure on site Remove victim from contaminated area; Remove all clothing; Cotton swab samples of nares, ear canals, and mouth to test dose level at lab;
- Rinse out mouth and nose with water; Survey with Geiger counter; Wash with soap and water-especially orifices and hair; Survey with Geiger counter again; Repeat wash if necessary and shave all body hair areas if necessary; Avoid abrading skin-enhances absorption; Use occlusive dressings (to be removed every six to twelve hours) for persistent contamination (sweating will flush out much of the contamination from superficial horny skin layers).
)
i 1
l j
l I
i Source:
IAEA No. 47, 33-42; NCRP No. 65, 113-118.
l
the radioactive isotope and the biological system that metabolizes it.
Alpha emitters, which deliver intense ionization in very focal areas, are, in general, most hazardous.
The chief health consequences are expressed over years, as induction of malignancy in local affected sites.
A more acute toxic effect on the lung has been observed with high-dose inhalation injury, especially when combined with some component of external contamination and whole body irradiation.
In this setting, over a several-month period, a
patient can experience progressive hemorrhagic pulmonary edema (blood and fluid in the lungs) and die from hypoxia (low level of tissue oxygen) and infection.75/
To assess the amount of radiation a person has absorbed internally requires a battery of tests and a series of calculations overtime that often challenge the technical capacities of hospitals even when only one or two patients are involved in the treatment protocols.
In disaster settings, where many people may be at risk for internal contamination, the assessment task may prove insurmountable.lb!
Treatment.
Treatment of internal contamination must be delivered as soon as possible.
Procedures or antidotes that i
1 are experimental and cumbersome to employ in individual 75/
Rotblat, 1981, p.
38.
76/
IAEA, pp. 4-32.
NCRP, Report No. 65, pp. 125-158, 1 i
cases, such-as chelation, are not recommended'on a population scale.
The administration of potassilum iodide is the only antidote currently recommended for widespread l
'use.
If taken as' prescribed, potassium iodide will protect populations from one of the major contributors to radioactive releases from. nuclear power plants--radioactive iodine.
Unless blocked, this radioactive iodine is selectively concentrated by the thyroid gland and can inflict high local doses in a short time frame.
Administering potassium iodide saturates the iodine receptors in the thyroid gland and inhibits uptake'of the radioactive forms.
If administered.within one hour of exposure, more than 85 percent of the radioactive dose will be blocked.
The recommended dose is 100 milligrams of
. potassium iodide taken orally within two hours and then daily for 10 days.
At this dose, administered to populations, some side effects may be observed.
Levels of thyroid stimulating hormone (TSH) may rise slightly, transient and clinically insignificant hypothyroidism may be induced in people with borderline thyroid function, and a percentage of the population may develop a skin reaction.22/
77/
David V.
Becker, " Reactor Accidents:
Public Health 5trategies and their Medical Implications," Journal of the American Medical Association 258'(1987):
649-654 Luther J. Carter, " National Protection from Iodine-131 Urged," Science 206 (1979):
201-206.
Frank von Hippel, "Available Thyroid Protection," Science 204 (1979):
1032. - _ -_-__. -
l I
{
Q.
What are the long-term health consequences of f
radiation exposure?
{
A.
(Leaning) Exposure to radiation exerts two principal long-term effects among those who survive the acute effects:
induction of cancer and promotion of genetic defects.
Both of these consequences appear after a significant latent period.
At issue is the dose-response curve, or the relationship between the amount of radiation to which a population is exposed and the subsequent numbers of malignancies or genetic defects that will later develop.
Most of the data on long-term effects derives from populations exposed in the range of 100 rads or more.
Since the human data is incomplete at lower levels of exposure, attempts to extrapolate back to effects ar lower doses must rely on theoretical concepts of threshold doses and calculated dose-response curves.
The scientific argument about this question is explored in detail in the 1980 report of the National Academy of Sciences, submitted by the Biological Committee on the Effects of Ionizing Radiation.
The BEIR III report examined the literature on long-term effects with a particular focus en an attempt to define a threshold radiation dose above which long-term consequences could be predicted with some certainty.
Both the concept of a threshold dose and the shape of the dose-response curve on either side of this threshold remain active questions in the literature.18/
18/
BEIR III, pp. 21-23. _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
cancer.
In studies of populations exposed to relatively high-dose radiation (the survivors of Hiroshima and i
Nagasaki, Marshall Islanders, uranium miners, and others),
the carcinogenic effect of radiation--its capacity to induce cancers--has been repeatedly demonstrated.- Only certain cancers are increased in incidence by radiation exposure and the time of their peak occurrence varies by cell type.
Follow-up on Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors reveals that they have experienced increased incidence of leukemia, cancer of the breast, lung, stomach, and thyrold, and are probably at risk for an increased incidence of multiple l
myeloma and cancer of the colon and urinary tract.
In the case of leukemia, which in the years of peak incidence occurred at a rate 10 times that in the non-exposed I
population, a dose-response curve can be drawn.
That curve is now in dispute since the gamma and neutron dosimetry data for Hiroshima have been revised.79/
79/
Stuart C. Finch, "The Study of Atomic Bomb Survivors in Japan," American Journal of Medicine 66 (1979):
900.
Hiro Kato and William J. Schull, " Studies of the Mortality of A-Bomb Survivors:
7:
Mortality, 1950-1978:
Part 1.
Cancer Mortality," Radiation Research 90 (1982):
395-432.
Eliot Marshall, "New A-Bomb Studies Alter Radiation Estimates," Science 212 (1981):
900-903, i
Warren K. Sinclair and Patricia Failla, " Dosimetry of the Atomic Bomb Survivors:
A Symposium," Radiation Research 88 (1981):
437-447.
1 1
f4 I:.
j ha The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)has.Jpublianhd'stundardestimatesof'cancerrisks, based on extrapolations from a broad range of data, employing a linear dose-response curve.
Although the linear
,g hypothesis is con rtiversial, the ICRP estimates presented in Table 23' serve as gross indicators of risk.
According-to the ICRP formula, the total risk of death from all cancers for both sexes comes to 12.5 x 10-3 per 100
/
rems, meaning that if 10,000 people were exposed to 100 rems, 12S would subsequently die of cancer who would otherwise no,t incur this disease.
The number of non-lethal cancers induced by this radiation exposure might be double
(
this figure.
Gygetic effects.
Ionizing radiation can damage chromosomes, containing many genes, or alter the structure of just one gene.
Ganetic or chromosomal alterations in germ cella may be transmitted to the offspring of the exposed person.
These defects may take several generations to reveal themselves in populations.
Since it is assumed that radiation-induced gentic defects will be similar to the significant spontaneous mutations that currently occ.ur at the rate of 10 percent of all live births, scientists employ the concept of doubling dose, or the radiation doce required to double the normal background incidence of significance mutation from all causes.
The doubling dose concept assumes that the dose response curve is linear. '
.t
TABLE 23 Risk Factors for Cancer Deaths Cancer Type
- Death Rate per 100 Rems leukenus 2.0 x 10-3
~
Breast cancer 2.5 x 10-8 Lung cancer 2.0 x 10-8 Bone cancer 0.5 x 10-8 Thyroid 0.5 x 10-8 Other (stomach, 5.0 x 10-8 colon, liver, salivary glands)
Total 12.5 x 10-3 a No abowenn made for age or se oEw y= h = as an emase for bom e== sew ance bmet aner ee f
femain,owruksore m = m Source:
ICRP No. 26, cited in Rotblat, 1981, 47.
c r
FY J.}
4,-
- u ',
l
..r Q
~
4 g
- h 4
+
-;r.
n9-qy
' ; \\. *,'
3 v s
,s s.,
/
1 f
I \\ 'y, /
3 3 f 3,
+
r E
..y Thh dou lir deseinIh'uNans'has e n estimated.to range f,
s,k' t
?
,,)
?;
between 50 and.250 rads.g p
+
M
)
~ Teenslaving this range to y.
,d'i i
~
_ population,effectn,S Qe BEIR_III Committee.has suggestad that i
e, s
fl
\\
e exposing a populatiorr to.. lj r'em will iiidues in',.the. first, ),
[j {\\
t/
-e 3
t s
- , \\
Nnerstioril thereaf tec! 5,65 cignificatih.tgeneticmutat'ionsheY'
,-v.
1./
a a
mijidon N ye births.81/
4 6
v 4
Q(*Couldyoudescribethetaskfac!,$hinn mergency I
~
physiI. ian asked to respond and provide Eriage and treatmsnte.,
s s
7" 3
'tg 8
i a
j to people;possibly exposed to a releaselof, radioactivity r
.\\
a i
from'Seabrochi
< y' A !"
g
/
J l
4 4
i
(
A.
(Leaning) The response to thic' question can be d. <l, ti.
r t
,3 approached by defining the' problem, describing the resonice.
s available, outlining the(e'stablished proce' dure to be j
- s s
t.
+
s s >
t.
1 followed, and evaluating the potentia 3 results :
id y 1
i
[
s s\\
(f The problem:,
'i s
It is assumed that the ireleise of radioactiv'itiy has been i\\
\\
1significant;Jdesulting in the lytelihood that many of the i s
'i a s.
11 f
people on the Te,ach have received'a potentially letha1 d'osei-i l
\\
- g 1
9 4
~
['
Notification of the disasterJhas occurred, and the
((
s s
evacuation'of theibeach population i,sj in progress.. The t!.nie j
.c cl frame for this.didcussion is within tQefirst four to eight 2
hours from the time of the accident.
I s
,' i i
q'
\\
t 8_0,/
BEIR III,.p. 84.
4 8_1,/
Ibid., p; 0 5.!
, a, v
i; s
s w w.
r s
1-
('
At one of the local community hospitals within a 10 mile radius of the Seabrook plant, one might anticipate the arrival of at least 100 patients per hour, experiencing a l
range of symptoms from anxiety to intense vomiting.
The Resot_Jes:
(a) Physical Plant The appropriate treatment of radiation victims requires space, equipment, ventilation, and waste disposal systems that are separate from the general treatment area and from the external environment.
In most hospitals that have paid attention to the risk of radiation accidents and have organized a response system, the physical plant is usually arranged for multi-purpose use, so that in the actual event of a radiation emergency, necessary modifications in routine space must be made at very short notice.81/
82/
For d!scussion on necessary resources and recommended procedures, see:
J. Geiger, op cit.
I Harold A. Goldstein, " Radiation Accidents and Injuries,"
Emergency Medicine, September 15, 194-215.
3 R.E.
Linnemann, op. cit.
Fred A.
Mettler, " Emergency Management of Radiation Accidents," Journal of the American College of Emergency Physicians," 7:8 (1978); 302-305.
l Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Radiation Accident Management:
Syllabus, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, November, 1980.
LL. Richter, et al.,
"A Systems Approach to the Management of Radiation Accidents," Annals of Emergency Medicine, 9:6 (1980):
303-309.
Frances Shepherd, " Treatment for Patients with Radioactive Contamination," Dimensions in Health I
Service, June (1990):
19-20.
l l
1 i
-100-i
]
)
(b) Personnel The local disaster plan would be activated.
Serial intervention results in a situation where many potentially seriously ill patients queue up, unevaluated, and
')
untreated.
Ultimate morbidity and mortality of victims would, in this mode, be increased.
For'a community hospital responding to a radiation alert, at most 20-30 physicians and nurses could be expected to assemble.
(c) Coordination In this context, the organization and coordination of personnel is more crucial than the actual numbers deployed.
This priority always prevails, regardless of the kind of disaster under discussion; in the case of radiation accident, the various procedures that need to be performed are discrete, serial, often counter-intuitive, and carry an element of fear.
Consequently, even in small-scale radiation disasters, a higher premium is placed on leadership, training, and appropriate task assignment than what might otherwise be needed in a disaster response employing procedures tht physicians and nurse are mere accustomed to perform in the course of their regular work, And, as.with any disaster, even seasoned responders can find their efforts overwhelmed if the numbers of people in need outstrip the physical and human resources available.
-101-
Procedure A)
Standard Procedure:
I Standard procedure for one patient with possible exposure to external contamination and the potential for internal contamination have been outlined in proceding sections.
The process of assessing life-threatening injury, taking patient history, screening and decontaminating, would take two experienced people approximately 15 to 30 months for each patient.
The task of triage requires estimating radiation received.
This estimate would be based on patient history, on evidence of predromal symptoms (anorexia, nausea, vomiting, fatigue), and on results of survey for external contamination.
Such an estimate will often be hard to arrive at with any certainty or precision.
In making this triage decision, a protocol will have to be in place or arrived at soon into the event as to where and how to send patients who are deemed at risk for lethal exposures.
The destination should be a hospital environment equipped for the management of severely exposed individuals.
