ML20217C000

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Responds to 971219 RAI on Resolution of USI A-46.NRC Urged to Promptly Restore Regulatory Stability to Resolution of USI A-46 by Recertifying Conclusion Sof to Gc Creel
ML20217C000
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs  
Issue date: 03/23/1998
From: Cruse C
BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR GL-87-02, GL-87-2, TAC-M69435, TAC-M69436, NUDOCS 9803260247
Download: ML20217C000 (163)


Text

CHARLES H. Cat >se Bahimore Gas and Electric Company Vice Presid nt Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Nuclear Energy 1650 Calven Cliffs Parkway i

Lusby, Maryland 206$7 j

410 495-4455 March 23,1998 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i

Washington,DC 20555 H

ATTENTION:

Document Control Desk

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos.1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 s

Response to Request for Additional Information on the Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-46, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. I and 2 (TAC Nos. M69435: M69436)

' In Generic Letter 87-02 (Reference a), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) endorsed a process for resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46, and encouraged the affected nuclear power plant licensees to participate in a generic program. Supplement I to Generic Letter 87-02 (Reference b) requested a commitment to the Generic implementation Procedure (GIP-2)(Reference c) prepared by the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) schedule for the implementation of the GIP, and a future submission of a report summarizing the remits of the USI A-46 program, in Reference (d), Baltimore Gas and Electric Company committed to unplement GIP-2, including the clarifications, interpretations, and exceptions in the Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No. 2, and to inform the NRC Staff of any significant or programmatic deviations from GIP guidance. In Reference (c), we submitted a summary of the results of the USI A-46 evaluation. In Reference (f), you requested additional information needed to complete your review of our evaluation. This letter forwards our response to your questions.

We are concerned that a number of the questions are related to aspects of the A-46 program that had been previously rey!cwed and approved in Reference (b). Some of these fundamentally question the SQUG j

method. We understand that there have been no new technical issues identified by the staff or industry

/

that would prompt the challenge of the NRC-approved methodology. Regulatory instability and unpredictability of this nature complicates and frustrates timely, final resolution ofissues. We urge the

/

NRC to promptly restore regulatory stability to the resolution of US! A-46 by recertifying the conclusions of Reference (b).

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Document Control Desk March 23,1998

. Page 2 Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours, wV W

Attachment (1): BGE Response to NRC Request for Additional Information on Resolution of USI A-46 c

at Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant ec:

11. J. Miller, NRC Without Attaebment R. S. Fleishman, Esquire Resident Inspector, NRC J. E. Silberg, Esquire R.1. McLean, DNR A. W. Dromerick, NRC J.11. Walter, PSC Director, Project Directorate I-1, NRC Referenees:

(a)

Letter from Mr. II. R. Denton (NRC) to Mr. J. A. Tiernan (BGE), dated Februa.y 19,1987, I

" Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mchanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 (Generic Letter 87-02)"

(b)

Letter from Mr. J. G. Partlow (NRC) to Mr. G. C. Creel (BGE), dated May 22, 1992,

" Supplement No. I to Generic Letter (GL) 87-02 that Transmits Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No. 2 (SSER No. 2) on SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure, Revision 2, As Corrected on February 14,1992,(GlP-2)"

(c)

" Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment," Revision 2, Corrected 2/14/92, Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG)

(a)

Letter from Mr. G. C. Creel (BGE) to Document Control Desk (NRC), September 18,1992,

" Response to Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1 on Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Resolution of USI A-46" (e)

Letter from Mr. C.11. Cruse (BGE) to Document Control Desk (NRC), June 28, 1996,

" Summary Report for Resolution of USI A-46 (TAC Nos. M69435; M69436)"

(f)

Letter from Mr. A. W. Dromerick (NRC) to C. H. Cruse (BGE), December 19,1997, " Request 1

. for Additional Information on the Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-46, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. I and 2 (TAC Nos. M69435; M69436)"

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ATTACHMENT (1)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT i

I Baltimore Gas and Electric Company March 23,1998

ATTACHMENT (I)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NRCReggyt1:

In Section 5.1.1 of Attachment (1) to your letter (Reference 1), the following effective grades are indicated:

Containments Elevation 10' Intake Structure Elevation 3' All other brildings Elevation 45' In generating the " realistic median centered" in-structure response spectra (IRS) in Appendix 11 to Attachment (1) for resolution, you used NUREG/CR-0098, 84 (" Development of Criteria for Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants") percentile non-exceedance spectral shape and the realistic damping values recommended therein. You used 10% frequency peak shifting and indicated that the free field motion at the basemat elevation may be less than 60% of the ground level free motion. The damping values mentioned are: (1) 5% equipment damping in Section 1.1; (2) 7% structural damping for both steels and concrete elements in Section 2.0; and (3) the best estimate, lower and upper bounds of effective soil hysteric damping of 0.08,0.10, and 0.06 m Section 3.0 of Appendix II.

On the basis of the information summarized above, we request the following additional information:

NRCReaurst 1(ah Since the NUREG/CR-0098 spectrum does not reflect the soil amplification at your site, what is the basis for using these spectra at the ground level for deconvolution to the foundation level of each structure?

By doing this deconvolution, you are inappropriately reducing the spectra for the response analysis. This is contrary to the method described in your submittal of September 18,1992, which was reviewed and accepted for use in resolving the Unresolved Safety issue (USl) A-46 issues. Provide the basis for your revised approach, which deviates from your previous commitment.

BGE Respanac_lo_lfa)1 In developing the " realistic median centered" IRS for use in outlier resolution, the original 2-D stick models developed by Bechtel were used. Bechtel accounted for the soil with soil springs. To be consistent with the original models, embedment was not considered, and the soil springs were essentially replaced by soil in the FLUSil analyses. A soil depth of 200 feet was used, with the structure at the effective soil surface. The seismic input motion was defined at the same level at which the structures were founded in the original models. In the case of these models, each structure is founded at the ground surface.

NRCReauest 1(b):

Is there any ground motion generated at the foundation level through deconvolution less than 60% of that at the ground level? Provide yourjustification if such a condition exists.

BGE Reanonne to Ifb):

As stated in the response to 1(a), embedment of the structures was not considered. The ground level and feundation level are the same; hence the ground motion generated is the same.

1

ATTACHMENT (1)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NRC Request 1(c);

in all the figures provided,5% damping is indicated. Where is the 7% damping used?

BGE Resnonse to 1(c)t The 5% damping indicated is the equipment damping level. The 7% damping referred to in Appendix H to Attachment (1) was structural damping applied to the concrete and steel structural elements during the generation of the IRS.

NRCReauest 1(dh The last sentence of Section 4 of Appendix H states, "For the Reactor Building the fundamental soil structure interaction mode frequency is shifted to the len, outside of the frequency range of maximum earthquake power resulting in the structural response being considerably reduced." The in-structure spectra with such shift are shown in Figures Al.12 and A1.13 in Appendix II. The staff believes that a single time-history has been used. In accordance with Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 3.7.1.I.I.b.

Option 1, if single time-history is used, it is required to satisfy a target power spectral density in addition to the design response spectra enveloping requirement. Indicate if this requirement is met. If so, provide the documentation.

HGE Resnonse to 1(d):

Reference to the Reactor Building (Containment Structure) fundamental soil structure interaction mode frequency being "shifled to the left, outside the frequency range of maximum earthquake power," is relative to the analysis using lower bound (softer) soil properties. As stated, the upper bound (stifTer) soil case dominated the response and the resulting in-structure spectra. A single time-history was used.

Stevenson and Associates (S&A) has generated target power spectral density (PSD) functions in accordance with SRP 3.7.1, Appendix A, compatible with the Newmark-Ilall 84th percentile spectrum for previous projects. The PSD check was not documented for this project, and a target PSD specific to the Newmark-Hall 84th percentile spectrum is not currently available. However, to demonstrate that the time-history used contained sufficient energy throughout the frequency range of interest, the one-sided PSD as defined in SRP 3.7.1, Appendix A, for the time-history used is shown plotted, on page 3 of this attachment, against the SRP 3.7.1, Appendix A, target PSD function defined for a Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.60 ground spectrum. Also,80% of the latter curve is plotted. Also shown plotted, on page 4 of this attachment, is the Newrnark-Ilall (NUREG/CR-0098) 84th percentile ground response spectrma compared to the RG 1.60 ground response spectrum, both for 2% damping.

It is realized that the target PSD in SRP 3.7.1, Appendix A, is specific to the RG 1.60 spectrum.

However, comparison of the two spectral curves and the PSD functions indicates the time-history used had significantly more energy in the low frequency range (0.5 Hz to about 2.5 Hz) where the Newmark-Hall spectrum exceeds the RG 1.60 spectrum, and is only slightly below the RG 1.60 target PSD requirement at about the 6.5-7.5 Hz and 9-10 Hz ranges. It should be noted that the RG 1.60 spectrum peak range extends to 9 Hz, where the Newmark-liall spectrum peak range for soil sites extends only to i

about 6-6.5 Hz. Hence, it is concluded that the time-history function used would meet the target PSD requirement for a target PSD specific to the Newmark-liall 84th percentile spectrum.

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ATTACHMENT m BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NRCRequest 2:

In your reference letter, you stated that Baltimore Gas and Electric (BGE) committed to implement the Gener c Implementation Procedure (GIP), Revision 2 (GIP-2). You also stated that no significant or programmatic deviation from the GIP-2 guidance was made during the USI A-46 resolution process.

Provide the worst-case items that deviate from the GIP-2 guideline, but were considered to be insignificant for Calvert Cliffs, and also provide the bases for categorizing them as such.

BGE Response _to_h The following examples ofinsignificant deviations from the GIP-2 were taken:

The Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) used during the conduct of seismic verification walkdowns at CCNPP were generated in most cases from the Seismic Qualification Utility Group These (SQUG)-developed computer program " Safe Shutdown Equipment Manager (SSEM)".

sheets vary slightly from those provided in GlP-2 in that they incorporate the corrections provided in GIP, Revision 2A.

Similar to item a), above, Screening Verification Data Sheets (SVDS) were generated by one BGE contractor whose personnel were involved in the seismic verification walkdowns performed on various tanks and heat exchangers. While these SVDS sheets are not the exact version included in GlP-2, they do include and address all of the appropriate questions.

Several equipment items were originally classified as being in GIP Equipment Class 0 (Other).

110 wever, once a determination of seismic adequacy was made, these items were not considered to be outliers as directed by the GIP. An example of this is 1MS3986. which is disc eed further in the response to NRC Request 3.

As far as BGE is aware, no other deviations were taken.

4 jyRCRequest 3:

Referring to Tables 5.2-1 and 5.2-2 of the attachment, " Intent but Not Letter Caveat Summary," for Units 1 and 2, respectively, each of the items listed in the table involve some degree ofjudgment or estimation by licensee personnel in concluding that the intent of the applicable caveats were met.

Provide the technical bases for the judgment or estimation that were used to determine the seismic adequacy for certain items (e.g., IMS3986, IC67, IN0411, OPO5429, ICV 517) listed in the tables, but not identified below [i.e., in question 3(a) through 3(c)].

IlGimesponstto_h This response provides information on the determination of seismic adequacy for the following listed items. These items were judged by the respective Seismic Capability Engineers (SCE) involved in the evaluation to " meet the intent but not the letter" of one or more applicable SEWS caveat. The SEWS documents for each of the equipment items discussed in this response are included in Enclosure (A).

IMS3986 - During the development of the CCNPP Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL), this control valve was designated as an Equipment Class 0 component. During the conduct of the seismic verification walkdowns, the responsible SCEs concluded that this valve actually fit the description of an Equipment Class 7 (Fluid-Operated Valves) component. While the evaluation was documented on an Equipment Class 0 SEWS, all of the appropriate Equipment Class 7 caveats were considered in the evaluation.

5

ATTACHMENT (1)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT The valve is similar to other valves in the earthquake equipment class.

e The valve body and yoke are not cast iron.

Pipe size is greater than 1 inch in diameter.

Centerline of pipe to top of operator is within restrictions of GIP Figure B.7-1.

The valve actuator and yoke are not braced independently from the pipe.

Attached lines have adequate flexibility.

A notation stating the intent of all Equipment Class 7 caveats were met for this component was placed on the SEWS by the SCEs. At the conclusion of their evaluation, they considered this equipment item to be seismically adequate.

IC67 - For this panel, the following was noted by the SCEs: " Gaps exist in some locations under front of panels. Panels are bolted together and judged to act as a unit, thus gaps will not cause impact or adversely affect the overall anchorage. Intent of caveat is met." This panel is one of six that are bolted together. At some areas along the front of the panel, visible gaps can be seen under the panel framing.

Ilowever, the panel is anchored at each corner and each corner is in contact with the concrete floor. The six panels will act as a unit because they are internally bolted together into one rigid frame. The bolted connections ensure that each panel will not act as an independent unit. In their judgment, the SCEs concluded that the intent of Anchorage Caveats Nos.6 and 7 for Equipment Class 20 (Instrument &

Control Panels & Cabinets) were met for this panel.

Based on the above, and the fact that all other caveats have been satisfied, this equipment item was considered seismically adequate.

INMH - For this panel, the following was noted by the SCEs: " Top entry conduit not flexible, but would r.ot be damaged (rugged), therefore, intent is met." In theirjudgment the SCEs concluded that the intent of Bounding Spectrum Caveat No. 8 for Equipment Class 20 is met for this panel. The panel and conduit are rigidly mounted to the same structure. Based on the installed configuration, there is no reason to conclude any adverse differential movement could occur during a seismic event that would cause damag: to the conduit and its attachment to the panel.

Based on the above, and the fact that all other caveats have been satisfied, this equipment item was considered seismically adequate.

OPO5429 - For this equipment item the following was noted by the SCEs: " Pneumatic (air) operators for dampers / louvers are often used on air handlers (and fans). Therefore, Equipment Class 10 (Air llandlers) is used for this item." By way of applying this concept, the SCEs were establishing the basis this component is to be evaluated against. The component as a stand-alone item would not fit into Equipment Class 10, but in its design function it satisfies the GIP description of equipment that is included in Equipment Class 10. It is a typical component found on dampers that are considered to be air handling equipment. In their judgment, the SCEs concluded that the intent of Bounding Spectrum Caveat No. I for Equipment Class 10 is met for this equipment item.

Based on the above, and the fact that a'l other caveats have been satisfied, this equipment item was considered seismically adequate.

6

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A'ITACHMENT (1)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ICV 517 - For this equipment item, the following was noted by the SCEs: "The valve is independently supported from the pipe. It is judged to be seismically adequate.... (the) pipe is laterally supported 5 feet to the north and 4 inches to the south. Support locations are judged to be adequate to prevent overstress in the valve yoke due to pipe seismic movement. Intent of caveat is met." Based on the as-installed configuration of piping and supports, the SCEs concluded that the intent of Bounding Spectrum Caveat No. 7 for Equipment Class 7 is met for this valve.

The valve actuator assembly and support were installed in 1988 under Facility Change Request 87-113.

The piping was reanalyzed with the valve actuator assembly explicitly modeled. The valve actuator was then qualified by analysis using the resulting forces. This confirmed thejudgment of the SCEs.

Based on the above, and the fact that all other caveats have been satisfied, this equipment item was considered seismically adequate.

NRCRequest 3(ah For valve 2MOV509 (motor operated valve), the top of the valve operator touches pipe insulation on the same piping, and the bleed-off line touches support framing. You indicated that there is no impact concern because the valve and the piping will move together, and the piping has a nearby restraint.

Provide additional information to demonstrate that the valve and the piping, and the bleed-off line and the support frame, would not respond out-of-phase to one another and impact each other during an earthquake.

RGEResponac_tol(a):

The following is provided on the determination of seismic adequacy for 2MOV509. For this item, the SCEs noted: " top of operator touches pipe insulation on same piping. OK since pipe & valve will move together. Biced-offline against framing is OK due to nearby lateral restraint."

These conditions were noted in consideration of Bounding Spectrum Caveat No.6 for Equipment Class 8A (Motor-Operated Valves). There is no actual bracing installed for this operator that would cause it to move out-of-phase with the nearby piping. The SEWS document for this equipment item is included in Enclosure (A).

The contact point with the insulation is on the riser adjacent to the valve on the same piping. Between the valve and the pipe riser is located a pipe restraint that provides both vertical and axial restraint. In addition, the natural frequency of the valve / operator assembly has been calculated to be greater than 40 liz. These two features, the restraint and high natural frequency, significantly reduce the potential for out-of-phase movement to develop between the riser and the operator. The SCEs did not consider the contact point between the MOV motor housing and the insulation to be a hard point as described in the GIP, since the insulation is thick enough to deflect under the small movement. No force would be transferred to the operator.

The bleed-off line in question runs under the framing mentioned on the SEWS. Since the pipe is vertically restrained immediately adjacent to the valve body, there is no potential for differential movement to occur during a seismic event that would cause the valve bleed-offline to impact the frame.

7

ATTACHMENT (1)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NRC Reaurst 3(M:

Valves IMOV501, IMOV514, IMOV504, 2CV517, etc., are independently supported from the connected piping. Provide an example calculation in support of yourjudgment to demonstrate that the specific piping and valve support configuration would not cause an overstressed condition.

BGE Response to 3(b):

The following is provided on the determination of seismic adequacy for IMOV501. IMOVS14.

IMOV504. 2CV517, etc. Provided, as an example, is the information that led the SCEs to determine that the piping and support configuration for IMOV504 would noi cause an overstressed condition. The same logic used to validate the seismic adequacy of 1MOV504 and its adjacent piping applies to all of the above valves. The SEWS document for this equipment item is included in Enclosure (A).

IMOV504 is installed in a horizontal run of pipe. The valve body and operator share the same support structure. Approximately 5 feet south of the valve is located a pipe anchor that provides 6-way restraint; approximately 6 inches north of the valve is located a vertical restraint; approximately 5 feet north of the valve is located a combination vertical and lateral restraint. A second pipe anchor is constructed 2 feet up a riser located 2 feet south of the valve. All of these restraints are built off of the same concrete structure. Differential movement of the operator with respect to the pipe is precluded by this restraint configuration. Therefore, the SCEs judged that this configuration meets the intent of the SEWS caveat as described in GIP-2, Appendix B.8A.

This configuration is conservatively modeled into the existing CCNPP piping analysis for this system and no overstress condition exists for any valve or piping component as a result of seismic loading.

NRC Reanst 3(d:

Valves IPCV4510, IPCV4520, etc., are mounted on piping less than 1 inch in diameter. Provide the analysis, in accordance with the GIP-2, to ensure that the structural integrity of the valves and the connected piping is satisfied.

BGE Respositol(c)1 The following is provided on the determination of seismic adequacy for JPCV4510. IPCV4520.

2PCV4510 & 2PCV4520. These items werejudged to be outliers by the respective SCEs due to the fact that the valves are mounted on piping that is less than 1 inch in diameter. This is a violation of SEWS Bounding Spectrum Caveat No.4 for Equipment Class 7. As an example, the SEWS document for 2PCV4510 is included in Enclosure (A).

The structural integrity of the valve itself is not in question for these four valves. The issue is the potential for an overstress condition to exist in the immediately adjacent small diameter piping. To resolve the outlier, a pipe stress evaluation was performed per GIP-2, Appendix B.7. The analysis accounted for valve operator weight and eccentricity. The resulting stresses in the piping adjacent to the valve were found to be within Code allowables. This evaluation is documented in BGE Calculation No. 95-0212. This calculation package is available for review at CCNPP.

8

i ATTACHMENT (1)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NRCReaurst 4:

Referring to Tables 5.3-1 and 5.3-2, " Equipment Outlier Description and Resolution Summary," for Units 1 and 2 respectively, we find the analysis method employed for resolution of each of the items listed in the table to be unclear. Provide a more detailed description of the analysis employed for resolution of a representative sample outliers and the basis for thejudgment used.

BGE Resnonne to 4:

This response provides a more detailed description on the analysis method employed for the resolution of a representative sample of outliers found in Tables 5.3-1 and 5.3-2. The four groupings discussed below represent several different types of GIP outliers found at CCNPP and their method of resolution.

IPDTI11 A. IPDT111D. IPT1013 A & IPT1013C - These rack-mounted instruments were found to be in compliance with all GIP caveats associated with Equipment Class 18, except the expansion anchor tightness check of Anchorage Caveat No.4. At the time the walkdowns were conducted, the SCEs did not have available to them plant personnel who could nerform expansion anchor tightness checks. The Seismic Verification Project at CCNPP conservatively chose to consider these items of equipment as outliers, pending the resolution of expansion anchor tightness checking. Considering nuclear and personnel safety, it was deemed appropriate to coordinate and perform the tightness checks during the proper equipment maintenance window. Tables 5.3-1 and 5.3-2 use the acronym ABT (anchor bolt tightness) to note the necessity to perform such a check.

Subsequent completion of expansion anchor tightness checks has resolved these outliers.

IC01 and all other nanels located in Room A405 - These panels were found to be in compliance with all GIP caveats associated with Equipment Class 20, except Interaction Effects Caveat No.4.

The suspended ceiling in the Control Room was determined to have the potential to generate falling parts during a scismic event. This type of earthquake effect has been noted in the GIP.

Many of these panels also state, " Rule-of-the-box" under the outlier description. The panels were grouped together based on how they were tied together and their physical location in the Control Room.

if possible, the outlier resolutions were ultimately tied back to one panel.

Calvert Cliffs performed a modification to the sucpended ceiling to either strengthen, replace, or climinate features that had the potential to generate missiles. This modification eliminated an outlier affecting over 60 pieces of equipment.

IC100A through 1C100F - These panels were found to be in compliance with all GIP caveats associated with Equipment Class 20, except Interaction Effects Caveat No.4.

The tops of the panels were extremely close to making contact with fire-proofing material used for providing protection for an overhead run of cable trays.

Subsequent to the SCE's walkdown, the fire-proofing material was modified to eliminate the potential for adverse seismic interaction with the panels. These outliers have been resolved.

1D01. 2D01. and other panels located in rooms A302 & A30.fi - These panels were found to be in compliance with all GIP caveats associated with Equipment Class 14 (Distribution Panels), except Bounding Spectrum Caveat No.1. The text of GIP-2, Appendix B.14, describes standard sections from 9

ATTACHMENT m BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT e1 freestanding distribution switchboards as ranging from 20 to 40 inches in depth. The panels in question had depths of 14 to 15 inches. Therefore, they were identified as outliers. It should be noted that the cabinets conform to the National Electrical Manufacturers Association Standards, which is the only dimensional restriction in the Senior Seismic Review and Advisory Panel (SSRAP) Report.

