ML20217F248
| ML20217F248 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant |
| Issue date: | 10/02/1997 |
| From: | John Miller UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC) |
| To: | Paperiello C NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| GDP-97-0174, GDP-97-174, TAC-L32029, NUDOCS 9710080025 | |
| Download: ML20217F248 (42) | |
Text
- -
United Stat:s Enrichment Corpor; tion 2 C:mocracy C;nter T~
6903 nockiedge orive Bethesda, MD 20817 Tel: (3011564 3200 Fax:(301) 564-3201 JAMES H. MILLER D r: (301) S64-3309 VicE PRESloENT, PROoUCTioN Fax: (301) 571-8279 l
October 2,1997 Dr. Carl J. Paperiello SERIAL; GDP 97-0174 Director, Ollice of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Attention: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 l
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS)
L Docket No. 70-7002 Transmittal of Revision 13 to Portsmouth Certification Application j
Dear Dr. Paperiello:
l in accordance with 10 CFR Part 76, the Ur.ited States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) hereby-
,ubmits twenty (20) copies of Revision 13 (September 29,1997) to USEC-02, Application for United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Certification, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant.
Revision 13 incorporates changes to the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) and Safety Analysis Report. These changes were previously submitted for your review in accordance with 10 CFR 76.45 and were approved as Amendment 4 to the Certificate of Compliance GDP-2 in your letter dated August 29, 1997 (TAC NO. L32029).
Revision 13 also incorporates changes to the basis statement for TSR Section 2,1.3.5 for the Autoclave Shell High Pressure Containment Shutdown System. These changes have been reviewed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 76 and have been determined not to require prior NRC approval.
Revision bars are provided in the right-hand margin to identify the changes. Revision 13 was implemented effective September 29,1997.
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9710080025 971002 U
PDR ADOCK 07007002 C
PDR Omces in uvermore, California Paducah, Kentucky Portsmouth, ohio Washington, DC i--.
~
I Dr. Carl J. Paperiello October 2,1997 GDP 97-0174 Page 2 Should you have any queat ans or comments on Revision 13, please call me at (301) 564-3309 or -
i Steve Routh at (301) 564 3251. There are no new commitments made in this submittal.
Sincerely, O
es H. Miller ice President, Production
Attachment:
USEC-02, Application for-United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Certification, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Revision 13, i'
Copy Numbers I through 20
Enclosure:
Affidavit cc:
NRC Region III Office Copy Numbers 21,172 NRC Resident Inspector-PGDP Copy Number 22 Mr. Joe W. Parks (DOE)
Copy Numbers 24 through 28
OATH AND AFFIRMATION I, James H. Miller, swear aad amtm that I am Vice President, Production, of the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), that I am authorized by USEC to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this Revision 13 of the USEC Application for United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Certification, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (USEC-02), that I am familiar with the contents thereof, and that the statements made and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.
~
l Ja s I ! Miller j
On this 2nd day of October,1997, the omcer signing above personally appeared before me, is known by me to be the person whose name is subscribed to within the instrument, and l
acknowledged that he executed the same for the purposes therein contained.
In witness hereofI hereunto set my hand and omeial seal.
NAA h
Notary Public i
1
O iPPtiCATiON FOR UNiTEo SriTtS NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CERTIFICATION PORTSMOUTil GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT REMOVE / INSERT INSTRUCTIONS REVISION 13 SEPTEMBER 29,1997 Remove Pages Insert Pages VOLUhE1 List of Effective Pages List of Effective Pages i/ii, ix/x, nii/xviii, xix/xx i/ii, ix/x, nii/niii, xix/xx Pages 3.2-7 through 12 Pages 3.2 7 through 12 VOLUME 2 l-List of Effective Pages List of Effective Pages l
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j-j SAR PORTS September 15, 1995 Rev.I j
i l
Autoclave Temperature Control Category UF. Cylinder Model Number A
30A, 30B, 48A, 48X, 48F, 48Y, 4fiY (Allied Chemical Serial Nos. 401 and above),12B,48H and j
48HX, and 480 (Serial Nos. 111821 and above), $A, 4
i B
480 (Serial Nos. 111820 and below). 48B*
)
'48B cylinders may also be known as 48T. 480 cylinders in Category B are models 480 and 480M.
4 UP. Cylinder High Temperature Cutoff Safety Cylinder Category Calculated Cylinder Category LCS Limh Maximums I
A 235'F 265'F Sample 293'F 5 inch 279'F
\\
B-220'F 235'F 12 Inch 279'F l-30-Inch 280'F A
48-Inch HW 280'F V
48 Inch TW 265'F 48 inch TW Std. Vol.
265'F 48-Inch TW High Vol.
255'F 1
A steam regulator controls the internal steam pressure of the autoclave. The fk w through the
' valve.is determined by three forces acting on a metallic diaphragm actuator. Two forces on the bottom of the diaphragm cause the valve to close: a preset spring, and steam pressure fed through tubing from a tap located downstream of the valve. A remotely supplied air pressure (loading pressure) on the top i'
of the diaphragm causes the valve to open. With the loading pressure and spring pressure held constant
[
the flow through the yklve is modulated by the down stream pressure.
Steam pressure and flow are controlled by changing the loading pressure, The autoclaves use two preset loading pressures for high and low flow steam. A solenoid valve switches either of two loading j
pressure air supply regulators into the system to apply air pressure to the top of the valve. The switching solenoid is controlled by a temperature recorder to monitor the cylinder wall temperature via two i
magnetically attached thermocouples. The recorder is equipped with an internal switch set at 212'F and a high temperature cut-off based on cylinder category.
