ML20216H306

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Rev 5 to TVA Employee Concerns Special Program Element Rept 80203-SQN, Insp Performance
ML20216H306
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 06/15/1987
From: Halverson R
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20216H211 List:
References
80203-SQN, 80203-SQN-R05, 80203-SQN-R5, NUDOCS 8707010372
Download: ML20216H306 (48)
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{{#Wiki_filter:*d '., ? TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: SPECIAL PROGRAM 80203-SQN [ REPORT TYPE REVISION NUMBER: Element Report 5 PAGE 1 0F 13 TITLE: Inspection Performance REASON FOR REVISION: Revised to incorporate NRC comments. Revision indicators are show in the right margin of each affected Page. Note Sequoyah Applicability Only PREPARATION PREPARED BY: R. D. Halverson SIGNATURE DATE REVIEWS PEER: MWO 4-7 7 i DATE / / f j JORATURE .TAS: Ktb C/M'f81 $h f/jgh7 SIGNATURE /DATEI CONCURRENCES CEG-B:,h ,, f/[y/Ry p:bfuhf /s /$-f7 SRP :' SIGNATURE DATE g@IGNATURE*[ ~ DATE ~ APPROVED 7: i h

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N/A A MANAGER OF NUCLEAR DATE M'NAGlR' ( ATf *' " 'EC3P POWER \\ I CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)

  • SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.

8707010372 B70615 ADOCK0500g7 DR 1

Q 4 TVA EMPLOYER. CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: SPECIAL PROGRAM 80203-SQN REPORT TYPE: REVISION NUMBER: Element Report 5 TITLE: PAGE 2 0F 13 Inspection Performance 1.0 CHARACTERIZATION OF ISSUES 1.1 Introduction The issues described below were derived from Employee Concerns generated as a result of the Watts Bar Employee Concern Special Program. The issues were specific to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. 1.2 Description of Issues The conditions reported (Attachment A) by concerned employees are: a. Inspection personnel were distracted by craf t perconnel and did not observe damaged cable insulation. (00-85-005-003) b. Craft and inspection personnel f alsified anchor pull tests and applicable documents. (XX-85-023-X02) c. Conax connectors in the containment did not always meet vendor wire bend radius instructions, connector installations with deficiencies were inspected and accepted by Sequoyah Quality Control (SQN QC); no action was taken by SQN QC management to investigate or document the deficiencies. (I-86-101-SQN) d. An item of equipment may not have been adequately inspected. (SQM-6-009-001) 2.0

SUMMARY

2.1 Summary of Characterization of Issues The issues raised by the employee concerns suggest that: inspection personnel were distracted by craft personnel and did not perform their r required functions; test results and documents were falsified; inspection personnel did not perform an adequate inspection of an item; and QC Manugement failed to investigate or document identified deficienc ie s. 2.2 Summary of Evaluation Process The evaluation process consisted of a review of the Employee Concern files, Quality Technology Company (QTC) filcs, and Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) files to determine the scope and extent of the concerns 10

  • fied.

The Nuclear Quality As suranc e Manual, lower tier procedures and instructions, General Construction Specifications, Work Requests and other related correspondence and documents were reviewed to determine the programmatic requirements and management directives related to the

TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: SPECIAL PROGRAM 80203-SQN REPORT TYPE: REVISION NUMBER: Element Report 5 TITLE: PAGE 3 0F 13 Inspection Performance i l

issue, j

Discussions were held with Quality

Control, Construction, and j

Modification personnel to obtain more specific information regarding the issues. The documdnts reviewed during the investigations and used in the evaluation are listed on Attachment D. 2.3 Summary of Findings 2.3.1 Issue -- Inspection personnel were distracted by craf t l personnel and did not observe damaged cable insulation. The concern from which this issue was extracted provided-reference to a similar concern (00-85-005-014) which noted specific cable / conduit runs and identified the period in which the incident occurred as 1977. The records that were applicable to the specific cable pulling operation were reviewed. It was determined that only one 5 ceble received and passed a High Potential (Hi-Pot) test. The cables have since been de-energized and the electrical circuit for the back flow gate hoist motors have been converted from automatic control to manual control. 1 2.3.2 Issue -- Craft and inspection' personnel falsified anchor pull tests and related documentation. The investigation identified an Employee Response Team (ERT) Report dealing with the same issue. The investigation also produced a copy of a memorandum from the Office of the General-Counsel which agreed with the ERT findings and took no further ~ action on the falsification issue raised. Based on the ERT Report, the interviews conducted, and the Quality Assurance Category Evaluation Group (QACEG) evaluation of the results, the QACEG could find no cases where anchor pull tests were j falsified. " Investigation and evaluation of anchor pull testing concerns is covered in the Construction CEG Subcategory Report 11300, Revision 0, titled ' Anchorages'". i 2.3.3 Issues -- Conax connectors in the containment did not always meet vendor wire bend radius instructions; connector installations with deficiencies were inspected and accepted by SQN-QC; no action was taken by SQN QC management to investigate or document the deficiencies. The NSRS investigated these issues and issued report No. I l 1

l ?' a TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: REPORT TYPE: SPECIAL PROGRAM 80203-SQN REVISION NUMBER: Element Report 5 TITLE: PAGE 4 0F 13 Inspection Performance 101-SQN dated February 1986 (Attachment B). A Corrective Action Report dated February 1986 was also issued. Two valves found to have connectors where wire bend radii were below were minimum requirements and workplans were found to have been written where work was performed and inspected; however, the plans did not refer to the vendor manual for installation of the connectors. Lack of QC management action could not be verified since the QACEG could find no evidence to determine if the concerned individual brought this issue to QC Management prior to the NSRS investigation. meeting the wire bend radius 5 The issue of the connectors not instructions and connectors being installed and accepted with deficiencies is valid. 2.3.4 Issue -- A item of equipment may not have been adequately inspected. QACEG was provided with a sanitized Employee Response Team (ERT) report, which identified the welds on Heat Exchangers A, B, and C for the Component Cooling Water System as the welds in question. This report deals with two subjects, linear indications and the support saddles. The maintenance records of the Heat Exchangers were reviewed and it was determined that linear indications were found, and repaired to satisfy magnetic particle examinations. With respect to the support saddles, it was revealed that a Condition Adverse to Quality Report (CAQR) was written which identified problems with the pad support weldments. 2.4 Corrective Actions Taken and the Results Achieved to Date It could not be determined if cable insulation was improperly repaired. However, QACEG investigation has determined, through the issuance of Corrective Action Tracking Documents and Responses from the SQN Site Director, that the subject cables have experienced worst case conditions and been in service since 1977.- Engineering concluded if there was insulation damage, it was not sufficient to impair the fuention of the cable and no further action is needed. Conax connectors were installed outside the Vendor Manual allowable limits. A Corrective Action Report was issued calling for a QA Program revision, reinspections and rework. This was completed in August 1986 and no further actions are required. The shop fabricated welds on the saddle supports for the component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers A, B, and C need to be inspected and evaluated. A CAQR No. SQP 870565 was issued April 8, 1987. This is

i r 3 ~. TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: REPORT. TYPE: SPECIAL PROGRAM 80203-SQN REVISION NUMBER: Element Report 5 TITLE - PAGE 5 0F 13 Inspection Performance considered a tracking document. 3.0 EVALUATORS' D. G. Barlow E.-H. Diem R. D. Halverson W. F Hathaway. 4.0 EVALUATION PROCESS 4.1 General Methods of Evaluation Research of the files produced additional information to support the investigation by way of NSRS Reports and an additional concern. Construction specifications, Vendor

Manuals, procedures and 5

instructions were reviewed to extract the requirements and determine adequacy of the details provided. Microfilm records provided details of inspections and tests performed and personnel discussions were held to support the records reviewed. Corrective action records and supporting data were also reviewed to provide details on the deficiencies noted and the corrective actions taken. I 4.2 Specifics of Evaluation 4.2.1 Issue -- Inspection personnel were distracted by craft personnel and did not' observe damaged cable instruction. In researching the files for additional' information regarding craft distracting inspection personnel and cable insulation damage, QACEG personnel reviewed a' related concern (00-85-005-014) which identified the specific cable / conduit runs ^^ -~ involved. Four cables were identified. That concern also identified the period of time as mid-1977. Microfilm records relating to the above identified cable / conduit runs were reviewed (cable pulling

cards, cable / conduit inspection
cards, and Hi-pot records) to determine if inspections were performed and tests completed.

