ML20234F267

Fourth Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents. Forwards App J Documents.Documents Also Available in Pdr. Records Also Responsive to FOIA Requests84-744 & 84-776

ML20234F267
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	09/14/1987
From:	Grimsley D NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
To:	GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT
Shared Package
ML20234F270	List: DCL-84-161, Advises That Util Revised Pipe Support Design to Require Base Plates to Be Welded to Fan Cooler Structure in Lieu of Using A-325 Bolted Connection.Design Issued & Mods Ready for NRC Insp.Related FOIA Documents Encl ML20234F267 ML20234F326 ML20234F354 ML20234F383
References
FOIA-84-743 NUDOCS 8709230074
Download: ML20234F267 (4)

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i i RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF pm y nwu 4 M (...../ oy, INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST gp 141987 o Q REQUESTER MR. PevewE AALD fos Vw W PART l.-RECORDS RELE ASED Oh NOT LOCATED (See checked bones) No agency records subrect to the request have been located. No additional agency records subject to the request have been located. Agency records subsect to the request that are identifed in Appendix are already available for public inspection and copying in the NRC Public Document Room, i 1717 H Street, N.W., Washmgton, DC. 1 Agency records subrect to the request that are identrfied in Appendix __.. are being made available for public inspection and copying in the NRC Public Docurnent Room,1717 H Street. N W., Washington, DC, in a folder under the FOlA number and requester name. The nonproprietary verson of the proposal (si that you egreed to accept in a telephone conversaten with a rnember of my staff is now being enade aveaeble for public inspection and coying at the NRC Public Document Room,17t7 H Street, N W, Washington, DC, in a folder under this FOIA number and requester name. Enclnsed is informaton on how you may obtain eccess to and the charges for copymg records placed in the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC. j Agency records subrect to the request are enclosed. Any applicable charge for copies of the records provided and pay nent procedurse are noted in the cornments section. l Records subsect to the request have been referred to another Federal agency (es) for review and direct response to you.. l in view of NRC's response to this request, no further action se being taken on appeal letter dated j PART II.A-INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Certain information in the requested records is being withheld from public disclosure pursuant to the FOIA exemptions described in and for the reasons stated in Part 11, eac-tens 8. C, and D. Any released portions of the documents for which only part of the record is being withbeid are being made available for public inspection and copying in the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC, in a folder under the FOIA number and requester name. Commsets & hN TY p .Js /usp ak~u e Jw wp<u.cAU pyk FM-24 'YF4 mL F0& 8 [7% B709230074 070914 PDR FOIA DEVINE84-743 PDR SIG . DIRECTOR D' ' N OF RU J RECORDS ff* f ta & A N AC fop.M 464 iPen li is asi k

y Release Documents in Entirety APPENDIX J F01As 84-743.744 & 776 (Fourth Partial) Number Date Subject I., Allegation No. 25 - RV-83-A-33 (1 Fage) 2.' 11/ 7/83 Ltr from Purple to Files

Subject:

Telephone call from Dr. Henry Myers. Subcommittee on Energy & Environment (2 Pages)' 3. Allegation No.189 - RV-84-A (1 Page) 4. Allegation No.190 - RV-84-A (1 Page) 5. Allegation No.191 - RV-84-A (1-Page) 6. Allegation No.192 - RV-84-A (1 Page) 7. Allegation No.193 - RV-84-A (1 Page) { 8. Allegation No.194 - RV-84-A (1 Page) j 9. Allegation No.195 - RV-84-A (1 Page) 10. 7/10/84 Ltr from Bishop to Eisenhut

Subject:

Diablo Canyon Allegations j Assigned for Nuclear Reactor Regulation (1 Page) 11. Allegation No. 189-195 - RV-84-A (1 Page) ~ ~ ~ 12. 2/7/84 Allegation Form - RV-84-A (1 Page) 13. Affidavit - (20 Pages) 14. 1/2/84 Ltr from Hudson to G111nsky

Subject:

Report #2 - QA Deficiencies in the Ultrasonic Measurement of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Valves for Minimm Wall Thickness Requirements as Requested by the Atomic Energy Connission in their Letter of 6/20/72 to PG&E at,Diablo' Canyon (83Pages) 15. Allegation No.188 '- RV-84-A (1 Page) 16. Problem Statement - Allegation No.188 - RV-84-A-24 (1 Page) 17. Affidavit (31 Pages) { 18. Allegation No.133 - RV-84-A' (3 Pages) l Problem Statement - j 19. Allegation No.134 - RV-84-A-ll - (3 Pages) ' Problem Statement 20. 2/4/84 Welding information - note from Tresler (35 Pages) 21. Problem Statement - Allegation No.132 - RV A-09 (1 Page) 22. Allegation No.132 - (4 Pages) 23. 3/8/84 Ltr from Schuyler to Martin

Subject:

Secy-84-61, Item 132 (9 Pages) 24. 10/9/83 P1pe Support Design Tolerance Clarification Form (25 Pages) 25. 10/11/82 Discrepancy Report - (3 Pages) 26. 8/11/83 Allegation Date Form - (1 Page) ) i

Release Documents in Entirety APPENDIX J Number Date Subject Allegation No. 26 - RV-84-A (1 Page) 27. Allegation Nos. 24, 26 46 & 66 - RV-83-A-28. RV-83-A-33. 28. RV-83-A-46 & RV-83-A-52 (5Pages) ] 29. 8/11/83 Allegation Data Form - (1 Page) 30. Allegation Nos. 25, 58,142,154,176 - RV-83-A-33. RV-83-A-57, RV-83-A-15 & RV-84-A-17 ~ (6 Pages) i 31. Details on an Inspection - (3Pages) 32. False floor in cable spreading rooms is not class 1 - (4 Pages) 33. Anchor Bolts - Allegation File No. 25 - (13 Pages) l Notes from a telecon I 34. 2/27/84 Conversation Record - (1 Page) q 35. Problem Statement - RV-83 A (1 Page) ~ 36. 8/11/83 Allegation Data Form - (1 Page) 37. 11/19/83 Allegation Data Form - (1 Page) 38. 11/15/83 Memo from Dentonto Martin with note from Martin to Bishop (2 Pages Enc 1: Ltr from Purple to Files Subject Telelphone call from Dr. Henry Ityers, (2 Pages) l Encl: Conversation Record, - (1 Page) 39. 10/3/83 Pipe Support Design toler'ance Clarification Form - (24 Pages) 40 Memo from Morrill to Bishop Subj Inspection Results LLL Personnel Examination of Raceway Suppcrt Bolted Connections at Diablo (2 Pages) 4 41. 12/S/83 Ltr from Wade to Kirsch

Subject:

Inspection Status Report (9 Pages) 42. 6/1/ 79 Ltr from Spencer to Crane

Subject:

NRC Inspection - (39 Pages) 43. 7/5/84 Ltr from Lubbock to Moore

Subject:

Response to Footnote 21 of Memo and Order of 6/28/84 (ALA8-775) - (3 Pages) 44. 4/27/84 Ltr from Schuyler to Martin Subject Welding Base Plates to Fan Cooler Structure - (1 Page) 45. Route Sheet with ASLA attached - (3 Pages) 46. 3/9/83 Field Warehouse Requisition - (29 Pages) 47. 8/25/83 Discrepancy Report - (5 Pages) 48. 9/3/83 Discrepancy Report - (2 Pages) 49. 9/3/83 Discrepancy Report - (2 Pages) 50, 9/3/83 Discrepancy Report - (2 Pages) 51. 9/3/83 Discrepancy Report - (5 Pages) 52. 9/30/83 Discrepancy Report - (5 Pages)

R c APPENDIX J Release Documents in Entirety I Number : Date Subject i 53. Progress Report (1 Page) 54. Progress Report (1 Page) 55. Progress Report (1 Page) 56. 8/26/83 Telephone Call message with cover letter (facsimile) - (2 Pages) j 57. 9/7/83 Telephone Calls (2) - (2 Pages) 1 I = I j \\ i ) e '% e g

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTADill1Y PROJECT Institute for Policy Studies '1901 Que Street. N.W. Woshington, D.C. 20009 (202)234 9382 September 13, 1984 b 0 i of Administration EMM g O U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission h g,,,,{ p p g Washington DC 20555 To Whom It May Concern: 9$-/ 7 y PursuanttotheFreedomofInformationAct(FOIA),5U.S.C.$552,theGovernment f. Accountability Project (GAP) request copies of any and all agency records and information, including but not limited to notes, letters, memoranda, draf ts, minutes, diaries, logs, calendars, tapes, transcripts, summaries, faterview reports, procedures, instructions, files, graphs, engineering analyses, charts, maps, photo-graphs, agreements, handwritten notes, studies, data sheets, notebooks, books, tele-phone messages, computations, voice recordings, any other data compilations, fateria l and/or final r t r of the Dia which We request N that e ocument be identified by the allegation number (s) to which it may relate. y If any of the materials covered by this request have been destroyed and/or' removed', j please provide all surrounding documentation, including but not'11mited to a de-j' scription of the action (s) taken, relevant date(s), and justification (s) for the action (s). CAP request that fees be waived, because " findings }nformation can be considered as primarily benefitting the general public," 5 U.S.C. 5552(a)(4)(A). GAP is a non-l profit, non-partisan public interest organization concerned with honest and open l government. Through isgal representation, advice, national conferences, films, pub-lications and public outreach, the project prosatena whistleblowers as agents of government accountability. We are requesting the above information as part of an on-going monitoring project on the adequacy of the NRC's efforts to protect public safety and health at nuclear power plants. For any documents or portions that you deny due to a specific FOIA exemption, please provide an index itemizing and describing the documents or portion'of documents ~l withheld. The index 'should provide a detailed justification of your grounds for-claiming each exemption, explaining why each exemption is relevant to 4he document ~ l or portion of the document withheld. This index is required under Vaunhn v. Rosen(I), j 484 F.2d. 820 (D.C. Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). l We look forward to your response to this request within ten days. j Yours truly, q i n V Y Thomas Devine C stal Dixon' Legal Director, CAP Legal Intern %'5>30"l0 $ Y l

c, UfJITED STATES 4 y % [( NUr' EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,;. p WASmNGTON, D. C. 20555 s.. o %, -.....f

November 7, 1983 j

i a NOTE'FOR: Files (LIMITED DISTRIBUTION) i FROM: Robert A. Purple, Deputy Director 1 ) Division of Licensing

SUBJECT:

TELEPHONECALLFROMDR.HENRYNYERS, SUBCOMMITTEE j ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT j ~ j As a followup to our meeting last Friday', Dr. Myers called me today to further discuss the information that he had on Diablo Canyon deficiencies. He prefaced his conversation by stressing that he intended to give me this information only on the condition that by Friday of this week, I would call i him to tell him what has been done to follow up on the information. He expressed reluctance to convey the information to me since he was not confident that I would take the matter seriously and make a vigorous effort to get to the bottom of th'ings. He asked me to identify who'the single person was who was in charge of resolving all of the Diablo. Canyon 3 allegations and determining their significance. I told him that since the 1 issues could involve construction deficiencies, design control deficiencies j and perhaps even matters for investigation of wroTigdoing, the only single j person in charge would be the Executive Director for Operations. He noted i l that, since most of the items appear to be related to construction defi-ciencies, he planned to call Jack Martin of Region V later today. (I subsequently telephoned Mr. Martin's office, who was unavailable, and relayed l a summary of the following information to Tom' Bishop of his staff.) t ) l Dr. Myers did not wish to provide copies of the documents to us that we had seen last Friday in his office. He preferred instead to orally identify the areas that he believed the NRC should look.into. I believe that he felt that by defining the areas in broat' enough terms, the identity of the alleger would be more protected than if U gave us the documents. He warned me that by passing this information u., to me that I now shared a personal responsibility for protecting the ident fy of the alleger and that if, as 'a result of our investigation of these it wes, the identity of the alleger is made known that the responsibility for thst compromise rested with me. He then outlined the following nine areas of inquiry that he believes the NRC should investigate. l 1. Review all new conformance reports concerning the purchase of material from non-approved vendors over the last 2 or 3 years. Check all M(, Q l purchase orders against approved vendor lists. 5 i } A p Q h

a g 's Q l ' Note to Files 2. Review all NCR's vs DCN's and check the disposition thereof. 'Look at' PG&E's DCN's vs the Foley and Pullman Companies' DCN's for Discrepancies. ~ Mbl 3. Provide a description of deviations over the past 2 years in' DCN's and _ revisions thereto regarding the control room pressu e'and ventilation e / system. 4. Request all documentation from PG&E, Foley and Pullman regarding the _ :443 upgrading of materials from non-essential to essential. 5. Check documentation to establish Foley and Pullman record on certification of inspectors. Review NCR's against inspector control ~" N prior to 1983. Note those NCR's and their disposition. - 4 5 8 6. Are there any NCR's on Redhead stud anchors? 7. Review inspection reports and NCR's by Foley and Pullman on testing 'ofJ '~~"" 4 N concrete and grout and the use'of, samples. 8. Ask PG&E and Foley for all NCR's regarding wire traceability. Check -- 4 q work packages to determine if they clearly indicate the source of all wires. 9. Ask for documentation establishing wire cable termination and pull test M g and inspections performed per Appendix B. Mr. Myers reiterated that he expected to hear from me within a few days with respect to the Agency's actions on these allegations. D-Robert A.. Purple, eputy Director l Division of Licensing l

5 UtdTLD ST ATES g [ [,,,, i i' c fiUCLEAR REGULATORY COf/fAISCiOfJ E ft! GIOfJ V ',. ?4 '.h.v[j,[ 14% M AHl4 L AfJf.1,UliI 7)(, s,, V/A L fJU1 Cf41 i V, C AL 18 DHfJI A 8A Wl. JUL 10 L I MEMORANDUM FOR: D. G. Eisenhut, Director Livision of Licensing ,j FROM: T. W. Bishop, Director l' Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, Region T

SUBJECT:

DIABLO CANYON ALLEGAT]ONS ASSJGNED FOR NUC11AR FIAC10R l FIGUI.ATION ] I Based on the Allegation Panel Review Board on July 12, 1984, it was detern.ined l that the following allegations. are referred to NRR for close out I responsibility. I NRC Allegation Fumbers: 194 368 l 351 l 479 484 i i l Should you have questions or require additional information please do not I hesitate to contact myself or my staff. l s .u/ I d l \\ T. W. Bishop, Director i Division of Reactor Safety and Projects CC* J. Martin, RV l v D. Kirsch, RV l G. Knighton, NRR H. Schier3ing, NRR R. Volmer, NRR T. Crowley, RV 1 l 4 3 / d acen

s nm g 7.- w97 fed o % T. % y 3 .,/ E!M2l1 e& @w)o t./s/s4 / 1 1 M% S: zorm+. j 3 ug 8ty n Me is Mr.W id e 4 san. 'I as submitting'this affM5vit f ,' and volun,tarily without any threats, inducements, or coercion, to Mr. s Devine, who hAs identified himself to me as the Legal Director of the Government Account-- ) i ability Projert rf the Institute for Policy Studies. I am submitting this state-g ment to evidence my concern 'over a comprehensive quality assurance (QA). breakdown for the wcfk.bf Pul'Iman Power Products at the Diable Canyon '4uclear Power Plant. There is no possible justification for allowing jhls nuclear power plant to go l_ critical until the iduclear Regulatory Connission (NRC) confirms the, full scope of QA bmakdown; identifies the causes; and monitors completion of a cfr'rective action program, including a full reinspection of safety-related work'at the pl$tw',. 3 In many instances, the reinspection may be the first legitimate quality control ; 'i 1 coverage the. hardware has had. l ti I base this conclusion on my four and a half years experience at Diablo Copyon in Pu11 man'.s quality assurance / quality control (QC) program, including 1 two and a half years, through 1982, during which I was the Internal Aud,itar.aThe ) ' '(' basic lesson I learned ic that the conclusions of a Nuclear Service Corporation ^ t,, audit of Pullman am more true today than when first publis!)ed in 1977--the (. . ') / <hs [ progran does not meet thd requirements of 10C.F.R. 50, Appendix B; and it does' ) not have an operative corrective action.,syste. The'latter has been demonstrated by the further deterioration in corrective action from 1979-1983 Sh1 b fore, s ,i 6, a the system was merely fiiling to identify and solve problems, now it is actively 1 coverbg them up. This has been especially true with respect to wel ing, non-destructive examination procedures (NDE), and hydrostatic tests--all)of which I A learn /d'were consistently uncontrolled, and that some of the proced@res"for the i first two items were not gualified by a test)iig process which proves the procedures I actually work as claimed. ,t. I l. .--e.-~~- y of50 M y. O( w

u o, The, system also broke down for vendor quality assurance, where Pacific Gas and - Electric (PG&E) management ordered Pullman inspectors to stop reporting cracked welds found in structural steel restraints supp1,1ed by vendors such as Boston Bergen and American Bridge. ). (s an auditor trying to work within the Pullman site and corpodate QA system. I leaImed the cause of the QA breakdown and why it has not been corrected. n. Pullman QA Management does not want to know about QA/QC violations. Management's corrective action has been to harass, threaten, and intimidate QA/QC personnel who identify problems, and to dismiss those who persist. Although I exhaustively reported deficiencies, the major effect of my disclosures was to prompt orders from the QA manager to only look where I was told, and his angry threats to "get l rid of me"During one such exchange.he exclaimed Pullman's bottom line: we're not comitted to building this plant to 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B. In that case, I do not see any legal basis for the NRC to allow this plant to operate. I am not opposed to nuclear power. Rather, I believe in the technology enough to insist that it receive the proper respect. I began working in the nuclear power industry in 1974 at the Trojan Plant and have worked at the Humboldt Bay Plant.With the exception of two months in 1979 I worked at Diablo Canyon for Pullman from September,1978 until Friday the 13th,1984, when I was laid off. The layoff occurred the day after I finished a two-month series of j disclosures to the NRC. For my first three to four months on site, I was a documents reviewer. For nineteen months I worked as a weld inspector in the pipe rupture restraint i program. In August, 1980, I was promoted to QA Internal Auditor. j ? a

~- ep My' responsibility was to evaluate and monitor the entire QA/QC program for compliance with our legal obligations.- This is how I learned that Pullman does not consider 10 C.F.R. 50 a legal obligation for work at Diabb Canyon. 8- ," In January,1983, I was removed as internal auditor, but refined in the J QA p gram to help close out Discrepancy Reports (DR) and Deficient Condition - Notices (DCN), as well as to complete my pending audits. QA Manager.. Harold Karner, restricted me to carrying out his specific assignments. The harass-ment was so ir'ense that in mid-May I resigned. Through my union, the next day I return to Diablo Canyon as a pipefitter. There simply had been too many headaches attempting to work within the corporate system. On my own time', at home, I finished organizing and summarizing my evidence of QA violations. In \\ November, I completed an initial report. On November 28, I sent it to NRC Commissioner Victor Gilinsky. On December 6,1983, his office wrote that I would be contacted by the Office of Investigations (01). Although OI never called, on. January 6, 9, and 12. I was interviewed extensively by a series of NRC inspectors from Region V. On January 13. I was laid off. This statement will sumarize the information and list the allegations i in three written reports already disclosed to the NRC. My affidavit also is to submit a written record for allegations which I have only described to the NRC in interviews.and identify allegations not yet described to the NRC. I. QUALITY ASSURANCE BREAKDOWN FOR WELDING With a few except:9ns, ' rom the onset of construction, the welding program for structural steel esse..ually has been uncontrolled--in violation of ~ = legal requirements, as well as contract and design specifications. FThe I, techniques to circumvent quality assurance included unqualified welders;

en' qualified welding procedurest use of weldicg procedures so irrelevant for the assigned work that, in effect, safety-related welding was widely conducted uithout procedures; reliance upon unqualified inspection procedure,s to check the quality of the welds; informal changes of contract specificatipis without 5 the tequired administrative review or distribution; falsification of records; 1 and-liarassment and intimidation of QA personnel who identified and attempted d to obtain corrective action against the violations. The abuses occurred both during original construction, and during the current modifications due to the Bechtel/PG&E seismic design review program. The list below represents a more detailed sumary of the allegations and evidence that form the basis for the above conclusions. l l 1. Weld procedure Code 7/8 for piping and plates has been used improperly to weld numerous forms of structural steel on pipe supports. What l happened is that Pullman substituted American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) pipe welding procedures for the toerican Welding Society ( AWS) struc-tural ' steel procedures, as implemented. This practice exceeded the legally-approved limitations for use of the procedure. The limits were logical, since the two types of jobs have little in comon. Pipe welding involves working l around a circumference. In -structural steel welding tfie axis of the weld is' on a. straight plane (Exhibi.t 1, at 2).. i 2. Code 7/8 has been used improperly to weld tube steel on pipe supports. ' Tube steel involves a different type of metal than the Pfl material covered by ASME procedures. This is significant, because the NRC has identified i i

l. dse of the same metals as a precondition to use ASME procedures for AWS work. In fact, tube steel welding is so unique that the AWS Code has a special sec-tion for it (M., at 2-3). ,) r. 3. Code 7/8 was improperly used to weld threaded wet studs f whi bolt plates to civil steel on Class I safety-related pipe supports. The 1,ype of welding used for these studs is not listed within Code 7/8 and it bears almost no resemblance to the work legally covered by Code 7/8 l (M..at2). ) l I 4. The welding for threaded studs did not even honor the require-ments of Code 7/8, which calls for the use of a backing bar. Instead, process sheets operated by the conruction department imposed backgrinding, which is ] l a totally different operation (M.). 5. Code 7/8 has been used to weld at least eight pipe support joint configurations, including flare bevel groove welds, and double bevel groove welds, not covered by Code 7/8. Each of these configurations repre-sents a unique welding task and legally must have its own approved weld procedure specification detailing the joint configuration (M., at 3). l 6. Process sheets that guide quality control coverage did not consistently call for inspection to verify the fitup of flare bevel I i l l groove welds; one of the joint configurations not covered by the 7/8 pro-cedure in the first place. That leaves the quality of the ensuing welds doubly unreliable. This uncontrolled work has been occurring as part of the burrent design modification construction work (Jd.). I have read a PG&E Eemor~andum asserting that QC fitup inspections are not requirh for flare bevel welds. That memorandum is not sufficient to overrule eng[neering

6 specification ESD 264, which requires inspections of groove welds and full-penetration welds. 7. Code 7/8 has been improperly used on pipe ruptug restraints to teeld five types of metal different from the ASME approved P-1 sisterial. s f' These. restraints prevent a pipe ruptured during an earthquake from whipping I back'and forth, which could damage the rest of the equipment (M., at 4). 8. Code 7/8 was improperly used to weld two structural steel 1 shapes on pipe rupture restraints that are not covered by the procedure--W shapesandtubesteel(M.). 9. Code 7/8 was improperly used for at least 11 joint config-urations not covered by the procedure itself. These joint configurations were not generically prequalified per the AWS Code and were without Procedure Qualification Records and/or were not detailed on the Weld Procedure Specification (M.,at4-5). 10. The result of the procedural breakdown was uncontrolled welding. To illustrate, in one example, pipe rupture restraint square groove welds were conducted without any established or documented procedure that applied to the work in question. In some instances, welds had been completely removed without any QC record of their disappearance. The records reflected QC accepted welds where none existed. For doctsnented repairs, there was only erratic QC coverage due to unexplained procedural changes that deleted the requirement for nondestructive examinations (M., Attachment 2). 1 I, ~

-y. 11. Pullman has recognized the error of_ applying ASME welding procedures to AWS work in an uncontrolled manner and issued Welding Technique Specification No. AWS 1-1, in an attempt to clarify the proper use of Code 7/8 on AWS work'. But the scope of corrective action was inadequate, t only ~ covered the. work in a weld crack repair program on pipe ru$ture restraints (Jd., at 5-6). The misuse of F

• 9 far exceeds the u;* of AWS 1.1.