To resolve this outlier, a search of earthquake data on freestanding distribution panels and motor control centers was performed. Approximately 36 freestanding cabinets were identified ranging in depth from 9 to 15 inches, located at sites that experienced peak ground accelerations ranging from 0.25g to 0.85g.

The cabinets were at the following sites: Burbank Power Plant (1971 San Fernando and 1994 Northridge Earthquakes), Glendale Power Plant (1971 San Fernando and 1994 Northridge Earthquakes), Sylmar Convener Station (1971 San Fernando and 1994 Northridge Earthquakes), Metcalf Substation (1984 Morgan 11ill Earthquake), PALCO Lumber Mill (1992 Mendocino Earthquake) and Cool Water Power Plant (1993 Landers Earthquake).

Some of this experience data was from earthquakes that occurred subsequent to development of the GIP-2 bounding spectrum. To be conservative, an equipment-specific bounding spectrum was developed to be used for capacity versus demand coraparison in place of the GIP-2 bounding spectrum. Response spectra were obtained for each site. Following the procedure described in the SSRAP Report, the spectral ordinates were averaged to obtain a " shallow panel" reference spectrum, then this was divided by 1.5 to obtain a bounding spectrum. This equipment-specific bounding spectrum, which was lower than the GIP-2 bounding spectrum, was used in place of the GIP-2 bounding spectrum for the capacity versus demand comparison in order to resolve the outlier.

NRC Request 4(a):

Provide the following information. Valves ICV 5210, ICV 5150, ICV 5152, ICV 5212, ICV 5153, ICV 5155, etc., were identified to be outliers because their valves were manufactured of cast iron.

Provide an analysis to demonstrate that these valves will not be overstressed.

ILGEResonadnEa):

Valves ICV 5210. ICV 5150. ICV 5152. ICV 5212. ICV 5153. ICV 5155 & ICV 5156 were identified to be outliers because their valve bodies were constructed of cast iron. Seismic adequacy was demonstrated in the original vendor qualification data.

However, concurrent with the replacement of the Unit I service water heat exchangers during the 1998 refueling outage at CCNPP, these valves will be removed. The saltwater piping to the new heat j

exchangers requires a complete redesign. The new piping will be constructed using rubber-lined carbon j

steel spool pieces. The new valves will be constructed of stainless steel components. As a result, the

)

valve outlier, related to cast iron construction, will no longer exist.

NRC Request 4th):

Provide the following additional information. Panel IPYS427A was identified to be an outlier because the natural frequency is within the range where the required response spectra are greater than 1.5 times the bounding spectrum. You proposed that this outlier be resolved by plant modification that eliminates the need for the component. Provide an explanation as to how the panel function is no longer needed.

10 j

ATTACHMENT (1)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT HGUtesponse to 4(b):

Equipment item IPYS427A is a panel mounted pneumatic relay. At the time this response is being developed, a plant modification is scheduled for implementation that will convert the function provided by this control system from pneumatic to digital controls. This component and its associated pneumatically-operated control valves will be replaced by a single unit, a temperature indicating controller, which will perform all of the required controlling functions, in addition, the controls will be relocated to a new panel that is a rigid structure. The potential seismic accelerations to which this item would be subjected will be greatly reduced. The new panel's resonant frequency will be in the ZPA range of the Calvert Cliffs 1RS for this location. Therefore, the outlier identified utilizing the A-46 resolution methodology, as described in the GIP, will no longer exist.

The PY component is currently not considered to be a plant operability issue due to how it performs its function. Even if the panel on which the component is now mounted were to fait catastrophically, the pneumatic system would bleed-off air pressure and cause the dampers, for which the component provides control, to close as desired.

l NRCRequest Md:

Provide the following additional information. There are items (e.g., Switches IPS5431, IPS5432, IPS5433 and IPS5434, etc.) for which both the outlier description and the outlier resolution address the same rule-of-the-box number. Please explain in detail using any of the switches as an example.

I BGE Response to 4(ch These four pressure switches, IPS5431. IPS5432. IPS5433 & IPc;5434, are all panel-mounted components. They are all mounted in the same panel and provide control functions for the same compressor. The panel on which they are mounted is constructed off of the same skid as its respective compressor. The switches themselves had no outlier associated with them. However, the compressor mounting was determined to be an outlier. Subsequently, the compressor mounting scheme was modified to eliminate the outlier. Therefore, per the GIP concept of" Rule-of-the-Box", the resolution of the outlier concern for the compressor resulted in the verification of seismic adequacy for the four pressure switches.

NRCRequtSLh in Section 6 of Attachment (1) to your letter, outlier items for tanks and heat exchangers are identified and listed in Table 6.1. All of the outliers were resolved by additional or further analysis except for the condensate storage tanks and refueling storage tanks. For these tanks, the calculated seismic overturning moment was 8161 kip-ft, which exceeds the overturning capacity of 6292 kip-ft. A dynamic analysis accounting for soil-structure interaction was performed by Stevenson & Associates using its developed computer code, SUPER SASSI/PC. The results showed overturning moments in the magnitude of 5395 kip-fl and 6009 kip-ft for shear wave velocities of 760 fps and 1600 fps, respectively. However, it is our understanding that the staff has not previously reviewed and approved the SUPER SASSI/PC code.

Provide the validation documents, which should contain sufficient information for the staff's review, especially in the areas of application at Calvert Cliffs for resolution of the USI A-46 issues. Also, provide for each type of outlier a sample calculation to show how the outlier was resolved.

I1

ATTACHMENT (1)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT BGE Response to 5:

SUPER SASSI/PC Validation - The SUPER SASSI/PC software was developed by S&A, using their own corporate strategic funding, as a licensed software product. It was based on the SASSI software 3

program developed at the University of Caiifornia - Berkeley Campus. As a licensed product, all of the

]

verification documents and manuals are licensed material and proprietary to S&A. Baltimore Gas and i

Electric Company is in the process of procuring this information for our files once adequate and necessary bi-party confidentiality agreements are put in place between S&A and BGE. It is expected that the NRC will come to similar terms with S&A in order to have access to the requested documentation. If the NRC declines to enter into such an agreement with S&A, then this information will be available for review at CCNPP.

Copies of the following tank and heat exchanger outlier resolution evaluations are provided as representative samples. They can be found in Enclosure (B).

Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchangers OliXSFPCLRll & OHXSFPCLR12 - These items were considered outliers due to " capacity vs. demand" and anchorage issues.

  • Steam Generator Blowdown Tanks ITKBDTKil & 2TKBDTK21 - These items were considered outliers due to "capaci'y vs. demand" and anchorage issues.

Pretreated Water Stocage Tanks OTKPWSTWGli & OTKPWSTWG12 - These items were considered outliers due to " capacity vs. demand" and anchorage issues.

Fire Pump Diesel Fuel Oil Tank OTKDFPFOSTWG - This item was considered an outlier due to

" capacity vs. demand", anchorage and seismic interaction issues.

Other examples of tank and heat exchanger outlier resolution evaluations are available for review at CCNPP.

NRC Reauest 6:

In reference to Section 6.2 of the attachment, " Summary of Outliers" for Tanks and Heat Exchangers, you indicate that an expansion anchor capacity reduction factor (CRF) of 0.75 rather than 0.5 for unknown bolt type anchors was used in accordance with Revision 3 of the GIP (GIP-3), dated July 31,1995. On the basis ofits Supplemental Safety Report (SSER) No. 3 dated December 4,1997, on the review of the updated GIP-3 dated May 16,1997, the staff did not accept this CRF. Therefore, the staff request that you re-evaluate the equipment types for which the unknown expansion anchor CRF of 0.75 was used in evaluating their seismic adequacy. The evaluation should be in compliance with SSER No. 3 and the updated GlP-3. Also, provide the results for the staff's review.

BGE.Respanac_te.fi:

All four of the CCNPP shutdown cooling heat exchangers were evaluated using an expansion anchor CRF of 0.75. These components were the only ones listed on the CCNPP SSEL for which the factor was used. There are two such heat exchangers for each operating unit at CCNPP. The CRF of 0.75 was applied in one enveloping anchorage evaluation for the four components. There are two basic anchorage details for each of the four components. One detail is applied at four locations per component. The second detail is applied at one location per component. Therefore, there are a total of 20 individual baseplates for which this CRF was applied.

12

NITACHMENT (1)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT The re-evaluation of the anchorages for these four heat exchangers per GIP-2, using a CRF of 0.6 for unknown bolt type anchors, has determined that all four components are seismically adequate. A copy of the re-evaluation is included as Enclosure (C).

NRCRequest 7:

The NRC staff has concerns about the way the A-46 cable trays and condait raceways issue was being disposed of by some USI A-46 licensees. The staffissued requests for additional information to several licensees on this issue. The SQUG responded instead of the licensees because SQUG considered the requests for additional information to be generic in nature. The staff issued a subsequent request for additional information to SQUG as a follow up to their response. However, the staff found that the correspondence with SQUG did not achieve the intended results, in that it did not address the identified technical concerns of the staff. Therefore, we are stating our concerns in the following discussion.

The GIP procedure recommended performing what is called a " limited analytic evaluation" for selected cable and conduit raceway supports. The procedure further recommended that when a certain cable tray system can be judged to be ductile, and if the vertical load capacity of the anchorage can be established by a load check using three times the dead weight, no further evaluation is needed to demonstrate lateral resistance to vibration from earthquakes. The staff has concerns with the manner in which these simplified GIP criteria were implemented at your plant.

The GIP procedure climinates horizontal force evaluations by invoking ductility, liowever, some so-called non-ductile cable tray support systems would eventually become ductile by inelastic deformation, buckling or failure of the non-ductile cable tray supports and members. This procedure is a basic departure from conventional methods of engineering evaluation, and the GIP does not provide an adequate basis for dealing with those cable trays that are initially judged to be non-ductile but are eventually called ductile by postulating failure of the lateral supports. if this procedure was followed for eliminating cable trays from further assessment at your plant, then all the cable trays could conceivably be screened out from the A-46 evaluation. We request that you provide the following information to enable our assessment and safety evaluation of cable trays at your plant.

NRCRequest 7(ah Define ductility in engineering terms as used at Calvert Cliffs for the USI A-46 evaluation. Clarify how this definition is applied to actual system configurations at Calvert Cliffs plant consistently for the purpose of analytical evaluation.

BGE Response to 7(a):

The defm' ition of ductility used at Calvert Cliffs for the USI A-46 evaluation of cable and raceway supports was as given in the first' paragraph of Section 11.8.3.3 of the GIP:

"An evaluation should be conducted of the supports selected for review to characterize their i

response to lateral seismic motion as either ductile or potentially non-ductile. Supports suspended only from overhead may be characterized as ductile if they can respond to lateral seismic motion by swinging freely without degradation of primary vertical support connections and anchorage.

Ductile, inelastic perforr.ance such as clip angle yielding or vertical support member yielding is acceptable so long as deformation does not lead to brittle or premature failure of overhead vertical support."

13 j

ATTACHMENT (1)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46

)

AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR PGWER PLANT 4

This definition was applied to actual system configurations at Calvert Cliffs by the selection of limited analytical review samples by the SCEs. The SCEs used engineering judgment and experience to select j

worst-case representative samples of raceway supports for limited analytical review, as per GIP Section 8.2.4.

Each of the worst-case samples of raceway supports that were selected for the GIP limited analytical review were evaluated using the procedure given in GIP Section 11.8.3.3 to determine whether they are ductile or non-ductile based on the examples shown in GIP Figures 8-7 and 8-8.

NRCReauest 7th):

Provide the total number of raceways that were selected for worst-case analytical calculations and were classified as ductile in your A-46 evaluation and for which you did not perform horizontal load evaluation. Indicate the approximate percentage of such raceways as compared with the population selected for analytical review. Discuss how the ductility concept is used in your walkdown procedures.

RGE Response to.7Lh)1 A total of thirteen supports were selected for worst-case analytical review. Three of these supports were classified as ductile and for which a horizontal load evaluation was not performed.

The approximate percentage of ductile raceways as compared with the population selected for analytical review is information which was not collected during the plant walkdown since it is not part of the GIP guidelines. As provided in GIP-2, Section 8.2.1, the purpose of the plant walkdown is to:

"(1) verify that the cable and conduit raceway systems meet the Inclusion Rules given in Section 8.8.2; (2) note and evaluate any of the Other Seismic Performance Concerns given in Section 8.2.3; (3) select a sample of representative worst-case raceway supports as described in Section 8.2.4; and (4) judge whether there are any seismic spatial interactions which could adversely affect the performance of the raceway system as outlined in Section 8.2.5." (GIP-2, page 8-8)

As provided in GIP-2, Section 8.2.4, it is necessary to select a limited number (e.g.,10 to 20) of worst-case samples from the plant in the limited analytical review. Therefore, it is not apparent to us how knowledge of the percentage of ductile raceway supports from this limited sample, compared to the population selected for analytical review, can be used by the NRC staff to determine whether we followed the criteria and guidelines in GIP-2, as approved in SSER No. 2.

Since the effort to determine the total number of raccway supports at CCNPP is significant, and there is no requirement in GIP-2 or SSER No. 2 to provide this data, we ask that the NRC staff reconsider the need for this information.

The request for additional information also asks how the ductility concept is used in our walkdown procedures. The walkdown procedures used at CCNPP are described in Section 8.2 of GIP-2. These procedures do not require the ductility concept to be used during the walkdown. The only place where the ductility concept is used is in the limited analytical review. The procedure used for this review is contained in GIP-2, Section 8.3.

14

ATTACHMENT (1)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NRC Request 7(ch:

Describe the typical configurations of your ductile raceways (dimension, member size, supports, etc.).

BGE Responattal(c)t Of the thirteen raceways supports selected for the limited analytical review, three were classified as ductile: Selections 4, 8, and 10. These three configurations are provided for your review in Enclosure (D). It should be noted that Selection 8, although it meets the definition of a ductile support per GIP-2, also satisfies the lateral load check. Also, Selection 10 was subsequently determined to be an outlier and is discussed further in BGE Response to 7(f).

NRCRequest 7(d):

Justify the position that ductile raceways need not be evaluated for horizontal load. When a reference is provided, state the page number and paragraph. The reference should be self-contained, and not refer to another reference.

RGEResponse_to 7(d):

The justification for stating that ductile raceways need not be evaluated for horizontal load is provided in Section 8 of the GIP and in the SSRAP report (Reference 2), upon which the GlP is based.

The GIP, Section 11.8.3, Limited Analytical Review Guidelines, states the following:

"As shown in Figure 8-6, supports characterized as ductile do not require an explicit load check.

Instead, seismic ruggedness for ductile raceway supports is assured by the Vertical Capacity Check (Section 8.3.2). The high vertical capacity of the ductile data base raceway supports is the main attribute credited for their good performance." (GIP-2, Part II, page 8-19)

The basis for not evaluating horizontal loads during the limited analytical review of raceway systems with ductile supports is described further on page 17, paragraphs I and 2 of Reference (2), where it states the following:

"A limited analytical review shall be performed on those cable tray supports selected by the SRT

[ seismic review teamJ and the walkdown engineers as representative of conditions within the plant with the lowest seismic margin. The intent of this limited analytical review is not to simulate potential performance or stresses, but to correlate, approximately, conditions within the plant analytically with conditions that performed well in the experience data base."

"It is important for the analyst to understand the philosophy behind this limited analytical review.

As previously discussed within this report, cable trays and supports have performed extremely well in past earthquakes and shaking table tests with few exceptions. The trays and their supports typically act as pendulums and wiggle and sway but do not fail. Ductile inelastic performance such as yiciding of clip angle supports or steel vertical support members is completely acceptable as it allows the cable tray to deform and move without brittle or premature failure. The high damping inherent in cable tray systems reduces the dynamic motions resulting from the inelastic performance and maintains integrity." (Reference 2, page 26) 15

ATTACHMENT (1)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Reference (2) goes on to say on page 26, paragraph 1, that earthquake experience and shake table tests show that if the ductile raceway supports have a large dead load margin (i.e., they pass the GIP three times dead load check), no lateral load check is required:

"It must be kept in mind that this limited analytical review is not intended to simulate potential seismic performance or stresses, but to correlate approximately conditions within the plant analytically with conditions that performed well in the experience data base. The rationale for the checks is as follows:...The 3.0 times dead load without eccentricity check is a simple check to insure that the basic connectors have a large dead load margin. The experience data base supports pass this check and verification of a large dead load margin provides assurance that if an isolated support should fail for some unforeseen situation, that a progressive support failure mechanism is unlikely. For ductile mechanisms, no lateral load check is required consistent with the experience data base and shake table test experience." (Reference 2, page 26)

The NRC staff thoroughly reviewed the GIP methodology during the period of time from 1987 to 1992.

As a result of that review, the staff took the position on pages 30 and 31 of SSER No. 2 that:

... the plant walkdown guidelines represent an acceptable approach for evaluating the seismic adequacy of existing cable and conduit raceways in USI A-46 plants. Also, the staff agrees that the proposed analytical procedure is a reasonable approach to ensure that the cable and conduit raceways and supports in USI A-46 plants, when all the guidelines are satisfied, are as rugged as those observed in the past earthquake experience data. Although the proposed guidelines would not require detail analyses and, therefore, would not predict the structural response of the raceway support systems, they provide the needed rationale to judge the seismic adequacy of the raceway support systems with a reasonable factor of safety. Therefore the staff concludes that the proposed guidelines for evaluation of seismic adequacy of cable and conduit raceways and their supports are acceptable subject to the staff evaluations described in this supplement." (SSER No. 2, pages. 30, 31)

In Reference (4), SQUG provided the NRC with a copy of a report that was originally used by the NRC staffin their review and approved of the cable tray methodology. Reference (4) also included two other documents to assist the current NRC staff members in understanding the basis of the NRC original position that the GIP provides an acceptable evaluation method for resolution of USI A-46.

We conclude from the above statement that the NRC staff position is that the GlP method is acceptable for evaluating the seismic adequacy of cable and conduit raceways and their supports. We consider our review of the effect of lateral loads on cable and conduit raceway systems to be in accordance with the requirements and intent of GIP-2 as approved for use by the NRC staffin SSER No. 2.

NRCReauest 7(eh in the evaluation of cable trays and raceways, if the ductility of the attachments is assumed in one horizontal direction, does it necessarily follow that the same system is ductile in the perpendicular direction? If yes, provide the basis of this conclusion. Ifit is not ductile in the perpendicular direction, how was the seismic adequacy of the attachments evaluated?

HGE Responac_to 7(e):

The ductility of supports for cable and conduit raceway in the longitudinal direction is addressed using the procedure in GIP, Section 11.8.2.3, where our raceway systems were evaluated for "hard spot" l

16

ATTACHMENT (in BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT supports. No other analyses for longitudinal forces are required for cable tray supports hung from above or attached to a wall. Aside from this check for "hard spots," the GIP does not require an evaluation of raceway support ductility in the longitudinal direction. The basis for this is found in Reference (2),

page 27, paragraph 2, which states:

"SSRAP also does not intend that the cable tray supports hung from above or attached to a wall be checked for longitudinal lateral forces, i.e., lateral forces parallel to the long run of the cables.

There are numerous cases of this condition in the experience data base without damage or distress to the cables (Reference 7), and SSRAP does not believe that analytical checks are needed for this condition. 'the experience data base justifies this situation, and ductile pendulum action will be sufficient for good performance." (Reference 2, page 27)

Reference 7 cited in the above quotation is the same as GIP Reference 19, Electric Power Research Institute Report NP-7153, "Longitadinal Load Resistance in Seismic Experience Data Base Raceway Systems," March 1991.

As discussed in BGE Response to NRC Request 7(d) above, the GIP method, including the loadings on the raceway supports in the longitudinal direction, was thoroughly reviewed and accepted by the NRC staff in SSER No. 2. We consider our review of the effect of longitudinal loads on cable and conduit raceway systems to be in accordance with GIP-2 as approved for use by the NRC staffin SSER No. 2.

NRCReauest 79h Discuss any raceways and cable trays, including supports, in your plant that are outside of the experience data. Explain what criteria are used for establishing their safety adequacy and specify your plan for resolution of outliers that did not meet the acceptance criteria. Provide examples of the configurations of such raceways and cable trays including supports. Also, indicate the percentage of cable trays and raceways outside the experience data in relation to the population of raceways and cable trays examined during the walkdowns of the safe shutdown path. Discuss how they will be evaluated and disposed.

BGE Resnonne to 7(fli All the cable and condun raceway systems in the plant are within the scope of the seismic review procedures contained in the GIP, except those that were identified as outliers. GIP Section 11.8.0, i

page 8-2, paragraph 2, describes the scope of raceway systems that are covered by the GIP as follows:

"The seismic review guidelines contained in this section are applicable to steel and aluminum cable tray and conduit support systems at any elevation in a nuclear power plant, provided the bounding spectrum (shown in Section 4, Figure 4-2) envelopes the largest horizontal component of the 5% damped, free-field, safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) ground response spectrum to which the nuclear plant is licensed." (GIP-2, page 8-2)

The raceways that were classified as outliers did not meet the " Inclusion Rules," had "Significant Other Seismic Performance Concerns," or did not satisfy the " Limited Analytical Review Guidelines" contained in the GIP. The resolution of outliers may include additional analysis, investigations, or a modification to the raceway that would allow the raceway to meet the GIP screening criteria.

The cable and conduit system outliers identified during the A-46 review are described in Table 7-1 of Section 7 of Reference (1). Outliers I through 6 were outliers identified during the in-plant screening walkdown. Outliers 7 through 12 were identified as a result of the Limited Analytical Review.

17

ATTACHMENT m BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Outlier 1 (Kindorf nuts do not have the required serrated teeth) was resolved by a dynamic test program that was carried out to determine realistic connection capacities. The report documenting the test program was included in Appendix F to Reference (1). The realistic connection capacities from the test program were used for allowable loads in the limited analytical review.