j i An interview was held with an individual involved in the i inspection of three (3) of the above noted cable pulls. The l-interview centered around how an inspector may become distracted and how an inspector can cover the inspections

f TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: REPORT TYPE: SPECIAL PROGRAM 80203-SQN j REVISION NUMBER: Element Report 5 TITLE: PAGE 6 0F 13 Inspection Performance 1 given the various areas cable is pulled through. General Construction Specification G-38, Revision 1, dated October 22, 1975 " Installing Insulated Cable Up to 15,000 Volt 3 Inclusive", was reviewed to determine if instructions were j provided for repairing damaged cable and/or insulation. Likewise, Sequoyah Inspection Instructions Numbers SNP II-28, " Cable Pulling Inspection" Revision 0 (dated May 26, 1977), Revision 1 (dated June 11, 1977), Revision 2, (dated October 4, 1977); SNP 11-10, " Electrical Penetration and i Interconnecting Cable Termination and Insulation Inspection" Revision 6 (dated December 27, 1976), Revision 7 (dated May 26, 1977), Revision 8 (dated June 11, 1977), Revision 9 (dated December 21, 1977); SNP 11-26, " Exposed Conduit and Conduit Box Inspection", Revision 0 (dated May 26, 1977), Revision 1 (dated June 11, 1977), Revision 2 (dated September 13, 1977), Revision 3 (dated October 14, 1977), were reviewed to determine inspection requirements and adequacy of those methods and acceptance criteria to enable an inspector to perform the intended functions. A Construction Category Evaluation Group Element Report No. C010900-SQN dated Nov. 1986 was also reviewed for additional information pertaining to the subject issue. 4.2.2 Issue -- Craft and inspection personnel falsified anchor pull tests and related documentation. An Employee Response Team (ERT) Report (XX-85-023-X02, dated March, 1986) (Attachment C) was found to addrese the same issue. The QACEG investigation attempted to secure a listing of the hangers in the Unit 2 Annulus area since the employee concern identified this area specifically. A list of hangers by location does not exist, according to Engineering, and it was concluded that if records were located it would be extremely difficult to establish if the test results were falsified. Therefore, emphasis was placed on locating and ~ discussing the issue with personnel who were involved in anchor bolt installations / inspections in that period. A review was performed of General Construction Specification G-32, " Bolt Anchors Set In Hardened Concrete" Revision 4 (dated April 21, 1976) and Revision 5 (dated July 21, 1977) to determine the installation and test requirements. Inspection i Instruction SNP 11-93, " Testing of Expansion Anchors Set in Hardened Cencrete", Revision 0 (dated February 14, 1977), Revision 1 (dated March 15, 1977), Revision 2 (dated November 2, 1977) were also reviewed to determine testing requirements and the associated documentation.

TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: REPORT TYPE: SPECIAL PROGRAM 80203-SQN REVISION NUMBER: Element Report 5 TITLE: PAGE 7 CF 13 Inspection Performance 4.2.3 Issue -- Conax connectors in the containment did not always meet vendor wire bend radius instructions, connector installations with deficiencies were inspected and accepted by Sequoyah Quality Control (SQN QC); no action was taken by SQN QC management to investigate or document the deficiencies. NSRS Report I-86-101-SQN dated February 1986 war written on the above issues along with a Corrective Action Report CAR-86-02-005 also dated February 1986 describiss deficiencies on Conax connector bend radii, torquing sequences, and the 5 application of grafoil sealant. 1 In researching this

issue, the QACEG Evaluation Group interviewed the cognizant QC Electrical Supervisor.

A copy of Corrective Action Report SQ CAR-86-02-005 dated February 10, 5 1986 was furnished by this individual. ) The CAR and subsequent revision to Maintenance and Addition Instructions M&AI-19 (RI), " Installation of Conax Connectors" and conax vendor installation manual, IPS-725, Revision G, were reviewed to 5' "For electric conductor seal assemblies..." determine if adequate requirements for inspection of wire bend radii had been provided and if CAR-86-02-005 had been closed satisfactorily. 4.2.4 Issue -- An item of equipment may not have been adequately inspected. A review was conducted of TVA Specification 1339, contract 71C33-92691, " Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant units 1 and 2," to determine the inspection requirements. Industrial Process Engineers drawing F-6721-1 Revision D, Si Component Cooling Water Exchanger was reviewed for details. I Discussions were conducted with a QC Welding / Nondestructive Examination (NDE) inspector involved in the inspection of the Heat Exchangers, "A," "B," an,1 "C" to reconstruct the event. Microfilm records relating to the above were reviewed (Maintenance Requests and Magnetic Particle Examination Reports) to determine the adequacy of the inspection. A discussion was also held with a material engineer who provided CAQR SQP-870565 concerning the support welds on the heat exchangers. 5.0 FINDINGS

TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: REPORT TYPE: SPECIAL PROGRAM 80203-SQN REVISION NUMBER: Element Report 5 TITLE: PAGE 8 0F 13 Inspection Perftrmance 5.1 Findings on Issue - Inspection personnel were distracted by craft personnel. 5.1.1 Discussion i ' Concern No. 00-85-005-003 dealing with - the inspector being distracced and preventing him from noticing damage to cable insulation re f ere nced Concern No. 00-85-005-014 which identified four specific cable / conduit runs. That concern stated in part, " Insulation was mistakenly _ cut off of a 440 reattached with electrical volt cable and the insulation was tape." ,The concern went on to identify the cables as the-power feed to the Back Flow Gate Hoist Motors. There are four such motors and are part of the Essential Raw ' Cooling Water (ERCW) System. That same concern identified four cable / conduit runs as 1-PL-6370-B, 1-PL-6360-A, 2-PL-6370-B and 2-PL-6360-A and also identified the period.of time as mid-1977. Concern No. 00-85-005-014 is a reissue of Concern No. 00 005-001. The reason for reissue was a correction of one of the' cable numbers referenced in the concern. This concern was part of the Construction Element Report No. C010900-SQN and the particular issue is addressed under the heading " Insulation Damage". Inspection records show that two (2) inspectors were involved with the cable visual examinations of the identified cable / conduit runs in the period from June-September 1977. An interview.was held with an individual involved in the inspection of three (3) cable pulls (1-PL-6370-B, 1-PL-636 0-A, and 2-PL-6360-A). The interview centered around how an inspector may become distracted and how an inspector can cover the inspections given the various areas cable is pulled through. The individual involved with cable pull 2-PL-6370-B inspection could not be interviewed as he is no longer employed by TVA. The individual interviewed, who inspected three of the four cables in, question, stated that because of the various areas a cable may be pulled through the inspector could not always witness the entire operation. In his opinion, the point at issue could have happened. In reviewing the records it was noted that the four (4) cable / conduit runs referenced are non-5 CSSC and received acceptable installation inspection through the period June-September 1977. One

cable, I-PL-6360A, i

received and passed a Hi-Pot Test. It was also found that the cables have been de-energized and per ECN

L5720, the electrical circuit for the Back Flow Gates have been converted from automatic control to manual control.

l

) 3 1 I TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: SPECIAL PROGRAM 80203-SQN REPORT TYPE:. REVISION NUMBER: Element Report 5 TITLE: PAGE 9 0F 13 Inspection Performance In discussions with the Design Engineering personnel and a review of the drawings associated with the motors and cables, it was found that the design drawings 45N-751-1, -2, -5', and - 6 do not reflect that the cables have been de-energized and motors taken out.of service. 5.1.2 conclusion The issue of an inspector being ' deliberately distracted from noticing a cable insulation nonconformance and the' same inspector being distracted while the cable ' was improperly repaired and pulled into the conduit cannot be substantiated. Craft and inspection personnel falsified anchor 5.2 Finding on Issue pull tests and applicable documents. 5.2.1 Discussion. The SQN Inspection Supervisor provided the names of five (5) inspection personnel who-were involved in anchor bolt inspections in 1977. These personnel were interviewed to determine their knowledge of falsification of test records or other wrong doing involving records. They all said they had heard that falsification had happened at Watts Bar, but no one could recall an instance of falsification of test results having happened at SQN. The ERT report mentioned conducting interviews with 27 individuals involved in the installation and inspection of anchor bolts. They too denied knowlege of f alsification of test records. ~ The Office of General Counsel (OGC), in their memorandum to the Manager of Nuclear Power dated April 30,.1986, concluded that in its review of the QTC investigation into the issue of l craft and inspection personnel falsifying anchor pull tests and documentation there' was "...no collaborating / objective I evidence...found to allow substantiation." The Office of ~ General Counsel will take no further action on this issue. In a phone conversation with the Of fice of the Manager of Nuclear ~~' Power, ONP advised that it has accepted the decision of the Office of General Counsel regarding this issue. "The Construction CEG has performed an extensive investigation and evaluation of the anchorage issues and has reported on i their findings in Subcategory Report 11300 Revisio~n 0. 5.2.2 Conclusion Based on interviews, lack of data to support the issue, the s