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SAR PORTS September 29,1997 l
Rev.13 g
When the cylinder wall temperature reaches 212'F the steam regulator is switched from high to low flow. At the low Dow set point, (Se steam regulator controls the pressure in the autoclave steam supply pipe to a maximum of 8 psig when heating Category A cylinders and 2.5 psig when heating Category B rylinders. This is equivalent to approximately 235'F and 220*F respectively. At high flow the pressure in the steam supply line is approximately 12 psig. This is equivalent to approximately 245'F. Nonnal controlled heating of Category A cylinders is at 220'F with a steam pressure of 4 psig.
l If for any reason the cylinder wall temperature reaches the cylinder high temperature cut off setting, redundant temperature switches with cylinder thermocouple inputs will cause the steam regulator and the first steam block valve to close and the LocalInstrument Control (LIC) to alarm. The first steam l
block valve is a containment valve located in the steam supply line, closest to the autoclave.
l l
Another system which serves to limit autoclave temperature, is the Autoclave Shell liigh Stean Pressure Shutdown trip. This system has three pressure switches. One switch is set to initiate stea'a shutdown. The other two switches are redundant, set at the same pressure. The redundant switch I
terpint causes containment shutdown and is described latet. The steam shutdown setpoint is dependent i
on the category of the cylinder being heated and the type of autoclave being used.
Autoclave Shell liigh Steam Pressure / Cylinder Temperature Shutdown - Based on Cylinder Category.
Cylinder Category LCS g
A 8 psig/235'F B
2.5 psig/220'F C
145'F Autoclave liigh Pressure Containment Shutdown Based on Autoclave Type Autoclave Type Autoclave Location LCS Autoclave Vessel Safety Limit 72 Inch X-343 15 psig 179 psig 84 Inch X-342, 343 15 psig 181 psig 96 inch X 344 15 psig 165 psig in order to prevent cylinder rupture caused by overpressurization, a transducer is employed to monitor the UF. pressure during the entire heating cycle. This transducer will trigger a steam shutdown if the UF. pressure reaches 115 psia. All cylinder pigtail connections are leak tested at a minimum of 98 psig with dry air before admitting UF.. Thinwall UF. cylinders have a maximum service pressure e
i 3.2 8
SAR PORTS September 15, 1995 Rev.1 of 100 psig whereas, heavywall cylinders are rated for 200 psig. Normal operation at 220'F to 230'F, however, produces UF pressures in the range of 80 90 psia. Thus, it is practical and safe to keep the pressure switch set for the worst-case cylinders UF. cylinders exhibiting an excessive cold pressure (greater than 10 psla) are cold burped to remove contaminant gases that can cause excessive pressure to l
result upon heating, 1
In order to ensure that the cylinder valve and pigtail are opened to the pressure monitoring l
circuit, a pressure switch and timer are employed. During initial heating of a UF cylinder, if the i
pressure indicator indicates to the operator that cylinder pressure will be less than 20 psia whhin one hour, then the steam input will be checked. If steam flow had already been established, then steam flow will be shut off, the autoclave will be shut down and opened, and the cylinder safety valve and cylinder valve will be verified open. The autoclave is then reclosed and the heating cycle is reinitiated. A check of cylinder valve clarity is made; if valve clarity cannot be established, then the cause is investigated and corrected before further heating of the cylinder. The cylinder low pressure cutoff system serves as a backup to the operator and h s been designated a Limilng Condition for Operation (LCO).
At the conclusion of a heating cycle, steam is exhausted from the autoclave through the blowdown exhaust system. This system consists of an alt jet ejector (aspirator) connected to the blowdown piping and is capable of exhausting steam from any one or all of the autoclaves simultaneously. A check valve located in each autoclave blowdown line prevents steam exhausted from one autoclave from entering Q
another autoclave. A vacuum breaker is employed to allow a sweep of air through the autoclave. The Locking Ring Interlock system consists of redundant pressure switches interlocked with the hydraulic locking ring to prevent the autoclave from being opened unless the autoclave pressure is at 0.5 psig or
- less. This feature is intended to prevent the mechanical damage and hazard to employees that would be expected to occur if the autoclave were unlocked while pressurized with steam or UF. release products.
U F.
release detection and containment shutdown are accomplished by the steam sampling / conductivity monitoring system, the high autoclave pressure steam shutdown and the extreme high autoclave pressure containment shutdown. Each autoclave employs two independent steam sampling systems which withdraw steam through two small diameter lines each leading to a water-cooled condenser and reservoir. A conductivity cell is located in each reservoir to measure the conductivity of the condensate as the condensate flows through the reservoir. HF is formed by the reaction of UF. with water when released inside *he autoclave. HF in the condensate causes the conductivity to increase. This system is designed to detet. 7. releases (as small as 2 lbs/ min) and cause the autoclave to automatically _
Fo into a containment shutdown mode. This mode consists of appropriate alarms and closure of all the containment block valves. Additional features of the conductivity sampling system are a flow switch and a sanitary water supply tap. The flow switch will signal steam shutdown upon loss of cooling water flow to either condenser. The sanitary water tap is used to test the conductivity cells each time the autoclave is used. Sanitary water has sufficient conductivity to simulate a small UF. release. Although the steam condensate conductivity system can initiate autoclave shutdown it is not considered to be necessary for autoclave operation and is not a safety system.