Outlier 2 (cable tray in Room Alli has a span that exceeds GIP criteria) and Outlier 5 (cable trays in Room A225 have spans that exceed GIP criteria) were resolved by analysis. The bending moment using the actual tray fill and span length was calculated and determined to be less than the bending moment of a cable tray with 100% fill and a 10 foot-span length (i.e., maximum span length using Inclusion Rule 1 in GIP Section 8.2.2). The adjacent supports were judged adequate based on the GIP limited analytical review criteria and comparison with other supports.

Outlier 3 (conduit in Room A227 has a missing support clamp, which results in a span that exceeds GIP criteria) was resolved by linear elastic analysis. The seismic bending stress in the conduit was calculated and determined to be low (0.28 x Fy). The existing condition wasjudged acceptable.

Outlier 4 (conduit in Room A222 is routed in the rattle space) was resolved by additional walkdowns which determined the conduit to be non-safety related.

Outlier 6 (a support in Room A416 appeared to have only one anchor bolt) was resolved by additional walkdowns. A more detailed inspection was performed, and a second anchor bolt was identified on the support.

Outlier 7 applies to analytical review Selection 7, which initially f ailed the three times dead load check and the lateral load check. A walkdown was performed to obtain more detailed information. A more detailed analysis was performed, and the support was found to meet the analytical review criteria of the GIP, using realistic connection capacities from the test program documented in Appendix F Reference (1).

Outlier 8 applies to analytical review Selection 8, which initially failed the three times dead load check.

A more detailed analysis was performed, and the support was found to meet the analytical review criteria of the GIP, using the realistic connection capacities from the test program documented in Appendix F to Reference (1).

Outlier 9 applies to analytical review Selection 9. which initially failed the lateral load check. A more detailed analysis was performed, and the support was found to meet the analytical review criteria of the GIP, using realistic connection capacities from the test program documented in Appendix F to Reference (1).

Outliers 10 and 11 apply to analytical review Selections 10 and 11, respectively. Selection 10 failed the three times dead load check, and Selection 11 failed the one times dead load check. Tnese supports have been modified to meet the analytical criteria of the GIP.

Outlier 12 applies to analytical review Selection 12, which passed the one times dead load check but failed the three times dead load check. This support passed the lateral load check; therefore, the outlier l

was resolved on this basis. This method of resolving the three times dead load outlier is given in 18

ATTACHMENT (1)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NGCLEAR POWER PLANT Section 8.4.8 of the GIP, and in Section 5.2.7 of the SQUG Cable Tray and Conduit System Seismic Evaluation Guidelines (Reference 3).

Analytical review Selections 10 and 11 are the only outliers that did not meet the GIP criteria. They have since been modified to meet the GIP criteria. The original configurations of these supports are shown in Enclosure (D). These supports were unique in the plant. The total number of raceways and cable trays examined was not determined during the plant walkdown since it is not part of the GIP guidelines.

NRCReqwst 7(ch Submit the evaluation and analysis results for four of the representative sample raceways (one single non-ductile, one single ductile, one multiple non-ductile, and one multiple ductile raceway), including the configurations (dimension, member size, supports, etc.).

BGEResponse_to 7(r):

The analysis results for the following raceway supports can be found in Enclosure (E):

Selection 4, single (short) ductile; and Selection 6, multiple (long) non-ductile.

e The only multiple (long) ducti': support was Selection 10, which has been modified with the addition of a brace, thereby making it non-ductile. There were no single (short) non-ductile supports in the limited analytical review as these were bounded by the multiple (long) non-ductile supports selected.

NRCRequest 8:

In Section 8 of the attachment, you stated that there are 35 unresolved outliers and the schedule for resolving them is provided in Section 5.3 of the enclosure to your letter. liowever, there is no resolution schedule provided in Section 5.3. On page 2 of your letter, you indicated that you plan to resolve all outliers by July 1998. Explain the safety implication for not resolving these outliers, in accordance with item 17 in Section 9.1 of the GlP-2. You are also requested to elaborate on your decision to defer the resolution of the identified outliers, and your evaluation in support of the conclusion that the operability of the affected plant equipment will not be affected by your decision.

RGE Responac to 8:

i While the schedule for the resolution of the 35 remaining outliers is not contained in the 5 paragraphs that make up Section 5.3 of the CCNPP Seismic Evaluation Report, the section does mention that a description and method of resolution for outliers could be found in Tables 5.3-1 and 5.3-2. These tables also list the outliers that were unresolved at the time the report was submitted.

A thorough review of Tables 5.3-1 and 5.3-2 will arrive at a total of 31 unresolved outliers shown as remaining to be evaluated, modified, etc. The balance of the stated 35 unresolved outliers is as follows:

Two unresolved outliers pertained to cable tray supports, previoualy discussed in BGE Response to Request 7(f), which do not have unique equipment identifiers. Therefore, they were not included in Tables 5.3-1 & 5.3-2, which were developed based on the equipment ids. These two cable tray supports have since been modified and are no longer considered outliers.

19

ATTACHMENT (1)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Two unresolved outliers pertained to non-safety related components, which are classified as e

" Optional" on the CCNPP SSEL. As optional components, they were not required to have seismic adequacy evaluations performed on them. Therefore, they were not included in Tables 5.3-1 and 5.3-2. Ilowever, they were evaluated and subsequently identified as having inadequate anchorages. Even though these two items were considered optional, it was determined that the equipment anchorages should be upgraded to improve overall plant safety and reduce the potential for equipment failure. These two equipment mountings have since been modified and are no longer considered outliers.

Of the remaining 31 outliers, all but 3 have been resolved as of the time of this response.

in all cases, outliers were evaluated against CCNPP's current licensing basis. In any instance where the SCE's may have felt an operability concern existed, an Issue Report would be generated and acted upon in accordance with existing plant procedures. If the concern was determined to be legitimate, evaluations would be performed and the appropriate activities would take place in accordance with the CCNPP Corrective Actions Program. Of the 35 outliers discussed in Tables 5.3-1 and 5.3-2 and above, all were determined to not impact plant operability.

NRCRequest 9:

In Appendix G of the attachment, the third-party audit report and responses indicate that the instrument and control panel (lNBl30) is attached to a block wall and wasjudged to be acceptable by BGE. Clarify why this equipment is listed as line no. 6053 in the Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 SSEL, but not documented in the SVDS in Appendix D. Also, provide the status and resolution regarding the seismic adequacy of this control panel.

BGEResponae_tol The component in question, INB130. is a pressurizer heater proportional controller and is listed as an

" Optional" component on the CCNPP SSEL. As such, it was not required to have a seismic adequacy evaluation performed on it. Ilowever, an evaluation was performed, a SEWS was developed, a,d the existence of the potential anchorage deficiency was noted. Subsequently, while on a plant walkdown, the panel was also noted by the third-party reviewer as an example of a potentially deficient anchorage. The third-party reviewer discussed the existence of this anchorage " deficiency" in the write-up of his plant visit and program evaluation.

Since this component was listed as an optional item on the SSEL, with no seismic adequacy evaluation required, the formal evaluation did not extend to the development ofits own SVDS.

Project personnel concluded that the equipment anchorage should be upgraded to improve overall plant safety and reduce the potential for equipment failure. Therefore, the SEWS was used as the basis for ultimately implementing a modification to the anchorage. The modification to this component, which has since been completed, provided through-bolts for the mounting to the block wall. The block wall itself was previously qualified in accordance with the implementation of the guidance provided by NRC IE Ilulletin 80-11," Masonry Walt Design."

20

A'ITACHMENT (1)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NRCRequest 10:

Referring to the IRS provided in your 120-day-response (Reference 5) to the NRC's request in Supplement No. I to Generic Letter 87 02, dated May 22,1992, provide the following information.

NRCRequest 10(a):

Identify structure (s) that have IRS (5% critical damping) for elevations within 40-feet above the effective grade, which are higher in amplitude than 1.5 times the SQUG bounding spectrum.

BGE Resnonse to 101a)1 The following structures have IRS for elevations within 40-feet above the effective grade, which are higher in amplitude than 1.5 times the SQUG bounding spectrum:

Frequency Range Where 1.5 times Structure Elevation SQUG Bounding Spectrum is ExceedeI Auxiliary Building

(-) 15'

<2 5 IIz Auxiliary Building 5'

<2.3 Hz Auxiliary Building 5' (Penetration) 3.711z - 4.8 Hz Auxiliary Building 27'

<2.5 liz Auxiliary Building 27' (Penetration) 3.2 IIz - 5.2 Hz Auxiliary Building 45' (East of SFP)

<2.5 liz Auxiliary Building 45'(West of SFP)

<2.4 liz Auxiliary Building 45' (Penetration) 3.2 llz - 5.7 Hz Auxiliary Building 69' (East of SFP)

<2.5 Hz Auxiliary Building 69' (West of SFP)

<2.4liz 1

Auxiliary Building 69' (Penetration) 3.1 llz - 5.9 Hz Containment 8.5' 2.8 liz - 4.7 Hz Containment 44' 2.6 liz - 4.9 Hz Intake Structure (North) 3'

<3.7 Hz Intake Structure (Middle) 3'

<3.7 liz j

Intake Structure (South) 3'

<3.7 llz NRCRequest 10(b):

With respect to the comparison of equipment seismic capacity and seismic demand, indicate which method in Table 4-1 of GIP-2 was used to evaluate the seismic adequacy for equipment installed on the corresponding floors in the structure (s) identified in item (a) above. If you have elected to use Method A in Table 4-1 of the GIP-2, provide a technical justification for not using the IRS provided in your 120-day-response. It appears that some A.-46 licensees are making an incorrect comparison between their plant's safe shutdown carthquake ground motion response spectrum and the SQUG bounding spectrum. 'Ihe safe shutdown earthquake ground motion response spectrum for most nuclear power 21

ATTACHMENT (1)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT plants is defined at the plant foundation level. The SQUG bounding spectrum is defined at the free field ground surface. For plants located at deep soil or rock sites, there may not be a significant difference between the ground motion amplitudes at the foundation level and those at the ground surface. Ilowever for sites where a structure is founded on shallow soil, the amplification of the ground motion from the foundation level to the ground surface may be significant.

BGE Resoonse to 10(bh The method used to compare seismic capacity to demand for equipment installed on the corresponding floors in the structures identified in item 10(a) is listed in the SVDS contained in Appendix B to our A-46 summary report (Reference 1). Columns 10,11, and 12 on the SVDS forms provide this information. The SVDS forms have been completed as defined in Section 4.6 of the GIP. Method A from Table 4-1 of the GIP has been used for a majority of the equipment items.

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company performed the A-46 seismic capacity versus demand evaluation using the procedures defined in the GIP. There is nothing in GlP-2 or SSER No. 2 that limits use of the GIP to Method B. GIP-2 clearly states, in Part II, Section 4.2, thr.t either Method A or Method B may be used to compare seismic capacity to seismic demand:

"The seismic capacity of an item cf equipment can be compared to a seismic demand which is defined in terms of either a ground response spectrum or an in-structure response spectrum.

Table 4-1 outlines these types of comparisons as either Method A or B. Method A is for making a comparison with a ground response spectrum; Section 4.2.3 discusses this type of comparison.

Method B is a comparison with an in-structure response spectrum; Section 4.2.4 discusses this type of comparison. Method A comparisons are generally easier to apply than Method B comparisons." (GIP-2, page 4-8)

Supplemental Safety Report No.2 does not take exception to this provision in the GIP, but concludes that the screening procedures and criteria are adequate and acceptable:

"The staff has reviewed the screening procedures and criteria. Based on the evaluatior.s and findings described in Sections 11.4.2,11.4.3 and 11.4.4 below, the staff concludes that the screening procedures and criteria are adequate and acceptable only for verifying seismic adequacy of equipment in USl A-46 plants, subject to the staff clarifications, interpretations, exceptions and positions des.ribed in the sections that follow." (SSER No. 2, page 12)

There are no staff clarifications, interpretations, exceptions or positions in SSER No. 2 that contradict our conclusion that either Method A or Method B may be used.

He technicaljustification for using Method A is contained in Reference (2)(SSRAP Report), pages 101 and 102, which states:

"Often floor spectra for nuclear power plants are very conservatively computed. In such cases an amplification factor greater than 1.5 may le found even at elevations below 40 feet above grade.

liowever, when more median-centered analyses are performed that use reasonable damping levels for the structure and account for embedment and wave-scattering effects, these high amplifications are not observed with most carthquake ground motion records. The Seismic Safety Margin 22

ATTACHMENT (1)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Research Program (SSMRP) (References 31 and 32)1 has demonstrated the large conservatism which exists in traditionally computed floor spectra versus median floor spectra. Further, spectra measured less than 40 feet above grade on moderately stiff portions of the Pleasant Valley Pump Station, ilumboldt Bay Nuclear Power Plant (Reference 33) and the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant do not show amplifications over ground spectra of more than 1.5 for frequencies above about 6 IIz. In fact, on floors corresponding to near grade level, the floor spectra are less than or about equal to the ground spectra at frequencies above about 6 IIz. Thus, it is SSRAP's judgment that amplifications greater than a factor of 1.5 are unlikely in stiff structures at elevations less than 40 feet above grade, except possibly at the fundamental frequency of the building where higher amplifications might occur when such a frequency is less than about 6 Hz. Thus, for equipment with fundamental frequencies greater than about 811z in their as-anchored condition, it was judged that floor spectral amplifications within 40 feet of grade would be less than 1.5 when reasonab!y computed using more median-centered approaches." (Reference 2, pages 101 and 102)

The GIP limitations on the use of Method A given in GIP-2 Section 4.2.3 are:

The equipment should be mounted in the nuclear plant at an elevation below about 40 feet above the effective grade.

The equipment, including its supports, should have a fundamental natural frequency greater than about 8 Hz.

Seismic Capacity Engineers should be alert for unusual, plant-specific situations that could cause the amplification factor to be greater than that of a typical structure. The 1.5 amplification factor is only applicable to reinforced concrete frame and shear wall structures and to heavily-braced steel framed structures.

The above limitations ensure that the realistic amplification factor between the free-field response spectra and the IRS will not be more than about 1.5.

At the time of the Calvert Cliffs A-46 review, the structures containing SSEL equipment and the analysis methodologies used to compute the licensing basis IRS were reviewed (provided in Reference 5). The SCEs determined that the structures were " typical," as defined in the GIP, and this met the requirements for the 1.5 amplification factor. The analysis methodologies used to compute the licensing basis IRS are typical of the conservative analyses discussed in the SSRAP report, which could show unrealistic amplification of over 1.5 even at elevations below 40 feet above grade level. It was further noted that the IRS did not exceed 1.5 times the bounding spectrum at frequencies above 811z. This is the frequency range ofinterest for equipment evaluated using Method A.

In 1994, S&A generated realistic median-centered IRS for use in the A-46 program. This spectra and a description of the analysis was provided in Appendix Il to Attachment (1) to Reference (1). The new 1RS were generated in order to provide a more realistic estimate of seismic response of the structure.

The reanalysis employed current state-of-the-art methods that were not available at the time the original seismic analyses were performed. The methods used in the reanalysis were in accordance with the methodology described in GlP-2 for median-centered IRS. The seismic model and the soil propenies used in the reanalysis were based on the original seismic analyses.

1 NRC Contractor LLNL presents the results of this work in NUREG/CR-1849 in which IRS are estimated to have factors of conservatism ranging from 1.5 to 8.

23

l ATTACHMENT m BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON RESOLUTION OF USI A-46 AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT The seismic input motion used in the reanalysis was the 84th percentile non-exceedance NUREG/CR-0098 ground response spectrum for soil sites at 5% damping. The seismic input motion j

was applied at the foundation of the structure. The resultant IRS curves clearly show that the original j

analyses were overly conservative. This supports the judgments of the SCEs that Method A was i

justified.

NRC Request 10(c):

For the structure (s) identified in Item (a) above, provide the IRS designated according to the height above the effective grade. If the IRS identified in the 120-day-response to Supplement No. I to Gencric Letter 87-02 were not used, provide the response spectra that were actually used to verify the seismic adequacy of equipment within the structures identified in item (a) above. Also, provide a comparison of there spectra to 1.5 times the bounding spectrum.

BGE Response _talDic):

The IRS identified in the 120-day response (Reference 5) to Supplement No. I to Generic Letter 97-02 were used for SSEL equipment capacity versus demand evaluations for equipment within the structures identified in item 10(a). The spectra for the structures identified in Item 10(a) can be found in Enclosure (F). The spectra are designated by elevation and plotted against 1.5 times the SQUG bounding spectrum. The effective grades are Elevation 10 feet for the Containment, Elevation 45 feet for the Auxiliary Building, and Elevation 3 feet for the intake Structure. Please note that the enclosed IRS for both the Containment Structures and the Intake Structure are at 2.5% damping, and are the same as those submitted in the above-mentioned 120-day response. The curves representing 1.5 times the SQUG bounding spectrum have been adjusted accordingly to reflect 2.5% damping for those structures.

The " realistic median-centered" IRS in Appendix H of Attachment (1) to Reference (1) were only used fer outlier resolution. Also, in that same document, the " realistic median-centered" spectra are shown plotted against 1.5 times the SQUG bounding spectrum.

References 1.

Letter from Mr. C. IL Cruse (BGE) to NRC Document Control Desk, June 28, 1996,

" Summary Report for Resolution of USI A-46 (TAC Nos. M69435; M69436)"

2.

SSRAP Report," Review Procedure to Assess Seismic Ruggedness of Cantilever Bracket Cable Tray Supports," Senior Seismic Review and Advisory Panel (SSRAP), Revision 3.0, March 1,1991 3.

EPRI Report NP-7151, " Cable Tray and Conduit System Seismic Evaluation Guidelines,"

Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, prepared by EQE, Inc., March 1991 4.

Letter from N. P. Smith (SQUG) to Mr. John F. Stolz (NRC), dated January 22, 1998,

" Suggested Responses to NRC RAls on Cable and Conduit Raceway" 5.

Letter from Mr. G. C. Creel (BGE) to NRC Document Control Desk, September 18, 1992, "Re.cponse to Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1 on Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Resolution of USI A-46" 24

ATTACHMENT (1) - ENCLOSURE (A)

BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THREE SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEETS Baltimore Gas and Electric Company March 23,1998

]

l l

l SSEL Line No. 4053 Status Y N U l

4 A

SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Sheet 1 of 2 iI f 2TCIMf W l* TASS 7MfM W t l 4

MS7'M i

Equip. ID No.

IMS3986(ICV 3986)

Equip. Class _0

- Other_

  • as"'

x / ew mww Equipment Description AFW/AFWPUMP11kRIPTHROTTL, i

VALVE Location: Bldg.

TURB Floor El.

12 Room, Row / Col T603 l

Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) 50/u7nE' # NOERT//X,bMf>"2 S I 2 6 //

dvST.opetP653C m 75 SIDE cf Vff.yG M>

SEISMIC CAPACITY VS DEMAND cr;*#P:sfosy 70 X E S

Does capacity exceed demand? ( b i d..t hN U N/A 7dv mpeg.

W V2/// - C-Ool CAtC.

y ggyS,

  • Le55 7WtJ 9'O ' d > 8HE /. tr4 6ts ANCHORAGE Uh Is the anchorage adequate?

Y N a

INTERACTION EFFECTS Is equipment free of adverse seismic

@N U N/A interaction effects?

IS EQUIPMENT SEISMICALLY ADE0VATE?

l

@NU

_..__m__

SSEL Lin: No. 4053 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Sheet 2 of 2 Equip. ID No.

IMS3986(ICV 3986)

Equip. Class 0 - Other Equioment Description AFW/AFW PUMP 11 TRIP THROTTLE VALVE COMMENTS I

CLASS F CMOVr5 GoMSIcsRED:

'WMIL/Ik x> CTh'Ek V&VG5 1/J ftP. ORmBASG'.

l

" OPERA 70R HEIGHT ~ S/' TD 7 URB /A% CA3nJC, (le, d MECA*r)

- SIMILktt SIZK # CONSTRUC77oQ TO VALVM /M 9;P969)CE"OfM&lSE

" 6ffAA72"O (D mAf)bWLLY,lh VIA MEfMAfKh. u'UC/Gf, ut (3) BY.50LOJotD l

-MS-3984-SV) nHicH is Cn)^ wend yo /.sca pg>ca_. All. 3vocq GCAD.

- Of'6KATR (LINYfr6E) Cory)Ec.Te:> To THE' $495 Rj(2/D PFBVIE CAS//J6.

- VALVC Vbg5 UES Avr AFPf;92 ;ro M CW //OrJ $ pony 936 Oup'sb 59 /nSuwnna. EV90 /P VAlVf /S CASr /RCA THERC AKE/Jo

/NTER//c77CAJ CtrJCfEM.5, MND S772sse3 /d VAtV6 fgf Jymm i

70 bi'E SMALL (ortrcom /xnSS / d6. P/SmKfARf PRL)) 77/rMRRE, 6ffr /20tJ VJ0VLD /%7 Bf A CO')WN' i

l l

FHer0 62 FPM'2D 19 4 y Evaluated by:

8#_/ j /. m __ W Date:

/-E-99' s/(At/ V r.

l-r-9 +

SSEL Line N).

6552 Status Y N U A,I-SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Sheet 1 of 2 l Equip. ID No.

IC67 (IPNLIC67)

Equip. Class 20 - Instr. & Control Panels & Cabinets Equipment Description ESFAS/ACT LOGIC & RELAY CAB A Location: Bldg.

AUX Floor El. 27 Room, Row / Col A306 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

INneo deer SEISMIC CAPACITY VS DEMAND 1.

Elevation where equipment receives seismic input Mr /

2.

Elevation of seismic' input below about 40' from grade CV N U 3.

Equipment has fundamental frequency above about 8 Hz 8N U N/A(WoT.1) 4.

Capacity based on:

Existing Documentation DOC Bounding Spectrum dDD 1.5 x Bounding Spectrum ABS GERS GERS 5.-

Demand based on:

Ground Response Spectrum CEP 1.5 x Ground Response Spectrum AGS Conserv. Des. In-Str. Resp. Spec.

CRS Realistic M-Ctr. In-Str. Resp. Spec.

RRS Does capacity exceed demand? (Indicate at right (*) and in

$NU COMMENTS if a special exception to enveloping of seismic

.5rdgc#

demand spectrum is invoked per Section 4.2 of the GIP.)

gp_f. g CAVEATS - BOUNDING SPECTRUM (Identify with an asterisk (*) those caveats which are met by intent without meeting the specific wording of the caveat rule and explain the reason for this conclusion in the COMMENTS section below) 1.