3 n '~. TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 1 . REPORT TYPE: SPECIAL PROGRAM 80203-SQN~ L Element Report REVISION NUMBER: TITLE: 5 Inspection Performance-PACE 10 0F 13 1 ERT Report a n.d the OGC memorandum, it is concluded that the i issue of craf t and inspection personnel falsifying anchor pull ] tests and applicable documents is not substantiated. 5.3 Finding on Issues - Conax connectors in the containment did not always meet vendor wire bend radius instructions, connector installations with deficiencies were inspected and accepted by Sequoyah Quality i Control (SQN QC); no action was taken by SQN QC management to investigate or document the deficiencies. J 5.3.1 Discussion The issue dealing with Conax connectors and deficiencies noted was the subject of a NSRS Report of " Installation of l Conax Connectors", I-86-101-SQN dated February 1986 and a 1 Corrective Action Report (CAR) SQ CAR 86-02-005 dated i February 10, 1986. Two valves were verified to have wire bend radii below. minimum allowed. A sample was then taken from Units 1 and 2 and an additional 14 valves were found to have deficient wire bend radii. Workplans were written to install l the connectors, field installation was completed and inspections were performed. Work plans did not contain steps to verify wire bend radius nor did they reference the vendor manual for installation. (Reference Attachment G for general arrangements details for Conax Connector.) ~ Additionally, instructions included in M&AI-19, " Installation of Conax connectors," are not consistant with the requirements of the Conax vendor manual, IPS-725, Revision G, referred to in the EQ Binder. M&AI-19 has a different torquing sequence with a different final torque value and there are no details concerning the application of grafoil sealant. A QACEG review was made ' of the corrective actions associated 5 with CAR-86-02-005. M&AI-19 was revised (revision 1) to include installation criteria and inspection requirements for wire bend radii. M&AI-19 was also revised to incorporate a reference to the conax vendor manual to ensure proper torquing and the application of grafoil sealant. A 100% reinspection of all conax connectors was performed and l rework was accomplished as necessary. TVA QA verified proper corrective action was taken and CAR-86-02-005 was closed in August 1986. 5.3.: Conclusion n The issue of Conax connectors installed in containment that do not meet the vendor wire bend radius instructions was substautiated. However, this condition was documented in SQ CAR-86-02-005, reinspections have been performed, and i

I TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: l REPORT TYPE: SPECIAL PROGRAM 80203-SQN Element keport REVISION hUMBER: 5 TITLE: Inspection Performance PAGE 11 0F 13 corrective actions have been completed. I The issue of connectors being inspected and accepted by QC with deficiencies is factual since there were cases found where wire bend radii was inadequate. Work Plans for the installation of the connectors did not address bend radii when issued. General Construction Specificati.on G-38 did not address wire bend radii either. Inspections were conducted to the requirements of the approved workplans. It was the omission of minimum wire bend radius inspection criteria in the workplans which allowed the connector installation to be accepted by QC. The inclusion now, of vendor instructions for minimum bend radius in the M&AI-19 (R1) will preclude the omission of bend radii inspections in the future. The issue of no action being taken by SQN QC Management to j investigate and document the deficiencies prior to the NSRS investigation cannot be susbtantiated. No evidence exists to determine if anyone knew there were deficiencies prior to the investigation. 5.4 Finding on Issue - An item of equipment may not have been adequately inspected. Discussion 3 This issue was not evaluated in revision 4 of this element report as specific information was not available for a meaningful QACEG investigation. The NRC provided further expurgated information to QACEG regarding this issue. " Welds on heat exchangers A, B, and C for 5 the component cooling water system, located in the Auxillary Building, at elevation 714. Finding numerous linear indications and vendor welds on the support pads. QACEG investigation revealed previous corrective action had taken 5 place. Magnetic particle examination (MT) reports of the cooling water heat exchangers "A," "B," and "C" (serial numbers 6721, 6722, and 6723) provided objective evidence that welds with linear indications were ground and re-examined to satisfy the MT examination. In regard to the vendor fabricated shop welds on the heat exchanger support saddles, it was revealed that a CAQR No. SQP-870565 Revision 5 0, was issued April 8, 1987 by DNE-0ES. The CAQR states in part that porosity and overlap is evident on the welds and recommends inspection and evaluation. o Conclusion Based on the sanatized ERT report, it is assumed that the CI was 5 concerned about the numerous linear indications found and the

l TVA EMPLOYEE COMCERNS REPORT NUMBER: SPECIAL PROGRAM 80203-SQN l REPORT TYPE: REVISION NUMBER: Element Report 5 TITLE: PAGE 12 0F 13 ~ Inspection Performance condition 'of the shop fabricated saddle support welds. Based on this assumption and the QACEG investigation, this issue' is considered 5 factual.in which corrective action has been, and is being taken. 5.5 Corrective Action . Corrective Action Report CAR-86-02-005 was issued in February 1986 to document that Conax connectors were installed outside the alicwable i limits. Corrective actions included Environmental Qualification (EQ) review and concurrence with the Conax Vendor Manual and issuance of Rev. 1 to Maintenance and Addition Instruction M&AI-19 to included wire bend radii criteria. Reinspections and rework was performed on all Conax connec tors and verification by Quality Assurance (QA) was completed in August 1986. No further actions were required. The ECSP Corrective Action Tracking Document No. 80203-SQN-01 (Attachment E) which was issued on September 18, 1986 was issued for Engineering to evaluate the long term effect on the esbles being repaired with electrical tape. The SQN Site Director has since responded by saying that records indicate acceptable installation. The cables have been in service since 1977 and it is likely that they have experienced - the worst conditions including submergence during that time without any problems. Engineering concluded that if there was damage, it was not sufficient to impair the function of the cable and no further action is needed. . With the additional information made available to QACEG and further research where it was found that Engineering did not reflect the status of the cables as being de-energized on the design drawings, QACEG has prepared CATD 80203-SQN-02 (Attachment F) for SQN to evaluate the problem condition in. light of their response to CATD 80203-SQN-01. The SQN Site Director has responded by stating: " Design Drawings 45N751-1, -2, -5 and -6 do reflect the system ' status, however, the ~ electrical circuit for the back flow gates '~ had been converted from automatic control to manual control by the unit operator (ECN L5720) which he has authority to do. The l breakers for the back flow gate hoist motors are being tagged' with ' caution order' of the administrative operation." Memorandum (RIMS 553 870312 918) from the acting SQN plant manager to the project engineer, dated March 12, 1987, provides clarification as to the current status of the backflow gate motors. This memorandum states in part: "A review of the usage of these cables has shown that 5 they are normally deenergized (adminsitratively tagged-out power supply) and are operated only in the event inspec tion / maintenance is a

TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: REPORT TYPE: SPECIAL PROGRAM 80203-SQN Element Report REVISION NUMBER: TITLE: 5 Inspection Performance PAGE 13 0F 13 required on the discharge channel. This occurs at a frequency of less than once during re fue ling, and the time the cable is energized is a 30-minute duration. Based on these factors, we approximately recommend that this cable not be repulled, but that the plant maintain 5 administrative control similar to those in existence. This will save considerable time and money while providing adequate assurance of cable integrity over the life of the plant." QACEG investigation also reveals that in the case when the subject cables are energized during a refueling outage, it is not considered a safety related function. No further action is required. A CAQR No. SQP 870565, Revision 0, Attachment H wa s issued April 8, 1987 by DNE-0ES to require inspection and evaluation of vendor 5 fabricated shop welds on the Cooling Water Heat Exchangers' pad supports. Attachment A identified these issues as potentially safety related and safety significant.

However, corrective measures which include procedural revisions, rework, and reinspection have been completed, except for the inspection and evaluation of vendor velds on the C.

W. 5 Heat Exchangers. Further action is required on these welds. 6.0 ATTACEMENTS A. List of Employee Concern Information Subcategory: 80203 Inspection Performance B. NSRS Report I-86-101-SQN C. QTC Employee Response Team (ERT) Report No. XX-85-023-X02 D. Listing of documents and correspondence reviewed during the investigation of these issues. E. CATD No. 80203-SQN-01 and SQN Memorandum dated October 29, 1986 (RIMS S03 861022 808) F. CATD No. 80203-SQN-02 and SQN Memorandum dated January 24, 1987 (RIMS S03 870123 803) G. General Arrangement Detail for Electrical Conductor Seal Assembly - Conax. H. CAQR No. SQP870565, Revision 0, issued April 8, 1987 I

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f /5 of yt ' 9 . x..\\. ) P cl 3 TE!TNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF USRS I!TVESTICATION REPORT No. I-86-101-SQN 's INSTALLATION OF CONAI CONNECTORS SUBJECT DATES OF ItNESTIGATION: TEBRUAR2 10-13,'1986 kff* ) AT b$ t .11NESTIGATOR* DATE Jrac. U. T. EENRICH 5 .,j'ql.llf n.. ; %) 2 b /..' E.b. 'IEWED BY

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/g o h VI. i h ,a, A u ~. I. DACXCROUND l l A Nucicar Safety Review Staff'(NSRS) investigation was conducted to determine the validity of an expressed employee concern identified to the NSRS during the investigation of employee concern XX-85-087-001. The concern addressed by this report was not related to the concern under investigation at that time and was outlined in a memorandum from Sauer dated December 31, 1985 (Ref. 1). C. E. Chmielewski to R. C. .. The employee concern addressed by this investigation report did not come through the Quality Technology Company (QTC)/Employea, Response Team Theref ore, no Employee Concern Assignment Request Form is (ERT). availabl,e summaricing the concern of record. II. ' scope. The scope of' this investigation was determined from the concern of record as summarized in reference 1 to be that of three specific A. issues requiring investigation: Conax connectors installed'inside Seg'uoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN)- unit 1 containment do not always meet vendor wire bend. radius 8 1. f{.[. ~ requirements. ,yy;.& Alleged deficiencies in Conax connector installation were ? $.$ r 2. and accepted.

v. '

inspected by SQN Quality Control (QC) 3_. h.n No action was taken by SQU QC management to investigate or document these doficiencies when they were made aware of them. 3. To accomplish this irvestigation, vender manuals and environmental qualification data stects were reviewed to determine Conax connector B. Procedures governing the actual , installation require #4nts. instal *ation of these connectors were reviewed and co Discussions were also held with QC personnel to 8 these requirements. determine if Conax connector installation deficiencies have'been identified rno any corrective action planned or taken to resolve the deficiencies should they exist. s, III.