O 3.2 9 w
SAR PORTS Septernber 29,1997 Rev.13 g
in the event of a large release of UF, inside an autoclave, a faster reacting system is available to effect a contairunent shutdown mode. That system is the Autoclave Shell liigh Pressure isolation system. During a large release, a massive amount of IIF gas would be rapidly produced by the reaction of UF, with water. The 11F gas will increase the pressure in the autoclave and upon the autoclave i
internal pressure reaching the autoclave shell high pressure containment shutdown setpoint, a redundant l
pressure sensor will trigger containment shutdown. The amount of liF gas produced is directly proponional to the amount of water available to react with UF.. In order to limit the amount of water inside the autoclave, two independent and redundant water level probes are installed in the condensate drain line directly beneath the autoclave. These probes will trigger steam shutdown if the water level in the condensate drain should rist because of blockage downstream. This liigh Condensate Level Cutoff system has been designated a safety system. An initial water inventory test is perfonned on each new autoclave to determine the amount of water normally entrained within an operating autoclave. Past experience indicates that seven-foot feed and sampling and six foot feed autoclaves can have excess entrained water during normal operation. Consequently, these six foot autoclaves are not full containment vessels in the event of a catastrophic cylinder rupture in a closed autoclave because the stated pressure vessel limits will be exceeded and the pressure relief system will vent excess material outside the X 343 Facility.
Each autoclave is equipped with an Autoclave Shell liigh Pressure Relief system to prevent the internal pressure from exceeding the maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) as determined by Section Vill of the ASME Pressure Vessel Code. This system consists of a pressure relief valve and rupture disc, each rated at or below the MAWP. The rupture disc is necessary only to prevent constant g
exposure of the pressure relief valve to steam during normal operation. Such constant exposure could cause undesirable corrosion and scaling of the valve. Pressure above the rating of the pressure relief valve would be vented. (In the X 342A and X-343 Buildings, the safety relief valve exhaust is outside the building. Due to the configuration of the equipment in the X 344A Building, the PRV exhaust is inside the building.) The valve is expected to re seat at the MAWP to contain pressure (reaction products) up to that amount.
The autoclaves are equipped with limit switches that are interlocked with the hydraulic system to prevent opening the autoclaves at greater than 0.5 pdg. Only steam pressure would be present under normal conditions; however, opening the autoclave may cause enough thrust between the head and shell to propel the shell and cause equipment damage. The X 342 and X 343 sutoclaves have been fitted with an emergency hydraulic override switch. Using this switch, the shell can be opened at any time, as long as the internal pressure is below 0.5 psig.
The autoclave shells are thennally insulated. Under the insulation and against the outer surface shell is tubing (tracing) through which steam or cold water can be passed. 11 eating or cooling an autoclave may be necessary during clean up operations following a release.
O 3.2 10
SAR PORTS Septembcr 29,1997 Rev.13 In summary, the following autoclave related devices are identified as active safety systems:
ne liigh Condensate Level Cutoff System activates to stop the input of steam and sound appropriate alarms if the condensate approaches an unsafe level in the condensate drain line.
The UF. Cylinder liigh Pressure Cutoff System activates to stop the input of steam to the autoclave and to sound appropriate alarms if the cylinder pressure approaches an unsafe level.
The UF. liigh Temperature Cutoff System activates to stop the input of steam to the autoclave and sound appropriate alarms if the cylinder temperature approaches an unsafe level.
The Autoclave Shell liigh Steam Pressure Shutdown System activates to stop the input of steam, close the containment valves, and sound appropriate alarms if a large release I
or other undesirable high pressure situation exists inside the autoclave.
The Autoclave Shell liigh Pressure Relief System activates to prevent the internal autoclave pressure from exceeding the maximum allowable working pressure for the autoclave as determined by the ASME rating.
O The Auteciave Sheii iiigh eressure Centainmeni Shutdown Sysiem activates io sien the input of steam, close the containment valves, and sound appropriate alarms, if a large release or other undesirable high pressure situation exists inside the autoclave.
Containment and pressure systems include the code rating on the autoclave vessel and all associated piping appendages up to the second containment block valve (if present).
In addition to the safety systems summarized above, the following systems and limits are present to enhance safety:
The Locking Ring Interlock contains pressure limit switches which interlock with the hydraulic system to prevent opening the autoclave shell while under pressure (above 0.5 psig). Although only steam may be present in the autoclave, opening while the autoclave is under pressure may cause a thrust between the shell and the head which could cause equipment damage or personnel injury.
The Conductivity Monitoring cells cause containment shutdown and appropriate alarms if a small UF. release occurs inside of an autoclave.
O 3.2-11
SAR PORTS September 15, 1995 Rev.1 A Cylinder Safety Valve is installed between the cylinder valve and pigtail connection prior to hnting and serves as one of the redundant contaiunent valves in the process piping.
Void Volume 2equirements are established to prevent hydraulic rupture of a cylinder at maximum allowable heating temperatures.
A UF, Low Cylinder Pressure Cutoff system activates to stop the input of steam to the autoclave and to sound appropriate alarms if a predetermined UF. pressure is not achieved within a specified time after heating begins. Failure to achieve the specified pressure could indicate a plugged or closed cylinder valve. This system is not a Limiting Condition for Operation when dumping sample bombs directly to tht cascade or when cold feeding.
