ML20217F372
| ML20217F372 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/13/1999 |
| From: | Collins S NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Congel F NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| References | |
| SECY-99-134-C, SECY-99-135-C, NUDOCS 9910200304 | |
| Download: ML20217F372 (18) | |
Text
MEMORANDUM TO:
Frank J. Congel, Director October 13, 1999
~
' incident R sponse Operations a
FROM:'
Samuel J. Collins, Director / Original signed by:
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' ' Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE FOR POWER REACTOR Y2K-P. ELATED AND OTHER NOEDs DURING THE Y2K s
TRANSITION'- FINAL DRAFT FOR USE DURING THE
, j OCTOBER Y2K EXERCISE in accordance with SECY-99-154, " Agency Contingency Plans for the Year 2000 [Y2K]
Computer Problem.in the Nuclear industry," and consistent with SECY 99135 and Appendix E of the NRC Enforcement Policy, botn' titled " Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement
- Discretion for Nuclear Power Plants During the Year 2000 Transition," the staff has prepared the attached final draft implementing procedure (Attachment 1) for power reactor Y2K-related Notices of Enforcement Discretion (NOEDs) for inclusion in the contingency plan. NRR staff consulted with members of the incident Response Operations (IRO) and regional staffs in
- developing this procedure. This memorandum confirms the procedure that NRR and IRO staff have jointly developed for use by the Y2K Response Team and reflects extensive interaction with the regional staff.
. In response to regional suggestions, the attached procedure has been prepared as a " final draft." It will be finalized after the October 15,1999, Y2K exercise. At that time a copy of the procedure will be provided to licensees via a regulatory issue summary.
- This final draft procedure contains the process for granting Y2K-related and other NOEDs during the Y2K transition, the proposed delegation of authority memorandum from the Director of NRR, the proposed staffing plen, a sample NOED processing worksheet, and examples of possible NOED scenarios.
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Attachment:
- 1. Implementing Procedure for Y2K-Related NOEDs cc: 'F. Miraglia H. Miller, RI R. Zimmerman L. Reyes, Ril W. Kane J. Dyer, Rlli ft k.{IE p*1'! h k g l
E. Merschoff, RIV J. Glitter c=
- W. Borchardt.
l-Contacts:. L Raghavan, NRR
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L 415-1471 A. Hansen, NRR 415-1390 qw J. Zwolinski/S. Black H. Berkow G. Holehen Reading Fils, B. Sheron S. Rmhards L.Re9 aven ConendP9es h
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\\{g XCUMENT NAW: P:W2K\\y2kprocedure.upd *See provous concurrence
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OPFICE PD4:PM PD2;PD DLPM D DSSA:D DE:DD IRO NAME LRegheven:cn*
HBerkow*
JZwolinski
- GHolehen
- RWessrnen
- JGiliter *g DATE-Sr21/99 '
9/21!99 IW2999 9/2&99 9/21/99 9/21 OFFICE Rt:RA Ril:RA Rlil:RA RfV.RA ADPT N
NAME HMmer*
LReyev JDyer*
EMerschor BSheron*
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% 99 DATE 1 & 4/99 9/2699 9/3&99 9/29/99 10/12/99 -
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 9910200304 991013 9
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ya UNITED STATES j
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 0001 October 13, 1999
)
MEMORANDUM TO:
Frank J. Congel, Director incident Response Operations FROM:
ctor Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE FOR POWER REACTOR
)
Y2K-RELATED AND OTHER NOEDs DURING THE Y2K TRANSITION - FINAL DRAFT FOR USE DURING THE OCTOBER Y2K EXERCISE In accordance with SECY-99-134, " Agency Contingency Plans for the Year 2000 [Y2K]
Computer Problem in the Nuclear Industry," and consistent with SECY 99-135 and Appendix E of the NRC Enforcement Policy, both titled " Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Nuclear Power Plants During the Year 2000 Transition," the staff has prepared the attached final draft implementing procedure (Attachment 1) for power reactor Y2K-related Notices of Enforcement Discretion (NOEDs) for inclusion in the contingency plan. NRR staff consulted with members of the Incident Response Operations (IRO) and regional staffs in developing this procedure. This memorandum confirms the procedure that NRR and IRO staff have jointly developed for use by the Y2K Response Team and reflects extensive interaction with the egional staff.
In response to regional suggestions, the attached procedure has been prepared as a " final draft." It will be finalized after the October 15,1999, Y2K exercise. At that time a copy of the procedure will be provided to licensees via a regulatory issue summary.
This final draft procedure contains the process for granting Y2K-related and other NOEDs during the Y2K transition, the proposed delegation of authority memorandum from the Director of NRR, the proposed staffing plan, a sample NOED processing worksheet, and examples of possible NOED scenarios.