SUMMARY

OF FINDINGS A. Requirements and Commitments Not applicable to this investigation. ( I f B. Findings Conax Corporation Manual, Installation Manual for Electric Body for Pipe Thread 1. Conductor Se'al Assemblies with Lone Eeuiement Interface,'IPS-725, was originally issued June 26, -The latest' revision to this 7.anual is revision "C" which va 1981. 1 L.- - - _ _

() /7 c$ 'f L \\ was issued February 15, 1985 (Ref. 4). This manual provides s basic information, handling, and installation instructions f or Conax clectrical conductor scal assemblies type ECSA. Section 7.2 of the manual specif[es the minimum wire bend radii it Based on a review of the manual revision log, requirements. appears that these requirements were identified in the original issuance of the manual. Reference 3 documents that Conax electrical conductor seal 2. assemblies type ECSA are environmentally qualified for forty years with one design basis accident and 100-day postaccident ~ However, the initial installation and subsequent operation. reinstallation or replacement of the seal following maintenanec must be performed in,accordance with Conax installation ' nstructions outlined in ref erence 4. i Workplans 11077 R1, 11231, and 11335 (Refs. 6, 7, and 8, respectively) were written to install Conax connectors to meet. 3, environmental qualification requirements set f orth in ITUREG-0588. I Each of these workplans were prepared and worked prior to issuance of a modification and additions instruction regarding These workplans did not, installation of Conax conrectors. cpecify minimum connector wire bend radius requirements and did Each of Jf,.][ not require-verification of installed wire bend radii. Q5?? these workplans had been reviewed and approved by SQN QC F.'f' Work was performed in accordance with the workplans, NE! .L. personnel. and specified QC inspections were performed. h5' Discussions with QC personnel revealed that seme., but not all, of the SQN QC inspectors received Conax connector installation 4. training when it was offered to craft personnel. 'QC inspectors cvaluated Conax connector installations against requirements identified in approved workplans. The inspection criteria did not include evaluation of wire bend radii. 5. Modifications and Additions Instruction M&AI-19 RO (Ref. 2a) was approved April 12, 1985, and provides guidelines for initial As . field installation of electrical Conax connectors for SQN. initially issued, this procedure did not address minimum bend radius requirements for these connectors nor did it' identify a ~~~ ne,ed to inspect completed in,stallations for acceptable wire bend radii. Modification and Additions Instruction M&AI-19 was subsequently 6. 26, 1985 (Ref. 2b) and incorporated vendor revised July recommendations for the minimum bend radius of electrical pigtails as specified by Conax Corporation in reference 4. f v 2 4 2

/Io d 7 6 4 ) e ,CN Maintenance activities have confirmed that valves 2-TSV-43-3 ) and 2-FSV 43-319 installed under wokplan 11077 El have wire .? 7. bend radii which do not meet mininum requirements set forth in H&AI-19 R1 (Ref. 2b) and Conax manual IPS-725 (Ref. 4). have been initiated to Work requests B-106737 and B-106242 i inspect a sample of installed Conax connectors f or proper w B. bend radii. valves using Conax connectors on both units do not meet the specified wire bend radii requirements. On February 10, 1986, SQN Corrective Action. Report (CAR) SQN-CAR-86-02-005 (Ref. 5) was is' sued to identify an adverse 9. condition related to the installation of Conax c,onnectors. This CAR states: ^ Contrary to the requirements of M&AI-19 and the Conax vendor manual IPS-725, not all Conax connectors were installed with wire bend radii In addition, M&AI-19 l within allowable limits. is not consistent with the vendor manual revision referenced in the EQ binder. Adherence to these requirements is*necessary to raintain equipment environmental qualification. 8 As written, E&AI-19 R1 (Ref. 2b) specifies a dif f erent torquing

1

~' C.;9<'14 k sequence and different final torquing values than ConaxIn addition, E&AI-Na# .( installation manual IPS-725 (Ref. 4). does not provide details regarding application of Grafoil h ff.y' ~. t J sealant. In accordance with SQN Administrative instruction AI-12 (Ref. 9) an evaluation of the root cause of the deficiency-must 10. addressed by SQU-CAR-86-02-005This evaluation must also address of the issuance of a CAR. remedial corrective action, action to prevent recurrence, and an estimated schedule for completing the corrective action. QC has begun reviewing all workplans and/or work instructions for work aff ecting any equipment within the scope,cf the 11. environmental qualification program against vender instructions liance with vender recernendations. " ~ ~ ' to ensure cc P - ~ ~.. ~ CONCLUSIONS AliD RECOMMEUDATIONS l '. IV. A. Conclusions ( The first issue raised by the concern of record is substantiated in that several Conax connectors have been i 1. installed on both units 1 and 2 without meeting the minimum i wire bend radii requirements set f orth in Conax installat on l' nanual IPS-725. l .J 3

f} /9 0f E0 'l .= ,,,,4.. The second issue raised by the' concern o'f record could not be 2. -substantiated. Conax connectors were installed in accordance 'These workplans had'been reviewed and with approved workplans. approved by QC. QC inspectors were not directed to inspect Conax installations for proper bend radii. It should be noted, +however, that the workplans did not adequately address Conax installation recomendations identified in the vendor's manual regarding minimum wire bend radii. The third issue raised by the concern of record could not be 3. CAR SQN-C/G-86-02-005 has been. issued to-substantiated. document Conax connector installation deficiencies. A response. is required by March 12, 1986, unless an extension is approved. B. Recommendations I-86-101-SQU-01, Resolution of Deficiencies The deficiencies identified in corrective action report should be addressed and resolved in accordance SQN-CAR-86-02-005 with SQN AI-12. [F2). 1 t j.}?... e ~' f s %/ s i s m .J 4

20 Ok YS-2 .9 ~ ~ ' DOCUMENTS REVIEWED IN INVESTICATION I '86-101-SQW AND REFERENCES j Chmielewski to R. C. Sauer, " Employee 85 Informal memorandum from C. E. Concern at Sequoyah Nuc1 car Plant (SQN), ,1. f Conax Modifications and Additions Instruction M&AI-19. " Installation 2. Connectors" RO dated April 12, 1985 b. El-dated July 26, 1985 a. l Assemblics SQN Environmental, Qualification Binder, "Conax Conductor Sea 3. (ECSA)," No. SQNEQ-CSC-001-d t Seal _ Conax Corporation, Installation Hanual f or Electrical Con uc orfor Pipe Th 4. Bodv Assemblies with Long 15, 1985 5PS-725 2G, dated February February 10, 1986 SQN Corrective Action Report SQU-CAR 86-02-005 dated 5. Valves Inside Workplan 11077 R1, " Installation of Conax Conne'ctors in PASF t 15, 1984 26. Containment," prepared.0ctober j., Oy:, d

7., Workplan 11231, "Various Equipment Seals - UUREG-0588," prepare
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.h. September 24, 1984 d (g'...-B. Workplan 11335, "Various Equipment Seals - UUREG-0588," prepare 15 November 7, 1984 tive SQN Administrative Instruction - AI-12, " Adverse Conditions and Co: '9. Actions," R20, dated August 2, 1985. O e e wp ,6s 4 -t -J 5 s

2/ O-f YS / .+[ (' (' ATTACH 11ENT C .-../ QUALITY ~ TECHNOLOGY COMPANY l Q(. (615)365 4414 . Sweetwater. TN 37874 'P.O. BOX 600 PAGE 1 OF.4. REPORT. EgT INVESTIGATION XX-85-023-X02 CONCERN NO: falsified anchor and inspection personnel A: CONCERN: Sequoyah; Craft ble' documents, (Mid-1977, Unit 2, Annulus). ~ 7

pull-tests and applica INVESTIGATION' T.

