ML20217Q413
| ML20217Q413 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1998 |
| From: | Andersen J NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Bowling M NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| References | |
| TAC-MA1258, NUDOCS 9804100429 | |
| Download: ML20217Q413 (8) | |
Text
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Mr. MIrtin L. Bowling, Jr.
April 3, 1999 Rtcov:ry Officer-Millstona v/
Unit Ns.- 2 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company-clo Ms. Patricia A. Loftus Director-Regulatory Affairs.
e P.' O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 -
SUBJECT:
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3 - CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES SECTIONS 3/4.6.6.1,3/4.7.7,3/4.7.9 AND
. 3/4.9.12 (TAC NO. MA1258)
Dear Mr. Bowling:
- By letter dated March 16,1998, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (the licensee) submitted a
- change to Technical Specification (TS) Bases Sections 3/4.6.6.1, " Supplementary Leak' Collection and Release System," 3/4.7.7, " Control Room Emergency Ventilation System," 3/4.7.9,
- " Auxiliary Buildmg Filter System," and 3/4.9.12,
- Fuel Building Exhaust Filter System." The change addresses the application of a correction ~ factor to be used in surveillance procedures for the emergency safeguard features filtration unit heaters.
In the March 16,1998, letter, the licensee stated that the TS require a surveillance to verify that
- the emergency safeguard features filtration unit heaters dissipate the nominal rated kW output plus or minus 10 percent when tested in accrerdance with ANSI N510-1980.~ The changes to the TS Bases sections address the application of a correction factor to be used in surveillance procedures to modify the heater's measured kW prior to comparing to the heater's 480V rating.
Tlee licensee stated that the correction factor will ensure that the heater's performance will not be influenced by bus. voltage variances.
The Millstone Unit 3 Plant Operating Review Committee approved the revision to Bases Sections
- 3/4.6.6.1,3/4.7.7,3/4.7.9 and 3/4.9.12 on March 2,'1998. The NRC staff has reviewed the change and has no objection to the wording.~ A copy of revised TS Bases pages B 3/4 6-6, B 3/4 7-16, B 3/4 7-23, and B 3/4 9-8 are enclosed.
. Sincerely,;
Original _ signed.by:
James W. Andersen, Project Manager Special Projects Office - Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-423 -
Enclosure:
_ Revised TS Bases pages B 3/4 6-6, B 3/4 7-16, B 3/4 7-23, and B 3/4 9-8 cc w/ encl: See next page 1
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April 3, 1998 Mr. Martin L. Bowling, Jr.
Recovery Officer-Millstone t
Unit No. 2 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company clo Ms. Patricia A. Loftus Director-Regulatory Affairs P. O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385
SUBJECT:
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3 - CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES SECTIONS 3/4.6.6.1,3/4.7.7,3/4.7.9 AND 3/4.9.12 (TAC NO. MA1258)
Dear Mr. Bowling:
By letter dated March 16,1998, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (the licensee) submitted a change to Technical Specification (TS) Bases Sections 3/4.6.6.1,
- Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System," 3/4.7.7, " Control Room Emergency Ventilation System," 3/4.7.9,
" Auxiliary Building Filter System," and 3/4.9.12, " Fuel Building Exhaust Filter System." The change addresses the application of a correction factor tc be used in surveillance procedures for the emergency safeguard features filtration unit heaters.
In the March 16,1998, letter, the licensee stated that theTS cequire a surveillance to verify that the emergency safeguard features filtration unit heaters dissipats the nominal rated kW output plus or minus 10 percent when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980. The changes to the TS Bases sections address the application of a correction factor to be used in surveillance procedures to modify the heater's measured kW prior to comparag :o the heater's 480V rating.
The licensee stated that the correction factor will ensure that thf, neater's performance will not be influenced by bus voltage variances.
The Millstor:e Unit 3 Plant Operating Review Committee approved the revision to Bases Sections J
3/4.6.6.1,3/4.7.7,3/4.7.3 and 3/4.9.12 on March 2,1998. The NRC staff has reviewed the change and has no objection to the wording. A copy of revised TS Bases pages B 3/4 6-6, B 3/4 7-16, B 3/4 7-23, and B 3/4 9-8 are enclosed.
Sincerely, t
es W. Andersen, Project Manager Sper.ial Projects Office - Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-423
Enclosure:
Revised TS Bases pages B 3/4 6-6, B 3/4 7-16, B 3/4 7-23, and B 3/4 9-8 cc w/ encl:
See next page
f CONTAINNENT SYSTENS BASES 3/4.6.6.1 SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM (Continued)
Surveillance Recuirements i
Cumulative operation of the SLCRS with heaters operating for at least 10
)
continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The 31-day frequency was developed in consideration of the known reliability of fan motors and con-
~
trol s'.
This test is~ performed on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS once per 31-days
- b. c. e. and f These surveillances verify that the required SLCRS filter testing is performed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2.
ANSI N510-1980 shall be used in place of ANSI N510-1975 referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2.