In the j
example described here, preparations should be made to i
transport the patient by ambulance to teaching hospitals in the Greater Boston area.
l l
-102-
B)
General' triage guidelines:
- Send to tertiary hospital anyone with presumed exposures of 200 rems or more;
- Send to community hospital for admission surveillance for further symptom development,.and pending results of blood samples;
- All patients with exposures estimated to be between 50 and 200 rema, send home, with information allowing for immediate re-call; any patient whose exposure is judged to be 50 rems or less.
4 Procedure for Mass Casualty Response Availa' ole space, equipment and personnel, even in the most advanced and prepared radiation sites would be stressed to capacity after receiving 100 patients an hour, an orderly, comprehensive response would be disrupted.
The area around and outside the hosptal emergency room would be crowded with patients.
Crowd supervision would be a matter of great priority.
If not handled well (and crowd management requires sufficient numbers of trained people) the situation could degenerate to hysteria and mass panic.
The mangement of large numbers of children would especially complicate matters.
-103-
One of two different consequences could result.
The personnel on site could think clearly and de-esculate their response protocols to a minimum level of intervention aimed at identifying the mostly severely exposed and delaying until later the assessment and treatment of those less seriously exposed.
The key problem with this decision process in the context of radiation injury is the degree of uncertainty that is inexorably attached to the assessment of individual cases--a degree of uncertainty, given our medical knowledge, that is greater than the uncertainty with which a skilled physician approaches someone with a traumatic chest injury.
The stress of this process lead to a deterioration in medical judgment over time.
If the on-site personnel become confused and anxious, they might resort to a serial treatment patter (taking care of each set of patients as they arrive).
Summary The short-term response to a significant radiation accident at Seabrook, involving exposures of over 200 rems to a population in excess of 500 people, could be expected to overwhelm a methodical standard approach to the assessment and decontamination of radiation victims.
Instead, an accelerated and truncated treatment process would develop, and, in the best I
i case, those most seriously exposed would be identified, 1
l
}
-104-l
decontaminated, and sant to more definitive treatment sites with'little delay.
In the worst case, medical organization would crumble, resulting in delay in treating those who should be treated at once.
A. greater incidence of morbidity and mortality could be. expected.
Q.
In conclusion could you describe what might be the reactions of the beach population during the first few minutes to one hour after exposure to a potentially lethal radiation release?
A.
(Leaning)
Radiation is invisible and leaves no smell or taste.
The first signs of the release would be the onset of nausea and vomiting in that section of the population whose sensitivity to radiation was highest and who were in the path of the release of rad'.c2ctivity.
This population would include a preponderance of children and whatever elderly adults were present on the beach.
Initially, other family members, friends, and bystandere would not pay particular attention to isolated instances of nausea or vomiting occurring up and down the beach area.
However, this kind of news, recounting untoward and unexpected symptoms, travels very rapidly.
Within minutes of onset of symptoms in a few people, word of a strange epidemic would spread througho'2t the several miles of populated beach region.
At that point, regardless of official communications and advice, mass turmoil could be expected.
Any exodus would be
-105-
]
complicated by the' fact that an increasing num.ber of people would begin to fall ill.
This expanding number would include parents and drivers of vehicles.
The nausea that afflicts people is intense and sudden, often persisitng for several hours.
This nausea-will reduce energy levels, impair clarity-of thought, and constribute to emotional instability.
These-adverse effects, would be felt more by that segment of the population that immedately becomes nauseated, and soon after exposure begins to vomit.
The vomiting of the radiation prodrome syndrome can come on suddenly, and may continue relentlessly for several hours.
Again, people with this condition may well be unable to manange, with any dispatch or efficiency, the task of assembling family and belongings, getting to vehicles, and negotiating the journey out of the affected area.
In the scenarios described in the testimony of Professor Beyea, on any given summer day there might be as many as 10,000 to 23,000 people who could be exposed According to statistical probablity, based on study of previous population experience, even at levels of radiation below 100 rems one could predict chat approximately 30% of the population would begin to feel los, of appetite and general decline in wellbeing, another 10% would become nauseated, and 10% would begin to vomit.
A few people might expereince abrupt onset of diarrhea, with or without other symptoms.
l
-106-
Translated'into. numbers, within minutes of exposure 'o a t
radioactive release, 1,000 people-or more on the beach would become acutely nauseated,-and another 1,000 people would begin
~
active vomitting..It should be noted that these percentages were derived'for an adult population.- Higher percentages for illness in each' category.should be employed for populatins containing many children.
Evacuation procedures in this setting would take longer and involve more' complexities than the evacuation of people who are not ill.
Q.
Does this complete your testimony?
A.
(Leaning)
Yes.
'It does.
1 i
I
}
-107-
TO TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C. SHOT I Y TABLE A Sunny DotAINANT ACCIDENT SEOUENCES. WASH-1 Ann The WASH-1400 analysis of Surry Unit 1 identmed tweNo accident sequence which do,W&i,d the estimated median core melt frequency of 5 x 10-5 pg. reactor-yes'.
1/
These twelve accident sequences, their.t',r':., and their estimated frequencies are desentud below. 2/
Sequence TMLB' - This sequence is a station blackout sequence (a loss of offsste power followed by the falure of onsite AC power and the failure to recover AC power within about three hours). WASH-1400 esamsted the frequency of sequence 4
TMLB' at 3 x 10 per reactor-year. 2/ 4/
.1/
It we be noted that N the frpuencies of these twehe sequences me summ i
met frequency is 1.24 x 10 per reactor-year, WASH 1400 otesined em s x 10 per reactor y by a Monte cario sempting technique, ow persaders of which are not especies value has been caed widely, and is thermore used here for reference purposes. y ciee 2/
Rooerely, a new rtak asessement for Surry Unt 1 was perforrned for the dreR NRC report NUi 1150, Aameer Alaer Aanyones Daeumant. The hd reeuite of the new surry 1 PRA are documented in Robert C. Senucio, et e., m at cans & = #caare f.._.. __r._' E._
sany Unir 1, Senes Nedonal I.abonsortes, prepared for the U.S. Nudeer Reguinary Commemon.
NUREG/CIW860, SAPCOS8084, Vp 3, November 1988. This study andmated the mean frequency of core melt et s.8 x 10 I
per.reeceer year from "Ireemmi events' accidente (i.e not induens 'seemst everus'such as eenngumes, soods, ares, seca. kr., page M.. wash 14oo I
esquenses TMQ, TMnaQ, and 8 C were found not to need to core met. Other WASH-1400 2
tedplulene hr Surry were identfled as among the dominert more met sequences in the new study, along om savousi neelyidentfled accident esquences A tehle tram NUREG/CR4660 which sumh 9e fee of the newer study le provided as an addendum to Exhlht 3 for oorgadusepurposes, al N.C. Reemussen, et al., Aescar Sanmar Sanfr An "--
.. ; af k : = n w In u s.
Cww Mr* Penner ".-e. U.S. Nudear Reguimofy Commmelon, WASH 1400, NUREG-75/014. October 1978. *Aderr Aaport,* page 82.
4/
The NUREG 1150 anopyeis of Surry idendned four esponse staden sequences. These four sequences have an aggregate core met frecuency estimated at 9.5 x 10 per reactor year. 333, Robert C. Bertucio, et al., Anaksis of cara Damman Fraarasiew From innamat Events Sandia
4-2 Sequence TML - This sequence is a transient esther resulting from by a loss of main feedwater, with a failure of auxiliary feedwater. W the frequency of sequenos TML st 6 x 104 per reactor year, g/ g/
Sequence V - The V sequence represents an "intersystem LOCA*
the failure of the low pressure injection system check valves. This re of the low pressure injection system piping outside of the containme release from this core melt accident also bypasses the containment.
t WASH-1400 k
estimated the frequency of sequence V at 4 x 104porreactor year. Z/ g/
Sequence 82C - Sequence S C represents a smed LOCA in which tr )
2 contenment spray injection system fails. This results in a lock of containment ho removal.
The containment fails due to steam overpressure, fodowing which the emergency core cooling systems fail due to insufficient not postive suction and/or damage due to containment depresst 24;ce. This results in core mel National ich E prepared for the U.S. Nudeer Regulatory Comminaion, NUREG/
SANDes-20se, Yet 3, November 19ss, pages V4 and V4.
1]
N.C. Reemuseen, et al., Mm W b+ An k- - ; : d V:Uw Misks in US.
Cc7- _c'21 Murer Power f.'e.n U.S. Nudeer Reginatory Comnussion, WASH 14 75/014, Octotar te7s,
- Admin Aaporr,' page st.
R/
The NUREG 1150 andysle ensimmed the frequency of this type of anddent esqu 4
per rencoor year, ja, Robert C. Senucio, et d, Annanda d dans c T==
r.-==ev r,r.a Commission, NUREG/CR 4880, SANDsH0s4, Vol 3, N 2/
N.C. W n A,." -=-- sanaar 6+ An A--
-..- d.'.::a= Misks in U.S.
Mudear Ammar h. U.S. Nudeer Regulatory Carenussion, WASH-1400. NUREG.
7s/o14 sers,'anner Asport.'page s1.
A/
Sci nos Appseskme insemedones Corporenon hee to eedmeesd es V equence 10*9per reactor year. $m, R.L,. Rtzman, a et, some tw=en Term and C.:.-
=;.;.ze AnaArsis.
Sciernce Applicadone intamational Corporation, prepared for the Electric Power R EPRI Report No. NN0ss, Mnal Report, June 19s a et, AnaAnde e care w rc=uence a s.0 x 10 p,per reemor. year.
page 24. The NUREG-1150 enetyse eedmeted the frequency of the V esq
==;< r,nr,.. _ _ s_= Sendte Nedonal Laboratorme, prepared for the U.S. Nudeer Reguistory Commiseen, NUMEG/CR6, SANDes-20s4, Vol. 3 November 1sse, page v4.
4-3 contairiment fagure. WASH 1400 estimated the frequency of sequence S C at 2 210-6 2
per reactor-year. a/.10/
Sequence S2D - Sequence S D represents a smal LOCA in which the 2
emergency coolant injection system fails.
WASH-1400 estimated the frequency of sequence S D at 9 x 10-5 per reactor-year.11/
2 Sequence S2H - Sequence S H represents a smal LOCA in which the 2
emergency coolant recirculation system faus. WASH-1400 estimated the frequency of sequence S H st8 x 10 8 2
per reactor-year.12/
9)
N.C. Reemuseen, et eL, Ma=**w sananv %4 An A 7.._; d k--M
- = An u.s.
Cc_ ;;; _r'
! Nueimer Power Am. U.S. Nudeer Regulatory Commission WASH 1400, NUREG-75/014. October 1975 'Meire Aaport.* page 99.
19/
Both science Applications International corporation and the NUREG-1150 analyses conclude that this is a non-core melt sequence.
5.sa, R.L. Rititman, et et, Surry ta=en Tame and cc =- x A.dc.
Science Application intemational Corporadon, prepared for the essetc Power Reeserch in EPRI Report No. NP 4008, Pinel Report, June 1988, page 210; and Robert C. Benucio, AnaAm,s d ceve Damaa= Fear xs rm l..._T-l ra.n. Sandle Nanonal Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear RegWatory Commismon, NUREG/CR 4880, SMC08 2004, Vet 3, Novemb 1988, peos V 70.
The NUREG-1150 analysis identified similar sequences with medium and large I4CAs, loss of offaite power transients, and loss of feedwater transients as initiating events.
These sequences wer frequency of about 1.1 x 10~9 estimated to have an aggregate per reactor-year.
533, Robert C.
Bertucio, et al. AnmWe d cans nammaa Fraa'=a frT.
T ; f=.=
Sende National Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nucteer Reguietary Commission, NUREG/CR 4880, SANOes 2004, Vol 3, November 1988, pages V-69 to V-71.
The large reduction in frequency arises from analysee which suggest that containment failure results in ECCS failure only 2% of the time, rather than 100% of the time as assumed in WASH-1400.
11/
The f45WS 1180 enefyele estimesed the frequency of this esquence et 7.1 x 10*7 per reactor year.
The endpe also esersuand a simter esquence (g fr'sm reemor cor, tert pump sea which wese not f suadered h WASH 1400) et 2.6 x 10 per reactor year. 3m Roben C. Bertucio, et et, Aamw= d care c_T = fr==s r= 1.=.T fr. Sende Nedonal Laboratales.
prepared for the U.S. Nucteer Regulatory Commesion, NUREG/CR-4880, SAN 0062004, Vol. 3.