Hough PERFORMED BY: DETAILS

PERSONNEL CONTACTED: (CONFIDENTIAL)

I ef' B $Q/-. d,/ O. / e e y A* /1 e, ..e; e 9 6 .) a D 4

7 7-o k '//, S- 'I e. ,'[ ( PAGE 2 OF 4 REPORT' l'INVCSTIGATION. CONCERN: NO: xx-85-023-X02 continueo

5ETAILS,

. DOCUMENTS' REVIEWED: " Testing of Expansion

Instruction - 93 (II-93) h SNP Inspection Anchors Set in Har6ened Concrete and Grouted Anc ors s ' 3 1.. <

R-1 (3/22/77), R-16 (8/1/84). a-R-0, (2,/22/77), in Hardened G-32." Bolt Anchors set R-0 (9/72), R-4 (4/21/76), R-5' (7/21/77), R-6 + E T2., ' General-Construction ~ sppe. '4 Concrete" ( 2/17 /81), and R-10 (4/1/85). u (Support Typicals) L SNP 47A050 " General Notes" 3 '. T4. 'Crafe Time Cards (1978) SU. MARY OF INVESTIGATION: iated. Interviews were conducted with (27) 3 anchors E ividuals involved in the, installation of concrete expansion M[l$, bis.conEsdn was not.substant No T IdpEA's)atSecuoyahduringthetimeframespecifiedintheconcern. evid of JbF collabotating/objec'tive concucted intermittently from Ethe concern. This investigation was p d {gp25/85.to2/21/96, ~

._ ~

f.- FINDINGS: 1 review Of 4 -wo ways;

The 'invesVigation cf *.hi.s concdrn was approachec.n -ena interview of Perso in. CEA epolicable documentat o noted during the inves-ca 4 of a

-^ ed s -in'stallation c,uring' 19o-023-001), applicable documenta related-concer.n (XX_ P This 4s due to the fact that wor,th *he myriad of b d wi

  • 9 <

'di'#: cult to obtain. This <BC-when combine 47A050 notes an, utilited'at SNP un 41 1981. exceptions +o anchor pull-testing (Re^I-Ddin documentation e. '^ documenteo andsthe. unlikelihood o. investigation procedures) dictated,ha +- applicable proving falsificat:.on,o<.pu11-testing,e 4ntervieWiD9 of pers nnel. r s ffe-- be concentratea on t = accounting records e-e revte ec _j ~~ eCords and cost interview-1 ' ' Personnel- ^ appropriate pe s inspections of CEA*s an6 personnel ce,*{-~,gnne1 o determine. conduct . comprising. ~ r e .. x, W\\n. ts _w2.

y pg ~. 31 .(g (1 t s. Pact 3 or a CSTIGATION _ REPORT-T % -]INV C'OhCCRN NO. XX-85-023-X02 DETAILS, continued TINDINGS, continued' ~ installation. The list was narrowed by those persons involved in.CEA determining-whom within.the list are still ' employed locally (i.e., immediately available' for interview). Interviews-were ccnducted to determine compliance (during specified. time-frames), e verify involvement and ascertain knowledge-of wrongdoing with procedural requirements, activities. Results of the interview process ahe as follows: Acquaintance; with the individual alleged to.have been. in falsification activities could not be o involved i _even after. prompting). ( established, of alleged wrongdoing activities was limited 'to Several craft Knowledge yas denied in-relation to Sequoyah.' o WBNP and reference to and a few inspection personnel.made activities - such as cutting off " Red-Head" CIA's, welding personnel etc., but only at

WBNP, f%.

bolts to.the backs of"' base-plates,. j4$.y (Reference various other:ERT concerns). not at SMP. EN o, With few, exception, inspection personnel interviewed %)

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"47A050 Notes" '.hy{..d,' expressed concern regarding the quantity of of the and the ability of anyone to keep abreast generated "050 Notes"- and subsequent changes. (Reference various other ERT concerns) i CONCLUSIONS: This, concern is.not substantiated. s ' This conclusion is based'on the follogring: o The "47A05'O Notes" allowed numerous exceDtions to there were few personnel knowledceable ..__m. ~ 1pu11-testing,

i. e.,

about exactly when a pull-test absolutely had to be performed. _.~.., I I' 6 e 4 x) e

83 2 '/ oi '/ 6 ( t l PAGE 4 OF 4 REPORT _ j,CRT INVCSTICATION 5 .u ONCERN NO. XX-85-023-X02 DETAILS, continueo .a CONCLUSIONS, continued-o No documentation could be obtained that would support occurrence of this wrongdoing activity (falsifying pull-test records) o No collaborating testimony was obtained from personnel involved in CEA installation in the Sequoyah Unit-2 Annulus during 1977. 9 0 [", a ,f. ?! l ..i;/ 'n a ,/.., / e a A DATE /h1[ M 3/7/ Wa> REVIEWED BY: DATI i O %cf

F ~2 5 o k V 0 ATTACRMENT D J- ' ' \\ .,_

  • ng

} List of Documents Reviewed in the Evaluation Process l Element Report 80203. L ~ Quality - Technology Corportation Employee Response Team (IRT) Reaort No. XX- ) a. L 023-001 (Revised 10/22/55) b. Memorandum, SQH Site Director to Manager of Nuclear Manager's Review Group, April 24, 1986. c.- Memorandum, General Counsel to Manager 'Huclear Power, April 30,.1986 ( Administrative 1y Confidential) d. Construction Specifications: G-38, R1 "Insta11iug insulated Cable UP to 15,000 Volt inclusive" G-32, R4, R5 " Bolt Anchors Set in Kardened Concrete" Seqvoyah inspection Instructions: e. SNP-11-93, R0, R1, R2 SNP-11-10,'R6, R7 g{ SNP-11-26, RO, R1, R2, R3 ,yh'Af SNP-11-2B, RO, R1, R2 'e :r-a ,f. ,haintenance and Addition instructions: EY' ?,'? W lMEAI-4, RB M&Al-7, R6 l I Construction QA ' Procedure, Const. QAP-10.01; R1 g. h. Manger Drawing General Notes, 47A050 (latest issue of each page) i. NSRS Report 1-86-101-SQN, February 27, 1986 j.' Corrective Action Report, SQ CAR 86 02 005, 2/10/86 k. Construction CEG Element Report C010900-SQN, November 1986 g e et 6 a 9 i j w!)

6 -

1 g ATTACP.". INT I' Page 1 l ( ' T!.._._ 7 L 1 i u ICSF COilFICTI\\*E - Action Trackine-Document (CATD) L-i INITIATION ' 1. Itzmediate Corrective A:: ion Required: ' Y/ Yes. / /- No / 2. Stop Work' Recommended: // Yes /7./ No 3. CATD No. 80203-SON-1 4 INITIATION D/CI 9/5/86 S.. FISPONSISLE ORGNIIZATION: OACEC 6. PROBLIM DISCRIPTION: /I/ QR /~/ NQR _ h Enrineerine to cetermine ov evaluation. :be lonc term effect on cnole unere insulation vas eossiolv recaired ov ene ese of elet rical : ave. 640 vol: caole feedine Eack Flow Ga t e' iiet s : hotors (IAA. ISE. 2/4. 235) n A /1 . ///// / // \\ / /ATTAC:91INTS '7. ?FIFAPID BY: NAMI D.G.5t lov //'t W /t /#.J DATE: C. / f f/ E. CONCUPSINCI: CIG-E f c" k" / VM ~' 8' _ DATI: C. s k-Y (, ~ D. A??ROVA* : ICTO PE00FJ.M MGR: / DA I: .i COPJIC~I'v7. ACTION 10. PROP.OSID COPJ2CTIVI ACTION PLAN: 4, ^!DUL ~ S fA 'fuf71C4Wc J 0,J & % / A l' os /Afrof/Ar Du/A B25 S to e s>in O ~7 le D nGm') ~O:n 1i, I?C.$ i. f " ~~~ >//// / / /ATTACHMINTS 11. PROPOSID BI: DIFICTOF./EGE: J.ryvi17l/j//JJ.M MOR: DA~I: VIRIPICATION AND CLOSIOUT l'iT, 13. Approved cerree:ive a:: ions have been verified as i=p l emer.:ed. sa:isfa :orily 51;nATUF2 I;TLI p;.!I

i PG 'l 7 0 h '$ ?. v 4 w io..es. ATTACHMENT E Page 2 / ., twirp STATES GOVT.RNMENT S03 861022 808 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY [.hCm O Tdn d um - {, ). W. R. Brown, Program Manager, Employee Concerns Task Group, ONP Watts Bar DR T Nuclear' Plant rn0M- }{. L..Abercrombie, Site Director, ONP, O&PS-4, Seguoyah Nuclear Plant -DATE. : October 29, 1986 1 - EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP (ECTG) ELEMENT l SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) l stfuCCT: REPORT 802,03 SQN - QUALITY ASSURANCE CATEGORY - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN Your memorandum to me dated October 2, 1986, " Watts Bar Nuclear 4