Attachment:
-1. Implementing Procedure for Y2K-Related NOEDs cc: F. Miraglia H. Miller, RI R. Zimmerman L. Reyes, Ril W. Kane J. Dyer, Rlli E. Merschoff, RIV J. Glitter W. Borchardt Cantacts: L. Raghavan, NRR 415-1471 A. Hansen, NRR 415-1390
m
. g IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE FOR POWER REACTOR Y2K-REl.ATED NOEDS j
1' PURPOSE / DESCRIPTION 1
The NRC's Enforcement Policy, Appendix E (included in the Federa/ Register notice provided in A), describes NRC's Interim Potcy for Exercising Notices of Enforcement Discretion (NOEDs) for Nuclear Power Plants During the Year 2000 Transition. The NRC recognizes that, despite licensees' efforts, power reactors may be sura.eptible toy 2K-related events resulting in potential noncompliance with the license and requiring. shutdown. Such shutdowns could exacerbate localized or widespread powegoutages diet ti$6 serious short-and long-term consequences. Accordingly, continued safe operation'of nudeer power plants,
f during critical Y2K periods may be necessary to help in, maintaining stable and foliable electrical power, NRC enforcement discretion is required for contiriued plant 5ieratibnhnoncomplish6e
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2 CRITERIA g4 2.1 NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 for Notices of Enfor%&O ' %
8 cement Discretion Criteria for granting a regular or weather-related N655 ere con %gd4 tai 6 e Part 9900. For a Y2K-related NOED, licens,edshould" address all o(th6se criteria to the extent practicable except as provided in the Y2K interim NOED policy (Appendix E to the NRC
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2.2 Criteria Unique to Y2K These criteria are prescribed by%ppendix Eto the NRC Enforcement Policy with additional background material provide *d iri the FedeI1sf Msgdsforhotice (Attachment 1 A). In Y2K-related situations nGhich forcedhom,pliance wittificense tionditions (including technical specifications a reliable and glele grid,kehutdown, and*diiiitinued plant operation i (TSs)) wingidgequire a pf licensees may request a NOED. As stated in Appendix E to the NRC Enforcement"
. staff slho,nsider such a request when the licensee has determined that jY ng with th Noenee* conditions would require a plant shutdown; (a) Cop /
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(b) hntinued plant oper&'f A
ation is needed to help maintain a reliable and stable grid; and bN N
(4Any decrease in safety as a result of continued plant opera'. ion is small (considering both
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_and dete tic aspects), and reasonable assurance of public health and safety, the security is maintained with the enforcemeat discretion.
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The guidance in NRC inspection Manual Part 9900 should be followed to the extent possible. In
., recognition of potential communication challenges brought on by the Y2K situation, staff communications and NOED processing should follow this implementing procedure.
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. l During the Y2K transition period, if a non-Y2K-related situation arises that generates a need for a NOED request, the normal NOED guidance in NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 should be followed.
3.1 Licensee Responsibilities g
in seeking NOEDs, power reactor licensees should (a) Follow the existing guidance in the NRC Inspection M,anual Part 9900 to the, extent possible, and provide as much information as possible to enable the NRC staff to make a j/
determination for exercising enforcement discretionMSee SectidiCAO, Part 9900, NQED guidance). Specifically, licensees should provide details of thEstatus of the platit$ isis and nature of the emergency; potential challenges to offsite'and6nsite power sdUrges'; aihd consequences of forced compliance with license conditiors to,the plant and to exacerbation of the emergency situation.
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- g (b) Address criteria in Section 2 above.
MM Q gifA (c) Contact the NRC early in the evaluation process,-particularly in t,, yV critical situations, even though complete information, as specified in NRC inspecuon Manual Part 9900, may not be available.
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(d) Contact, in the following order,,
'NRC Heebquarters Operations Center, the Region IV j
incident Response Center, otMy other asiilab!e regihinal incident Response Center.
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(e) Provide a written justificatiogg in hardahllicrcumstances, justification by telephone followednilthin 24 hods as soon a{pobsilde',' by written justification. Hardship circu$sterNes may Inclu@de ti5te limitationi6r inab:lity to provide writt 4
Y2K-r'eletedeemmunic51tcushIllculties.
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(f) Provide a facelmileef the applicableTS pages.
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3.2 Coraptunications !
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Y unication with NRC and NRC staff approval are required for continued plant operation.