November 1988, pages V4 to V4.
l 12/
I The NUREG 1150 enelysis estimated the frequency of this esquence et 1.2 x 10 4
(sequences per reactor year Fmm Inremag endg Eas, Robert C. Bertucio, et eL. Anahein dcare camsee heau Neuened t.aboratortes, prepared for the U.S. Nudeer Regulatory Comrmenion, NuREG/CR-4550, SAND 86-2064, Vol. 3, November 1908, pagee V 5 to V 6.
i l
4-4 1
l Sequenas S1D - Sequence $ D represents a medium LOCA in which the i
3 emergency coolant injection system fails.
WASH-1400 esumated the frequency of l
sequence S D at3 x 10-8 per reactor-year.12/1(/
i 3
i Sequence S1H - Sequence SjH represents a medium LOCA in which the emergency coolant recirculation system fails. WASH-1400 estimated the frequen sequence S H st3 x 104 i
per reactor-year.11/Ig/
Sequanes AD - Sequence AD represents a large LOCA in which the em coolant injection system fails. WASH-1400 estimated the frequency of sequence A x104 per reactor-year.,12/.13/
I i
i 1ll/
N.C. Raemuseen, et aL, * ^ ^ = - Sannw Rn+ An ^ ^ ^ - ^._; d A^.-=
1
"'= - in U S.
Cex... r ' ' M=" '- Power "l ;
U.S. Nucieer W" Comminaion, WASH 1400. NUREG-75/014. October 1975, *Medrr Aaporr.' pees 80.
1(/
The NUREG 1150 anefysis estimated the frequency of this esquence at 7.1 x 10*7 Ass, Robert C. senueto, e aL, doeMut care
- f=- a fw. !r T !per reactor. year.
.m Sandia National Labormories, prepared for the U.S. Nucieer Regtdecry Commission, NURE SAN 086 2004, Vol 3, November tees, pages V4 to V4 15/
N.C. Rasmuseen, et aL, ~~ ^ ~== Ranuv An+ An ^^- ^ ^ = ; d A=LM Minks in us.
Ce... v' > M="-- Ammar."s'
- U.S. Nuc$ser "egidebory Commission, WASH 1400. NUREG.
75/014. Omotor 1975, " Adam Aaport," page 80.
16/
The 6115 anefyele sellmaled the frequency of this se See, Reben C Bonusin, et at, Annwm d care w r.=quence a 7.7 x 10*7 per renczor. year.
2.r. 2 :. -- !r. ;..Sandia Nedoms tJhmeteries, prepared tar the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiseson, NUREG 86 Wat 3 Novemberites, pages V4 to V4 12/
N.C. Rasmuseen, et eL, ~ ^ ' ^== Re.W.^ Mn+ An ^ -- - -..-
d A = L = = M w In u s.
Ce- ;. r ' 2Mr' Power m._. U.S. Nucteer Regulatory Commesson, WASH 1400 NUREG-75/014. October 1975,
- Mein Aaport,' page 80.
18/
The NUREG.1150 analysis estimated the frequency of this esquence at 3.9 x 10*7 Aas, Robert c. senucio, et at, Anawn s can nania - >=a r.w. s T ! rm Sandia per remotor year.
National Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nucieer Regulatory Commission, NUREG/C SAN 006 2004 Vol 3. November 190s, pegen V4 to V4
4-5 Seouance AM - Sequence AH represents a large LOCA r1 which the emergen coolant recirculation system fails. WASH-1400 estimated the frequency of sequence AH 4
at 1 x 10 per reactor-year.' 13/ 20/
Secuence TKO - Sequence TKO represents a transient followed by failure of the reactor pei-26 system and a failure of at least one pressunter safety / relief valve to reclose. WASH 1400 estimate the frequency of sequence TKO at 3 x 104 per reactor-year. 21/ 22/
Sequence TKMO - Sequence TKO represents a loss of feedwater transient followed by failure of the reactor pbM-:n system and failure of at least one pressuruer safety / relief velve to reclose. WASH-1400 estimated the frequency of sequaw TKMO 4
at 1 x 10 per reactor-year. 23/ 26/
lt/
N.C. Raemunnen et al., *^' ^ = Sannw 6+ An ^ ~ ^ --.
d A^ ^M-;-
42 in U s.
Commerefal Nurjeer Pomw Monet U.S. Nudeer Regtdelary Commlesion, WASH 1400, NUREG.
75/014, October 1975, 'Adeh Report,* page W.
22/
The NUMEG-1150 anefysis esimeted the frequency of thh sequence at 3.s x 10*7 Sag, Robert C. Bertucio, et al. AnaAnds d cons Dan *== Fe==-ww r a, l;a.;.per reactor year.
! hre. Sandia National 1.aboratorien, prepared for the U.S. Nudeer RegLdecry Comminaion, NUMEG/CR 4550.
SANOe6 2004, Vol. 3, November 1988, pages V 6 to V4.
21]
N.C. Reemuseen, et aL, "^ =-- Sannw 6+ An ^^^ ^ ^ - -.
d A^ ^M -: R:na in US.
Commercial Mudeer Pneur Pterna. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commhalon, WASH-1400, NUREG.
75/014 Ocanter 1s75, "Adeh Aaport," page M.
22/
The 61180 enefysis salmeted the frequency of a simeer seguonos (Dot 0 ) at 1.1 x 104 per renessegues, Rae, Robert C. sertucio, et at, AnnAmin d car ans-.= p,-- 4vu pm.,,_ i flag, M Nedonal Laboratorten, prepened for the U.S. Nudeer Regulatory Comminaion.
NUM SAPCOSGS4, Vol 3, November 1908, page V-69.
11/
N.C. Reemuseen, et aL, ^ ^ ^ =-^ t=^w 6+ An ^ - ^ -. : d A-m Miska ks U.S.
Cc.T, T' ' Ne- "-^ Pmmer "' a U.S. Nudeer Reguistory Compteolon, WASH 1400, NUREG-75/014 October 1975, 'Adatrr Aaport,* page 90.
Zi/
The NUREG 1150 ansfysis estimated the frequency of a simter esquece (TKRZ) at 4.s x 10*7 per reactor year. 333, Roben C. Benucio, et al., AnaAmis d Cans one-- Fr===sev Fmm Intamal E3013, Sandle National Laboratorten, prepared for the U.S. Nudeer Regulatory cwt,,,Wi.
NUREG/CR 4650. SAN 006 2004, Vol 3, November 1988, page V-69.
e
1 i
46 ADDENDUM TOnst.s A DOMINANT SURRY UNIT 1 ACCIDENT SEQUENCES. JU Tan:e v.:.;
!arry Dominant Ac=:er.: f eeweace 133 3 153.
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l l
.TEHfSTIMONY OF STEVEN C. SHOLLY Taste a SURRY RE!IASE CWrEGORIES. WASH 1 Ann 1
This exhibit provides a description of the WASH-1400 release categories Unit 1, as well as a table which gives the release charactensecs (frequency, release magnitudes, etc.).1 Jwir.srgi for this Exhibit is taken from WASH-1400 1/
l The release category frequencies and cherectortatics are taken kom N.C. Reemussen, et If Baaenv Safaw %& An ^=--^ ^ 1 :: at A -L= Misks in U St c_.... *' Ma 'r ra=: Pkm.
U.S. Nudeer Reguistory Commission, WASH-1400, NUREG 75/014 October 1975, ' Main Aapo page 97; the desertpelone at the reisene categortes are taken kom N.C. Rasmussen, at al., da SateN h+ An A--^ ^ T.
at A -LM Misks in U.S cc.:.; :-' Meenar Pomar "k=. U.S.
Nudeer r" _="-^ -y Commiselon, WASH-1400, NUREG 75/014 October 1975, Appenetr VI,
'Calcutadon of Meector Accident Consequences
- pages 21 to 2 3.
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sely the reader understand e postulates contair.=se, re
- resente knet deser ptasas of me varteus pnysical ;r
- : esse. eases. :sts testa:
release category.
s cat define eac:
- se teenarques employed s compute ce radioactive releases reader as referred to Appendices. VI and 72 :.
i ae re.
.s e f
ta esca release eategesy are discussed La dataA1 an secuan 4"he dsmanant event tree s
.6 of Appendez.*.
ran 7 s release category can he caaractensed by a care mistswa fs11 expicssan on contas The sansatament spray and heatef =elten fuel vita ce residual vatar LA ce react:r v owed my a st'eas could he ac a pressure amove ametent atremoval sy scorefore, c e testa & ament steem esplestem.
- ornoa of the treeter vessel and krossa na containeens barrierIt is a ce
- ::a of tr.a
- = a puff over a pened of sheet 10 masutes. mat a substantial assent o
, vita ue res C :
would ::stume at a relatively *sw rate thereafter.ter. orated dunny c ter:Als appess:mately 7Ct of saa isdises and 40% of ne alkali =etals present La as ce n=e of release. -
the time of failure, a relatively higa release este of solocause the gases at
=sre f :s the =entaAcetat could he assestated wata mis cateeer nsthie energy
- 1: des certata potential ace: dent sequences cat would ::f. This Categert aise cf :gre =eltsag and a steam esplestem after :satatament ::Stvre due s ove velve tas oceurresse On tr.ees sequences, saa rate of energy release vould he 1:wer reistavely hign.
rpressure.
, altr.ouga st * *.
ra :
This categor me.usg cancu/ is associated vita the faalure of care-eceli g systems and ::re rrent vts:
TA
- ure Cf tr.e c 3tala=ent harner would occur.r.e fatture of contausent spray and heat-rem sus: ant:41 fractact. of : e contauant.:
Artuga overpressure, taust y a a ;ened of amout 22 =Ar.utes.
assespeare se he reisased in a puf* :ver
- r.tainmer.t vessel =eltersugn. t e release of radioac. ave =aterial vould 1: a relatively low rate cereafter.
~2% af me acdians and 20t cf ce alkali =etals prThe totai release tould :: state. appe x= ate unne re.aase.
As an ;wR release category 1, the hag eser.. :: tr.e :=re at : e :=a cf
- an=ent re;asse race cf sens21e energy fr a.he cantaan=ent.ce ::=a of contauzer.2 {
at swa :
Th s cater:r/ involves an overpressure failure of.ae contat=ent due o f natatamen:.-
ef : re aesa. eat removel. Centau= set fa& lure venid sc== pnar := ce ::=at;:re -f u :uga a raptured easa& ament barrier. Care telting then would cause radioactive matena g.
se::e=e.:
aR.ali =etals present is.he core at ce :=e =f release veuld he released ::Approxta at=sepnere.
- ess of the release vould occur ever a pened =f asent se acuan of gases generated hy ce reactaon of : e =elser. :e; w 1.5 sours. The case gasee.esid he inatially hea ed by entact vita es ze c ue :ste =f sens;Ma S an:s energy reisees te tae aumespaars vo:uld to =ederately higs.
Va.
Thas cateysc/ involves fatlure :f us cere-esoling systes and me : rsancen
- acuan systen af ter a loss-of-::stant accident.
sp:27 fulure =f ce cantatament system sa properly :solate.
tegessar vitt. a :sseurren re. ease af it of the redir.es anc 4% of the alkali =stals present Tus vould resul: : ne n=e f rolesse. 14est of u sa es es:e at.se
- : 3 nours. Because ce ::s release would ocnr==ntar.uously over a pen =d af ntaunent recientataan spray and heat-ramaval sys s:s vould operate to remove heat from ce contan=er.t a relanvaly 1:w rata of release f sanscle energy would he associated vt:"
at=sspr.are tunny core :sitant, n sic:7
. :: s
- - - - - - - - - - ~ ~
4 run s 21s category tamelves failure of the core cooli release eategory 4. except that the containment spray ing systems and is simi to *ur.her redeem the quantity of airborne i
n1eetion system would operate suppress coatmimmaat temperature and pressure,ioactAve matertal and to initially rad i
a large leassge rate due te a eeneurrent failure of th m contalassas barrier would have Asolate. and meet of the radleastave material would be released continuout W evere cont a persed of several hours.
hypremanately Jt of the iodiaes and 0 9% of the
' r:etals present la the core would be~ released.
containannt heat-removal systems, the energy release rate we ldBecause of t alkall run s e
be law.
Se containment sprays would met operate, but the contan its integrity until the amitea core preeeeded to melt rrier would retaAa base mat.
leasage to the atmosphere eesurrsag upward tarsega the greend crete containment the seasophore womad alas escur at a low rate prior t Direet leakage to Most of the release womid eseur costimeously ever a pers de oestaammeat-vesset melt Me release would include appremisseely 0.08% of the iodines and alk li of atest 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
e present in the core at the time of release.
a antals the atmosphere wesid be law and gases escaping through thBecause leakage from een*=
by contact with the soil, the energy release rate would be ver e ground would be eseled y law.
swa 7 would operate to reduce the conta&ammat temperature and amount of 41 norme radioactivity.
