ML20217M099
| ML20217M099 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1998 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217M097 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9804080007 | |
| Download: ML20217M099 (3) | |
Text
- f'84 9k UNITED STATES p
'g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e-WASHINGTON, D.C. 30006 0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.116 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF 43 DETROIT EDISON COMPANY FERMI 2 DOCKET NO. 50-341
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated January 28,1998 (NRC-98-0008), as supplemented on March 10,1998 (NRC- 0036), the Detroit Edison Company (DECO or the licensee) requested an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) appended to Facility Operating License No. NPF-43 for Fermi 2.
The proposed amendment would revise the '#" footnote in TS Table 1.2 and the "*" footnote associated with surveillance requirements 4.9.1.2 and 4.9.1.3 to allow placing the mode switch in the Run or Startup/ Hot Standby positions to test mode switch interlock functions while control rods are withdrawn from defueled core cells. The March 10,1998, supplement requested a change in the implementation period and was not outside the scope of the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.
2.0 BACKGROUND
in the current TS, the '#" footnote in TS Table 1.2 allows the mode switch to be placed in the Run or Startup/ Hot Standby positions to test moJe switch interlock functions provided that the control rods are verified to remain fully inserted. The "*" footnote associated with surveillance requirements 4.9.1.2 and 4.9.1.3 is worded slightly different and allows the mode switch to be placed.in the Run or Startup/ Hot Standby positions to test mode switch interlock functions provided that all [ emphasis added] control rods are verified to remain fully inserted.
' At one point during the fifth refueling outage the licensee had multiple control rods withdrawn for maintenance in accordance with TS 3.9.10.2. This TS required that the associated fuel cells
- be defueled and the licensee had complied with this provision. An equipment problem occurred on the refueling bndge.' After repairing the problem, TS required the licensee to test the interlocks before declaring the refuel bridge operable. This would require moving the mode switch from the Refuel or Shutdown positions.- The existing footnotes would not allow this Laction with control rods withdrawn. However, in order to move the rods back into the core, the licensee would need the use of the refuel bridge to place blade guides. This situation identified a defic.ency in the TS.~
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2-3.0 EVALUATION The refueling interlocks are' designed to reinforce the refueling procedures and to reduce the probability of inadvertent criticality, damage to reactor intemals or fuel assemblies, and.
exposure of personnel to excessive radiation. The interlocks are active when the mode switch
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is in the Shutdown or Refuel position. Part of the testing of the interlocks requires moving the i
modo switch out of the Shutdown or Refuel position. The requirement in the footnotes to verify -
j that all rods are inserted is intended to ensure that the core is in a safe confguration before moving the mode switch to a position in which the refueling interlocks are not active. Having all rods inserted ensures that the reactor will remain subcritical.
Defueling a cell means removing the four fuel assemblies around a particular control rod. Once the fuel has been removed from a cell, the associated control reci does not affect the reactivity
.of the core.- The revised footnotes would allow moving the mode switch out of the Shutdown or Refuel position only when the licensee has verified that all control rods have been inserted in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. In addition, TS 3.9.1 prohibits core
- alterations when the mode switch is not in the Shutdown or Refuel position. With these requirements met, there are no credible mechanisms for unacceptable reactivity excursions
- during the planned interlock testing. Therefore, the staff concludes that the changes proposed by the licensee are acceptable.
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
in accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Michigan State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.
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5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that ritay be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. - The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (63 FR 9599). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility c
cnteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),
no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The Con.imission has concluded,' based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there
- is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
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Principal Contributor: Andrew Kugler Datei : March 31, 1998-2
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