Whout NRC approval ilBensees should take actions in conformance with their license s
oogglitions and applicable regulations (e.g.,10 CFR 50.54(x), if appropriate). If communications established but,$e volume of requests is such that the NRC staff cannot review and
' Attbely fashion, the staff will obtain sufficient safety-significant information from
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" "5ke a prompt initial assessment. Unless the assessment is unfavorable, the i
li Te permitted to proceed with its planned course of action. A more detailed assessment will be made as soon as possible.
3.3 Headquarters and Regional NOED Team Responsibilities The Interim Policy, as published in the Federal Register, directs power reactor licensees to contact the Headquarters Operations Center if they seek enforcement discretion in conjunction
i with a Y2K issue. This parallels the approach taken in situations of severe weather, where the NOED action is managed by the Headquarters staff, with the decision authority delegated to the appropriate NRR project director. Typically, the " severe weather" NOED decision is made by Headquarters with regional concurrence. This approach for Y2K-related NOEDs also was established in recognition of the high confidence in the communications capabilities of the Headquarters Operations Center and the substantial staff expected to be on duty;af the Headquarters Operations Center during the Y2K transition. It is expecte'd however, that most t
Y2K-related NOED requests will involve situations in which, under otM ciic0mstances, the NOED decision would be made by the region, with Headqueriers coilcurrenceras described in.
NRC lospection Manual Part 9900 (that is, a Y2K-related NOED will likely not necessitate an/
exigent TS change.) On the basis of these consideratidos, the folloivi$g ssctiosdescribe the Headquarters and regional respons!bilities in dealing witti power r'eactor Y2K4 elated NOED
- requests, h ' ~@
N4f e<fr (a) The reactor safety team director, or his designee, andthe regional administrators, or their designees, are delegated the authority from the Director,$RRl tsgrant NOEDs. (See B for delegation of authority and Attachment 1C%gf for staffing plans.)
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(b) The Headquarters Y2K Response Team, expects that the Regior(ly and cognizant Regional incident Response Center teams (if other than Region IV) will, participate in all telephone discussions with the licensee and alj intemal staff dismssions,*to the extent possible. The cognizant regional team should assule participition by 'the appropriate resident inspector, if possible.
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(c) The Headquarters Y2K Response Team will coordinate all NOED-related requests and activitiesg n conjunction iuith the cognizant regional team. Both teams will jointly evaluate i
such rehdests. In tije' event that the Headq'uart6rs Operations Center is no longer functional, the Regior) IV Incident Response Centir will assume the coordination role. In this situation, it is ex~pected that Regiort3 williransfer the lead for NOED approval to the cognizant regional IRC teani'on a case-tiyfcase_ basis. Following the Part 9900 analogy for severe weather NOEDs; the HeadquartersN2K Response Team will assume lead responsibility for the agency response tEY2K-related NOEDs. Depending on the nature of the request and the corriheting aciiv_ltie'I,{tts headquarters team may request a regional team to take the s
leadlor some NOED evaluations.
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([d)1lf situations arise that result in a loss of commu Headquarters and pegion IV, any region can process and grant NOEDs, consistent with the
@pMY2K delegatiot) of authority (Attachment 1B).
Of%Aff (e);WheN m,ultiple NOED requests need to be evaluated simultaneously, the Headquarters Y2K
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% Response Team, in coordination with the regional teams, to the extent possible, will prioritize the requests based on t-
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(i) overall safety significance of the issue (ii) duration of the allowed outage time (AOT) and remaining time before AOT expires (iii) operability of other safety-related systems (iv) grid stability and reliability (v) compensatory measures in place A
(f) The Headquarters Y2K Response Team should prepare a real-time work t to document the initial processing of each NOED teleconference and evaluatiokas'shdwn in D. If lead responsibility is passed to a region)that foglos should prepare the.
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f appropriate documentation.
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,g v Q; pag (g) The organization having the lead will grant the NOED approval by telephone $ThetW,s necessary followup documentation to the licensee U$litie pie ~ pared by the rigiddrproject manager, depending on whether the region or Headqueners 1 ad responsibility for the NOED 3
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processing.
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(h) NOED tracking (assignment of sequence numbers) will be conducted in accordance with Part 9900. NOED database updates will be coihple'ed after thsY2K tr5nsition.
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4 POSSIBLE SCENARIOS Possible power reactor NOED scenarios'are pres [ented in^ A DN8/
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Y2K Enforcement Discretion Federal Register Notice Dated July 30,1999 l
(Volume 64, Number 146)
I NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NUREG-1600, Revision 1)
Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions; Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Nuclear Power Plants During the Year 2000 Transition
\\
AGENCY; Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
l ACTION: Policy statement; amendment.
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, Revision 1 (Enforcement Policy), by adding Appendix E. This amendment adds an interim enforcement policy that the NRC will follow to exercise enforcement discretion for noncompliance with license conditions, including technical specifications (TSs), because of year 2000 (Y2K) related situations.