The surveillances include testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). The heater kW measured must be corrected to its nameplate rating. Variations in system voltage can lead to measurements of kW which cannot be compared to the nameplate rating because the output kW is proportional to the square of the voltage.
d The automatic startup ensures that each SLCRS train responds properly.
The REFUELING INTERVAL frequency is based on the heed to perform this surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the surveillance was performed with the reactor at power. The surveillance verifies that the SLCRS starts on a SIS test signal.
It also includes the automatic functions to isolate the other ventilation systems that are not part of the safety-related postaccident operating configuration and to start up and to align the ventilation systems that flow through the secondary containment to the accident condition.
The main steam valve building ventilation system isolates.
Auxiliary building ventilation (normal) system isolates.
Charging pump / reactor plant component cooling water pump area cooling subsystem aligns and discharges to the auxiliary building filters and a filter fan starts.
i Hydrogen recombiner venMistion system aligns to the postaccident configuration.
The ' engineered safety features building ventilation system aligns to the i
postaccident configuration.
NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 6-6 Amendment No. 77, 777,-
Revised by NRC Letter dat'ed
)
April 3, 1998
0 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS (Continued)
During the first hour, the control room pressurization system creates and maintains the positive pressure in the control room. This capability is verified by Surveillance Requirement 4.7.8.C. independent of Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7.e.2.
Furthermore, ACTIONS A.2 and B.1 of Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.8 requires that an OPERABLE control room emergency air filtration system be initiated and maintained in the recirculation mode i
following'both control _ room envelope pressurization systems becoming inoperable (e.g., a breech in the control room envelope).
Running the control room tir filtration system in the recirculation mode with the control room emergency. pressurization inoperable would prohibit the ability to create and maintain a positive pressure in the control room envelope, because no source
-of air would be available to pressurize the. control room envelope..A CBI signal will automatically align an operating filtration system into the recirculation mode of operation due to the isolation of the air supply line to the filter.
After the first hour of an event with the potential for a radiological release, the control room emergency ventilation system will be placed in service in either the recirculation mode (isolated from the outside environment) or filtered pressurization mode (outside air is diverted through the filters to the control room envelope to maintain a_ positive pressure).
The mode of service for the control room emergency air filtration system will be based on the radiological conditions that exist outside the control room.
Alignment to the filtered pressurization mode requires manual operator action to open the air supply line.
4.7.7.e.3 This surveillance verifies that the heaters can dissipate 9.4 i 1 kW at 480V when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
The frequency is at least once per REFUELING INTERVAL. The heater kW measured must be corrected to its nameplate rating. Variations in system voltage can lead to measurements of kW which cannot be compared to the nameplate rating because the output kW is proportional to the square of the voltage.
4.7.7.f Following the complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, the operability of the cleanup system should be confirmed. This is accomplished by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criterion of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a DOP test' aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of 1,120 cfm i 20%.
NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 7-16 Amendment No. JM.
Revised by NRC Letter dated Aprill3.1998
~
PLANT SYSTENS 1
BASES 3/4.7.c AUXILIARY BUILDING FILTER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Building Filter System ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the equipment within the charging pump, component cooling water pump and heat exchanger areas following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment. The charging pump / reactor plant component cooling water pump ventilation system must be operational to ensure operability of the auxiliary building filter system and the supplementary leak collection and release system. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continucus hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce.the buildup.of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The operation of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the safety analyses. ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing. The heater kW measured must be corrected to its nameplate rating. Variations in system voltage ca'n lead to measurements of kW which cannot be compared to the nameplate rating because the output kW is proportional to the square of the voltage.
3/4.7.10 SNUBBERS All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and all other safety-related systems is main-tained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads.
For the purpose of declaring the affected system OPERABLE with the inoperable snubber (s), an engineering evaluation may be performed, in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.
Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size.
Snubbers of the same manufacturer but having different internal mechanisms are classified as different types. For example, mechanical snubbers utilizing the same design features of the 2-kip, 10-kip and 100-kip capacity manufactured by Company "A" are of the same type. The same design mechanical snubbers manufactured by Company "B" for the purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer.
A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50.
The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee. The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g.,
NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 7-23 Amendment No. 77. JJ7, J77, 0677 Revised by NRC Ltr dated April 3,19
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and STORAGE POOL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis.
3/4.9.12 FUEL BUILDING EXHAUST FILTER SYSTEM The limitations on the Fuel Building Exhaust Filter System ensure that all radioactive iodine released from an irradiated fuel assembly and storage pool water will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to. discharge to the~ atmosphere. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters.
The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the safety analyses.
ANSI NS10-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.
The heater kW measured must be corrected to its nameplate rating.
Variations in system voltage can lead to measurements of kW which cannot be compared to the nameplate rating because the output kW is proportional to the square of the voltage. The filtration system removes radiciodine following a fuel handing or heavy load drop accident.
Noble gases would not be removed by the system. Other radionuclides would be scrubbed by the storage pool water. Iodine-131 has the longest half-life: -8 days. After 60 days decay time, there is essentially negligible iodine and filtration is unnecessary.
