ML20216B677
| ML20216B677 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1987 |
| From: | Brown R, Russell Gibbs, Selewski M TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216B630 | List: |
| References | |
| C010900-SQN, C010900-SQN-R07, C10900-SQN, C10900-SQN-R7, NUDOCS 8706300130 | |
| Download: ML20216B677 (42) | |
Text
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i TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN I
SPECIAL PROGPAM REPORT TYPE: Seguoyah Nuclear Plant Element REVISION NUMBER:
7 (FINAL REPORT) i TITLE:
Cable PAGE 1 0F 37 REASON FOR REVISION:
Revised to incorporate TAS and SRP comments.
Revision 1 i
Revised to incorporate a new evaluation at SQN and NRC comments.
Revision 2 I
Revised to incorporate TAS, DNQA, and SRP comments.
Revision 3 Revised to incorporate SRP comments, further evaluations at Revision 4 j
SQN, line management responses, and to finalize report.
I Revised to incorporate revised CAP.
Revision 5 Revised to incorporate revised CAP.
Revision 6 Revised to incorporate revised CAP.
Revision 7 i
i PREPARATION PREPARED BY-b 6-/5'-f 7 m
4IGNATURE DATE
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l REVIEWS
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' DATE CONCURRENCES
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DATE APPROVED BY:
vfb. 6.M Chh-L. [@f91 N/A 4c4CSPMANAGER DATE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE g
CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY) 1365T B706300130 870622 DR ADDCK 050 7
i ir TVA EMPLOYEE' CONCERNS' REPORT-NUMBER:
C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM l:
' REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 2 0F 37
- i. INTRODUCTION The following concerns have been evaluated in relation to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) specific and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) generic issues. relative to all areas;of the cable program:
WBN GENERIC.
SQN SPECIFIC CABLE PULLING Splicing (1 concern)
MAS-85-003 Minimum Bend Radius'(1 concern)
Maximum Pull Tension and JLH-86-002 Sidewall Pressure (21 concerns)
EX-85-076-003 Insulat!co, Damage (I concern).
EX-85-086-001 00-85-005-014' j
IN-85-213-001 IN-85-255-001' IN-85-295-003 IN-85-325-005-IN-85-433-002 IN-85-436-004 IN-85-581-001 IN-85-733-001 IN-85-856-005 IN-85-935-001 IN-85-978-001 IN-86-028-001 IN-86-199-001' IN-86-201-001 IN-86-259-001 IN-86-259-004 IN-86-262-003 XX-85-008-001 XX-85-094-004 Minimum Bend Radius (3 concerns)
EX-85-157-002 IN-86-266-006-WI-85-100-013
,u
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1
1 o
TVA-EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C030900-SQN j
SPECIAL PROGRAM j
REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 3 0F 37
)
i I.
INTRODUCTION (Continued)
WBN GENERIC Cable Coating (3 concerns)
IN-86-259-005 IN-86-268-002 OW-85-007-004 i
480-volt Receptacle (1 concern)
IN-85-009-001
-l Nuclear Instrumentation System j
'(NIS) Cable (1 concern)
IN-85-120-001-Firebarrier (2 concerns)'
IN-85-018-004 XX-85-094-005' j
Cable Routing (2 concerns)
IN-85-300-002
{
IN-86-268-003-
]']
Splicing (1 concern)
^
IN-86-314-005 Terminations (2' concerns) 4 I-85-101-WBN j
PH-85-003-N32-d l
II.
SUMMARY
OF PERCEIVED PROBLEM The perceived problems evaluated in this element report are:
i Cable pulling - Allowable limits for maximum pull' tension-(MPT),
cable sidewall pressure (SWP), and minimum bend radius (MBR) have i'
been exceeded.
Cable coating - Flamemastic 77 has been-applied-thicker than j
specified by site procedures allowing too much heat buildup in cable trays. It has also been removed from cables with sharp instruments-which resulted in.possible cable damage.
Firebarriers - Inadeguate controls.andfimproper tools'have been used i
to breach firebarriers (Room Temperature, Vulcanizing (RTV) silicone foam).in wall and floor penetrations.
i
I
'TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS.
' REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN-
.1
~SPECIAL PROGRAM-l tV
' REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 4 0F 37
.II.
SUMMARY
OF PERCEIVED PROBLEM (Continued).
i l
Insulation damage - Insulation was mistakenly cut off of,a 440-volt-l cable which feeds the back flow or discharge gate hoist motor-(part
{
I of'. Condenser Circulating Water-(CCW) System), and was' incorrectly' repaired using electrical tape.
480-volt receptacles - Receptacles have not been properly sized for-
~
Division of Nuclear Engineering-(DNE).specified wire" size for-receptacles found throughout:the; plant.
Cable routint - Cables were improperly' routed outside of cable trays.
Splicing-(MAS-85-003) - This covered;a specific instance.of an
'j improper splice.
]
'1 Splicing (IN-86-314-005) - There was improper splicing-at the plant site.
Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Cables - Cables were not' l
supported for long distances after..they exited.the raceway to the' NIS detectors.
l Terminations - AMP Diamond Grip Insulated Terminal-LugsL-(PIDG) which were designed for use with stranded wire were'used.on solid wire leads.
List of Evaluators Lead Evaluator Rob Brown Evaluator
' Guy Huff Mike Shirey
-Beth Selewski Chris Haerr.
III. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
- - It was determined whether or not other investigations had been.
performed on these issues..
The expurgated Employee ConcernsLTask Group _(ECTG) files were' reviewed'to determine'if additional informati~on was available to:
- l assist'in evaluation.
't i
tf i
q
I TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN o
SPECIAL PROGRAM j
REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 5 0F 37 III.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (Continued)
Cable Pulling Sidewall Pressure (SWP) and Maximum Pull Tension (MPT) i R. W. Cantrell's memorandum to C. C. Mason, dated December 2, 1985
{
(B43 851203 915) was reviewed to determine the significance of j
Division of Nuclear Engineering's (DNE) program for addressing
/
Class 1E installed cables.
Modifications and Additions Instruction M&AI-04 " Control, Power, and j
Signal Cables," Revision 8, was reviewed to determine the site j
requirements for monitoring maximum pull tension.
1 NSRS Report I-85-06-WBN was reviewed to determine the inadequacies cited in TVA's cable pulling program, and to determine if findings, conclusions, e.nd recommendations were adequate.
R. M. Pierce's memorandum to K. W. Whitt dated July 8, 1985 (F01 850708 604), " Nuclear Safety Review Staff Investigations of an 1
Employee Concern Regarding Cable Routing, Installation, and Inspection Practices - NSRS Report Number I-85-06-WBN" was reviewed to determine the NSRS recommendations regarding the adequacy of the i
program for cable pulling.
" Cable Sidewall Bearing Pressure Test" conducted by the Division of Operations Support Central Laboratories Service Branch was reviewed to determine test results.
SQN Generic Concerns Task Force (GCTF) Report titled, " Overfill of Cable Trays and Conduits," was reviewed to evaluate the findings and conclusions of that report concerning conduit overfill.
SQN GCTF Report titled, "Overtensioning and Minimum-Bend Radius Violations of Cables Due to Improper Cable Installation Methods,"
was reviewed to evaluate the findings and conclusions of that report concerning sidewall pressure and maximum pull tension concern issues.
Discussions were conducted with cognizant Modifications engineers involved with cable pulling.
W. S. Raughley's memorandum to J. A. Raulston dated September 2, 1986 (B43 860903 905) was reviewed to determine DNE's response to the NRC's request for information in their letter dated August 4, i
1986, to Steven A. White with regard to sidewall bearing pressure concerns.
f TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS
- REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN.
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 6 0F 37
.III.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (Continued)
Discussions were conducted'with cognizant DNE design engineers involved in walkdowns and. calculations addressing conduits with multiple bends between cable pull points which could cause excessive SWP.
DNE calculation.SQN-E12-015 (B25 860724 801) titled " Identifying Sidewall Pressure Violations" was reviewed to determine how SWP was analyzed at SQN and to determine calculation results.
Minimum Bend Radius (MBR)
Site procedure M&AI-4, all revisions, General Construction-Specification G-38, Revision 8, and Design Specification DS-E12.1.5,,
" Minimum Radii for Field Installed Insulated Cable. Rated 15,000 Volts.and Less," were reviewed to determine' applicable requirements for MBR at SQN.
Two personnel knowledgeable of the design, construction, and operation of SQN were interviewed to determine if any work had been done concerning MBR violations at SQN.
SQN GCTF Report titled, "Overtensioning and Minimum Bend Radius Violation of Cables Due to Improper Cable Installation Methods," was reviewed to determine the findings and conclusions relative to this evaluation.
Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) Report:I-85-06-WBN was reviewed
.j to determine the findings and recommendations applicable to this i
evaluation.
W. S. Raughley's memorandum dated September 2, 1986 (B43 860903 904) j titled " Class 1E Cable Bend Radius" was ~ reviewed to determine what additional work needed to be completed before Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's restart concerning the bend radius of Class'1E cables.
With respect to concern JLH-86-002, the NQA supervisor at.SQN was interviewed on what corrective' actions have been generated as.a-result of the concern.
SQ-CAR-86-02-005 was reviewed for the actions taken to answer R
JLH-86-002.
Cable Coating i
Site personnel.in Modifications (1) and Electrical Maintenance (3).
1 were interviewed about the existence of procedures for the removal.
of Flamemastic cable coating and if they-had removed Flamemastic in the past.
L
r.;
1 J
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS
' REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN
. SPECIAL PROGPJLM REVISION NUMBER: 7 j
l PAGE 7 0F 37
)
i
.i III.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (Continued)
M&AI-13 Revision 6 and SQN Inspection. Instruction (II) A4,
)
Revision 1 and Revision 6, were reviewed for any precautions against the use of sharp instrumenh to remove Flamemastic'and for acceptance criteria for the.
-*h of coating to be' applied.
i The SQN Generic Concerns Task Force Report on OW-85-007-004 and IN-86-262-002 was reviewed for: adequacy'of findings and 1
1 conclusions.. Reviewed the Joslyn Research Center Report on the use of Flamemastic~for information' relative.to'this evaluation.
