ML20217D693
| ML20217D693 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/06/1998 |
| From: | Mcgaffigan E NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217D663 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-97-205-C, NUDOCS 9803300166 | |
| Download: ML20217D693 (5) | |
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- N OT ATIO N VOTE RESPONSE SHEET TO: John C. Hoyle, Secretary FROM: COMMISSIONER MCGAFFIGAN
SUBJECT:
SECY-97-205 -INTEGRATION AND EVALUATION OF RESULTS FROM RECENT LESSONS-LEARNED REVIEWS Approved 2-/ Disapproved
- Abstain Not Participating Request Discussion COMMENTS:
See attached comments.
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SIG TURE IOU U 4 "S 6 , )$W Release Vote / < / U DATE Withhold Vote / /
I Entered on "AS" Yes
- No
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9803300166 980324 RES E E PDR ci163.5m/99
Commissioner McGaffican's Comments on SECY-97-205 I want to join Chairman Jackson in commending the staff for their work in preparing SECY-97-205. They clearly went the extra mile in developing options for the Commission's consideration.
I support the short-term actions of Option 5. subject to the following comments:
I previously approved the revision to Generic Letter 91-18 and agree with Commissioner Diaz that this revision was well executed by the staff in a timely way.
I support the staff's proposal to revise the Enforcement Policy as it relates to unreviewed safety questions (US0s) and to exercise enforcement direction in the interim pursuant to Section VII(B)(6) of the Enforcement Policy.
I continue to support the development of regulatory guidance on updating Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs or SARs), as the Commission SRM on SECY-96-036 directed. I strongly prefer the Option 2/ Option 5 approach which would allow obsolete, historical, or less meaningful information to be deleted from the UFSAR or placed in an appendix where further updating pursuant to 10 CFR 50.71(e) would not be required. I also strongly prefer the procedural option described in Attachment 3. page 3-16._of working with NEI on developing the necessary guidance, which can than be endorsed by NRC. NEI has already submitted such draft guidance (Pietrangelo letter to Roe, dated November 14 1997). which I understand is now referred to as NEI 98-03.
I am not convinced at this time that rulemaking will be necessary to permit removal. of information from the UFSAR as proposed by staff and NEI. If it is nevertheless ultimately determined that rulemaking would be necessary to allow removing obsolete historical, or less meaningful information, then the staff should carry out a targeted, expedited rulemaking for that purpose. I would also note that in deciding whether information is appropriate for removal from the UFSAR. staff and licensees should bear in mind how the 50.59 process and the FSAR are used in decommissioning a reactor. For example, historical material on hydrology and geology may not be relevant during operations but may.be relevant to decommissioning.
I also support the development of an expedited rulemaking to modify 10 CFR 50.59. The long-standing differences between the staff and NUMARC/NEI on-10 CFR 50.59 have been narrowed by NEI's development of NEI 96-07. Revision 0.
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2 Mr. Collin's January 9, 1998 letter to Mr. Beedle indicates that there are essentially three issues remaining two of which the staff believes can be addressed in the near-term rulemaking and the third of which, the baseline against which increases in consequences must be judged, the staff does not propose to reconcile through the near-term rulemaking. I join Commissioner Diaz in requesting that the staff reconsider its position on acceptance limits as they pertain to consequences. The staff does not appear to be object w to a similar approach to acceptance limits in NEI 96-07 with regard to " margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specification."
'With regard to the sub-options for rulemaking discussed in Attachment 3. I join Commissioners Dicus and Diaz in supporting a rule change that would explicitly allow minimal increases in the probability or consequences of a accident or malfunction without an unreviewed safety question being triggered.
The work that has been done in the PRA Implementation Plan on draft Regulatory Guide 1.174 and draft Standard Review Plan Chapter 19 should make defining
" minimal" in a revision to NEI 96-07 reasonably straightforward.
I would not be opposed to the sub-option proposed by staff and NEI to divide clause 50.59(a)(2)(1) into two clauses, one dealing with probability, one with consequer.ces. The second clause would then read. "if the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report more than minimally exceed established acceptance limits." One benefit of this approach is that it would focus the discussion on where the acceptance limits have been " established." the heart of the difference between NEI 96-07. Revision 0 and the staff's NUREG-1606.