A Cylinder Assay Limitation of 5% is established for any cylinder to be heated in an l
autoclave.
l The Steam Interlock System is designed to prevent admitting steam to an autoclave unless the locking ring is closed and locked. The position of the locking ring is monitored by limit switches. When these switches confirm locking ring closure, contacts in the electric power supply to the solenoid valve are closed. This permits opening the steam regulating valve.
g The Roll / Tilt Interlock System prevents the use of the roll or tilt motors on 84 in, autoclaves (and 96 in. autmlaves in the X 344A Toll Enrichment Facility) unless the autoclave shell is more than 3 ft. open. The safety function of this system is to ensure the operator has a clear view of the pigtail during roll / tilt operations. The shell positinn is monitored by limit switches. If the shell is otsen more than 3 ft, the motors will operate.
General Surveillance Requirements are in place to specify safety system / components testing after maintenance or when autoclaves are taken out of service for an extended period of time. Also, surveillance requirements provide for testing the Roll / Tilt System and the Steam Interlock System.
3.2.1.1.2 Scales The fill limits for all UF. cylinders are set at a value to allow the cylinders to be heated within the specified limits without causing hydraulic rupture of the cylinder. It is therefore necessary to have accurate weighing devices available to ensure that the cylinders are filled within acceptable limits before the processing begins. Production quality scales are used to check fill limits, and are calibrated annually to a tolerance of 10 pounds from 0-6,600 pounds and 20 pounds from 6,600 pc unds upward.
O 3.2-12
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. ~..
i f
4 SAR PORTS September 29,1997 Q
Rev.11 l
Boundan' The Cylinder 1,ow Pressure Steam Shutoff System boundary includes the following:
l 1.
Pressure sensing instrumentation; 2.
Timer; 3.
Steam block valve; 4.
Solenoid valve (operates the steam block valve);
1 5.
Programmable logic.:ontroller (includes input / output modules); and
- 6. - Connecting electrical signal and pneumatic lines.
Note:
This system is fall safe upon loss of electric power or air.
3.8.1.4.4 X 3424 Autoclave Shell High Pressure Containment Shutdown System i
O FurrMon
- O ise High eressure Centainmeni Shutdown System is to ceniain a reicase of us. inside the auteciave.
Fifteen (15) psig is the lowest pressure which can be assumed that is not due to a steam control failure l
and yet give an early indication that a UF. release is in progress. This is detected by instrumentation monitoring internal autoclave pressure.
1 See Section 3.2.1 for a description of the system.
4 Boundarv The Shell High Pressure Containment Shutdown System boundary includes the following:
1.
Pressure sensing instrumentation; 2.
Containment block valves, including steam supply, condensate drain, vent, feed header, purge air, conductivity sample and steam exhaust; 3.
Solenoid valves (operates the containment block valves);
4.
Programmable logic controller (includes input / output modules);
5.
Process piping from the autoclave shell to containment block valves. including piping between redundant containment block valves; and O
3.8-19 L
SAR PORTS September 29,1997 Rev.13 g
6.
Autoclave shell, o ring, shell locking ring, shell penetrations and connecting electrical signal and pneumatic lines.
Note:
This system is fail safe upon loss of electric power or air with the exception of the 'F" valve located in the feed line of each autoclave which will fall as is.
3.8.1.4.5 X 342A Autoclave Shell liigh Steam Pressure Shutdown System O Function The Autoclave Shell liigh Steam Plessure Shutdown System is to ensure that a cylinder is not ovterheated due to an !nstrument or steam supply system failure, which could create a high cylinder pressure situation leadin}, to a UF. release. This is detected by insttumentation monitoring internal autoclave pressure.
See Section 3.2.1 for a description of the system.
Bounda v.
The Autoclave Shell High Steam Pressure Shutdown System boundary includes the following:
1.
Pressure sensing instrumentation; g
2.
Steam block valves; l
3.
Solenoid valves (operates the steam block valves);
l 4.
Programmable logic controller (includes input / output modules); and 5.
Connecting electrical signal and pneumatic lines.
Note:
This system is fail safe upon loss of electric power or air.
3.8.1.4.6 X 342A Autoclave UF, Cylinder High Temperature Steam Shutoff System O Function The Cylinder High Temperature Steam Shutoff System is to ensure that cylinder hydrostatic or zero ullage limitations will not be exceeded; or, in the case of controlled feeding, to ensure that the UF. is not liquified by over heating. High temperature is detected by elements magnetically attached to a cylinder being heated in an autoclave.
See Section 3.2.1 for a description of the system.
O 3.8-20
SAR PORTS Septernber 29,1997 Q
Rev.13 3.8.1.5.4 X 343 Autoclave Shell High Pressust Confalament Shutdown System O Functing The liigh Pressure Containment Shutdown System is to contain a release of UF. Inside the autoclave.
Fifteen (15) psig is the lowest pressure which can be assumed that is not due to a steam control failure l
and yet give an early indication that a UF. release is in progress. This is detected by instrumentation monitoring internal autoclave pressure.
1 See Section 3.2.1 for a description of the system.
1 Boundatr The Shell High Pressure Containment Shutdown System boundary includes the following:
1.
Pressure sensing instrumentation:
2.
Containment block valves; 3.
Solenoid valves (operates the containment block valves);
4.
Programmable logic controller (includes input / output modules);
5.
Process piping from the autoclave shell to containment block valves, including piping between redundant containment block valves; and 6.
Autoclave shell, o-rings, shell locking ring shell penetrations and connecting electrical signal and pneumatic lines.
Note:
This system is fall safe upon loss of electric power or air with the exception of the "F" valve located in the feed line of each autoclave which will fall as is.
- 3.8.1.5.5 X 343 Autoclave Shell High Pressure Stmm Shutdown System O Function The Autoclave Shell High Pressure Steam Shutdown System is to ensure that a cylinder is not overheated due to an instrument or steam supply system failure, which could create a high cylinder pressure cituation leading to a UF. release, This is detected by instrumentation monitoring internal autoclave pressure.