Members'of the WBN ECTG walked down-trays in the cable Spread R'oom.
]
for evidence of excessive' depth of cable coating.
l
)
.a The responsible DNE engineer was interviewed on the steps that'had-
.]
been taken to initiate a sampling program to. verify the adequacy of
.y ar'pacity of the installed cables..
Firebarriers (Site Procedure Control)
Surveillance Instruction, SI-233.1, Revision.0, " Visual Inspection-of Penetration Fire Barriers - Mechanical" was reviewed.
Surveillance Instruction, SI-233.2, Revision 0, " Visual ~ Inspection-of Penetration Fire-Barriers - Electrical" was reviewed.
Physical Security Instruction, PHYSI-13. Revision 48, " Fire" was reviewed.
The Safety Supervisor was interviewed on the' subjects of penetrations, SI-233.1, SI-233.2, and control of breaching. His section prepared SI-233.1, SI-233.2, and PHYSI-13.
Firebarriers (Breaching Tools)
Modifications and Addition Instruction,'M&AI-13. Revision 6,-
" Electrical Pressure Seal, Firestop Barrier, and Flame Retardant Cable Coating" was reviewed.
A responsible Modifications > supervisor was interviewed on the'.
subject of breaching ~ electrical penetrations.
I
. A responsible general foreman was interviewed on the subject ~ of breaching electrical penetrations.
o
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
7 I
PAGE 8 0F 37 III.
EVALUATION HETHODOLOGY (Continued)
Insulation Damage i
Personnel knowledgeable of the equipment at SQN were interviewed to i
determine the location and function of the discharge gates hoist motors specific to this evaluation.
Observation of the supply cables on the above motors was performed to determine their status and condition.
g i
Workplan 11043 and Engineering Change Notice (ECN) L5720 were reviewed to determine what work had been done on the cables and what were the changes and reason for changes of the ECN.
The SQN system 27 Systems engineer was interviewed on the method used to de-energize the gate hoist motors.
480-volt Receptacles A walkdown was conducted with two electricians to determine the manufacturer and model number of 480-volt receptacles in the fifth diesel generator area.
Discussions were conducted with the cynizant DNE procurement supervisor to determine the acceptable cable diameter range for the receptacles found in the walkdown.
Discussions were conducted with a cognizant Electrical Maintenance engineer to determine the cable diameter for number 2 wire.
Cable Routing II-28, " Cable Pulling Inspection," Revision 4, M&AI-04, " Control.
Power and Signal Cables," Revision 0 through Revision 8, G-38,
" Installing Insulated Cables Rated Up to 15,000 Volts," Revision 8, SOP-104, " Electrical Cable Installation," Revision 1, and E-6,
" Cable Storage and Installation," Revision 0 through Revision 7, were reviewed for information on the acceptability of running cables outside of cable trays.
Two Modifications electrical engineers and two DNE onsite engineers were interviewed on the acceptability of running cables outside of cable trays and on the removal of temporary cables, i
The DNE engineer responsible for revisions to G-38 was interviewed on the interpretation given to step 3.2.1.8.2(b) regarding the acceptability of routing cable outside cable trays-.
A walkdown of cable trays in the Cable Spread Room was conducted to locate examples of improperly routed cables.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS'
' REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN
-]
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
7 l
PAGE 9 0F 37 l
i 1
III.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (Continued) j 1
Splicinr (MAS-85-003)
Discussions were conducted with a cognizant Electrical Maintenance engineer in regards to split insulation on cable to the CS Component Cooling System (CCS) pump that had been taped during construction.
Maintenance Request (MR) A561116 was reviewed to-determine if the j
splice had been reworked using a Raychem sleeve.
J q
Splicing (IN-86-314-005) i A discussion was conducted with the cognizar.t SQN DNE engineer on the disposition of Nonconformance Reports (NCR) 6208, 6224, 6536 6623, and 6774.
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant individual responsible-for the SQN Experience Review Program on the disposition of NCR 6208/6224.
1 A discussion was conducted with cognizant DNE n'uclear licensing and
~
i Electrical Engineering Branch (EEB) personnel on the generic applicability of NCR 6623/6774.
Applicable DNE and site documentation of the generic applicability-j of NCR 6623/6774 was reviewed for actions taken at SQN on the' subject.
A discussion was conducted with SQN DNE and EEB engineers.with
{
respect to the disposition of NCR 6623/6774.
1 Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Cable j
The SQN GCTF Report on concern IN-85-120-001 was revi. awed to.
evaluate the findings and conclusions of that report concerning the-supports for NIS cable.
Terminations NSRS Report I-85-101-WBN,." Improper Termination Techniques," was reviewed to. evaluate the finding, conclusion, and. recommendation.
pertaining to SQN concerning the use of PIDG lugs for termination of; discrete electrical components with solid wire leads.
A memorandum from H. G. Parris to'K. W. Whitt dated September 13, 1985 (A02 850904 010), was reviewed to discover what corrective action was specified to resolve the NSRS recommendations' in I-85-101-WBN.
t
a TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN
{
SPECIAL PROGRAM j
REVISION NUMBER:
7
)
PAGE 10 0F 37 j
III.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (Continued)
Potential Generic Condition Evaluation memorandums (B43 850923 916 j
and B25 851008 015) for SCR WBNEEB6537 and a memorandum from j
H. G. Parris to Those listed, dated September 13, 1985 j
(A02 850905 009), were reviewed to discover the generic applicability j
of the subject SCR and what section was responsible for corrective
]
action.
A discussion was conducted with the responsible Electrical Maintenance engineer concerning the corrective action taken in relation to j
SCR WBNEEB8537.
j l
A discussion was conducted with the responsible Compliance engineer J
concerning the status of the question raised pertaining to PIDG lugs
)
on surge suppression networks.
j A discussion was conducted with the responsible DNE engineer on the status of the decision to be made on whether or not to replace the PIDG lugs on solenoid valve surge suppression networks.
]
A preliminary memorandum from D. W. Wilson to P. R. Wallace dated October 24, 1986 was reviewed for more detail on the DNE response to replacing PIDG lugs on surge suppression networks.
1 i
d IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS
]
Cable pulling (MPT and SWP)
Review of R. W. Cantrell's memorandum to C. C. Mason dated December 2, 1985, revealed the purpose of the evaluation was to collect and review 1
operational, maintenance, and surveillance test data on cable from TVA's operating plants and any readily available equivalent data from other outside sources to determine if cable failures could be attributed to-past cable pulling practices. As a result of the evaluation, DNE determined that no cable failures could be attributed to past cable b
pulling practices, i.e., violations of the minimum bending radius ~or maximum allowable sidewall pressure. The following statement was given in an executive summary attached to the memorandam:
"From the evaluation, DNE concludes.that past Class 1E cable installations could not adversely affect startup, operation, or safe shutdown capabilities. DNE.has used historical data, ongoing surveillance requirements and a random failure concept to arrive at this conclusion."
I
k TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 11 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
For specifics on representative cable test data, see Section II titled,
" Collection and EvaluationHof Cable Test Data" of the above mentioned-memorandum.
Review of M&AI-4 revealed the following statement concerning mechanical assistance on cable pulls:
"On pulls requiring mechanical assistance, the craft foreman shall notify'the cognizant engineer that mechanical' assistance will be required on that particular cable pull. The cognizant engineer will in
' turn perform'the sizing of-the pull rope and necessary calculations (refer to sections 6.3.1 and 6.4.1) prior.to'the cable pull."
Methods for determining the maximum pulling force were given in section 6.0.
Table 6.2~.1.3.c provided manila break rope sizes for various conductor sizes.
Non-Class 1E cables were not monitored for maximum pull tension nor
' sidewall pressure.
NSRS Report I-85-06-WBN was reviewed and three problem areas of the cable program were found that were applicable to this evaluation:
(1) the. fact that TVA did not include sidewall pressure (SWP) calculations in their cable pull procedure, (2) the way TVA defined their method of calculating maximum pull tension (MPT) on multi-cable pulls, and (3) the way DNE resolved the question of exceeding minimum bend radius.
The NSRS recommendations consisted of establishing values for pulling and training radii that were fully supported by manufacturer's test data.
These values were to be used to disposition NCRs on the subject. The report suggested a sample at WBN, (the plant to which the report was written) Unit 1 for Class 1E cables for inspection of. pulling and training radii.
If the evaluation failed to' justify the-as-installed conditions, then it was suggested that a formal'in-service surveillance / inspection program be considered.
A review of "NSRS Investigation of an Employee Concern Regarding Cable Routing. Installation, and Inspection Practices" revealed the following conclusion and recommendation'concerning the adequacy for cable pulling:
"The DNE and Nuclear Construction established and documented-program was determined to be inadequate to accomplish the cable pull activities. The past and'present programs have been inadeguate -
inconsistent, and in violation of the accepted industry. standards and practices."-
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN
-SPECIAL PROGRAM.
REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 12 0F 37 j
'l IV.
SUMMARY
OF-FINDINGS (Continued) l "DNE management should revise G-38 and-G-40 to incorporate resolutions.
to the identified problems discussed in this report; and, subsequently, WBN DNE, NU CON, and ONP management should revise the relevant DNE documents, as well as NU CON and ONP procedures.
The final adequacy of
.]
the present cable installation should then be evaluated per revised acceptance criteria."
A similar program to that given for. pulling and training radius was also suggested.
l
" Cable Sidewall Bearing Pressure Test" was reviewed, and the objective j
and results are summarized below:
/
i The objective.of the test was to determine the maximum Sidewell Bearing 1
Pressure (SWBP)-possible on cable pulls without cable degradation.
Representative samples of power, control, signal and instrument, and coaxial cables from TVA's nuclear power plants.were pulled through a conduit test setup containing four horizontal 90-degree bends.