. s well as the and 0.001% of the alkali metals present in the core at the time of releasem r of the release would scour over a period of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
the energy release rate would be very low.
Meet As in PWR release category d e rwa e mis category approminates a PWR design basis accident that safeguarda are assumed to functica properly.the containment would fail to The other engtaaered would involve appremamately 0.01% of the iodines and 0 05%m core would not salt. The rele P.o s t pressure would be above ameient.of tse release would occur in tne 0.5-hour persed esiting would not occur, the energy release rate would aise be lawBecause containm ant Pwn e m is categor talv the ac.y approximates a PWR design basta accident cladding would be released into the containment.avity initially emetained within the g"as assumed that
.he core would not salt.
to remove heat from the eers and concata==atthe minimaur, required engtaaered sa It is 0.5-hour perted during which the een*at a=aat pressure would bm release would occur ov Appromanately 0.000814 ei the iodines and 0.000064 of th e above ambient.
released.
Ae in SWE release estegory 8, the energy release rate would bee alkali assals wo 3
1 very Icv.
na reisase category is representative of a core melt exp1 ton in reacter esel. Se followed by a stese quant:
of rad active na al to the stor would cause the releas f a substar.tial approm tely 404 f the iod es and sika natals present the core a the ti.e taosynere. The tal release old contass of contaa.
nu fai re.
Most t the role would occur ove a 2-hour per Iscause of he ener generated in the see caaracterate by a re tively hi exploeton, this tegory would category also ciudas etaia e aces that volve overpress failure of rate of an rgy release to atmosphere.
is c=ntainment pri these segnances, to the occurrence f core nel and a steam losion. In a rate discussed above, a thougn if energy ease woul somewnat smalle than for those would still be relast ly hign.
l
m c TO TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C. SHOL I Y MOURES l-11 TO lois. NUREGGs6 This exhibit consists of refic-iM pages from NUREGM contain Fgures 1-11 Ewough 1 16. These figures are r+ c-1=d on the follow
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Figure 1 11. Conditioned Prebebility of Emoneding Whole Body Dose Versue Distanos. Probabilities are Conditional en e Core Melt Asendent (5 a 10 8).
Whole body does colaulated includes: extemet does to the whole body due to the poseing aloud, exposure to radionuclides on yound, and me does to the whole body from inimied rodeonuolidos.
Does estauletions assumed no protective actions taken, ed straight line porne trojecsery.
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Figure I 12. Conditional Probability of Exceeding Lung Doons Versus Distenas. Probabilities are Conditioned on a Core Meet Accadent (5 x 10 8).
Lung does calculeend includes: externel dose to the lung due to the possing cloud, exposure to rodeonuclides on yound, and the does to the hang from inhaled radionuclides wrthin 1 year.
Does ceiculacons assumed no protective actions taken, and streight line trajectory.
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l Thyroid does asieutened includes: exernel does to the eid due to the pseuns cloud, esposure to radionuclides on ground, and the dose to the thyroid from inheied radionaaledes.
Does minuiseens assumed no protectwo actions taken, and sereight line tropectory.
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I Probabilities are Conditional on a Core Melt Accedent (5 x 10 5),
i Thyroid dose amieulsted is due solely to radionudide ingescon through the milk consumption pathway.
Does caiculeuens assumed no protective accons taken, and straeght line trajectory.
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Thyroid dose seisteted is due soleF to radiersciide ingescon through de nik
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., p FIGURE 8.1 PROM MARCH 1987 BNL REPORT i
,I This M omisists of Fhpure 6.1 trom W.T. Pratt & C. Hofmeyer, et al.,
Iachnk'=1 EvaM=% $ A ggm am w e--'
m um t.aboratory, prepared for the U.S. Nuder Regulatory Commission, Marc 1s. This agure een be compared wth Figure I 11 srom funescae8 (ame E attached to this testimony).
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10 100 Miles Figure 6.1 Compone*:s of NUREG-0396 curw as com-puted by SNL using CAAC2. T curve is normalized to 6:10 p suunary core mit probability. The result differs from i
I NUREG-0D6 f
REFERENCES TO TESTIMONY OFLGORDON THOMPSON (Kouts, 1987)
H. Kouts, Review of Research on Uncertainties in Estimates of Source Terms from Severe Accidents in Nuclear Power Plants, Brookhaven National Laboratory, NUREG/CR-4883, April 1987.
(NRC, 1975)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, October 1975.
(NRC, 1987a)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Risk Reference Document, NUREG-1150 (3 vols.), Draft, February 1987.
(NRC, 1987b)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Uncertainty Papers on Severe Accident Source Terms, NUREG-1265, May 1987.
(PLG, 1983)
B.
John Garrick (Study Director) et al., Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Pickard, Lowe and Garrick i
I w
1 4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
- IN THE MATTER OF
)
)
Docket Nos. 50-443-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
)
50-444-OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL.
)
Off-site Emergency
)
Planning Issues (SEABROOK STATION, UNITS 1 and 2)
)
September 14, 1987
)
)
ATTACHMENTS TO COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C.
SHOLLY ON THE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. JAN BEYEA ON POTENTIAL RADIATION DOSAGE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENTS THAT FORM THE BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. GORDON THOMPSON ON POTENTIAL RADIATION RELEASE SEQUENCES, AND DR. JENNIFER LEANING ON THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF THOSE DOSAGES Departrent of the Attorney General Commonwealth of Massachusetts One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108-1698 (617) 727-2265 l
l 4
k
l UNITED STATES 13F AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
.IN THE MATTER OF
)
)
Docket'Nos. 50-443-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY.0F
)
50-444-OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL.
)
Off-site Emergency
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Planning Issues (SEABROOK STATION, UNITS 1 and 2)
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September 14, 1987
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ATTACHMENTS TO 1
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C. SHOLLY ON THE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. JAN-BEYEA ON POTENTIAL
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RADIATION DOSAGE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENTS THAT FORM THE BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY. PLANNING RULES, DR. GORDON THOMPSON ON POTENTIAL RADIATION RELEASE SEQUENCES, AND DR. JENNIFER LEANING ON THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF THOSE DOSAGES
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Department of the Attorney General Commonwealth of Massachusetts One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108-1698 (617) 727-2265
7-t ATTACHMENTS Professional Qualifications of Steven C. Sholly Professional Qualifications.of Jan Beyea L
Professional Qualifications of Gordon Thompson
. Professional Qualifications of Jennifer Leaning Town of Hampton Revised Contention VIII SAPL Contention 16 NECNP Contention RERP-8 1
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ATTACHMENT 1 1
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RESUME OF STEVEN C. SHOLLY STEVEN C. SHOLLY MHB Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue Suite K San Jose, California 95125 (408) 2SS-2716 EXpEnfENCE:
September 1985 PRESENT Associate - MHB Technical Associates San Jose. Califomia Associate in energy consutting firm that specializes in technical and economic assessments of energy production facilces, especially nudear, for local, state, and federal govemments and pnvate organizations. MHB is extenskely involve:1 in regulatory proceedings and the preparation of studies and reports. Conduopresearch, write reporta, participate in disemery process in requtatory proceedings, develop testimony and other documents for regulatory proceedings, and respond to.
client inquiries. Participated as a panelist at the NRC sponsored Contamment Performance Design Objective Workshop. Harpers Feny, West Virginia (NUREG/CP4084) (1988), and as a panelist at the Severe Accident Policy implementation Extemal Events WWW Annapolis. Marytand
- (presentation on seismic nsk assessment) (1987). Clients have included: State of Califoma State of New York. State of lilinois. State of Massachusetts, and Suffolk County (New York).
Februam/1981 September 1985 Technical Research associate and Risk Analvst - Union of Concemed Sciems s Washine en. O C Research associate and risk analyst for public interest group based in Cambndge, Massachusetts.
that specializes in examming the impact of advanced technologies on society, AnnC! pally in the areas of arms control and energy. Technical work focused on nudear power plant safety, with emphasis en probabilisoc risk assessment. radiological emergency plannng and preparedness, and genenc safety issues.
Conducted research, prepared reports and studies, participated in administrative proceedings before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commesson developed testtmony, anlayzed NRC rule maiong proposals and draft reports and preparoc comments thereon, anc responded to inquiries from sponsors, the general public, and the moda Participated as a member of the Panel on ACMS Effectiveness (1985), the Panel on Regulatory Uses of Probacifistic Risk Assessment (Peer Review of NUREG 1050; 1964), invited Observer to NRC Peer Review meetings on the source term reassessment (BMI 2104: 1983 1984), member of the independent Advi sory Commrttee on Nuclear Risk for the Nuclear Risk Task Force of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (1964).
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January 1980 J0nuary 1981 Proinct Directne and Research Omdinator - Three Mile Island Public inter==i Re Harrm_wn. Per,, wAvar,;s Provided administratNo direction and coordinated research projects for a public interest g based in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, centered around issues related to the Three Mie Island Nuclea Power Plant. Prepared fundraising proposals, tracked progresa of U.S. Nudear Regulatory Com-mission. U.S. Department of Energy, and General Public Utilities activities concoming deanup Three Mile Island Unit 2 and preparation for restart of Three Mie Island Unit 1, and monttored
- developments related to emergency planning, the financial health of General Public Utittties, and NRC rulemaking actions related to Three Mile Island.
July 1978 January 1980 Chief Biolooical Process Ooerator - Wastewater Treatnwnt Pfant. Derrv Townshio Mu Authentv. Hershev. Pennsvtvania Chief Biological Process Operator at a 2.5 million gallon per day tertiary, activated sludge, wastewater treatment plant.
Responsible for biological process monstoring and control, induding analysis of physical, chemical, and biological test results, process fluid and mass flow managemen micro-biological analysis of activiated sludge, and maintenance of detailed process logs for input I
into state and federal repons on treatment process and effluent quality. Received certification from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a wastewater treatment plant operator. Member of Water Pollution Contrd Association of Pennsylvania. Central Section,1980.
July 1977-July 1978 Wastownter Treatmem Pfant Ooerator Borouch of Leinovna. Lemovne. Pennsvtvania Wastewater treatment plant operator at 2.0 million gallon per day secondary, activated slud wastewater treatment piant. Performed tasks as assigned by supervisors, induding simple physical and chemical tests on wastowater streams, maintenance and operation of plant equipment, and maintenance of the collection system.
September 1976 June 1977 Scionee Teacher West Shore School District Camo Hill Pennsvhrania Taught Earth and Space Science at ninth grade level. Developed and implemented new course matenals on plate tectonees, environmental geology, and space science. Served as Assistant Coach of the district gymnastics team.
September 1975 -June 1976 Science Tameher Cartisle Area School District. Cartisle Pennsvtvania Taught Earth and Space Science and Environmental Science at ninth grade level. Developed and implemented new course materials on plate tectonics, environmental geology, noise pollution, water annietnn and enerev. Served as Advisor to the Science Projects Club.
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i EDUCATION:
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B.S., Education, majors in Earth and Space Science and General Scunce, minor in Environmental Education, Shippensburg State College, Shippensburg, Pennsylvania.1975.
Graduate coursework in Land Use Planning, Shippensburg State College. Shippensburg.
Pennsylvania, 1977-1978.
PUBLICATIONS:
- Determining MercalliIntensities from Newspaper Reports,' Joumal d Geoloaical Education. Vol. 25, 1.
- 1977, 2.
A Crttious of An independent Assessment of Evacuation Times for Thwe Mile Island Nuclear power Sant, Three Mile Island Public Interest 9esource Center, Hamsburg, Pennsylvania. January 1981.
3.
A Brief Review and Critious of the Pocidand County Radiological Ememenev Preparedness Plan.
Union of Concemed Scientists, prepared for Rockland County Emergency Planning Personnel and the Chairman of the County Legislature, Washington, D.C., August 17,1981.
The_ Necessity for a Promet Public Alertino canability in the Pfume Excesure Pathwav E8Z at 4.
Nuefear Pe= Plant Sites. Union of Concemed Scientists, Critical Mass Energy Project, Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Environmental Action, and New York Public Interest Research Group Washington, D.C., August 27,1981,
- 5.
" Union of Concemed Scientists, Inc., Comments on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Amendment to I
10 CFR 50, Appendtx E,Section IV.D.3,* Union of Concemed Scientats. Washington, D.C., October 21,1981.*
6.
'The Evolution of Emergency Planning Rtdes," in The Indian Feint Book A Briefine on the Safety investigation of the Indian Point Nuctear Power Pfants. Anne Witta. editor, Union of Concemed Scientists (Washington, D.C.) and New York Public interest Research Group (New York, NY),1982.
7.
' Union of Concemed Scientists Comments, Proposed Rule,10 CFR Part 50, Emergency Planning and Preparedness: Exercises, Clarification of Regulations, 46 F.R. 61134,* Union of Concemec Scientists, Wa:hington, D.C., January 15,1982.