Reference:

Plant - Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG) Element Report 80203-SQN - Inspection Performance (Seguoyah)" (T25 861002 871) i l I acknowledge receipt of your element report and in accordance with your request (see reference), Element Report 802.03 SQN has been reviewed for. applicable corrective action. By way of tais memorandum I am endorsing the site line organization CAP and l i attaching the CAP for your review / concurrence and returning your Corrective This CAP is not a restart requirement. Action Tracking Document 80203-SQN-1. If you ' agree with thi proposed CAP, please sign th'e ECTG concurrence space m fg(,$ l below item 9 on the CAP tracking checklist and return the CAP tracking % checklist. _. :i.' ' fr ?. 'luNImxLr

h. L. Abercrombie RCD:JDS:JB:CS Attachments RE DEf VED l

cc (Attachments): RIMS, F.R AN 72A-C (B25 '861017 076) A. G. Debbage, DNP, ECTG Building, WBN E30BS/ Employee Ccnnms Tuk 0221T C cup WBN -_l y...-# gr,,ettle 1 y.) Tet:3. IPo 1 i j t','L B 4 i l 1 O i i i tis ia I

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3 Zir' e-h V5 17 I t Standard Practice ~Page B SQA166 Revision B ...'"} Attachment A Page 1 of 2 Corrective Action Plan of Employee Concern Investigation Tracking Checklist W2d 3 -SM -- / ICTG Report /CATD Number FC 2 o3 -SOA! 47b Lead Organication Responsible for Corrective Accion Plan

  1. h6./w F2rP.M / ee Initiation Date-

/ 0 T'"1 i ) CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN (CAP)

1. Does this report requireg' corrective action?

Yes No I (If yes, describe corrective action to be taken, if no, provide justification) D?>witAo ouforwes,o ) pJ 7W. Rulpt.o emSWIJ.suosw Sive.L TMM /.s ao IM/P1r DV rWL uM. op StAa7uMrd n*9L. or crJ.cir C+J bG rk:0J fcL rH 7?W6 ~ MJML, C/l'otM15 fod 7% f@ ChM /foODuir 4*W.S (M idot&#rt pcr.4. rih 6ff.- tusm!k*'17 tad HD 72.5% ( h's-hr M 'ml&M.C L *TMJL CMWs ML 64bJ od MILL. .croeb 1977 Hb tJ RU. LIr.f.L1 mO DuDad-77t15 U/WL VE& fL&tM M Ber%C/f4b ~fML. s.orttf CoJDin&.5 l'sJCluboul-SuomMCM) 'WhsT* TWOf unt.b 8L sut332.utd> 're vsrrmuY peoV Pitobksms ok.ts o.J 7% i+swl-wL Comt6 ~rMer 7M IUsut>*11o# # 2. Ydentify any similar, item / instances and corrective action taken. .et +::5.w ~ w

3. Will corrective action preclude recurrence cf findings?

Yes X. No '] y

4. Does thic report contain findings that,are conditions adverse to cuality (CAQ)

YIS No X. l ns defined by AI-12 or NIP 9.17 4f;V SiIF a CAQ condition exists, what CAQ document was initiated? ff M1A

6. Which site section/organication is responsible for corrective action?

MoWE

7. Is corrective action required for restart?

Yes, No X. (This determination is to be made using Attachment C of SQA166.) B. P2 :one number for restart corrective action?.7,one ' dJA f. 9.,Istimate completion date for correction action..,, WIA Completed By O/4M,l-Date Ocf. /? /96/o Approved Dy ~)71 (( ).5A.wm bO// Date to//E'/ M f ICTG Concurrence ~4 0 W/f M // \\ Date ' jf.:02-M a p3 j ..)ppmfrGC-wt$ UW Sppyc.qtCT* 7t Imf!Til2. 1HL fM*1CA?'O #

  1. II!

.~ gg pp Ajo f*udThil RCD'l IS lI"LO#. .:t.y 3' d . y 1-s . w" (>* l .,) 02065/mit I l

Pp 29 el vt Standard Practice Page 9 SQA166 Revision 8 ~- ATTA0}tFZ:!T A .Page 2 of 2, l CAP CLCSURE

10. Was your corrective action initiated and completed in accordance with step 17 l

Yes No

11. If step 10 is no, describe the corrective action taken.
12. Is the corrective action implementation complete?

Yes No

13. Is the corrective action documentation closed?

Yes No

14. Rnat documents were used to implement the corrective action?

Date Completed By: verified By: Date ECTG Closure: Date (Step No.) Description . ~,.c. s:cc-Qy.? - e:~. ' e

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o.. I i l l l i I 1 ,4 C2065/m1t n:) _______________.___-___________________m_____,__

1 } ) 1% 30 c h ') l-ATTACHMENT F s s,.. '?- 'ECSP CORRECTIVE Action Tracking Document (CATD) INITIATION 7 1. Immediate Corrective Action Required: /~/ Yes // No 2. Stop Work Recommended: // Yes /I/ No 3. CATD No. 80203-SON-02 4. INITIATION DATE 11/18/86 5. PISPONSIBLE ORGANIZ.ATION: Office of Nuclear Power 6. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: /I/ QR /1/ NQR Employee concern OD-85-005-003 was investigated by OACEG and COCEG. C00EG investigation C010900-SON indicates that cables 1-PL-6370-B 1-PL-6360-A. 2-PL-6370-B and 2-PL-6370 which supplies power feed to the ERCW Backflow Gate Boist Motors have been de-energized and the motors permenatelv taken out of service. DACEG invstigation reveals Design Drawings 45N-751-1, -2, -5, and -6 do not reflect this sys t ern status. / // ATTACHMENTS 7. PREPAPID BY: NAMI R. D. Halverson- @ DATE: 11/18/86 8. CONCURPINCE: CEG-H R. R. Maxon /< /C //;I (d_ DATE: /t / / P/ Y (o ,w 9. APPROVAL: ECTG PROGRAM MOR: /lBJh.,8 ' % DATE: 2/f/g') 5' / CORPICTIVE ACTION

J <-

g 10. PROPOSED CORPICTIVE ACTION PLAN: '/ + l / /ATTACEMENTS 11. PROPOSED BY: LIFICTOR/MGR: DATE: l 12. CONCURPINCE: CEG-H DATE: SRP: DATE: ECTG PROGRAM MGR: DATE: I l VERIFICATION AND CLOSE0UT 13. Approved corrective actions have been. verified as satisfactorily 3 l implemented. l l l l SIGNATUIiE TIT 11 DATE 3 %./ l l l-J

P9 u J u ~ Unrren srarcs covcnxucxr 803 861424 806

  • MCm07andum TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

..} 4_ T4 W. R. Brown, Jr., Program Manager, Emp3oyee Concerns Task Group. ONP, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant rnoM H. L. Abercrombie, Site Director, ONP, OLP5-4, Segueyah Nuclear Plant DArc December 24, 1986 SenJccT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAP PLANT (SQN) - EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP (ECTG) ELEMENT REPORT B02.03 SQN - QUALITY ASSURANCE CATEGORY - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN (CAP) /

Reference:

Your memorandum to me dated November 25,1986, " Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Empicyee Concerns Task Group (ECTG) Element Report 80203-SQN - Inspection Performance (Seguoyah)" (725 861125 891) I acknowledge receipt of your element report and in accordance with your reguest (see reference), Element Report'802.03 SQN has been reviewed for applicable corrective action. By way of this memorandum I am endorsing the site line organi::ation CAP, 7"! returning your Corrective Action Tracking Document No. 80203-SQN-02, and y,Ep:_ attaching the CAP for your review / concurrence. This CAP is not a restart requirement. If you agree with the proposed CAP,'please sign the ECTG concurrence space g,,,*, yp ' below item 9 on the CAP tracking checklist and return the CAP tracting checklist. r.. Y$ d f H. L..Abercrombie P. E C E I V E D RCD:JDS:JB:CS Attachments f' DEC 30 BB y ec (Attachments): RIMS, MR 4N 72A-C.(B25 '861218 025) !Em;2yee cct:arns Task