The applied tension was controlled and measured.during each cable. sample pull to achieve maximum SWBP. With_the exception of the larger power-cables, size No. 2 and larger, each cable was tensioned to near its ultimate breating strength. The maximum SWBP values achieved are summarized in the following table:
Cable Types Maximum SWBP 1
(1bs/ft).
1 Power Cables The cable with the lowest tensile strength 1398 The cable with the highest tensile strength-3104 Control Cables The cable with the lowest tensile strength 602 The cable with the highest tensile strength 1831 Signal and Instrument Cables:
The cable with the lowest tensile strength
.447 The cable with the highest tensile strength-
'1496-i i
l TVA' EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT. NUMBER: C010900-SQN j
SPECIAL PROGRAM PAGE 33 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
Cable Types.
Maximum-SWBP_
(1bs/ft) j Coaxial Cables 1
The cable with the lowest tensile strength 373' The cable with the highest tensile strength 1242 After. pulling, the cables were inspected, dimensioned, and outer-jackets were removed from multi-conductors.
They were then subjected to dielectric breakdown tests (see section 6.0 of the.above mentioned test
'{
for the acceptance criteria).
1 1
"All cables met the established acceptance criteria."
Review of GCTF report titled, " Overfill of Cable Trays and Conduits "
revealed the following:
~
There'was no computer program check or QA records kept on the total-cross sectional area fill of cables in conduits.
l SCR SQNEEB8529 was generated to document conduit. overfill of 55 conduits at Sequoyah. The recommendation for the disposition-was use-as-is. Tests and-inspections were performed on the cables in.
question, and no damage was revealed. The SCR was closed out on January 28, 1986. However, in the time since then, it was discovered that the cable diameters used in the cable fill program were not auditable. For this reason,; cable diameters were measured at TVA Singleton Labs for various cable samples and sizes. The i
cable diameter data was distributed to each Engineering Project in' TVA Design Standard DS-E12.1.13.
SQN Engineering Project was in the process of incorporating the new values into_their conduit fill program. NCRs will be written on any conduits where SWP has been exceeded.
Review of GCTF report titled "Overtensioning and Minimum Bend-Radius-Violations of Cables Due to Improper Cable Installation Methods,"
I revealed the following conclusion stated in the report:
"The NSRS Recommendation No. I-85-06-WBN-02 and the DNE walkd'wn o
procedure are appropriate actions-to determine if."Overtensioning of Cables" is a problem at SQN."
The evaluation agreed with the findings of the. report.
o
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN j
SPECIAL PROGRAM
)
REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 14 0F 37 j
IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
Discussions were conducted with a cognizant Modifications engineer concerning monitoring of MPT during cable pulls. The following information was obtained.
MPT had been monitored in the past using break ropes and other devices. General Construction
]
Specification G-38 was recently revised which changed the way MPT j
and SWP were determined. The majority of the cable were pulled before these changes and were pulled by the old requirements.
Concerning cable pulls with trucks, cherry pickers, or other devices, the use of a mechanical device was acceptable when pull tensions were monitored by break ropes or dynamometers. The use of a choker was also acceptable for safety purposes only. The choker was used to prevent the cable from whipping out and hitting personnel if the break rope broke.
Review of W. S. Raughley's memorandum to J. A. Raulston dated j
1 September 2, 1986, revealed the following response to the NRC's request for information concerning the methods used by TVA in determining the acceptability of sidewall pressure exerted on j
Class IE cable:
i i
"The purpose of the calculations was to determine acceptability of j
sidewall bearing pressures exerted on Class 1E cables in existing
.{
conduits. All Class 1E (approximately 10,400) conduits were evaluated through preliminary screening and field inspection."
i Note: Data was taken from WBN assumed worst-case conduit configurations to determine the SWBP test set-up.
" PRELIMINARY SCREENING The screening analysis was performed as follows:
(1)
Developed a list of assumed worst-case configurations based on vertical conduit with four 90 degree bends in pulling end of conduit. The cable pull was assumed to be upward.
See figure:
1 3" Conduit lh 3 Cables We =1.4 y
K = 0.42
(
R = 0.955 Ft
}
a = 90* (1.57 rad)
-bj Sidewall bearing pressure i
(SWP) = 300 lbs/ft Q'4 (Conservatively assumed)
~
4 Wr Cable weight per foot
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS--
. REPORT' NUMBER:.. C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 15 0F 37-IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
(2)
Calculated maximum pulling tension allowable to avoid-exceeding sidewall bearing pressure limits (300 lbs/ft for power and control; 100 lbs/ft'for instrumentation)
EXAMPLE:
T=
3(SWP)R-(3We -2)
T = 391 lbs. for above figure (3)
Calculated length of conduit in terms of W that would correspond with allowable sidewall bearing pressure limits.
This_was done for all the conduit sizes and number of cables in each conduit.
EXAMPLE:
T1'= WL1 T =T1 eKa = T1
( 1.93) 2 T =T2 eKa = T1
( 3.72) 3 T =T3 eE8 =
T
-( 7.18) 1 4
(13.86) = WL (13.86)
T =T4 eKa = T1 1.
5 28.21 391-Li=
T5
=
=
(13.86)(W)
(13.86)W W
(4)
Screened the conduit schedule for. lengths exceeding the.
~
calculated lengths by using nominal weights of cables. A large number of extremely short cables were eliminated from further analysis because they.were shorter than'the. length of four 90 degree bends.
The original number of 10,400 conduits was. reduced during the preliminary. screening process to a list of 1914 conduits requiring further evaluation.
Conservatism was used in the screening method because:
(a) Sidewall bearing pressure' criteria was 300 lb./ft. ' Test.
results of 600 - 1500 lb./ft. were later' reported.
(b) Four conduit bends were assumed back to back. Using a more typical conduit with bends distributed-throughout the conduit could result-in pulling tensions.1/2 to 1/4-of tho'se in screening.
(c) Initial conduit section assumed to be-vertical. This assumption doubled the resultant tension as compared to pulling through a horizontal section-(which is far more typical)."
l'
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C030900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM t
REVISION NUMBER:
7' PAGE 16 0F. 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued) 1 q
FIELD INSPECTION Obtained a sample size of 81 worst-case conduits at WBN for.
detailed calculations (approximately 20 conduits per voltage The worst case conduits were selected by visual level).
J inspection of 778 conduits using the criteria of multiple berAs -
(>360*), long lengths, elevation chang's and conduit fill (>301).
e (EEB Engineering Procedure 22.29).
Discussions with two.DNE cognizant engineers revealed TVA-selected-and conducted a walkdown of 16 conduits at.SQN which should meet the worst case configurations to determine whether the ellowable sidewall pressure (SWP) or MPT for cable in conduit had been-sl exceeded. The conduit configurations were' tabulated, isometric
]
sketches were drawn, and cable pull cards were obtained for SWP<
calculations.
]
1 1
Review of SQN-E2-015 titled " Identifying Sidewall. Pressure Violations" revealed calculations were performed:by DNE for SQN to determine if sidewall pressure inside conduits had exceeded.
~
1 allowable limits.
Sixteen conduits were se1ected as indicated in:
the above mentioned walkdown. The conduits were assumed to be.
The calculation concluded that all of the calculated worst-case.
sidewall pressure and pulling tension values were within the.
]
prescribed guidelines.
~!
At the writing of this report, DNE's evaluation of-sidewall pressure and.MPT was not yet complete. DNE was involved in contract negotiations with a third party. engineering company to evaluate the sampling' program mentioned above.
Final resolution of the SWP and MPT' issues addressed for-all TVA nuclear plants depend on DNE's: final response.
Because of the ongoing DNE evaluation process, no further information was avallable concerning thejresolution of this issue.
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1 TVA' EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN f
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
7-1
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PAGE 17 0F 37 d
i l
IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
)
==
Conclusion:==
l MPT and SWP issues were verified.
The program inadequacies were
)
identified in NSRS report I-85-06-WBN and later addressed in SQN GCTF report titled "0vertensioning and Minimum Bend Radius Violations j
of Cables Because of Improper Cable Installation Methods." To provide a resolution, DNE was actively evaluating sidewall bearing pressure to determine the acceptability of installed Class 1E cables.
i TVA's Central Laboratory conducted a test to determine acceptable SWP limits using representative cable samples from SQN, BFN, and BLN l
and surveys from sections of assumed worst-case; conduits at WBN.
j The test results were favorable since SWP limits were reported j
between 600 to 1500 pounds / foot while TVA's prescribed guidelines were from 100 to 300 pounds / foot. To verify the installed cable at l
SQN, DNE selected 16 worst-case conduits, performed walkdowns to develop isometric sketches, and then performed calculations.
The initial calculation results were favorable since SWP and MPT j
values were within TVA's prescribed guidelines. While actions j
appeared to be complete, the sampling program used to determine
]
worst-case conduits was in question.
For this reason, TVA 1
was involved in contract negotiations with a third-party-l engineering company to evaluate the methods used to select the worst 1
case conduits.
Until further evaluation is complete and NSRS report I-85-06-WBN is addressed, SWP and MPT issues will remain open.
(CATDs 10900-NPS-01, 10900-NPS-05, and 10900-SQN-03) l Minimum Bend Radius Design standards, site procedures, and construction specifications were reviewed and those found applicable for cable MBR installation guidelines are listed below:
Design Standard DS-E12.1.5 M&AI-4 Construction Specification G-38 i
~-
'TVA EMPLOTEE CONCERNS' REPORT NUMBER: CM 0309-SQN h'
,-~
'SPECIAL PROGRAM
^
~
REVISION. NUMBER:
7 PAGE 18 0F 37 IV. '
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
Four concerns were evaluated ccncerning iinimum bend radius (MBR).
1 Interviews with two personnel involved in both the design and construction-of SQN and knowlednenble of the proble.m concerning'MBR, revealed that i
some attention had been given to this issue at SQN.
Review of NSRS Report I-85-06-WBN revealed the FSF.S conducted a
-m comprehensive review.of cable bend radius isspes for installations between 1979 through.1985. The report questioned the way DNE' i
resolved the issue of exceeding manufacturecs' requirements for.