- 8.
Testimony of Robert D. Pollard and Steven C. Sholly before the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, Committee on Interior and insular Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Middletown.
Pennsylvania, March 29,1982, available from the Union of Concemed Scientists.
9.
' Union of Concemed Scientists Detailed Comments on Petttion for Rufemaking by Citizen's Task Force Emwg.,,cy Planning,10 CFR Parts 50 and 70, Docket No. PRM-50-31,47 F.R.12639,* Union of Concemed Scientists, Washington, D.C., May 24,1982.
10.
Supplements to the Testimony of E!!yn R. Weiss, Esq., General Counsel, Union of Concemed Scientists, before the Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, Union of Concemed Scientists, Washington. D.C.,
August 16,1982.
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Testimony of Steven C. Sholly, Union of Concemed Sci:ntists, Washington, D.C., on behalf of the 11.
New York Public interest Research Group, Inc., before the Special Committee on Nuclear Pcwer Safety of the Assembly of the State of New York, haanngs on Legislative Oversight of the Emer Radiologic Preparedness Act, Chapter 708, Laws of 1981, September 2,1982.
12.
" Comments on ' Draft Supplement to Final Environmental Statement Related to Construction and Operatien of Clinch RNor Breeder Reactor Plant',' Docket No. 50-537 Union of Concemed Scientists, Washington, D.C., September 13,1982. *
" Union of Concemed Scientists Comments on ' Report to the County Commissioners', by the 13.
t Advisory Committee on Radiological Emergency Plan for Columbia County, Pennsylvania,' Union of l.
Concemed Scientists, Washington, D.C., September 15,1982.
- Radiological Emergency Planning for Nuclear Reactor Accidents' presented to Komenergie 14.
1 Ontmanteld Congress Rotterdam, The Nethettands, Union of Concemed Scientists, Washington.
I D.C., October 8,1982.
15.
" Nuclear Reactor Accident Consequences: Implications for Radiological Emergency Planning,'
presented to the Citizen's Advisory Committee to Review Rocidand County's Own Nuclear Evacuation and Preparedness Plan and General Disaster Preparedness Plan, Union of Concemed Scientists. Washington, D.C., November 19,1982.
Testimony of Steven C. Sholly before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee 16.
on interior and insular Anairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., Union of Concemed Scientists, December 13,1982.
17.
Testimony of Gordon R. Thompson and Steven C. Shelly on Commission Question Two.
Contentions 2.1(a) and 2.1(d), Union of Concemed Scientists and New York Public Interest Research Group, before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Ucensing Board, in the Matter of Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Indian Point Unit 2) and the Power Authority of the State of New York (Indian Poirt Unit 3), Docket Nos. 50 247 SP and 50 286-SP, December 28,1982. '
Testimony of Steven C. Sholly on the Consequences of Accidents at Indian Point (Commission 18 Question One and Board Question 1.1, Union of Concemed Scientists and New York Public interest Research Group, before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comtnission Atomic Safety and Ucensing Board, in the Matter of Consolirtatart Edison Company of New York (Indian Point Unit 2) and the Power Authority of the State of New York (Indian Point Unit 3), Docket Nos. 50 247 SP and 50-286 SP, February 7,1983, as corrected February 18,1983.
- 19 Testimony of Steven C. Sholly on Comtnission Question FNo, Union of Concemed Scientists and New York Public Interest Researc.h Group, before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Ucensing Board, in the M'itter of Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Indian Point Unit 2) and the Power Authority ot :he State of New York (Indian Point Unit 3), Docket Nos. 50-247-SP and 50 286-SP, March 22,1983. '
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" Nuclear Reactor Accidents and Accident Consequences: Planning for the Worst,' Union of Concemed Scientists, Washington, D.C., presented at Crttical Mass '83. March 26,1983.
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1-5 21.
Testimony of Steven C. Sholly on Emergency Planning and Preparedness at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, Union of Concemed Scientists, Washington, D.C., before the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, CommNtee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, April 15.1983 (wi
' Union of Concemed Scientists' Response to Questions for the Record from Senator Alan K.
Simpson.' Steven C. Shony and Michael E. Faden).
22.
'PRA: What Can it Really Tell Us About Public Risk from Nuclear Accidents?
- Union of Concemed Scientists, Washington, D.C., presentation to the 14th Annual Meeting, Seacoast Anti Pollution League, May 4,1983.
- Probabilistic Risk Assessment: The Impact of Uncertainties on Radiological Emergency Planning 23.
and Preparedness Consadorations,' Union of Concemed Scientists, Washington, D.C., June 28.
1983.
' Response to GAO Questions on NRC's Use of PRA,' Union of Concemed Scientists, Washington.
24.
D.C., October 6,1983, attachment to letter dated October 6,1983, from Steven C. Sholly to John E.
Bagnulo (GAO, Washington, D.C.).
25.
The emnact of *Extemal Events' on Radioiooical Emereenev ResDonse Pfannino Considerations, Union of Cmcur,ed Scientists, Washington, D.C., December 22,1983, attachment to letter dated December 22,1983, from Steven C. Sholly to NRC Commissioner James K, Asselstine.
36.
Sizewell 'B' Public inquiry, Proof of Evidence on: Safety and Waste Manacement implications of the Sizewell PWR. Gordon Thompson, with supporting evidence by Steven Sholly, on behalf of the Town and Country Planning Association, February 1984, including Annex G, 'A review of Probabaistic Risk Analysis and Its Application to the SLzewell PWR,' Steven Shelly and Gordon Thompson, (August 11, 1983), and Annex 0, ' Emergency Planning in the UK and the US: A Comparison,' Steven Sholly and Gordon Thompson (October 24,1983).
27.
Testimony ed Steven C. Sholly on Emergency Planning Contention Number Eleven. Union of Concemed Scientists Washington, D.C., on behalf of the Palmetto Alliance and the Carolina Environmental Study Group, before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Ucensing Board, in the Matter of Duke Power Company, et. al. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, AprH 16,1984.
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' Risk IMicators Relevant to Assessing Nuclear Accident Uability Premiums,' in Preliminary Reoort to the indt 3endent Adviserv Committee to the NAIC Nudw Risk Task Force. December 11,1984 Steven C. Sholly, Union of Concemed Scientists, Washington, D.C.
29.
" Union of Concemed Sciendsts' and Nuclear information and Resource Service's Joint Comments on NRC's Proposal to Bar from Ucensing Proceedings the Consideration of Earthquake Effects on Emergency Planning,' Union of Concemed Scientists and Nudear Information and Resource Service. Washington, D.C., Diane Curran and Ellyn R. Weiss (with input from Steven C. Sholly),
February 28,1986.
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' Severe Accident Source Terms: A Presentation to the Commissioners on the Status of a Review of the NRC's Source Term Reassessment Study by the Union of Concemed Scientists.' Union of Concemed Scientists, Washington, D.C., April 3,1985.
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- Severe Accadent Source Terms for Ught Water Nuclear Power Ptares: A Presemation Department of Nuclear Safety on the Status of a Review of the NRC's Source Term Reasses Study (STMS) by ths Union of Concemed Scientists,* Union of Concemed Sciemists D.C., May 13,1665.
32.
The Source Term Debate A Rd= of the Currer,i Basis for Prsdmue Sware Acddent Source Terms with Scacial Emohasis on the NRC Source Term Rea===:r- +1 Procr Union of Concemed ScierAm Cambndge, Massachusetts, Steen C. Shoity and Gorcon Thompson, January 1986. (AvaHable from the Union of Ccrc.eir,ed Scentists) l 33, Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh, Gregory C. Minor, Lynn K. Nee, and Steven C
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behalf of State of Connecticut Department of Public Utilty Cortru. Prosecutorial DMsion and DMsion of Consumer Counsel, regarding the prudence of expenditures on M81 stone Una Ill, Fe ary 18,1986.
34.
Implications of the Chemobyl 4 Accidern for Nuclear Emergency %..g for the State of New York, prepared for the State of New York Consumer Protection Board, by M-3 Technical Associates, June 1986.
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Review of Vermont Yankee Containment Safety Study and AnaNs s d Containment Ventino Issues for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Pe=r Plant. prepared for New.%. gland Coalition on Nuclear Pollution, Inc., December 16,1986.
36.
Affidavk of Steven C. Sholly before the Atomic Safety and Ucensmg Soard, in the matter of Public Servich Company of New Hampshire, et al., regarding Seabrook Station Units 1 and 2 Of'stte j
Emergency Planning Issues, Docket Nos. 50-443-OL & $0 444 OL, January 23,1987.
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Direct Testimony of Richard 8. Hubbard and Steven C. Sholly on befuf of Califomia Public Utilities Commission, regarding Diablo Canyon Rate Case, PG&E's Failure to Esublish its Committ QA Program, Application Nos. 84 06 014 and 85 08-025, Exhibit No. If" 235, March,1987.
38.
Testimony of Gregory C. Minor, Steven C. Sholly et. al. vn behalf of Suffolk County, regard ULCO's Reception Centers (Planning Ramin), before the Atomic Safen and Licensing Board in th matter of Long Island Ughting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Sation Unit 1, Docket No. 50-322-OL 3 Apnl 13.1987.
- 39.
Rebuttal Testimony of Gregory C. Minor and Steven C. Sholly on beruf of Suffolk County rega ULCO's Reception Corners (Addressing Testimony of Lewis G. HLiman), Docket No. 50-322-OL-3.
May 27,1967.
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Review of Selected Asomets of NUREG 1150. *Reacter Risk RefFe s '.')ocument'. prepared for the lillnois Departmera of Nudear Safety, forthcoming.
Available from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Public Doctrnent Room, Lobby,1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
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b ATTACHMENT 2 1
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i Resume for Jan Beyea July 1986 EDUCATIm:
Ph.D., Columbia University,1968 (Physics).
l B.A.,
Amherst College,1962.
EPPLOYMENT HISTORY:
1980 to date, Senior Staff Scientist and, as of 1985, Director of the Environmental Policy Analysis Department, National Audubon Society, 950 2hird Avenue, NY, NY 10022.
1976 to 1980, Research Staff, Center for Energy and Environmental Studies Princeton University.
1970 to 1976, Assistant Professor of Physics, Holy Cross College.
1968 to 1970, Research Associate, Colurrbia University Physics Departrent.
CCNSULTItG WORK:
Consultant on nuclear energy to the Office of Technology Assessment, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection; the Offices of the Attorney General in New York State.and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; the State of lower Saxony in West Germany; the Swedish Energy Comission; the Ihree Mile Island Public Health Fund; and various citizens' groups in the United States.
PUBLICATIONS CCNCERNING DEKTl CCNSERVATIN, EEPCY PCLICY, AND ENEPGY PlSKS:
Articles:
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" Oil and Gas Resources on Federal Lands: Wilderness and Wildlife Pefuges," Stege and Bepea, Annual Review of Enercy (to be published, October 1986).
[An earlier version appeared as National Audubon Society Peport, EPAD No. 28, June 1985.]
"U.S. Appliance Efficiency Standards," Pollin and Beyea, Enercy Policy, J3, p. 425 (1985).
" Computer Modeling for Energy Policy Analysis," Pedsker, Peyea, and Lyons, Proceedings of the 15th Annual Modeling and simulatien Conference, Pittsburgh, PA,15, part 3, p.1111 (1964).
" Containment of a Reactor Meltdown," (with Frank von Hippel), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 38, p. 52 (August / September 1982).
"Second Thoughts (about Nuclear Safety)," in Nuclear Pcwer: Both Sides, W. W. Norton and Co. (New York, 1982).
" Indoor Air Pollution," Pull. At. Scientists, 37, p. 63 (Feb.1981)
- _ _ - _ _. Articles (Con't)
" Emergency Planning for Reactor Accidents," Bulletin of the Atomic I
Scientists, 36, p. 40 (Decerter 1980).
(An earlier version of the article appeared in Mrman as Chapter 3 in Im Ernstfall hilflos?, E. R. Koch, Fritz l
Vahrenholt, editors, Keipenheuer & Witsch, Cologne, 198C.)
" Dispute at Indian Point,* Bull. At. Scientists, 36, p. 63, (May 1980).
" Locating and Eliminating Obscure but Major Energy Losses in Residential Housing," Harrje, Dutt, and Beyea, ASHRAE Transactions, 8_5, Part II (1979).
5 (Winner of ASHRAE outstanding paper award.)
" Attic Heat Ioss and Conservation Policy," Dutt, Beyea, and Sinden.
A9'E Technology and Society Division Paper 78-TS-5, Houston, Texas,1978.
" Critical Significance of Attics and Basements in the Enercy Balance of Twin Pivers Townhouses," Beyea et al., Enercy and Buildings, Vol. I (1977),
Page 261. Also Chapter 3 of Saving Enerc.y in the Home, Ballinger,1978.