Equipment is included in earthquake experience equipment class SN U N/A 2.

No computers or programmable controllers

@N U N/A 3.

No strip chart recorders

&N U N/A 4.

Steel frame and sheet metal structurally adequate

6) N U N/A 5.

Adjacent cabinets or panels which are close enough i

to impact, or sections of multi-bay cabinets or panels, are bolted together if they contain essential relays

@N U N/A (Mare 2) 6.

Drawers and equipment on slides restrained from falling out N U N/A 7.

All doors secured by latch or fastener N U N/A 8.

Attached lines have adequate flexibility

]L.U N/A 9.

Anchorage adequate (See checklist below for details)

G7 U N/A dvfL/"

10.

Relays mounted on equipment evaluated N U N/A I

11. Have you looked-for and found no other adverse concerns?

N U N/

Is the intent of all the caveats met for Bounding Spectrum?

U N/A ANCHORAGE 1.

Appropriate equipment characteristics determined (mass, CG, natural freq., damping, center of rotation)

N U N/A 2.

Type of anchorage covered by GIP N U N/A 1-3.-

Sizes and locations of anchors determined N U N/A N#7E # M

'SSEL Line No. 6552 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Sheet 2 of 2

' Equip. ID No.

IC67 (IPNLIC67)

Equip. Class 20 - Instr. & Control Panels & Cabinets Equipment Description ESFAS/ACT LOGIC & RELAY CAB A ANCHORAGE (Cont'd) 4.

Anchorage installation adequate, c.g.,

weld quality and length, nuts and washers, expansion anchor tightness Y@U N/A "duTuE4 5.

Factors affecting anchorage capacity or margin of safety considered:

embedment length, anchor spacing, G No free-edge distance, concrete strength / condition, and concrete cracking hN U N/A 6.

For boited anchorages, gap under base less than 1/4-inch

@N U N/A M/E 8 7.

Factors affecting essential relays considered: gap under base, capacity reduction for expansion anchors

@jN U N/A NarE 3

8. -

Base h.s adequate stiffness and effect of prying action on anchors considered

@N U N/A 9.

Strength of equipment base and load path to CG adequate hN U N/A

10.. Embedded steel, grout pad or large concrete pad adequacy evaluated Y N U N Are anchorage requirements met?

SEE C4Lc.

@U

'/ Zill-C-edt SLC17dd 11 INTERACTION EFFECTS 1.

Soft ta'rgets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures

@N U N/A 2.

If equipment contains sensitive relays, equipment

  1. 'N Y free from all impact by nearby equipment or structures

@N U N/A 3.

Attached lines have adequate flexibility (1/ N U N/A 4.

Overhead equipment or distribution syste~ are not likely to collapse N U N/A 5.

Have you looked for and found no other adverse concerns?

Y N U N/

Is equipment free of interaction effects?

NU IS EOUIPMENT SEISMICALLY ADE00 ATE?

Y@ U COP 94ENTS (0 7?P ENrKY Oroouor.

(2).$CL F/LLp SKZ7CH 4TnpCt(40 M.SLNC 604, 2.C h 7 (3) ddN L>tsr Id.soH4 Loc &rit.4r vsed;e faar of psx4Ls, psytLs Aet notn:o nurm. sxo sesea n ser

  • 4 ver 7xus ces wet **r c4vst tMrscr* ox gov 4daty Af6ect CYAMLL MdMcM64, ta mkr of CAV/4 r IS ffil~a

-(4)

Li6Mr~ f/y g it.tG/otY.swfpgyg:o 440 gy)Glo 4 p p gg/4 n 70 gvote St&dificur~ /MP4cn Evaluated by:

\\/(/fM W M

Date: /-24 -f 4

N~

hZF-J'Y

. M90 ADLL 65~ p/Ast4s ig t t 10

iA JO+'B-SSEL Line No. _E^5 -44 Status Y NU A

SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Sheet 1off5' A

Equip. ID No.

IN0411 {1PNLIN0411) Equip. Class 20 - Instr. & Control Panels & Cabinets Equipment Description 'IC/EDG 12 MCC 12G TRANSFER SWITCH ZB Location: Bldg. AUX Floor E1. 45 Room, Row / Col A421 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Kot&h0 (WTEot2##- 40. "A#fD-R-Abt SEISMIC CAPACITY VS DEMAND 1.

- Elevation where equipment receives seismic input j[,

2.

Elevation of seismic input below about 40' from grade

-MN U 3.

Equipment has fundamental frequency above about 8 Hz QvN U N/AdwMI) 4.

Capacity based on:

Existing Documentation DOC Bounding Spectrum (87 1.5 x Bounding Spectrum ABS GERS GERS 5.-

Demand based on:

Ground Response Spectrum (SIDD 1.5 x Ground Response Spectrum AGS Conserv. Des. In-Str. Resp. Spec.

Realistic M-Ctr. In-Str. Resp. Spec..

CRS RRS Does capa' city exceed demand?- (Indicate at right (*) and in

$NU COMMENTS if a special exception to enveloping of seismic 76T demand spectrum is invoked per Section 4.2 of the GIP.)

/A C,g 92N/.c co/

CAVEATS - B0UNDING SPECTRUM (Identify with an asterisk (*) those caveats which are met by intent without meeting the specific wording of the caveat rule and explain the reason for this conclusion in the COMMENTS section below) 1.

Equipment is included in earthquake experience equipment class N U N/A 2.

No computers or programmable controllers N U N/A 3.

No strip chart recorders N U N/A 4.

Steel frame and sheet metal structurally adequate

@N U N/A 5.

Adjacent cabinets or panels which are close enough to impact, or sections of multi-bay cabinets or panels, are bolted together if they contain essential relays Y N U@

6.

Drawers and equipment on slides restrained from falling out Y N UM 7.

All doors secured by latch or fastener N-U N/A 8.

Attached lines have adequate flexibility

  • N U N/A (# 7F20 9.-

Anchorage adequate (See checklist below for details)

N U N/A (ers 31

-10.

Relays mounted on equipment evaluated

/2 #J. DtMS N U N/A

11. Have you looked for and found no other adverse concerns?

d) N U N/A Is the intent of all the~ caveats met.for Bounding Spectrum?

$ NUN /A ANCHORAGE Appropriate equipment characteristics determined 1.-

(mass, CG, natural freq., damping, center of rotation) 8N U N/A 2.

Type of-anchorage covered by GIP N U N/A 3.

Sizes.and locations of anchors determined NU N/A Y

~.

SSEL Line N).

6595 I

SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Sheet 2of(

Equip. ID No.

IN0411 (IPNLIN0411) Equip. Class 20 - Instr. & Control Panels & Cabinets Equipment Description IC/EDG 12 MCC 12G TRANSFER SWITCH ZB ANCHORAGE (Cont'd) 4.

Anchorage installation adequate, e.g.,

weld quality and length, nuts and washers, expansion anchor tightness 8N U N/A d23'*C 5.

Factors affecting anchorage capacity or margin of safety considered: embedment length, anchor spacing, free-edge distance, concrete strength / condition, and 4

concrete cracking 6N U N/A 6.

For bolted anchorages, gap under base less than 1/4-inch Y N U@

7.

Factors affecting essential relays considered: gap under base, capacity reduction for expansion anchors Y N U@

8.

Base has adequate stiffness and effect of prying action on anchors considered 8N U N/A 9.

Strength of equipment base and load path to CG adequate hN U N/A 10.

Embedded steel, grout pad or large concrete pad adequacy evaluated hN U N/A M 'd Are anchorage requirements met?

$N U

[foo7F 3)

INTERACTION EFFECTS 1.

Soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures

@N U N/A 2.

If equipment contains sensitive relays, equipment free from all impact by nearby equipment or structures Y N U@

3.

Attached lines have adequate flexibility 6tN U N/A 6276 2) 4.

Overhead equipment or distribution systems are not likely to collapse N U N/A 5.

Have you looked for and found no other adverse concerns?

N U N/A Is equipment free of interaction effects?

$NU IS E0VIPMENT SEISMICALLY ADE0VATE?

d)NU ptra<fus B R FM arg /S v > f 6Act +1 FfsnT~ TDP INTM WWW *2WRP orFNorz... nem.

.'JUET@ A2TNE.

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p4' Date:

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~SSEL Line No. 8158-Status-U A,I SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Sheet 1 of 2 Se e No+e 3 Equip. ID No. OP05429 Equip. Class Air Handlers Equipment cription _DG/EDG 11 RM EXHAUST __ DAMPER d n m M c O # rufor-Location: Bldg. AUX Floor E1. 45 Room, Row / Col A422 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) Ab Ai (6. f//'a"ah A Ju 5

V SEISMIC CAPACITY VS DEMAND f

1..

Elevation where equipment receives seismic input 9

2.

Elevation of seismic input below about 40' from grade N U 3.

Equipment has fundamental frequency above about 8 Hz N U N/A 4.

Capacity based on:

Existing Documentation Bounding Spectrum Q C4 4risse.m 1.5 x Bounding Spectrum S

GERS 5.

-Demand based on:

Ground Response Spectrum 1.5 x Ground Response Spectrum Conserv. Des. In-Str. Resp. Spec.

CRS Realistic M-Ctr. In-Str. Resp. Spec.

RRS Does capacity exceed demand? (Indicate at right (*) and in YNU ComENTS if a special exception to enveloping of seismic demand spectrum is invoked per Section 4.2 of the GIP.)

CAVEATS - BOUNDING SPECTRUM (Identify with an asterisk (*) those caveats which are met by intent without meeting the specific wording of the caveat rule and explain the reason for this conclusion in the COMMENTS section below) 1.

Equipment is included in earthquake experience equipment class hN U N/A* Nd/r3 2.

Anchorage of heavy internal components is adequate; internal vibration isolators have seismic stops to limit uplift and lateral movement Y N U d5 3.

All doors secured by latch or fastener Y N U N Ne d e 4.

No possibility of excessive duct distortion causing binding or misalignment of any internal fan Y N U No b 5.

Base vibration isolators adequate for seismic loads Y N U 6.-

Attached lines (water, air, electrical) have adequate flexibility hN U N/A 7.

Anchorage adequate (See checklist below for details)

UJ N UMNNb 8.

Relays mounted on equipment evaluated N U QWD 9.

Have you looked for and found no other adverse concerns?

Y N U N/

Is the intent of all the caveats met for Bounding Spectrum?

N U N/A ANCHORAGE 1.

Appropriate equipment characteristics determined (mass, CG, natural freq., damping, center of rotation)

N U N/A 2.

Type of anchorage covered by GIP N U N/A 3.

Sizes and locations of anchors determined N U N/A 4.-

Anchorage installation adequate, e.g.,

weld quality and length, nuts and washers, expansion anchor tightness hN U N/A

.SSEL Line No. 8158 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Sheet 2 of 2

~ Equip. ID No. _0P05429 Equip. Class 10 - Air Handlers Equipment Description DG/EDG 11 RM EXHAUST DAMPER ANCHORAGE (Cont'd) 5.

Factors affecting anchorage capacity or margin of safety considered:

embedment length, anchor spacing, free-edge distance, concrete strength / condition, and concrete cracking hN U N/A 6.

For bolted anchorages, gap under base less than 1/4-inch Y N U N 7.

Factors affecting essential relays considered: gap under base, capacity reduction for expansion anchors Y N U N/

8.

Base has adequate stiffness and effect of prying action on anchors considered

@N U N/A i

9.

Strength of equipment base and load path to CG adequate

@N U N/A 1

10.

Embedded steel, grout pad or large concrete l

pad adequacy evaluated Y N U N/

Are anchorage requirements met?

Y N U INTERACTION EFFECTS 1.

Soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures Y N U N/A 2.

If equipment contains sensitive relays, equipment free from all impact by nearby equipment or structures 1N U 3.

Attached lines have adequate flexibility

@N U N/A 4.

Overhead equipment or distribution systems are not likely to collapse N U N/A 5.

Have you looked for and found no other adverse concerns?

Y N U N/

Is equipment free of' interaction effects?

NU IS EQUIPMENT-SEISMICALLY ADE0VATE?

hU COP 9lENTS

@hoto A[l.-[4 (DbircyhNoter +0 v bd *

  • 5* M os louver a sseOy ds fL 2 $1 h Nis.
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% f u P'm.

w vm>K,aagkn a,nion+>as<n><L.t~).

n<a p,,,gj.

///f/94

/MF Date:

. Evaluated by:

g

'CMON 9e thw/9v u

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1 l

J

SSEL Lin2 No. 3204 Status Y N U A

SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Sheet 1 of 2 Equip. ID No.

ICV 517 Equip. Class 07 - Fluid-Operated Valves Equipment Description RCS/ AUX SPRAY FROM CVCS CONTROL VALVE Lccation: Bldg.

CONT Floor El.

M Room, Row / Col C230 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)- b T6Mus Jesu,4~.

N UGLAW g

Pipe Size and Design Classification (optional but recommended) L

~

SEISMIC CAPACITY VS DEMAND 1.

Elevation where equipment receives seismic input A 7 'h 2.

Elevation of seismic input below about 40' from grade CD N U 3.

Capacity based on:

Existing Documentation DOC Bounding Spectrum

y. W ll" M ggp i l.5 x Bounding Spectrum S D GERS RS 5.

Demand based on:

Ground Response Spectrum 1.5,: Ground Response Spectrum AGS Conserv. Des. In-Str. Resp. Spec.

CRS Realistic M-Ctr. In-Str. Resp. Spec.

RRS Does capacity exceed demand? (Indicate at right (*) and in

$NU COMMENTS if a special exception to enveloping of seismic demand spectrum is invoked per Section 4.2 of the GIP.)

CAVEATS - BOUNDING SPECTRUM (Identify with an asterisk (*) those caveats which are met by intent without meeting the specific wording of the caveat rule and explain the reason for this conclusion in the COMMENTS section below) 1.

. Equipment is included in earthquake experience equipment class N U N/A 2.

No cast iron body N U N/A 3.

No cast iron yoke (for spring-operated pressure relief or piston-operated valves) 1N U@

4.

Mounted on 1 inch diameter pipe or larger

(_Y)N U N/A 5.

Centerline of pipe to top of operator within restrictions of Figure B.7-1 of Appendix B, or yoke can take static 3g load (for air-operated diaphragm, lightweight piston-operated, and spring-operated pressure relief valves)

Y N U@

{

6.

Centerline of pipe to top of operator within restrictions of Figure B.7-2 of Appendix B, or yoke can take static 3g load (for piston-operated U @ Mam b valve of substantial weight)

Y N

-7.

Actuator and yoke not braced independently from pipe

@N U N/A#

8.

Attached lines (air, electrical) have adequate flexibility

@N U N/A 9.

Have you looked for and found no other adverse concerns?

(I) N U N/

Is the intent of all.the caveats met for Bounding Spectrum?

N U N/A

l SSEL Line No.

3204 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Sheet 2 of 2 Equip. ID No.

ICV 517 Equip. Class 07 - Fluid-0perated Valves Equipment Description RCS/ AUX SPPAY FROM CVCS CONTROL VALVE CAVEATS - GERS (Identify with an asterisk (*) those caveats which i

are met by intent without meeting the specific wording of the caveat rule and explain the reason for this conclusion in the COMMENTS section below)

(Note that GERS for this class apply up to attachment point of valve to piping system; valve / pipe interface is not covered.)

1.

Equipment is included in the generic seismic testing equipment class Y N U 2.

Meets all Bounding Spectrum caveats Y N U 3.

Air-operated gate or globe valve with spring-opposed diaphragm-type pneumatic actuator Y N U@

4.

Use amplified response spectrum of piping system

{

at piping / valve interface Y N U@

l 5.

Valve and aperator will not impact surrounding structures and components Y N U(

6.

Mounted on 1 to 3 inch nominal pipe line Y N U(

1 7.

Carbon steel (not cast iron) yoke or bonnet Y N U l

Is the intent of all the caveats met for GERS?

YNU@

JNTERACTION EFFECTS 1.

Soft tgrgets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures N U N/A 2.

Attached lines have adequr.te flexibility N U N/A 3.

Overhead equipment or distribution systems are not likely to collapse N U N/A 4.

Have you looked for and found no other adverse concerns?

N U N/A Is equipment free of interaction effects?

$NU IS E0VIPMENT SEISMICALLY ADE0VATE?

hU COMMENTS 1)TLs vs\\ve is i&4m% Sufford & A W'A W N

fl~

v <> 94d n te usai, atys. k wc4d~s A fl' lo Lt. \\Mty s utPoM 5 ' k k nsrk ud 4 " lo h.SMA

  • Sff *N I*N'"'

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f Seiyn'c p40%$. ~Zr1Y N Me^h h 14k.

t i

Evaluated by:

[t$

Date:

3-/* fd Y vt1/W N-3-1-W fo ) 7 /0 ( U

)

e o

SSEL Line.No. '1103 Status

@N U A

. SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Sheet 1 of 2

' Equip. ID No. 2MOV509 Equip. C1 ass 08A-Motor-0perated' Valves Equipment' Description CVCS/ BORIC ACID TANK 21 TO CHARGING PUMPS VALVE

)

Location: Bldg. AUX Floor El.

5 Room, Row / Col 'A215 Manufacturer, Model,'Etc. (optional but recommended) LeMiron. cut SHS-00 oPLEA7Dd.

VE.L4d \\/41.JL Pipe Size and Design Classification (optional but recommended) 3"

~

~

SEISMIC CAPACITY VS DEMAND l.

Elevation where equipment receives seismic input

_6<

2.

Elevation of seismic input below about 40' from grade N U 3.

Capacity based on:

Existing Documentation e

Bounding Spectrum 1.5 x Bounding Spectrum GERS 5.

Demand based on:

Ground Response Spectrum 1.5 x Ground Response Spectrum S

Conserv. Des. In-Str. Resp. Spec.

CRS Realistic M-Ctr. In-Str. Resp.. Spec.

RRS Does capacity exceed demand? (Indicate at right (*) and in

@NU COPMENTS if a special exception to enveloping of seismic demand spgetrum is invoked per Section 4.2 of the GIP.)

CAVEATS - BOUNDING SPECTRUM (Identify with an asterisk (*) those caveats which are met by intent without meeting the specific wording of the caveat rule and explain the reason for this conclusion in the COPMENTS section below) 1.

Equipment is included in earthquake experience equipment class N U N/A 2.

No cast iron body N U N/A 3.

No cast iron yoke N U N/A 4.

Mounted on 1 inch diameter pipe or larger N U N/A 5.

Centerline of pipe to operator within restriction.;

of Figure B.8-1 of Appendix B, or yoke can take static 3g load N U N/A 430 6.

Actuator and yoke not braced independently from pipe N U N/A 7.

Attached lines (electrical) have adequate flexibility N U N/A 8.

Have you looked for and found no other adverse concerns?

N U N/

Is the intent of all the caveats met for Bounding Spectrum?

N U N/A CAVEATS - GERS (Identify with an asterisk (*) those caveats which are met by intent without meeting the specific wording of the caveat rule and explain the reason for this conclusion in the COMMENTS section below)

(Note that GERS for this class apply to only motor operator and its connection to valve; valve itself and valve / pipe interface are not covered.)

1.

Equipment.is included in generic seismic testing

~j equipment class Y N U N/A 2.

Meets all Bounding Spectrum caveats Y N U N/A

SSEL Lin) No. '1103 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Sheet 2 of 2 O

Equip. ID No. 2MOV509 Equip. Class 08A-Motor-Operated Valves Equipment Description CVCS/ BORIC ACID TANK 21 TO CHARGING PUMPS VALVE CAVEATS - GERS (Cont'd) 3.

Use ampitfied response spectrum of piping system and valve at valve / operator interface Y N U N/A 4.

Motor axis is horizontal Y N U N/A 5.

Valve and operator will not impact surrounding structures and components Y N U N/A 6.

Motor controls remotely located Y N U N/A 7.

If valve has side inounted actuator attached to secondary reducer, seismic brackets are used Y N U N/A 8.

Manufactured by Limitorque or Rotork Y N U N/A 9..

Any loose or missing valve-to-operator bolts are tightened or replaced (tightness check not required)

Y N U N/A Is.the intent of all the caveats met for GERS?

Y N U N/A INTERACTION EFFECTS 1.

Soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures N U N/A j

3.

Overhead equipment or distribution systems are N U N/A j

2.

Attached ifnes have adequate flexibility

" N U N/A g

not likely to collapse 4.

Have yop looked for and found no other adverse concerns?

Y N U N/L (J

s Is equipment free of interaction effects?

()Y N U~

IS EOUIPMENT SEISMICALLY ADE00 ATE?

hNU COWtENTS M TOP OF OPELATot Tovo4t.s. Fi9L /usVLkrs od od 64ML Pip /44, OC smct P pt 4. A u L L].u HedL T6gE m LL.

SdA.D - CFF LiaL A4 A ia sr FaA8 aq Is OC haL To AlLALaV lArLLAG ELSTLA IdT' Evaluated by:

,8d, Date: // t.3 S 3 c NAM a 1,,6 a

~

+. -. - -

~SSEL Line No.

2007 Status Y N U A

' SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET-(SEWS)

Sheet 1 of 2 Equip. ID No.

IMOV504 Equip. Class 08A-Motor-Operated Valves-

Equipme it Description CVCS/ REFUEL WATER TANK TO CHARGING PUMP VALVE Location: Bldg. AUX Floor E1. _5 Room, Row / Col A218 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. '(optional but recommended) /.d#bnp46, St*1Proo Pipe Size and Design Classification (optional but recommended) $tsvlaard A55***/ 3" SEISMIC CAPACITY VS DEMAND f

1.

Elevation where equipment receives seismic input f.

2.

Elevation of seismic input below about 40' from grade CD N U 3.

Capacity based on: Existing Documentation DOC

'I, CW C -

Bounding Spectrum g

1.5 x Bounding Spectrum

  1. o)

GERS GERS g///- C 5.

Demand based on:

Ground Response Spectrum

@ ( M86 j,,,

GRS 1.5 x Ground Response Spectrum AGS Conserv. Des. In-Str. Resp. Spec.