1 i
cable bend radius. The NSRS recommendation consisted of. establishing values for training radji that'were fully supported by manufacturer test' data. -(See discussion given below for W. S. Raughley's memorandum dated September 2,1986 for action taken concerning this
]
issue.)
The SQN GCTF report orf MFT and MBR was reviewed and no pertinent-information was disccrered.
Interviews with personnel involved in'the installation of cable at SQN as well as some limited field evaluitioniindicated'that violattons of MBR requirements existed.
j Review of W. S. Raughley's memorandum ceaed September 2,1986,.
i titled " Class 1E Cable Bend Radius" reverJed the purpne of the memorandum was to provide direction to esch project concerning specific work actions which were necessary to resolve concerns on l'
biend radii of Class 1E cables before'each plant could operate. The' following direction was given pertaining to SQN:
i
'The Electrical Engineering' Branch has evaluated'the adequacy.of l I
the bend radius to which Class IE cables wen installed. The basis for the evaluation was the comprehensife' investigation conducted by'the Nuclear Safety Review Staff sa the same. subject i
during February to April 1985. The measures!specified herein are.
ex'pected to comprise the majority of:any project. specific-l corrective actions resulting from this investigation.
EEB's final j
report documenting the evaluation and providing. conclusions'and j
s recommendations based upon.an independent: review of our evaluation' will'be issued in September 1986.: '{ Discussion on November 14 "19861 with the DNE Engineer responsible for preparing this1 report j
revekled.the report was not complete'because DNE was; concentrating-q on ampacity calculations.).
q Each project should proceed.immediately to-perform the following
]
j inspections, as applicable, and to 'fo'rward the results to the-respective engineering pr.ojects.
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y..
. REPORT. NUMBER:.C010900-SQN
!l
.TVA EMPLOYEF,CONCERNE.
l
'SPECIAL PROGRAM 1
REVIS1bN 'NbtfBER:
7 f
PAGE-19 0F 37 s
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'IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)~
3 l
4 (1). (Instructions. pertained to WBN'and BLN only).
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(2) All projects sha11' perform.a field inspection o' all conduits.
{
containing Class IEJ medium. voltage' power cables for the U
existence of any. straight'-through pull: box oriconduit type (C,' ELL', TEE, etc.) raceway fitting or any cynduit raceway, fitting other than a standard.condult bend arcend $hich a' cable isLbent. The' existence. of any such.I\\ttings, includink '
- H the raceway number and. size, the fitting'd d eription, manufacturer (if w allable) and size, and tde lointion'shall oe documented as alnonconformance'ani. forwarded'to tho' respectiv( engineerinc" project for'd position.
j (3) All projects shall determine the min!pum size conduit that-the following coaxial.: triaxial', anc.byinarial. cables, if utilized =in Class 1E applications.and routed-in conduit, are.
installed'in. If any of these cablesare installed in j
Class IE applications and in a conduit smaller than indicated-1
~
N below, the pr'oject shall perform a field--inspection for the I
existence of conduits of..any' type (ELL. TEE, etc.)Ein which l
the cable is bent.. The existence of any such fittings,-
including the raceway number and' size, the fitting' i
. description, manufacturer (if available) and. size and the:
location shall. M dccumented as-a nonconformance-and
.j 1
forwarded to the respective ' engineering project'for l
disposition.
In addition. each project shalleverify that1the following list includes all coaxial, triarial,..and twinarial 4'
cables installet,in Class 1E applications. A positive statement to this effee.t on h-list [of additional: cable mark numbers shall be addressed to my 'atext: ion.
g.
i 4
. Minimum Conduit i Y Size (Inches) l Cable Mark No.
Description 3
WTJ Coax RG6A/U.
\\.
2 WTJ-5 1/c #21 Coax,So.',id Cu Clad' Steel 2.
WTK
'#22 Coax'PG59B/D' 1-1/2.
WIK Coax RG59B/U Xte' 1/2 i
WTL Coax RG216/0'Mxcept 3 Shields 3,
yl WTL-4' Coax's!' ohm'#22 AWG 1/2' r
3 WIM.
Coax EG114A/U Except 3' Shields & ST WIM-6 1/c Coax #26' 7. Strands '_LOCA.
3 s;
WTY-1
- 21 AWG, Coax, RG58C/U 1-1/03
'3,
WTU'
- 20 Triar FG'11/U
' WTN Trlar RG-59U,#22, 2' Shields LOCA-2, j
'WTN-1 Triax Similar to RG11/ULLOCA 3
3 --
. WIN-2 Twinax RG22B/U WK TP,#22 W/SH TP #20 2/c #22 2 @ ax p
a u.
x*
.~.
4 '
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- -
i s i TVA EMPLOYEE 10NCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGP.AM'
't REVISION NUMBER:
-7 pAGE 20 0F 37 JV
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
(4). The Watts Bar project shall; perform a field inspection of all-
. ' Class 1E coaxial, twinarial, and triaxial cables which were installed or modified during the period of May 25, 1979'to May 18, 1981, under the' guidance of Design Information Request (DIR) No. E-9.
In addition,'all projects shall inspect all Class 1E coa'xial and twinaxial cables which were installed or modified during:the period'of September-20, 1983 to April 23,'1986, understhe direction cf DS-E12.1.5 Revision 0.
l The cable shall be veilfied to'be installed to.a bend radius-
-equal to 8 times its.outside diameter..This inspection need-s.
.not address the bend' radius in standard conduit. bends as this has been addrgssed generically in PIRGENEEB8605. The inspection of the bend radius in conduits:is covered in itemt3 above. Therefore, provided'the project establishes that all cable tray fittings were procured with a radius equal to or greater than 8 times the outside diameter of the largest cable in guestion or that the cable was restricted to use in conduit and that'all conduit bends meet'the minimum requirements of.
4 DS-E13.1.7, this inspection may be. limited.to cables in free air'(transitions from raceway to raceway or raceway-to equipment) and to the points of termination.
I All installations which do nut conform to the specified 8; times factor shall be.d.,cumented.as s'nonconformance.and forwarded to q
the respective engineering project for.; disposition. The documentation shall include the cable and,.if applicable, the' a
raceway number, the locat$on of the violation..the actual-installed bend radius and: the results offa~. visual inspection noting-any discernible stress on the cable jacket in the' area of b e bend or uny ripples in,the cable jacket which could
)
lacicate shield deformation.,
Tj Each Lead Engineer should prepare a fragnet. reflecting the indif fdual project's' approach ind schedule for. resolving these '
- \\
issues.
1
+
i Resolution of these concerns has been tied to plant restart and should be scheduled for. implementation accordin6 Y "
1 i
Due to the ongoing DNE evaluation process, no further_information.was.
3 available concerning the resolution of this issue.
j t.n interview was conducted with'the NQA supervisor-at SQN to..
determine what actions had been initiated as a result of:JLH-86-002.
This' concern specified violations of MBR'for.Conax connectors. The, superdsor stated that a survey had been! conducted as a result of.:
j' the condern. SQ-CAR-86-02-005-had'been-generated:on February 10, 19867 because of the discrepancies found.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:. C03 0900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 7 PAGE 21 0F 37 1
IV. '
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued) a SQ-CAR-86-02-005 was reviewed to discover what corrective actions had
{
occurred. The CAR stated that:
1
" Contrary to the requirements of M&AI-19 and the Conax.
(
-Vendor Manual IPS-725 not all Conax connectors were installed 1
with wire bend radii within allowable limits.
In addition,
.i M&AI-19 is not consistent with the vendor manual revision referenced in'the,EQ binder. Adherence to these requirements is-necessary to maintain equipment environmental-qualification."
The survey conducted due to JLH-86-002 had revealed three problem
)
areas:
-(
. (1) _Two valves were found to have excessive MBR during' maintenance
-l activities. These valves had been installed on WP 11077 R1.
A review of the workplans used to. install the Conax connectors revealed that three of them had been field complete before M&AI-19 (the ONP procedure used to install Conax connectors) i was written. Another workplan was found to have been written j
and approved before M&AI-19 was issued but was not field complete until after M&AI-19 was issued. No change to this workplan had been initiated to incorporate requirements for wire bend radii.
1 1
(2)'.Two work releases had been initiated to sample valves'for wire
. bend radii problems. 'Five of nine in unit 1 and'nine of nine in' i
~
unit 2 were unacceptable.-
]
(3) M&AI-19 had a different torquing seguence with'a'different final.
torque value than the Conax Vendor Manual-(IPS-725 Revision G) referenced in the EQ binder..
.j In response to item 3, a memorandum from B.!M. Patterson to
-R. A. Sessoms dated February 7.-.1986 (S01'860207 956) was initiated asking if the torguing seguence found in M&AI-19 wasieguivalent to the Revision'G of IPS-725 found in the EQ binder. The response (B70 860304 005) dated March 4, 1986 stated that the two sequences were-1 equivalent based on information from Conax Buffalo Corporation (B70 860226 100). The vendor-stated that the method;in M&AI-19 was a longer process for torquing than Revision G.
A memorandum from R. W. Olson to D. C. Craven dated March'26, 1986 (S02 860326 862) gave the corrective action ~for items:1 and 2 as inspection'of all field terminations.of Conax connectors. Those-
.found out of compliance-were to be reworked.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C020900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
7 q
PAGE 22 0F 37 i
IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
I SMIs 1-363-1 and 2-363-1 had been written to provide walkdown procedures for reinspection of the connectors (these SMIs were initiated by work releases B122261 and B106248). The reinspection was complete. SMIs 1-363-2 and 2-363-2 were initiated for all rework of Conax connectors.
The ECTG group for other sites which was evaluating the classical NSRS j
1 items interviewed SQN Hodifications personnel and discovered all rework was complete. The data packages had been sent to QA for review. They f
had been rejected because there was no Nuclear Performance Reliability Data System reporting. The packages were still in Modifications.
