ML20216F439
| ML20216F439 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1999 |
| From: | Zimmerman R NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216F444 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9909220046 | |
| Download: ML20216F439 (7) | |
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7590-01-P j
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in tne matter of
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Florida Power Corporation
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Docket No. 50-302
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(Crystal River Unit 3)
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License No. DPR-72 l
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l CONFlRMATORY ORDER MODIFYlNG POST-THREE MILE ISLAND REQUIREMENTS PERTAINING TO CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN MONITORS 1.
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Florida Power Corporation (the Licensee), is the holder of Facility Operating License i
No. DPR-72 issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to l
10 CFR Part 50. The license authorizes the operation of Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3), located in l
Citrus County, Florida.
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l As a result of the accident at Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2), the NRC issued NUREG-0737,
" Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements"(November 1980). Generic Letters 82-05 and 82-10, issued on March 17 and May 5,1982, respectively, requested licensees of operating I
power reactors to furnish information pertaining to their implementation of specific TMI Action Plan items described in NUREG-0737. Orders were issued to licensees confirming their commitments made in response to the generic letters. The Order to the Licensee issued on March 14,1983, requires the Licensee to implement and maintain the various TMl Action Plan 9909220046 990916 PDR ADOCK 05000302 P
PDR t-
items, including item II.F.1, Attachment 6, pertain'ing to monitoring of hydrogen concentration in containment.
Significant improvements have been achieved since the TMI accident in the areas of understanding risks associated with nuclear plant operations and developing better strategies for managing the response to potentially severe accidents at nuclear plants. Recent insights pertaining to plant risks and alternate severe accident assessment tools have led the NRC staff
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to conclude that some TMI Action Plan items can be revised without reducing, and perhaps
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enhancing, the ability of licensees to respond to severe accidents. The NRC's efforts to oversee the risks associated with nuclear technology more effectively and to eliminate undue regulatory coMs to licensees and the public have prompted the NRC's decision to revise the post-TMI requirement related to establishing indication of hydrogen concentration injontainment.
The Confirmatory Order of March 14,1983 imposed requirements upon the Licensee for having continuous indication of hydrogen concentration in the containment atmosphere provided in the control room, as described by TMI Action Plan Item II.F.1, Attachment 6. Subsequently, by letter dated January 18,1984, the NRC approved an exception to this requirement which allowed the containment hydrogen monitor system (CHMS) indicator and the CHMS indicator-recorder to be located in the CR-3 emergency feedwater initiation and control room. Information about hydrogen concentration supports the Licensee's assessments of the degree of core damage and whether a threat to the integrity of the containment may be posed by combustion of the hydrogen gas. TMl Action item II.F.1, Attachment 6 states:
If an indication is not available at all times, continuous indication and recording shall be functioni,,
G.....m.2f the initiation of safe'y injection.
Thir. requirement to have indication of the hydrogen concentration h containment within 30 minutes following the start of an accident has defined both design and operating
characteristics for hydrogen monitoring systems at nuclear power plants since the implementation of NUREG-0737. In addition, the technical specifications of most nuclear power plants and NRC regulations at 10 CFR 50.44, " standards for combustible gas control system in light-water-cooled power reactors," require availability of hydrogen monitors.
By letter dated April 14,1999, Florida Power Corporation requested relief for CR-3 from the requirement to have indication of hydrogen concentration in containment within 30 minutes of the initiation of safety injection. Specifically, the Licensee requested a risk-informed functional requirement for providing indication of hydrogen concentration in containment. The technical basis for this request was that a delay in providing indication of hydrogen concentration in containment would provide more margin for the operators to complete accident assessment and mitigation duties, before redirecting the:r attention to longer-term recovery actions. The licensee indicated that the delay would have a positive effect on the ability of operators to respond to an event by enabling them to concentrate on important immediate action steps. The licensee further indicated that there would be no negative effect, since the actions for which hydrogen monitoring would be used were not needed for more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after an accident, and in addition, other indications would be available to the operators for use in recognizing and classifying emergencies and issuing protective action recommendations to offsite authorities.
"On the basis of the NRC staff's review of information provided by the Licensee, j
consideration of the lessons learned since the TMI-2 accident pertaining to severe accident management and emergency planni[g, and in order to make NRC licensing and regulatory oversight more efficient, the staff concludes that the Licensee should have the flexibility and assume the responsibility for determining the appropriate time limit for indication of hydrogen concentration in containment, such that control room personnel are not distracted from more important tasks in the early phases of accident mitigation, and decisionmakers, mostly outsid$
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i the control room, are able to benefit from having useful information on hydrogen concentration.