3/4.9.13 SPENT FUEL POOL - REACTIVITY The limitations described by Figure 3.9-1 ensure that the reactivity of fuel assemblies introduced into Region II are conservatively within the assumptions of the safety analysis.
Administrative controls have been developed and instituted to verify that the enrichment and burn-up limits of Figure 3.9-1 have been maintained for the fuel assembly.
3/4.9.14 SPENT FUEL POOL - STORAGE PATTERN The limitations of this specification ensure that the reactivity conditions of the Region I storage racks and spent fuel pool k,n will remain less than or equal to 0.95.
The Cell Blocking Devices in the 4th location of the Region I storage racks are designed to prevent inadvertent placement and/or storage of fuel assemblies in the blocked locations. The blocked location remains empty to provide the flux trap to maintain reactivity control for fuel assemblies in adjacent and diagonal locations of the STORAGE PATTERN.
STORAGE PATTERN for the Region I storage racks will be established and expanded from the walls of the spent fuel pool per Figure 3.9-2 to ensure definition and control of the Region I/ Region II boundary and minimize the number of boundaries where a fuel misplacement incident can occur.
NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 9-8 Amendment No. 77, JP), JP7, Revised by NRC Ltr datedAig11'3e 199'
a-N:rthe:st Nucle:r En:rgy Comp:ny Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 cc:
Lillian M. Cuoco, Esquire Mr. William D. Meinert Senior Nuclear Counsel Nuclear Engineer Northeast Utilities Service Company Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale P. O. Box 270 Electric Company Hartford, CT 06141-0270 P.O. Box 426 Ludlow, MA 01056 Mr. Kevin T. A. McCarthy, Director Monitoring and Radiation Division Joseph R. Egan, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Egan & Associates, P.C.
79 Elm Street 2300 N Street, NW Hartford, CT 06106-5127 Washington, DC 20037 Regional Administrator, Region i Mr. F. C. Rothen U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Vice President - Work Services 475 Allendale Road Northeast Utilities Service Company King of Prussia, PA 19406 P. O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 First Selectmen Town of Waterford Ernest C. Hadley, Esquire Hall of Records 1040 B Main Street 200 Boston Post Road P.O. Box 54g Waterford, CT 06385 West Wareham, MA 02576 Mr. Wayne D. Lanning Mr. John Buckingham Deputy Director of inspections Department of Public Utility Control Special Projects Office Electric Unit 475 Allendale Road 10 Liberty Square King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415 New Britain, CT 06051 Mr. M. H. Brothers Mr. James S. Robinson, Manager Vice President - Operations NuclearInvestments and Administration Northeast Nuclear Energy Company New England Power Company P.O. Box 128 25 Research Drive i
Waterford, CT 06385 Westborough, MA 01582 i
Mr. M. R. Scully, Executive Director Mr. D. M. Goebel Connecticut Municipal Electric Vice President - Nuclear Oversight Energy Cooperative Northeast Utilities Service Company 30 Stott Avenue P. O. Box 128 Norwich, CT 06360 Waterford, CT 06385 Mr. David Amerine.
Deborah Katz, President Vice President - Nuclear Engineering Citizens Awareness Network and Support P.O. Box 83 Nodheast Utilities Service Company Shelbume Falls, MA 03170 P. O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385
i-Northe st Nucircr En:rgy Company Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 cc:
Mr. Allan Johanson, Assistant Director Mr. Don Schopfer Office of Policy and Management Verification Team Manager Policy Development and Planning Sargent & Lundy Division 55 E. Monroe Street 450 Capitol Avenue - MS# 52ERN Chicago,IL 60603 P. O. Box 341441 Hartfora, CT 06134-1441 Mr. J. P. McElwain Vice President (Acting) - Millstone 3 Citizens Regulatory Commission Northeast Nuclear Energy Company ATTN: Ms. Susan Perry Luxton P.O. Box 128 180 Great Neck Road Waterford, CT 06385 Waterford, CT 06385 -
Mr. G. D. Hicks The Honorable Terry Concannon Unit Director-Millstone Unit 3 Nuclear Energy Advisory Council Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Room 4035 P.O. Box 128 Legislative Office Building Waterford, CT 06385 Capitol Avenue Hartford, CT 06106 Senior Resident inspector Millstone Nuclear Power Station Legislative Office Building c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Captiol Avenue -
P. O. Box 513 Hartford, CT 06106 Niantic, Connecticut 06357 Mr. Evan W. Woollacott Co-Chair Nuclear Energy Advisory Council 128 Terry's Plain Road Simsbury, CT 06070 Little Harbor Consultants, Inc.
Millstone -ITPOP Project Office P.O. Box 0630 Niantic, CT 06357-0630 Mr. B. D. Kenyon Chief Nuclear Officer-Millstone Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P.O. Box 128 Waterford, CT OG385 Mr. Daniel L. Curry Project Director Parsons Power Group inc.
2675 Morgantown Road Reading, PA 1g607
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