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.s \\' s' ECSP CORRECTIVE ~* . Action Tracking Document (CATD) INITIATION 1. Immediate Corrective Action Required: // Yes // No ~ 7 2. Stop Work Recommended: /;/ Yes /X/ N"o" ~ 3. CATD No. 80203-SQN-02 4. INITIATION DATE 11/18/86-5. RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATJON: Office of Nuclear Power 6. . PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: /X_/ QR /;/ NQR Emplovee concern 00-85-005-003 was investigated by OACEG and COCEG. CDCEG investigation C010900-SON indicates that cables 1-PL-6370-B l-PL-6360-A. 2-PL-6370-B and 2-PL-6370 which supplies power feed to the ERCW Backflow Gate Hoist Motors have been de. energized and the motors permenately taken out of service. QACEG invstigation reveals Design Drawines 45N-751-1, -2, -5, and -6 do not reflect this system

status, A

/ // ATTACHMENTS ~ 7. PREPARED BY: NAME _R. D. H a lv e r s on. XC_~~W DATE: 11/18/86 8. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H R. K. Maxon /< /C // / ( - /, DATE: /i /] P/ 9 'e l 9. APPROVAL: ECTG PROGRAM MGR: di4(t'.A"f ' d~ DATE: 7///r') CORRECTIVE ACTION 10. PROPOSED.CORPICTIVE ACTION FLAN: $ L-E 7%i l/W 7~XWA'5 M/7YZ7) [A Y /Xt'x!CA AA 'LUMf /r'7?A S d $2 5 M. /Z/C 02 5~ n.a+C l' ':~ ~ :C , ~. ~ / / ATTACHMENTS 11. PROPOSED BY: DIRECTOR /MGR: # #t/M /4,7 DATE: /) -A 9-/-4 12.- CONCURPINCE: CEG-Rhb N DT &ic1E, f ae l'G vi I DATE: SRP: DATE: l ECTG PROGRAM MGR: DATE: -VERIFICATION AND CLOSE0UT 13. Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily i ( implemented. i SIGNATURE TITLE DATE i sw.

.W-4 Standard Practice Page 8 SQA166 e Revision 8 I Attachment A Page 1 of 2 Corrective Action Plan of Employee Concern Investigation k i Tracking Chacklist ECTO Report /CATD Number 80a.0 3 SQu E.( / CeTD # 80 2,03 - SO N -cq Lead Organization Responsible for Corrective Action Plan Initiation Date / /- 2 8 - % _ (,.V /- CCERECTIVE ACTION PLAN (CAP)

1. Does this report require corrective action?

(If yes, describe corrective action to be taken, if no, provide justificati Yes No DfS tid D,'l'pta,&S G d 7 L7-l -l -C n b -l, n: Y on) Waer n-L MS,% Srn-213 a, -{s'tiv M EMCTT-redb <*4ecuir kil % 8/XL. fwJ (45 imD %t'ft70 Pncen AfA' r>tmmi+nc, & nte L. rc inn.:rs ten:-mo iW r7s .inin" cflav1'bt. / fcu' f C1nc ) meP il kPS rwktt W n 0:, f % tb W Q t: < R i:- > ~ 6 in~ /,. P tw' ( % HCaY tht.*;/Lf P f:/, b&O,*7H4'<D,zy"h %+11nta,J C A(){'f

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2. Identify rny similar item / instances and corrective action taken. 3 , /r /v / /7

3. Will corrective action pre Aude recurrence of findings?
4. Does this report contain #

Yes No as defined by AI-12 or NI ndings that are conditions adverse to qualitv (CAQ) 9.17

5. IT a CAQ condition exist, what CAQ document was initiated?

YES No

6. Which site section/organiza ion is responsible for corrective action?

j

7. Is corrective acticn requi ed for restart?
8. P2 :ene number for resta. corrective action?(This determination Yes No Zone
9. Estimate completien dat for correction action.

Completed By i kf-1 M Date /'2/~b 7 Approved By __ /C //. t'ch Date /- f 3 -T */ ECTG Concurrence it. c r</ C. - Date Z*-n 4/ o 0206S/m t

3 7 Di Y l. Standard Practice Pace 9 .. ~*' :-( SQA'166 Revision 8 f u,. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~- (~~, .ATTAC100!T A Page 2 of 2 I CAP CLOSURE

10. Has your corrective action initiated and completed in accordance with step 1?

Yes No

11. If step 10 is no, describe the corrective action taken.
12. Is the corrective action implementation complete?

Yes No

13. Is the corrective action documentation closed?

Yes _ _ No

14. What documents were used to implement the corrective action?

Completed By: Date Verified 3y: Date ECTG Closure: Dcte (Step Ko.) Description sw.. .46fi 4W % h: '... l I l l I 4 s. 1 j r.. s 0206S/m1t i l l \\ L.

F7 u d vi. \\ 3 m m m,v, - m nto m nom n ,1 " morandum Trxxtssee VALLEY AUTHORITY d s m k e ..-. 810717 E 013 0 _ .._ _4 ,. ro.e. u s t e d 2. g Uf C. A. Chandicy, Chief, Hechanical E.ngineering Branch, W10D224 C-K h JUL B 1981 ( J SEQUDYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - DISPOSITION OF DESICH CHANCE REQUEST (DCR) d SQ-DCR-891 jj CONDENSER CIRCULATINC WATER SYSTEM (CCW) AND PREOP TEST - TVA-17 TEST

  • h DEFICIENCY No. PT-600 j

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,tdu n..:w : ticuocmiuum from L J. Green to R N. Sprouse dated Dec, ember 6, j 1980 (DES-00-12-17-021), and DCR-971 4 o We recon: mend disapproval of SQ-DCR-891. The subject pressure switches for N 1 units 1 and 2; PS-0131 A and B, -132 A and B, and -134 A and B; were safety-related switches to activate the closure of the CCW backflow gates. 3 This functional requirement was deleted when the new ess,ential raw cooling 9 watei puc: ping station was activated. ]a As long as these switches are installed, they can activate the closure of h the backflow gates and possibly trip the unit. Since the safety-related j h closure requirement of the backflow gates no longer exists, the closure of M@ the backflow gates and the shutdown of any CCW pumps should be under the i' i, control of the unit operator.and not automatically actuated. s a. h .: 'p [ Therefore, we recon: mend the following: y, 1. Removal from both units of PS-027-131 A and B, -132 A and B, and -134 A 0 and B. ( 9 2. Do not buy any replacement switches. i 7 3. Revise the following drawings to delete the above pressure switches and p their functional use: p ~ Control Diagram 47WB10-27-series ( Logic Diagram 47W611-27-series G Instrumentation Tab 47B601-27-series ] Pumping Station 37W205-series Sl 0 Any other drawings If you are in concurrence, we will revise the scoping document for the j preep test TVA-17. j 3 k 0 N N 9 J e ) h

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fp 1s of vt. 3 Those Liated 9" JUL 8 1981 ~ ~ .s-SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - DISPOSITION OP, DESIGN CHANGE REQUEST (DCR) SQ-DOR-891 j CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM (CCW) AND PREOP TEST - TVA-17 TEST DETICIENCY NO. PT-600 Flease correct the reference drawing number 47W601-27-series instrumentation tabulation to read 47B601-27-series on drawing 47W610-27-1. Please respond by July 31, 1981. j ( 4+r C. A. Chandley T. W. Chandler, WBC126 C-K J. E. Holladay, W2D224 C-K J. A. Raulston, W10C126 C-K R. W. Cantrell, 204 CB-K 'lf7 JEM:JES 'ap ,Qys /g'i' cc: H. N. Sprouse, W11A9 C-K muy / ' 'g ~ .) anS:aES JUL n 1981 ~~ ce s, H. J. Creen,1750 CST 2-C - Pleese respond by July 31, 1981. i '.,f d8 [MEDS. E4B37 C-K b' o S EB1187.09 i J 1 a 1

f] 37oby4 ,W - v,,; i onogn n o,.3,, z,,, SsEET No. CLEAR'ANCE SHEET

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3 ? ok yl. CLEAR ANCE m..EET onpEn, g SEOUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT Cwwn no 0 v c, s ,l..< 3, e,,, a,, ~ $""^"*'"* L nc)ent.~ C w h \\ i N, L d e t 1-hh R f-ch .iETERuint TiOH OF 2nd PARTY N REQURED DMpRMINED DW (SRO) M (CHECK ONE) VERIFIC ATION REQUIREMENT R E QUIR ED h \\_ h b S rw~nNs h REMOVAL FROM SERVICE / RELE ASE OF CLE AR ANCE O l VALVE DRAIN 2nd U EQUIPMENT RETURN 2nd U CLOSED OR PERSON RELEASED E TO NORMAL PERSON E VALVES, BRE AKERS. SWITCHES, BREAKER VENT VERtF1-no7 ygg g,j p4 OR SWITCH OPEN CATION I4 AllGNED C OR FUSES HELD. OPEN. IF C NORMAL CAT 10H i ip 1 E FUSE PULLED REQUIRED E REQUIR (LOCATION AS NEEDED) gg, initinis initials initiale NO. Initicis initials initiale lAjf} Qy liit LI C.. D 1 C I ,n,n n, n u g e. 1, m AUCR > asa n a na w,b w hQG / lbfu n Rt rM/ 0.k-T,.y*N"5.$., n -, Ibj ~ ' REP;,. - E#E ' W*E