See Section 3.2.1 for a description of the system.
O 3.8 27 1
SAR PORTS September 29,1997 Rev.13 h
Boundary The Autoclave Shell High Pressure Steam Shutdown System boundary includes the following:
1.
Pressure sensing instrumentation; 2.
Steam block valves; l
3.
Solenoid valves (operates the steam block valves);
l l
4.
Programmable logic controller (includes input / output modules); and L
5.
Connecting electrical signal and pneumatic lines.
Note:
This system is fall safe upon loss of electric power or air.
i 3.8.1.5.6 X 343 Autoclave UF. Cylinder High Temperature Steam Shutoff System O Functigg The Cylinder liigh Temperature Steam Shutoff System is to ensure that cylinder hydrostatic or zero u!! age limitations will not be exceeded; or, in the case of controlled feeding, to ensure that the UF. is not g
liquified by over heating liigh' temperature is detected by temperature sensing elements magnetically attached to a cylinder being heated in an autoclave.
See Section 3.2.1 for a description of the system.
Boundan*
The Cylinder liigh Temperature Steam Shutoff System boundary includes the following:
1.
Temperature switch; 2.
Temperature element / thermocouple / feed-thru; 3.
Steam block valve;
.4.
Solenoid valve (operates the steam block valve);
5.
Programmable logic controller (includes input / output modules); and 6.
Connecting electrical signal and pneumatic lines.
Note:
This system is fail safe upon loss of electric power or air.
O 3.8 28
_=
SAR PORTS May 31,1996
- O j
3.8.1.6.2 X 344A Autoclave Ur. Cyllader High Pressure Steam Shutoff System i
O Function 1
The Cylinder liigh Pressure Steam Shutoff System is to prevent over pressurization of a UP cylinder 1
during the heating process which could result from excessive " light' gases or overfilling. This is detected l
by instrumentation monitoring the feed line.
See Section 3.2.1 for a description of the system.
Boundan-The Cylinder liigh Pressure Steam Shu%ff System boundary includes the following:
1.
Pressure sensing insttumentation; 1
2.
Steam block valve; 3.
Solenoid valve (operates the steam block valve);
4.
Programmable logic controller (includes input / output modules) or solid state logic modules; and O
5.
Connectins eiectricai si nai and eneumatic iines.
8 1
j Note:
This system is fall safe upon loss of the electrical or air support system.
)
3.8.1.6.3 X 344A Autoclase UF Cylinder Low Pressure Steam Shutoff System O Function W
The Cylinder Low Pressure Steam Shutoff System is to prevent over pressurization of a UF cylinder l
during the heating process which could result from a blockage in the UF. line between the cylinder and l
the pressure transmitter (cylinder valve not open or clarity not established). This is detected by l
instrumentation monitoring the feed line for low pressure after a cylinder has heated for a predetermined l
period of time.
See Section 3.2.1 for a description of the system.
BoundaT The Cylinder Low Pwssure Stearn Shutoff System boundary includes the following:
l 1.
Pressure sensing instrumentation; l
l 4
. 2.
Timer; I
O 3.8 33 4
emy,.
y
--y y
94-m--.-w-7~
yi,-
--6%.'t
---m
+-'r'-r-t P-*"
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SAR PORTS September 29,1997 m
Rev.13 W
3.
Steam block valve; 4.
Solenoid valve (operates the steam block valve);
5.
Programmable logic controller (includes input / output modules) or solid state logic modules; and 6.
Connecting electrical signal and pneumatic lines.
Note:
- This system is fall safe upon loss of the electrical or air support system.
3.8.1.6.4 X 344A Autoclave Shell High Pressure Containment Shutdown System O Funci,n The High Pressure Containment Shutdown System is to contain a release of UF. inside the autoclave.
Fifteen (15) psig is the lowest pressure which can be assumed that is not due to a steam control failure l
and yet give an early indication that a UF. releue is in progress. This is detected by instrumentation monitoring internal autoclave pressure.
See Section 3.2.1 for a description of the system.
Boundan-The Shell liigh Pressure Containment Shutdown System boundary includes the following:
1.
Pressure sensing instrumentation; 2.
Containment block valves;
- 3.. Solenoid valves (operates the containment block valves);
4.
Progranunable logic controller (includes input / output modules) or solid state logic modules; 5.
Process piping from the autoclave shell to containment block valves, including piping between redundant containment block valves; and 6.
Autoclave shell, o rings, shell locking ring, shell penetrations and connecting electrict] signal and pneumatic lines.-
Note:
This system is fall safe upon loss of the electric or air with the following exceptions:
- a. The daughter cylinder safety valve located between the cylinder and the pigtail at each autoclave which will fail as is on loss of air,
- b. Autoclave 3 and 4 UF. drain line valves will fall as is on loss of electric power or air.
g 3.8-34 l.
=-
SAR. PORTS September 29,1997 Rev.13 3.8.1.6.5 X 344A Autoclave Shell liigh Pressure Steam Shutdown System O Function The Autoclave Shell liigh Pressure Steam Shutdown System is to ensure that a cylinder is not overheated due to an Instrument or steam supply system failure, which could create a high cylinder pressure situation leading to a UF. release. This is detected by instrumentation monitoring internal autoclave pressure.
See Section 3.2.1 for a description of the system.
Boundary The Autoclave Shel! 111gh Steam Pressure Shutdown System boundary includes the following:
I 1.