"The Two-Resistance Podel for Attic Heat Flow: Imp'ications for Con-servation Policy," Woteki, Dutt, Beyea, Enercy--The Intl. Journal, 3, 657(1978)
Published Debates:
Proceedings of the Workshop on %ree Mile Island Desimetry, %ree Pile Island Public Eealth Fund,1622 Locust Street, Phila., Pa., Dec.1985
" Land Use Issues and the Pedia," Ctr. for Communication, NYC, Oct.1984.
Nuclear Peactors: How Safe Are %ey?, panel discussion sponsored by the Acaderry Forum of the National Acade:ry of Sciences, Wash., D.C., May 5,1980.
The Crisis of Nuclear Enercy, Subject No. 367 on William Buckley's Firing Line, P.B.S. Television.
Transcript printed by Southern Education Communi-cations Assoc., 928 Woodrow Street, P. O. Box 5966, Colunbia, S.C.,1979.
Reports:
The Audubon Enercy Plan, Beyea et al., 2nd Ed., July 1984 (1st Ed.,1981)
(See also, Intro. to Special Issue on Legal Issues Aris:ng From %e Audubon Energy Plan 1984, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, IJ1_, p.251, (1986)]
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A PeView of Dose Assessments at %ree Mile Island and Pecorrmendations fcr Future Research, Report to the %ree Mile Island Public Eealth Fund, August 1984.
[See also, " Author Challenges Review," Health Physics Newsletter, March,1985, and "TMI-Six Years Later," Nuclear Medicir.e, 2_6, p.1345 (3985).]
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- _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ - - Reports (Con't)
" Implications for Mortality of Weakening the Clean Air Act," (with G.
Steve Jordan),' National Audubon Society, EPAD Report No. 18, May 1982.
"Some Long-Term Consequences of Hypothetical Major Peleases of Radioactivity to the Atomosphere from %ree Mile Island," Report to the President's Council on Environmental Quality, DeceJter 1980.
" Decontamination of Krypton 85 from Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant,"
(with Kendall, et al.), Report of the Union cf Concerned Scientists to the Governor of Pennsylvania, May 15, 1980.
"Some Consnents on Consequences of Hypothetical Peactor Accidents at the Philippines Nuclear Power Plant" (with Gordon hompson), National Audubcn Society, EPAD Feport No. 3, April 1980.
" Nuclear Reactor Accidents: The Value of Improved Containment," (with Frank von Hippel), Center for Energy and Environmental Studies Peport PU/ CEES 94, Princeton University, January 1980.
"The Effects of Peleases to the Atmosphere of Radioactivity from Hypothetical Large-Scale Accidents at the Proposed Gorleben Waste Treatment Facility," report to the Government of lower Saxony, Federal Republic of Germany, as part of the "Gorleben International Review," February 1979.
" Reactor Safety Research at the Large Consequence End of the Risk Spectrum,' presented to the Experts' Meeting on Reactor Safety Research in the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, September 1,1978.
A Study of Scre of the Consequences of Hypothetical Peactor Accidents at Barseback, report to the Swedish Energy Com., Stockholm, DS I 1978:5, 1978.
Testimony:
" Responses to the Chernobyl Accident," before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U. S. Senate, June 19, 1986.
" Dealing with Uncertainties in Projections of Electricity Consumption,"
befcre the Com. on Energy and Natural Pesources, U. S. Senate, July 25, 1985.
"Some Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Indian Point and Their Implications for Emergency Planning," testimony and cross-examination before the Nuclear Regulatory Comission's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, on behalf of the New York State Attorney General and others, July 1982.
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l Testimony (Con't)
"In the Matter of A@lication of Orange and Rockland Counties, Inc. for
' Conversicr. to coal of Lovett Units 4 and 5," testimony and cross-examination on the health impacts of eliminating scrubbers as a requirement for conversion to coal; Department of Environmental Resources, State of N.Y., Nov. 5, 1981.
" Future Prospects for Comercial Nuclear Power in the United States,"
before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, comittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U. S. House of Representatives, October 23, 1981.
"Coments on Energy Forecasting," material submitted for the record at Hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversights of the House Comittee on Science and Technology; Comittee Print No.14, June 1-2,1981.
" Stockpiling of Potassium Iodide for the General Public as a Condition for Restart of TMI Unit No.1," testimony and cross-examination before the Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board on behalf of the Anti-Nuclear Group Representing York, April 1981.
" Advice and Recommendations Concerning Changes in Reactor Design and Safety Analysis which should be Required in Light of the Accident at Three Mile Island," statement to the Nuclear Regulatory Comission concerning the propcsed rulemaking hearing on degraded cores, December 29, 1980.
" Alternatives to the Indian Point Nuclear Peactors," statement before the Enviroreental Protection Comittee cf the New Ycrk City Council, December 14, 1979. Also before the Comittee, "The Impact on New York City of Peactor Accidents at Indian Point, June 11, 1979. Also " Consequences of a Catastrophic Reactor Accident," statement to the New York City Board of Health, August 12,1976 (with Frank von Hippel).
"Erergency Planning for a Catastrophic Reactor Accident," testimony before the California Energy Resources and Development Comission, Emercency Pesponse and Evacuation Plans Hearings, November 4,1978, Page 171.
"Corrents on the Proposed FTC Trade Regulation Rule on Labeling and Advertising of Thermal Insulation," Beyea and Dutt, before the FTC,1978.
" Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Jamesport," testimony before the N.Y. State Peard on Electric Generation Siting and the Envirenrent in the Patter of Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Pcwer Station), Pay 1977.
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"Shcrt-Tern Effects cf Catastrophic Accidents on comunities Surrounding the Sundesert Nuclear Incta11ation," testimony before the California Fnergy Resources and Development Comission, December 3,1976.
O ATTACHMENT 3 4*
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Resume f
for Gordon Thompson i
January 1987 professional Exoertise Consulting scientist on energy, environment, and International security Issues.
Education
- PhD in Applied Mathematics, Oxford University,1973.
- BE in Mechanical Engineering, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia,1967.
- BS in Mathematics and Physics, University of New South Wales,1966.
Current Accointments
- Executive Director, institute for Resource & Security Studies ( IRSS ),
Cambridge, MA.
- Coordinator, Proliferation Reform Project ( an IRSS project ).
- Treasurer, Center for Atomic Radiation Studies, Acton, MA.
- Member, Board of Directors, Political Ecology Research Group, Oxford, UK.
- Member, Advisory Board, Gruppe Okologie, Hannover, FRG.
Consulting Exoerlence ( selected )
- Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, DC, 1986-1987 : preparation
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of testimony on hazards of the Savannah River Plant.
- Lakes Environmental Association, Bridgton, ME,1986 : analysis of federal
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regulations for disposal of radioactive waste.
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- Greenpeace, Hamburg, FRG,1986 : participation in an international study on the hazards of nuclear power plants.
- Three Mlle Island Public Health Fund, Philadelphia, PA,1983-present :
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studies related to the Three Mlle Island nuclear plant.
- Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Boston, MA,1984-present : analyses of the safety of the Seabrook nuclear plant.
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- Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, 1980-1985 : studies on j
l energy demand and supply, nuclear arms control, and the safety of nuclear
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installations.
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- Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Boston, MA,1985 :
l preparation of testimony on cogeneration potential at the Maine facilities of 1
Great Northern Paper Company.
- Town & Country Planning Association, London, UK, 1982-1984 : coordination and conduct of a study on safety and radioactive waste implications of the proposed Sizewell nuclear plant.
- US Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, 1980-1981 3
assessment of the cleanup of Three Mlle Island Unit 2 nuclear plant.
- Center for Energy & Environmental Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, l
H),1979-1980 : studies on the potentials of various renewable energy l
sources.
- Government of Lower Saxony, Hannover, FRG, 1978-1979 : coordination and conduct of studies on safety aspects of the proposed Gorleben nuclear fuel
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center.
Other Exoerlence ( selected )
- Co-leadership ( with Paul Walker ) of a study group on nuclear weapons proliferation, institute of Politics, Harvard University,1981.
- Foundation ( with others ) of an ecological political movement in Oxford, UK, which contested the 1979 Parliamentary election.
- Conduct of cross-examination and presentation of evidence, on behalf of the Political Ecology R Jearch Group, at the 1977 Public Inquiry into proposed expansion of the reprocessing plant at Windscale, UK.
- Conduct of research on plasma theory ( while a PhD candidate ), as an associate staff member, Culham Laboratory, UK Atomic Energy Authority, 1969-1973.
- Service as a design engineer on coal plants, New South Wales E!ectricity Commission, Sydney, Australia,1968.
Publications ( selected )
- The Nuclear Freeze Revisited ( written with Andrew Haines ), November 1986, Nuclear Freeze and Arms Control Research Project, Bristol, UK.
- Nuclear-WeaDon-Free Zones A Survey of Treatles and proDosals ( edited with David Pitt ), Croom Helm Ltd, Beckenham, UK, forthcoming.
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- International Nuclear Reactor Hazard Study ( written with fif teen other
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authors ), September 1986, Greenpeace, Hamburg, FRG ( 2 volumes ).
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- "What happened at Reactor Four" ( the Chernobyl reactor accident ), Bulletin l
of the Atomic Scientists. August / September 1986, pp 26-31.
)
3
- The Source Term Debate : A Aeoort by the Union of Concerned Scientists
( written with Steven Sholly ), January 1986, Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA.
- " Checks on the 3pread"( a review of three books on nuclear proliferation ),
Nature.14 November 1985, pp 127-128.
- Editing of Perspectives on Proliferation. Volume I, August 1985, published by the Proliferation Reform Project, Institute for Resource and Security Studies, Cambridge, MA.
- "A Turning Point for the NPT ?", ADIU Reoort. Nov/Dec 1984, pp 1-4, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK.
- " Energy Economics", in J Dennis (ed), The Nuclear Almanac. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA,1984.
- "The Genesis of Nuclear Power", in J Tirman (ed), The Militarization of Hlah Technology. Ballinger, Cambridge, MA,1984.
- A Second Chance New Hamoshire's Electricity Future as a Model for the Nation ( written with Linzee Weld ), Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA,1983.
- Safety and Waste Management implications of the Sizewell PWR ( prepared with the help of 6 consultants ), a report to the Town & Country Planning Association, London, UK,1983.
- Utility-Scale Electrical Storaae in the USA : The Prosoects of Pumoed Hydro.
Comoressed Air. and 8atteries. Princeton University report PU/ CEES "120, 1981.
- The Prosoects for Wind and Wave Power in North America. Princeton University report PU/ CEES " 117,1981.
- Hydroelectric Power in the USA : Evolvino to Meet New Needs. Princeton University report PU/ CEES
- I IS,1981.
l
- Editing and part authorship of " Potential Accidents & Their Effects", Chapter Ill of Reoort of the Gorleben international Review. Dublished in German by j
the Government of Lower Saxony, FRG,1979 -- Chapter ill available in English from the Political Ecology Research Group, Oxford, UK.
- A Study of the Consequences to the Public of a Severe Accident at a Commercial F8R located at Kalkar. West Germany. Political Ecology Research j
Group report RR-1,1978.
I Exoert Testimony ( selected )
i
- County Council, Richland County, SC,1987 : Implications of Severe Reactor l
Accidents at the Savannah River Plant.
- International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War,6th Annual Congress, Koln, FRG,1986 : Relationships between nuclear power and the
_______ a
4 threat of nuclear war.
I
- Maine Land Use Regulation Commission,1985 : Cogeneration potentf al at facilltles of Great Northern Paper Company.
- Interfalth HeaHngs on Nuclear issues, Toronto, Ontario,1984 : Optlons for l
Canada's nuclear trade and Canada's involvement in nuclear arms control.
- Sizewell Public Inquiry, UK,1984 : Safety and radioactive waste implications of the proposed Sizewell nuclear plant.
- New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission,1983 : Electricity demand and supply options for New Hampshire.
- Atomic Safety & Licensing Board, Dockets 50-247-SP & S0-286-SP, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission,1983 : Use of f fltered venting at the Indian Point nuclear plants.
- US National. Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere,1982 :
Implications of ocean disposal of radioactive waste.
- Environmental & Energy Study Conference, US Congress,1982 : Implications of radioactive waste management.
Miscellaneous
- Australtan citizen.
- Married, one child.
- Resident of USA,1979 to present; of UK, 1969-1979.
- Extensive experience of public speaking before professional and lay audiences.
- Author of numerous newspaper, newsletter, and magazine articles and book reviews.
- Has received many interviews from print and electronic media.