Realistic M-Ctr. In-Str. Resp. Spec.

RRS Does capacity exceed demand? (Indicate at right (*) and in

@NU COP 91ENTS if a special exception to enveloping of seismic demand spectrum is invoked per Section 4.2 of the GIP.)

CAVEATS - B0UNDING SPECTRUM (Identify with an asterisk (*) those caveats which are met by intent without meeting the specific wording of the caveat rule and explain the reason for this conclusion in the COMMENTS section below)'

1.

Equipment is included in earthquake experience

, equipment class N U N/A 2.

No cast iron body N U N/A 3.

No cast iron yoke N U N/A 4.

Mounted on 1 inch diameter pipe or 1rt ger N U N/A 5.

Centerline of pipe to operator within restrictions of Figure B.8-l'of Appendix B, or yoke can take static 3g load N U N/A 6.

Actuator and yoke not braced independently from pipe N U N/A Alo7f Z k 3-7.

Attached < lines (electrical) have adequate flexibility N U N/A 8.

Have you looked for and found no other adverse concerns?

d) N U Is the intent of all the caveats met for Bounding Spectrum?

N/ @A U N/A CAVEATS - GERS (Identify with an asterisk (*) those caveats which are met by intent without meeting the specific wording of the caveat

' rule and explain the reason for this conclusion in the COMMENTS section below)

(Note that GERS for this class apply to only motor operator and its connection-to' valve; valve itself and valve / pipe interface are not covered.)

.l.

Equipment.is included in generic seismic testing equipment class-Y N U(

2. -

Meets all Bounding Spectrum caveats Y N UC

1 SSEL Line No. 2007 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Sheet 2 of 2 Equip. ID No.

IMOV504 Equip. Class 08A-Motor-Operated Valves Equipment Description CVCS/ REFUEL WATER TANK TO CHARGING PUMP VALVE CAVEATS - GERS (Cont'd) 3.

Use amplified response spectrum of piping system and valve at valve / operator interface Y N U(

4.

Motor axis is horizontal Y N UO 5.

Valve and operator will not impact surrounding structures and components Y N U(

6.

Motor controls remotely located Y N U /'

7.

If valve has side mounted actuator attached to secondary reducer, seismic brackets are used Y N U(1 6.

Manufactured by Limitorque or Rotork Y N U (jp 9.

Any loose or missing valve-to-operator bolts are U @Y N U @

tightened or replaced (tightness check not required)

Y N Is the intent of all the caveats met for GERS?

INTERACTION EFFECTS 1.

Soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures N U N/A 2.

Attached lines have adequate flexibility N U N/A 3.

Overhead equipment or distribution systems are not likely to collapse N U N/A 4.

Have you looked for and found no other adverse concerns?

N U N/

Is equipment free of interaction effects?

NU IS EOUIPMENT SEISMICALLY ADE00 ATE?

8NU COMMENTS O ulve nyd/y suppdJ k waII.

20 firi hs W vieWe} Aufer mrm G,' m % ala. Thas vat pcwt Y

ife & be($ rirsktgj g5 & yalve sy&, )ygdy,] dayyaje f

  1. "d O h ided of k & J,,, je,,, pc,/.

Evaluated by:

[8 Date: 2Mf[

b usern mir f6m $/f-/4 $/p

SEL Line No. 8710 Status Y

U' SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Sheet 1of3 Equip. ID No.

2PCV4510 Equip. Class 07 - Fluid-Operated Valves Equipment Description CA/AFW AIR SYSTEM RECEIVER 2IA PRESS CONTROL VLV i

Location: Bldg.- AUX Floor El.

5 Room, Row / Col A205 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) Me n, L n. HJ h #2 6ody suA s:l4., Po d /2, % s: 70 +o tro pcj, S e h 2.3ltvi GoQ: C 5% ej 3

Pipe Size and Design Classification (optional but recommended) 3/r ob ( 1/4' u Ad SEISMICCAPACITYVSDEMAbD 3 4ooog e"4 Pm--ats Trb ' 3I6 sT. ST,

0. 4 :

1 1.

Elevation where equipment receives seismic input

_f 2.

Elevation of seismic input below about 40' from grade N U 3.-

Capacity based on:

Existing Documentation Bounding Spectrum p, f.*

1.5 x Bounding Spectrum S

42 01 - c. -oo l GERS S.

Demand based on:

Ground Response Spectrum 1.5 x Ground Response Spectrum Conserv. Des. In-Str. Resp. Spec.

CRS Realistic M-Ctr. In-Str. Resp. Spec.

RRS Does capacity exceed demand?

(Indicate at right (*) and in

@NU COMMENTS if a special exception to enveloping of seismic demand sp6ctrum is invoked per Section 4.2 of the GIP.)

CAVEATS - B0UNDING SPECTRUM (Identify with an asterisk (*) those caveats which are met by intent without meeting the specific wording of the caveat rule and explain the reason for this conclusion in the COMMENTS section below) 1.

Equipment is included in earthquake experience equipment class N U N/A 2.

No cast iron body Y N U N/A 3.

No cast fron yoke (for spring-operated pressure relief or piston-operated valves)

U N/A 4.

Mounted on 1 inch diameter pipe or larger Y N U N/A WY,ffe 5.

Centerline of pipe to top of operator within restrictions of Figure B.7-1 of Appendix B, or yoke can take static 3g load (for air-operated diaphragm, lightweight piston-operated, and ga d '/#

spring-operated pressure relief valves)

YhU N/A f

6.

Centerline of pipe to top of operator within restrictions of Figure B.7-2 of Appendix B, or yoke can take static 3g load (for piston-operated valve of abstantial weight) 1N U <N/

7.

Actuator and yoke not braced independently from pipe Q3 N U 8.

Attached lines (air, electrical) have adequate flexibility N U N/A 9.

Have you looked for and found no other adverse concerns?

N U N/A

.Is the intent of all the cave'ats met for Bounding Spectrum?

Y N/A

l SSEL Line No. 8710 I

SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Sheet 2 of 2j Equip. ID No. 2PCV4510 Equip. Class 07 - Fluid-Operated Valves Equipment Description CA/AFW AIR SYSTEM RECEIVER 21A PRESS CONTROL VLV CAVEATS - GERS (Identify with an asterisk (*) those caveats which are met by intent without meeting the specific wording of the caveat rule and explain the reason for this conclusion in the COMMENTS section below)

(Note that GERS for this class apply up to attachment point of valve to piping system; valve / pipe interface is not covered.)

1.

Equipment is included in the generic seismic testing equipment class Y N U N 2.

Meets all Bounding Spectrum caveats Y N U 3.

Air-operated gate or globe valve with spring-U@

opposed diaphragm-type pneumatic actuator Y N 4.

Use amplified response spectrum of piping system at piping / valve interface Y N U@

5.

Valve and operator will not impact surrounding structures and components Y N U 6.

Mounted on 1 to 3 inch nominal pipe line Y N U 7.

Carbon steel (not cast iron) yoke or bonnet Y N U Is the intent of all the caveats met for.GERS?

YNUh INTERACTION EFFECTS i

1.

Soft turgets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures N 'U N/A 2.

Attached lines have adequate flexibility iY N U N/A 3.

Overhead equipment or distribution systems are

_ N U N/A not likely to collapse 4.

Have you looked for and found no other adverse concerns?

Y N U N/

Isequipmentfreeofinteractiongffects?

YNU tots n C C T' Ci p s cIz M N S.

hu Pr E0VIPMENT SEI5"ICALLi ADEGUATft-COMMENTS 0)

P@

% II :

Ar, 6 : 4 - (,

L.bs w,, r

& %.hJd dex$ ( ~f WO M4 p p,:- as &

z c t < cia e

2 PC V 4 f 2 0 Evaluatea by: (

b

//t f[94--

Date:

U.b, A 96 MM4

EQE ENGINEERING SON SHEET NO.

CoIVf fI'bflF6 A 46 sy gok otte st(at.

JOB NO. k7-I I I JOB Pr<sc. CH 6Iv e_s 2 Pcv 4rla CHxo MFDATE [l4[44-

/

CALC. NO.

SUBJECT 2Pcv 4Tta

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ATTACHMENT (1) - ENCLOSURE (B)

I

\\

f BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FIVE OUTLIER RESOLUTION EVALUATIONS l

\\

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company March 23,1998

eof EQE INTERNATIONAL

.ii r.-

sHEETNO/b job No. 42111 job Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outiler Resolution BY @ k DATE68I*NY b

DATE E' Y tf CALC.No. C-013 SUBJECT Soent Fuel Pool Cooler Heat Exchanaer CHKD Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanaers OHXSFPCLR11 & 2HX1999 (oph 5FP(.L.R 82).

. Problem Statement:

These heat exchangers were found to be Outliers during the initial evaluation. They were found to have a seismic capacity of 0.426g vs. a required capacity of 1.556g. The weld between the saddle and the base plate was also found to not be adequate.

Resolution Method:

This calculation will use more refined analysis techniques and an input response sprectra using soil-structure interaction.

l i

EGE EQE INT ERNATIONAL t :

SHEET NO/b b JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Q1iffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY N k DATE 6 8I*

CALC. NO. C-013 SUBJECT SDent Fuel Pool Cooler Heat Exchanaer CHKD DATE I" D *I CAPAC4TY REDUCTION FACTORS FOR CAST IN PLACE BOLTS WITH NUTS OR HEADED STUDS 1HXCC12 Bolt Dia. (D) inches:

1.000 Note: Per BG&E drawing FSK-C-287, the CIP Required Edge Dist. (Emin) inches:

8.75 anchor bons are installed with 5" edge Required Embedment (Lmin) inches:

10 distance in the d:rection parallel with the Required Spacing (Smin) inches:

12.625 pad length. The CIP bolts are also shown Telecom between to extend well down into the rebar that is Concrete Strength fc (psi) =

4,000 J. White (EQE) and in the pad. As such it m judged that no M. Wright (BG&E) capacity reduction factor is required for embedment or for edge distance violations Actual Edge Dist. (E) inches:

8.75 due to the well reinforced conrete pad.

Actual Embedment (L) inches:

10 Actual Spacing (S) inches:

20 Note: If actual embedment, spacing, or edge distance exceeds m;nimum required,

use minimum values for calculation of reduction factors.

L=

10 inches S=

12.625 inches E=

8.75 inches l

THETA (edge dist.) = 2 cos-1 (2E/(2L+D))

r = (2L+D)/2 M

L1Z rad a

=

165 rad THETA (spacing) = 2 cos 1 (S/(2L+D))

=

Edge Distance Check E=

8.75

>= Emin, no pullout reduction factor required.

E=

8.75

>= 8.75D, no shear reduchon factor required.

Page 1 of 3

EGE EQE INTERNATIONAL "a

SHEET NO. /N '

JOB NO, 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outfier Resolution BY b@DATE N 3 DATE M 1Y* Y CALC. NO. C-013 SUBJECT SDent Fuel Pool Cooler Heat Exchanaer CHKD Concrete Strength Check GIP Table C.3-1 allowables are based on a concrete strength = fc = 3500 psi.

Concrete strength, fc, >= 3,500 psl No reduction factor required.

- Embedmont Check:

10

  • D =

10.DQ 4*D=

d.DQ L >= 10D, no reduction factor required.

- Spacing Check 2*D=

ZDQ Actual spacing equals or exceeds required spacing, no pullout reduction factor required.

Shear capacdy reduction factor for closely spaced cast-in-place anchor bolts = RSs:

RSs=

LQQ for actual spacing (S) >= 2

  • D Page 2 of 3

N EQE WTERNATIONAL SHEET NO/O" y O k DATE @ O "

JOB No. 42111

' JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY CALC.No. C-013 SUBJECT SDent Fuel Pool Cooler Heat Exchanaer CHKD h DATEI-1 Y I

- Revised Allowable Loads From Table C.3-1 of the GIP, the subject bolt has the following full allowable loads:

For D =

1.000 inches, the allowable pullout capach (Pu') =

26.690 lbs. and the allowable shear capacity (%/) =

13.350 lbs.

The revised puGout load & Pu = Pu'

  • rep
  • RFp
  • RLp
  • RSp

=

26.690 lbs.

The revised shear load = Vu = Vu'

  • REs
  • RFs
  • RLs
  • RSs 13,350 lbs.

=

\\

Page 3 of 3

EGE EQE WTERNAT10NAL

~g :-

r :

SHEET NOIb M k DATE k N JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY CALC. NO. C-013 SUBJECT SDent Fuel Pool Cooler Heat Exchanaer CHKD DATEf*1Y-97 GIP EVALUATION OF HEAT EXCHANGERS CHXSFPCLR11 STEP 1:

Determine the following input data and compare it with the range of applicable parameters of Table 74. If the parameters are bounding, then this evaluation is applicable to the subject horizontal tank. If not, then classify the tank as an OUTUER and proceed with the resolution of the OUTUER.

HEAT EXCHANGER Diameter (inches):

28 Length of Heat Exch.in feet (L):

24.004 Diameter in feet (D):

2.33 Thickness of SheD inches (t):

0.375 C.G. above floor in feet (Heg):

3.50 Weight of Hx + Fluid (Wtf)Ibs.:

15,850 Density of Hx with fluid (Ib/ft3): 153.8427054 SADDLES Number of saddles (NS):

2 Elastic modulus of saddle plate psi (E):

2.90E+07 Spacing between saddles in feet (S):

14 Saddle Moment of inertia (in4) lxx:

68.34 Height of saddle from btm of Saddle Steel Area (As)(in2):

12.234 Hx to base plate inches (h):

25.25 Shear modulus of saddle plate psi (G):

1.12E+07 BASE PLATE Thickness of base plate (Tb) inches:

0.625 Minimum yield strength (Fy) psi:

38,000 Thickness of weld between Eccentricity from anchor C.L.

saddle and base plate (Tw) inches:

0.25 assumed to the vertical saddle plate (Es):

2.25 ANCHOR BOLTS No of bolt locations per saddle (NL):

2 Diameter of anchor bott (d)in. :

f.000 No. of anchor bolts per location (NB):

1 Distance between extreme anchor bolts in saddle in feet (D'):

1.67 LOADING Floor response spectrum at 4% damping (G)

SFP-HX.XLS Page 1 of 5

EGE EQE NTERNATiONAL 5 I.

~

SHEET NO.!

M k DATE h JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY F2Y W CALC. NO. C-013 SUBJECT Soent Fuel Pool Cooler Heat Exchanaer CHKD DATE Table 74 Parameters 1.

Tank Diameter =

2.33 Parameter No.1 satisited, i' <= D <= 14'.

2.

Length of tank =

24.094 Parameter No. 2 satisited, d' <= L <= 60'.

' 3.

Height of Corder offaravty of tank and fluid above the floor where the tank is anchored (Hcg) ft. =

3.5 Parameter No. 3 satisired 1' <= Hcg <= 12'.

4.

Number of saddles (NS) =

2 Parameter No. 4 satisited,2 <= NS <= 6.

5. ~

Spacing between support saddles (S) ft =

14 Parameter No. 5 satraired,3' <= S <= 20'.

6.

Number of botting locations por saddie (NL) =

2 Parameter No. 6 satisired 2 <= NL <= 3.

7.

Number of anchor bolts per bolting location (NB) =

1 Parameter No. 7 satisited.1 <= NB<= 2.

8.

Distance between extreme anchor bolts in base plate of saddle (D') ft. =

1.67 Parameter No. 8 satisited, i' <= D' <= 12'.

9.

Ratio of tank C.G. Height 40 Saddle specing = ( Heg / S ) =

0.25 Parameter No. g satoired,,1 <= Heg / S <= 2.

10.

Ratio of tank C.G. Height-to-Detance between extreme anchor bolts ( Heg I D') =

2.096 Parameter No.10 NOT satisified, Heg / D' > 2. Classify as an OUTUER.

SFP-HX.XLS Page 2 of 5

l EGf EQE NTERNATIONAL iW

~

~

SHEET No.

job No. 42111 Jos Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY 99k DATE NIk CALC.No. C-013 SUBJECT Soent Fuel Pool Cooler Heat Exchanaer CHKo oATEI"U/*I OUTLIER RESOLUTION:

The Hx was classified as an Outfier for not meeting a database caveat as defined in Table 7-6.

This Hx has a height to CG to distance between bolts ratio = 3.5' over 1.67' = 2.09 vs. an allowable of 2.0. This ratio is used in Step 6 to compute an F2 value. This F2 value is then used in the denominator of the equation that determines the allowable acceleration in Step 7.

By using a value of 2.09 instaed of a 2.0 value the allowable acceleration is reduced.

Therefore using the higher ratio is conservative and this Outlier is considered to be resolved.

1 4

EGE EQE INTERNATONAL i +

's. 7 0-SHEET NO.

JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY DATE N CALC. NO. C-013 SUBJECT SDent Fuel Pool Cooler Heat Exchanaer CHKD DATEI*dY-11.

Weight density of subject horizontaltank =

154 tb/ft3 Parameter No.11 met 130 <= Density <= 180 lbs/ft3.

If any of the above parameters are not met and the subject horizontal tank has been classified as an OUTLIER, proceed wtth the rest of this evaluation and resolve the OUTLIER in accordance with Section 5 of the GIP.

5TEP2 Determine anchor bolt tension and shear allowables (Ibs)

Pd =

26.690 Vu'=

13.350 STEP 3 Determine base plate bending strength reduction factor (RB)

R8=

(Fy*Tb'2)/(3*Pu')=

Dja Q10 STEP 4 Determine the base plate weld strength reduction factor (RW) 132 RW = (2*SQR(2)*Tw'Es*30,600)/Pu'

=

LQQ If RW >= 1.0, use.1.0

=

STEP 5 Determine the anchorage tension allowable using the strength reduction values.

Use the smaller of the reduction factors (RW) or (RB).

Pu' = (RB)

  • Pu' =

LQQs Ibs STEPS Calculate the following ratios:

ALPHA =

Pu/Vu =

0.36 Heg / D' = 2.0958084 Wb = Wtf/(NS*NL*NB) =

3,962.50 Heg / S =

0.25 Vu/Wb =

3.37 F1 = SQRT ( NSa2 + 1 ) =

2.24 F2 = SQRT (NL*2 * (( CG / D' )'2 ) + (( 2/3 )*2)+ (( CG / S) *2) * ( ( NS*2 ) / (( NS-1 )*2 ) )

=

4.27 SFP-HX.XLS Page 3 of 5

EGE g*

EQE INTERNATIONAL q

"2 SHEET NO.

W DATE Y-E5

  • JOB No. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY CALC. No. C-013 SUBJECT Soent Fuel Pool Cooler Heat Exchanaer CHKD W DATE [ 1Y Y STEP 7 Determine the acceleration capacity of the tank anchorage.

The acceleration capacity is derined as the smaller of the two defined.

LAMDA1 = Vu/(Wb*F1)

=

1.51 LAMDA2 = ((VuNVb)+(0.7/ ALPHA)y(((0.7*F2yALPHA)+F1)

=

0.34 Allowable Acceleration =

0.34 g

SFP-HX.XLS Page 4 of 5 i

N E0E HTERNATONAL

$3 SHEET NO/O ~

@ k DATE h ld* W JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution 3Y DATE ["EY'# [

f CALC, No. C-013 SUBJECT Soent Fuel Pool Cooler Heat Exchanaer CHKD_

STEP 8: Determine whether the Hx is rigid or flexible in the lateral and vertical direction.

OD.= 28 in thk.= 0.375 in ID.= OD - 2 thk ID = 27.25 in OD - 109 4

l.. x d

i = 3105 in 64 Conservatively assume pinned-phned model with the supports at the ends of the Hx.

Wt.= 15850 lb L = 24.09412 in m.= $

m = 54.82 b E = 29000 kci L

in From Reference 10, Table 8-1.

1 2

x Elg In

fn = 14.964 Hz 2, m l

4 i

j l

)

i

)

SFP-HX.MCD 1

EGE EQE HTERNATONAL

. -E E SHEET NO.g - /[

" ^ ^ ~ -

JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calveft Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY T M k DATE h N DATE [" N I CALC. NO. C-013 SUBJECT SDent Fuel Pool Cooler Heat Exchanaer CHKD STEP 9 Determine whether the tank is rigid or flexible in the longitudinal directien.

Saddle stiffeess (Ka) = 1/(((h*3)/3*E*1xx)+(h/(As*G)))

=

345,792

  1. /in Freq Long = (1/(2*PI))*SQRT((Ks*g)/Wtf))

=

15 Hz in the longitudional direction the Hx is classified as FLEXIBLE.

l l

STEP 10 Determine the seismic demand acceleration 2nd compare it to the capacty determination.

The Hx is located on Elevate 27-0" of the Auxiliary building west of the SFP. From Reference 2, Figures A2.9 and *2.20 find the horizontal acceleraten corresponding to 15 Hz is equal to 0.19g.

This is a 5% damped value. Per the GIP, Hx accelerates should use 4% damping. Using the guidelines of Section 4.4.3 of the GIP, convert this acceleration to a 4% damped value as follows.

i l

acc 4% =

0.19'tSQRT(5/4)) =

0.2 f g

\\

I acc 4% =

0.2f g

i i

This is a median centered acceleration value. It must be amplified by a factor of 1.25 I

Revised acceleration =

0.27 Allowable Acceleration =

0.34 g

i The Hx anchorage is seismically adequate. The allowable acceleration exceeds the demand acceleration.

SFP-HX.XLS Page 5 of 5

EGE EQE INTERNATIONAL g".g SHEET NO.

JOB NO. 42111 JOD Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY T7)O k DATE ['N',

hO DATEbY" CALC. NO. C-013 SUBJECT _$ Dent Fuel Pool Cooler Heat Exchancer CHKD STEP 11:

Check saddle stresses W

tf Wt = 15850 Ib y

=

=

h Distance from bottom of Hx to

, _ n base plate = h.

D d

7 h = 25.25 in l

kip = 1000 Ib

-Mts psi Ib--

ksi. kip 2

in in 3

3 W = 24 ir, t g = g in D = 9 in ts

  • j'I" d '= D - t g d = 8.625 in f

tgi d

(W t g) ! d +

+ (d t ) g s

I y=

y = 7.623 in (Wtg)+(dt,)

3 i

2 3

~ W tg

'I tg td 2

+ (d t )-(y g\\

/- d s

lx = 68.337 in, fx*

+ (W t g)-

d+

-y

+

12

- tgW d t *3 3

d

+

IY = 432.038 in 1Y=

12 12 3

3 S x :=

Sx = 8.965 in S y := 1 -

S y = 36.003 in y

y SFP-HX.MCD 2

N 4-EQE NTERNATIONAL

$I J '?