DATES: This action is effective August 30,1999. Comments on this revision should be submitted within 30 days of publication in the Federal Register and will be considered by the NRC prior to the next Enforcement Policy revision.
ADDRESSES:- Submit written comments to David L. Meyer, Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, Mail Stop T-6 DS9, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Hand deliver comments to 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m., Federal workdays.
Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room,2120 L Street, NW, (Lower Level), Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard Wessman, Deputy Director, Division of Engineering,301-415-3298, or Allen Hansen, Lead Project Manager, Division of Licensing Project Management,301-415-1390, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Y2K-related events arise from a date-related problem that is experienced by a software system, a software application, or a digital device at a key rollover date when the system, application, or device does not perform its intended function. The key rollover dates are January 1,2000; February 29,2000 (an uncommon leap day); and December 31,2000 (the 366th day of an uncommon leap year).- The nuclear utility industry is engaged in Y2K readiness programs at all nuclear power plant facilities to seek out and correct Y2K-related problems that have any potential to adversely affect facility operations. A
P
. i Y2K concerns result from licensees' reliance upon (1) Software to schedule maintenance and technical specification surveillances; (2) Programmable logic controllers and other commercial off the-shelf software and hardware; -
(3) Digital process control systems; (4) Software to support facility operation;
- (5) Digital systems for collection of operating data; and
-(6) Digital systems to monitor post-accident plant conditions.
It is recognized that in spite of every reasonable effort by licensees to identify and correct Y2K computer system problems at their facilities, some software, applications, equipment, and systems may remain susceptible to the problem. Additionally, software, data, and systems external to the facility could adversely affect the facility (for example, interruption of
~
communications or partialloss of offsite power).
The electricity production and delivery systems, as two of the more important elements of the North American economic and social infrastructure, must remain dependable during Y2K transition or rollover periods. Most other critical elements of the infrastructure depend on the availability of an interconnected, stable, and reliable supply of electrical power. There is no
' doubt that cascading or even localized outages of generators and transmission facilities could have serious short-term and long-term consequences.
Continued safe operation of nuclear power plants during Y2K transition or rollover periods will play a major role in mairdaining stable and reliable electrical power supply systems,
_ providing necessary reserve power if there are major losses at other generating facilities. The NRC staff is issuing interim guidance on the process for the NRC to exercise enforcement
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discretion in certain situations where power reactor licensees encounter Y2K-associated compliance problems in the Y2K transition period (December 31,1999, through the first few days of 2000) or in other key rollover periods.' The exercise of enforcement discretion may i
support a licensee decision to keep the plant in operation, if the licensee has determined that safety will not be unacceptably affected, in order to help maintain electrical grid stability and reliability. The NRC Headquarters Operations Center and the NRC Region IV Incident Response Center will have staff augmented during the key transition from December 31,1999, to January 1,2000, to ensure that appropriate actions can be taken for any regulatory issues that arise.
Scope i
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This interim enforcement policy provides for the exercise of enforcement discretion to address noncompliance with license conditions, including TSs, because of Y2K transition or rollover issues. The interim enforcement policy applies to situations in which plant operation is l
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3-needed to help maintain the stability and reliability of the electrical power supply system, even when license conditions, including TSs, would require a plant shutdown. If such situations occur, licensees are expected to follow the existing guidance in NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 for Notices of Enforcement Discretion <http://www.nrc. gov /NRC/IM/noed.html> to the maximum extent practicable, particularly regarding a safety determination and notification of NRC. Licensees may decide to continue operations upon making a determination that it is safe 4
and prudent to do so to help maintain electrical grid stability and reliability, and when certain criteria are met. This enforcement discretion does not extend to situations in which the licensee may be unable to communicate with the NRC (The staff assessment of telecommunications capability indicates that a loss of all telecommunications between NRC and licensees is highly uniikely,)
To the extent noncompliance was involved, the NRC staff will normally take enforcement action for the root causes that led to the noncompliance for which enforcement discretion was used. Enforcement action will also be considered in those cases in which incorrect or incomplete information was provided to the NRC staff by a licensee in its justification. The NRC recognizes that a licensee will need to exercise judgement in making a determination under this discretion provision. Consistent with the NRC's position involving 10 CFR 50.54(x), enforet ment action for a violation of a license condition, including a TS, will not be taken unless a licensee's action was clearly unreasonable considering all the rajevant circumstances. Enforcement action could include the assessment of civil penalties and the issuance of orders.
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement Thir interim policy statement does not contain a new or amended information collection requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0136.