==
Conclusion:==
The MBR issue was verified. The issue was actively being evaluated by DNE. The program discrepancies were identified in NSRS report I-85-06-WBN mentioned above. SQN GCTF report titled z
"Overtensioning and Minimum Bend Rad;us Violations of Cables Because of Improper Cable Installation Methods," also identified the problem at SQN. Based upon the above findings, we concur with the SQN GCTF EEB's final report documenting the evaluation and providing report.
conclusions and recommendations will be required to provide a resolution to the minimum bend radius concerns.
(CATD 10900-NPS-01)
Concern JLH-86-002 was verified.
Conax connectors had been installed with excessive MBR. However, corrective action had been initiated. All rework was complete.
Cable Conting The use of sharp instruments to remove Flamemastic was never verified. ONP had no written method for removing Flamemastic, but through conversation with a cognizant general foreman, it was determined that it'was=not an approved practice to use sharp instruments to remove the coating.
He also stated they had
)
?
never removed Flamemastic except at penetrations where the cables were terminated.
Here the procedure was to flex the cable until the coating cracked and then peel it off.
There was some question that the Flamemastic coating had exceeded
{
the limits set by DNE for depth of coating. However, the examples i
noted in the spread room which appeared to have excessive coating were Non-QA trays (trays VCA, VCB, and WB). The safety-related trays were much neater in that the surface was smoother and was i
more evenly applied. In a review of the Joslyn Research Center.
)
report on the effects of Flamemastic on grouped cables, it was q
noted that this report was almost identical to the Factory Mutual Report on Vimasco and the same conclusions were reached. At WBN the above mentioned test did not appear to be adequate for the j
l i
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT' NUMBER: 'C010900-SQN i
SPECIAL PROGRAM.
f REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 23 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued) configurations in the plant, therefore the same recommendation is made for SQN as for WBN in NSRS report I-85-569-WBN. The recommendation consisted of testing using trays which were filled,'
as found at the plant sites.
New ampacity tables had been generated in DS-E12.6.3 which Jncluded the derating effects of cable coatings. As.a result of the changes made in these tables, the adequacy of ampacity of installed cables'was questioned. An interview with the responsible DNE engineer revealed'that a sampling program was to be. conducted to verify the adequacy of V3, V4, and V5 level cables installed' prior to the issuance of DS-E12.6.3, Revision O.
However, there was no procedure drafted for this program.
==
Conclusion:==
Based upon the above findings, the concern (IN-86-268-002) for the use of sharp instruments to remove Flamemastic was never verified.
Although the use of sharp instruments to remove Flamemastic was not verified, the potential existed that this'could occur because there was nothing in any site procedure preventing their use and no provision for assuring that there was no cable damage after the-coating was removed. The concerns (IN-86-259-005, OW-85-007-004) for Flamemastic coatings exceeding the limits set by-DNE for depth of coating were verified.
(CATDs 10900-NPS-04 10900-SQN-02, and 10900-SQN-04).
Firebarriers (Site Procedure Control)
(
'I Review of Surveillance Instructions (SI-233.1, Revision 0, " Visual Inspection of Penetration Fire. Barriers'- Mechanical," and y
SI-233.2, Revision 0, " Visual Inspection of Penetration Fire Barriers - Electrical"), and Physica1' Security Instruction, i
PHYSI-13. Revision 48, " Fire", along with an interview with the l
safety supervisor revealed the following:
t SQN had only one procedure for control of breaching fire barriers.
e i
This has been PHYSI-13, " Fire," Attachment F. " Procedure:for the Control of Breaching Fire Barriers." The condition of attempted 1
~2
- existed at SQN.
SQN has not'had a problem with' fire. barrier breaching control. ' Surveillance. instructions. arelin place at SQNLto verify the integrity of the penetration fire barriers.--
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM ~
REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 24 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
==
Conclusion:==
Based on the above findings, SQN had adequate procedures and control to verify the integrity of the penetration fire barriers.
Firebarriers (Breaching Tools) l l
M&AI-13, revision 6, stated that a metallic breaching tool may be used. The foreman must note and sign the data sheet that the metallic tool is free of burrs and sharp edges before use.
Both interviews had the following findings.
There was no known fish-hool tool for foam removal. As with the WBN ECTG Report, it was assumed that the concerned individual had meant to use the term fish tape. Fish tape had been used at SQN to breach the fire j
barriers. This was acceptable by M&AI-13. No problems were identified because of'the use of fish tape, l
==
Conclusion:==
Based upon the above findings, the concern was not verified. However, WBN MAI-14 had been revised on revision 6 to exclude the use of fish tape. Fiberglass or wooden rods were to be used to breach penetrations. This same change should be evaluated at SQN for inclusion in SQN M&AI-13.
(CATD 10900-NPS-02)
Insulation Damage This concern stated that insulation was mistakenly cut off of a 440-volt cable which fed the back flow or discharge gate hoist motor of the Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) system. Electrical tape was supposedly used to re-attach this insulation. The-concerned individual gave four motor numbers (1AA, IBB, 2AA, and 2BB) as well as four conduits (1-PL-6370-B, 1-PL-6360-A, 2-PL-6370-B, and 2-PL-6360-A).
Discussions with various personnel from the Electrical Engineering Branch-site, Electrical Maintenance, and Operations units revealed that these motors were used to control the gates which prevented the backflow of hot condenser circulating water to the intake when the Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) Pumps were located at the initial intake pumping station. This was a necessary precaution needed to maintain the ERCW supply temperature requirements. However, the ERCW s
I
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C030900-SQN I
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 25 0F 37 I
1 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued) pumps had been moved to a separate pumping station (ERCW pumping station) and the need for these backflow gates no longer existed.
Currently, these gates have been blocked in the open position and the subject cables have been de-energized.
l A field evaluation of these motors verified that they were numbered j
as the concerned individual stated, and they had been taken out of q
service as described above. This field evaluation did reveal a j
disconnected cable inside a control panel with a tag referencing l
Workplan 11043. A review of this workplan revealed that this work was done to remove several instruments from service. This wasA required according to Engineering Change Notice (ECN) L5720.
review of this ECN revealed that it gave the same information
{
j concerning these gates as that stated above.
The SQN system 27 Systems engineer was interviewed on the specifics of how the gate hoist motors had been removed from service. The engineer discovered that the breakers were open with a Caution Order sign attached.
==
Conclusion:==
Based upon the fact that the subject cables were not energized, and no longer needed, and had been taken out of service, the need for further action concerning this item was not required.
480-volt Receptacles A walkdown was conducted and. assisted by two electricians. During i
the walkdown, the electricians removed covers from two of the 480-volt receptacles in question. These were box 4097 (480-volt Receptacle-DSL Auxiliary Board C2-S)'and box 4100 (480-volt Receptacle - DSL Auxiliary Board C2-S),
Both of the receptacles I
were Crouse-Hinds model number AEQ 01648. Both of the receptacles were wired with 3 conductor number 2 wire. This was the only model number found in the fifth diesel generator area.
8 1
Discussions with the Procurement Section Supervisor (DNE) revealed that catalog information for Crouse-Hinds catalog number 4700 j
(catalog page IP-27), model number AEQ 1648 stated the cable j
diameter range for the receptacle was from 0.64 inches to 1.37 l
i
- inches, Discussions with an Electrical Maintenance engineer revealed the diameter of one number 2 wire is 0.476 inches.
By using TVA Cable Splice and Termination drawing number SD-E12.5.8, Revision 2, the evaluator determined that 3 conductor WMT wire now being used had a minimum diameter of 1.02 inches and a maximum of 1.30 inches.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS' REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN bl SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 26 0F 37
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IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
==
Conclusion:==
This investigation demonstrated the receptacles being used were rated for 3 conductor number 2 wire and therefore were not a problem.
Cable Routing From a review of site DNC and Modifications l instructions, no
' j specific references to maintaining cables in cable trays was discovered until M&AI-04 Revision 8,. dated December 31, 1985.
This was due to a misinterpretation of'G-38.
G-38 step 3.2.1.8.2(b) was-worded such that there was a difference of interpretation between i
site DNE and Modifications personnel and DNE personnel-in j
Knoxville. This difference was extremely significant because. site personnel believed before December 31, 1985, it was' acceptable to run
]
cable outside of cable trays while DNE in Knoxville said something-entirely different. The wording must be made clear.
It will mean a walkdown at SQN to verify all permanent cables are in-the cable trays and to correct those that are not (An example of an " improperly" routed non-QA. cable was: discovered-at SQN in the 480-volt Shutdown Board Room 2A2 in cable tray JAN.) It should be.noted all. examples found were non-QA.
a The removal and/or identification of temporary cables had been the source of improperly routed cables.outside of cable' trays at WBN I
determined during the WBN site evaluation. The cables had not been identified or they had not been removed.at the end of use by DNC.
1 The major source of these cables was temporary security cables.
l 1
SQN site personnel stated they had seen one or two cables-running i
outside of cable trays in various locations around the plant (no I
specific locations given) but'there were no massive amounts of-unsupported cable. There were large amounts of cable running-outside cable trays at WBN. As stated previously,- these cables were determined to be temporary DNC cables and temporary security cables in a walkdown of the cable trays. DNE and Modifications-personnel were confident that all temporary security cables had been removed in 1981 or 1982. The. temporary security.
cables were removed by workplan because they appeared on. design drawings which were then voided. The DNE response to NCE.W-283-P '
l (the NCR written at WBN.which dealt-with unidentified cables in.
i cable trays) reads that " Abandoned cables are spares-not given numbers yet.
Spare cables have no function, thus cannot affect safe operation and/or shutdown of the-plant." This would' indicate-l 4
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERWS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN-SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 27 0F 37 j
IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued) that if there are unidentified temporary cables they are not a problem as far as the safe operation of the plant is concerned.
j A walkdown of all cable trays should identify all cables routed outside of cable trays.
==
Conclusion:==
5 This evaluation concentrated on the removal of temporary cables because this was the problem identified at WBN.
However, interviews conducted indicated that temporary DNC and security cables had been removed.
Attention was turned to permanent cables. The concern for cable routing outside cable trays was valid because site personnel believed it was-acceptable before the December 31, 1985 revision to MLAI-04.