..v,<-

SHEET NO.

f JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY

@k DATE 'I' dk iI CALC. NO. C-013 SUBJECT SDent Fuel Pool Cooler Heat Exchanaer CHKD DATE [*1Y I [

- Determine Comoressive Load Caoacity of Saddie:

2 A := (W tg) + (d t )

A = 12.234.in k = 1.0 x

3 A

3 r = 2.363 *in k b = 10.684 r

Per Table 3-36 of Reference 8, find the following allowable compressive stress:

F,

21.1 ksi F b = 21.6 ksi The longitudional frequency was computed as 15 Hz by the GlP analysis. From Reference 2 Figures A2.9 and A2.20 find the 5% damped acceleration as follows: Note this is a median centered acceleration value that must be amplified by a factor of 1.25.

5 accel 5% O.19 1.25 accel 4% := accel 5%

i accel 4% = 0.266 2

acc H accel 4%

acc y := yacc H acc y = 0.177

-Determine Saddle Loadina: Both of the saddles will resist the lateral moment while only the non-slotted base will resist the longitudional moment. Model the saddles as fixed-guided cantilevers with the fixed end being welded to the Hx.

Wt acc H h + OD\\

I M lat

  • Mlat = 41.298 kip in g

Wt ace H-(h + OD\\

f M

M IOD9 = 82.596 kip in iong

2 (Mlat) fM I

' IWt acc y) 2 Wt long Y

I

'^ l INT '=

+

+

+

INT = 0.46

< 1.0, OK F b F b F

2 F, i

a CONCLUSION: The Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchangers have been found to be seismically adequate.

i SFP-HX.MCD 3 l

LYALY-bowsi NoreS ECE ENGINEERifG

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1 T

EQE ENGWEEraNG SHEET NO.MO.--

[

JOB NO. Allt \\

JOB ULUl%T CLIPPS A4'b BY L

DATE'3/2.Of N

DATET* Mf CALC. NO.6* O l3 SUBJECT JS 6 Lov)DouJtd 7/rfJX CHK'D a

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EGE EQE NTERNATIONAL i. 'E r.-

SHEET No.b *

~

2'"

job No. 42111 job Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY-DATE 5dJadf CALC. No. C-013 SUBJECT Pretreated Water Storace Tank CHKD DATE E~ b if f$ 7A P U $7td4 Il h

$TA Psd 6TLJ4 82.)

Problem Statement:

This vertical tank was found to be an Outlier for the following reasons:

1. GIP step 8 found the top plate of the anchor bolt chair to be overstressed.
2. GIP Step 18 found the base overturning moment exceeded the capacity.
3. GIP Stop 19 found the tank shell was overstressed.

Resolution Method:

This calculation will use more refined analysis techniques and an input response spectra using soil-structure interaction.

)

M EQE INTERNATIONAL

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SHEET NO 72A N DATE 4~2W[

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- Determine Capacity of 1-3/8" Cast-in-Place Bolts: The bolts are embedded into a 12" wide concrete ring foundation. They have 30" of embedment and a 6"long 90 degree hook. This embedment does not meet the GlP required minimum embedment of 75" for a 1-3/8" CIP bolt with a 90 degree hook. They also have an edge distance of 3".

Embedment = E E a 30 ui-23'-6" 3"

22'9a The edge distance of 3" results in the CIP bolt having zero shear and pullout capacity per Section C.3.4 of Radius the GIP. This is because the concrete will have a brittle failure mode. However, the ring foundation is well o

o 0"

reinforced as detailed on Bethlehmen Steel drawing 5274-DG-12. As the hook of the CIP bolt is wellinto 48" the rebar, the pullout load will be taken by the rebar and not solely by a unreinforced concrete shear cone. The failure mechanism therefore becomes a failure of the o

bond stress between the CIP bolt and the concrete.

13" Wid5 psl e b kip.1000 lb 2

in

- Determine CIP Bolt Allowable Pullout Based on Bond Stress:

Per page 2-98 of Reference 6, the ultimate bond stress between plain bar and 3,500 psi concrete is 200 psi. Use this value and a factor of safety = 1.5 to determine the allowable pullout load.

D := 1.375 in o llow := 200 psi FS = 1.5 a

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EQE ENGINEErdNG ,/g JOB NO. hS" VM7[LolTs k h. N>lL% $ b JOB BY Phk DATE T*Eh *W CALC. NO. O/ } SUBJECT P(4/ 5 7 CHK'D IO DATE J U'I $ rep 3 * & lie 7~ 3 fh h,9c hie R9% he;vd P K telllz :.00 l kg. EIP 2.H 33" /, F W.O (i.h &4 157 1 11 G. 7 C' Wb 20 5,9 5,\\b 4, 7 Srep 2/: table. 7-s- ( SIosk Neig & hu vdQ E a_LP zar 3.ze /, E' 9(,,8 lo1,3 1/29

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ECE INTErWATONAL SHEET NO. //! JOB b bL/WJ [Adt'6 N DATE 58/M BY JOB NO. 527 9h CALC. nod-C2/3. SUBJECT W CHK'D b DATE Outlier Resolution: This tank is further classified as an Outlier as it is located on a ring foundation. Per Bethlehem Steel drawing number 5274-DG12 (BG&E document number 12005G-12) the vertical ring wallis secured to the footing with #7 rebar on 5" centers. The rebar are embedded 2'-3"in the 2*-6" thick footing. At this depth the vertical bar is hooked into the lower layers of the footing reinforcement. The tank is secured to the ring wall with 1-3/8" bolts on 49.2" centers (bolt-to-bolt arc spacing). Each of the CIP bolts are embedded 30"in the concrete. Equate the pullout allowable load, P, of the CIP bolts per foot of ring wall with the tensile stress of the rebar. - Determine area of rebar per foot of ringwall (.875 in)2 2 Arebar ' "' Arebar = 0.601 *in per bar 4 rebar*[12 inj Arebar aA \\ 5 in / Arebar " 1.443 *in per foot of ringwall - Determine Allowable Pullout Load per Foot of Ringwall: P = 17.279 kip t I 12 in P allow aPH P allow = 4.214 Mp per foot of ringwaH t t49.2 in - Determine Tensile Stress on Vertical Rebar per Foot of Ringwall: oa a = 2920 psi per foot of ringwall 1 Areber Per Bethlehem Steel drawing number 5274-DG12 (BG&E document number 12005G-12) all reinforcing t, teel is to be ASTM Grade A-615-40. As the actual rebar stress is less than the 40 ksi allowable, the ring wall is found to be adequate to transfer the CIP bolt load to the base foundation. The ringwall Outlier is considered to be resolved. CONCLUSION: The Outliers have all been accounted for and resolved. Therefore the tank is seismically adequate.

EGE EQE WTERNATIONAL (? SHEET No.)h " ! ~ " ' " job No. 42111 job Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY. DATE T-N( NNd CALC. No. C-013 SUBJECT F.P. Fuel Oil Tank CHKD oATE (OUD Problem Statement: The Fire Pump Fuel Oil tank was identified as an Outlier as it was only sitting in its support saddle and it is touching the access platform located next to it. Outlier Resolution: The tank must be welded, or at least rigidly attached, to its support saddle. This calculation will show that the support saddle and ancF.Jage will then be seismically adequate. The SRT found the platform to be braced in both the N-S and E-W directions. As the tank is found to respond rigidly, see Steps 8 and 9, there will not be any appreciable deflection. Therefore the SRT judged the interaction with the platform to not be a credible interaction hazard and the Outlier is considered to be resolved. FPFUELooC Page 2 of 2

EGE noe WTERNATXNW. ~ SHEET NO.fO' JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY D k DATE T*~31'If CALC. NO. C-013 SUBJECT F.P. Fuel Oil Tank CHKD @b DATE ~ - Determine Weicht of Tank: Assume wall thickness of 1/4". Capacityis defined as 500 gallons. Assume fuel oil weight typical of lubricating oil. OD.= 48 in thk = 0.25 in ID.= OD - 2 thk ID = 48 in L = 5.5 ft h = 12 in k.= 1.0 psi n Ib 2 in kip = 1000 lb ksim b2 in L 490-Wtank = 702 lb Wtank

  • I

\\ W ;; = (500 gal). 57 \\b-W ;; = 3810 lb o o 3 ( ft j Wtotal = Wtank + W ;; Wtotal = 4512 lb 1 o - Determine Support Saddle Properties: All of the following information is from the walkdown notes or assumed j as noted. W - All plate thicknesses are 1/4" X d f u ts t, := 0.25 in W.= 36.75 in d.= 4 in I,d I i 2 3 y := (W - 2 t ) t, t 4 y 3 Sy = 1.357 in + 2-1 y = 2.71 in S 1 y= \\ i 2 A, := 2 t, d + t,-(W - 21,) A, = 11 in FPFUEL.MCD (Page 1) I

EGE . EQE INTERNATONAL E 3: SHEET NO. M DATE h M JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY N CALC. NO. C-013 SUBJECT F.P. Fuel Oil Tank CHKD DATE GIP EVALUATION OF HORIZONTAL TANKS IM N % Q p '7 STEP 1: Determine the following input data and compare it with the range of apphcable parameters of Table 7-6. If the paramotors are boundeng, then this evaluation is applict.ble to the subject teorizontal tank. If not, then classify the tank as an OUTLIER and proceed with the resolution of the OUTLIER. HORIZONTAL TANK Diameter (inches): 44 Length of Horizontal Tank in feet, L' 5.5 Diameter in feet (D): 4.00 Thickness of Shell hches (t): 0.1875 assumed C.G. above floor in feet (Hcg): 3.00 Weight of Hx + Fluid (Wtf)Ibs.: 4,512 Density of Hx with fluid (tb/ft3): 65.28246 Note: it is conservative to assume 3/16" wall thickness for frequency derNation and 1/4" wall thickness for weight derivation. SADDLES Number of saddles (NS): 2 Elastic modulus of saddle plate psi (E): 2.90E+07 Spacing between saddles in feet (S): 3.75 Saddle Moment of inertia (in4)lyy-2.714 Height of saddle from btm of Saddle Steel Area (As)(in2): 1f.063 Hx to base plate inches (h): f2 Sheer modulus of saddle plate psi (G): 1.12E+07 BASE PLATE Thickness of base plate (Tb) inches: 0.25 Minimum yield strength (Fy) psi: 36,000 Thickness of weld between Eccentricity from anchor C.L. saddle and base plate (Tw) inches: 0,f875 to the vertical saddle plate (Es): ANCHOR BOLTS No. of bolt locations per saddle (NL): 2 Diameter of anchor bolt (d)in. : 0.875 No. of anchor bolts per location (NB): f Distance between extreme anchor bolts in saddle in feet (D'): 3.29 LOADING Floor response spectrum at 4% damping (G): PPFULot xLs Page i et 4

M EQE INTERNATIONAL E% a' SHEET NO. k DATE $ M JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY CALC. NO. Q-01$ SUBJECT F.P. Fuel Oil Tank CHKD DATE Table 74 Parameters 1. Tank Diameter = 4.00 Parameter No.1 satisified, i' <= 0 <= 14'. 2. Length of tank = 5.5 Parameter No. 2 satisifed,4' <= L <= 60', 3. Height of Center of-Gravity of tank and fluid above the floor where the tank is anctaed (Hcg) ft. = 3 Parameter No. 3 satisified, l' <= Hcg <= 12'. 4. Number of saddles (NS) = 2 Parameter No. 4 satisified,2 <= N$ <= 6. 5. Spacing between support saddles (S) ft. = 3.75 Parameter No. 5 satisired,3' <= S <= 20'. 6. Number of bolting locations per saddle (NL) = 2 Parameter No. 6 satisified,2 <= NL <= 3. 7. Number of anchor bolts per bolting location (NB) = 1 Parameter No. 7 satisified,1 <= NB<= 2. 8. Distance between extreme anchor bolts in base plate of saddle (D') ft. = 3.29 Pararneter No. 8 satisified, i' <= D' <= 12'. 9. Ratio of tank C.G. Height 4o-Saddle spachig = ( Heg / S ) = 0.80 Parameter No. 9 satisified,.1 <= Heg / S <= 2. 10. Ratio of tank C.G. Height-to-Distance between extreme armhor bolts ( Heg / D*) = 0.91 Parameter No.10 satisified,.5 <= Hcg / D' <= 2. 11, Weight density of subject horizontal tank = 65 lb/ft3 Parameter No.11 met,60 <= density <= 75 lbs/ft3. If any of the above pararneters are not met and the subject horizontal tank has been classired as an OUTLIER, proceed with the rest of this evaluation and resolve the OUTLIER in accordance with Section 5 of the GIP, i l PPFULolL.XLa Pa082of4

EGE EQE WTERNATIONAL k.I r : SHEET NON' .. " ~ JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calveft Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution _ BY DATE h N I"N" C/.LC. NO. C-013 SUBJECT F.P. Fuel Oil Tank CHKD DATE d STEP 2 Determine anchor bolt tension and sheer allowables (Ibs) Ylh C:R kW***

  • Pd = 20,440 Vd= jf,22Q STEP 3 Deterrnine base plate bendmg strength reduction factor (RB)

RB= (Fy*Tba2y(3*Pu')= Q,Qi I QQs = l l STEP 4 Determine the base plate weld strength reduction facior (RW) RW = (2*SQR(2)*Tw'Es*30,600yPd = Q12 i l STEP 5 Determine the anchorage tension allowable using the strength reduction values. I Use the smaller of the reduction factors (RW) or (RB). Pd o (RB)

  • Pd =

Z50 be l STEPS Calculate the following ratios: ALPHA = Pu/Vu = 0.07 Heg / D' = 0.911?M l Wb = Wtf/(NS*NL*NB) = 1,128.00 Heg / S = 0.B0 Vu/Wb = 9.06 F1 = SQRT ( NS*2 + 1 ) = 2.24 F2 = SQRT (NL*2 * (( CG / D')*2 ) + (( 2/3 )^2)+ (( CG / S) *2) * (( NS*2 ) / (( NS-1 )a2 ) ) 2.515 4 = l STEP 7 Determine the acceleration capacity of the tank ancierage. The acceleration capacity is dermed as the smaller of the two defined. LAMDA1 = Vu/(Wb*F1) = 4.Os LAMDA2 = ((Vu/Wb)+(0.7/ ALPHA)y(((0.7*F2yALPHA)+F1) = 0.71 Allowable Acceleration = 0.71 g FPFulOLJtts Page3of4 ~--______--_-___--_____-_-______-_--_-__- - -_-_ - - --

EQE EQE INTERNATIONAL i % O**h SHEET NO Ok DATE 6-M" JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outiler Resolution BY I"2I CALC. NO. C-013 SUBJECT F.P. Fuel Oil Tank CHKD DATE l STEP 3 Determine whether the tank is rigid or fleidble in the transverse and vertical direction. DENSITY = 65.28 lba/ft3 Diameter in feet (D): 4.00 Thickness of Shellinches (t): 0.1875 l l From Figure 7-14, max. spacing for rigid Hx = 14.8 ft. Actual Spacing is 3.75 ft. In the transverse and vertical direction the tank is classifed as RIGID. STEPS Determine whether the tank is rigid or flexible in the longitudinal direction. Neither saddle has slotted holes so they are both effective in the longitudinal dwection. Saddle stiffness (Ks) = 2/(((h*3)/3*E*lyy)+(h/(As*G))) 269,701 f/in = Freq Long = (1/(2*PI))*SQRT((Ks'g)/Wtf)) = 24 Hz in the longitudional direction the Hx is classired as FLEX 1BLE. STEP 10 Determine the seismic demand acceleration and compare it to the capacity determination. As the tank is classired as FLEX 1BLE, conservatively use on acceleration for 10 Hz from the 4% damped floor response spectrum. Acceleration for a 10 Hz frequency from the 5% damped ground response spectrum = 0.16 g Convert this acceleration to a 4% damped value = SQRT(5/4)

  • ace 5% =

0.18 g Allowebie Acceleration = 0.71 g The tank anchorage is seismically adequate. The allowable acceleration exceeds the demand accelers' ion. l i 3 9 4- ,4 onb FPruto oxLS Paes 4 ef 4

EGE EQE NTERNATK)NAL kI ~: SHEET NO O# D4 DATE @ U-N job No. 42111 Joe Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution By DATEf"3I'iI calc. NO. C-013 SUBJECT F.P. Fuel Oil Tank CHKD STEP 11: Check the saddle stresses Determine the anchor bolt loading in order to check the base plate outside of the stiffener to the bolt. Assume a prying factor of 2. In Step 8 the tank was found to respond rigidly. In Step 9 the tank and saddles were found to respond at 24 Hz. Conservatively use a ground acceleration value corresponding to 10 Hz. Model the saddles as guided cantilevers longitudinal loading. 2 ace = 0.12 g acc h := 0.18 g acc y := g acc h y M lat := Wtotal 36 in acc h Mlat = 29.2 kip in M long = 29.2 kip in M long = M let 2 32 fM Wtotal acc h h3 fWtotal acey Wtotal M lat long t" f39.5 - 36.75 + 36.75\\ in k l k A ( 2 / f = -219 lb Net compression load on bolts. t As there is no net tensile loading on the saddle bolts, the base plate outside of the vertical plates is adequate. FPFUELMCD (Page 2) m

EGE EQE NTERNATIONAL SHEET NO. h #b ^ Mb DATE f*M* T JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY hb DATE f-31*N CALC. NO. C-013 SUBJECT F.P. Fuel Oil Tank CHKD - Check compressive stress on saddle: 2 fM Wtotal acc h h)2 IWtotal acc i Wtotal long v

  1. ~"

45 in A 22S 2A 2A $i s y J ( s j s b = 24 k r := r = 0.495 in b A f S s 1PX From pg. 5-74 of Reference 8 find the following allowable compressive stress: O ~ F, = 20.28 ksi As the actual stress is less than the allowable the saddle is OK. - Check Support Pedestals: The concrete pedestals and their reinforcement are detailed on BG&E drawing 61807. This shows that the pedestals are reinforced with #4 bars on 12" centers. It also shows that the vertical

  1. 4 bars extend down into the concrete floor stab.

This tank is relatively lightweight, for tanks, and was found to respond at a high frequency resulting in a low acceleration value. Therefore the oncrete pedestals are judged to be seismically adequate. CONCLUSION: The tank, its saddle, and its anchorage have been found to be seismically adequate, i FPFUEL.MCD (Page 3) \\ J

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ATTACHMENT (1) - ENCLOSURE (C) BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SIX ANCIIORAGE RE-EVALUATION Baltimore Gas and Electric Company March 23,1998

EGE EQE INTERNATIONAL SHEET No. f N k DATE Y8 NI ) job No. 42111 job Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY CALC. No. C-013 SUBJECT Shutdown Coolino Heat Exchanaers CHFD DATE f*2Yif Shutdown Coolina Heat Exchanaers 1HXSICS12.1HXSICS22. 2HXSICS21. and 2HXSICS22: Problem Statement: These heat exchangers were found to be Outliers during the initial evaluation. They are mounted on wheeled supports that have lateral support only. This was written up as a violation as there is no uplift restraint. Resolution Method: . This calculation will use more refined analysis techniques and an input response spectra using soil structure interaction. These heat exchangers are supported different than the typical GIP heat exchanger. The dead weight is taken by (2) sets of rollers. Each of the roller wheels have lateral supports (bumper pads) located next to them that will take the lateral load. The longitudinal load is taken by a welded and bolted support mechanism located at one end of the heat exchanger. This calculation will compare the various Shutdown Cooling Hx attributes with those of GIP ) Hx's as stated in Table 7-6 of the GIP. The remaining anchorage evaluation will be performed using standard engineering techniques. 9

EQE INTERNATIONAL SHEET NO. D b DATE 9 0 Y.$' JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY CALC.NO. C-013 SUBJECT Shutdown Coolina Heat Exchanaer$ CHKD DATE N W-I GIP EVALUATION OF HEAT EXCHANGERS SHUTDOWN COOUNG HEAT EXCHAGERS STEP 1: Determine the following input data and compare it with the range of applicable parameters of Table 7-6. If the parameters are bounding, then this evaluation is applicable to the subject horizontal tark. If not, then classify the tank as an OUTLIER and proceed with the resolution of the OUTLIER. HEAT EXCHANGER Diameter (inches): 45 Length of Heat Exc5.in feet (L): 23.489 Diameter in feet (D): 3.75 ThiC4 ness of Shellinches (t): 0.5 assumed C.G. above floor in feet (Hcg): 3.33 Weight of Hx + Fluid (Wtf)Ibs.: 44,500 Density of Hx with fluid (Ibt3): 171.67735 SADDLES Number of saddles (NS): 2 Elastic modulus of saddle plate psi (E): 36,000 Spacing between saddies in feet (S)- ff.67 Saddle Moment of inertia (in4)lyy-MA Height of saddle from btm of Saddle Steel Area (As)(in2): MA Hx to base plate inches (h): 18 Shear modulus of saddle plate psi (G): eMA BASE PLATE Thickness of base plate (Tb) inches: f.25 Minimumylekf strength (Fy) psi. 36,000 Thickness of weld between Eccentricity from anchor C.L. saddle and base plate (Tw) inches: 0.3125 to the vertical saddle plate (Es): MA ANCHOR BOLTS No. of bolt locations per saddle (NL): MA Diameter of anchor bolt (d)in. ; f.250 No. of anchor bolts per location (NB): MA Distance between extreme anchor bolts in saddle in feet (D'): N/A 1 LOADING Floor response spectrum at 4% damping (G) SHUT-HX.XLS Page 1 of 2