- ========
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ATTACHMENT 4 l
o'____________________
CURRICULUM VITAE Name:
Jennifer Leaning (Link)
Address:
RFD 4, 113 Tower Road, Lincoln, MA 01773 Telephone:
617-259-9108 (Home)
Place of Birth:
San Francisco, California Education:
1968 A.B.
Radclif f e College 1970 M.S.
Harvard School of Public Health 1975 M.D.
University of Chicago Pritzker School of Medicirm Predoctoral Work Experience:
1965-1966 Maternal and child health care, Tanzania, East Africa Predoctoral Research Experience:
1963-1968 Research assistant to Barbara M. Solomon, (then Dean at Radcliffe): History of American Women Research assistant at the Center for Studies in Education and Development: annotated bibilography of African education Faculty alde at Women's Archieves, (now the Schlesinger Library) : dating and annotating letters of women suf frage activists 1968 Summer Assistant to the. Director; Population Service, Agency for International Development: deve loped i
three-demons tonal graph f or population growth analysis; supervisor R. Ravenholt, M.D.
{
1969 Summer Field researcher and data analyst f or A. l.D.
population study in rural Taiwan: tested and revised interview Instrument and wrote training manual to Instruct field workers in the use of the revised interview; supervisor Dr. David Heer, Harvard School of Public Health 1970-1971 Associate Director of Mid-Southside Health Planning Organization, Chicago, Illinols: wrote several assessments of health care needs of population of southside Chicago; principal autNm of successf ul grant proposal to Of fice of Economic Opportunity for establishment of four neighborhood health centers in that area 1972-1973 Data analyst f or hypertension prograr. using computer i
protocol f or drug treatment; supervisor, Frederic Coe, M.D., Michael Reese Hospital 4
d
I i
7 2
Postdoctoral Tralning-Internship and Residencies:
1975-1976 Intern in Med!cino? - Massa:husetts General Hospital 1976-1977 Resident in Medicine, Massachusetts General Hospital 1977-1978 Clinical Follow in Medicine, Massachusetts General Hospital Licensure and Certification:
1976 Diplomate, National Board Of Medical Examinars 1977 Massachusetts License Registration 1978 Olplomate, American Board of Internal Medicino 1980 instructor Certification, Advanced Cardia: Li f e i
Support 1983 Certif leation, Provider, Advanced Trauma Lif e Support 1984 Diplomate, American Board of Emergency Medicine j
1986 Re-certification, Provider, Advanc6d Cxdiac Life Support Re certification, Instructor, Advanced Cardiac Life Support Academic Appointments:
1975-1978 Clinicel Fellow in Medicine, Harvard Medical School 1978-1982, 1983-1984 Cl'nical Instructor in Medicine, Harvard Nedical I'
School i
1986-Instructor in Medicine, Harvard Medical School 1983-1985 Research Af f1IIate, Laboratory of Archltecturn!
Sciences and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1983-1984 Schef er-in-residence, 'Radellf fe College 1984-Visiting Scholar, Radcliffe College 1986-Research Associate, institute for Hoelth Research, Harvard University Hospital Appointments:
1975-1978 Assistant in Medicine, Massachusetts General Hospital 1978-1982, 1983-1984 Attending Phy' urn Hospitalsician, Department of Medic Mount Aub 1982-1983 Attending Physician, Newton-Wellesley Hospital Attending Physician, Carney Hospital 1984-1986 Attending Physician, Harvard Community Health Plan Mspital 1984-Attending Physician, Beth Israel Hospital 1986-Attending Physician, Brigham & Women's Hospital l
L_ __ _- - --
,/!
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p: *
.c y
Awards and Honors:
i 1968 A.B. magna cum laude Captain Jonathan Fay Prize Senior Sixteen Phi Beta Ka;;a 1'
1970~
Briggs Fellowship, Radclif fe College 1975 M.D. with honors Upjohn Award Alpha Omega Alpha Mdjor ComMttee Assigninents:
Hospital:
1974-1981 Infectious Disease Committee, Mount Auburn i
Hospital 1983-1984 Joint Conf erence Committee, Mount Auburn Hospital 1985-1986 HCHP-H Medical Executive Committee 1986-1937 Patient Care Committee, Brigham & Women's Hospital e'
and Harvard Community Health Plan Memberships, Of fices and Committee Assignments in Prof essional Societies:
i 1979-Physicians for Social Responsibility Executive Committee and Board of Directors 1979-1984 (Chair from 1979-1981 Secretary 1983-1984 Treasurer 1984)
Acting Medical Director 1982 Long Range Planning Group 1984-(Chair 1984-1986)
Board of Directors,1987 1981 '
American College of Emergency Physicians 1982-American Public Health Association 1985-Co-chair, Governor's Advisory Committee on the impact of the Nuclear Arms Race on Massachusetts 1985-Chair, Rapid Response Fund Connittee, Medical Advisory Task Force, U.S.A. f or Af rica 1985-Member, Arms Control Advisory Committee to Senator John Kerry Teaching Experience:
1 1977-1978 Drganizer of three two-week courses on Emergency Medicine at Massachusetts General Wspital l
?977-1978 Lecturer on respiratory emergencies, Massachusetts
{
General Hospital l
5 Teaching Experience (Continued):
1982 (Continued)
Testimony before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Environment, Energy and Natural Resource:
Hearings on Crisis Relocation, Washington, D.C., April.
Lecture on the Medical Consequences of Nuclear Wars given at the International Sympcslum on the Morality and Legality of Nuclear Weapons, New York, NY, ~ June.
Testimony on Survival aft 6r Nuclear War before the Boston City Council Hearings on Crisis Relocation, Boston, MA, June.
Testimony on Civil Defense before Annual Meeting of the U.S. Civil Defense Council, Portland, Oregon, October.
Lecture on Civil Def ense ard Nuclear War, given at Symposium on the Consequences and Prevention of Nuclear War, University of New Jersey Medical School, Newark, NJ, October.
Lecture on Civil Defense and Survival, given at the First Biennial Conf erence on the Fate of the Earth, Coldla University, New York, NY, October.
Lecture on the Physician's View of CMCHS, given at Radlology Grand Rounds, Brigham and Wonen's Hospital, Boston, November.
Welcome address to the New England Regional Conference of PSR and workshop leader on civil def ense issues, Cambridge, MA, November.
Lectures on issues of Long-term Survival, given at Symposium on Aspects of Nuclear War, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, and at Symposium on Medical Consequences of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War, University of Minnesota Medical School, Minnesota, November.
1983 Lecture on Survival issues af ter Nuclear War, PSR Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA, January.
Chair of Panel on the Physician's Role in the Prevention of Nuclear War, organized by the Greater Boston Chapter of PSR, Boston, MA, February Lecture on Medical Aspects'of Survival Af ter Nuclear War, Emmanuel College Seminars, Boston, MA, February.
Lecture on Civil Defense and Disaster Management, given as part of the lecture series in the Harvard Medical School course on Nuclear War, Boston, MA, March.
l u_
i
.c Teaching Experience (Continued):
1983 (Continued)
Lecture on Medlcal Consequences of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War, given at Symposlum on " Issues in the Nuclear Age: Applications for Teaching,"
sponsored by the New York City Board of Education, New York, NY, March.
Testimony bef ore the Committee on Pub lic Saf ety, Massachusetts State House, Boston, MA, April.
Annuel tester G. Houston Meco-ial Lecture,
" Survival Af ter Nuclear War," Beldgewater State College, Bridgewater, MA, April.
Lecture on Medical Aspects of Nuclear War, given et forum held by the Volunta y Services Advisory Council of the Massachusetts Hospital Associat ion, Boston, MA, April.
j Lecture on Disaster.Managemert Strategies for Nuclear War, given at the plenary session of the Third World Congress o-Emergency and Disaster Medicine, Rome, Italy, May.
Delegate to the Third international Congress for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Amsterdam, Nether lands, June.
Lecture on the Illusion of Survival: Civil Defense for Nuclear War, given at the Washingtor.
University of St. Louis Symposium on Medical Consequences of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War, October.
Lecture on Disaster Management and Civil Def ense, Pub lic Forum on The Day Af ter, Kansas City, Novemb er.
1984 Director of civil defense workshops, PSR Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., January.
Lecture on Civil Defense in Nuclear War, Harvard Medical School course on Medical Aspects of Nuc lear, War, March.
t lecturer on Civil Defense and Nuclear War, University of Illinois School of Medicine, Michael Reese Hospital, Department of Medicine Grand Rounds, and University of Chicago, Pritzker School of Medicine, February.
Mernber of PSR Executive Committee study tour of Moscow and Leningrad, gues*s of Soviet Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Marc h-Apr i l, 1984 Chair of the Working Group on Physician Resistance '
to Preparations for War, a two-day seminar held as part of the Fourth World Congress of the international Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Helsink t, F inland, June,19f4
. Teaching Experience (Continued):
1984 (Continued)
Participant in the Massachusetts Ad Hoc Committee on Crisis Relocation, wtich was Instrumental in bringing about Executive Order 242 (renouncing evacuation and sheltr and af firming prevention as the Commonwealth's response to the threat of nuclear war) and in the establishment of the Govenor's Advisory Coser'ttee on the impact of the Nuclear Arms Race or Massachusetts Citizens and the Massachusetts E::enomy.
Participant in the Semines of the Harvard Nuclear Psychology Program, Deprtment of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School.
Presentation entitled, "Ecuating for Peace,"
American Association of University Women Regional Conference, Oc*cber.
Presentation entitled, "A-halysis of Civil Def ense Research," Ser!*ar Series, Program in Science, Technology an: Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, December.
Participant in the American Friends Service Committee Study Tour of the Mideast, November 10 - Decembe* 1.
Organized to introduce U.S. peace an: disarmament activists to the complexities of tne Mideast crisis.
1985 Chair of a seminar on curre-* civil defense strategies, Annual Meet:ng of Physicians for Social Responsibility, Los Angeles, CA, February.
Lectures on Civil Defense It Nuclear War and Biological Ef fects of Ratlation in War, Harvard Medical School Course or Medical Aspects of Nucl ear War, March anc AprlI.
Lecture on the History and Pnllosophy of Civil Def ense in the U.S., Ne'lonal Colloquim of Ohio Wesleyan University, Ap-il.
Chair of the Working Group or international and National Civil Defense Strategies, Fif th Congress of the Interne-lonel Physicians for the Prevention of Nucler War, Budapest, Hungary, June.
Lecture on Survival Af ter ho: lear War, Public
{
Health Aspects, MIT/Harird J
Arms Control Studies Program, June.
Participant in panel on Tririty Plus Forty -
Scientif ic Responsibill*y and The Bomb, Forum at Kennedy School, inst:tute of Politics, Ju ly.
I l
I
- S-Teaching Experience (Continued):
1985 (Continued)
Steering Committee Member for the Institute of Medicine Sympostum entitled, " Medical implications from Recent Studies of Nuclear War.'
invited paper on triage on burn and blast injuries, sponsored by the Institute of Medicine and the National Academy of Sciences, September.
Lecture on Public Planning Policies for Nuclear War, Annual Meeting of University Association of Urban Planners, Atlanto Georgia, November.
Lecture on Survival af ter Nuclear War, Biological and Public Health issues, Honors Colloquim, University of Rhode Island, November.
Participant Delegate, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Nobel Peace Prize Award Ceremonies, Oslo, Norway, December.
1986 Lecture on Social Costs of the Arms Race, Boston Museum of Science Symposium for Educators on issues of Nuclear War, January.
Lectures on Civil Defense in Nuclear War and Biological Ef fects of Radiation in War, Harvard Medical School Course on Medical Aspects of Nuclear War, March and April.
Seminar Presentation to Radellffe Proje.;t on Interdependence on Decision-making Under Stress: Case Studies in Olsaster Management, Mare!..
Lecture on Olsester Management, Comron Emergenc ies Workshop, Harvard Corrrnunity Health Plan, April.
Seminar Presentation to Radclif fe Project on Interdependence on Decision-Making Under Stress : Three More Case Studies in Disaster Management, Apri1.
Lecture on the role of Health Professionals in the Nuclear Age, Social Medicine Course, Boston University School of Medicine, May.
Lecture on Survival Af ter Nuclear War, Public Health Aspects, MIT/ Harvard Summer Program on Nucle L
- and Arms Control, June.
ACLS CerticatIin and Recertif Ication course for Brighan. W Women's Hospital House Of f!cers, June.
Lecture on Triage In Nuclear War: The Management of Mass Casualties from the Perspective of U.S.
War-time Experience, Quarterly Staf f Neeting, Benedictine Ibspital, Kingston, NY, September.
Lecture on Nu' clear Winter and the Longer-Term Consequences of Nuclear War, International Scientific Symposium, World Congress of Cardiology, Washington, D.C., September.
- Teaching Experience (Continuedb:
ACLS Certification course for HCHP physicians, October.