Pressure sensing instrumentation:
2, Steam block valves; l
3.
Solenoid valves (operates the steam block valves);
l 4.
Programmable logic controller (includes input / output modules) or solid state logic modules; and O
5.
Connecting electrical signal and pneumatic lines.
Note:
This system is fall safe upon loss of the electrical or air support system.
3.8.1.6.6 X 344A Autoclave UF. Cylinder High Temperature Steam Shutoff System O runction The Cylinder liigh Temperature Steam Shutoff System is to ensure that cylinder hydrostatic or zero ullage limitations will not be exceeded; or, in the case of controlled feeding, to ensure that the UF. is not liquified by over heating. High temperature is detected by temperature sensing elements magnetically attached to a cylinder being heated in an autoclave.
See Section 3.2.1 for a description of the system.
Boundan The Cylinder liigh Temperature Steam Shutoff System boundary includes the following:
1.
Temperature switch:
2.
Temperature element / thermocouple / feed-thru;
'GV 3.8-35
=
.-Y
SAR PORTS May 31,1996 Rev. 3 g
3.
Steam block valve; 4.
Solenoid valve (operates the steam block valve);
l l
5.
Programmable logic controller (meludes input / output modules) or solid state logic modules; and l
l 6.
Connecting electrical signal and pneumatic lines.
l l
Note:
This system is fail safe upon loss of the electrical or air support system.
l l
3.8.1.6.7 Y 'tf A Autoclave Shell Iligh Pressure Relief System.
l 1
0 Function l
l The Autoclave Shell High Pressure Relief System protects against autoclave over pressure by l
relieving excess pressure. The issue of fall safe is not applicable to this system.
l See Section 3.2.1 for a description of the system.
Doundarv l
The Autoclave Shell High Pressure Relief System boundary includes the following:
1.
Rupture disk; 2.
Pressure relief valve; 3.
Piping between autoclave and pressure relief valve, including the manual block valve and the l
pressure indicator installed in the piping; l
l 4.
Vent line piping to atmosphere.
l l
Note:
No support systems are required.
l 1
3.8.1.6.8 X 344A Autoclave Pigtall Isolation System l
l O Function l
1 Upon failure of a manifold or pigtall during a sample / transfer operation, allowing UE to release.
l the Pigtail isolation System will manually be initiated to close isolation valves and thus minimize the l
quantity of UF released.
l l
See Section 3.2.1.3.6 for a description of the system.
l l
l 9 3.8-36
SAR PORTS September 29,1997
(")
Rev.13 v
Fl:.ED, SAMPLING, AND TRANSFER OPERATIONS Case R-28 Pietail Failure The probability of rupturing a pigtail connection without outside interference is almest nil. This is due to the pre shaping of pigtails for each feed position; the 700 psig tests performed on each pigtail; and the certification program. A ection leak can occur; however, this will result from an operator error (cross threading connector,.. t using virgin gasket, etc.). The release will be much smallt.r than a rupture release. A pigtail can be ruptured by abuse, falling object, or moving the cylinder while the pigtail is still connected to 'he manifold.
The complete breakage of a 7:8-inch pigtail or cylinder valve in the feef autoclaves could w
in the release of UF. vapor at 80 pounds per minute. The cylinder pressure is based on the UF. liquid vapor equilibrium pressure at a temperature of 235'F. The cylinder valve is at t o' clock position. In a feed autoclave with less than the allowable water inventory, this cylin%.
?
releo,e will result in no UO F, HF or UF. release to the environment, if the feed stitoclave has 2 2 excess water, the reaction between UF. and water ' vill rcsult in a pressure increase. The leak would be detected io s 7 seconds at s 15 psig pressure and the autoclave isolated in s 22 seconds.
l F:gure 4.2 3 show; the pressure that develops from an 80 lb/ min UF. leak in a 72-inch feed autoclave. The autoclaves that have failed the water inventory tests are the 6-foot (feed) and the 7-foot (feed and sample) diameter autocla"es in X-343.
Q V
The pigtail in sample and transfer autoclaves is connected with the cylinder valve at the 6 o' clock position. In this case a pigtail rupture will allow liquid UF to flow into the autoclave or to the atmosphere if the autoclave is open. The probability of a pigtail rupturing in an autoclave while the autoclave L Ned is extremely low, because the pigtail would have to fail without outside
)
interie ence. (This is assuming that a certified pt:taillas been used.nd the connections leak-rated.)
Small leaks can occur at pigte.il connection. These are the result of improper connections. These i
risks are mitigated by leak-rating the connections.
In case a pigtail ruptures in t closed autoclave, it vias faund from Figure 4.2-4 that it would take aboa: 15 seconds for the autoclave pressure to reach 82 pisa cylinder pressure. After pressure equilibration, the liquid flow of 1,690 lbs/ min should slow to about 470 lbs/ min. During the 15 seconds before pressure equilibration, approximately 420 pounds of UF. will escape and approximately 360 pounds would escape in the next 45 seconds for a total of 780 pounds released to the autoclave only. A pigtail leak will be much less severe than this rupture incident; therefore, this case is used as a bounding " worst case" incident.
In the event the autoclave retains more than the allowable water inventory, e g, faHs the water inventory test, a UF. release inside the autocitse will activate the pressure relief system and result in a source term. The source term will be a function of vessel volume, pressure relief valve setting, water inventory, and UF. leak rate. However, the maximum release is equivalent to a 700 pound UF. release directly to the ambient environment in about 10 minutes. This release will c; cur at the X-(
343 or X-342 buildings since these are the only locations that contain autoclaves that have failed the water inventory tests.