The crack repair program only cowwred about one-fourth of the pipe rupture restraints, and none of the pipe supports.

12. AWS 1-1 failed to fully correct the improper use of Code 7/8 for weld'ng in the weld crack repair program.

The procedure uses a steel not contained in the list of acceptable AWS base metals, without evidence that it had been individually qualified to prove its reliability (J_d... at 6). d 13. The above violation was approved on December 20,1979, by V. J. Casey, who signed off as Cognizant Welding Engineer. Sixteen days earlier, however, he had been appointed Pullman's Assistant QA/QC manager, according to an interoffice memorandum. To my knowledge, Mr. Casey has never been listed on the Pullman organizational chart as a Cognizant Welding En gi ne~e r. The only way his approval would not represent a false statement is if he were simultaneously a construction and QA official. That would be a violation of the NRC's requirement for a QA program independent of construc- .__t~ ion (Id., at 6-7). 7 14. I also have serious reservations about Mr. Casey's qualifica-x tions, based on his judgment in the field. He instructed me 1[b measure ~ fillet' welds by the throat, when the AWS Code requires the measure nft from -ma__.:,

1 1 'the leg of the weld. For approximately two months, ! inspected welds to the j t wrong standard, because Mr. Casey gave me a makeshift gauge not designed to i measure fillet welds. Other inspectors informed me that Mr. Casey has changed the rules on the spot for equipment anchor modifications in the containment. They, stated his instructions were to work to a " relaxed" engineering' specification t-ESD.J43. 15. Through loopholes in its Engineering Specification ESD 223, Pullman improperly exempted itself from AWS design, fabrication, and erection requirements for all structural steel pipe support welding. Writing off the rules in this fashion violated the PG&E contract specifications. To my know-ledge, there is no documented authorization from PG&E to deviate from the Code requirement, which is still in the contract (M., at 7-9). 16. PG&E contract specifications on welder qualifications were changed without required review and authorized approval. The rules were changed through a cryptic, unexplained note. The changes involved the i qualifications standard for all rupture restraint welders before July 10, 1979. The use of ASMI qualification standards for welders doing unrelated AWS work mirrors the breakdown in welding procedures. Again, however, the 1979 corrective action only applied to rupture restraints (H., at 9-12). 17. The PG&E contract requirement for Charpy, or notch impact strength tests, was waived for Code 7/8 and other welding procedures. Charpy tests are necessary to be sure the welds installed under the procedure can meet relevant design and professional code requirements for strength. Delethg this requirement was a serious step, which should have gon( through the Contract Specification Change Notice process to assure proper engineering review and approval. Instead, in January,1974, a PG&E piping superintendent I I i l 1 - - - - - -. ~

s removed this significant QA check with a one-word penciled response, "No", when Pullman asked in a letter if weld procedures for rupture restraints required Charpy impact tests (M., at 12-13). -h 18. In violation of still unrevised contract specifieltions, specific corrective action consnitments on relevant Nonconformance Reports (NCR), and relevant procedures for the weld crack repair program, none of the full penetration welds less than 9/16 in thick among rupture restraints were ultrasonically tested. This means that the welds in rupture restraints since July,1979, were not fully covered by quality control tests in a signifi-cant number of cases. PG&E engineers accepted the-loopholes to Pullman's j program in July,1979, again without the required review end approval, and without revising the relevant contract specification that was being ignored (Ld., a t 13-15 ). i 19. Another weld procedure Code 88/89 for carbon steel piping, has been used to weld pipe support structural steel shapes.and plates.during both original construction and repair work in the current design modifications. Structural steel shaper, and plates are not covered by Code 88/89 (Id. at 10). 20. In violation of the contract specification, Code 88/89 has been used to weld carbon steel plates and structural steel shapes to rupture restraints with two welding processes. Shielded Metaldre Welding (SMAW) and Gas Tungsten Arc Welding (GTAW).' GTAW is not covered by -the relevant AWS Code-(Id,1)' 21. In August,1979, PGEE issued Welding Technique' Specification No. Ail 51-3 to clarify the use of Code 88/89 for AWS welding. Unfhtunately, i the " solution" again repeated the problem. AWS 1-3 covers a weldini (rocess, (GTAW) and a base metal (A-515) not covered by the relevant AWS code provision 1 (Id., at 16-18). i ]

~ 7

22. Pullman els3 substituted welding procedure Code 92/93 for pipe rupture restraints when the process sheets specified that the work would be done to Code 7/8.

The Pullman Assistant QA manager accepted the switch in an August 15. 1978, memorandum without changing the prockss sheets-- which left a record of work to a different procedure than was actul11y used. l (HQ at 18). The only records accurately reflecting the weld procedure used were the weld rod requisition forms (H., at 21-22).

23. The informal approval of the welding procedure switch was based on a falte premise--that both procedures were qualified to unlimited thickness and were technically equivalent.

In fact, they only hear a passing F resembl ance. For example, Code 7/8 does not include a type of welding in Code 92/93 that is only universally approved by the AWS for welds up to 1/4 in. thickness. Nor did Code 92/93 have its own procedure qualification test to verify its reliability on the welds greater than 1/4 in. thick. In effect, that welding was uncontrolled and its quality is legally indeterminate. The ) i two welding procedures are also different with rerpect to joint configurations, l joint details, tacking the joints, weld prccesses to be used, backing bar requirements, and welding techniques, such as the allowable heat input from J AMPS and maximum volts. The controls for clearly distinct special processes i l l cannot be legally intermingled through a memorandum (M., at 18-21). l 24 Contrary to contract specifications, welders qualified to ASME-based Code 92/93 were used for structural steel welding without being l propef y qualified to the AWS Code. The switch was accepted on August 15, 1978, Interoffice Correspondence, rather than through an accountable procedure esith review, authorized approval and a Contract Specification Changd Notice (M.. a t 20-21 ). 1 4

-11 25. m April 14, 1983 Discrepancy Report on 1972 welding in the Spray Ring Piping System for the Unit No. I containment dome DR #4713, failed to identify an organizational breakdown far more significant.than the k issue it disclosed (variations between the SMAW weld process used aff the process reported in the process sheets). DR #4713 also revealed thdt the ~ process sheets and rod requisition forms referenced different weld rods than had, in fact, been used. The respense of the QA/QC manager was to accept the violation as is. The DR did not mention one of the most signifi-cant violations: the production department substituted an unauthorized, unapproved procedure and process for the procedure which had been properly selected and approved by the QA system and the third party authorized inspector from the State of California. This was done in order to avoid delays when QA issued the wrong weld rod for Weld Procedure 128. Production could not wait to correct the weld rods, so the foreman just changed the procedure. In other words, the production department's " solution" was to achieve compat-ibility by making the procedure as wrong as the weld rod. DR #4713 endorsed the procedure switch (id., at 23-25). If production can overrule the QA system so easily on such casual grounds, it means that cuntrolled welding procedures occurred only when tolerated by the construction department. Under the circumstances there can be no basis for confidence that the quality of the welding was controlled. Most significant, in April,1983 Diablo j Canyon management was still satisfied with this result. 26. DR #4713 missed another equally significant violation: QC inspektors had approved all the welds after visual examination, alth,ough the GTAW ahd SMAW welding procedures do not look the same. The 1972 fat ure raises ' serious questions about the reliability of QC inspections at tKe time. The failure of DR M713 to even note the QC inspection failure demon-strates that 11 years later, the acceptance standards have not yet become realistic..Significantly, before it was issued, this DR was revie d,three times by Bechtel and PG&E management, which must assume responsibility for a v. QA (port that failed to disclose, at all, the most significant QA violations ( M. at 25-28). i

27. The breakdown in records for the weld rod and weld process 1

sheets render it impossible to verify the qualifications of early welders by reconstructing weld rod and process records, as asserted by Pullman in response to 1977 Nuclear Services Corporation findings that the qualifications could not be established for welders in late 1972. I demonstrated this effect of DR #4713 by applying its findings to a case study on a welder whose qualifica-tions were challenged in the original NSC audit (M., at 28-30). 28. Hy attempts to perfom my audit duties on welding led to sustained management hostility, including restrictions on my organizational freedom, harassment and intimidation, and retaliation through personnel { actions. On January 28, 1983, the harassment reached a climax. I had already been removed as internal auditor on pretextual grounds (, infra, at 23-4) and was doing research for pending audit reports that I had issued, in this case Unscheduled Internal Audit #35 on pipe rupture restraings. I was at my desk reviewing the records on three full penetration welds that had been tested to the wrong nondestructive examination process. Mr. Karner approached I and nted to know what I was doing. When I told him, he asked if I had been 1 directed to identify those problems. Because I was completing a pending audit of whi'ch Mr. Karner disapproved I accurately answered "No." Hethen' shouted at me that I was. no longer the internal auditor and could no longer identify

discrepancies unless he specifically ordered me to. At the time, I was still a quality assurance employee, helping to close out DCN's and DR's. Mr. Karner's orders to restrict my inquiries violated the requiremanit.for = organizational freedom in 10 C.F.R. 50 Appendix 8. s. ~ g.

29. During the January 28, 1983, confrontation, Mr. Karner also

~~ threatened that if I repeated this type of behavior, he would "get rid of me." From his demeanor, I was unsure whether he was referring to my presence on the job, or my presence--period. Mr. Karner's threats eventually convinced me to resign and to take a pipefitting job. The pervasive atmosphere of intimidation was too counter-productive for an employee to successfully uphold required QA/QC standards within Pullman's quality assurance program. I 30. Although Pullman has gotten rid of me, the company has kept { the problem of unqualified welding procedures. When I left in January,1984, we were still working to the same welding procedures I had audited. Nothing has changed except that after all the notice, it is clear that Pullman and ) PG&E's violations are deliberate. There can be no excuse of ignorance. 1 Corrective action has been nonexistent or ineffective. There were discussions on-site of attempting to qualify Code 7/8 after the fact, which would have been ineffective anyway since it was the sponscring procedure for considerable i work that it did not describe. As of my departure, however, even that halfway I step had not occurred. l II. QUALITY ASSURANCE BREAKDOWN IN NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATIONS Nondestructiveexaminationstotesttheweldsandother5 hardware were as unreliable as the procedures to conduct the welding in the$irJt place. The indeterminate quality of the testing process leaves the quality of the J ~ ' ~ T ~~ ~

uw ~ m hardware in the same status--indeterminate, at best. In some cases, NDE results were compromised due to simple manipulation at manage-ment direction. This phenomenan allegedly occu'rred when Bechtel and PG&E had T.. the NDE personnel do certain vitrasonic tests (UT) over with a diftprent f apprdsch, after the tests had identified a large number of rejectable welds. I i! A good illustration of the quality assurance breakdown involves 1972 tests used to measure Seismic Class I valves on the reactor coolant pressure boundary for minimum wall thickness in response to an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) directive. The UT procedure was not qualified by tests to determine its reliability, which was questionable anyway, because the procedure did not measure the entire surface of the valves. There is serious question t whether all relevant valves were examined, in part due to conflicting informa-Sion in the records. Not all the equipment used to measure the valves was traceable and calibrated. The fonner violation invalidates usage of the equip-ment. The latter affects the accuracy of UT results by up to 48 percent, when the AEC required 98 percent accuracy. Informal changes of contract specifications, without the required review and approval, again facilitated the QA violations. To my knowledge, corrective actior, has not occurred. The unreliability of valve measurements was representative of a general QA breakdown for nondestructive examinations. In Internal Audit 101, I checked 21 such procedures--seven were deficient, representing three forms of nondestructive exams To date, the most significant problem remain. The basic [ flaw was that records were not available to demonstrate that. test pro-cedures were qualified. After I traced the use of one procedure badk to the steam generator feedwater nozzle, the QA manager ordered me not to ling out where a related test procedure was used. The response to my disclosure of these problems was to sit on them for over a year. In some instances, there still

ha,s not been effective corrective action. QA management reneged on solutions to which we had agreed. De situation became so frustrating..that I conducted an audit on corrective action and sent the results to Pullman corporate head-quarters. The response was to reprimand me for breaking ranks, wh a the QA viol (tions continued to be ignored. Below is a more detailed listing of related allehtions. t 31. In some instances, the unreliability of nondestructive examinations is due to manipulation of the test results in order to mask de ficiencies. This allegedly occurred in 1982, with respect to tests involving around 230 Unit I full penetration welds--some in the containment--where UT examinations revealed large numbers of rejectable conditions.. Witnesses described the defects to me as voids, slag, and lack of fusion in the roots of the welds--which raise questions about weld bonding. I was also informed that Bechtel and PG&E management responded by manipulating the UT procedure in. a manner that would lower the number of rejected indications. The welds were then " accept (ed) as is" (Id., at 15). In other instances, the QA violations are more deeply rooted. The case of Engineering Specification ESD 234 for ultrasonic measurement of valves on the reactor coolant pressure boundary is a microcosm of the break-down. On January 18, 1982, I initially reported QA violations through Internal Audit #101. I tried again in November, with unscheduled Internal Audit #34. On January 2,1984, I finished a report to Commissioner Gilinsky on this still ) uncorrected problem, which I have since forwarded to the NRC inspectors at ~ Diablo Canyon. It is enclosed as Exhibit 2. 5 32. There is no evidence that the ultrasonic thicknesdmeasurement i

.c ] .-procedure was qualified through tests to demonstrate the 98 percent level of accuracy required by the AEC. The valve measurements were conducted with an . uncontrolled procedure, and therefore cannot be accepted as the bap.is for y.. conc 1usion's about the quality of the valves. In my audit, I could peither l f l find A' vidence of a Procedurt Qualification Record (PQR), nor a Procedure T Qua11fication Test (PQT) (Exhibit 2, at 2-3). 33. There is no evidence of " procedure verification tests," j required by ESD 235 for the transducers,that take into account the curves, l 1 ridges, and irregularities that exist on every valve and significantly affect -) the measurements (M., at 3). ) e 34. Management appearn to have conducted the measurements without i any qualification test, despite prior warning that the procedure was too i 1 unreliable to support its findings. An April 17,1973, " Interoffice Corres-pondence" had disclosed: I 3. The transducers sveilable are adeqJate for flat smooth surfaces. There are no adapters, shoes or wedges available should they become necersary. l l 4. At this time, it appears the transducers supplied may not be the correct type for thickness readings. If this is true, we will have to order new I I transducers. 5. The effect of surface contour and roughness must be tested prior to making any reportable results. 6. There is no available equipment on the U.T. equip-ment for review. It is doubtful that any meaningful results can be obtained at this time and it is definite thal. none can be reported until the above-mentioned problems are solved. (M., and related attachments)

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a gy, i 35. Pullman QA manager Harold Karner improperly refused to take cornctive action in January,1982, when I disclosed the lack of pro-cedure qualification records or tests for ESD 236 and ESD 244, the.UT Thickness Gauge Procedure. The problem remains uncorrected. Hisexcusewashtthese prochlures were only nondestructive measurements rather than nondestructive testr..and therefore did not represent "special processes" whose quality must be controlled Qd., at 4). l l That semantic distinction is irrelevant. The reason to require reliable, controlled procedures is to assure the quality of sensitive, safety-related hardware. Indeed, in 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B, Criterion X, I the terms " examinations, measurements, or tests" are used interchangeably. l The safety-related purpose for qualified NDE procedures is magnified for ESD 236. ESD 236 was instituted in response to an AEC directive to the nuclear industry after discovery of valve problems at a series of plants. l l

36. Mr. Karner's manipulation of definitions is wrong.

UT measure-l ments constitute a special process which must be qualified. They are a special process because they are uniquely created to perform a specific quality-related function. Further, PGSE contract specifications and 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B, Criteria IX, " Control of Special Processes," identify nondestruc-i tive testing as an example of special processes, not as the boundary of the concept. 37. VIA #34 of 254 Valve Wall Thickness Data Reports demonstrated that be Data Reports are incomplete and, therefore, are not traceable, as ~ required. For example, none listed the size, shape, or manufacturer,'s designation for the transducers that perfonned the wall thickness. 'The' ESD 1 J

" 236 Documentation Packages do not provide any infonnation on the testing equipment beyond the serial numbers. In some cases, there were not even serial numbers for the UT machines and the micrometers used as a' mechanical \\ backup measuring device (g., at 5-6). g, L

38. The Data Reports offered unreliable, inconsistent 9nformation.

( 1 For instance,19 reports listed two different UT machines as having conducted the same valve measurement. Serial numbers for UT thickness equipment and t micrometers could not be verified independently. Ten percent of the valves checked physically had serial numbers different from those listed in the Data Repo rts. In many Data Reports, original information had been whited-out and altered without signature or explanation (M., at 6). 39. Necessary records to demonstrate calibration of the measuring equipment were not consistently available. To demonstrate the potential effects, on three UT measurements whose accuracy was tested, the pre-and post-calib. ration checks snowed variations of 10 percent, 48 percent, and 2.6 percent (jd,., UI A #34, Attachment 5). The maximum error permitted by the AEC i was 2 percent. 40. The AEC acceptance standards were violuted when valve i measurements from equipment that failed minimum reliability standards (#39, supra) were used to accept the valves as sufficiently thick (!_d,.). d 41. Forty-two Data Reports disclosed that the valves were below the minimum thickness, but on the paperwork they were marked as " accepted" ~ withc ut explanation (J_d,.). d 42. In 11 cases, the measurements were incomplete. ThI records simply skip results for required areas of the valve, such as the flat pad at the bo ttom (J,d. ). D

J' 43. In 14 valve locations, there was no documented evidence that I the valves had been examined at all (M.).

44. Therewasnodocumentationtoindicatethatweldyspairson r

theyalves were controlled, as required by the AEC. To illustrateithe absence of der ~1fiable controls, the Data Reports do not have a requirement to list whether valves were weld-repaired, or the weld procedure used (ld., at 7). ] 45. During my research for UIA #34, I discovered that none of the valves meet AEC and PG&E design requirements. Westinghouse, the manufacturer, had explicitly declared that they "were not designed to meet the minimum wall thickness requirements of ANSI B16.5"--one of the relevant professional codes listed by the AEC in 1972. By comparing Westinghouse's communication with PG&E contract specifications, I learned that the valves also do not meet the design requirements in the contract (H.).

46. To my knowledge, there still has not been any corrective action on this problem.

If there had been good faith attempts. I should have been contacted as the originator of the audit. I remain available to help follow through. 47. Similar to UT thickness measurerrent procedures, nondestructive I test procedures lacked documentation of Procedure Qualification Records or Tests. In IA #101 I found this flaw in seven procedures out of 21 examined. Beyond the UT thickness procedures, there were five cases where no evidence exisied that NDE procedures had been qualified. As a result, the quality of work examined under those procedures remains indeterminate. Thesekncluded:

1) ESO 234, for UT Inspection of Groove Welds on pipe rupture restrakts prior to 1979; ESD 241, for UT examination of Safety Yoke Rods on Safety

-______________m__.____

-WW F f. Valves; E50 246, for Magnetic Particle testing, t:1th unknown use; ESD 247, for Magnetic Particle, examination of welds in the crack repair program on Unit #1 Steam Generatet Feedwater Nozzles; and ESD 270, for Liquid Penetra,nt examinations, with unknown use. On January 12, 1984, I completed nd delivered to IIRC inspectors, a draft report to Consnissioner Gilinsky on IA 1V1. It is encipsed as Exhibit 3. 48. The corrective action for procedure ESD 234, consisted of unreliable, "a f ter-the-fact" Procedure Qualification Tests, whose use was not controlled and accomplished using qualified procedures. Ironically, this is the same flaw the late PQT-were supposed to correct. l Further, there is no evidence that management reviewed and approved the procedures for the PQT (1d. at 2-3). ) 1 1 49. QA Manager Harold Karner improperly prevented any corrective action for the lack of procedure qualification records on ESD 270. Instead, he' I directed that the Procedure Qualification Records for a similar procedure, ESD 210 should be used for ESD 270. That is unacceptable. If the two pro-cedures have separate numbers, there are at least some dissimilarities. Those l unique features of ESD 270 inherently will not have a proven demonstration of i their ability to identify defects. This QA violation remains ignored.

50. No. ' investigation was perfonned to detennine where ESD 270 was used. Instead, the QA manager told me to just write up what I hadlearned already as an audit finding.

I 51. ESD 241 for UT of the safety valve yoke rods involves the most significant violations. In addition to the lack of a PQR, the hardware was I tested from December 17-20, 1973, before the'UT_ procedure it'self was even issued on December 26, 1973, and prior to approval of the UT procedure i

, PG&E on February 12.; 1974. The testir.g was totally uncontrolled for l the yoke rods on these valves, which ! believe control the release of radiation from the containment (M., 8 at 4). 'l T 5'2. ESD 241 was deficient because-it violated instructions from 3 Dres(er, the vendor for bolts and studs. The Dresser instructions required I the isds to be examined prior to threading. At Diablo Canyon, the UT's were conducted after the threading. Further. ESD 241 did not use the Dresser h instructions to determine the reference point for sensitivity and the criteria l I l to report questionable items (M., at 4-5). 53. The existing documentation for the tests fails to meet the standards both of ESD 241 and the Dresser Instructions. Required information on the testing surface and instrument calibration was not included (M., at 5). ) I 54 Both ESD 241 and the UT inspection. records failed to reflect compliance with a PG&E-imposed requirement for backup inspection "with the liquid dye penetrant technique to check the yoke rod ends for indications of l cracking that might extend into the threaded area of the yoke ends" (M., at l 5-6). l l l j 55. No DR was issued to PG&E on ESD 241, although this corrective 4 action had been agreed to both by Mr. Karner and the NDE supervisor. Mr. Karner improperly reneged on the basis of a memorandum from John Guyler, Mr. Guyler dismissed the detailed, documented DR which I had prpposed with the following assertion: "PPP has accomplished this per instruction from PG&E. It is evident that a nonconformance does not exist and a DR 1 not necessary" (Jd... at 3-4). Mr. Guyler's response was in equate. First, the procedure violated PG&E instructions (see #54, supra). Second, 1 l e l t

g l. 1 -i even PG&E does not have the authority to validly instruct Pullman to violate 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX- "Special Processes." Third, Mr. i Guyler did not document his asserted conclusion.. y 2. t

56. Overall, Pullman violated NRC reporting requidn'ts and

~ PG&E' contract specifications by only reporting the deficiencies for two out m. of the seven nondestructive procedures to PG&E on Discrepancy Reports (M., at 6).