Public Protection Notification if a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
The NRC is revising the NRC Enforcement Policy by adding Appendix E to read as follows:
GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR NRC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS Appendix E: Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Nuclear Power Plants During the Year 2000 Transition This appendix sets forth the interim enforcement policy that will govern the exercise of enforcement discretion by the NRC staff when licensees of operating nuclear power plants find it
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~4 necessary to deviate from license conditions, including technical specifications (TSs), in those cases in which year 2000 (Y2K) related conylications would otherwise require a plant shutdown
- that.could adversely affect the stability and reliability of the electrical power grid. This policy l does not extend to situations in which a licensee may be unable to communicate with the NRC.
' f The policy is effective August 30,1999, and will' remain in effect through January 1,2001.
This policy only applies during Y2K transition or rollover periods (December 31,1999, through January 3,2000; February 28,2000, through March 1, 2000; and December 30,2000, through
- January 1,2001). During these periods, a licensee may contact the NRC Headquarters Operations Center and seek NRC enforcement discretion with regard to the potential noncompliance with license conditions, including TSs, if the licensee has determined that
,(a) Complying with license conditions, including TSs, in a Y2K-related situation would require a plant shutdown; (b)l Continued plant operation is needed to help maintain a reliable and stable grid, and
'(c) Any decrease in safety as a result of continued plant operation is small (considering both risk and deterministic aspects), and reasonable assurance of public health and safety, the environment,~ and security is maintained with the enforcement discretion.
Licensees are expected to follow the existing guidance as stated in NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 for Notices of Enforcement Discretion to the maximum extent practicable, particularly
- regarding a safety determination and notification of NRC, A licensee seeking NRC enforcement
- discretion must provide'a written justification, or in circumstances in which good cause is shown, an oraljustification followed as soon as possible by written justification.' The justification muet document the need and safety basis for the request and provide whatever other information the
. NRC staff needs to make a decision regarding whether the exercise of discretion is appropriate.
The NRC staff may grant enforcement discretion on the basis of balancing the public health and safety or common defense and security of not operating against potential radiological or other hazards associated with continued operation, and a determination that safety will not be nnacceptably.affected by exercising the discretion. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or designee, will advise the licensee whether the NRC has approved the
. licensee's request and, if so, will subsequently confirm the exercise of discretion in writing.
- Enforcement discretion will only be exercised if the NRC staff is clearly satisfied that the action is consistent with protecting public health and safety and is warranted in the circumstances presented by the licensee.-
. _, if the volume of requests to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center is such that the NRC staff cannot review and approve all licensee requests in a timely fashion, the NRC staff will e obtain the safety-significant information from the licensee to enable the NRC staff to make a prompt dial assessment. Unless the assessment is unfavorable, the licensee would be
- permitted to proceed with its planned course of action. The NRC staff will complete these
. assessments as time permits and the licensee will be advised of the results orally, if possible, and then in' writing. If the' NRC staffs prompt initial assessment or subsequent assessment i
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. determines that a licensee's actions raise safety concems, the licensee would be so informed.
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The licensee would then be required to follow its license conditions, including TSs.
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~ { if there are communications difficulties between the licensee and the NRC, tlie licensee is
- encouraged to interact with the NRC inspector onsite who will have a' dedicated satellite
~ telephone.5The inspector should be able to facilitate communication with the NRC Headquarters Operations Center and/or the NRC Regional incident Response Centers (IRCs). If..
communication with the NRC Headquarters Operations Center is not possible, then the licensee :
should contact the IRC in NRC Region IV to discuss enforcement discretion.' Similarly, if the
' Region IV IRC cannot be reached, then the licensee should attempt to contact the Region I, ll
- and lil IRCs. Although it is considered highly unlikely, if communication with NRC is not possible, the licensee should follow the plant license conditions, including technical
. specifications.
- .. y in conducting its assessments, the licensee should follow, to the extent practicable, the M guidance in NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 for Notices ^f Enforcement Discretion. Contrary to Part 9900 Section B.3 guidance, it is not necessary for L., emergency to be declared by a i
government entity.' Licensees are encouraged to contact NRC early in their evaluation process, l
~
Lparticula'rly if time is of the essence, even though complete information as specified in Part 9900
' may not be available.:
The decision to exercise enforcement discretion does not change the fact that the licensee i
will be in noncompliarce nor does it imply that enforcement discretion is being exercised for any noncompliance that may have led to the noncompliance at issue. To the extent noncompliance Lwas involved, the NRC staff will normally take enforcement action for the root causes that led to the noncompliance for which enforcement discretion was granted. Enforcement action will also
- be considered in those cases in which incorrect or incomplete information was provided to the NRC staff by a licensee in its justification.- The NRC ' recognizes that a licensee will need to exercise judgement in making a determination under this discretion provision. Consistent with -
the NRC's position involving 10 CFR 50.54(x), enforcement action for a violation of a license
' condition, including a TS, will not be taken unless a licensee's action was clearly unreasonable considering all the relevant circumstances. Enforcement action could include assessment of
' civil penalties and the issuance of orders.