J i
4.2-35 l
c
SAR-PORTS May 31,1997 Rev. 3 g
The purpose of the containment autoclaves is to protect workers in the immediate area and the general public in the event of a release of UF. into the autoclave. Most of these releases involve small liquid or vapor releases associated with leaking cylinder valves and pigtail gaskets. Larger i
j releases would require failure of safety systems. The resulting autoclave pressure can be limited by l
two factors, the amount of water available for reaction or the amount of UF. released. The rate of pressure increase is a function of the rate of the release of UF. In general, accident pressures cited below are based on the consumption of the available water in the autoclave and ope ation of safety systems to limit releases to the autoclave and to prevent additional water being added to the autoclave.
Conservative calculations were performed using the model described in POEF-TO-26 to dete:mine
'he accident pressures. Both gas vapor and liquid releases of UF. were considered in determining the accident pressures. The calculations assumed that there was 150 pounds of water in the autoclave available to react with the UF (this ar..ount is larger than the water inventory control system'
,d allow in the autoclaves). The results of the calculations indicate that the accident pressures for vapor releases in th; autoclaves are 91 psia for the 8' autoclaves,93 psia for the 7' autoclaves, ai i 95 psia for the 6' autoclaves.
At the leak rates for liquid that could occur, assuming operation on he safety systems to prevent catastrophic failures, the autoclave pressure rise is bounded by that calcul.ted for the UF. vapor releases. Based on the discussions above, the autoclaves will be tested at 90 psig (104.5 psia). This will provide reasonable ass'irance that the autoclaves are capable of withstanding the accident pressure.
a The probability of pigtail rupture is greater when the autoclave is open. The rupture could occur g
due to the operator lif'ing the cylinder in the sample or transfer autoclave while the cylinder is still w
connected, in this case, the valve could be pulled from the cylinder or the pigtail could break while the valve is still open.
The liquid UF release from a cylinder in the sample and transfer autoclaves could be as much as 1,690 pounds per minute. The leak would be to the atmosphere providing the autoclave it, open. The total release in this case would be approximately 10,000 pounds UF..
The probability of this occurrence is medium, because two operators are present during the changing of cylinders in autoclaves. Additionally, the Pigtail Line Isolation System can be activated to isolate the sptem in the event a pigtail line breaks. This is a safcty system. The consequences are similar to but less severe than the cylinder drop. The resultant risk is low.
l Case R-29 Cylinder Valve Failure There is the possibility of breahg a cylinder valve while the cylinder is being moved; however, the probability is greatly reduced bj the permanent cylinder valve shieM that protrudes past the end of large cylinders (2-1/2-ton,10-ton, and 14 ton) and the screw-on caps installed on 5-inch, 8-inch, and 12-inch cylinders prior to movement. Still there is the remote possibility of breaking a valve while the cylinder is being moved by crane.
Failure to completely close a valve after use at Tails withdrawal or at the autoclaves could result in a gaseous UF. release. However, this would require an additional operator error of failir.; to leak-O 4.2-36
SAR-PORTS September 29,1997 Rev.13 ruptured cylinders were calculated to show the effects of a liquid UF. release; although, these cylinders are never transported while the contents are in the liquid state. Cylinders at Portsmouth are handled by crane with UF. in the liquid state at Tails, ERP and during bi monthly inventory weighing operations st feed facilities).
One o' the two worst case health effects resulting from breaching a cylinder of liquid UF. (18,000 pounds) ir estimated to be at winter conditions, class "D" atmosphere,15 miles per hour wind and 60 percent r.ative humidity. The UO F plume could be lethal for 1,200 feet downwind and impose 2 2 renal injuty for 8,000 feet. In a class "F" atmosphere and a 2 miles per hour wind, the UO F: p!ume 2
would be lethal for only 800 feet but would impose renal injury downwind for 25,000 feet. The HF in these plumes would be lethal for upproximately 700 feet and could cause health effects for 25,000 feet.
If a UF. release of this magnitude did occur, as the result of dropping a liquid filled cylinder from a crane, the probability of death or injury is low. The plume would not be lethal off plantsite in the calculated exposure time of seven to nine minutes. The plume would be lethal onsite to personnel in the immediate vicinity which are overcome, trapped or injured. The width of the plume would be so narrow that able bodied personnel could move from its path before vnal exposure. The plume would be visible so that people could move from its path before receiving any exposure. Piketon, Ohio is the mest densely ropulated ate where people could receive renal injury; however, in a 2 miles per hour wind (this is the only case thrt Piketon could be affected) it would take two hours for the plume to reach Piketon With approximately two hours notice, personnel should de able to escape to df-a sr.fe area. Persons trapped in homes or automobiles would have windows closed which would give protection. (The worst plumes are at winter conoitions).
The worst casooff plantsite would be renal injury to patients in nursmg homes which are less than 1-1/2 miles from a possible cylinder rupture. There are apptoximately 60 patients in two nursing homes southwest of thi. plant. These people would have less than 45 s.iutes to be alerted and evacuated if the release occurred in a 2 mph wind, or less than 10 minutes in a 15 mph wind. The patients would receive some protection by being indoors with the doors and windows closed.
4.2.4 Q Systerns Autoclave Q systent. ne provided to accomplish the following (all pressures and temperature setting are maximum permissible, e.g., lower limits can be used):
The UF Cylinder Hich Pressure Cutoff System shuts off the steam to the autoclave if the cylinder a.
pressure exceeds 100 psig (
5 psig)..