57. PG&E dispositioned the 'DR for ESD 246 " accept as is", although there is no information indicating where the nondestructive test was conriucted.

Since the identity of the affected hardware could also impact on the evaluation criteria, PG&E's acceptance was premature (M., at 7). 4

58. The reason the location of work tested under ESD 246 could not be identified is that i4r. Karner improperly prevented me from looking. After I learned that ESD 247 was used for welds in the crack repair program on feedwater nozzles in the Unit I Steam Generator, he ordered me not to check where ESD 246 -

hadbeenused(M.,at6). i 59. PG&E improperly dispositioned the DR on ESD 247 " accept as is", j although the Magnetic Tests in the procedure were referenced to ANSI standards, rather than the relevant ASME Code Section I; and although the qualifications of the MT personnel conducting the test cannot be verified from the records available (Id.). 60. The corrective action for ESD 246 and 247 involved procedure qualifications after-the-fact (Id at 7). After-the-fact proceduty qualifica-tions should not excuse PG&E from accountability under NRC rules. t best, it means that the damage has been minimized. But it also inherently means that

} 10 'C.'F.R. 50. Appendix B. was violated, because special processes were con-J ducted under uncontrolled conditions. Even if it is acceptable to c' nduct procedure queiification 61. o . y 2. tests after the fact, the tardy. test must be performed under contr611ed cir-i ~ cums_tances. In this case, PQT's were conducted with different equipment than l had imen used originally (M.). No documentation was supplied to support the B asserted Corrective Action Response that the new equipment made the results more conservative. 62. QA Manager Karner was responsible for the deliberate failure to provide reasonably prompt corrective action for IA 101. ' On January 18, 1982, I initially disclosed IA 101; on March 23, 1982, it-was finalized after I provided Mr. Karner with additional information which he had requested. On April 6,1982, corrective action for the first finding in the audit' on lack of procedure qualification tests was approved. Before implementation, how-ever, he changed his mind. Although the official time limit for corrective action is ten days, the audit was not closed out for over another year, despite my repented memoranda and attempts to formally notify Mr. Karner of his obligation to address the issue of unqualified NDE procedures (M., at 8-11). 63. Pullman corporate QA Director A. Eck was notified of the failure to take corrective action and improperly refused to help. Instead, he reprimanded me for bringing the matter to his attention. On June 14, 1982, I notified Mr. Eck, through an Interoffice Correspondence, of the overdue ~ corrective action. He did not respond. On July 6,1982,'I performed and submitted Unscheduled Internal Audit #31 to Mr. Eck on the lack of torrective action' required by ESD 263 within 10 days. This time I received a kesponse. Both Mr. Eck and Mr. Karner reprimanded me for submitting the audit to Mr. Eck directly, rather than letting it proceed through the chain of command.

24-i This violated E50 263, they explained. My audit was voided. Both individuals neglected to mention the violation of ESD that I had raised - el the QA violations were not getting fixed (Id., at 9-10). I 1 64 In January 1983, I was further punished for Mr. Karner's e improprieties. I was removed as internal auditor because only 5 instead of the required 18, audits had been closed out. Part of_.the problem was due t o circumstances -

• beyond my control. Mr. Karner or supervisors were sitting on some of my audits beyond the required deadline. Mr. Karner also was loading me down with ancillary assignments and unscheduled audits were not counted.

65. On January 28, 1983, during the meeting in which Mr. Karner j

threatened to get rid of me for looking at quality -related issues without being assigned (Supra, Nos. 27-28), I informed Mr. Karner that he had violated,10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B. He responded twice that we are not committed to 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B, and that it was "O.K." for him j to violate the Code cf Federal Regulations and related contract specifi-cations. III. BREAKDOWN IN OUALITY ASSURANCE FOR,HYORO, STATIC TiSTS. Hydrostatic testing at Diablo Canyon from 1975 to 1978 does not have the necessary QA documentation to prove the reliability of the tests. In hydrostatic tests, water is run through the plant at higher pressures than normal to see if the piping is reliable. In February.1981, I conducted Internal Audit 86 in-wNich I ~ - learned that nearly all hydrostatic piping tests. for a year, dur'ing 198O' and 1981 were conducted wtthout required QC documentation. -In April 1982 NRC inspection identified that documentation problems identified

) in Internal Audit-96. were not properly--corrected. I became convinced that,. serious problems may exist with the hydrostatic tests. In March 1983 l I completed Internal Audit 106, which examined the records for 79 priginal N hydrostatic tests and 118 ratests conducted from 1975 onward. Iharned i i thattthe test documentation did not have evidence of required QC oIersight, l QA rgcords, consistent procedures, or controlled test conditions. In short, there has been a generic breakdown in the QA requirements for hydrostatic tests. They must be redone. Internal Audit 106 is enclosed as Exhibit 4 My specific allegations follow.

66. The procedures for hydrostatic tests conducted before l

Ja nua ry 27, 1975 are fundamentally inadequate, due to their failure to ] include documentation requirements, and due to lost pages, the inability 1 to even entirely reconstruct the procedure requirement. 67. Almost all hydrostatic tests and retests from 1975 onward lack required QA documentation. The ecst significant omission 1 involves QC coverage documented on a piping system closecut - F98 Departinent Release. This activity is necessary to assure that departments performing the test comply with procedure checklists. Un fo rtunately, departments only complied sporadically with the requirement to complete and maintain the form whichdmonstrates compliance with the test pro-cedure. In other cases, there is not necessary backup documentation to verify the conclusions ' in the release. (Exhibit 4. AAR #1). l 68. From December 1977 - April 1978, in 28 cases Pul1[ man,. test requirement forms did not have information necessary under the

a . - - procedure ESD 229. Fundamental Qta, such as the type of fluid, pressure and temperature, simply is missing (M., AAR f 2). m 69. In 28 cases. Pullman's NT procedure data form dies-1 i l not]matchPG& Requirements. This form is the guide used to condict-the tes5, so the distinctions translated into different test conditions that' m. disqualify the results from Pullman's hydrostatic test. To illustrate, in one test Pullman's procedure only had a pressure of 2485 PSIG, when PG&E's acceptable minimum was 2812 PSIG.

70. The absence of backup documentation continued after 1978.

From March 1978 to April 1980, there were 14 hydrostatic retests without a l signed QC field pipe release, dispite the conclusion by Quality Engineering l in the test records that QC had verified the results (M. AAR #3). ) 71. The problems with hydrostatic tests offer another example of management harassment of QA personnel. During the May 1982 ) l NRC inspection, I spoke extensively with NRC representatives. After the interview Mr. Karner expressed anger at'the length of the neeting. At a later meeting, during-this general time frame, he threaten to get rid of me. IV. BREAXDOWN IN VENDOR QUALITY ASSURANCE. Although I was not as actively involved with vendor QA as with.special process and hydrostatic test procedures. I observed the symptoms of a generic QA breakdown after becoming familiar with ty examples of QA violations involving vendors. One case involved a endor that calibrates micrometers, a precision measuring device for Pullman I tools and the impact of weld repairs, among other functions. Although 1 l the vendor had a clean bill of health and was on the Approved Vendors __-----________.-_____________._a_,

==.

.g. \\ .I List (AVL) until my October 1981 audit, there was virtually a quality assurance program. Unfortunately, corrective action was solely prospective - to remove the firm from the AVL. The damage that already has been done will p. remain. I 7The second case involves 1980 and 1982 orders by PG&E for Pullman inspirctors to stop reporting the large number of cracked shops welds found 1 in Boston Bergen and American Bridge. work 7hese hardware defects should have been reported on DR's, but instead were ordered to be ignored because they came from a vendor. Specific allegations follow.

72. The reliability of Pullman,'s Approved Vendors List is indeterminate, due to the inclusion of Microsurface Engineering.

This firm only had a token quality assurance program, yet had been approved and passed previous vendor audits. My audit demonstrated that Microsurface did not conduct audits, did not have a written procedure for calibration, conducted uncontrolled inspections, lacked traceability for use on Pullman tools, failed to disclose laboratory standards for calibration, and did not have required documentation for training of laboratory personnel. The violations were so ingrained and pervasive that it is not credible to conclude they only sprang up since the vendor passed an audit the previous year. 73. Corrective action for the Miscrosurface QA violation improperly was restricted to the prospective step of removing the firm from Ihe AVL This was inadequate, because the accuracy of measurements made with Microsurface tools is indeterminate. The effects of previous vio-lations will remain undisturbed. L

s 74 b July 1979 Pullaan inspectors began ficding signifi- .y cant quntities of cracks in welds received from two vendors, Boston d Bergen and American Bridge.. thtil 1980 Pullman inspectors wrote 19 l r; Discrepancy Reports on the welds, which displayed a consistent pe(kern of l lingierindication. The DR's are enclosed as Exhibits 5-24. On Aphil 3 I 1986,'however, Mr. Marvin Leppke of PGLE-issued a memorandum directing ) 4 Pullman to stop issuing Discrepancy Reports on thess " shop" welds. The { memorandum is enclosed as Exhibit 25. I 75. In 1982 PGAE repeated the improper restrictions on i QA enforcement against the same shop welds. This time PG&E instructed Pullman to delete shop welds from the formal walkdown program that l represents a final visual check on quality. Relevant supporting documenta-tion is enclosed as Exhibit 26. V. RECORDS FALSIFICATION Beyond instances of contradictory and impossible information in the records, in some cases I am sufficiently familiar with the cir-cumstances of false records to state that they were intentionally fal sified. Examples involve the qualifications tests for QC inspectors. l As a prospective welding inspector I failed one of1gy initial test and was I then 'given1 copy of the ' test to study to ~ assure passing on the second attempt. Another inspector was certified after taking-* test which upon review months I later he:was found to have failed. He was ratested at that time and passed ^ with the assistance of coaching. The test was backdated to the ortpinal test date to cover work performed during the intermin period. The latte{ example f occured in 1980. ,,,m e-.-= =sM=.ee> s,e= =e-e W ew hw

- - - - - - - - - m y ,1 VI. CAUSES OF THE g ITY ASSURANCE BREAKDOWN. 3 s 77., The mor,t significant cause for the @ breakdown.is the { environment of repression and the predictable retaliation againsthA personnel who diligently try to identify and correct QA violations'.' The probjem goes well beyond the loss of o ganizational freedom. Upholding the b Atomic Energy Acff at Diablo Canyon can represent professional suicide. N.s 6 s1 Most significant, the sacrifice is for nothing. The violations remain, ( uncorrected. My own experience is a case study. Mr. Karner threatened to i "get rid of" me on three occassions when I persisted in attempts to obtain f corrective action. Mr.Karner restricted my freedom as an inspector until j I could only look at, specific problems assigned by him. I 'we ) reprimanded, a verbally and in writing, for communicating with corpoia,te Qdiahagement about such a fundamental violation as the failure to tske ccrrective l "t i j action against unqualified NDE procedqres on safety related worb.s To add i i insult to injury, in January 1983 I.was demoted for not finishing enough t i a ssignments. The denotion was d, Ud in part to Mr. Karner's refusal to act on my audits, which made it impossible in some cases for me to' finish j sty assignments. 78. The final act of reprisal against me occurred on January 13, 1984 I was laid off froni my job' as a ~pipefitter, the ' day after making my third disclosure to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. NRC inspectors already had Ibid me that site management had a copy of my first report on welding procedures, and that Bechtel was studying it. On Friday, 50 pipef5tters were 1 aid off, supposedly due to a lack of parking space. The usual pr(cti,ce for these layoffs is to let workers from the local union stay until last. In this instance 4 6 out of the 50 employees laid off were " travel cards" t__

f'om out -of-town unions. Although more travelers were available, four r employees from the local were swept out with the travelers. One of the four tas having conflicts with his supervisor and one had an absenteeism problem. T. The other two were g partner and wself. My foreman protested toi the super-1 ~ f viso'r.not to lay off g partner and me, and asked for permission to pick b som ne else. The supervisor referred him to the resident construction manager, who refused the request and told the job steward that we had to be the ones laid off. My foreman and the job steward recounted these events to me on the day of the layoff. That day the job steward also informed me of the perception of site that my layoff was due to " politics" and was decided " higher up". On January 25,1984, the day after retaliation was widely discussed at' e Congressional hearings, management called me back to work but not my partner. l The pattern represented by my case illustrates why a significant number QA violations have gone unreported, and why the quality of Diablo Canyon is indeterminate. Those who persist in reporting the violations are dismissed, or harassed l relentlessly until they resign, or give up and stop trying. l l

79. Another cause for the QA breakdown is subordination of PG&E's l

and Pullman's QA department to construction. Until recently, PG&E site QC did not l l review Pullman Discrepancy Reports. PG&E's Resident Mechanical Engineer, a con-struction offical, reviewed and approved corrective action to discrepancies. As of 1 May 1983, Pullman Internal Audits were not submitted to PG&E site QC for review but instead submitted to the Resident Mechanical Engineer. l

80. Another cause for the QA violations was lack of resources. To illustrate, from August 1980 to September 1982, Mr. Karner was the only permanent employee in the QA/QC site management. He did not have an assistant QA Manager, and the QC Supervisor was a temporary employee.

81. The QA breakdown was not due to PG&E ignorance. On

- - *. = *

[ .o 31 .E' repeated occasions I identified many of' the issues in this affidavit to a variety of officials within the PG&E supe'rvisory and management staff. 5-Alth,ough some officials listened and expressed agreement and/or sybpathy, a f nongef the violations were corrected. I believe that PG&E and Pullman ) i have been gambling that the NRC will not enforce the QA laws, even if l they are caught. For the sake of the public's health and safety, I hope that the NRC calls their bluff. l 1 l l I have read the above 31 page affidavit, and it is true, accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. k'lCLiC (- dW i Harold Hudson l ~. ilu e u.s ' SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN this kp' day of January,1984','in d: e r ..y l Cali fornia. sa v.a.amun -- u - swW k v' N F.Os A s \\D /* \\ E[didj h NOTARY PUBLIC M l un ne-nxu '\\ i:3ppj, smumnxm g g My Comission Expires: 1 M X X y h !,u21L M G kp l l l l l _.._.__________.___..m__________.____________

O233 @ ) /_,.3 k~ PACIFIC OAS AND E LE C T RI C C O M PANY EOUd3 l 77 BEALE STREET $AN FRANCISCO, C ALIFORNI A 94106. (415)781 4211. TWx 910 37Mt67

• *2.9.22?"

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-097 Mr. John B. Martin, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V p 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 y Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368 Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76 st*

• Diablo Canyon Unit 1 SECY-84-61, Item 132 Welding of Attachment Plates to CCW System Piping

Dear Mr. Martin:

On January 27, 1984, NRC Region V representatives requested information regarding welding of doubler plates on the component cooling water system piping at the heat exchangers. The NRC requested (1) a description of the basis for acceptance of welds made on the component cooling water system piping while the system was filled with water, and (2) the Pullman Power Products Field Process Sheets associated with Drawing No. HGR 18-SR dated November 5, 1983. PGandE's response is provided in the enclosures. Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope. Sincerely. Enclosures E cc: T. W. Bishop D. G. Eisenhut C 7 E H. E. Schierling = 1.G Service List 45 c. C BJ s .t d'lo'( o LdoM l,f S.1 s r 4 8 ( - 6 f= w' 1 , a an

e PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-097 ENCLOSURE 1 WELDING OF DOUBLER PLATES ON CCW SYSTEM PIPING k The following discussion provides the basis for acceptance of welds made on the component cooling wate" (CCW) system piping while filled with water. The review and acceptance of welding to water-filled lines was performed by the cognizant engineer prior to any welding being performed. Welding to the CCW system piping, while filled, was the preferred method due to environmental considerations associated with draining and disposal of chromated water held in the system. The weld procedure used was Pullman Power Products Weld Procedure 7/8 which is applicable to P1 materials. The CCW pipe is A-53, Grade B material and the attachment plates are A-515, Grade 70 material, both classified as P1 material in ASME Section IX. The weld procedure requires a minimum preheat of 500F. The CCW system was at a temperature well above 500F; therefore, preheat requirements were satisfied. The main concern with welding to water-filled lines is the possibility of cold cracking. Since the primary agent which can cause cold cracking in the weldment is hydrogen, the weld procedure used dictates a low hydrogen weld rod (E 7018) which minimizes hydrogen and, therefore, minimizes the possibility of formation of cold cracks. The sections welded were thin sections (0.375" pipe wall and 0.375" to 0.625" attachment plates) which assures a relatively even temperature gradient during the welding process and eliminates the possibility of cracking occurring. Because of the above, welding to the CCW piping while the system is filled with water is acceptable. 4 0535d/0005K j

.s PGandE Letter Noa DCL-84-097 ENCLOSURE 2 s-The following Pullman Power Products Field Process Sheets and related documentation are associated with Drawing No. HGR 18-5R dated Novesber 5,1983, and welding of attachment plates to the component' cooling water piping (the information listed below has been provided to NRC Region V i representatives). n 1. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1377A Date 11/05/83 2. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1377B Date 11/05/83 3. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1377C Date 11/05/83 4. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1377D Date 11/05/83 5. DC-1-E-P-9041-R-0 SK-18-SR Sheets I4, 15 and 16 6. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414A Date 11/05/83 7. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414B Date 11/05/83 8. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414C Date 11/05/83 9. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414D Date 11/05/83

10. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414E Date 11/05/83

11. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414F Date 11/05/83

12. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414G Date 11/05/83

13. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414H Date 11/05/83

14. Pipe Support Design Tolerance Clarification Form, Seq. No. TC-1-8578 dated 07/02/83, with 08/12/83 comments

15. PPP-FPS Mark No.DCN 1604-006 Date 11/05/83

16. Deficient Condition Notice No. 1604-006 Date 11/02/83

17. PPP Liquid Penetrant Examination Record ISO 1-14-5 DCN 1604-006 R-0/1-K-104-20 Date 08/11/83

18. PPP Thickness Report ISO 1-14-5 HGR 18-5R Part Serial No. DCN 1604-006-R-0 Serial No. 1086 Date 08/11/83

19. Pipe Support Design Tolerance Clarification Form, Seq. No. TC-1-8578, dated 07/02/83 20.'

Field Sketch DCN 1604-006 Sheet 2 of 2

21. DC-1-E-P-9041 Rev 1 SK-18-512 Sheets 14, 15, 16 and 16x 0535d/0005K i

r. PACIFIC GAS AND E LE C T RIC C C M PANY-PGw2 77 scetc stacc7. s4n ra4weisco. catiroasia 94tos. <4 s> 7si.4 ii . Twx 9:o.372.ess7 J O.SCMvYLsm , ta e.r:,rW .ou........,,..... PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-097 ifr. John B. itartin, Regional Administrator U. 5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region Y 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368 Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76 Diablo Canyon Unit 1 SECY-84-61, Item 132 Welding of Attachment Plates to CCW System Piping

Dear fir. Martin:

On January 27, 1984, NRC Region Y representatives requested information regarding welding of doubler plates on the component cooling water system piping at the heat exchangers. The NRC requested (1) a description of the basis for acceptance of welds made on the component cooling water system piping uhile the system uas filled with uater, and (2) the Pullman Power Products Field Process Sheets associated with Drawing No. HGR 18-SR dated November 5, 1983. PGandE's response is provided in the enclosures. Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope. Sincerely, Enclosures y cc: T. W. Bishop v1 E5 D. G. Eisenhut 4 7 A H. E. Schierling a

.e STJ Service List y

05 = 7 0 5 P PDR (D \\ l , wa 7 - h

(h l,p .PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-097 -l ENCLOSURE 1 WELDING OF DOUBLER PLATES ON CCW SYSTEM PIPING 'I The fo119 wing discussion provides the basis for acceptance of welds 'made on the comp 6nent cooling water (CCW) system piping while filled with water. The review and acceptance of welding to water-filled lines was performed by the cognizant engineer prior to any welding being performed. Welding to the CC'.I systin ciping, while filled, was the preferred method due to environmental considerations associated with draining and disposal of chromated water held in the system. The weld procedure used was Pullman Power Products Weld Procedure 7/8 which is 1 applicable to P1 materials..The CCW pipe is A-53, Grade B material and the attachment plates are A-515, Grade 70 material, both classified'as P1 material in ASME Section IX. The weld procedure requires a minimum preheat of 500F. The CCW system was at a temperature well above 500F; therefore, preheat requirements were satisfied. The main concern with welding to water-filled lines is the possibility of cold' cracking. Since the primary agent which can cause cold cracking in.the weldment is hydrogen, the weld procedure used dictates a low hydrogen weld rod (E 7018) which minimizes hydrogen and, therefore, minimizes the possibility of formation of cold cracks. The sections welded were thin sections (0.375"- pipe wall and 0.375" to 0.625" attachment plates) which assures a relatively even temperature gradient during the welding process and eliminates the possibility of cracking occurring. Because of te above, welding to the CCW piping while the system is filled with water is acceptable. l s 0535d/0005X 'N .-_--J

r - ~ - - ~ PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-097 ENCLOSURE 2 The following Pullman Power Products Field Process Sheets and related documentation are associated with Drawing No. HGR 18-5R dated November 5, 1983, and welding of attachment plates to the component cooling water piping (the information listed below has been provided to NRC Region V representatives). 1. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1377A Date 11/05/83 2. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1377B Date 11/05/83 3. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1377C Date 11/05/83 4. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X13770 Date 11/05/83 5. DC-1-E-P-9041-R-0 SK-18-SR Sheets 14, 15 and 16 6. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414A Date 11/05/83 7. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414B Date 11/05/83 8. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414C Date 11/05/83 9. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414D Date 11/05/83

10. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414E Date 11/05/83

11. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414F Date 11/05/83

12. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414G Date 11/05/83

13. PPP-FPS HGR 18-SR Field Weld X1414H Date 11/05/83

14. Pipe Support Design Tolerance Clarification Form, Seq. No. TC-1-8578 dated 07/02/83, with 08/12/83 comments

15. PPP-FPS Mark No.DCN 1604-006 Date 11/05/83

16. Deficient Condition Notice No. 1604-006 Date 11/02/83

17. PPP Liquid Penetrant Examination Record ISO 1-14-5 DCN 1604-006 R-0/1-K-104-20 Date 08/11/83

18. PPP Thickness Report ISO l-14-5 HGR 18-5R Part Serial No. DCN 1604-006-R-0 Serial No. 1086 Date 08/11/83

19. Pipe Support Design Tolerance Clarification Form, Seq. No. TC-1-8578, dated 07/02/83

20. Field Sketch DCN 1604-006 Sheet 2 of 2

21. DC-1-E-P-9041 Rev 1 SK-18-512 Sheets 14, 15, 16 and 16x i

0535d/0005K

C o b------- ~ ~ mc _ c _ c _ c c e-77 et ALE STRrti, $ AN re ANCISCO, C AltFORNI A 94106 TELEPHONE (4)$) 781 4711 i March 8, 1984 1 PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-097 Mr. John B. Martin, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368 Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76 Diablo Canyon Unit 1 I SECY-84-61. Item 132 i l. Welding of Attachment Plates to CCW System Piping )

Dear Mr. Martin:

) 1 i i On January 27, 1984 NRC Region V representatives requested information piping at the heat exchangers.regarding weldin2 of doubler plates on the basis for acce)tance of welds made on the component cooling wa piping while tie system was filled with water, and (2) the Pullman Power Products Field Process Sheets associated with Drawing No. HGR 18-SR dat ) November 5, 1983. PGandE's response is provided in the enclosures. j Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope. Sincerely, l 0tlGNAL 54GNfD BY J. O. Schuyler 1 Enclosures T' 1 cc: T. W. Bisho)

[;

i D. G. Eisenhut H. E. Schierling ~ l Service List 1 lb 1

PGandE Letter Noe: DCL-84-097 ENCLOSURE 1 WELDING OF DOUBLER PLATES ON CCW SYSTEM PIPING The following discussion provides the basis for acceptance of welds made on the component cooling water (CCW) system piping while filled with water. The review and acceptance of welding to water-filled lines was performed by the cognizant engineer prior to any welding being performed. CCW system piping, while filled, was the preferred method due to environmenta Welding to the 1 considerations associated with draining and disposal of chromated water held in the system. applicable to P1 materials.The weld procedure used was Pullman Power Pro 4 The CCW pipe is A-53, Grade B material and the attachment plates are A-515, Grade 70 material, both classified as P1 material in ASME Section IX. The weld procedure requires a minimum preheat of 500F. The CCW system was at a temperature well above 500F; therefore, preheat requirements were satisfied. The main concern with welding to water-filled lines is the possibility of cold cracking. Since the weldment is hydrogen, primary agent which can cause cold cracking in the (E 7018) which minimizes hydrogen and, therefore, minimiz formation of cold cracks. The sections welded were thin sections (0.375" pipe wall and 0.375" to 0.625" attachment plates) which assures a relatively even temperature gradient the welding process and eliminates the possibility of cracking occurring. with water is acceptable.Because of the above, welding to the CCW piping 4 o 0535d/0005K

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-097 e ENCLOSURE 2 The following Pullman Power Products Field Process Sheets and r. elated documentation are associated with Drawing No. HGR 18-5R dated November 5, 1983, and welding of attachment plates to the component cooling water piping (the information listed below has been provided to NRC Region Y representatives). 1. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1377A Date 11/05/83 2. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1377B Date 11/05/83 3. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1377C Date 11/05/83 4. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1377D Date 11/05/83 5. DC-1-E-P-9041-R-0 SK-18-SR Sheets 14, 15 and 16 6 PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414A Date 11/05/83 7. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414B Date 11/05/83 8. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414C Date 11/05/83 9. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414D Date 11/05/83

10. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414E Date 11/05/83

11. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414F Date 11/05/83

12. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414G Date 11/05/83

13. PPP-FPS HGR 18-5R Field Weld X1414H Date 11/05/83

14. Pipe Support Design Tolerance Clarification Form, Seq. No. TC-1-8578 dated 07/02/83, with 08/12/83 comments

15. PPP-FPS Mark No.DCN 1604-006 Date 11/05/83

16. Deficient Condition Notice No. 1604-006 Date 11/02/83

17. PPP Liquid Penetrant Examination Record ISO 1-14-5 DCN 1604-006 R-0/1-K-104-20 Date 08/11/83

18. PPP Thickness Report ISO 1-14-5 HGR 18-5R Part Serial No. DCN 1604-006-R-0 Serial No. 1086 Date 08/11/83

19. Pipe Support Design Tolerance Clarification Form, Seq. No. TC-1-8578, dated 07/02/83 2d. Field Sketch DCN 1604-006 Sheet 2 of 2

21. DC-1-E-P-9041 Rev 1 SK-18-512 Sheets 14, 15, 16 and 16x 0535d/0005K

3 s 'o , - / 1 hEGsG ENERGYMEASUREMENTS GROUP San Ramon Operations ) MAfL; BOX 204, SAN RAMON. CA 94583 28o1 OLD CROW CANYON ROAD, $AN RAMON CA TEL(4151837-5381 in reply please refer to: WOW: 84-06 S' December 1983 ~ .\\ 1 . Mr. Dennis Kirsh U. 5. Nucleer Regulatory Commission ) 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 1 Walnut Creek, California 94596 j 3 INSPECTION STATUS REPORT l

Subject:

Memo; D. Kirsh to W. Wade dated 30 November 1983

Reference:

This report provides the information requested in the ' reference memo. tabulates the information by category with the exception of anchor-bolt data which is not. available. Anchor l . concrete expansion - bolts were inspected against the appropriate Foley or' Pullman specifica-tions (QCP9, QCPE9, and ESD 223) when they were used for the installation. Aside from population data, the information was derived from records main-tained for the inspections conducted under FIN B-8552. The. inspections As were conducted between July and November 1983 and some are incomplete. a consequence, a description of the discrepancy. and an assessment of the significance is provided only for completed inspections. - Attachment 2 illustrates the information stored in the data file for this project. The computer -was asked to list all completed inspection items having a discrepancy for which a quality assurance (QA) report and/or a citation has been initiated. Incomplete inspection items for which QA reports have been initiated were also added since these reports provide the descriptive information needed to assess significance. If further explanation or additional information is required please contact me at my office in San Ramon. O W. O. WADE MECHANICAL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT WOWicog Distribution: j EG&G /SRO LLNL G. Cumings R. Pong A. Debeling I M. Eli C. Morton R. Bogdanowicz NRC jugu /o(53 .T. Bishop g .P. Narbut' ~ P. Morrill

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ATTACHMENT H U N 1 FAFT STPi CDR5LETE STATUE r.Ay LOS NW LOC i 11EM NUMhEP. LATE LATE CRIT CCNTACTS AFF STATUS DATE INSP HRE 0019 AUI PLLB 1 RACEWAY SUFFORT 14/CSR-127-3880 7/13/83 10/19/03 CCP 3 GCP 5A QCP 9 GCP E9 MONTER0LA BE CAMFBELL F0 MDERISDN F5 PHYSICAL 9/23/E3 ME E.0 MVR-E2625 9/23/E3 ACCEPTED 10/19/53 MiE 7.0 0020 AUI ILDS - 1 RACE HY SUFFORT 10/CSR1274322 7/13/83 10/31/E3 CCP 3 GCP 5A QCP 9 ECP E9 MONTEPOLA BE CA".FEELL FD MORRIS 0N P6 isEC0EDS 9/23/E3 ME B.O MVR-E2625 9/23/E3 ACC-W/0-GA 10/31/E3 r/iE 5.0

0022 AUT PLDB 1 RACEEAY SUFF0RT 12/H-!!5-6-105 7/13/E3 8/29/83 GCP 3 CCP 5A 00P 9 CCP E9 MONTER0LA FE CAMPEELL FD HEF,NANDEZ NR CITAilDW B/20/E3 MSE 2.0 MVR-E2618 E/20/53 ACCEPTED 8/29/E3 Md!

5.0 IOC26 AUI ELOG 1 RACE #Y SUFFORT F-154-1-112 8/05/03 10/15/83 GCP 3 CCP 5A DCP 9 GCP E9 MONTER0LA FE CAMFFELL FD MDRRISDN F5 PHYSICAL 9/15/E3 MWE 5.0 MVR-E2653 9/15/E3 ACC-W/0-9410/15/53 MWE E.0 10027 Al'1 FLOG 1 RACEkAY SUFFORT 9/r-140-4-140 E/05/83 10/15/B3 G"P 3 00P 54 GCP 9 QCP E9 MONTER0LA FE CA".FEELL FD MDRRISDN FB PHfSICAL 9/15/E3 MWE 5.0 MVR-E2653 9/15/E3 ACC-W/0-GA 10/15/E3 MsE 7.0 20020AUIPLDS 1 RACEWAY SUPf 0fti 9/K-140-4-136 G/05/E3 10/15/B3 GCP 3 QCP 5A QCP 9 GCP E9 MONTERDLA PE CAMFFELL FD M0RRISDN P6 PHYSICAL 9/15/E3 MiE 5.0 l MVR-E2653 9/15/E3 ACC-W/D-CA 10/15/E3 ME E. 0 6003: CONTAI4"ENT 1 EACELAY SUFP0RT 245-140-6-E!00B 10/15/83 QCP 3 CCP 5A l QCP 9 PCP E9 MORRISON PB CAMTEELL F0 PHYSTCAL 10/20!E3 MWE 5.0 E0033 C"NTAINMENT 1FACEKAYSUPPORT10/F-146-5-965 10/15/E3 GCP 3 CCP 5A GCP 9 QCP E9 MDRRISDN PB CAMFFELL F0 PHYSICAL 10/20/E'3 MWE 5.0 MVR-E-2699 10/20/53 !E0039 FEKETRAT FLDG 1 RACEEAY SUFFORT 14BE6Wil51313 10/16/83 10/31/E3 CCP 3 1 1 GCP 54 1 GCP 9 QCP E9 MDRRISDN PS l C A".PIELL F0 PHYSICAL 10/20/E3 ME

3. 0 i

MVR-E-2703 10/20/53 ACC-W/D-DA 10/31/E3 ME 2.0 10043 TL':11NE 1106 1 RACELAY SUPPORT ll/C-104-E-10 10/19/B3 11/17/53 ECP 3 GCP 5A GCP 9 GCP E9 MDERISDN PS l CAMTEELL F0 FHYEICAL 10/19/E3 RMB 7.0 i RECCRIS 10/19/E3 NE 6.0 J

. = _ - _. -ACC-W/D-CA 11/17/E3 RKB !. 0.- 1 10044TURl!N!ILt6 1 RACEWAY SUPPORT 15/A-Il 44 10/19/E3 11/15/E3 GCP 3 GCP 5A l DCP 9 _ P6 ~ GCP E9 MDER150N CAMfi' ELL F0 ' DIP.EE10M 10/19/E3 RMB : 7.0 . RECORDS 10/19/E3 MWE -6.0' Mv'R E-2704-10/31/83 MVR. E-2706 10/31/E3 ACC4WD-CA 11/15/E3 RMIi 1.0 E0075 TURilNE BLD6 1 RACEVAY SUPPCRT 45/A-119-5-48 10/26/83 !!/01/E3 DCP 3 GCP 9 GCP E9 P, DER! SON P6 - MELLO FD RECORDS 10/26/E3 RMB 1.0- ~ PHYSICAL ~ 10/26/E! PJ.'R-E-2711 10/26/23 ACC-W/0-GA !!/01/E3 RMB 1.0 E0077 TL'REINE PLDS 1 RACEWAY SUPPORT 50/A-107-7-BB 10/27/B3 11/C2/53 CCP 3 : QCP SA DCP 9' GCP E9 P*RRISDN PB MILLO .FD RECORDS 10/27/E3 RMB 1.0 PHYSICAL 10/27/23 MVR-E-2713 10/27/E3 ACC-W/D-GA 11/02/23 RMB 1.0 'E007B TURflNE BLD6 1 RACEWAY SUPPORT 50/A-119-2-15 10/27/?.3 11/02/03 CCP 3 GCP SA QCP 9 GCP E9 MDRRISON T6 MELLO TD RECORDS 10/27/E3 EMB 1.0 PHYSICAL-10/27/B3 j MVR-E-2714 10/27/53. ACC-W/O-GA 11/02/83 RftB 1.0

E1002 AUI BLD6 1 RACEWAY SUPPORT CSR-127-4-56 II/08/E3 !!/17/83 QCP E9 CAMPPELL-TD-MORRISON 96 MVR-E-2729 11/17/83 RP 3.0 E!014 CONTAINMENT 1 RACEWAY SUPPORT H-85-1-42 11/09/E3 11/17/83 GCP E9 CAMFFELL 70-MORRISDN T6 MVR + 2729 11/17/E3 RP 3.0 M0023 CONTAINMENT 1 PIPE HtdiBER 12-196SL 7/07/83 10/12/E3 EED 223 TINKLE P6-EAUDIUSD P6 RECDRD5-. 9/02/23 MWE B.O MVR-M-4542 9/02/E3 MWE 6.0

$Mo0I9 (see ned page) ACCEPTED 10/12/83 l ( M0029 N/A 1 PlFE HANGER 46-9V 7/11/E3 7/ll/E3 ESD 223 H0iELL PE 1.0 l TINKLE . P6 CITAT10N 7/11/23 ASD RP 1.0 M0047 N/A 1 PIPE HANGER 22-396SL 7/13/S3 7/13/E3 ESD 223 TINKLE f6 HOWELL IE DR-5184 7/13/E3 ASD

2. 0 RP 1.0 M0085 AUJ PLD6 1 FIPE HANBER 55S-172R 7/19/E3 9/02/83 ESL 223 TINKLE f6 BIACOLON!.BE EAUDlUSD PB PHYSICAL E/20/53 VELD B/20/E3 MWE 5.0 MVR-M4511 6/20/53 MWE

!.0 ACCEFTED 9/02/E3 M0067 CONTAIN9ENT 1 PIPE HANBER 57N-3BR 7/20/E3 9/02/83 ESD 223 BAUDIUSO P6 11NKLE' P6 HOWELL BE WELD 8/20/E3 MWE 5.0 RECORDS B/20/E! MVR-M4511 B/20/83 ACCEPTED 9/02/E3 hWE 1.0 M0055 CONTAINMENT 1 PIPE HANGER 57N-2SV 7/20/83 9/02/83 ESD 223 TINKLE PB 61ACOLON BE SAUDIUSD P6 WELD E/20/B3 MWE 5.0 MyR.M4511 E/20/83

x Mol38 (see next page)

ACCEPTED 9/02/B3 MWE 1.0 K0160 1 PIPE HANGER 73-39R B/09/B3 9/15/E3 ESI' 223 TINKLE P6 BADICD PS DDLE P6 MVR M-4533 9/15/S3 RSS 1.0 CHM !.0 i M0200 1 PIPE HANGER 92-103R B/17/83 9/15/E3 ESD 223 TINKLE F6 6ADICO P6 00'.E P6 DR 5144 9/15/53 EWR 1.0 CHM 3.0 i M02LI N/A 1 FIPE HANSER 22-5475L B/24/E3 B/24/83 ESD 223 TINKLE P6 LDRilE fE MVR 4542 8/24/53 ASD 1.0 J M0330 1 HVAC SUPPORT SKC-HV570 B/11/03 9/20/83 GCP 40 FERESTEDT F0 D'CONNDR P6 1RES27-71 9/20/E3 RSS 1.0 CHM 3.0 j J

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==== = "' 65667 PE IRB227-71 9/80893 EW 9.@ ). CHM 3.0 1 HVAC SUFF0F,T SKC-HV!67 B/11/83. OCP 40 NOVACK F0 0!44... CARL 5ON FD.- BER551ELT FC IEBf27-73 9/20/B3 RSS !.0 CHR

2. 0 '

60f/03 CONTAINMENT 1 AhNULUS 6121-C1-13-610 7/14/83 GCP 3 PCP 5A CCP C7 DCP 9 KDHLER BE K11CHEN PB IERS FC PHYSICAL 9/15/83 CA 9/15/B3 NCR5422272 9/15/B3 MWE-5.0 30046N/A 1 SW11CH GEAR 6422-T1-13-871 B/25/B3 2/31/63 DCP 3 PALARM0 PS NCR B/31/B3 ASD 1.0 5422-255 B/31/B3 '30049 N/A 1 SW11CH GEAR 6422-11-13-274 E/25/03 B/31/03 QCP 3 PALARO PB NCR B/31/83 ASD 1.0 5422-246 B/31/B3 3006) FUEL'liA OLIN6 1 TUEL HANDLING 6160-F1-13-026-016 9/22/53 10/20/83 00P 3 CCP 5A CCF C7 KOHLER BI TINGLEY TD CANNINS FD MUNRO EI WELD .10/14/83 MWE 3.0 NCR-E233 '10/14/B3 ACC-W/0-9A 10/20/B3 MEE 2.0 80062 FCEL HACLlh5 1 FUEL HAMLlh5 6180-F1-13-026-Il6 9/22/83 10/20/63 CCP 3 CCP 5A QCF C7 rDHLER PE TINSLEY F0 CANNIN6 TD MUNR0 PE WELD 10/14/B3 MWE 3.0 NCR-BB33 - ACC-W/D-DA 10/20/83 MWE 2.0 S0063 TUFflNE ELES 1 TURilNE PLDS 6424-11-13-794 !!/01/83 QCP 3 CCP 5A QCP C7 DCP 9 KDHLER BE HARRIS 0N PE BERS FD MARTINSON FD KlRSCH NR WELD 11/01/B3 MWE 16.0 NCR 11/03/83 EMB 5422-332 !!/03/83 NCR 11/03/63 5422-333 !!/03/83 NCR !!/03/B3 5422-341 11/03/B3 NCR 11/10/B3 MWI 10.0 5422-351 11/10/B3 C11 AT10W - '!!/12/83 MWE 10.0 lr.0025AUIPLES 1 flFE HANGER B55-66R 7/07/E3 9/15/83 ESD 223 ilarLE P6 ~ SM11H - SE 9/02/E3 rs! SAU;10SD F5 PHYSitAt gyg 45rp 9/02/83 l AttE D 9/15/B3 l 9/02/53 9/15/83 ESD 223 P,0138'1UR21XE BLLB. 1LP1FE HAWEER_ 3B4-393R ,R-144 9/02/23 ME _c e:1> 9M/e * *-f l I l

f pt' y,..; il ' i ~ % .9 To: f Hon. Victor Gilinsky, Commissioner \\ United States Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner i i 1717 H. Street Washington, D.C. 20555 i. ] From: Harold Hudson - Former Fullman Power Products' Quality -i Assurance Inspector, Quality Control Inspecter,. Quality Assurance Program Internal Auditor and Lead' Auditor. ~ Date: 1-2-84 sl\\ S d u. A A J.

• 3 -

l w e-- -- L__-___-__-__-

y 7 C. The Atomic Energy Commission letter of 6-20-72, page 3, paragraph 6 (see attached U.l.A. #34, Quality Audit Checklist, page 3) states: "In certain instances, you may wish to repair valves found to have wall thickness below the specified minimum. In such instances, you are requested to provide to this office for our review the proposed repair procedure, including a description of techniques to be used to verify the acceptability of the repaired components". There is no documented evidence in the ESD 236 Document-ation Packages that M.W. Kellogg (Pullman Power Products) or PG&E complied with this A.E.C. requirement. 1. There are 47 Data Reports that indicate that valves were below minimum wall requirement. U.I.A. ??4, A. A.R. #8 (see attached) identified two valves (Locations 9 2-PCV-455A and # 2-PCV-4553) that were weld repaired to meet minimum wall requirements. But the ESD 236 Documentation Packages do not specify which of the valves were weld repaired. It is an item of concern, that the L*RC should investigate, as to which valves were weld repaired or replaced. 2. The ESD 236 Documentation Packages do not provide any information as ta the weld procedure used to weld repair valves in Locations #2-POV-455A and d 2-P Y-4553 and any other valves that might have been weld repaired. There is no documentation available that assures that the A.E.0 reviewed and approved the weld procedures used or the description j of techniques used to verify the acceptability of the repaired valves. The Tn0 should determine what { valves were weld repaired; if the weld procedure used was acceptable; and if the technique used to verify

• l acceptability was adequate.

There is no assurance in the E3D 236 Documentation i Packages that valves weld repaired meet the A.E.C. requirements. i 1 D. In reviewing the A.E.C. Letter of 6-20-72 and the l Westinghouse Letter # PG&E 2030 of 7-25-72, a question is raised as to what is the relevant code and/or standard the " Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Valves" should conform to in relation to "specified minimum wall thick-ness"? Page 2, paragraph 4, of the A.E.C. Letter (see attached U.I.A. p 34, Quality Audit Checklist, page 2) states:" "Specified Minimum Wall Thickness", as used above, means t the wall thickness required by the relevant codes and j standard s ( e. g. AS A 331.1 (1955); USAS 331.1.0 (1967);

8 \\ USAS B16.5; MSS-SP-66) in effect on the date of the purchase order". ) l Page 1 of the Westinghouse Letter (see attached U.I.A.