Because the appropriate balance between control room activities and longer term management of the response to severe accidents can be best determined by the Licensee the NRC staff has determined that the Licensee may elect to acopt a risk-informed functional requirement in lieu of the current 30-minute time limit for indication of hydrogen concentration as imposed by the Order dated March 14,1983, and as desenbed by TMl Action item Il F.1, Attachment 6 in NUREG-0737. Other exceptions to item ll.F.6, recognizing the location of the CHMS indicator and indicator-recorder and phone used to initiate contact with the control room, shall remain part of the CR-3 licensing basis. The applicable functional requirement is as follows:
Procedures have been established for ensuring that indication of hydrogen concentration in the containment atmosphere is available in a sufficiently timely manner to support the role of the information in the Crystal River Unit 3 Emergency Plan (and related procedures) and related activities. Hydrogen monitoring will be initiated based on the appropriate priority for establishing indication of hydrogen concentration within containment in relation to other l
activities in the control room. Affected licensing basis documents and other related documents will be appropriately revised and/or updated in accordance with applicable NRC regulations.
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Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 103,104b,161b,161i,161o, and 182 of the Atomic l
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR Part 50, IT IS HERBY ORDERED that:
NRC LICENSE No. DPR-72 is modified as follows:
The Licensee may elect to either maintain the 30-minute time limit for indication of hydrogen in containment, as described by TMI Action Plan item II.F.'1, Attachment 6, in NUREG-0737 and required by the Confirmatory Order of March 14,1983, or modify the I
time limit in the manner specified in Section il of this Order.
The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, may, in writing, relax or rescind the above ccndition upon demonstration by the Licensee of good cause.
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Any person adversely affected by this Confirmatory Order, other than the Licensee, may request a hearing within 20 days of its issuance. Where good cause is shown, consideration will I
be given to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and include a statement of good cause for the extension. Any request for a hearing shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear e
Regubtory Commission, ATTN: Chief, Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Copies of the hearing request shall also be sent to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; to the Deputy Assistant General Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement at the same address; to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region 11,61 Forsyth Street, SW., Suite 23T85, Atlanta, Georgia 30303; and to R. Alexander Glenn, General Counsel, Florida Power. Corporation, MAC - ASA, P.O. Box 14042, St. Petersburg, Florida 33733-4042, attorney for the Licensee. If such a person requests a hearing, that person will set forth with particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely affected by this Order and will address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.714(d).
If the hearing is requested oy a person whose interest is adversely affected, the Commission willissue an Order designating the time and place of any hearing. If r hearing is held, the issue to be considered at such hearing will be whether this Confirmatory Order should be sustained.
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions specified in Section til above will be final 20 days from the date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an extension of time for
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. requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions specified in Section ill will be final when
.p the extension expires if a hearirig request has not been received.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
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P. Z erman, Acting Director ffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 16th Day of September 1999.
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Mr. John Paul Cowan CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT NO. 3 Florida Power Corporation cc:
Mr. R. Alexander Glenn Chairman Corporate Counsel (MAC-BT15A)
' Board of County Commissioners
- Florida Power Corporation Citrus County P.O. Box 14042 '
110 North Apopka Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33733-4042 Invemass, Florida 34450-4245 Mr. Charles G. Pardee, Director Ms. Sherry L. Bemhoft, Director Nuclear Plant Operations (PA4A)
Nuclear Regulatory Affairs (NA2H)
Florida Power Corporation Florida Power Corporation Crystal River Energy Complex Crystal River Energy Complex 15760 W. Power Line Street 15760 W. Power Line Street
' Crystal River, Florida 34428-6708 Crystal River, Florida 34428-6708 Mr. Michael A. Schoppman Senior Resident inspector Framatome Technologies Inc.
Crystal River Unit 3 1700 Rockville n.ke, Suite 525 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Rockville, Maryland 2085:r.
6745 N. Tallahassee Road Crystal River, Florida 34428
. Mr. William A; Passetti, Chief Department of Health Mr. Gregory H. Halnon Bureau of Radiation Control Director, Quality Programs (SA2C) 2020 Capital Circle, SE, Bin #C21 Florida Power Corporation Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1741 Crystal River Energy Complex 15760 W. Power Line Street Attorney General Crystal River, Florida 34428-6708 Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. Joe Myers, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 l
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