Lecture on Disaster Management, BWH omergency conference, October.
Lecture on Nuclear Disasters and the View from Chernobyl, New England Adical Center, November.
Lecture on the Chernobyl Disaster, seminar for PSR speakers, Boston, December.
1987 Delegate, International Peace Forum, as guest of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences, Moscow, February.
Plenary lecture on Systems Failures in Disaster and semir ar leader on Civil Defense issues, PSR Annual Meeting, Chicago, March.
i ACLS Certification course for HCP physicians, March.
Lectures on Biological Ef fects of Radiation in War and Civil Defense for Disasters and Nuclear War, Harvard Medical School Course on Health Aspects.of Nuclear War, March and April.
Lecture en History of U.S. Civil Defense and Disaster Planning, Brown University Medical School course on Nuclear War, Prov idence, Rl, April.
Lecture on Decision-Making Under Stress:
A Perspective on Disasters, Harvard Club of Boston Spring Lecture Series, ApriI.
Principal Cilnical and Hospital Service Responsibilities:
1977-1978 Emergency Physician, Harrington Memorial Hospital Southbridge, MA Emergency Physician, Wing Memorial Hospital, Palmer, MA Emergency Physician, Lowell General Hospital, Lowell, MA Staff Physician, Bunker Hill Health Center, Charlestown, MA Stef f Physician, Ambulatory Screening Clinic, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA 1978-1982, 1983-1984 Emergency Staf f Physician, Mount Auburn Hospital, Cambridge, MA 1982-1983 Emergency Staf f Physician, Newton-Wellesley Hospital and Carney Hospital 1984-Chief of Emergency Services, Harvard Community Health Plan 1986-Emergency Staf f Physician, HCHP Emergency Service at Brigham and Women's Hospital Attending Emergency Physician, Brigham and Women's Hospital l
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I
. BlbI lography:
Reviews:
Link, JL, Review of the Woman Patient: Volume 1, Notman NT and Nadelson CC, eds, in Soc Sci and Med.1979: 13A:830-831.
Leaning, J, Review of WHO Report, Ef fects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services, Environmental Impact Assessment Review 1986: 9:99-103.
Videotape:
Link, JL, Emergency Management of Asthma.
1978: Massachusetts General itspital Emergency Videotape Series.
Legal Briefs:
Principal author of section
.s Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Moe v. Hanley, No. 2231. Amici Curlee.
September, 1980.
Publications:
Executive Committee, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Medical Care in Modern Warf are, NEJM 306:741-3, principal author.
Leaning,.J, Civil Defense in the Nuclear Age, Testimony presented t, the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Record of Hearings on L,.S.
and Soviet Civil Def ense Programs, March 16 and 31,1982.
Leaning, J, European Civil Defense Planning, Testimony presented to the House Oversight Committee, Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, U.S. House of Representatives, Record of Hearings, ApriI 22, 1982.
Leaning, J, Civil Defense in the Nuclear Age: What Purpose Does It Serve and What Survival Does it Promise?, published and distributed by PSR, Cambr i dge, 1982.
Link, JL, Emergency Response to Nuclear Accident / Attack, published in the Proceedings of the Second World Congress on Emergency and Disastor Medicine, Pittsburgh, PA, June,1981.
Leaning, J, and M. Leighton, The World According to FEMA: Preparin Survive Nuclear War, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June, g to 1983.
Leaning, J, and L. Keyes, eds., The Counterf elt Ark: Crisis Relocation for Nuclear War, Ballinger, Cambridge, MA,1984 Leaning, J, Civil Def ense Challenges for 1984, The Front Line, Cambridge, l
i MA, March,1984
__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ Bibilography (Continued):
Publications (Continued):
Leaning, J, Civil Defense Planning for Nuclear War, Disaster Medicine, Springer YerIag,1985.
Leaning J, and A. Leaf, Public Health Aspects of huelear War, Ann. Rev.
PubIIc Health 1986: 7:411-39.
Leaning, J, Burn and Blast Casualties: Trlage in Nuclear War, The Medical Impilcations of Nuclear War, Press, Washington, D.C.,1986. institute of Medicine, National Academy Leaning, J, Analysis of Current Civil Defense Plan, Testimony presented to the House Armed Services Subcoenittee on Military installations and Facilities, U.S. House of Representatives, Record of Hearings, March 27, 1987.
Unpublished Reports:
Link, JL, Evaluation of Pre-Test Population Questionnaire adtrinistered in rural Taiwan.
U.S. A f D program, September,1969.
Link, JL, et al. The Mid-South Health Plan. Report to the Board of Directors of the Mid-Southside Health Planning Organization and to the Of f Ice of Economic Opportunity, Chicago,1971.
Link, JL, Report of Site Visit to Salem Hospital Emergency Service, Submitted to Salem Hospital Board of Directors, February,1978.
Link, JL, et al.
Position Paper of PM3f elans for Social Responsibility on the Civillan Military Contingency hospital Systee, distributed by PSR, Cambr idge, MA, October,1981.
Daley, W, J. Leaning, et al. Emergency Telephone Triage Manual, Harvard Community Health Plan Emergency ' Service,' 1986.
In Press:
Geiger, J, and J. Leaning, Nuclear Winter and the Longer-Term Consequences of Nuclear War, Preventive Medicine, Spring,1987.
Leaning, J, The FEMA Civil Defense Program, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Spring,1987.
ATTACHMENT 5 t
TOH Revised Contention VIII to Revision 2:
Revision 2 fails to provide adequate emergency equipment, facilities, or personnel to support an emergencv response and fails to demonstrate that adequate protective responses can be implemented in the event of a radiological emergency.
10 CFR 550.47(1)(8)(10).
Appendix, Board's Order & Memorandum, May 18, 1987 Admitted Bases:
In preparing the Hampton RERP, the State relies upon a " shelter-in-place" concept as a " valuable protective action" (in) that it can be implemented quickly, usually in a matter of minutes.
RERP, ogs.
II-25, 26.
The Hampton RERP acknowledges, however, that " sheltering may not be considered as a protective action on Hampton Beach during the summer."
RERP, og.
II-2_5_.
The plan thereby fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate and immediate protection measures will be available to the thousands of beachgoers in the event of emergency.
Under its RERP, therefore, the Town is required to rely upon evacuation as the sole means of avoiding radiological exposure to large segments of the population.
Since a
" major portion" of radioactive material may be released within one hour of the initiating event, NUREG, pg. 17, and present estimates indicate evacuation could take up to seven and one-half hours, RERP, II-32, RERP measures for evacuation are a wholly inadequate protective response to meet an emergency.
Contentions of Town of Hampton to Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Town of Hampton, New Hampshire, November, 1985 (Contention VIII), at p.
12, admitted per Board's Memoranda and Orders of April 29, 1986, at 8, and May 18, 1997, at 27.
While acknowledging that "Hampton has a very high seasonal population," Revised Hampton RERP II-24, the State has revised the Hampton RERP to purportedly provide for " Protective Actions For Seasonal Beach Population."
Revised Hampton RERP Appendix G.
Th.ese
" precautionary measures" merely provide that beaches may be closed and traffic control initiated for all but the lowest level of emergency classification in the event an emergency develops at Seabrook.
By relying upon evacuation as the sole means to " protect" the beach population, the State thereby implicitly i
(
]
M acknowledges that no adequate sheltering or other protective responses short of evacuation would be appropriate or adequata in the event of radiological emergency.
Indeed, the Revised Hampton RERP exoressly acknowledges that,.although " sheltering.is a valuable protective action.
sheltering may not be considered as a protective action on Hampton Beach during the summer."
Revised Hampton RERP, Page II-26.
As set forth in~the bases to Town'of Hampton Contentions IV-(Inadequate Transportation), Contention V (Inadequate Road System), and Contention VI (Lack of Adequate. Personnel), however, evacuation of the tens of thousands of people from Hampton Beach is simply not feasible.
Since a " major release" of radioactive material may occur within one hour of notification of onset of an. accident, NUREG-0654 pages 13, 14, the thousands of beachgoers, many without benefit of.the protection of even normal clothing, will likely be subject to significant radiological exposure and injury.
13, 14.
The Revi' sed Hampton RERP and the Compensatory Plan prepared by the State, therefore, fail to make provision for any substantive changes over the original Hampton RERP to protect the beach population, confirm the Town's position that sheltering or alternative protective actions are unavailable to the Hampton Beach population, and fails to demonstrate that evacuation will provide adequate protection in the event of radiological emergency.
Contentions of the Town of Hampton to Revised Radiological Emergency Response Plan and to Compensatory Plan for the Town of Hampton, New Hampshire, April 14, 1986 (Revised Contention VIII), at pp 8-10, as admitted by Board's Memoranda and Order of May 22, 1986, at 5, and May 18, 1987, at 27 '
.__ __-____ ________-______--_-____-_-_ Q
SAPL contention 16:
l The New Hampshire State and local-plans do not I
make adequate provisions for the sheltering of
.various segments of the populace in the EPZ and therefore the plans fail to meet the requirements of 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1),
S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654 II.J.10.a. and m.
Appendix, Board's Memorandum and Order, May 18, 1987 Admitted Bases:
10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) requires that a range of protective actions be developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
NUREG-0654 requires that there be maps of shelter areas and the inclusion of the bases for the choice of recommended protective actions from the plume exposure pathway during emergency conditions.
II.J.10.m. specifies that the expected level of l-protection to be afforded in residential and I
other units must be evaluated.
The New Hampshire State and local plans fail to meet these requirements because there are no provisions for sheltering the population in the beach areas and no provisions for the sheltering of the population in the many camping areas in the EPZ.
In a quickly developing accident with anticipated fast release of short duratica, sheltering could be the only realistic protective action that could be implemented.
Evacuation of all transients is supposed to be carried out, according to the plans, if an evacuation is ordered.
There is, however, no l
realistic description as to how this can be done.
Given the current status of these plans and the lack of availability of sheltering capability for large segments of the population, a reasonable level of assurance that adequate l
protective measures will be available for i
transients in beach or camping areas has simply not been attained.
Seacoast' Anti-Pollution League's Second Supplemental Petition for Leave To Intervene, dated February 21, 1986 (Contention 16), at pp. 19-20, admitted per Board Memorandum and Order of April 29, 1986, at 93.
Though an evaluation of the sheltering adequacy of some of the buildings housing special facilities appears at Table 2.6-3 of Vol. 1 of the NHRERP Rev.
2, there is no information given with regard to schools and day care centers.
Seacoast Anti-Pollution League's Contentions on Revision 2 of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan, November 26, 1986 (amended Contention 16), at pp. 24-25, admitted per Board Memorandum and Order of May 18, 1987, at 38.
e
='
NECNP Contention RERP-8:
Neither the New Hampshire RERP nor the local plans provide a " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency,"
as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1), in that the plans do not provide reasonable assurance that sheltering is an " adequate protective measure" for Seabrook.
Nor do the plans provide adequate criteria for the choice becween protective measures, as required by S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654, S II.J.10.m.
Appendix, Board's Memorandum and Order, May 18, 1987 Admitted Bases:
The New Hampshire RERP relies on two principal protective actions for the public:
sheltering and evacuation.
The plan, however, contains only the most general criteria for determining when shelter should be used as opposed to evacuation.
It provides no evaluation of the sheltering capacity of the Seabrook EPZ; or any analysis of how sheltering is expected to contribute to dose reduction in the event of an emergency.
The following examples illustrate the plan's lack of analysis of the adequacy of sheltering, in spite of Seabrook area characteristics which raise considerable questions about the effectiveness of sheltering
- there, a.
The RERP includes virtually no assessment of the capacity to protect the public with sheltering facilities, whether during peak use periods or at other times.
Only the adequacy of special facilities is described to any degree.
Thus, there is no basis for a finding of reasonable assurance that sheltering constitutes an adequate protective measure for all people who may need it.
NECNP Contentions on Revision 2 of the New Hampshire State and i
Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans, November 26, 1996 (Contention RERP-8), at 7, as admitted per Board Memorandum and Order of May 18, 1987, at 53.
- b.
The RERP-suggests that in order to achieve the' greatest protection, " shelter should be sought in the lowest level of the-building (e.g., in basements), away from windows."
RERP at 2.6-6.
No assessment is made of the number of structures in the Sea 5 rook EPZ that have basements.
In fact, it may reasonably be assumed that an unusually high proportion of.Seabrook. area houses, many of which'are summer homes, do not have the tight construction that is
~
necessary for effective-sheltering.
NECNP-Contentions on the New Hampshire State and Local
-Radiological Emergency Plans, February 24,.1986 (Contention RERP-8), at pp. 11-13, as admitted per Board Memorandum and Order of April 29, 1986, at 59.
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