(CATD 10900-SQN-01)
Splicing (MAS-85-003)
Discussion with a cognizant engineer in Electrical Maintenance revealed they were aware of a specific case of split insulation on cable to the CS CCS pump that had been taped during construction.
The concern had been that this cable might still be taped according to earlier procedures rather than meeting II-10, Revision 11, which required the use of Raychem for splices. A review of MR A561116 revealed that cables 1PL47355 and IPL47365 were inspected and repaired.
Cable 1PL47355 had Raychem sleeves placed on it.
Cable j
1PL47365 was found to have no damage.
{
==
Conclusion:==
The taped insulation on cable 1PL47355 had been replaced with Raychem j
sleeves and was no longer a problem. No further action was required.
4 Splicing (IN-86-314-005)
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant SQN'DNE engineer on the disposition of NCRs 6208, 6224, 6536, 6623, and 6774. The NCRs had been identified as the problem areas.in the WBN Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG) report on cable.
It was determined that NCRs 6208, 6224, and 6623, 6774 were to be grouped together because they were NCRs on the same subject with different affected units o
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
7' PAGE 28 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
(one for' unit 1 and one for unit 2)..The sites dealt with only one NCR and evaluated it for both units..The engineer had information on NCR 6208/6224 and 6536.
The problem defined in NCR 6536 was determined not to exist at SQN because:the site used a j
.different series of. products to make a splice than at WBN. The engineer referred to ONP for further details on NCR 6208/6224.
He had'information that,the NCR was to be handled by the Experience Review Program.
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant individual'in charge of the SQN Experience. Review Program on the disposition of NCR 6208/6224. This program was-a method of handling questions,
. generated by NRC bulletins. INPO reports, SCRs,.etc. The licensing
'j I
unit would assign the questions to the appropriate plant sections which would respond as to whether a problem existed onsite. :In the case of this NCR, all splices'in question were inspected and corrections were made as:necessary. The documentation was then sent
(
to the Environmental Qualification '(EQ) project to become' a part of.
1 the EQ binder. The NCR in question.was considered closed on the SQN site.
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant DNE Nuclear Licensing Section and Electrical Engineering Branch'(EEB)~personne1'on the generic applicability of NCR 6623/6774. These NCRs questioned all.
splices in harsh environments in that it questioned.the environmental qualification of the Raychem products used before December 1985. They,had documentation that a potential generic applicability memorandum'had been sent to SQN and that.a-response had been received..
I Applicable DNE and site documentation wasl reviewed to determine what had been decided on the generic applicability of NCR 6623/6774.
This included reviewing'the potential generic applicability memorandum from DNE to SQN and their response. It:was determined that the activities'in question werelapplicab1'e.to SQN.and-Significant Condition Report (SCR) SQNEEB8631.was generated.;
.]
i A discussion was conducted with the cognizant'SQN'DNE~and EEB J
engineers on the disposition'of SCR SQNEEB8631. The SQN'DNE engineer said that there.were three parts to the SCR. The part that-dealt with the use of HVS Raychem kits was not' applicable to-SQN because this particular kit was not used onsite in the timeframe noted. The part that' dealt with thefapplication ranges of WCSF-N-
' tubing was dispositioned by the. fact that'the ranges for'use a
(
4 TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: COIO900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 29 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
-OF FINDINGS (Continued) were broadened, and therefore any applications before this change were well within the specified range. The site DNE engineer referred to the cognizant EEB. engineer on the disposition of the last part of the SCR'which dealt with the'use of breakouts and end caps with no oversleeve in harsh environments. -The EEB engineer said that this part of the SCR was being dispositioned'use-as-is
. according to an EEB calculation which was in the process of being
_ finalized. This calculation was to prove that there was.no problem
. for cables whose ends were not sealed to keep the shield (or drain)
~
wire separated from the ground. The SCR has since been dispos,itioned and no rework _was required.
==
Conclusion:==
No problem was found at SQN with NCR 6536. NCR 6208/6224 had been found generic, but all work associated with this NCR had been completed. NCR 6623/6774 was dispositioned use-as-is.
Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Cables The SQN Employee Concerns Task Force Report on WBN Concern IN-85-120-001 was reviewed for adequacy. The evaluation agreed with the report. The design'of the system was.different between SQN and j
WBN. The SQN orientation did not have the large distances found j
between the raceway and the detectors.
.J
==
Conclusion:==
.i This evaluation agreed with the SQN Employee Concerns-Task Force report.
The layout of the NIS cables at SQN was different from WBN because the orientation of cables at SQN did not have large distances between raceways i
and detectors and the concern was not verified at SQN.
Terminations i
NSRS report I-05-101-WBN had been written describing the misapplication of AMP PIDG lugs. As part of this evaluation-at WBN, SQN was tied into the report. The evaluator discovered-that
_j
'l SQN had experienced test point resistor failures in the Foxboro racks due to crimp failures and that all PIDG-lugs in the security system' which were crimped on solid wire were replaced with the appropriate type terminal lugs. The evaluation did discover that even though
~
there had been problems with past~ installations, the:present SQN' procedure M&AI-12. " Interconnecting. Cable Termiination and Insulation j
i
'l
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 30 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
Inspection," Revision 7 did note that only AMP Solistrand lugs were to j
be used on solid conductors. Through interviews with SQN personnel, it was determined that the PIDG lugs used on solid conductors were being replaced and/or soldered over on an as-needed basis. The recommendation was'made by the NSRS that a formal replacement and/or solder program be implemented for all AMP PIDG lugs used for terminations of discrete 1
electrical components with solid wire leads.
]
A memorandum from H. G. Parris to K. W. Whitt dated September 13, 1985
]
(A02 850904 010) described the proposed corrective action for SQN due
]
to the recommendation of NSRS report I-85-101-WBN.
Some PIDG lugs on-i smoke actuated dampers were found to be installed incorrectly.
They j
were to be replaced by August 27, 1985. A memorandum was to be J
issued from the plant manager to Instrument and Electrical Maintenance and the Modifications group to remind then to use the proper type of lug on safety-related equipment.
Inspections were in progress to
]
verify the extent of the misapplication of PIDG lugs and to identify j
all sources of misapplication.
SQN engineers were then to evaluate the impact to plant safety of each application.
Corrective action and a schedule for rework would follow this. These evaluations were to be completed by October 15, 1985.
j A review of the potential generic condition evaluation memorandum and a memorandum from H. G. Parris to Those listed dated September 13, 1985, revealed that the issue had been referred to ONP.
The H. G. Parris memorandum in particular stated that the problem would be handled by the Experience Review Program at SQN.
An interview with the individual responsible for the Experience j
Review Program revealed that the problem was being evaluated by j
Electrical Maintenance..An interview with the responsible Electrical i
Maintenance engineer verified that all work specified in the preceding j
paragraph which dealt with smoke actuated dampers was complete.
It was also verified that all evaluations and rework associated with the 1
misapplication of PIDG lugs was complete except for the rework of lugs on solenoid valve surge suppression networks. -The work had been specified on SMI-2-317-25.
The Compliance Section had been asked to justify not replacing these lugs.
The existence of a memorandum to ensu.re that Instrument Maintenance, Electrical Maintenance, and Modifications used the proper type lug was not verified.
- However, M&AI-7, " Cable Terminations, Splicing, and Repairing of Damaged Cables", Revision 7 and M&AI-12, " Interconnecting Cable Termination i
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 31 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued) j and Insulation Inspection," up until it was cancelled with Revision 8 both specified that AMP solistrand lugs were to be used on solid conductors.
There was also a requirement for the QC inspector to verify the proper type lug was used. Therefore, there was no need for any further action since the site procedures contained the proper information.
The individual responsible for resolving the surge suppression issue in Compliance stated that the issue had been referred to DNE and that no response had been received.-
An interview with the EEB engineer resolving the problem stated he was writing a memorandum requiring that all valves where the solenoid energized to perform its safety function were to have the lugs replaced or soldered over immediately, All others would have to be checked to determine if the lugs were in an acceptable condition.
It was going to be recommended that those lugs be reworked.
A preliminary copy of the memorandum referenced in the preceding paragraph (from D. W. Wilson to P. R. Wallace dated October 24, 1986) gave a general description of the use of are suppressors.
They were "to protect the circuit contacts against pitting and burning caused by arcing associated with breaking the inductive load current of the solenoid valve." The memorandum indicated that PIDG lugs on Class 1E surge suppressors should be replaced or soldered.
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, all PIDG lugs on scienoid valves which energize to perform their safety function were to be replaced or soldered prior to restart.
For those which de-energerized a 10-percent sample was to be verified operable by fiald measurement of are suppressor circuit resistance.
If any were found open, all Class 1E are suppressors should be checked.
It was suggested this procedure be repeated periodically until all arc suppressor circuits were permanently fixed.
i
==
Conclusion:==
The evaluation agreed with the NSRS report that a problem with the misapplication of AMP PIDG lugs existed at SQN. A replacement program had been initiated but not completed due to the question over the replacement of lugs on surge suppression networks.
(CATD 10900-NPS-03) o
s TVA EMPLOYEE CONeERNS REPORT NuM8ER: - C010900-SQN
- q 1
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
.'7
]
1 PAGE 32 0F 37
]
V.
ROOT ~CAUSE W
Cable' Pulling
-MPT, SWP, MBR - The upper-tier document-(G-38) for pulling cable was.
The inadeguate which, in turn, resulted in inadequate site' procedures.
reason was failure to recognize a need to monitor. maximum pull tension',
sidewall bearing pressure and adhere to the manufacturers' minimum' bend a
redius limits.
Conduit =0verfill'- The Design Project.used non-auditable' records'for conduit fill. There was no Quality Assurance record.,k.ept on the total cross' sectional' area fil1 and TVA Design' Standard DS-E12.1.13,' Revision 1
~
(recently revised) did not incorporate averageLcable diameters also.
~
resulting in some error.
Cable Coating The root cause of cable' coating concerns was a failure to follow'the.
l manufacturer's recommended maximum thickness.
Inadequate administrative l
control' over the application of Flamemastic was the major-cause of the exc'essive coatings.