I would recommend th6; current clause 50.59(a)(2)(ii) be adjusted to read "if the possibility for' an accident of a different type, or malfunction of equipment important to safety with a different result, than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created." This would appear to be consistent with the staff's January 9. 1998 comments on NEI 96-07 Revision 0.
Since there now appears to be resolution and consensus on margin of safety. I would not propose to change current clause 50.59(a)(2)(iii). I would not be opposed to a change to this clause if such a change were thought to be prudent to reinforce that consensus.
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3 I do not support changing the term "unreviewed safety question." I agree that the term can be misleading and may not always fully describe what is really involved, but I am impressed with how long and widely the term has been used in our regulations and in the processes of the Department of Energy. I do not think it is worth the effort to replace it everywhere (I would note that the staff in NMSS working on Yucca Mountain /Part 60 and on Part 70 need to consider the 50.59 short-term rulemaking as they deal with the USQ concept in their rulemakings. Possible revisions to 10 CFR 60.44(a)(2), for example, may need to be considered.)
I do not support in this rulemaking either the Chairman's proposal to broaden the' scope of the rule by replacing the phrase " safety analysis report" with
" current licensing oasis " or NEI's December 19. 1997 proposal to the Chairman to delete all references to the safety analysis report and substitute
" accident analyses." I believe that either approach will delay the short-term rulemaking and that the scope problem intended to be resolved by the changes can better be worked out without rulemaking through joint work on updating NEI 96-07. Revision 0, draft NEI 98-03, and the NEI " Guideline for Managing NRC Commitments.' previously endorsed by NRC in 1996.
Finally, let me turn to the long-term aspects of Option 5. Ijoin Commissioner Dicus in disapproving the commitment of resources to that effort at this time. I note that the staff in its discussions of Options 1 and 2 in Attachment 3 points out that ~[i]mplementation of this option [1]. however, may prove sufficient to obviate the need to pursue more resource-intensive and high-impact activities in the longer term" and that "[1]ike Option 1. this option [2] will allow the staff an opportunity to gather and evaluate more experiential data in order to make more informed decisions about where future improvements are needed and how they should be'prioritized." NEI has similarly suggested that an Advanced Notice of Proposed'Rulemaking on how to make all of 10 CFR Part 50 more risk-informed would likely divert resources from solving the immediate issues at hand.
Like Commissioner Dicus. I support the 1995 PRA Policy Statement and the f ongoing efforts in the PRA Implementation Plan to take incremental steps j toward a more risk-informed regulatory framework for reactor licensees. I i recognize that both the Chairman and Commissioner Diaz are powerful and persuasive voices for long-term. more far-reaching changes to Part 50, and both would like to embark on that journey now. But my view is that we need to successfully carry out the short-term steps and learn as we do so before we i
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4 can judge how far we can and should go in the long term. Due to backfit constraints, most of the possible broad revisions to Part 50 are likely to end up being voluntary options available to licensees. Without constructive and willing participation from industry stakeholders long-term revisions that provide voluntary options may be futile. A prerequisite.to constructive engagement in the.long term is the prompt completion.of the three remaining short-term actions.
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION wasamotow.o.c. asss-ooot g ,
%, March 24,1998 AfCRETARY MEMORANDUM TO: L. Joseph Callan ive Director for Operations FROM: hn .
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SUBJECT:
STAFF REQUIREMENTS: SECY-97-205 - INTEGRATION AND l EVALUATION OF RESULTS FROM RECENT LESSONS-LEARNED REVIEWS After carefully considering the various options presented in SECY-97-205 and the informatica provided at the December 17,1997 Commission briefing on the issues addressed in the paper, the Commission approved only the short term actions proposed by the staff under Option 5 (as expanded by those portions of Options 1 and 2, as noted specifically below). As a result, the staff should take the following specific actions:
a initiate an expedited rulemaking to modify the language of 10 CFR 50.59, as described in Option 1, to clarify and simplify the current rule and to incorporate knowledge gained from risk insights, as appropriate. In order to establish realistic and safe limits allowing licensees to make changes under the rule without prior NRC approval, the staff should eliminate the de facto "zero increase" criteria and allow " minimal" increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment, and "minimar reduction in the margin of safety. The staff should evaluate for Commission consideration the advisability of allowing proposed changes that result in the creation of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated /_
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that has "minimar safety impact. The scope of this evaluation should include 50.92.