1. 34, Quality Audit Checklist, page 5) sta.tes: " note l

that the pressurizer safety valves for Diablo Canyon. Units 1 and 2 were designed to meet the requirements o' Article 9 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel CodW, Section III (1968 Edition). The valves were not designe4,l 1 to meet the minimum wall thickness requirements of ANSI 316.5". e The Westinghouse supplied reactor coclant pressure { boundary valves (pressurizer safety valves) were ddsigned i l to meet the requirements of Article 9 of the ASME Boiler 2 and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III (1968 Edition). This code is not referenced in the A.E.C. Letter which specifies relevant codes and standards. Westinghouse states the valves were not designed to meet the minmum wall thickness requirements of ANSI 316.5 (US AS 316.5 ) which.is referenced in the A.E.C. Letter as one of the relevant codes. This raises the question of whether the Diablo Canyon reactor coolant pressure boundary valves (pressurizer safety valves) meet the A.E.C. (NRC) code requirements. The NRC should investigate this issue I to assure that the Diablo Canyon reactor coolant pressure boundary valves (pressurizer safety valves) co= ply with the relevant codes and standards as established by the A.E.C. (NRC) f or valves within the reactor coclant i pressure boundary, as defined in subsection 50.55 (a) j (codes and standards) of lo:FR 50. I l The Westinghouse supplied " pressurizer safety valves" (reactor coolant pressure boundary valves) do not comply with PG&E 2.S. d8711 Section 2.2.1 Code require-ment to be designed, manufactured, and fabricated to AUS 331.1. PGLE C.S. #8711.2.2.1 states "The reactor coolant piping and pressurizer targe lir.-: ;f the rnactcr coolant systems have been designed, manufactured, and fabricated to ANS 331.1 with applicable Nuclear Code Cases and will be furnished by Westinghouse". C.S. #8711 Section 2.1 and 2.16 states reactor coolant system except for main coolant loops and pressurizer surge line are to be designed, fabricated, and erected per A3ME 3 oiler Code Section I. I The Westinghouse supplied " pressurizer safety valves" (reactor coolant pressure boundary valves) as referenced in the Westinghouse Letter VPG&E 2080 do not comply with the PG&E Code Requirement to be designed, manuf acturec, and fabricated to AUS E31.1. This is a nonconfermance l l T II N S E h w a - J.aksssu n a w asar - $= gdw.w-r_sm J. _ - L

9 !l l 1 to PG&E C.S. #8711 Section 2.2.1 The Westinghouse l I supplied valves were designed to meet Article 9 of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III (1968 Edition). 2. I Note: PG&E C.S. 98711 Section 1.1.1 defines piping to I include valves, hangers and supports. 7alves I are considered part of the piping system. I l The apparent nonconformance of Westinghouse supplied j " pressurizer safety valves" (reactor coolant pressure l boundary valves) to PG&E C.3. 48711 Code Requirements indicates noncompliance to 100FR50 Appendix 3 Section III Design Control, Section I7 Procurement Document Control, Section VII Control of Purchased Material, Equipment or Services, and Section X7 Nonconforming materials, Parts or Components. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should investigate this nonconformance of Westinghouse supplied valves to.PG&E Code Requirements for the reactor coolant i piping and pressurizer surge lines of the reactor coolant systems to assure that the properly designed, manufactured and fabricated valves have been installed ] 4 at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant and that the appro- { priate 10CFR50 Appendix 3 requirements have been complied with, i Chis report, Pullman Power Iroducts' Unscheduled Internal Quality Assurance Program Deficiencies in the ?3&E/M.W. Kellogg j Audit #34, and Internal Audit #101 have identified significant l (Pullman Power Products) Quality Assurance Records for the ultrasonic thickness measurement of Unit #1 and r2 Reacter Coolant Pressure Boundary Valves as requested by the Atocic Energy Com-mission. 10CFR50 Appendix 3 IVII specifies that " sufficient records shall be maintained to furnish evidence of activities affecting quality". This require =ent has not been implemented. In addition, a question has been raised as to what code or i l l standard the Reactor Coolant Pressure 3oundary Valves (pressurizer safety valves) should be designed, manufactured, and fabricated to. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should investigate the identified deficiencies to determine if the use of these valves which are important to nuclear safety will effect the safe operation of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant. i Sincerely, I } Harold Eudson i Phone 605-525-5970 n 1 F r r f i P 6 minmsmM-me m.u-~m_ %- - - --- 4

AU LIST OF ATTACHMENTS 1. Pullman Power Products' Unscheduled Internal Audit #34 - ESD 236 Quality Assurance Records. A. Quality Audit Summary Report. B. Audit Action Request (A.A.R.) Nos. 1 thru 8. C. U.I. A. #34 Attachments lios. 1 thru 10. D. Quality) Audit Checklist (Program Requirements and Obser-vations. 2. Pullman Power Products' Internal Audit #101 - Organization. l A. Quality Audit Summary Report. B. Audit Action Request ( A. A.R. ) No.1. C. Quality) Audit Checklist (Program Requirements and Obser-vations. D. I.A. #101 Attachemnts. 1. Interoffice Correspondence of July 28, 1982 and attachments. 2. Interoffice Correspondence of September 15, 1982.

3.. PG&E Contract Specification 18711.

A. Section 1.1.1 - Outline of clcrk. B. Section 2.2.1 and 2.16 - Description of clork. l I l

) ^ g Pullman Power Products 7 7." F-106 rav. 7/5/73 re v. 1/3/ 79 7 rev. 3/09/79 3:?.3'.,0 CA.!? O'! !UC*.21.2 l ADVANCE COPY AUDIT REPORT m: 1 = 3 2. QUALITY AUDIT SU'0'l.2Y ?2? OPT !!T "^.: Unscheduled M34 ? ! '.~' '!C. : xytt 5 " * "' ';T: ': T'.' AU7ITED l 'ATI 3,_3o_ce QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS 0I5 7 ?!_9 ~~'"I 0;! !!!2E I .' E ~ ' ? '.; :.C COC' ~~ ?T3 l 10CFR503 XVII J ~.""'I ??I5 E.""' O A iE.F. GERWIN .\\.E.C. Letter 6-20-72, PG&E DR#103-R1, ESD236

?2cTC? -r OA tA.A. ECK

) 'iestinchouse Letter #PG&E2080 ?IS IOr'i~' "T N3 ~. VC-?. IJ.W. RYAN ) l'5 03; 27 a.C DI T } S~PER. OIA A~3:~~ID P. DAWSON (see othersi l A. 'i. :. R. SANDERSON Unscheduled ?IILO 2A/0C '#A'IAGE? I" - K M EE I 2'.'i P. Dawson, current supervisor but not. "T. ?. VI". ' 7NS '"'-. IP L EVANS supervisor at time QA Records initiated. PG&E IJ. ARNOLD ett e i .i..i. ?.. !

E a

l S U'.C 'A:.Y ESD 236 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS l 1 [ j ESD 236, Ultrasonic Thickness Measurement of Boundary Valves, was identified on Internal Audit #101 as not having a Procedure Qualification l Record. It was determined that ESD 236 was not a nondestructive testing 1 [ procedure and did not require a P.Q.R. Subsequent investigation revealed jthatmeasurement of the Boundary Valves was performed to assure minimum toall thickness as required by the U.S. Atomic Energy Com=ission in their j letter of 6-20-72 for " valves important to nuclear safety". PG5E initiated 1 i I Discrepancy Repor: #103-R1 which stated that the individual valves to be { measured would be as shown on Westinghouse letter #PG&E 2080. The valves i l identified in the Westinghouse letter are called out as " Class I valves which make up the reactor coolant pressure boundary" and are part of piping { systems designated by PG&E as Seismic Class I. M.W. Kellogg (Pullman) ) initiated ESD 236, which was approved by PG&E, to implement the valve body wall thickness measurement by an ultrasonic method as required by the A.E.C. l j Unschedule Internal Audit #34 has identified major Program Deficiencies in the Quality Assurance Records (Valve Wall Thickness Data Reports) for the UT thickness measurement of boundary valves. The Program Deficiencies are traceability of the thickness readings obtained and calibration of test l that cannot be assured. j equipment 1 1 There is no docu ented evidence of " procedure verification tests" to determine that transducers used in the inspections were of a suitable l frequency, size, and adapted with shoes, vedges, or saddles as each valve l 1 measurement requires. None of the Data Reports list the size cf transducers, 1 1 shape of transducers and type designation. 252.. 5:2Z CZTACT: H. Karner P.~2 ? ;.72 3 5. : H. Hudson " ~ "'

• OA /0C Mana ge r TI T*.

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~ ~-

5. 7 PullmanWwer Products e

E - 12 6 A ra v. 7/6/70 ro v. 3/ 30/ 79 / PAGC 2 OF 3 DI A3LO CA'iYC 7 'IUCICAn P O'.C R P Ltil! QUALITY AUDIT St"'?,37 P.'2P ORT ci- ;o. : } Unscheduled #34 ) PIL .;0. : l X"Il 1 '00I7 D""~: l11-18-82 AiA.3. CCDC 8 SUIU'AUY ] 1 Six Data Reports do not list a transducer serial number. Nineteen Data Reports do not list the testing frequency or nominal frequency of the transducers used to make the inspections. Three Data Reports do not list the type couplant used. I 2 Seven Data Reports do not list a serial number for the UT thickness 1 2 tester used to make the measurements. Nineteen Data Reports list two different UT thickness testers as the equipment used to =ake the valve measurements but there is only one set of calibration information and 1 2 valve body measurements results. Two hundred and seven Data Reports reference serial numbers for UT thickness tester equipment that could not ^ be traced to documentation for certification of equipment calibration. There are conflicting procedure requirements as to the type of UT thick-g L ness test equipment to be used, digital read out or cathode ray tube. 1 3 Fourteen Data Reports do not list a serial number for the micrometers used to check the calibration accuraty on the valves by a mechanical Eighty four Data Reports reference serial numbers for micrometers 1 3 means. that could not be traced to documentation for certification of equipment calibration. Calibration linearity was established by taking multiple readings on a step wedge block. Calibration chickness was established by measur-ing the step wedge block by U~. 1 4 Six Data Reports do not list any information concerning the step 1 4 wedge blocks used for calibrating the UT test equipment. Nine Data Repor: s do not give complete information concerning the type of stainless steel the step wedge blocks were made of. Eleven Data Reports do not list pre or post operation calibration information. 1 5 One Data Report had a calibration check against the step wedge material that was not accurate within 27;. Three Data Reports had a 1 5 calibration check on the valve by a mechanical means that was not accurate within 27'. These valves were accepted. 1 6 Three Data Reports do not record the lowest reading obtained by the measurement in the proper space. Fort. two Data Reports indicate the valves as below the minimum allowed wall thickness but the Data Report I for-s are si-ed 9 the sr e e thne Mdiantes the mives were + sita11-PPSPAP,CD BY: H. Hudson ' 'PONSIOL COSTACT: H. Karner TITLE : Internal Auditor DATE: 1-11 E: OA/OC Vanacer l 1

46 A rev. WNW - 9 y ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~ ~ '~ l 1 re v. 3/39/ 79 y DIA3LO CNJYC I :1UCISAn PAGC 3 0" 3 PO:CR PLT;IT QUALITY AUDIT SU:'"AR7 ?".; PORT l cair ::0. : (Unscheduled #34 I l'I Z 10.: l xvii l 'UDIT D N!" : l11-18-8; 1 A. r.. a. I CCCO J SNUY i marked as acceptable. Seven Data Reports indicate valves had acceptable wall thickness but the Data Report forms are not signed in the space that indicates valves were physically marked as accepted. Many Data Reports 2 6 were found to have original information whited out and new information inserted. Twelve M.W. Kellogg (Pullman) Discrepancy Reports were identified as being generated to report to PG&E valves found to be below minimum 1 7 vall requirement. Three Discrepancy Reports do not have a signature and date for a Final Disposition indicating work. completed. Thirteen Data 1 7 Reports with valves below minimum wall could not be identified as being reported to PG&E on a Discrepancy Report. Eleven Data Reports did not 1 7-have a complete measurement inspection of all areas of the valves as 1 7 required by procedure. Fourteen valve locations, listed by Westinghouse to be examined, had no documented evidence of being UT examined. Eighteen audited valves were properly marked. Two audited valves 1 8 had serial numbers that did not match the Data Report serial numbers. Several valves and' relating piping had are strikes and one pipe had a 2 B gouge. .The individuals performing UT measurements were certified per ASNT-TC-1A, Supplement C. Two hundred fifty four Valve Wall Thickness Data Reports were audited (approximately 124 Unit #1 and 130 Unit 42 reports). Some valves identified on the reports as being for one unit were actually installed in the other unit. Twenty valves installed in the field were physically examined. i l l 70:15I3C CO:iTACT :H. Karner P PIP APO D M : H. Hudson E: OA/OC Manager TITI2: 19ter9a! Auditor DA'"E -D i 1 J

O 125 n v. 7/6/78 3/ 3'1/ 7' fr n v. DIADLO CANYCM ?.'. 1 N 2 NUCLEAR POMER P!J IT AUDIT ACTION PS2UEST UNSCHEDULf.D PII2 '10.: XVII YJDIT NO.: 34 ' 72 2..10. : 1 033O?.V% TIC'1 CCDE : 1 J CTI'/I'"Y ? UDI'.~ D : ESD 236 OA Records 11-18-82 .%.UDIT DATE : ?2 n ?C'iC':: DOCU:'E:!TS : PG&E DR103-R1, A.E.C. Letter 6-20-72, ESD 236 4 F I"DI 1", : TESTING EQUIPMENT - TRANSDUCERS 1. There is no documented evidence of " procedure verification tests" to determine that transducers used in the Boundary Valve UT inspections were of a suitable frequency, size, and adapted with shoes, wedges, or saddles as each valve measurement requires. This is l a nonconfomance to ESD 236.6.7. -Continued on page 2-f l H. Hudson DAT : 1-5-83 'C"'D EY-42) O t.T" : ? - ? re j TITTF. 3Y,: 3C3PCCC D CAUS7: 1 and 2 - Unknown l l 3,4, and 5 - omission by UT technician performing measurement. l 1 1 'E C O'" C:? DE D C O RPC C"'I'.C ACTI D'? : l 1. If no evidence can be provided of " procedure verification tests" for transducer l information then valve measurements be rejected and remeasured per procedure require-i s ments. l 4 I -Continued on nace 2-- C '.T O.t TE : i C 0 e.?I CTIVI AC"'I O'1 T.C" : i l I i 1 TAKEN BY: APP RC'IED BY : 1"'~? " T O P C'.*~;!T 'I CUP PC'? C : l TXG:1 BY : APP ROVED BY : FOLLOW UP : ACTIVIT CO"P LIE S ".717.1 ?TP '.OC C ? P.E"TI'"" J.CTIn : IP '10 - P II AGE E ::P LI.I:1 : C:: '^ 3 '.' : DATE: A.A.R. CLOSED BY : DATE: APP ROVED BY : DA"'E :

~

1. -g' Pullman Power Products J125 rev. 7/6/78 re v. 3/30/79 pr i

DIADLO CANYON i PA2 2 OF 2 NUCIEAR POWER PLANT i AUDIT ACTION - RCOUEST 3, UNSCHEDULED PILE NO.1 XVII AUDIT NO.: 34 A. A. R. NO.: 1 3BSERVATION CODE : 1 ACTIVITY AUDITED: ESD 236 QA Records ) \\UDIT DATE : 11-18-82 REFE RENCE DOCU?TNTS: PGSE DR103-R1, A.E.C. Letter 6-20 72. ESD 216 FINDING: CONTINUED: 2. None of the Valve Wall Thickness Data Reports list the size of transducer, shape of transducer and type designation (manufacturer's designation or description). This is a nonconformance to ASTM.E114-63.6.1.2, and ESD 236.3.2 and 5.1. 3. There are six Data Reports that do not list a transducer serial number. This is a non-conformance to ESD 236.4.1 and 8.3. See attachment #1 for list of Data Reports. 4 There are nineteen Data Reports which do not list the testing frequency or nominal frequency of the transducers used to make the inspections. This is a nonconformance to ASTM E114-63.6.1.1 and 6.1.2.3, ESD 236.3.2, 5.1, 4.1 and 8.3. See attachment 41 for i a list ot Data Reports. 3. Three Data Reports do not list the type couplant used to make the inspecticas. This is a i nonconformance to ASTM E114-63.6.1.3, ESD 236.6.3,.4.1, 8.3, 3.2 and 5.1. See attach-ment #1 for list of Data Reports. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION CONTINUED: 2. NDE Supervisor research and provide information concerning size, shape and type trans-ducers used to make measurements. If information cannot be provided, valve measurements be rejected and remeasured per procedure requirements. 3. Reject valve measurements and remeasure recording transducer serial number 4 and 5. NDE Supervisory research and provide required information. If information cannot be provided, valve measurements be rejected and remeasured per procedure requirements. FOLLO;f UP : ACTIVITY CO!' PLIES ii!TH APPROVED CORRECTIVE ACTION IF NO - PLE ASE EXPLAIN : YES NO DATE: k.A.R. CLOSED BY: DATE: APPROVED BY : DATE: --o

,. c.12 5 n v. 7/6/70 O re v. 3/3'/7' f ' ' ~ DIABLO CANYCN 'I/~~ l A NUCLEAR POSTER PIJCIT AUDIT ACTION FI'2CEST l UNSCHEDULED TILE *!O.: XVII Y.'DIT NO.: 34 ?. A. 2..10. : 2 0330'.'/UION CCDE : 1 ?CT!"!TY ?CDIC D: F.SD 236 OA Records '.UDIT DATE: 11-18-82 '3 F": ?C N C" DOCU"E:!TS : PG&E DR103-R1, A.E.C. Letter 6-20-72, ESD 236, AST: E114 F I'!DIT"> : TESTING EQUIP: LENT - ULTRASONIC THICKNESS TESTERS 1. Seven Valve Wall Thickness Data Reports do not list a serial number of the UT thick-ness tester equipment used to make the measurements. Traceability of the thickness readings obtained cannot be assured. See acatchment '!1 for a list of Data Reports. --Continued on page 2 and 3-- i ' C: D 27 : Ir8 O?.Tv :d-H r: j "I-7SI:M BY : H. Hudson DAT : 1-6-83 3C5PCC"~ D CAUS" : 1. Omission by UT technicians performing measurements. l 2. Data Report forms were preprinted with both types of equipment listed. The UT 8 Technician did not indicate the actual equipment used. l --Continued on page 4-- 'Z CO'r'""DE D CORPC CI'C ACTI D:! : 1. Measurements for Finding #1 valves be rejected and valves remeasured, j s 2. Measurements for Finding #2 valves be rejected and valves remeasured. l 3. NDE Supervisor provide calibr.ation records for Finding #3 valves or valve measurements be rejected and valves remeasured. --Continued on eace 4-- CUI 2122 : i 0 0'..'I CTI VI AC"'I O'I T.YC" : l I TAKEN BY: APP ROVED BY : "P 3 T O P *CV"NT '? CUP."C"C" : TA*GN BY : APP ROVED BY : FOLLON UP: ACTIVITY CO" PLIES IIITd A.'P'.OV D COR?7CTI", ACTIS : Ir '10 - P LC AS2 E",P LAI:: : 'C 3

^

l l 1 3 *.* : DATE: A.A.R. CLOSED BY: DATE: I 1 i APP ROVED BY : DA"'E :

r .,g_' Pullman Power Pmducts /I25 rev. 7/6/78 te V. 3/30/79 hr DIADLO CANYON l NUCLEAR Pot 1ER PLANT .PAGE 2 Op 4 AUDIT ACTION RCOUEST a-UNSCHEDULED

• ILc NO. t XVII AUDIT NO.:

34 A. A. R. NO. : 2 ) )BSERVATION CODE : 1 ACTIVITY At$DITED: ESD 236 QA Records .UDIT DATE : 11-18-82 , 2FERCNC DOCUMCNTS: PG&E DR103-R1, A.E.C. Letter 6-20-72 ESD 236, ASTM E114 'INDING : CONTINUED: ) ?. Nineteen Data Reports list both the Nortec NDT-120,SNr:12224, and the Branson Sonoray Model 303B, SN#18060, as the ultrasonic thickness tester equipment used to make the valve measurements. But there is only one set of calibration information and valve body measurement results for each Data Report. The actual UT equipment used to make the valve measurements cannot be determined for the purpose of traceability. See attachment #2 for a list of Data Reports. 1 3. Two hundred and seven Data Reports reference UT thickness test equipment that have serial numbers that could not be traced to M.W. Kellogg (Pullman), PG&E General Construc-tion or manufacturer's documentation for certification of equipment calibration. There } are seven UT thic'kness testers with different serial numbers referenced on the various reports. The UT testers referenced but not traceable are: A. Branson Sonoray 301 SN#710247 B. Branson Sonoray 301 SN#7012417 C. Branson Sonoray 301 SN#101247 D. Branson 301 SN#7012717 E. Branson Sonoray 301 SN#7102417 j Branson 303 SN#186060 I l G. Branson 303 SN#18060 1ee attachments 43, #4, and #3 for a list of Data Reports. "he above listed discrepancies are nonconformances to ESD 236.4.1, 4.2, and 8.3. There are conf 3'cting requirements as to the type of UT thickness test equipment to be used to make the measurements. ESD 236.1 specifically references digital read out equipment but there are also references to an ASTM procedure that requires use c: cathode ray tube equipment. 4. ESD 236.1 under Scope states that "this procedure is based on pulse echo digital read out equipment as specified in PC6E report 103-R1". There are no references in the-related PG&E documentation th at recoires the use of dirical read cut ecuirment. 'OLLO'.1 UP : ACTIVITY COf' PLIES 11ITH APPROVED CORE.*;CTIVE - ACTION F NO - PLEASE E : PLAIN : YES NO 2 DATE: .. A. R. CLOSED BY: DATE: .PPROVED BY: DATE :

g Pullman Power Products .us rev. 7/6/70 re v. 3/30/79 k DIADLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PAGE 3 OF 4 AUDIT ACTION PEQUEST 2, UNSCHEDULED ILE NO. - XVII AUDIT NO.: 34 A. A. R. No. : 2 BSERVATION CODE: 1 ACTIVITY AUDITED: ESD 236 QA Records UDIT DATE: 11-18 317 RCNCE DOCUMENTS: PG&E DR103-R1, A.E.C. Letter 6-20-72, ESD 236, ASTM Ella INDING: CONTINUED: his is an item of concern requiring supervisory attention. ASTM E114-63.2.3.2, referenced in ESD 236.3.2 and 5.1, states that " thickness may be determined from one side by observing the spacing of the multiple reflections or reverberations on the cathode ray tube over a given distance on the screen". ESD 236 which is based on digital read out equipment per the Scope of the procedure does not meet the requirement of ASTM E114-63.2.3.2 to use cathode ray tube equipment. The use of digital read out equipment as referenced in ESD 236.1 is a nonconformance to ESD 236, 3.2 and 5.1 and ASD! Ell 4-63.2.3.2. An M.W. Kellogg Interoffice Correspondence, attachment 'l 6 A, states "The PG&E fur,ished Branson 303B is missing the digial module". No subsequent documentation has been found indicating that the referenced Branson 303B was later adapted with a digital module. Since no calibration or other records have been located for the seven Branson models including the 303B models referenced in Finding #3 it is unknown if these testers were digital read out or cathode ray tube. This is an item of concern requiring supervisory attention. g A Branson Mark I, O'U42101, with traceable calibration records is a cathode ray tube instrument and war 24 to La e valve measurements. The use of this UT tester is a noncenformance to GD 236.1 but does comply with ASD1 E114-63.2.3.2. This is an item of concern requiring supervisory attention. OLLOW UP : ACTIVITY CO!TLIES WIT.i APPROVED CORE!:CTIVE ACTION F NO - PLE ASE E XP LAIN : YES No t DATE: -. A. R. CLOSED BY: DATE: PPROVED BY: DATE:

