ML20234D181
| ML20234D181 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 07/01/1987 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Mroczka E NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20234D185 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8707070127 | |
| Download: ML20234D181 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000245/1987009
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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July 1, 1987
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Docket No. 50-245
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
ATTN: Mr. Edward J. Mroczka
Senior Vice President - Nuclear
Engineering and Operations
Post Office Box 270
Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270
Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
INSPECTION NO. 50-245/87-09 (04/20/87 - 04/24/87)
This refers to the inspection performed by Messrs. E. T. Baker and P. J. Prescott
of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) Vendor Inspection Branch on April 20-24,
1987, at Millstone Unit 1 of activities authorized by NRC License No. DPR-21.
Our findings were discussed with Mr. J. Stetz and others of your staff at the
conclusion of the inspection.
The purpose of this inspection was to review the check valve testing programs
at Millstone Unit 1.
Particular attention was directed to the ability of the
testing to establish disk and seat integrity, location of check valves in
relation to turbulence generators, maintenance and failure history, and the
licensee's response to the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations' (INP0's)
SignificantOperatingEventReport(SOER)86-3concerninginspectionand
testing of check valves.
The findings of this inspection were that (1) you did not report the failure
te pass a leak tightness test of 8 of 12 check valves in the nitrogen supply
system to the automatic depressurization system valves; (2) you failed to take
corrective action to eliminate the recurrence of rust particles, which caused
the 8 check valves mentioned in (1) above to leak again; and (3) you failed to
ensure the adequacy of one test procedure, which was written to test four
low-pressure coolant injection (LPCI) pump discharge check valves, but actually
resulted in only two of the valves being tested for isolation function.
Additionally, the procedure for testing shutdown cooling pump discharge check
valves was r M sed to shift the inspection of the isolation function to the
pump testing procer ure. Although the valve inspection was deleted from the valve
test procedures it was not added to the pump test procedure. These deficiencies
have been cla!- fied as Potential Enforcement Findings 50-245/87-09-01,
50-245/87-09-02,ind 50-245/87-09-06,
8707070127 870701
ADOCK 05000245
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Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
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July 1, 1987
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Discussio'hs concernirig the. response to the SOER did not elicit any indications
of significant changes to the current testing and inspection programs.
It-
appeared that correceive, as opposed to preventive, maintenance was being
performed for the chec'; valves examined.
The potential enforcemd t findings are being referred to the NRC Region
office
for review and appropriate action. .Should you have any questions on this matter,
we would be pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely,
D nn b
rute kield, Dir
tor
Division of Reactor Proje s - III, IV, V
and Special Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
1.
Potential Enforcement Findings
50-245/87-09-01,50-245/87-09-02,
50-245/87-09-06
2.
Inspection Report No. 50-245/87-09
cc w/ enclosure:
See next page
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Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
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July 1, 1987
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cc w/ enclosures:
Gerald Garfield, Esquire
Mr. Richard M. Kacich, Manager
Day, Berry & Howard
Generation Facilities Licensing
Counselors at Law
Northeast Utilities Service Company
City. Place
Post Office Box 270
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Hartford, Connecticut 06102-3499
Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270
Wayne D. Romberg
Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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Northeast Utilities Service Company
Post Office Box 270
Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270
Bradford S. Chase, Under Secretary
Energy Division
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Office of Policy and Management
80 Washington Street
Hartford, Connecticut 06160
Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Mr. J. Stetz, Plant Superintendent
Millstone Unit 1
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Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
P. O. Box 128
Waterford, Connecticut 06385
Resident inspector
c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Millstone Nuclear Power Station
P. O. Box 811
Niantic, Connecticut C6357
First Selectman of the Town
of Waterford
Hall of Records
200 Boston Post Road
Waterford, Connecticut 06385
Kevin McCarthy, Director
Radiation Control Unit
Department of Environmental Protection
State Office Building
Hartford, Connecticut 06106
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POTENTIAL ENFORCEMENT FINDINGS
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Northeast' Nuclear Energy Company
Docket No. 50-245
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
License No. DPR-21
As a result of the NRC inspection conducted at Millstone Unit 1 on April 20-24,
1987, and in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures
for NRC Enforcement Actions," Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
Part 2 (10 CFR 2), Appendix C (1986), the following potential enforcement
findings were identified:
A.
Potential Enforcement Finding 50-245/S7-09-01
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10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(1) requires that the NRC be notified within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />
of any event, found while the reaccor is shut down, that, had it been
found while the reactor was in operatw n, would have resulted in the
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nuclear power plant's principal safety barriers being seriously degraded
or being.in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant
safety.
10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iii) requires a similar notification, any
condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety
function of systems that are needed to safely shut down the reactor or
to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to notify the NRC that 8 of 12
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check valves in the nitrogen supply system to the automatic depressurization
system (ADS) valves failed to pass the required leak test r.onducted on
November 2,1985.
The licensee also stated that a licensee event report
(LER) had not been submitted.
B.
Potential Enforcement Finding 50-245/87-09-02
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action," requires that
in the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, measures shall
be established to ensure the cause of the condition is determined and
corrected to preclude recurrence.
Contrary to the above, although the licensee determined that the check
valves in the ADS failed the leak test on November 2, 1985 (see PEF
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67-09-01) because of rust particles on the seat of the valves, the licensee
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did not take any action to prevent recurrence of the problem. The licensee
knew that the ring header, which supplies nitrogen to the accumulators,
has extensive internal surface corrosion.
C.
Potential Enforcement Finding 50-245/87-09-06
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI, " Document Control," in part requires
that procedures, including changes, be reviewed for adequacy.
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Contrary to the above:
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1.
Station Procedure SP622.7 was written to test the opening and closing
of all four low-pressure coolant injection (LPCI) pump discharge
\\ check valves. However, the test resulted in only two of the valves
being verified as closed because of the sequence of running the
pumps and the inspection / testing criteria for verifying valve
closure.
2.
Station Procedure SP623.20 was revised September 10, 1986, deleting
testing of the shutdown cooling pump discharge check valves. The
valve testing was supposed to be transferred to Surveillance Procedure
1060-38 which covered testing the pumps. However, a review of that
procedure revealed that the valve testing was not adced to Surveillance
Procedure 1060-38 after it was deleted from SP623.20.
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