This evaluation should be conducted expeditiously so that should the Commission ()d )
decide upon review of staff's evaluation that rulemaking activity in this regard is appropnate, the rulemaking can be included in the above expedited rulemalung for 50.59. The staff should define " minimal' in a clear and practical manner, consistent with the intention that 'minimar is larger than " negligible" and substantially smaller than "signecant" The staff should consider the work it has done in updating the Standard Review Plan (NUREG 0800) and, in a different context (severe accident), on draft Regulatory Guide 1.174 and Standard Review Plan Chapter 19 in formulating what constitutes a "minimar change.
In addition, consistent with and concurrent with the rulemaking enhancement, the staff SECY NOTE: This SRM and the Commission Voting Record will be made publicly available 5 working days after the date of this SRM. SECY 97-205 and the initial SRM on SECY 97-205 were made publicly available on October 2,1997.
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2 should continue to work with NEl to reconcile areas of disagreement with industry guidance (NEl g6-07), endorse those portions it considers to be appropriate, and report to the Commission any items which it recommends not be endorsed. The staff should {
reassess its position on acceptance limits on consequences and margin of safety, and report to the Commission on that matter.
The staff should be cognizant of 10 CFR 50.5g-type language that may be found in other ports of the regulations, notably 10 CFR Parts 60,72 and 76. The staff should consider, in parallel with proposing changes to 10 CFR 50.5g, proposing changes to those other parts of the regulations at an appropriate time (as well as corresponding )
changes to the Enforcement Policy).
(SECY Suspense: 7/10/g8)
(EDO)
. develop regulatory guidance to enhance 10 CFR 50.71(e) to clarify the scope and methode needed to update Final Safety Analy, tis Reports (FSARs), consistent with the Commission guidance in the SRM for SECY-g7-036, dated May 20, Igg 7. In this regard, safety and risk significance should be used to support the prioritization for incorporation of the information to be included in the updated FSARs and to aid in the removal or relocaten of obsolete or unnecessary information. (if the staff determines that rulemaking is necessary to remove or relocate information from the updated FSAR, this should be included in a separate expedited rulemaking package.)
in formulating this guidance, the staff should bear in mind how the 50.5g process and the FSAR are used in licensing, in operating plant activities, and in decommissioning a reactor. (The Commission recognizes that the staff is currently developing a draft Generic Letter on updated FSAR content and that NEl is developing draft industry l
guidance [NEl gS43). The staff should work with NEl to reconcile these documents.
The staff should integrate policy decisions in this Generic Letter with the proposed rule l change for 50.5g.
(SECY Suspense: 4/17/g8)
(EDO)
. revise the Enforcement Policy as it relates to unreviewed safety questions, consistent with the changes made to 10 CFR 50.5g, and exercise enforcement discretion pursuant
- to Section Vil(B)(6) of the Enforcement Policy during the penod prior to the rule change for those circumstanas that are clearly not safety significant and do not pose regulatory concoms which warrant elevated attention. The staff should provide the Commisson specifics regarding the nature and types of situations for which discretion will be considered (SECY Suspense: 7/10/g8)
(EDO)
Although the Commission did not provide a majority to initiate the long term recommendations within Option 5 that would have led to the development of much broader implementation of risk-informed decision making and oversight of NRC regulations from a risk perspective, the Commission believes that the steps outlined above are the necessary prerequisite to
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constructive engagement in the long term. The staff is requested to provide a status report on the effectiveness of these short-term activities and recommendations on whether to pursue more resource intensive and high-impact long term actions. Concurrently, the staff should consider and make recommendations, as appropriate, regarding the " scope" of 50.59. The staff should continue to develop guidance regarding design basis issues, such as specifying the type of information to be considered as design-basis information (as discussed in Option 2).
(SECY Suspense: 2/26/99)
(EDO)
The staff should continue with the Commitment Management related actions (Short Term Action 4, from SECY-97-036).
cc: Chairman Jackson Commissioner DLus Commissioner Diaz Commissioner McGaffigan OGC CIO CFO OCA OlG Office Directors, Regions, ACRS, ACNW, ASLBP (by E-Mail)
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