Cable' Routing The root cause of the routing problem was inadequate site procedures due.
to a misinterpretation of Construction Specification G-38 in regards to routing cables outside of cable trays. These procedures have since been updated.
Terminations Failure by TVA and Foxboro to follow vendor-recommendations in the application'of terminal lugs, and failure of TVA.to' follow General I
Construction Specification G-38.
VI.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
.. i The line management response to CATD 10900-SQN-01 was:
An evaluation will be performed on. cables routed outside of trays to determine the potential areas of-concern. In particular this evaluation will consider the potential impact ~on-electrical.
~
~
separation,~ cable ampacity, physical support ~and' protection of the cable, and adequacy of. tray supports. A field inspection will'.then 3
j j
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 33 0F 37 VI.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (continued) be performed to locate and determine the extent of cables routed outside of trays which are subject to the concerns evaluated above.
The process will continue until it is determined that all such cables with a potential concern are identified and the configuration justified or modified.
This is not a SQN restart item.
The line management response to CATD 10900-SQN-02 was:
An investigation was initiated in response to PIRGENEEBB605. A sampling program (that led to the evaluation of all 480 V and 6900 V Class IE cables in trays and non-Class 1E cables l
routed with Class IE cables in trays) was. conducted to determine if the cables installed in Class 1E cable trays at Sequoyah were adeguately sized. The cables were evaluated according to'the requirements of Electrical Design Standard DS-E12.6.3.
This standard applied a derating factor for Flamemastic 77 cable coating.
Other derating factors applied were cable tray covers, cable tray bottoms, cable tray fill and qualified cable insulation temperature.
The derating factors for the effects of Flamemastic 77 on cable ampacity were derived from test data. The test applied varying cable coating thicknesses to cables grouped in bundles by voltage level as required by Construction Specification G-38.
This program identified some undersized cables for which SCR SQNEEB86178 was initiated j
describing a condition adverse to quality. Those cables identified
]
on SCR SQNEEB86178 were further evaluated, and crartain physical i
modifications and engineering controls were applied such that the majority of the cables were made acceptable for use. The remainder were being replaced with adequately sized cable.
The test will be reviewed to determine if the test report encompasses the worst case as-constructed condition at Sequoyah for Class IE cable trays.
This is a SQN restart item.
i
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:.C010900-SQN T' ',
SPECIAi PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
7 l
i l
PAGE 34 0F 37 The 31ne management response to CATD 10900-SQN-03 was:
To prevent further recurrences the site procedure has been revised to comply with G-38 regarding cable pulling. M&AI-4'now requires monitoring and documenting the pulling forces used in the installation of non-Class 1E cables (with certain listed exceptions as contained in G-38).
The few associated cables (i.e., non-Clas's IE' cables routed in raceways designated for Class IE circuits) that exist at SQN were pulled to the same requirements as Class IE cables.
All systems (including non-Class IE cables) have undergone Pre-Op or functional testing. Additionally, all medium-voltage cables (i.e.,
480 volt equipment rated at more than 100 horsepower and 6900 volt equipment)_are' periodically tested under'the plant's maintenance schedule (MI-10.20).
The inclusion of non-Class IE cables in G-38's requirement for 1
monitoring pull tension is an economic consideration only (to preclude damage and thus wasting material) and is not a l
safety-related concern. Failure of these cables would.be a random occurrence and will be remedied on a case-by-case basis.-
i Hence, this employee concern item requires no further corrective action.
The line management response to CATD 10900-SQN-04 was:
1.
Determine if a CAQ exists.
2.
Identify the appropriate place to provide written instruction for craft and inspector use in the. removal of Flamemastic. The
'1
-:J written instruction is to include the' identification of proper tooling and prohibit the use of sharp tools.
3.
Revise as appropriate the identified document or generate a new j
document to provide written instruction for the removal of
{
Flamemastic.
1 This corrective action is not a SQN restart' item.
1 1
I f
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
7 I
PAGE 35 0F 37 The line management response for SQN to CATD 10900-NPS-01 was:
lR7 To determine the magnitude of the SWP applied to SQN cables during installation, TVA reviewed all conduits containing safety-related cables against screening criteria.
This was used to determine 16 of the worst conduit sections. The maximum SWP of cables within these conduits were determined.
These values were compared to maximum SWP values determined from testing at TVA's Central Laboratories. The SQN values were less than those determined in testing. The overall conclusions of TVA's testing were confirmed by the report of a third party reviewer. TVA has, through the above testing and analysis, conclusively demonstrated that the practices employed during the installation of electrical cable at SQN maintained the adequacy and integrity of Class 1E cable with respect to SWP.
TVA practice of monitoring total tension rather than individual tension, does assure individual conductor strength limits are not exceeded, and is consistent with IEEE 690-1984.
In fact, TVA practice is more conservative.
Since August of 1978 DNC takes 80 percent rather than 100 percent of individual conductor strength on multi-cable pulls.
TVA's EEB has used NSRS report I-85-06-WBN in addition to the manufacturer's requirements, to form the basis for its evaluation.
Each of the areas of potential concern is being resolved into elements for further analysis.
In each case the actual bend radius j
to which a cable has or could have been subjected is determined.
In particular. EEB has identified the elongation stress, to which a cable is subjected as the result of a bend, as.the critical parameter in determining acceptability.
Preliminary conclusions of the study indicate that this worst case bend at SQN does not reduce the cable's available elongation properties below that required for it to perform its safety-related function. The final report is expected to be issued in March 1987 for'SQN.
The effects of a reduced bend on shielded medium voltage power cable and coaxial, triarial and twinaxial cables will be evaluated separately.
EEB has issued project specific actions for the evaluation of these cables. These actions will include field inspections for the existence of pull boxes or conduits of any type in which the cable is bent as well as individual inspections of a cable's bend radius. The actual bend radius will be determined and the resulting effects on the integrity of the cable will be established. The work is expected to be complete by March 1987.
The work is being tracked by SCR SQNEEB8703.
i SWP is a SQN restart item.
MBR was not a SQN restart item as defined IR7 in Revision 3 of the Corrective Action Plan.
I
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN' SPECIAL PROGRAM ~
REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 36 0F 37 The line management response to CATD 10900-NPS-02 was:
lR7 Construction Specification G-38 or appropriate engineering l
requirements specifications will be reviewed for. breaching and the proper tools to be used. This in turn will require implementing 1
procedures to be revised, if necessary.
l The line management response to CATD 10900-NPS-03 was:
Corrective action which include soldering or replacing AMP (PIDG) terminal lugs on solid wire, has been completed for unit 2 per SMI-2-317-25 except the solenoid valve surge suppression networks.
Those CAQ's will be addressed by the resolution of the more specific
.employce concerns 241.02-SQN-01 sand 241.02-SQN-02.
The estimated completion date'of employee concern 10900-NPS-03 will be determined by the dates shown on employee concerns 241~.02 SQN-01 and-
-241.02-SQN-02..
The line management response to 241.02-SQN-01 and 241.02-SQN-02 was:
For solenoid valve are suppressors, those identified as required for safety. require replacement.
Rework should.be completed prior to-restart on each unit.. Arc suppressors required for safety on both units will be identified on the schematics' prior.to unit'1 restart.
This corrective action is a SQN restart item.
The line management response to CATD 10900-NPS-04.was:
This. potential problem was identified by' Problem Identification
]
j Report PIRGENEEB8605 (B43 860808 908)~.
This~PIR!will assure corrective action will be identified and: implemented.'
j This corrective action is a SQN restart. item.
The line management response.to CATD 10900-NPS-05 was:
'l The new cable diameters are being incorporated into the'SQN cable routing system per memorandum to Roberts from Raughley dated:
September 23,.1986 (B45 860923 908).
EEB8601'will assure verification of cabletinput' diameter.
~
.l information and that' the cable raceway' fill program is reevaluated -
using the new verified. values.
3 This-correctiv'e action is a SQN restart item.
i l
l i
l
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORI NUMBER:
C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM
~
REVISION NUMBER:
7 PAGE 37.0F 37 VII. GENERIC APPLICABILITY The concerns which dealt with MPT, MBR, and SWP have been determined in the WBN ECTG report on cable to be applicable to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN),:Bellefonte Nuclear. Plant (BLN), and Brown's Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN).
The cable coating concerns were found.to be potentially generic to BFN in.the WBN ECTG report on cable.
One of the fire barrier concerns.(IN-85-018-004) was found:to be potentially generic to BFN and BLN in the WBN ECTG' report.on cable.
The other concern (XX-85-094-005) was determined to be potentially generic to BFN in the WBN ECTG report on cable.
Splicing concern IN-86-314-005 was considered potentially generic to-BFN and BLN in the WBN ECTG report cn). cable.
Due to SCR WBNEEB8537, I-85-101-WBN and PH-85-003-N32 were generic to BLN and BFN.
No new generically applicable concerns were found in the SQN evaluation.
VIII. ATTACHMENTS, Attachment A - List of SQN Concerns j
'l
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- "DET 21: IVC
- ^ IS THE SLMAW:
UGdLT-ARDUNP-$ HARP CD
~ WHEN THE CONDUITS ARE FULL.
2.9#,
..737 8, ALS D FRD)L f M EXIS UNIT t.
'7 Al ', AHb 75D' AUK. 2.LDE. '.
1 1'
TRDL RDDrt : UNITS *1
' THER INFORMATIDW. & 2..
C3 MAS SD' FUR 1
COW 37RUCTION ~DEfi.'
.Ig.15-356-DD5 CO 1 09DD N WSN Y Y.Y Y-COM;ERH.-. FOLlok! VP WDT KEQt.rIR
'a
/
K FDRM~
.35 = THE FRACTTCE OF USING A BREAK RCFE L
HEM PdLLI#G C4BL -DID WCT JICOM j
~ " ECTIYE ukTIL 195 eTTER ALL TH
- ' fulls WEEE MAD >+ YEARS AGO l.l1
.UT~ BREAK ROPE 5 NO MORE 'IG CRMAT70W -
' A='AILA&LE.c ' NO FCbLDO WP: REQ
f0lO 900-SGM A7, 5
~
h-K.,.. -.