'u, w / ./p5 rev. 7/G/70 cg-Pullman Power Products rev. '3/30/79 f i DIADLO CN4 YON NUCLEAR POWER PIRIT PAGE 4 OF 4 AUDIT ACTION REQUEST 2. UNSCHEDULED

• ILE NO. :

XVII AUDIT NO.: 34 A. A. R. N O. : 2 )3SERVATION CODE: 1 ACTIVITY AUDITED: ESD 236 OA Records l .UCIT DATE : 11-18-82 2:ICRCNCE DOCUFCITS : PG&E DR103-R1, A.E. Cletter 6-20-72. ESD 236 SUSPECTED CAUSE CONTINUED: 3. Possible error by UT technician in recording actual serial numbers and/or inadequate documentation control for UT equipment calibration information. { l /.. Unknown i l RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION CONTINUED: '1. Per ESD 263.8.1 the NDE Supervisor shall determine and initiate corrective action subject to the QA Managers approval. l l l l \\ l l l l 'OLLOW UP : ACTIVITY CC!TLIES WITif APPROV :D CORFl:CTIVE ACTION

• F NO - PLC ASE E;T LAIN :

YES. NO DATE: 9 t.A.R. CLOSE D BY : DATE: \\PPROVCD BY: DATE:

p 125 r?v. 7/6/7? NllTw1 Power' Products r2 v. 3/ 3')/ 7' lP DIA3LO CANYCM NUCL2AR poi 1ER PLXIT

p. -

1 m-2 AUDIT ACTION REOCEST a. UNSCHEDUI.ED FII; *10. : XVII 3.UDIT NO.: 3!. '..i. 2. .!?. : 3 0332".'kTIO'I CCDE : 1 .S CTI'/!'"Y TUDIC D: ESD 236 OA Records "'0IT DATE : 11-18-82 '" C R"'4 C" DOCU"E:ITS : PC&E DR103-R1, A.E.C. letter 6-20-72, ESD 236 FI'1 DIN G : TESTING EQUIPMENT - MICROMETERS 1. Fourteen Valve Wall Thickness Data Reports do not list a serial number for the micrometers used to check the calibration accuracy on the valves by a mechanical means. ll Traceability of thickness readings obtained cannot be assured. See Attachment 2 for a l list of Data Reports. "I'!9I"G 3Y: H. Hudson DATC: 1-6-83 'C"'? 2Y:MJd ~'?.T" :2 i'l9 i 2 U3 P C C'"" D C.' '.'E3 : 1. Omission by UT technicians performing measurements. l 1 2. Possible error by UT technicians in recording actual serial numbers and/or d.nade-l quate docu=entation control for micrometer calibration information. i '!' C O'" C" DE D C O RPC CT !'_C.1CTI O:: : 1. Measurements for Finding n1 valves be rejected and valves remeasures. 2. NDE Supervisor provide calibration records for listed micrometers or valve measure ' ments be rejected and valves remeasured. .i i i 0 0'.'I CTI'.T AC'"I O'I T.'XT" : I l i l TAKEN 3Y: APP RC'7?.D BY : I ' '"" P G T O P 'C'.C ::T '" C'.* P P2" C" : TXGM BY : APPROVED BY: FOLLO'.i UP : ACTI"IT" CO"P LIES '.7 7.? A."P'.OC ' CTPECT!"".iCTIn: !" 'l0 - PI.CAG2 E::P L?.I ! : CC '^ 3": DATE: A.A.R. CLOSED BY : DATE: APP ROVED BY : D A'"E : e_

{ j j '125 tav. 7/G/78 re v. 3/30/79 hr' .i DIADLO CANYON PAT - 2 OF 2 NUCIEAR POWER DIRIT 2. AUDIT ACTION RCOUEST UNSCHEDULED PILE NO. XVII AUDIT NO.: 34 A. A. R. NO.: 3 l l OBSERVATION CODE: 1 ACTIVITY AUDITCD: ESD 236, OA Records AUDI'2 DATE : 11-18-82 REFE RENCC DOCUBCITS: PG6E DR 103-RI, A.E.C. letter 6-20-72. ESD 236 FINDING: 2. Eighty-four Data Reports reference micrometers that have serial numbers that could not be i

raced to M. W. Kellogg (Pullman), PGSE General Construction, or manufacturer's documentation l

for certification of equipment calibration. There are seven micrometers with different serial i iumbers referenced on the various Data Reports. The micrometers referenced but not traceable l are: j 1 l a)

1. 22508 Mvrt i

( b)

1. 01 j

l' c)

1. 1-2 d)
2. 1 l

,]e)

1. 2109286

) f)

1. 21092SC g)
2. 22 50.WK i

See Attachment 6 for a list of Data Reports. The above listed discrepancies are nonconformances to ESD 236, Paragraphs 4.1, 4.2, 6.5, and 3.3. l l \\ J FGEI;G7:tF-f: : fig'FI'4TJT::GG71C 3:M:M*ftOS20:mICit2"L'S:F^*'H: -iP-NO- -P" EASE-EPhA-Ier XX'rSL-{EE(E.3Q DATC: E.A.R. CLOSED BY : DATE: APP ROVED BY : DATE :

Mri 1 Prcduc s 7 12 5 r?v. 7/~/~'?

2 <r.

3,' Y / 7* DI.t 3' O CA'7Y O'I NUCI.2 A2 P OSTE R P ' A ; ? ' ~~ l ^~ 3 1 1 AUDIT ACTION 'I0 tJIST 2, I I .n.3 U.nscheduled.

r...

a s 77 7 .. m. s _y.

t. ; 9.. 34 4

.6 l \\ 03 0~:.*'.'13.TI O' CCCE: 1 2CT "In* TU :C D: ESD 236 OA Records I 'UDIT DATE: 11-18-82 I ?.": T ?.T. C"" DOCU:'I'.:TS : ESD 236 PG & E DR 103-R1 1 i i I '?D 'M: Equipment Calibration l i 1 l. Six Valve k'all Thickness Data Reports do not list any information concerning the( step wedge blocks used for calibrating the UT test equipment. It cannot be deter-l mined if the step wedge calibration blocks are of material acoustically si=ilar 6 to the material to be measured. This is a non conformance to ESD 236. 5.2,6. 6 (cont)l n-'r, 3y : H. Hudson DAC : 1-6-83 ' C:!' ? 3Y : /r. ?.'*" :?-P ""'> j I _,..e..e C ".", C.1. " _* ".- l 1. Omission by the UT technicians performing measurements. 2. Failure by the UT technicians performing measurement to provide adequate l l information. (cont) l .,. v- . -.. n..e , u s.,.e... w. y 3. 3.C..- n,. 1. Reject finding til valves and remeasure valves. i 2. h'DE Supervisor examine ASTM A 351 or A 182 step wedge blocks to determine if l i acoustically similar to the valves measure. If not reject valves. Two valves l with no pertinent inf ormation be rejected and reggasty,ei, (cont) l k e e g, ** !.a= -

• t.=.='*

3. CT.*

d'*. 9 l ( I I t i TAKI'7 3Y : APP,RCVID BY : ._,a ...-,a l T A.*C' N 3 Y : l APP ROVID SY : i, n z L.v m,7 UP. . c, n... s. C n e.. vr. e.; a.... m,.e, n. t. 4 ,~n. ...n. e.. e.. _..w. t n. ,y r ,3.a- .e. 2.,.a..., J. n_....e,. A..\\. R. C*.,0SID BY : DATI: AP P rot.'ID 3Y : CA-?: I, e Q_______- ~

g' Pullman Power Products 1 ,,y, ,g re v. 3/30/79 hr i DIADLO CANYON NUCLEAR POMER PIANT PAGC 2 Or 3 I AUDIT ACTION RCOUEST i k. Unscheduled AUDIT NO.: 34 A. A. R. NO. : 4 'IL: No.: y t.,, 1 = GSERVATION CODE : 1 ACTIVITY AUDITCD: ESD 236 QA Records >UDIT DATE: 11-18-82 l l 'E FI REN C DOCUMCNTS: ESD 236, pG6E DR 103-R1 I 'INDIN G : (cont) 1. (cont) 7.2.1, 7.2.4, 4.1, 4.2 and 8.3. See attachment #7 for a list of Data Reports. 2. Nine Data Reports do not list the type of stainless steel the step wedge blocks are made from. Per an Interoffice Correspondence, attachment d6A, the reference blocks are suppose to be type 316 or 304. Seven Data Reports list ASTM A351 or A182 but this is not enough information'since per the ASTM standard there are several grades of i ferritic, martensitic and austenitic steels included for ASTM A 182 and 22 grades of austenitic steel for ASTM A351. The other two Data Reports did not list any pertinent information. It cannot be determined if the step wedge calibration blocks are of material acoustically similar to the material to be measured. This is a nonconfor=ance to ESD 236.5.2, 6.6, 7.2.1, 7.2.4, 4.1, 4.2, 8.3. See attachment #7 for a list of Data Reports.

3. A.

Data Report, location #2-8819-B, does not list a pre-operations calibration check on the valve by mechanical and UT means. There is a post calibration check. B. Data Report, location #1-8956-B (replacement), does not have the signature of the person perfortling or the date of the measurement and post calibration check. C. Two Data Reports, SN 0566 and SN 1006 (no location # listed) do not have readings i for the measurement and post ca11 oration checx, actual step thicknema, ultrasenic readings and calibration check by mechanical and UT means. 1 i D. Data Report, location r/1-8702 does not have readings for the post calibration check i by a mechanical and UT means, There is a pre-operations check. I E. Six Data Reports do not have the required measurement and post calibration information for the person performing and the date of the check, the actual step I thickness and ultrasonic readings, and the calibration check by a mechanical and UT means. The Data Reports are: SN 0991. SN 0992, SN 0708, SN 0855, SN 0833 and SN 0604 (no location v's listed). l

---

Finding #3 items are nonconformances to ESD 236.7.2.a. 7.2.c, 7.2.2, 7.2.3, 7.2.4, 4.1, 4.2 and 8.3.

(continued) FOLLON UP : ACTIVITY CO!TLIES WITH APPROVED CCRR3CTI'r ACTION IF NO - P LC ASE E :P LAIN : YES NO jY t DATE: A.A.R. CLOSED BY: DATE: APP ROVCD BY : DATE : A

M' r::v. 7/0/TU 4M " ~ "**"*** ro v. 3/ 30/79 pr .DIADLO CANYON NUCLEAR POMER PLANT PAGE 3 OF 3 AUDIT ACTION RCOUCST Unscheduled

c NO.

XVII AUDIT NO.: 34 A. A. R. NO.: ,4 ) ~ I ISERVATION CODE : 1 ACTIVITY AUDITED: ESD 236 QA Records J JDIT DATE : 11-18-82

.CRENC DOCUMENTS :

ESD 236. POLE DR 103 D1 l J Ni b SUSPECTED CAUSE: (cont.) 'l 3. Failure by the UT techn1cians performing measurements to record information and/or I calibration operations were not performed. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION: (cont)

3. A.

Reject valve and remeasure. B. NDE Supervisor review Data Report and evaluate data and accept or reject valve. C. Reject valves and remeasure D. Reject valve and remeasure. E. Reject valves and remeasure. 1 OLLOW UP: ACTIVITY CC!' PLIES WITH APP RO D CORR.7CTI'm ACTION F NO - PLCASE E:: PLAIN : YES-NO DATE: . A. R. CLOSED BY : DATE: "'*D.3Y: DAS: s

y 7 c II POW 9f PTCdUCts ) 7-12 5 :.s *:. 7/6/7? h re v. ?/3S/7' f DIA3LO CA'iYC.i NCCI.2 AR P CME R ? *_'J:T 1 -r 2 AUDIT ACTION ?.E0"IST l 1. I Unscheduled TILE '10.: XVII 1.?DIT NO.: 34 7.....,.. .l 5 i 33;???iTI7' CCDE : 1 J CT!"I""i. T UCI" D ESD 236 OA Records j '."OIT DA"'E 11-18-82 l I 1 .....c. DO C "..' "'. ".. ~. a* : ESD 236, A.E.C. Letter (6-20-72) i i .3,+.,- Calibration Checks not-accurate within 2*; 5 I i 1. Data Report, location #1-8067-C, has a pre calibration check that list the step wedge l material actual step thickness for reading #C as.497. The pre operation calibra-l j tion UT reading for #C was.500 The post operation calibration actual-(cont.) j ,i . 1,. -.,,.

2. 7 H. Hudson 1-7..C...,.3...gfy?

n.<..-... >. 3.cm I .n.. l 2,. c.o. e.~..,, C.s.e..c. ,t I, i1. and 3. Unknown i I i 2. Possible error by UT technician in recording information. 1 1 .,~.w.. _...s.e.3 u-.,3..: c,, 3,-.,... .w i 1. Reject finding #1, 2. and 3 valve measurements and remeasure. i i i 8 t i < a ; 5.r..-. v e. _. A C*..' O". "..'.".' ' ' - I -1 i 1 .I i i TA".I'1 3Y: ) APDRC'l23 3Y: J i ...3.> . r, 3. 3 3... ,e. .. 3. .. m i 1 ) I TA:GN SY: APPRCV2D BY: [ .en. t or.g gp. .A C '..' ". I *. ". C C,>D ' I.". 4-. 1"...I AP.D ". e~ ' "'..'.2.'.'..'~..~.', .'s v" ~.' i '. ~ -.- m. e,., r py .v..y c<....,. .m 7.. .s . 2.. A..\\. R. CICSED 3Y: ,A:s : l A P P R C'7E D 3 Y : A-'r : l i _m____ _. _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ J

V' l$ :::v. 7/6 /'90 8 ') " " "" " " * * " M re v. 3/30/79 fr' e DIADLO CANYON NUCLEAR PONER PLANT PAGE 2 op 2 AUDIT ACTION PSOUCST Unseneculed

IO NO.:

XVII AUDIT NO.: 34 A. A. R. NO.: .5 i k

SERVATI5N CODC

1 ACTIVITY AUDIT D: ESD 236 QA Records I f IDIT DATES-11-18-82 ) ESD 236, A.E.C. Letter (6-20-72) 'F PINCI DOCUMENTS: NDING: (continue) l

1. (cont) step thickness for reading #C was 497, but the post operation calibration l

l UT reading for #C was.45. The accuracy between the pre and post UT reading for #C { is 10*/. of f. The valve was accepted with a minimum wall allowed as 437 and the actual j lowest valve body measurement at.510. This is a nonconformance to ESD 236.7.2.2 I l and A.E.C. letter (6-20-72) item #2. 2. Data Report, location #1-8956-C (11-29-73 replacement), has a pre operation calibra-tion check by a mechanical means that is 1.062 and the UT reading is 1.050. The I post operation calibration check on the valve by a mechanical means was 1.062, but the UT reading was 2.050. The accuracy between the pre and post UT check is approximately 48*.' off. The valve was accepted with a minimum wall allowed as 1.310 .I and the actual lowest valve body measurement at 1.475. This is a nonconformance l to ESD 236.7.2.3 and the A.E.C. letter (6-20-72) item 42, 1 l 3. Data Reports, location #2-PCV-455B (2-25-76, SN 26N86) and loca. ion #1-PCV-455A i (:-25-76, SN46W210) have pre and post operation calibration checks by a mechanical means that read.760. The pre and post UT reading were.780 The aceutacy between the mechanical and UT readings is approximately 2.6% off. Ite valves we re accepted-J w1:h a minimum wall allowed as.750 and the actual lowest valve body measure-l ment as.750. This is a noncot.formance to ESD 236.7.2.3 and A.E.C. Letter (6-20-72) ) 4 !*m #2. 4 l l SLLOW UP: ACTIVITY CC!TLII:S WI"".1 APPROVCD COPJCCTIVO ACTION ? NO - PLE ASE E:LDLAIN : YES NO DATE: .A.R. CLO9ED BY: DATE: ] ?PROVCD BY: DATE:

!ITW1 Power Preducts 123 n,. 7 /." / "' o .C:n , ! v.. / ~> n ) ...i e DIA3' C C.iliY0:! NUCI.2 A?. ? C'cTE ?. ? ' ';;; F ~~ l '7 3 i l c. .. C..,,., e -. _ c. _. l... - - .1 r.. Unscheduled XVII t.". ) - *. '.?. o. - 34 '... '... >... ^.. - .' 6 i ^ 2 30 "[72."'I O' CCDE: 1 and 2 3 CT!"- ~'Y ? tD!'~ D : ESD 236 QA Records I 'r':IT DATE : 11-18-82 I I l i E~.:"' ?.!"i C" DOCU:'I::TS : ESD 236 1 1 I i .. g... f. Data Report Information I } 1-Three Data Reports. locations #1-8089-D. #1-8702 and 1-8058-n rio not record the l lowest valve body measurement reading on the nata Renort 4r* iten d6. This is a l nonconformance to ESD 236.7.3.3. (cont on na 2) l I l 7:'1T!"O 3Y: H. Hudson D A-': : 1-7-83 '.Cr ' O 2Y : <' 'c. 1 ?.T~ : e c +; ,I 6 ... e.o C...,, v.t.r e.. i fl. Omission by UT technician. i valve body measurement. These reports do have readings for the grid lay out f 2. Unknown i (continue on pg 3) .. w-....,e. D

3. 3 ~

,3

g..C 7_ n..,..

s.... 1. NDE Supervisor review grid layout reading, record the lowest reading on the Data i Report form item #6, and sign and date the forms. 12. SDE Supervisor investigate 42 listed Data Report valves to verify that unacceptable valves have not been installed. (cont. on pg. 3 ) i .%rmvm,I s*~,.s., e - - e. y g m m .*w b. I I I i i f a t.?. ~?'.1 BV.- I r' > o.u.rJ , a v l

• - n e

a. ya .C .).p 3 9.. 3.p ....a t l l l T A*. C' N B Y : l APP P.CV":D BY : ..a n.o a.m. s.- s-+....:.....-.. . w. _-.y. l .rn..e.Lc,q gp ACn..rt.ry.v. C p. 3 + r.c:.7 ~..s a-s s,,.s ., r. a,-a,..:. .e.. 3., <. -... .r.... t ..:.. e_. A. A. P.. C' OSED 3Y : DATE: .a ....n. t.re.,. m

u. v..

n

y t v. 7/0 / N - c? ;/ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ J

2 v. 3/30/70' pr' DIADLO CANYON PAGE

? CI' 3 N UCLE AR P OWE R P LA.;-. i AUDIT ACTICN ROO UI5T f ~ Unscheduled AUDIT NO.: 3 *, A. A. R. NO.: 6 I-- NO. : vyty 3SE1,VAdICN CODE: 1 and 2 ACTIVITY AUDIT ~.D: ESD 236 OA Records 1 l 1 .i.~,DIT DATE : 11-18-82 i 'II'"RENC" DOCUMCMTS: ESD 236 ,4 i f1 'INDIN G : (continue) i 2. There are 42 Data Reports that list the. minimum wall measurement obtained as below the i minimum allowed wall thickness. These 42 Data Reports have item #7 of the report for:- signed indicating " valve identified per step 7.3.5". The requirements of ESD 236.7.3.3 ij are "for valves that meet the minimum wall thickness requirements'.', and requires that acceptable valves be identified by vibra tool marking by adding "TM" (thickness measured) followed by the valve location number and attaching a plain white tag with .i che name of the person performing the measurement, date, valve identification and serial number. Below mini =um wall valves having their' Data Report form item #7 signed is a nonconfor=ance to ESD 236.7.3.5 and raises the cencern that rejected valves were identified.as being acceptable a,nd possibly installed in' the plant. See attachment #8A for a list of Data Reports. 3. T'tre are seven Data Reports which indicate the valves have acceptable wall thickness but item il7 of the report form is not signed indicating " valve identi.fied per step 7.3.5". There is no documented assurance that these accepted valves were identified by adding "~M" followed by the valve location number on the valve by_ vibra tool marking and attaching a white UT accept tag. This is a nonconformance to ESD 236.7.3.3. See attachment tiBB for list of Data Reports. The ESD 236.7.3.4 requirement that below minimum wall valves be processed per.Ti!-1-7 ceuld not be audited. Neither Fullman (M.W. Kellogg) or PG6E Mechanical Dept. or PG&E QC, Dept. could provide a copy of the procedure fer review. The procedure had been superceded and PG6E has discarded it. This is an item of concern requiring supervisory attention. 5. Many Data Reports were found to have original information whited out and new infor=ation inserted. The vorst example is location #1-LCV-459. The following items had original information whited out and new information inserted. .l A. Step vedge material for calibration purposes, j B. All pre operation calibration step vedge readings, actual'and UT. (cont. on pg 3) TOLLON UP: ACTIVITY CO"PLIL'S WIT.! APP ROV"'D IIRE..CTI'O ACTION ~ IF NO - P LC ASI EnP LAIN : YES NO i DATC ' A. ?.. CLO9ED BY : DATI: i .? ? ?.07~ D 3 Y : D A'"E : e

gy w. av er a e> ~ y) ~~ r3 V. 3/30/79 k i DIADLO CANYON ~ NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PAGE 3 OF 3 AUDIT ACTION RCOUEST l.inseneculed 4 TILE NO. : XVII AUDIT NO.: 34 A. A. R. NO.: 6 ")SSERVATION CODE : 1 and 2 ACTIVITY AUDITCD: ESD 236 QA Records \\UDIT DATE : 11-18-82

tEFE RENC DOCUMENTS:

ESD 236 FINDING: (continue) l

5. (cont)

C. Five dates listed on the Data Report were changed from 8-16-73 to 8-17-73. D. Many of the valve body measurement readings. l 3 E. All post operation calibration step wedge readings, actual and UT. { F. Minimum allowed. wall thickness. i This is an item of concern requiring supervisory attention. SUSPECTED CAUSE: (continue) 3. Omission by UT technician. 4. MFI-1-7 procedure discarded by PG&E Mechanical. PG5E QC never had a copy of procedure Unable to locate a copy in Pullman files. 3. Unknown. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION: (continue) l 3. NDE Supervisor investigate 7 listed Data Reports to verify that they have been installed in their proper location. 4 A copy of procedure MFI-1-7 be located if possible and verify that below minimum wall valves processed per MFI-1-7 requirements. 5. Valve for location #1-LCV-459 be rejected and remeasured. NDE Supervisor review Data Reports with white out to determine if a critical problem. i 1 ( \\ l TOLLOW UP: ACTIVITY CO!TLIUS WITlf APPROVZD CORR 3CTIVC ACTION I IF N O - P LC ASE E *:P LAI.1 : YES NO l iY : DATE: 1 k. A. R. CLOSED BY: DATE: i I UPROVCD BY: DATE : l