EG.E EOE INTERNATIONAL SHEET NO. JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calveft Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY_ 77 DATE T-25 'k T b DATE ['1V'9I CALC.No. C-013 SUBJECT Shutdown Coolina Heat Exchanaers CHKD Table 7 6 Parameters 1. Tank Diameter = 3.75 Parameter No.1 satisited, i' <= D <= 14. 2. Lengthof tank = 23.469 Parameter No. 2 satisifed,4 <= L <= 60P. 3. Height of Center of-Gravity of tank and fluid above the floor where the tank is anchored (Hcg) ft. = 3.33 Parameter No. 3 satisified, i' <= Heg <= 12'. 4. Number of saddles (NS) = 2 Parameter No. 4 satistfied,2 <= NS <= 6. 5. Specing between support saddles (S) ft. = 11.67 Parameter No. 5 satisified,3' <= S <= 20F. 6. Number of bolting locahons per saddle (NL) = N/A Parameter No.8 NOT satisified, NL > 3. Classify as an OUTLIER. ) 7. Number of anchor bolts per bolting location (NB) = N/A Parameter No.7 NOT satisified, NB > 2. Classi.y as an OUTLIER. 8. Distance between extreme anchor bolts in base plate of saddle (D') fL = N/A Parameter No. 8 NOT satisified, D'> 12*. Classify as an OUTLIER. 9. Ratio of tank C.G. Height-to-Saddie spacing = ( Heg / S ) = 0.29 Parameter No. 9 satisifed,.1 <= Heg / S <= 2. N/A 10. Ratio of tank C.G. Height-to-D.%tance between extreme anchor bolts ( Hog / D') = Parameter No.10 NOT satisified. Hcg / D'> 2. Classify as an OUTLIER. 11. Weight density of subject horizontal tank = 172 lb/ft3 Parameter No.11 met,130 <= Density <= 180 lbs/ft3. If any of the above parameters are not met and the subject horizontal tank has been classified as an OUTLIER, proceed with the rest of this evaluation and resolve the OUTLIER in accordance with section 5 of the GlP. Note: The Hx caveats 6 to 8 and 10 are addressed in the body of the calculations. SHUT-HX.XLS Page 2 of 2

M EQE INTERNATIONAL 5; N SHEET NO I2.D d, DATE [ O k JOB NO. 42111 Jos Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx outlier Resolution By DATE 3 N I I CALC.No. C-013 SUBJECT Shutdown Coolina Heat ExchanaerS CHKD These heat exchangers are located on Elevation (-)15-0 of the Auxiliary Building. Determine the lateral frequency of the Hx assuming a pinned-pinned model and assuming the lateral supports are rigid. kip a 1000 lb ksi = $ psi =I 2 2 in in OD := 45 in thk := 0.5 in ID := OD - 2.thk ID = 44 in OD-IDh 4 I.= x d I = 17305 in Wt := 44500 lb 64 m = 158 I E := 29000 ksi L := 281.625 in m.= - L in From Reference 10, Table 8-1 find the following natural frequency; 2 'E l g e x In" in = 22 Hz 2 m 3 From' Reference 2 Figures A2.11 and A2.22 find the 5% damped acceleration as follows: Note this is a median centered acceleration value that must be amplified by a factor of 1.25. r-5 accel 4% = 0.25 g accel 22Hz := 0.181.25 accel 4% := accel 22Hz' i 2 acc H := accel 4% acc y := pace H acc y = 0.17 g Duermine lateral and longitudinalloads: H eg := 40 in Lat := Wt acc H Lat = 11194 lb Mlat = 448 kip in Mlat := Lat H eg SHUT-HX.MCD 1 )

EGE EQE HTERNATIONAL E.% SHEET NO. JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY M DATE hO* CALC. NO. C-013 SUBJECT Shutdown Coolina Heat Exchanaers CHKD DATE O U-I The wheels are located near

  • e tangent points of the Hx diameter. Assume the distance between them is equal to 30"which is less than the J/ Hx diameter. The lateralload (Lat) and lateral moment (M lat) are resisted by the bumper pads and the dead weight of the Hx. Assuae the overturning point is the wheet:

w.\\M dist := 30 in Mlat = 448 kip in fh*v dis Resis := (1 - ace y) Wt t Resis = 556 kip in T As the DW resistance is,reater than the overtuming moment, there is no net uplift on the wheels. Therefore they do not require uplift restraints. - Check Lateral Load on Bumners: There are seismic bumpers installed at each of the four Hx support wheels in accordance with Reference 22. These supports consist of steel plates welded to a 1" thick base plate. The base plate is anchored to the floor slab with (4) 1" anchor bolts. ) Determine loading on weld of vertical plate to base plate: The plate is secured to the base plate with a 7/8" all-around fillet weld. Length of weld = d. Assume minimum E60 electrodes were used to make welds, 2 d := 6 in S := S = 12 in Aw=2d Aw = 12 in tensile := Lat 10.25 in tensile = 9562 Ib S in shear := $ shear = 933 h \\ 2 2 \\h 1 fres := tensile + shear Ires = 9607-5,+ y f7 i Allow := 1 - in 0.707J3060s,d} Allow = 18930 Ib (8 j in As the allowable weld load exceeds the apolied weld load the weld is OK. SHUT-HX.MCD 2

EGE %., EOE MERNADCW - ~[.- SHEET NO. l JOB NO 4211 JOB dAu1EE TdLWrs -b ~)ME d Mr [brutt-BY I"M'N DATE b DATE N/o /90 ! CALC. NO. C'013 SUBJECT 3/h/-rBntsJ doc,4 6 N,K CHK'D - Check Anchor Bolts: The base plate is secured to the floor slab with (4) 1" expansion anchors. i pullout := Lat 1025 in uilout = 3528 lb 2 2-(8.13 in) i shear:= $ shear = 1399 lb 8 Determine anchor bolt allowable loads: The bolts are installed in 4,000 ps! concre' e per BG&E drawings t 61-666-E and 61-670-E. Use methodology of Appendix C of the GIP. From Table C2-1 of the GIP find the following anchor bolt allowable loads for a 1" expansion anchor. F t := 6950 lb F y := 9530 lb heduction Factors: ) RT p := 0.6 RTs := 0.6 Reduction factor for unknown anchor bolt type. 4 P Revised Allowable Loads: e l ,h F t := F RT p t F y := F RT y s 'l0h j F t = 4170 lb F y = 5718 lb A A S, Mk Check Interaction: shear = 0.24 < 0.3, therefore neO ect shear load l F p o'i d n J q e k b // b y aJ e&je d girles E"" = 0.85 < 1.0. OK F t 1 Factor of Safety = pullout k 1) Lg\\h k F . f* ' -A& 7I t 2(g

== Conclusion:== The lateral bumpers are seismically adequate. / gif d ' h *II5 An 6 6" ~W SHUT.HX.McD 3 i

mr EQE NTERNATiONAL j '.9 ~;7 SHEET NOK ='" 78Dh DA1E 0288[ JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outlier Resolution BY DATE b M W CALC. NO. C-013 SUBJECT Shutdown Coolina Heat Exchanaers CHKD - Check Lonoitudinal Restraint: The heat exchangers are restrained in the longitudinal direction by a welded steel plate configuration detailed in Reference 23. Determine axial stiffness and frequency of the support configurat%n. W I= I" Y b ; D d g e o Distance from point of applied load to base plate = H := ((18 + 1.25) - 7) in H = 12.25 in W := 12.5 in t g := in D := 6.75 in t, := in d.= D - t g ( ) d = 6 iry (W t g) d + (dt)- 2 '+ s l ~ y := y = 4.72 in (W tg) + (d t,) 2 3 3 W tg 'f t i _2 t, d f d 2 1x ;" + (W t g)- d+g d + (d t ) y g 2 1x = 79.74 in -y + s 12 3 I t g-W d t "3 (E l2 2 1 Conservatively use Ad term for d 1y:= + 2- +dtI 1y = 279 in stiffeners as being at the 1/3(W) s 12 ,( 12 ) L 3 / spacing. 3 3 Sx := Sx = 17 in S S y = 45 in y= in the longitudinal direction the Hx is secured to a floor mounted bracket by a rigid steel bracket. This rigid bracket is welded to the Hx and is attached to the floor bracket with (2) 3/4" bolts. The stiffened bracket extends below the bolts 1-1/2". This is Judged to be adequate to ensure no rotation of the brackets. Therefore the floor bracket may be modeled as a guided cantilever. 1 (12EI)'O x f in = 58 Hz n ;" 2 x 3 WtH 3 SHUT-HX.MCD 4

EGE toe #M4ADONAL SHEET NO. / 0 . BIN JOB btN6fX fFCs ~Ib %f f/b 8Mr.C BY DATE I"N *5 B CALC. NO.N/1-_ SUBJECT $/h/7bowd boc.e4 /b CHX'D W DATE JI'/f8 from Reference 2 Figures A2.11 and A2.22 find the 5% damped rigid acceleration as follows: Note this is a median centered acceleration value that must be amplified by a factor of 1.25. accel @id := 0.15 1.25 acc H := accel rigid acc H = 0.19 g acc y := bacc H acc y = 0.13 g 3 Determine longitudinalloads: Long := Wt ace H L ng = 8344 lb Determine Longitudinal Moment Resisted By Anchorage: Guided cantilever model. M long I "g 51 kip in M 2 ] Determine Bolt Loads: Assume rigid plato due to stiffeners, bolt rotation about edge of plate, and neglect ' closest bolt. P I "9 pullout := pullout = 2044 Ib (212.5 in) . shear := ' "9 shear = 2086 lb i 4 i i shear = 0.36 > 0.30, therefore interaction is as follows F y interaction := 0.7 !P"" shear + Interaction = 0.71 F F \\ t j y i I Factor of Safety = Interaction= 1.41 Anchoraae Interaction is Less Than 1.0. OK . CONCLUSION: Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers are Seismically Adequate. ) SHUT.HX.MCD s

l i EGE EQE NTERNATioNAL i % SHEET Noh .N DATE6-378I job No. 42111 job Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outfier Resolution BY DATE f*Zf*f[ CALC. No. C-013 SUBJECT Shutdown Coolina Heat Exchanaers CHKD OUTLIER RESOLUTION: The heat exchanger is classified as an Outlier per Table 7-6, caveat nos. 4,6,7, 8, and 10. Caveats 4,6,7,8, and 10 have to do with the saddle configuration. As the support configuration was explicitly evaluated, all of these Outliers are considered resolved. CONCLUSION: The Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers have been found to be seismically adequate. ) )

EGE soe wreRPMTIONAl. E_ i [2. ' SHEET NO. ! r JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 Tank and Hx Outiler Resolution BY % d DATE 6 U ~I I g CALC.NO. C-013 SUBJECT Shutdown Cool'no Heat Exchanaers CHK'D DATE S'NSI (A}At.$botdal b7CS g Sg WS [) g d pa } ,m (c L Y2't (b W' A l}d' j ) F-- dm 6-1(5) 2 T'p ad& f " ' b el At - s/M ] t b / k.cz,. g g4 g4 % li'lh, ,[ [+*b h* WV ~ Y'I t%P Y T V Q. k 0 10:14 _) I gt r- \\ J h is , 5Ep&l%I%I S 60-(lla, Dm i, t:e I rf' 9'iSfd 1 v "' p.l' za 9 pW4 6;yde s W ,c s zu,In wIv4a d<I NfM Nm ou w1La ~b : %# rn & %ww e ) WM

ATTACHMENT (1) - ENCLOSURE (D) BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 7c AND 7f RACEWAYS SUPPORTS REVIEW i Baltintore Gas and Electric Company March 23,1998

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ATTACHMENT (1) - ENCLOSURE (E) BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 7g ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR RACEWAY SUPPORTS Baltimore Gas and Electric Company March 23,1998

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EOE ENGINEERING SHEET NO. U JOB NO. JOB BY %k DATE YU*N III Calvert Cliffs A-46 CALC. NO. 006 SUBJECT Cable Tray Evaluation CHKD DATE IM*iY ANALYTICAL REVIEW No. 4 (from Room 223) Per Reference 2, the Kindorf Strut nuts have the following allowable pullout and slip along loads: 1300 lbs slip = 400 lbs pullout

=

Cable Tray Spans: note both directions 5.75ft Span _2 := 5.75ft Span _1 = 1 (Span _1 + Span _2 ) 5 Span = 5.75 ft Span

=

Cable Tray Sizt Note: Per Section 8.3.9 of the GlP, cable tray weight may be estimated as 25 psf for a 4" deep tray. 3 inches Depth standard := 4 inches 2.5 ft Depth Width = = CPM Ratio = Ratio = 0.75 Depth standard Cable Tray Percentage Fill: 10 25 %_ fill _2 %_ fill _1 = = 10 10 %_ fill _4 %_ fill _3 = = Cable Tray Weights: W i.= 25 Span -( %_ fill _1 0.01 ) Ratio Width Wj = 67 lbs per tray W 2 := 25 Span -( %_illl_2 0.01 ) Ratio Width W 2 = 27 lbs per tray W 3 := 25 Span -( %_ fill _3 0.01 ) Ratio Width W 3 = 27 lbs per tray W 4 25 Span -( %_ fill _4 0.01 ) Ratio Width W 4 = 27 lbs per tray = REVW 4.MCD (1)

ECE ENGINEERING SHEET NO. A By 52 6 k DATE l_M Calvert Clifts A-46 JOB NO. 42111 303 /W~Y CALC. NO. 006 SUBJECT Cable Tray Evaluation CHK'D DATE Additional weight due to conduit: There is a 1", a 1-1/2", and a 3/4" conduit attached to the support. Conservatively assume all same weight as the 1-1/2" conduit = 5.9 lbs/ft (Reference 5). 1021bs ( 5.9 Span ) 3 W conduit W conduit =

=

+ W conduit W total = 250 lbs + W 2+ W 3+W 4 W 3 W total = Following the guidelines of Section 8 of the GIP, all supports selected for limited analytical review should first pass a 1.0 x Dead Load check accounting for all eccentricities: GIP Section 8.3.1: 1.0 x Dead Load: Each of the trays are prevented from sliding off the cantilever member. The horizontal cantilever bracket is bolted to the vertical strut by a bracket similar to bracket type Pl777 of Reference 4. This is a 90 degree stiffened bracket tray support bracket. It is secured to the vertical strut member by two bolts. The deadweight of the cable tray is resisted by pullout of the top bracket bolt and slip along of both bracket bolts. Pullout load on the top bracket P top : Distance from centerline tray to cl vert strut = dist. cl Distance between points resisting moment = dist. points 4.5 inches dist c1 16 inches dist = points = (W }}l) dist cl P top = 240 lbs P top dist points pullout Pullout _ allow = 1300 lbs Pullout _ allow = Allowable exceeds demand, OK. W l Slip _ load := Slip _ load = 34 lbs Slip _ allow 2 slip Slip _ allow = 800 lbs

=

Allowable exceeds demand, OK. REVW 4.MCD (2)

ECE ENGINEERING SHEET NO. 07 I Calvert Cliffs A-46 gy _ m k DATE INJ-M JOB NO. JOB CALC. NO. 006 SUBJECT Cable Tray Evaluation CHK'D @O DATE II4 U Check connection of vertical strut member to horizontal strut member: The total weight is resisted by (4) bolts in slip along loading and (2) bolts in pullout loading. Sli _ load = 250 lbs Slip _ load := W total P Slip _ allow := 4 slip Slip _ allow = 1600 lbs Allowable exceeds demand, OK. Pullout _ load := W total Pullout _ load = 250 lbs Pullout _ allow := 2 pullout Pullout _ allow = 2600lbs Allowable exceeds demand, OK. Check horizontal strut member: Assume Kindorf B-900. Per Reference 5 find the following section properties: S := 0.155 in3 W total 30 M := M = 1875 lb

  • in 4

j l M o= o = 12098 psi < 25,000 psi (Reference 5) OK S ) REVW 4.MCD(3) l ) 1 l

) -QE j EQE ENGINEEl3NG SHEET NO. 07 Calvert Cliffs A-46 gy gg DATE 10-244 JOB NO. 42111 og CALC. NO. 006 SUBJECT Cable Tray Evaluation CHKD kb DATE IlW-W Check 1/2" anchor bolts: Determine anchor bolt allowable loads: Use methodology of Appendix C of the GIF. From Table C.2-1 of the GIP find the following anchor bolt allowable loads. 2380 lbs F t := 2290lbs F

=

y Reduction Factors: 0.6 Reduction factor for unknown RT p := 0.6 RT = s anchor bolt type. (C.2.2) Reduction factor for assumed 3000 3000 + 0.65 concrete strength = 3000 psi. RF

=

RF p := 3 (C.2.7) RF p = 0.75 RF s = 0.95 Revised Allowable Loads: F

=

F y RT RF s F

=

F RT p RF p y s t t 1357 lbs F i = 1031 lbs F = y Check interaction equation: q TV total = 0.12 < l.0, OK F ) t CONCLUSION: Support is adequate for 1.0 x Dead Load REVW 4.MCD (4)

ECE ENGINEERING SHEET NO. N Calvert Cliffs A-46 gy Wk DATE 10 28# JOB NO. 42111 303 CALC. NO. 006 SUBJECT Cable Tray Evaluation CHK'D DATE II*Y E Per Figure 8-6 of the GIP, the next check is a vertical capacity check. GIP Section 8.3.2: Vertical Capacity Check This check concentrates on the support anchorage, l focusing on the weak link in the support anchorage load path. The Vertical Capacity Check is an equivalent static load check, in which the support is subjected to 3.0 times Dead Load in the downward direction. This check is limited to the primary raceway support connections and the anchorage of suspended support systems. l DL 3 3W toul DL 3 = 750 lbs = l Check gusseted clip angle brackets and bolts: i The total weight is resisted by (4) bolts in slip along loading and (2) bolts in pullout loading. Slip _ allow := 4 slip Slip _ allow = 1600 lbs DL 3 = 750 lbs l DL 3 := 3W total Allowable exceeds demand, OK. Pullout _ allow = 2 pullout Pullout _ allow = 2600 lbs DL 3 := 3W total DI - 750 lbs l Allowable exceem emand, OK. f Check horirontal strut member: DL 3 30 M= M = 5625 lb

  • in 4

E o = 36293 psi < l.7 x 25,000 psi (Reference 5 & 6) = o := S 42,500 psi Allowable exceeds demand, OK. REVW 4.MCD (5)

ECE ENGINEERING SKfET NO. TJ Calvert Cliffs A-46 gy pd DATE /d'M*@ JOB NO. 42III JOB Cable Tray Evaluation CHK'D DATE II-4-14 CALC. NO. 006 SUBJECT i Check 1/2" anchor bolts: Interaction equation: DL 3 i = 0.36 < l.0, OK F t CONCLUSION: Support is adequate for 3.0 x Dead Load l 1 Per Figure 8-6 of the GIP, the next check is a ductile response check. l GIP Section 8.3.3: Ductile Resnonse Check Per Figure 8-7 of the GIP, raceway supports that l are constructed of standard catalog light metal strut framing members and clip angles, both gusseted and not, are judged to respond to loading in a ductile manner. Per Figure 8 6 of the GIP, the next check is a question if the support is a fixed-end rod hanger. It is not. CONCLUSION: This support passes the Limited Analytical Review guidelines of the GIP and is found to be representative of typical raceway supports in the seismic experience database. l l \\ \\ REVW 4.MCD (6)

EQE ENGINEERING SHEET NO. Tl II VN7 __161 BY DATE '7 [/ JOB ~~ JOB NO. CALC, NO. AO/d SUBJECTMLF 7% b/YI U47'o-J CHK'D DATE //Y"I'

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EQE ENGINEERING SHEET NO. U Calvert Cliffs A-46 gy %k DATE /#'78Y-JOB NO. 42111 jog CALC. NO. 006 SUBJECT Cable Tray Evaluation CHK'D hb DATE //-V-W ANALYTICAL REVIEW No. 5 (from North end of Hallway 426) Per Reference 2, the Kindorf Strut nuts have the following allowable pullout and slip along loads:

=

1300 lbs 400 lbs pullout slip = Cable Tray Spans: note both directions 6 ft 6 ft Span _2 Span _1

=
=

1 Span.= ( Span _1 + Span _2 ) 5 Span =6 ft Cable Trav Size: Note: Per Section 8.3.9 of the GIP, cable tray weight may be estimated as 25 psf for a 4" deep tray. Width = 2 ft Depth.= 3 inches 4 inches Depth standard =

  1. E Ratio = 0.75 Ratio

= Depth standard Cable Tray Percentage Fill: 100 10 %_ fill _3 := 25 %_ fill _4 10 %_ fill _2 %_ fill _1 = = = 100 75 %_ fill _7 := 50 %_ fill _8 %_ fill _5 = 100 %_ fill _6 = = nryw 3 men (.) I

EQE ENGINEERING SHEET NO. 35 Calvert Clifts A-46 BY M DATE ]0-M ff JOB NO. 42111 g3 CALC. NO. 006 SUBJECT Cable Tray Evaluation CHK'D DATE II W "I 4 Cable Tray Weights: W i := 25 Span -( %_ fill _1 0.01 ) Ratio Width W i = 23 lbs per tray W 2 := 25 Span -( %_ fill _2 0.01 ) Ratio Width W 2 = 23 lbs per tray W 3= 25 Span -( %_ fill _3 0.01 ) Ratio Width W 3 = 56 lbs per tray W 4 25 Span -( %,_ fill _4 0.01 ) Ratio Width W 4 = 225 lbs per tray

=

\\V 5= 25 Span -( %_ fill _5 0.01 ) Ratio Width W 5 = 225 lbs per tray \\v 6 := 25 Span -( %_ fill _6 0.01 ) Ratio Width W 6 = 169 los per tray \\V 7 := 25 Span -( %_ fill _7 0.01 ) Ratio Width W 7 = 113 lbs per tray \\V 8 := 25 Span -( %_ fill _8 0.01 ) Ratio Width W 8 = 225 lbs per tray + W 5 + \\V 6+W 7+W 8 W 1 +W 2+ W 3+ W 4 W total = TV total = 1058 lbs j l 1 ksvwa Mco p)

) M l EQE ENGINEERING SHEET NO. % 42111 Calvert Cliffs A-46 gy rgt;A DATE /O-Z6 h JOB NO. gog CALC. NO. 006 SUBJECT Cable Tray Evaluation CHKD @ DATE //-OT Y Following the guidelines of Section 8 of the GIP, all supports selected for limited analytical review should first pass a 1.0 x Dead Load check accounting for all eccentricities: GIP Section 8.3.1: 1.0 x Dead Load: The horizontal strut members are bolted to the vertical strut members by a B-917 bracket, Reference 4. This is a 90 degree clip angle bracket. It is secured to the vertical strut member by two bolts and to the horizontal strut member by two bolts. The tray deadweight will be divided by 4 bolts. W 8 Slip _ load = Slip _ load = 56 lbs 4 Allow. slip along load = slip = 400 lbs Allowable exceeds demand, OK. Check the connection between the vertical strut members and the horizontal strut member along the ceiling: The vertical strut members are bolted to the horizontal strut by a B-919 bracket, Reference 4. This is a 90 degree gusseted clip angle bracket. It is secured to the vertical strut members by two bolts and to the horizontal strut member by two bolts. The slip along loading of the tray deadweights is resisted by (8) bolts. Allow. slip along load = 8 slip = 3200 lbs W total = 1058lbs Allowable exceeds demand, OK. The pullout loading of the tray deadweights is resisted by (4) bolts. Allow, pullout load = 4 pullout = 5200lbs \\V total = 1058lbs Allowable exceeds demand, OK. .av. 3mco m

ECE ENGINEERING SHEET NO. 35 Calvert Cliffs A-46 hk DATE /O JOB NO. 42III JOB By CALC. NO. 006 SUBJECT Cable Tray Evaluation CHK'D DATE M4-9 Y Check the (3) 1/2" anchor bolts: Determine anchor bolt allowable loads: Use methodology of Appendix C of the GIP. From Table C.2-1 of the GIP find the following anchor bolt allowable loads. 2380 lbs 2290 lbs F

=

F = t y Reduction Factors: 0.6 Reduction factor for unknown 0.6 RT RT = = p s anchor bolt type. (C.2.2) Reduction factor for assumed 3000 3000 10000 + 0.65 concrete strength = 3000 psi. RF RF = p s (C.2.7) RF p = 0.75 RF s = 0.95 Revised Allowable Loads: F y RT 3 RF s F RT RF F F

=

= t t p p y 1357 lbs F t= 1031 lbs F = y Check interaction eqmitioin 'W total' 3 = 0.34 < l.0, OK F t CONCLUSION: Support is adequate for 1.0 x Dead Load an'w.s Mco (4) .. ~ -.