Dated a' t Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of July,1999.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
/s/
Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary of the Commission.
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,y UNITED STATES s
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
t WASHINGTON. D.C. 2055M)o01
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MEMORANDUM TO:
Gary M. Holahan, Director To be issued after the Division of Systems Safety & Analysis October 15,1999 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Y2K exercise Hubert J. Miller, Regional Administrator
- Region I Luis A. Reyes, Regional Administrator
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James E. Dyer, Regional Adbtrator h Region lli ie %
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Ellis W. Merschoff, Regional Admi,
ator Region IV
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l Wi Samuel J. Collins, Directorg gp$3 '
FROM:
y Office of Nuclear Reactor,Re Eh MD%
SUBJECT:
DELEGATION OF. AUTHORITY FOR'ALL Ff0WER REACTOR NOEDS PROCESSED DUR,ING THE Y2,KTRANSITION NJ As part of the agency's contingency planning for h,andlin k r 2000 (Y2K) computer problem, augmented staff has been assigned to;the NRC, Operations Center and to the regional incident Response Centers (IRC (Mr'. Holahan has been assigned as the reactor safety team director. Regional administrators' ave indic'aled their$nt to either be present at their IRC or to be available to their regionalIRC teamsMdg d
/@!!M Nf'py In acco,
the ',I ement Appendix E, " Interim Enforcement Policy ent D for Regardi
' ocedursi/M, Nuclear Power Plants During the Year 2000 Transition and its impi ector of the reactor safety team and the regional administrators elegMinefauthority to grant power reactor NOEDs that are requested,byjiN[
er piist' licensees, regardless of which region the plant is located, as a resultof Y2K-r her events during the Y2K transition (that is, the period DecerptiiIr 31,1999, th ary 3, 2000). They may re-delegate this authority, either in writ or by telephone,'
YES-level manager in their organizations, ity for granting ' " er reactor NOEDs after January 3,2000, is delegated as specifically ed in NRC in ion Manual Part 9900, " Technical Guidance-Operations-Notices of j
' ent D seIIp6on."
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Roy Zimmerman I
Brian Sheron Frank Congel j
Joseph Giitter B i
m STAFFING PLAN Minimum Staffing for' Headquarters Operations Center Power Reactor NOED Team
- 1. ' One team manager (SES). Responsible for coordinating and managing the team members and facilitating the decision process, This person may have delegated or re-delegated authority from the Director, NRR, to grant verbal NOED approval.
- 2. Three senior project managers knowledgeable in the NOED process, TS requirements, and plant safety systems. These members will be responsible for obtaining necessary information from the licensee and resident inspectors, and will assist the NOED team in its evaluation and approval of the NOED.
- 3. One senior TS specialist to provide understanding and interpretation of TS requirements.
- 4. Three or four technical branch section chiefs or senior reviewers representing Reactor Systems, Electrical, Instrumentation and Controls, Plant Systems and Probability Risk Assessment branches to develop safety assessments as input to NOED decisions.
i Sample Regional incident Response Center Power Reactor NOED Team Staffing *
(Note:
Actual staffing levels and personnel selections for the regions will be determined by the respective regional administrators.)
1J One team manager (regional administrator or designated SES manager) to serve the same function as the Headquarters' team manager. This person will have delegated or re-delegated authority from the Director, NRR, to grant verbal NOED approval.
- 2. One Projects branch chief to serve the same function as the Headquarters senior PMs.
- 3. A license examiner or senior resident inspector (SRI) to serve the same function as the l
Headquarters serdor TS specialist. (A member of the regional staff qualified as an SRI is l
acceptable.)
- 4. A senior reactor analyst.
- 5. Two or three DRS branch chiefs representing the same disciplines and serving the same functions as the Headquarters section chiefs.
- NOTE: Region IV will be staffed in accordance with Section 400 of the implementing procedures. C
SAMPLE WORKSHEET FOR PROCESSING A POWER REACTOR Y2K-RELATED NOED REQUEST (NOTE: Complete this form in so far as possible. This will facilitate subsequent formal I
documentation and preparation of the NOED approvalletter. Use of this checklist is not required, but it is provided as guidance.)