TOClUCt3 y 12 5 n :. 7/G / O .K.s. . ~..,, DIA31,0 CANYCM l NUCIZAR PC?TR PLA'0 -' ' ~ ~ 3 I l f AUDIT ACTION ?IQUEST a. Unseneaulec ~ ! TII; 10. : XVII 3.cDIT ;-;C. : 34 . '.........:?. : 7 3332*.'t.TI 7: CCOE: 1 2 CTI!""Y ? UOIC D : ESD 236 QA Records I' 11-18-82 ,,,CI,, D A i I i 72 7 ?.!'4 C" DOCU:'".".:TS : ESD 236, PG&E DR 103-R1, K7P 10, Westinghouse Letter 'fPG&E 2de i .. 1,...,1 : Incomplete Information t I 1. Three Discrepancy Reports (DR #1168, DR #960 DR #959), generated to report l l to PG6E valves found to be below minimum wall requirements, do not have a l signature and date for a Final Disposition indicating work completed. A total i of ten valves are listed on the three Discrepancy Reports. (continue on pg 2) l -:7 3. 37 H. Hudson 7A -. 1-10-83 ..CS ' ? 2 Y : /./ O 07.T : 2 '.~. -r_0 J L -.,.co-c e,. g.. e -. f 1 and hnown l e l 4 M.W. Kellogg documentation indicates these valves deleted but there is no i i i l explanation for the deletion. Locations 42-8010-A.B,C valves (cont on oe 3 ) ,. ~. .,n- ~.,. 3.w,..,.,.,,. .. - - w.... C.,. 3.. .v 1. NDE Supervisor review DR's and determine if valves have been dispositioned per the ! DR requirements. If so close out the DR's. 2. NDE Supervisor research the listed 13 Data Report valves to determine if identified ' on DR's to PGSE and if no evidence of being repq.r,t.sd.,qn,,.a,DR, (continue on pg3 ) i,. ~. 3...v. e... .s CT r., ... _w 1 I t 1 i a TAKIN 3Y: A? ? ?.C'.*E D B Y : i e -.,. n .,e..-......,. -...o .w i i e I TA.*CN BY : APP ROV 2 O SY : t FOLLON U? : ACTIVITY CO"? LIE S U~ T.I.VP '.C',~. COR?.:CC'~~ ACTIT: j .,s,., ....,,r.> e..,,- -. s,.c.a. .r 3" : OATE: 1 A.A.R. CLOSED 3Y: CATE: i APP ROVIO 3Y : OA*E : .i

g, yyy q 'y - - - - - - - ~ 3 I . re v. 3/30/79 pr i DIADLO CANYON NUCIIAR POWER PLANT PAGE 2 OF 3 AUDIT ACTION PSOUCST. Unscheduled ~ I1; NO.: XVII AUDIT NO.: 34 A. A. R. NO.: 7 ACTIVITY AUDIT 2D: ESD 236 QA Records BSERVATION CODE : 3 UDIT DATE: 11-18-82 EFORENCC DOCUMENTS : ESD 236 PG6E DR 103-R1. VFS 10. WmHng..., Letter #PG&E 2080 INDING: (Continue) 1. (cent) This is a nonconformance to KTP-10.10.1.4 (Rev 1-4-73) and PG&E DR 103-R1. See attachment #9A, #9B, and #9C for copy of the DR's. 2. Forty seven Data Reports indicate valves below the minimum wall thickness require-ment. Twelve Discrepancy Reports have been identified as reporting to PGSE 34 of the deficient Data Report valves and being dispositioned. But thirteen (13) Data Reports with valves below minimum wall cannot be identified as being reported to PG&E on Discrepancy Reports. This is a nonconformance to PG&E DR 103-Rl. See attachment #10 for a list of Data Reports. 3. Eleven Data Reports indicate " flat pad at bottom of casting inspected only for thickness". These reports had only two or three readings made and the valves were accepted based on these readings. These valves did not have a complete measure-ment inspection of all the areas of the valves as required by the Westinghouse Letter figure 'll and figure #2. This is a nonconformance to ESD 236.7.3.1, Westinghouse Letter #PG&E 2080 (paragraph four and figures #1 and #2) and PG6E DR 103-R1. The valve locations are: l A. 1-8948-A (11-28-73) G. 1-8956-D (11-29-73) B. 1-8948-B (11-29-73) H. 2-8948-C (1-17-74) 1 C. 1-8948-D (11-29-73) I. 2-8948-D (1-17-74) D. 1-8956-A (11-29-73) J. 2-8948-B (1-17-74) E. 1-8956-B (11-29-73) K. No location #, ID # 94-12872-76 F. 1-8956-C (11-29-73) (1-21-74) 4. Westinghouse Letter # PG&E 2080 list the valves that are to be' investigated for minimum wall thickness. There are 14 valves listed for which there is no i documented evidence of being UT examined for minimum wall thickness. This is a nonconformance to the Westinghouse Letter #PG&E 2080 (paragraph two and three) PG&E DR 103-R1 and ESD 236.3.1. These valves are: TOLLOW UP : ACTIVITY CO!TLIES WITH APPROVED CORECCTI'/O ACTION IF NO - PLE ASE E TLAIN : YES NO l !Y : DATE:

k. A. R.

CLOSED BY: DATE :

• 4PP ROVED BY :

DATE:

f r::v. 7 /G /"d 0 - @') " '== u - mwm rmeesep - rav. 3/ 30/ 70 pr DIADLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PL%N; PAGE 3 OF 1 l 1 / AUDIT ACTION PEQUEST Unscheduled 4 l ILS NO. : XVII AUDIT NO.: 34 A. A. R. NO. : 7 SSERVATION CODE : 1' ACTIVI"'Y AUDITED: ESD 236 OA Records UDIT DATE: 11-18-82 ) 1 El 2 PINC DOCUFCITS : ESD 236. PG&E DR 103-R1, KTP 10. Westinghouse Letter #PG&E 2080 INDING: (Continue) 4 (cont.) Locations #'s l 1-8010-A, B, C 2-8010-A, B, C i 1-8368-A, B, C. D l 2-8368-A, B,C,D ] SUSPECTED CAUSE: (Continue) 4 ( c on't. ) were examined and found to have ASME NB Code sta=ps. Locations

1. 2-8368-A, B, C D valves were examined but no Code stamps were found. Unit
2. 1 valves were not examined.

RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION: (Continue) 2. (cont) determine disposition of valves and report to PG&E on a Discrepancy Report for their concurrence. 3. NDE Supervisor determine reason for nonconformance and get PG&E approval or reject valves and remeasure the valves per requirements. 4 NDE Supervisor determine reason for valve deletions and get PG&E approval or perform valve measurement per procedure requirements. TOLLOW UP : ACTIVITY CO!TLIES WIT;i APPROVED CORRECTIVE ACTION i j IF NO - P LE ASE E T LAIN : YES NO l n: DATE:

k. A. R.

CLOAED BY : DATE: APP ROVC D BY : DA"E : ( L__ J

I t 4 Pullman Power Preducts .125 vi. m no rr. ?/v/r $9 DI.u' o C.ayC:: N C CI.2 A.. P CMI ?. ? '.X:T ? " "~ l 3 e.Un.. n C. - e. s.., e. e..- c.,. s- ..a. i. XVII ..U.n s c h e d ule.d l ...s-. ..; 9.. 34 -+._;+.. ve 8 I 9. m ;;.,.I O". Cam... 1 and 2 . c. '. ". _-. v.,. -. -.,. ESD '36 OA Records j Jf'! T D B."'I : 11-18-82 ( i l j ?: F~ ?.~" CT. DCCL':'E::TS : ESD 236 i l l -...Is..,': Valves with Physical Deficiencies I s-I l 1. A. Location #2-PCV-455B valve has a serial number "H.T.N86 S-N26" =arked on the valve. This serial number does not match the serial number listed on the l Data Report (2-25-76). The Data Report serial number is'"26N86". ( c ont.. 2, N )l on 2 . + ,o. p r~:~, f ~~ I!"C 3Y: H. Hudson RAT : 1-10-83 '.C::' ? 27 : O ?.~

U I-l l

i, _- 3 C...m C.3., e. i l s i i i 1. A and B-Each of these valves has been examined four times. There is documented I 1 l evidence with DR 2351 that the valves were repaired once and there are indications ' l on the latest Data Reports (2-25-76) that they were repaired a second time. i mie ~ ec 2 N ( c', n r e , v.... m. n .s.:,... w. 3 -. e y g ..C.

m.,.

w

1. A.

Accept valve if 5'DE Supervisor can prcvide traceability of valve serial number l to Data Report through various repair operations (DR's, shipping documents l and Data Reports.) If not traceable rejec. and remeasure. l l

1. B.

Reject and remeasure. (Continue on pg 3) l { y, f e e. n..n. e m..* s .4 m. m.s. ..y.,. l \\ .*w I l I I m.e4. p s., 3 V.. r30 06.,.*==D 3v.. l A 1 ge,. e p...,,..m m .. p l ...2 .v w l l ) 1 l -.w-.. 2.. r. - -) an a ....wv a.. l

76. 7 44Cf.g

.vm.Vr. A r e..v e.r.* ~ *. 9 bwe mi s.t 1 c .7v..J.

• n o S.,.m. --. m

. m..n.....=.. -. w-.i. S... a w .s .s. ..n_ 3 L,. r.? +,. y....,. .a i l'.' : TATE: l -, r.e f..) ,y. A..% e ,s. Lvs ."). .s n w. l l l._., Oh., 3y: i I, b C __._ _ _ _

V Ww vv w #e M/ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ' re v. 3/30/70 pr# DIADLO CANYON-NUCLEAR PO'1ER PLANT PAGE 2 OF 3 AUDIT ACTION REQUEST heduled s AhnsfT No, : d4 A. A. R. NO, 8.' !LE NO. : XVII o 3SERVATION CODE : 1 and 2 ACTIVIT'l AUDITED: ESD 236 QA Records JDIT DATE': 11-18-82 IFO RCNCC - DOCUMENTS : ESD 236 CNDING: (Continue) 1. B. Location #2-PCV-455A valve has the following numbers marked on the valve: HT 361 SN 16, N-95001, 13088. Thesk serial numbers do not match the serial number listed on the Data Report (2-25-76). The Data Report serial number is "46W210". Valve numbers not matching the Data Report serial number are a nonconformance to ESD 236.7.3.5, 7.3.6, and 4.1. 2. A. Valve location t/2-8956-D has an are strike on the bonnet flange and below the Darling ID tag. B. Valve location d28948-D has an are strike on the valve on the west side near-weld r/WIB 293. In addition there is an are strike'on the 10" SS pipe l approximately 8" southwest of weld i/WIB293. There is also a gouge in the 10" SS pipe, 3/8" x 1/S" x approximately 1/32" deep,15" west of weld.</WIB293. These findings were identified to'QC Inspector Ken Guy. A C. Valve location r/2-8702 has an are strike on the valve near the ID tag. D. Location :/1-8956-A, valve bonnet flange has two bolts that are not fully engaged with the nuts. Bolt !/16 is approximately 2 nut threads below the 1 face of the nut and Bolt </10 is approximately 1 nut thread below the face of nut. The above findings are items of concern requiring supervisory attention. SUSPECTED CAUSES: (Continue) 1. (Cont) Also there are inconsistencies between Data Reports concerning serial numbers referenced. Possible multiple handling and repair'of valves has created confused serial numbers on valves. 2. Unknown OLLOW UP: ACTIVITY CO!TLIES WITH APPROVED CORRECTIVE ACTION F NO - P LE ASE E :P LAIN : YES NO DATE: .A.R. CLCAED BY: DATE: PPROVED BY: DATE: ^

Pullman Power Products rev. 7/6/78 re v. 3/30/79-fr' ? DIADLO CANYCN NUCIEAR POWER PLANT PAGE 3 OF 3 AUDIT ACTION FIOUEST 2. II NO.: XVII AbihN.*:d 34 A. A. R. N O. :

8

) SERVATIOU CODE: 1 and 2 ACTIVITY AUDITCD: ESD 236 QA Records PIT DATE: 11-18-82 FERENCC DOCUMENTS: ESD 236 MDI1GX 1 RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION: (Continue) 2. Arc strikes and gouge be evaluated by QC and appropriate action taken. i i I l .j 3LLOW UP: ACTIVITY COf9 LIES WIT 11 APPROV2D CORFl:CTI'r: ACTION ? NO - PLE ASE E:: PLAIN : YES NO t DATE: .A.R. CLOSED BY: DATE: I l PP ROVCD SY : DATE : I i

- m l ATTACHMENT #1 - DATA REPORTS 4. No Transducer S/N Listed ~ 1. 1-8145 2. 2-8088D 3. 2-8033C 4 2-8088C 5. 1-8067D(7-31-73) No Couplant Listed 1. 2-PCV-455A 2. 2-PCV-455B (#96U86) 3. 2-8000-C No UT Eauipment S/N Listed 1. 1-8075-C 2. 1-PCV-456 3. Valve #0566 (No loc #) 4 Valve #0992 (No loc #) 5. 2-8073-B 6. 2-8033-D 7. 2-8057-B No Frecuency Listed 1. 1 -8067A (5-9-74) 2. 1-8956D (11-29-73) 3. 1-PCV-474 4 2-8378-C (8-8-73) 5. 1-8089-C 6. 1-8089-D 7. 1-8818-B 8. 1-8033-C 9. 1-8740-A 10. 1-8948-C 11. 2-PCV-455A (12-12-75) 12. 2-8073D (1-21-75) 13. 2-8819-B t 14 2-8088-C f 15. 2-8058-4 16. 2-8089-B 17. 2-8075-B 18. 2-8956-B 19. 2-8073-B l i l

ATTACHMENT #2 - DATA REPORTS l No Micrometer S/N Listed 1. 1-PCV-456 1 2. 1-8073-C 3. 1-8956-D (original) 4. 1-8820 5. 1-8948-D 6. 1-8956-C I 7. 1-8033-B 1 8. 2-PCV-455A (2-25-76) i 9. 2-PCV-455B (2-25-76) 10. 2-8379-B 11. 2-8378-C 12. 2-8000-C 13. 2-LCV-459 (Revised) i 14 2-8088-C l Branson/Nortec 303/NDT 120 { l S/N 18060/12224 Listed on Reports l l l 1. 1-8372-B (6-5-73) replacement 2. 1-8372-C (6-5-73) replacement 3. 1-8819-B l 4 1-8819-D 5. 1-8819-C i l 6. 1-8819-A 1 7. 1-8867-D 8. 1-8905-B 9. 1-8377 10. 1-8372-A 11. 1-8905-A 12. 1-8367-B l 13. 1-8372-B (5-17-73) 14. 1-8367-A 15. 1-8905-C 16. 1-8905-D 17. 1-8372-C (5-18-73) 18. 1-8372-D 19. 1-8367-C

13 - DATA REPORTS WITH UT EOUIPMENT S/N NOT TRACEAB

1. 742101 - PPP equipment - traceable g.-

E.

1. 186060 2.

1. 1-8075-A 2. 1-8075-B 51. 1-8073-A 3. 1-3075-D 52. 1-8073-B 4. 1-8088-A 53. 1-8073-C 5. 1-8088-B 54. 1-8073-D 6. 1-8088-0 55. 1-8378-C 7. 1-8088-D 56. 1-8949-A 8. 1-8076 57. 1-8949-B 9. 1-8900-A 58. 1-8949-C 10 1-8900-B 59. 2-8378-B 11. 1-8900-C 60. 2-8379-A 12 1-8900-D 61. 1-8145 13. 1-8810-A 62. 1-LCV-460 14 1-8810-B 63. 1-8379-B (original) 15. 1-8810-C 64 1-8379-A 16 1-8810-D 65. 1-8379-B 17. 1-8000-A 66. 1-8378-A 18 1-8000-B 67. 2-8378-A 19. 1-8000-C 68. 40604 20 1-8074-B 69. 40708 21. 1-8074-C 70.

1. 0833 22, 1-8074-D 71.

1-8956-A 23, 1-PCV-455C 72. 1-8956-B 24 1-PCV-4 74 73. 1-8956-C 25. 1-LCV-459 74. 1-8956-D 26. 1-PCV-455A 75. 1-8378-B

g. 27.

1-PCV-455B 76. 2-8820 77. 1-8820 28. 2-8378C (Orig in L~iT #1 book) 78. 1-8948-D 4 29. 1-8057-C 30. 1-8057-A 79. 1-8740-D 31. 1-8058-A 80. 1-8818-A 32. 1-8058-B 81. 1-8818-B d 33. 1-8058-C 82. 1-8818-C 34 1-8058-D 83. 1-8818-D I 35. 1-8089-A 84 1-8033-C [,36. 1-8089-B 85. 1-8740-A 37. 1-8089-C 86. 1-8033-D j 38. 1-8089-D 87. 1-8948-A 39. 1-8057-B 88. 1-8948-B 40. 1-8057-D 89. 1-8948-C 41. 1-8063-A 90. 2-8948-C ~ 42. 1-8063-B 91. 2-8948-D 43. 1-8063-C 92. 2-8956-D (Original) 44 1-8063-D 93. 2-8956-D 45. 1-8067-A 94. 2-8956-B 46. 1-8067-B 95. 2-8948-A 47. 1-8067-C 96. 2-8956-A 48. 1-8067-D 97 2-8949-B -9. 1-8949-D 98. 2-8818-D 50. 1-8074-A 99. 2-8949-C 100. 2-8949-A

T-ATTACHMENT #4 - DATA REPORTS k'ITH UT EOUIPMENT S/N NOT TRACEABLE ff

1. 186060 (cont) 7012417 (cont) 101.

2-8948-B 21. 2-LCV-459*Torig) 102. 2-8740-A 22. 1-LCV-460 (Unit #2) 103. 2-8740-B 23.

1. 94-1289-76

, ~104 2-8818-A 24 2-8948-C 105. 2-8818-B 25. 2-8063-A 25 106. 2-8818-C 26. 2-8063-A (12-5-73) d! 107. 1-8949-D 27. 2-8057-C ]! 108. 1-8379-B 28. 2-8057-D 109. 1-8378-A 29. 2-8076 110. 1-8379-A 30. 2-8058-A 111.

1. 0664

31. 8058-3 112.

1-8145 32. 2-8058-C Z 113. 1-LCV-460 33, 2-8058-D 34 2-8089-A 1

1. 710247 35.

2-8089-B g 36. 2-8089-C 1. 1-8372-C 37. 2-8089-D 2. 2-8702 38. 2-8075-A 3. 2-8701 39. 2-8075-B q 4 2-8067-A -40. 2-8075-C 3 5. 2-8067-B 41. 2-8063-A (12-5-73) a 6. 2-8067-C 7. 2-8067-D 4701247 8 8. 2-8057-A 9. 1-8372-C (Replacement) 1. 2-8088-D (used #1) 2. 2-8810-C

1. 7012417 3.

2-8810-D 4. 2-8075-D 1. 1-8948-A (Replacement) 5. 2-8088-A 2. 1-8948-B (Replacement) 6. 2-8088-B 3. 1-8948-D (Replacement) 7. 2-8088-C 4. 1-8956-A (Replacement) 5. 1-8956-B (Replacement) d7012717 im 6. 1-8956-C (Replacement) 1 7. 1-8956-D (Replacement) 1. 2-PCV-474 2 8. 2-8145 2. 2-PCV-455C 9. 2-PCV-455B (#26N86) 3. 2-PCV-456 10. 2-PCV-455A 4 2-8956-B i 11, 2-8073-A 5. 2-8948-C 12, 2-8000-A 6. 2-8948-B 13, 2-8000-B 14, 2-8000-C d18060 15, 2-8810-B 16, 2-8949-D (3-7-74) 1.

1. 0991 17, 2-8033-A 2.
2. 0855 18.

2-8033-B 3.

1. 1006 19.

2-8033-C 4 1-8033-B 20, 2-LCV-459 (revised) 5. 1-8033-A 6 1-8701 "{ 7 1-8702

O / ATTACHMENT #5 - DATA REPORTS WITH U*A f EQUIPMENT S/N NOT TRACEABLE i

1. 7102417 f

-,I 1. 2-8377 2. 2-8819-A 3. 2-8819-B '.4. 2-8819-C y,, 5. 2-8819-D -j 6. 2-8905-A j.1 7. 2-8905-B ,h 8. 2-8905-C Aj 9. 2-8905-D 7(p 10. 2-8367-A il 11. 2-8367-B 1 5') 12. 2-8367-C i 13, 2-8372-A .i 14 2-8372-B 15. 2-8372-C 16 2-8372-D 17. 2-8900-A 1 18. 2-8900-B 19. 2-8900-C 20. 2-8900-D ] 21. 2-8810-A -2 22. 2-8063-B 23. 2-8063-C 24 2-8063-D 3' -1 4 J

C 1 O,' I l ,j ATTACHMENT #6 - DATA REPORTS MICROMETERS WITH S/N NOT TRACEABLE <l / l , j y/ l

1. 01
2. 2109286
3. 1-2 (cont) 1.

1-8074-A 1. 2-8073-A 12, 2-8948-C 2. 1-8073-A 2. 2-8000-B 18 2-8948-D 3.~ 1-8073-B 19. 2-8956-C 4. 1-8073-D

1. 22508 MWK 20, 2-8956-D 5.

1-8949-A 21, 2-8948-A 6. 1-8949-B 1. 1-8948-A (Replacement) 22. 2-8956-A j 7. 1-8949-C 2. 1-8948-B (Replacement) 23. 2-8956-B 8. 2-8378-B 3. 1-8948-D (Replacement) 24 2-8948-B 9. 2-8379-A 4 1-8956-A (Replacement) 25. 2-8740-A 10. 1-8145 5. 1-8956-B (Replacement) 26, 2-8740-B 11. 1-LCV-460 6. 1-8956-D (Replacement) 12. 1-8379-A 13. 1-8379-B

1. 1
2. 210928C 14 2-8379-B 15.

1-8378-A 1.

1. 0604 1.

2-8000-A g 16, 2-8378-B 2.

1. 0991 2.

2-8810-A 17. 2-8820 3.

1. 0566 3.

2-8810-C 18. 1-8372-3 4

1. 0992 4

2-8810-D 19. 1-8372-C 5.

1. 0708 5.

2-8949-D (3-7-74) 20. 1-8033-C 6.

1. 0855 6.