- b. Tne Autoclave Shell Hich Steam Pressure Shutdown System shuts off the steam if the autoclave shell pressure exceeds 8.0 psig while heating Category A cylinders or 2.5 psig while heating Category B cylinders (6 2 psig).
The Autoclave Shell Hieh Pressure Containment Shutdown System shuts off the steam and closes c.
the containment valves if the autoclave shell pressure exceeds a setpoint of s 15 psig ( 2 psig).
l U
4.2-48a o
SAR-PORTS May 31,1996 g
Rev. 3
- d. The UF. Cylinder Hieh Temnerature Cutoff System shuts off the steam if the cylinder skin temperature exc.eeds 235'F while heating Category A cylinders or 220'F while heating Category B cylinders (i 5' F).
- e. The Hich Condensate Level Cutoff System will shut off steam if the level probes in the condensate diain lines detect a high condensate level.
f.
The Autoclave Shell Hich Pressure P,elief System (rupture disc and relief valve) activates to prevr.nt the internal at:oclave pressure from exceeding the maximum allowable working pressure for the autoclave as determined by the ASME rating.
- g. Pietail Line Isolation System isolates the pigtails by initiating containment in the event of a pigtai! line failure.
4.2.5 Fire and Explosion Hazards The possibility for fires occurring in the compression / liquefaction withdrawal exists because of the lube oil present and possible ignition source (hot compressor bearings). Such fires will be prevented by compressor shut down if high bearing temperatures are detected. If this system fails and fire occurs, it is tinlikely that the fire will result in a release. Furthermore, if the lube oil supply is disrupted due to a fire, compressor vibration accelerometers would be triggered by the resultant 3
compressor vibration and the compressor would be shutdown avoiding a release of UF..
W 4.2.0 The Effects of Natural Phenomena on UF, Handling and Storage Systems Flood Plant elevation eliminates the possibility of long-term flooding of any system amlyzed in this section. Flooding is possible from bcal flash flooding which can temporanly cover elements of these systems; however, site drainage systems should provide drainage away from the facilities, eliminating the chances for criticality or the release of UF to the atmosphere.
Tornadoes The force of high winds directly against any of the systems analyzed in this section would not result in the release of UF. or cause a criticality.
Seismic Earthquakes in the r(
>f the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant are estimated to have an effective peak ground acceleration of 0.05g with a 10 percent probability of being exceeded for a return period of 237 years. (The remaining plant life is estimated to be 20-25 years.)
Engineering Decision Analysis Company, Inc., (EDAC) performed a seismic analysis on similar 4.2-48b
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' TSR-PORTS September 26,1997 Rev.13 SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X 343, AND X-344 FACILITIES O) q 2.1.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.1.3.5 Autoclave Shell Illgt Pressure Containment Shutdown (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Frequency Surveillance Quarterly SR 2.1.3.5.1 Perform channel functional test to verify the High Pressure Containment system will actuate at or below 15 psig l
Semiannually SR 2.1.3.5.2 Calibrate shell high pressure shutdown l
instrumentation at r 15 psig Quarterly SR 2.1.3.5.3 Izak rate the autoclave by pressurizing the autoclave to at least 90 psig and verify that the overall system pressure loss is less than or equal to 10 psig/hr with all inner and outer containment valves closed.
OR N
(V Perform a leak rate test where the maximum acceptable leakage shall not exceed 12 scfm at a minimum test pressure of 90 psig Note: Allowable test tolerance M cover instrument drift and uncertainties during normal operation = +2 psig BASIS:
The steam used to heat a cylinder within an autoclave is controlled at approximately 5 psig.
Therefore, when the autoclave internal pressure reaches the 515 psig setpoint, the operating l
logic assumes that a UF release has occurred within the autoclave and causes the containment 6
valves to close, preventing an external release of UF. The 15 psig represents the lowest 6
pressure at which it can be assumed that it is not due to a steam control failure and yet gives the early indication that a UF, release is in progress. Testing the containment system at 90 psig is representative of the peak credible accident pressure that could be attained assuming functioning of safety systems, design features and administrative controls to prevent rupture of a cylinder or pigtail. The set point value corresponds to the trip set point established under DOE 5481.1B in 1985 and amended by DOE approval in 1995 to allow a 2 psi tolerance to comply with the definition of " Allowable Value" in ANSI /ISA-S67.04-1988 [SAR Section 3.2.1.1.1].
2.1-12
i
'TSR POR S September 26,1997 Rev.13 SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-705 DECONTAMINATION FACILITY 2.6.4 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES 2.6.4.1 Handtable Overnows DF:
Handtables shall have a s 1.5 inch high overflow.
SURVEILLANCE:
Frequency Surveillance Annually SR 2.6.4.1.1 Verify that s 1.5 inch high overflow is not obmucted and that a 5 inch overflow receiving container is used BASIS:
Potential solution criticality from an " unsafe" slab thickness in a handtable is prevented by overflow drains (SAR Sections 3.3.1.3.2.7 & 4.3.1.2.2.1].
2.6.4.2 Air Gaps O
DF:
Air gaps shall be installed at all "B" area drains and water-to-process connections that connect to geometrically unsafe systems as required by a NCSA
-SURVEILLANCE:
Frequency Surveillance Annually SR 2.6.4.2.1 Verify and document the presence of air l
gaps required by NCSAs.
BASIS:
Air gaps are used by design for piping to drains to prevent backflow to geometrically unsafe systems [SAR Section 4.3.1.3.3].
2.6-18
_u