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e K t'o o[ V( ~ F gy w v., hstTr sTATcs covennicxr. .M...,.n.C17107dnduln! TENNESSEE VALLEY l AUTilol:lTY l "]f ~~ W. R.' Brown,' Jr., Program Manager, Employee Concerns Task Group, ONP, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant H. L. Abercrombie, Site Director, ONP, OLPS-4. Seguoyah Nuclear Plant p.ng,y January 24, 1987 DATE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP (ECTG) ELEMENT senJECT: REPORT 802.03 SQN R1 - QUALITY ASSURANCE' CATEGORY - CORRECTIVE ACTION-PLAN (CAP) REVISION

Reference:

My memorandum to you dated December 24,'1986, "Seguoyah Nuclear Plant (SON) - Employee Concerns Tast Croup (ECTG) Element Report 802.03 SQN - Quality Assurance Category - Corrective Action Plan (CAP)" (S03 861224 806) l Attached is my revised CAP for Element Report 802.03 SQN R1, Corrective Action Tracking Document No. 80203-SQN-02 for your review / concurrence. 1 This revised CAP supersedes the CAP previously transmitted to you (see l l reference) and j_s,not a restart requirement. If you agree with the proposed CAP, please sign the ECTG concurrence space fw $-M9 below item 9 on the CAP tracking checklist and return the CAP tracking .2D@ . checklist. . o)". 1!!' 4 W.. r..,, W ~ llgj 2 H..L. Abercrombie , q RCD:JDS:JB:CS Attachment I cc: RIMS, MR AN 72A-C (B25 '870123.037) PEggygg T. C. Price, 5-212 SB-K (Attachment) JM 26 '87 0569I Employ:s Cene-n3 Tag r' ::uu_ws *.i

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~-- c, -.l.>,,,, A PP A.A A T US (S 7 ( n (, t A C.s AYr e ! ) (, f ~ \\ t i\\a %oC\\A.. A^ s r O t'. (* a DETERwuATION OF 2nd PARTY N IVERIFIC ATION RE QUIRE MENT (CHECK OPJE) QUIRED DEURWNED M (SRO) [I R E QUIR E D YN k h % r % % m y REMOVAL FROM SERVICE RELE ASE OF CLEARANCE 0 O U VALVE. DR AIN 2nd y EQUIPMENT RETURN

  • ?ne CLOSED OR PERSON RELEASED E

VALVES BREAKERS. SWITCHES. BAEAKER VENT VERIF1-E yogonggt PERs-N NOT VERif OR SWITCH OPEN CATION N AllGNED C OR FUSES HELD. OPEN. IF C NORMAL C ATIE - E FUSE PULLED REQUIRED E 3p (LOCATION AS NEEDED) RE OuiF. No, initials initials initleic NO. Initials initl e t s ini tl e i /Alf) kx bh Y C. m) CI ,o,o n, na v c..h w MLR i wn u ou ch w h QG i ont a ni w/ C <$c o e 1 l.Y& li f ~ .e %,* s e. ,?$ l s.3. .~ e 'i>.'* ' s .g y 64 j t \\ 98 t ~Y e e e lfd ) 1 7

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m Revision B .t .t. - } Attachment A.:3. ', y'

  • Page 1.of 2 Corrective Action Plan of Employee Concern Investigation Tracking Checklist ECTG Report /CATD Number 802 0 *b.SQLi R.I / C+ tid # Bo 2.03 - S Q M -0 7 -

Lead Organization Responsible for Corrective Action Plan N 6-Initiation Date / /~ 2. B" Ole CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN (CAP)

1. Does this report require corrective action?

Yes No 8 4, (If yes, describe corrective action to be taken, if no, provide justification) Df 5 i6.J D:1ma a S 1 sh) 7 t.7 - I -1 y~ p,,m 4, or Maze,r 11-f. s s-cm 5nn ary 2 sit,,4s 'I'.C =fut 1M37ttedb Nitut7" ht fMt. BM/ A.csJ (htWS thVD N l' 8.' tn,n'G'74 F1w rm r1m A nc. tNmu L. ro thin atw etc,orniL /H :M u>v,, cNnwThL f Ecd L. s'?ne > a'mru 1 t. kns InithcorW tv Or. DHi f>Ur4GK *: ft4 7/tC / SAtt F1-vu 6P C o M f" (hs.~1-AS M:L b&as 17WCCD v.'inr ' tmon s. J c At>U '.*P iHL rifumut m'.g'Mf. C (V AATit. ). PLCA'SE., i(L. nO FrTnwW h M(wv.uf tuf & b 8 c ) (.;'l ( lie ) f ~ C Lf ef.h:O SMK p. h fitT\\4 M.S.lkthsomte Li tw f M.ha tWrh 2. Identify any simil'ar, item / instances and corrective action taken. ^ .,l+ 2 ) /V l (7 O'b;? w's.1 < f' I $.Willcorrectiveactionpre ude recurrence of findings? Yes No Y $, ArDoes this report contain # ndings t; hat are conditions adverse to cuality (CAQ) /. r p as defined by AI-12 or NE 9.17 9' YES No h -,' 5'. IF a CAQ condition exist, what CAQ document was initiated 7l

6. Which site section/organiza ion is responsible for. corrective action?

~

7. Is corrective action requi ed for restart?

.Yes No (This determination is to me made using Attachment C.cf SQA166.) l

8. P2 :one number for resta corrective action? Zone
9. Estimate completion dat for correction action.'

Ab- ~ NII'b] Date Completed By M Approved By /t / h Date /-23-T7 l ( ECTG Concurrence Date l 3,;. -Q .y S.- ^ ., +. 4 4 .[. e e g l., i E .J 02065/mit L

ff,9'fo Yl 1- :li' ?y.E&. /-,- ............. u s m. s. a c.o o...uWm M O7d M d MM TENNESSEE MMEY AUTH01UTY w 810717E0130 !i Those Lis t ed 2-C. A. Chandley, Chie f, Hechanical EnEincering Dranch, W10D224 C-K JUL 8 1985 i

3., SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - DISPOSITION OF DESIGN CHANCE REQUEST (DCR)

SQ-DCR-891 ~' ' CONDENSER CIRCULATINC WATER SYSTEM (CCW) AND PREOF TEST - TVA-17 TEST

  • DEFICIENCY NO. PT-600 i

r gi:ic ci:..::e t }!cuocaliduu from H. J. Creen to M. N. Sprouse dated Dec, ember 6, 1080 (DES-00-12-17-021), and DCR-971 We recomend disapproval of SQ-DOR-891. 'The subject pressure switches for units 1 and 2; PS-0131 A and B, -132 A and B, and -134 A and B; were safety-related switches to activate the clorure of the CCW backflow gates.

  • This functional requirement was deleted when the new essential raw cooling L

water pumping station was activated. - 4 As long as these switches are installed. they can activate the closure of { the backflow gates and possibly trip the unit. Since the safety-related l closure requirement cI the backflow gates no longer exists, the closure of y%g q the backflow gates and.'the shutdown of any CCW pumps should be under the D -h? control of the unit operator and not automatically actuated. LI L c.; e ' Theref ore, we recomend the following: 'l' s y /. ' .9 h s q -4 1. Removal from both units of PS-027-131 A and B,' -132 A and B, and -134 A E sind B. L ? 4'! 2. Do not buy any replacement switches. .i y .s M. ~ h-3. Revise the following drawings.to delete the above pressure switches and n t their functional use: ,N ,s g Control' Diagram 47W810-27-series c. Logic Diagram 47W611-27-series Instrumentation Tab 47B601-27-series [h Pumping Station ~J7W205-series l l Any other, drawings f If you are in concurrence, we will revise the scoping document for the ~~ c-preep test TVA-17. 1 . g h s 3 ~ r - t ..i i g. ,i

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f VVCrh Na ... c. o Those Liated A' J U L. B 1981 SEQUOYAll tIUCLEAR PLAtlT ' DISPOSITION Of DES!CN CilANCE REQUEST (DCl() SQ-DCR-891 CotiDENSER CIRCULATINC WAT8:R SYSTEM (CCW) AND PREOP TEST - TVA-17 TEST DEFICIEtlCY NO. PT-600 1 Please correct the re ference drawing number 47W601-27-series instrumentation tabulation to read 47B601-27-series on drawing 47W610-27-1 4 Please respond by July 31, 1981. l v C. A. Chandley b, T. W. Chandler, WBC126 C-K J. E. Holladay, W2D224 C-K .. [,, J. A. Raulston, W10C126 C-K - e R. W. Cantrell, 204 CE-K r, li f7 ' i JEM:Jir i g $...,.. 'M '/'s'. ' ect M. N. Sprouse, W11A9 C K . g .nNS,JES _ J U L n is 81" ' '~ ^ ces H. J. Creen, 1750 CST 2-C - Please ~ respond by July 31, 1981. ,~~~ BEDS.E4B37C-K s y

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