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- 1. Licensee Facility Licensee contact Telephone nurnber
- 2. NOED Number Priority
- 3. Date and time of request Required by (date and time)
- 4. Identify key staff and licensee participants in the teleconference
- 5. Identify applicable TS (obtain facsimile of TS pages) 1
- 6. Brief description of the NOED request. Include as much of the information requested in I
l Section C 4.0 of the routine NOED guidance (NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900) as is possible. Also address the following:
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(a). - details of the basis and nature of the situation and potential consequences of forced comp'liance with the license conditions to the plant and to exacerbation of the situation; l
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(b) impact of the situation on plant safety; status of and potential challenges to offsite and onsite power sources; (c) brief description of how NOED criteria in Section 2 of the implementing procedure for Y2K-related NOEDs are satisfied:
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- 7. Date and time of approval / denial Duration
- 8. NOED granted (or denied) by (Name and title) 0 i
i EXAMPLES OF POSSIBLE POWER REACTOR NOED SCENARIOS Example 1: EDG Inoperability THE EVENT On December 31,1999, the plant is operating at normal power level. At 8:00 p.m., due to an unanticipated condition, Train A EDG is rendered inoperable. The NRC is immediately notified by the licensee to provide a " heads-up" due to the impending Y2K transition. TSs require 4
verification within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> that there is no common-cause failure. Otherwise, TSs require surveillance on Train B EDG by starting the EDG.
At 9:30 p.m., the licensee notifies NRC that a potential for a common-cause failure has not been eliminated, and that the Train B EDG surveillance test is now being conducted. At 10:30 p.m.,
the licensee notifies NRC that during the TS surveitance testing the Train B EDG failed to start.
With both EDGs inoperable, TSs require restoration of one EDG to operable status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or begin shutdown of the plant. The licensee expects to restore one EDG to operable
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status within the 2-hour allowed outage t;me (AOT), that is, by 12:30 a.m. on January 1,2000.
At this time, all offsite circuits are available and the grid is stable.
At 11:30 p.m., the licensee notifies NRC that it was notified by the load dispatcher that, although the grid is currently stable, there is some concern that, because of unanticipated Y2K problems affecting utilities in an earlier time zone, the grid could be adversely affected after midnight, and that operation of the nuclear unit would provide added margin to ensure that grid stability is maintained. At this point, the licensee had also concluded that an additional 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> will be needed to complete repairs on one EDG.
i The licensee has a 5-megawatt station blackout (SBO) gas turbine that is operable based on a surveillance test completed 3 days ago. The licensee stated that one of the inoperable diesels can be manually started if required, and that equipment operators have been stationed at critical plant locations to ensure that EDG and/or SBO power can be provided. No other equipment is inoperable.
NOED CRITERIA (a) complying with the license conditions would require a plant shutdown: Yes.
(b) continued plant operation is needed to help maintain a reliable and stable grid: Not at this time, but possible grid problems are anticipated. The licensee provided additional information which the NRC determined was sufficient to satisfy this criterion.
(c) any decrease in safety as a result of continued plant operation is smail: Licensee has stated that the decrease in safety is small due to the manual EDG start capability, the strategic placement of equipment operators, and the capability of the SBO turbine.
DECISION l
NRC reviewed the licensee's information and agreed with the analysis. Therefore, the NOED was granted, E o
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Example 2: Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Inoperability THE EVENT l
On December 31,1999, a BWR plant is operating at 80 percent power level. At approximately 9:00 p.m., due to leaking nitrogen, the licensee declares one MSIV inoperable, and immediately i
notifies NRC of the issue. The backup motive force for MSIV closure is provided by a hydraulic source with Class 1E power. TSs require restoring the MSIV to operable status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or initiate a plant shutdown. At 11:00 p.m., the licensee determines that restoration of the nitrogen supply will be completed within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> from the declaration. The licensee requests a NOED to extend the AOT to 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> instead of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
The licensee stated that both EDGs are operable, in addition, there are no historical problems with the MSIVs at this site. The 2.5-megawatt SBO diesel is operable based on a surveitlance test completed 14 days ago, and can provide power to the backup MSIV control system. No other equipment is inoperable. Plant staff has been significantly augmented due to the Y2K transition, and is stationed throughout the plant in criticallocations to ensure rapid response to requests. The licensee was notified at 10:30 p.m. by the load dispatcher that the grid is currently stable, and that there are no anticipated Y2K concernr.
NOED CRITERIA (a) complying with the license conditions would require a plant shutdown: Yes.
(b) continued plant operation is needed to help maintain a reliable and stable grid: Not at this time, and no grid problems are anticipated.
(c) any decrease in safety as a result of continued plant operation is small: Licensee has stated that due to the short (2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) extension of the AOT, the robust backup power and actuation capability, and the augmented staff, the level of safety is maintained.