ECE ENGINEERING SHEET NO. 2/n Calvert Cliffs A-46 TEbk DATE D2SN JOB NO. 42111 gg By CALC. NO. 006 SUBJECT Cable Tray Evaluation CHKD DATE //-4 *N Per Figure 8-6 of the GIP, the next check is a vertical capacity check. GIP Section 8.3.2: Vertical Canacity Check This check concentrates on the support anchorage, focusing on the weak link in the support anchorage load path. The Vertical Capacity Check is an equivalent static load check, in which the support is subjected to 3.0 times Dead Load in the downward direction. This check is limited to the primary raceway support connections and the anchorage of suspended support systems. DL 3 ': 3W total DL 3 = 3173 lbs Check gusseted clip angle brackets and bolts: The slip along loading of the tray deadweights is resisted by (8) bolts. Allow. slip along load = 8 slip = 3200 lbs DL 3 = 3173 lbs Allowable exceeds demand, OK. The pullout loading of the tray deadweights is resisted by (4) bolts. Allow, pullout load = 4 pullout = 5200 lbs DL 3 = 3173 lbs 3 Allowable exceeds demand, OK. Check 1/2" anchor bolts: Check interaction equation: DL 3 > 1.0, 3% overstress is judged to be 3 h = 1.03 acceptable due to conservatism in 3 determining anchor bolt allowable load (i.e. I capacity reduction factor = 0.6). f CONCLUSION: Support is adequate for 3.0 x Dead Load .uvw 3mmm i 1

MDE ECE ENGINEEf4NG SHEET NO. 3 p)Dhf DATE /04 M Calvert Clifts A-46 gy JOB NO. 42111 og CALC. NO. 006 SUBJECT Cable Tray Evaluation CHK'O DATE /I44 V Per Figure 8-6 of the GIP, the next check is a ductile response check. GIP Section 8.3.3: Ductile Response Check Per Figure 8-8 of the GIP, braced raceway supports must be considered to possibly not respond in a ductile manner and must be subject to a Lateral Load check. The Lateral Load check is in the form of an equivalent static load coefficient. Per Section 8.3.4 of the GlP, the lateral load check can consist of a dead load combined with, for elevations lower than about 40' above plant effective grade, a transverse acceleration of 2.5 times the floor ZPA. The floor ZPA can be defined as 1.5 (to account for building amplification) times 1.25 (to adjust for median-centered response) times the ground ZPA. As plant effective grade has been defined as 45' in Reference 3, and the elevation of all trays addressed by this calculation is less than 69', the above derivation of a floor ZPA is acceptable. The free-field ZPA is defined as 0.15g in Reference 3. free _ field 0.15 g ZPA = accel _horiz := ZPA free _ field 2.5 1.5 1.25 accel _horiz = 0.7 g Assume that the dead weight of the trays is taken by the vertical strut members and that the brace will take the horizontal load. P h := W total accel _horiz P h = 744 lbs 102 h

  • 66 Pullout _ load = 1149 lbs pullout _ load P

= Sli _ load = 744 lbs slip _ load P h P

=

i l REVW &MCD(6) F m ui

EQE ENGINEERING SHEET NO. N 7)ryk DATE NN Calvert Cliffs A-46 gy JOB NO. 42III DB CALC. NO. 006 SUBJECT Cable Tray Evaluation CHK'O DATE NW-W The bottom of the brace is welded to the vertical strut. The weld is judged to be adequate due to the relative:y small load. The top of the brace is welded to a base plate on the ceiling. The weld here is also judged to be adequate due the relatively small load. Check 1/2" anchor bolts for the brace: 1357 lbs F t= 1031 lbs F = y Check Interaction: pullout _ load sli}Qoad 0.42 < 1.0, OK = 4F 4F t y When the load reverses, the brace goes into compression and the pullout load is then resisted by the two vertical members. Check their connections and anchorage for the deadicad plus the additional pullout load due to lateral loading. Checjc the connection between the vertical strut members and the horizontal strut member along the ceiling: The slip along loading of the tray deadweights is resisted by (8) bolts. Allow, slip along load = 8 slip = 3200 lbs \\V total + Pullout _ load = 22071bs Allowable exceeds demand, OK. htvw.s Mco (7) i

ECE ENGINEERING N SHEET NO. Calvert Cliffs A-46 gh DATE !&EN JOB NO, 42111 gg gy C A(Jt,6 7847 hMLvMwd CHK'D DATE //4"IY CALC. NO. 006 SUBJECT The pullout loading of the tray deadweights is resisted by (4) bolts. Allow. pullout load = 4 pullout = 5200lbs r W total + pullout _ load = 22071bs Allowable exceeds demand, OK. Check the (3) 1/2" anchor bolts interaction eauation: TV total + Pullout _ load = 0.71 < 1.0, OK F t Allowables exceeds dernand, OK. CONCLUSION: Support is adequate for Lateral Load Per Figure 8-6 of the GIP, the next check is a question if the support is a fixed-end rod hanger. It is not. CONCLUSIONI This support passes the Limited Analytical review guidelines of the GIP and is found to be representative of typical raceway supports in the seismic experience database, nryw 3uco(s)

44" Jo 12" uf o s, ,, -.n,n 1 m.:,,.,, e.n,,,,,, /,,-- g, - >[ af g, / ", H (Ty/.) /4r'4 j 'I.,, s LS 8100 1 /05 I a4/doto c a 10 st" 1 25to I EAIAnoS~ a ff 1 507* f 24/AE fl jg, i 10 7o (5Alet$0 y - 1 ?,, I4' ~ Jp4d5 - S o ** L - 40. Paars ML f,TR.8Ys XIMedits - Tir4ys 4 f zet"r.s* ELEVAT10N OCLLCr/04 No. 6 {/tJ0 M 4 L 1) {

E* ~^' EQE INTERNATIONAL SHEET NO. d.I JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 BY 7-DA __ _DATE T-g15" CALC. NO. C-006 SUBJECT Cable Trav Evaluation CHK'D hh DATE I-/8"fI ANALYTICAL REVIEW No. 6 (from Room 429) Per Reference 2, the Kindorf Strut nuts have the following allowable pullout and slip along loads: slip.= 400 lb pullout := 1300 lb kip = 1000 lb Cable Trav Soans: note both directions Span _1 a 5 ft Span _2 := 5 ft Span,= (Span _1 + Span _2) 1 Span = 5 ft ksle b psf a b 2 2 2 in ft Cable Trav Size: Note: Per Section 8.3.9 of the GIP, cable tray weight may be estimatcd as 25 psf for a 4" deep tray. Width 4 2 ft Depth.= 3 in Depthstandard.= 4 in

  • E Ratio a Ratio = 0.75 Depthstandard Cable Trav Percentaae Fill:

%_ fill _1.= 10 %_ fill _2.= 25 %_ fill _3.= 50 %_ fill _4 a 10 Cable Trav Weichts: Per Trav: W j :s 25 psf Span-(%_ fill _10.01) Ratio Width W g = 19 lb W24 25 psf Span-(%_ fill _2 0.01) Ratio Width W2 = 47 lb W 3 = 25 psf Span (%_ fill _3 0.01) Ratio Width W 3 = 94 lb W4 := 25 psf Span-(%_ fill _4 0.01) Ratio Width W4 = 19 lb Wtotal a W j + W2+W3+W4 Wtotal = 178 lb REVW 6.MCD (Page 1)

EQE EQE INTERNATIONAL SHEET NO.IL ^" JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 -BY 7224-DATE 9/6*%" CALC.NO. C-006 SUBJECT Cable Trav Evaluation CHK'D Nh DATE [~M"f[ - Following the guidelines of Section 8 of the GIP, all supports selected for limited analytical review should fust pass a 1.0 x Deed Load check accounting for all eccentricities: GIP Section 8.3.1: 1.0 x Dead Load: The horizontal cable trays are bolted to the vertical strut members by a bracket simi!ar to bracket type P1773 of Reference 4. This is a 90 degree gusseted cable tray support bracket. It is secured to the vertical strut members by two bolts. The deadweight of the cable tray is resisted by pullout of the top bracket bolt and slip along of both bracket bolts. Pullout load on the top bracket P top : Distance from centerline tray to el vert strut = dist. cl Distance between points resisting moment (bolts) = dist. points distci := 14 in distpoints = 4.5 in - max ((W j W2 W3 W4 )).dist c Ptop = 292 lb Ptop - dist points Pullout _ allow := pullout Pullout _ allow = 1300 lb Allowable exceeds demand, OK. max ((W j W2 W 3 W4)) Slip _ load = Slip _ load = 47 lb 2 Allow. slip along load = slip = 400 lb Allowable exceeds demand, OK. REVW 6.MCD (Page 2)

EGE EQE INTERNATIONAL ,_pg v: = c:. SHEET NO.! J .L JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Clifs A-46 BY T2D A DATE 5-/g ff~ CALC. NO. C-006 SUBJECT Cable Trav Evaluation CHK'D DATE l~-/l*f[ Check All Mejn mii; The vertical strut member is bolted to the horizontal strut by (2) B-919 brackets, Reference

5. These are 90 degree gusseted clip angle brackets. They are secured to the vertical strut members by two bolts and to the horizontal strut member by two bolts per fitting.

42* b -l Wtotal-(42 + 17) in "' } t"* 42.in R2 = 250 lb [ 66" to. ^ Wto'.al 17 in 86* R1 2 R1 = 72 lb ___, gg 2 1 W3 ,12

  • 1W4 17' Compression in the brace:

Comp 4 R1-Comp = 83 Ib 75 in Bending moment in vertical member is a maximum at the point where the brace is connected: 3 + W ) 17 in M = 2709 lb in M > (W2+W 4 - Check Vertical MembE Conservatively use the properties for a B-900-2A 3 S b9002a > 0.436 in o, a = 6.21 ksi < 25 ksi allowable S b9002a s Allowable exceeds demand, OK. The slio alona loadina of the trav deadweiahts is resisted by (4) botts. Allow, slip along load = 4 slip = 1600 lb R2 = 250 lb Allowable exceeds demand, OK. REVW 6.MCD (Page 3)

M ..,_. EQE INTERNATIONAL i1 SHEET NO.& .m..' JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 BY Mh DATE 5'/8 fj-I"N W CALC. NO. C-006 SUBJECT Cable Tray Evaluation CHK'D DATE The pullout loadina of the trav deadweiohts is resisted by (2) bolts. Allow, pullout load = 2 pullout = 2600 Ib R2 = 250 lb Allowable exceeds demand, OK. Check the horizontal strut member alona the ceilina: Per the walkdown and comparison with Reference 5, the member is a B-900-2A channel. From Reference 5 find the following section properties: 3 S b9002a = 0.436 in psi e in M = R2 30 in 42 in M = 365 Ib ft 72 in a = 10043 psi < 25,000 psi allowable, OK o= S b9002a - Check brace: Assume the brace is Kindorf strut B-900M,1-1/2" x 1-1/2" x 14 gage. From the Kindorf strut manual find the following section properties: 2 d 3 rx = 0.520 in A := 0.329 in 1 x := 0.089 in Sx := 0.102 in d 3 y = 0.612 in 1 y := 0.123 in Sy = 0.167 in r b = 1.5 in t 0.0747 in F yield := 33 ksi (Note this is the Unistrut yield, assume same material for Kindorf) y)) 165 1 = 86 in k := 1.0 = min ((r f x E '= 30000 ksi REVW 6.MCD (Page 4)

EGE EQE INTERNATIONAL .yU SHEET NO. d_5 z.."" JOB NO 42111 ' JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 .BY I2DA-DATE (-8 # ' 5 CALC. NO. C-006 SUBJECT Cable Trav Evaluation CHK'D @d DATE 8"/8 "I Therefore the section is not-classified as b 76 = 20 = 13.23 non-compact and the allowable stress must t l be reduced in accordance with Section 4 p ield y B5.2.a. pg. 5-98, of Ref. 4. = 27 Therefore determine the reduction factor, Q,, jF yield using equation A-BS-1 Q,.= 1.34 - 0.00447 -]Fyield s O = 0.82 F b = 16.3 ksi Fyield := 33 ksi F b := 0.6-Q gF yleid - Allowable Axial Compressive Stress: y)) 165 C e = 134 C c= = y eld min ((r p r x Per Section E2 of the AISC 9th edition, when k!/r exceeds Cc, the a!!owable compressive stress is determined as follows: 2 12 x E a" 2 F a = 5.65 ksi ki 23-r )), min ((rx y - ActualCompressive Stress:

0.251 ksi f,.

a A Allowable exceeds demand, OK. REVW 6.MCD (Page 5)

E4E EQE INTERNATIONAL y SIIEETNO.f E JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 BY TED4 'DATE F sys-CALC. NO..C.-99ft SUBJECT Cable Trav Evaluation CliK'D DATE f*8 I - Check Brace Bolts: The brace has only one bolt at each end of it. slip = 400 lb Slip _Along = Comp Slip _Along = 83 lb Allowable exceeds demand, OK. Check the connection to the embedded strut: There are (2) bolts into the embedded strut. Per reference 5, and based on field observations, the embedded strut is most likely type D-990. Per page 29 of Reference 5 this type of embedded strut has an allowable load of 1,200 pounds per foot of length with a factor of safety = 5. Conservative load _ pullout := R2 load _ pullout = 250 Ib Allowable pullout = 1,200 lbs. Allowable exceeds demand, OK. CONCLUSION: Support is adequate for 1.0 x Dead Load Per Figure 8-6 of the GIP, the next check is a vertical capacity check. GIP Section 8.3.2: Vertical CaDacity Check This check concentrates on the support anchorage, focusing on the weak link in the support anchorage load path. The Vertical Capacity Check is an equivalent static load check, in which the support is subjected to 3.0 times Dead Load in the downward direction. This check is limited to the primary raceway support connections and the anchorage of suspended support systems. DL3 = 534 Ib DL3 := 3 Wtotal REVW.,6.MCD (Page 6)

M EQEINTERNATIONAL {::4? SHEET NO.$ JOB NO. _2111_ JOB Calvgrt Cliffs A-46 BY M 4 DATES ~-5 /S" 4 CALC. NO. C-006 SUBJECT Cable Tray Evaluation CHK'D hh DATE I-M-f[ 91gsk ausseted clip anale brackets and bolts: The slip along loading of the tray deadweights is resisted by (4) bolts. Allow. slip along load = 4 slip = 1600 lb DL3 = 534 lb Allowable exceeds demand, OK. The pullout loading of the tray deadweights is resisted by (2) bolts. Allow, pullout load = 2 pullout = 2600 lb DL3 = 534 lb Allowable exceeds demand, OK. Check the horizontal strut member alona the ceilina: Per the walkdown and comparison with Reference 5, the member is a B-900-2A channel. From Reference 5 find the following section properties: 3 Sb9002a = 0.436 in psi a in DL 30 in 42 in 3 M ~= M = 779 lb ft 72 in o := a = 21449 psi < 25,000 psi allowable, OK S b9002a Check the connection to the embedded strut: DL3 load _. pullout = load _. pullout = 267 lb A!!owable pullout = 1,200 lbs. Allowable exceeds demand, OK. CONCLUSION: Support is adequate for 3.0 x Dead Load REVW 6.MCD (Page 7)

) ?_ EQEINTERNATIONAL r;e SIIEET NO.df JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 BY M DATEY/8 f7 CALC. NO. C-006 SUBJECT Cable Trav Evaluation .CHK'D M/ DATE f-#'I Per Figure 8-6 of the GIP, the next check is a ductile response check. GlP Section 8.3.3: Ductile Response Check Per Figure 8-8 of the GIP, braced raceway supports must be considered to possibly not respond in a ductile manner and must be subject to a Lateral Load test. The Lateral Load check is in the form of an equivalent static load coefficient. Per Section 8.3.4 of the GIP, the lateral load check can consist of a dead load combined with, for elevations lower than about 40' above plant effective grade, a transverse acceleration of 2.5 times the floor ZPA. The floor ZPA can be defined as 1.5 (to account for building amplification) times 1.25 (to adjust for median-centered response) times the ground ZPA. As plant effective grade has been defined as 45'in Reference 3, and the elevation of all trays addressed by this calculation is less than 69', the above derivation of a floor ZPA is acceptable. The free-field ZPA is defined as - 0.15g in Reference 3. ZPAfree_ field := 0.15 g acc h := ZPAfree_ field 2.51,51.25 acc h = 0.7 g - Determine CG of Trav Lateralload; 42-42" }.

l l_

.I R1 R2 h i R1 { fR2 ,/ a 7 as-N 7 s-4 as-j4-cc 1; 42-88" 1 1 W4 / 17" P lat CG = (W j 65 in) + (W 113 in) + (W 137 in) + (W 149 in) 2 3 4 CG = 124 in Wtotal P lat = 125 lb P lat := acc h Wtotal REVW 6.MCD (Page B)

M EQE INTERNATIONAL i -1!n y SHEET NO. d,__ BY M DATE 5 <4 #s-JOB NO..,4_2111_. JOB Calvert Cliffs A-46 CHK'D W DATE [- M-i.f~ CALC, NO. C 006 SUBJECT Cable Trav Evaluation - Determine Reactions: Plat CG R2 = R2 + R2 = 621 lb 42 in Plat.CG R1 := R1 + R1 = 443 lb 42 in Comp := RI. Comp = 508 lb 75in - Check Vertical Member: Bending moment in vertical member is a maximum at the point where the brace is connected: 3 + W ) 17 in + P lat-(CG - 75 in) M = 8892 lb in M.=(W2+W 4 Conservatively use the properties for a B-900-2A 3 S b9002a = 0.436 *in a := a = 20.4 ksi < 25 ksi allowable S b9002a Allowable exceeds demand, OK. - Check Brace: Comp ;= R1-Comp = 508 lb Comp fa* Ia = 1.54 ksi < allowable F a = 5.65 ksi Allowable exceeds demand, OK. REVW 6.MCD (Page 9)

EQEINTERNATIONAL SHEET NO.5D JOB NO. 42111 JOB Calvert Clifts A-46 BY 2hk DATE G/4.($' CALC. NO. C-006 SUBJECT Cable Trav Evaluation CHK'D DATE 08-7 - Check Brace Bolts: The brace has only one bolt at each end ofit. Slip _Along.= Comp Slip _.Along = 508 Ib slip = 400 lb ANCO test report, Reference 2, Table 2.2 gives an average realistic connection load on a single clip angle, ungussetted connection using non-serrated nuts of 1,688 lbs. This allowable load ls derived by dividing the average ultimate test capacity by a factor of safety of 2. This was determined to be the correct factor of safety to use for realistic capacity determinations (i.e. lateralload and 3 times dead load checks). Therefore the realistic allowable capacity exceeds the slip along load created by the lateralload. QAq.gk the horizontal strut member alona the ceilina: Per the walkdown and comparison with Reference 5, the member is a B-900-2A channel. From Reference 5 find the following section properties: 3 S b9002a = 0.436 in psi in y, R2 30 in 42 in M = 906 lb ft 72 in a = 25 ksi <= 25,000 psi allowable, OK a := S b9002a Check the connection to the embedded strut: There are (2) bolts into the embedded strut. Per reference 5, and based on field observations, the embedded strut is most likely type D-990. Per page 29 of Reference 5 this type of embedded strut has an allowable load of 1,200 pounds per foot of length with a f actor of safety = 5. Conservative load _ pullout z R2 load _pulout = 621 Ib Allowable pullout = 1,200 lbs. Allowable exceeds demand, OK. CONCLUSION: Support is adequate for Lateral Load REVW 6.MCD (Page 10)

EQE INTERNATIONAL !+7 SHEET NO.[ JOB NO. 42111 JOB' Calvert Cliffs A-46 _BY M k_DATE @ g ff-CALC. NO. C-006 SUBJECT ' Cable Trav Evaluation CHK'D _ DATE ["/I-fI Per Figure 8-6 of the GlP, the next check is a question if the support is a fixed-emi rod hanger. It is not. CONCLUSION: This support passes the Limited Analytical review guidelines of the GlP. REVW 6.MCD(Page11) )

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NTTACHMENT (1) - ENCLOSURE (F) BGE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TEN IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRA Baltimore Gas and Electric Company March 23,1998

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