2-8033-A 21. 1-8819-B 7.

1. 1006 7.

2-8033-B l 22. 1-8701 8.

1. 0833 8.

2-8033-C 23. 1-8702 9. 1-8956-A 9. 2-8033-D 24 1-8033-A 10. 1-8956-B 10. 2-8702 25. 1-8819-A 11. 1-8378-B ll. 2-8701 26. 1-8819-C 12. 1-8740-B 12. 2-LCV-459(Criginal) 27. 1-8819-D 13. 1-8818-A 13. 2-PCV-474 28. 1-8367-D 14 1-8818-B 14 2-PCV-455C 29. 1-8905-B 15. 1-8818-C 15. 2-PCV-456' 30. 1-8377 16. 1-8818-D 16. 2-S956-3 31. 1-8372-A 17. 1-8033-D 17. d94-12892-76 32. 1-8905-A 18. 2-8948-C 33. 1-8367-B a 1-2 19. 2-8948-D 34. 1-8372-B 20. 2-8948-B 35. 1-8367-A 1. 1-8956-C 36. 1-8905-C 2. 1-8949-C "2250 MWK 37. 1-8905-D 3. 1-8956-A 38, 1-8145 4 1-8956-B 1. 2-8063-C 39. 1-LCV-460 5. 1-8740-B 40. 1-8372-C 6. 1-8818-A 41, 1-8372-D 7. 1-8818-B 42. 1-8367-C 8. 1-8818-C 43. 1-8379-D 9. 1-8818-D 44, 1-8378-A 10. 1-8740-A 45. 1-8379-A 11. 1-8033-D 46.

1. 0664 12.

1-8033-C 13. 1-8948-A 14 1-8948-B 15. 1-8948-C 16. 1-8033-A

AT"T AC,dYn E A) T :d. [o k. - 2v.% 7/ EnoFFICE CO.'tRESPONDENCE 4 THE H. W. KELLOGG COMPANY M W.R. FOX DATE FR N April 17, 1973 R.G. FINK SUBJECT. ..U.t.TRAS ONI C. EXAMi HATI ON,0F. YAL VE5 On 4/16/73, we received an F.O. from P.G. & E. to ultrasonic test valves. We need some of these valves this week for installation. 177 had planned on performing this test P.G. & E. themselves. Therefore, they purchased the U.T. unit, probes, calibration block, etc. They also wrote the procedure and in the process of having it approved. are properly, we mus t resolve the following problems:Cle feel in order to perform this test 1. The P.G. & E, fore, any thickness measurement will be subjectfurnished Branson 30 l There-to ocerator judgment. I 2. The P.G. & E. test This is impossible and atprocedure states the reference block must be ac identifcal. this time, the P.G. & E. supplied ref-erence block available is forged 316. The valves we need tested, 304 The procedure must be revised or a new block must be ordered.first, are 3. The transducers available are adequate for flat smooth surfaces. .a. .w . w,- ,-..-!!-to-There are -..y - -.,.y;,,;;;. ;;.,, 4 At this time, type for thickness readings.it appears the transducers supplied may not be the c t rans duce rs. If this is true, we will have to order new S. The effect of surface contour and roughness must any reportable results. be tested prior to making 6. There is no available information on the U.T. equipment for review. I is doubtful that any meaningful results can be obtained at It and it is definite that none can be reported until the above mentioned this time are solved. We are working on all the above at oroblems this time. However, I would like to point out that plied us, we could have a few weeks delay.this is a difficult project and with the eq i suo-cc: E.Y. Martindale R. P. Badger RGF/bc N h. .~c N h. ss s. N. w\\wa m

-x 1 ATTACHMENT #7 - DATA REPORTS No Step Wedge Info Listed l. 1-8145 2. 1-8475 3, 1-8058-c 4 1-8701 5.. 1-8702 6. 2-8905 No Type of SS List for S.W. Blocks 1. 2-8088-D - only info is QCR (used in #1) 2. 1-8956-A - only info is ASTM A351 3. 1-8956-B - only info is ASTM A351 j 4 1-8956-C - only info is ASTM A351 5. 1-8956-D - only info is ASTM A351 i 6. 1-8033-C - only. info is ASTM A182 4 7. 1-8740-A - only info is ASTM A351 8. 1-8033-D - only info is ASTM A182 9. 2-8145 - only info is Forged SS Note: Per the ASTM Standard there are several grades of ferritic, martensitic, and austenitic steels included for ASTM A182 and 22 grades of austentic steel for ASTM A351. ~ \\

ATTACHMENT #6A - DATA REPORTS FOR VALVES BELOW MINIMUM WALL THICKNESS IDENTIFIED AS UT ACCEPT ON DATA REPORTS 1. 1-8948-B 5-31-73 (R340) 2. 2. 1-8948-A 5-30-73 (R336) 3. 1-8948-D 6-7-73 (R 377) (i .4. 2-8820 6-18-73 (#0855) (in Unit #1 Book) )q 5. 1-8378-B 6-11-73 (P.319) f*q s 6. 1-8956-D 6-16-73 (R388) 7'. 1-8956-C 6-16-73 (R341) .h 8. 1-8956-B 6-12-73 (R337) 'j 9. 1-8956-A 6-11-73 (R339) 3 10. S/N 0833 6-12-73 No loc # 11. S/N 1006 6-12-73 No loc # 12. S/N 0855 6-12-73 No loc # l 13. S/N 0708 6-12-73 No loc # d 14 S/N 0992 6-12-73 No loc # P 15. S/N 0566 6-12-73 No loc # ,,J 16. S/N 0991 6-12-73 No loc # 17. S/N 0604 6-12-73 No loc # 18. 2-8378-A (#0833) 6-18-73 l 19. 1-8378-A 6-17-73 20. 1-8379-B (#1006) 6-18-73 (R745) 21. 1-8379-A 6-17-73 (R319) 22. 1-8379-B (#0991-R742) 6-18-73 (Unit #1 Book) 23. 2-8379-3 (#R319) 6-18-73 (Unit #1 : Jock) 24. y 2-8378-B (#R742) 6-18-73 (Unit di Book) 25. 2-8378-C (In Unit #1 Book) 8-8-73 26. 1-PCV-455-B (#25M367) 8-17-73 27. 1-PCV-455-A (#27N216) 8-17-73 l 28. U2-PCV-455-B (026N86) 4-19-74 29. U2-PCV-455-A (#16M361) 4-19-74 30. 2-8063-A 12-3-73(R728) 31. 2-LCV-459 (revised) 1-14-74 32. 2-LCV-459 (original) 1-14-74 33. 2-8063-A 12-3-73 (R728) 34 2-8948-C 7-16-73 (#94-12892-34) 35. 2-8948-D 7-18-73 (494-12892-59) 36. 2-8956-C 7-21-73 (#94-12892-52) 37. 2-8956-D 7-26-73 (#94-12892-53) 38. 2-8948-A 7-12-73 (R787) 39. 2-8956-B'7-17-73 (v94-12892-55) 40. 2-8956-A 7-17-73 (#94-12892-56) 41. 2-8948-B 7-12-73 (R786) 42. S/N 0664 6-7-73 (R377) l

-_-_--_,,_;----9 ATTACHMENT #8B - DATA REPORTS FOR ACCEPTED VALVES NOT IDENTIFIED ON REPORT AS BEING ACCEPTED - ITEM </7 1. 2-PCV-455B 25-76 S/N 26N86 l 2. 2-PCV-455A 25-76 S/N 46W 2.lo 3. 2-8379-B S/N 0604 2-6-76 4. 2-8379-A - 0708 2-6-76 ~5. 2-8378-A - 0566 2-6-76 6. 2-8820 - 0659 2-6-76 7. 1-8067-A 501148 1-16-78 I T. I c,- ,e* 'T t ( 4 I I t

m - ,,,j. HE M.W. KELLOGG COMPANY A DIVt PULLMAN INCOI.PORATED D R. NO. I168 bC N M N l tSo. No. I n. rte 32 4 dll A DISCREPANCY REPORT UNIT NO. 9 COCE NO. TOMER: pacifle Gas & Electric SPEC.NO. 8711 DA7E: 'l-3-73 MOJECT. Diablo Canyon JOB NO.. 7177 INSPECTOR W-JohnMon ?ISCR EPANT ITEM; 10-C48Z Darline Valves IXPLAN ATION OF olSCREPANCY: Below listed valves are below minimun wall requirements: (See attached data reports) 2-8948-A -47 2-89564A I'C 4 2-8948-B - a'8 2-8956-8 " 5* " 2-8948-C .5'+ 2-8956-c d z 2-8948-0.Jy 2-8956 s'.3 .y, .q I l. h,*,'.[

~

1 J 1% $.'~ J,, ECOMMENCED DISPOSITION: 1). Notify P. G. & E. of the above listed discrepancies in the Form of a 0 R. for record purposes. 2). P. G. & E. will provide final disposition instructions on this D.R. 3). Until valves are dispositioned they will be placed on hold.

• Accepted oer Ves tinghouse letter, attached.

All others returned to Wes t inghouse per P. G. & E.

a. - a r- > S-ny K. Field Q. A. Mgr.

Date Custorner Date 3 */' k k AL DISPOSITION C in Accordance With Above h l C Otner 'espiopon and approvoi reewireell ,r. ~o rnp ie v ed insp: Date: l Worli C ornoleted inso: Dore:

PLANATICN teF NECESSARYl;

\\N-l hK F* eld C. A. Manager oste Cust orner l Date j j EPS TC PAEVENT RECURRENCE C Not Applicable J l F'etc C A Yamager ST ai 8 UTION 2 Master Q. A F iie I Auth inso I Engmeerms Dept-C Otner E Custorner C Receiving C Fieid Inspector t l ' ACM SK E*CH 18 NECESS ARY l j

i H M.W. KELLOGG COMPANY A T T At AM E b> T A olVISloN OF PULt. MAN INCor.PO3ATED DA NO. O' C Q 1 ISO. NO. 1-QCh@.A M S6 DISCREPANCY REPORT UNIT No. I i j CCDE NO, 60?Fnnonnnrreoan CUSTOMER: Pacific Gas & Electric ( SPEC.NO: 8711 OATE. June 4, 1973 j P AOJE CT. Diablo Canyon JOB NO.. 7177 INSPECTOA:.E.Y., Ma r t i nda i e olSCREPANT ITEM-Darling check valve I-8Ch8-A R336 tyoe IOC 48% I 2 XPL AN ATION OP DISCREPANCY-I (-iG -z*) Area noted on " Data Report Valve Thickness Form" is below minimum 1.310 In. \\ See attached report. 1 l I i l ?.-'. m S',.."'"-- t> ., i 't i 3 U.' ', i l RECOMMENDED CISPCSITION-l l l. Notify P. G. & E. of discrepancy per this 0.R. 2 P. G. & E, to answer on this D. R. for corrective action. l l 1 l I i Rejected and returned to Westinghouse per P. G. & E. 2/2.r/frv l M W K. Fiesd Q.A. M%gr.T' ((I 7 l Aoo ./I-Date J Owstome' Oate b' ' # * [4 71'N AL DISPOSITION: C in Accordance With Above i { C Other evelowben and aposovoi eeow red,' I n,. C.,.. e,.. inse Dove: l work C ornei..ee insp: Oore-l o 1 ) IXPLANATICN liF NECESSARY). 1 A W ( Field Q. A. Venager Oste Customer Oate i ;TEPS 'O PA EVENT RECUR A( NCE $ Not Assiecsble l Field Q. A. Vanaae' ) STmieUTION 2 Maste' C A. Fise 1 A utn into. 2 Engineering Ceot Z Otn ' i e 2 Custome' Caeceiving E F'e'd insoector M

THE M.W. KELLOGG COMPANY A civisi:N CF PULLMAN INCOIPo AATEo D.R NO 960 k U MNMIdI iso. NO. 1-69458 l d qC DISCREPANCY REPORT UNIT NO. I CODE No. 0820CC00rCCCCCCC CUSTOMER Pacific Gas & Electric SPEC.NO. 8711 DATE; 6 h-71 (resohmittad 4.7 63 PAoJECT. aMo Canyon JOB NO.. 7177 INSPECTOA E. Y. Martinda1e 1 Disc A ES ANT ITEM: DARLING CHECK VALVE l-8048-B R340 Tyoe 10C48Z l f E X PL AN ATIO$ OF' Ol$CREP ANCY: ] I \\ 1 Area noted on " Data Report Valve Thickness Form" is below minimum l 1.310 inches. See attached reoort. p,.v n

g " n.

.\\ '4

f f.; Q '.*,

e i. 1 ..b -q ..c r. .,.e .= .i %, G \\ l i AECOMMENDEO DISPOSITION: l

1. Nctify P. G. & E. of discrepancy per this D.R.

2. P. G. r, E. to answe r on this D.R. for corrective action.

I l l Rejected and returned to Westinghouse per P. G. &E. "I-[@F ^ ~ / - M.W K. Fisic Q, A. Mgr Date ~ ' Cwstorner s4<f Cate N " /

• I4

.A sin AL 015 POSITION; C in Accoroance Mth Above C Otner encloaot a appro voi re coirec i n dor. C omp leted Insp; Do'e: f Work Completed insp Do'ei l l E APLAN ATION llF NECESSARYI s i Ni h C 8.eid C. A. Manager Date C ust omer Cate ST!*S *O PA EVENT AECU ARENCE ", Not App bcoble Fiend C A 'Aanaaer OiS T A l e U TI O *e Z Master O. A Fae 1AWtn inso. T Engineering Dept C Otner I Customer C Aeceiving Q F.eid intoector i AT* ACM SK E*CM IF NECESS A AY

ATTACHMENT #10 - DATA REPORTS WITH VALVES BELOW MINIMUM WALL NOT ID'ed ON DR's i Min Location Type SN Date N in Allow Obtained 1. 2-8379-A 3C58

1. 0991 R742 6-18-73

.625 .575 2 1-8379-B 3C58

1. 1006 R745 6-18-73

.625 .585 -r-- t 3. 2-8378-A 3C58

1. 0833 R742 6-18-73

.625 .580 F 4. No location # 3C58

1. 0991 R742 6-12-73

.625 .575 44 5. No location # 3C58

1. 0855 QCR07572 R745 6-12-73

.625 .575 2 l 6. No location # 3C58

1. 1006 QCR07572 R745 6-12-73

.625 .585

• 7.

No location # 3C58

1. 0833 QCR07073 R742 6-12-73

.625 .580 F 8. 2-8820 3C58

1. 0855 R745 6-18-73

.625 .575 C 9. 1-8820 3C58 R377 6-7-73 .625 .500 ---Data Report under remarks states " return to Westinghouse 2-8475 DR1031". But DR 1031 indicates delete from explanation of discrepancy.----- 10. II-PCV-455A 4RASSRGA

1. 6910 16M361 12-12-75

.750 .590 11. 2-PCV-455B 4RA58RGA

1. 13088-1 96N86 12-9-75

.750 .440 l 12. 2-PCV-455B 4RA58RGA

1. 26N86 11-17-75

.750 .505 i '3. 2-PCV-455A 4Ra58RGA

1. 46W210 11-17-75

.750 .630 l g Same valve but different Data Reports, tested on different dates, i l d-Same valve but different Data Reports, tested on different dates. l 9 Same valve but different Data Reports, tested on different dates. l G Same valve but different Data Reports, tested on different dates. l l l l w_____

e e l A oabT v i n pl h y h t d N 1 P7 A d t g a l - l poa u 6T Ect yt s .t e 1 i. ua v P o a i 3 t nnb hT 5 d b n 4 t t . vet s n 2 e e s o ~ r2 I s r a cI E e S. nr 2 h aaa u me e s "s q e c t I e-R sD T a oeM s aas7I t c w Dd l I t7 - n wc r eUt ee - i y S e t er n a a UU A V t( 1 e uC h rl v5 sf f h Et s r uet o i <. b A D X e 0 sRd Q t eocl2 s n ef sd s t L 1 e e/ h pua - a c i t. f e t an'.I B vncA f t mN v7 l t eh im e e o 's e l ooQ. o i C r p w n. e nl mpe 0 s R air 6 y nl d aS n el ob sv soae" 5 u D V t pe3 t b p ,e np i aeel e o a h2 n eyut s t6 r im t t vral Rh E ycgt ed vnd a aec3 u mi ail rVb F g 6 ri n D mel aid ra2 s r c uao a C n C af i yS eraC v ,t ar a ee i s vCf l i P di t bE riv i u t D e. t r f oi 0 t nl s uu" ed0 od nS m2 e e i a h e a 1 s N uaed r s q l n8 noE 7d w r cc nv e O o ut e o aer bi0d aC s - ef aio a W ) BQ nf er o a - 2 e d s0 as voef i 2 I ei m f i e re e2 t t f t s 7 T f evmd s DhEll "y i d n - n eesoa e A ori r e t a2 t & ar eik6d e r rarng 0 S V ut ed a 7 e G cah vc em ue eid 2 t d ct e h s h sP d t oif me d wst me T R ne uee t s0 t e# en rh orr e enaw N 6 E e c rd n e2 i r unpt oi c sl I x E S mot d n tf raoi rf u ond E r ( t r e rs st ek6 aie b ) l erq r od o B t e rP e ao i c t t r E sl t ee pi a .c u O u d wn fifd nt ee6 t at pr " t s7 i s t C t s an i h oeeet rG c we c n e O e a ot s t t ldl t uP u l st f er6 o o T D e gnI a n rl i e s d y an opo sh 1 M n w el ea el s yod. we s ,6 as S C i a dl t t 1 s eb r o D. 4 m en 3 r I E E sv .d i at sR uer u cis2 t r, Pb T L C A s at sr wen-os pI E. # 3 c n e l e N K N eh os o s l i3h u re o eegDU t n nec am 0 got se vA d dhdS" p A C N E 6 k t ne h ure1 nh ns wl t i t eE a 03 I E O R 1 c o s k S. mib#i gaaoaeie v w gd D P I E 2 i nac. nie t nll P vhd c en ona I I WR C R F h wig onh ot si oC t ur, i ,ti D Ts ho iit t ret o ne Ausd s no F E E a6 tl t m oWs ccah y owed eer n S H GN T T R E c 3 t a nrp e i mtbl s ot e oc e e I I i1 2l a geioenWrml a l nsh nc r O D R n0 ac i r R o osl td ndl eusan e o1 Dii t und eti unereom mo w GP U 'C s# S rf ssoeynh ceP e r ecf uehrc ER A a E ei esil cwt as( mit n c rt o e T rt t l vasl no e eunesoeif ,r RA Y I t i t aa n s aah n r s gl qI rad cwn3 e ld amu i oit psi agpe e u o7h EI T D U uh Q t mse e omrdf eodd c - t DI I U At e t mnr sdhdl i eerns en7 C L A re nd oicaet el sl ra nt o1 e U A ld ur eeC s i t eoau sapn t 6 aes u um i ef paKt d s sira 4 a q r y"y D b i N U 3 nl ad un ,d eut td a d Q 2 raee eogt t g. oh ol e a d eemc sf reel neiWEh ciurt set Dt v o b ref &l ek s 6 t s rse adi t a S neor uenaGid ae .G enaehh nh ah EI rt P S pE sP vimdMP mU vrTt aTdt 'A B C n s o j^ s d i 0 '* yb r s 7". J % *'.. f" ". - o s .E..'

• G gm c

i U" 1'. O. e m '7* .J

• COf. r "d

e E.

R m ge.- I. r ""J d"O" f. o

L".J e

T C c N

• l

" t C 'J. 0. ;= 1 . O **l iif.

f'.

n E y i U. a

u. !7 g

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__.m (L d d 2c Pullrnar1 Power Procfucts Fo?; r-126 nav. 7/6/79 { re v. 1/3/ 79 re v. 2/29/79 DI A3LO CA'iYO'I ;1CCL2?.2 .!. c _. y i P O".7E R PIXIT { u. /-- 1 I PAGE 1 or 1 QUALITY AUDIT SU!"iARY REPORT

3IT '70.

101 FII2 NO.:

I UlTIT M.TE :1-18-82 l ;CTI"I'"'1 AUDIT.:D l Organization DIS T RI B U"'I C.'7 21~LE I 1.N 'E j AP P LI CA3 LE DCCUENTS I PG&E 8833XR, 8711 I VTcE ??2sIrrr oA E.F. Ge m n DI?2CTCR OF CA A.A. Eck

0???50FI. F D-1. FP-16. F P-2

?2S OE E CCNS~5.. VGR. J. E'. an l.; ; '.; C5 OF Al'3IT l SUPER. A:2A AU3I' rD E. Ka ner. R. Eine Scheduled A.N.I. R. Sanderson [ CTE A l ? ED CA/;CyyASE. 1 H. Ka-er 7.o. Um r'C NS ~R. I ?. E ev e. s DO&T J. A-e r A. A. 3. c o..._ s - c._ ~...-v e :s L I CRGAN12ATICN I This audit was conducted to dete: ine if lOE Procedures were cu~alifi and if the Field Organi:aticn Chart reflected ue EFP-1 Organizatic'n Chart. Twenty-one IDE Procedures were audited. l " Procedure Qualification Reccrds" Iccated in the Master Job Fi Three 'CI Procedures were provided to Pullnan by PG&E and the qualification reccrds are naistained by PG&E. Two NDE Procedures are used to neasure naterial 1 1 thickness and do not require procedure qualification? Five ICE Procedu es do not have evidence that the special processes are accenplished using quali-fled procedures or that qualification records were naintained to docunent and assure quality of naterial and work. e L Q A/ c c. %9 8.K m. Mcm Spsty The Field QA/QC Organi:atien Chart listed all job functions listed en 2 2 the EF?-1 Organization Chart. the reporting relationships between job functions.The Fie'd Chart does not ha The Field Char dces n:: accurately show the reperting relationship of the QA Manager to the Resident Const uction Manager and to the Director of Quality Assurance. 1 3 the Field Production / Engineering Organizatic: Chart listed all job functions except one that was listed en the KFP-1 Organization Chart. h e job function of " Material Cont." was not listed on the Field Chart. 2 3 The Fiel; Chart had a key explaining the reporting relationships between job functions but the Eey is different fren the FP-1 Chart Eey and does net include the sane type infernation. The reporting relationships of Field F_ngineers (Rup-l { ture Restraint, Piping, Hangers and Snubbers) and the Buyer de not agree with the EFF-1 Chart. FZ 5.3 0. 5 I3 LE CONTACT: B. KAP.NER PT2PA?23 BY: H. HUDSON - ~ T 12 : CA/0C MANAGER TITL~:IN~ERNAL A"DITC* OATC: 1-1C-92 --____-_}}