DECISION NRC staff and management have reviewed the licensee's information, and agree with the analysis. However, this request does not conform to the Y2K NOED criteria due to a negative response to item (b). After further consideration, the licensee modifies the request to a " regular NOED." On this basis, the NOED is granted.
8 Example 3: Offsite AC Power Partial Loss THE EVENT On December 29,1999, a west coast plant is operating at 80 percent power. At 2:00 a.m. (all times are Pacific time), one required offsite circuit became inoperable due to the failure of a switchyard component. TSs require restoring the offsite circuit within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The AOT expires at 2:00 a.m. on January 1,2000. After evaluating the situation and due to the pending Y2K transition, the licensee notifies NRC at 8:00 a.m. on December 29 that restoration should be completed within the AOT, At 6:00 p.m. on December 31, the licensee determines that it will not be able to complete the required action by 2:00 a.m. on January 1 because a replacement part, which previously passed all pre-installation tests, failed during post-maintenance testing. The licensee promptly gives the NRC a " heads-up" phone call, and then at 9:30 p.m. on December 31, after diagnosing the failure, requests a NOED to extend the AOT from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> to complete the required action. During this call, the licensee stated that, at 9:15 p.m. on December 31, the load dispatcher told the licensee that, although the grid is currently stable, there is some concem that, because of unanticipated Y2K problems affecting utilities in the eastern time zone, the grid could be adversely affected after midnight, and that operation of the nuclear unit would provide added margin to ensure that grid stability is maintained.
The licensee stated that both EDGs and the 1.2-megawatt SBO diesel are operable based on recent surveillance tests. No other plant equipment is inoperable. Extra auxiliary and reactor operators are on site in anticipation of the Y2K transition.
1 NOED CRITERIA (a) complying with the license conditions would require a plant shutdown: Yes.
(b) continued plant operation is needed to help maintain a reliable and stable grid: Not at this time, but possible grid problems are anticipated. The licensee provided additional information which the NRC determined was sufficient to satisfy this criterion.
(c) any decrease in safety as a result of continued plant operation is smail: Licensee has stated that the decrease in safety is small due to the capability of the EDGs and the SBO diesel, and the small requested increase in the AOT from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 85 hours9.837963e-4 days <br />0.0236 hours <br />1.405423e-4 weeks <br />3.23425e-5 months <br />.
l DECISION NRC staff and management have reviewed the licensee's information, and agree with the analysis. Therefore, the NOED is granted.
Example 4: Loss of Vital DC Power THE EVENT On December 31i1999, at 11:00 p.m., a Class 1E Train A DC system ground alarm is received.
The licensee declares the DC bus inoperable. TSs require restoring the DC system within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The DC ground fault clearing procedure calls for de-energizing each circuit one at a time and would cause one train of safety system inoperability.
The licensee promptly notifies NRC of the problem and, at 11:30 p.m., after preparing a recovery plan, requests a NOED for extending the AOT from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
The licensee stated that the location of the ground has not been determined yet, and that the plant has experienced several other ground faults in different systems during the past 3 months and all have been repaired within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Both EDGs and the 0.6-megawatt SBO diesel are operable. The load dispatcherjust notified the licensee that the grid was stable and no problems were anticipated due to the significant margin.
NOED CRITERIA (a) complying with the license conditions would require a plant shutdown: Yes.
(b) continued plant operation is needed to help maintain a reliable and stable grid: No.
However, the licensee, in anticipation of the Y2K transition, wants to be in a position to I
support the grid.
(c) any decrease in safety as a result of continued plant operation is small: Licensee has stated that the decrease in safety is small due to the capability of the EDGs and the SBO diesel, the
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current staffing level at the plant, and their experience with several similar problems in recent months.
INITIAL DECISION NRC staff and rnanagement have reviewed the licensee's information. Because there are no i
current or anticipated grid issues, a Y2K NOED.cannot be granted. In addition, because there is a decrease in safety, a " regular NOED" may not be appropriate. Therefore, the NOED is denied.
SUBSEQUENT EVENT AND FINAL DECISION At 12:10 a.m., the licensee is notified by the load dispatcher that several fossil units have tripped. Although the grid is stable, margin has been significantly decreased and the dispatcher has requested the unit to stay at power if possible. The licensee immediately calls NRC and states that the unit is still operating. The licensee is trying to complete the repair within the AOT, but still anticipates requiring the aodinonal 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> previously requested. They are asking the NRC to reconsider their previous request. NRC evaluates the new information and agrees with 1
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the licensee that the conditions for a Y2K NOED are met. Therefore, this followup request for a i
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NOED is granted.
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