AfrfcWMfMT-k fi J
q
,.e
- 3g.g3 933.DDI CD 30900 3 HBH
,=
YYYY.
N5 C.J. STATE 3 YHAT IDX 10 35Y Op-7th
- 73D096-CD 13200 REPORT ABL E IN51 AL L ED 23 B AD AND 11 '5&mut; BE REPLACED. 'WHEN THE CABL E WA
.YALLED.-PRES 3URE BY-SUPERVISDR$ C ED PRDDUCTION NOT DUAll1Y.
CABLE 5 PUL L ED WJ1HDUT PRDPER EDUIPMENT, g
BEND RADU$ HA$ VlDL ATED AWD PULL]t PRDCEDVRE WA5 NDT. FDL L DWED.
AFTER ABLE WA5 )N PLACE. IT WA5 fl01 PRD1-
- TED AWD HA5 DAnaDED'FURTHER BY CDt3
- RUCTIDN'(UNIT-2) FDLLDH UP R!,0UI RE 3N 973 gD2 CD JD900 N H8N YYYY HS' SUPERV13DR (KNOWN)"D)RECTED 1 13cCDs K-r0HN CTRICAL CABL E DE PULL ED WITN ' CH Pj Cr.f R3.
MACR. TRUC A$ -
PROBLEM WAS WIDE 5 NTED H)NCHE5.'
D.
EXAMPLE 3 3 MCL UDE ( A)MUCH DF Tith L ARDE CABL E IN BURIED CDHDUIT IN,14
' 500 KV 3HJ1CHYARD - AND = (3)300 M*M
- ABLE THAT 23 WDH 2M31DE 1HE TU DUILD1HU M.n BUT WHICH,HA$ PUL L ED A MACK TRUCK USING A 31 EEL' CABLE.
CDHDUIT EHD3 WERE IN L2NE HI1H THE DDR 2H'THI TUREINE. ELDC. 1 HAT DPEW
. :. m-" -.
1H THE DIRE *T3DN DF THE 3DD KV 3R !
- CHYARD. ' 7HE-MACK **
'A 3
' r..
- IN TE 'IEN INDO.
g,~
C1 11AS ' NO FURTE{,17 L
2H -Bi-D23-DD2 -
CD-- JDPDD H H3H YYYY 23 CABLE Pull LIMIT 3' WERE EXCEEDED DN.
73D 30
~
REPORT P*
HE CABLE UDING TD THE 2HTAKE. PUMP 3
~
'"m a.
G STRU"TURE (IP3) ELE *TR*AL MAH HDL e
- ~
33,LA,'5,6.7.2.j'c1HA3 HD ADDI 1
'e 2DNAL JHFDRMATIDM.
s~-
j[b/ -S f-19 9-DD1 CD. 2DPDD H H3H-YYYY 2-Z5-46f-R3H IS CABLE PULL 3 ARE HDT ALWAY 3 PET.FDRMD.
3 j
'te+.73D103 -
REPDRT TD THE.REDUIREMEKT3 DF iME RC1.
F REXAMPLE,AREAKL3ttK3WERENDiUSE{
'~0" '
' ' ~
' DURJ ND CA!LE PULLS,; AND CDMDUIT3 - A i
.I 7DD FULL. :CDNSTRUCTIDN CONCER8.1 e.
m CI HA3-ND ADDITJcxAL JNFDRnATIDK.
3 4 ~ 56-201-001 CD 10900 N W3N YYYT.
I-15-466-WBM 33 ~ CABLE FULLING LIMIT 5 nAY HAVE BE 73 D130 REPORT
. rCEEDED DURING CABLE FULLS BEFDRE 39 ft. CI STATES THA1 PULLING L3 KIT 5 WEl RE HDT ADHERED TD DR nDNITDRED BEFDW E TRAT DATE. : CDRST.. bEPT. CONCERM. C
- 2 MAS ND ADDITIDNAL INFDRMATIDM. MD
.tDLLDH VP RIRVIRED..
Z H 159-DD1 " CD' 30)DD N H2N YYYY I-t'5-56 F-MB W
- T5D3 4)
S3 TVA REFDRT FAILED TD USE' FU5E LINK 5 DR DTHE
~
. R TEN 3IDM INDICATDR5 WHILE FULLING C; ABLE. -FUSE LINE3 HAVE ONLY.SEEN v5E
- D IN 1HE ' PA3T l'1/I; YEAR 5.
CONSTRUCi
. TIDN' DEPT. CDNEERN. CI HA3 ND ADDIT !
IOM&L INFDRMATIDH..ND TDLLOW-UP RER w-U1 RED.
34 239-005 CD.
30PDD N M&M YNYY t-95-569-WEN T3D249 REPDRT K3 MANY ELECTRICAL CABLE 3 : WERE SUNCHED%
TOGE1HER 1N CABLE TRAY 31D MAKE IT E e
A51ER TD CDYER THEM W11H 1W3ULATION,
( VE MASC D) DR FL AMEASTIC. THis nAY E3UL1 IN HEA1 BUILDUP:. CDNSTRUCTI D -
~"
N DEP1.= CDuCERNs - CI HA5 WD FURTHER Ht DRnATION. ND FDLLOW4UP REQUIRED.
. 3d 262-0 03
'CO 20900 N WSN tYYY I-95-573-W3(
. ' N5 UNIT 5422J APPKDYIMATELY A-YEAR: A
'~.JT5D146 REPORT
~
~
DWE-H ALY< AGD' (1983) A BRE AK LIMK MAS
~ ' 70 SL USED DURING A' CABLE FULLp WOW '
> EVER. A. PSTEEL Cl!bKER*' IS STILL SE1E
. j, G ADDEb ' AMD THE PRDSAE2LITT of EXCEE OING THE Y MIGH. MA%1 mum PULL w1EM3tCM IS VER ;
MDST OF THE CABLE HAP BEEN-
~.~fl.
7"
' PULLED BT 1963. CONSTRUCTION DEPT C.
DNCERA.., t1 M A$ 'ML FURTHER INfDRmKTI =
DW.
HO; FOLLDW9P. REcu1 RED.
o g
$dI69CO-SOk'-R7 m.,~
7"IACWAW h ~
.. e l
1..M 1*
E g JH -86 266 D06 CD
) @ H. HBH YYYY HT MAWT CABL ES WERE 'PUL L ED ARDunD 9p"r;
- !)D235
-REPOR*
GREE. SIMD5 W]THDUl. MA1Hl Aj NING ' PROF 4-E' PLACEMENT !N THE CAltLE TRAYS.N D'
- g,
- ADDITlDNAL IWFORMA17DN AVAILAgtE IN FTLE.
CDMSTROCTIDM DEPARTMEN1 CONC RM.
'.1N--66-26I DC2
- D
- 9FDD H MAN yNyy 73D241
-REPDRT SY REMOV)ND VAmtt3CD FRDM EL F' 1 RI N
CABLLS 14]TH A KNTFE DR D TH E C. SHARP 4
2,JECTS PA0Y) M5 A G1HG'THE ELECn.'**PD1ENTIAI FOR DAR i CADLES, CJ DDE
- NDT KWUW AUT SPECINC5 iDR HA5 A; Y ADDIT J DNAL. INrDRMA1);'
0DM31RUC 9
s..4 TON DEPAR1 MENT >CDNCERN.
.3N-66-26(-DC3.;,*D.
2DFDD H HBN YYYY I-3 5-37 D-HBH H5' 73c130 REPORT CABLES WERE INST ALL ED IMh;DPJLY IN-1HE CDH1RDL 3LDD., AT ELL.'ATIDh.??P-Agp 74)i.5PREADER RDDMr? CABLE SEP RA1JDN WA3.1MPROPER BEFORE PAINT 2N
~
. WITH 3ft3UL A13 DN tFLANUASTIC DR'VE ASCD). CDNSTRUCTIDN DEPT. CDNCERH
[P CT HA5 ND ADDIT 2DNAL IHFDRMATIDM.
.s s
ND.F,DLLDW-UP REDUIRED.
,3tg_gg.DD2 CD 2DPDD H 3DH HNYf REPDKT (.
35 ' ELECTRIOAlJCDNAX CDNNECTDR5 HAVE
.ry ".. -
H 2 NST ALLED WITH ' WIRE BEND RADIUS 3,
.:.. _ +
ALLER 1HAN ALLDWED 27 M&AT-39,' PARAS RAPH 3.4.
.A5-P3-Dc3
- D J DFDD H 3DH NNYH r
35,3 CC5 PUMP MD1DR'ADISUACY DF C REPDRT m
0 6-55-D P3-bl 4 *. CD 2DPDD H 3DH ~ N N *r H
- 7.50272 V.?.
REFDRT
'35' 3ERUDYAH * ' 3 NSULATIDN WA5 f.23T AK CUT DFF DF A 4&D VDLi CAILE. HNEN
.?
THE M13iAKE WA5 DISCOVEREO, THE IH3U LAT2DN MAS REATTACHED WITH ELECTR 7-L TME.
CABL E IS - 1HE PDNER FEED TD THE 1ACK FLOW LDR D13CHARDE) CATE IST MOTOR.inDTDR NDS. 2AA. 28B. 2AA AND 2BB INe DNE-DF "!HE F DLL OWI NG CO
~
VITSi PL-L37D-3, 2-PL-6 360- A, 2.-P L-6 37D-B OR ' 2.-PL-4 560- A). TNOI DE WT
~DCCURRED JH'1971 DETAILS KNDWN TO ',
. tiTC, WITHHELD DUE-To CONFIDEHT! ALTTY ND FURTHER TNFORMATIDW tlAY BE R 4
EASED. CDN3TRUCTI DN DEPARTt'ltNT C08KE
.C1 HAs go TURTHER INF0FJ1AT10N.
J' OW -ES-DD1-DD4 CD -3DPDD'N WBN-YhYY T30224 K-FORM N3 YAMASCO -FI RE 'PRDOFING WI$' AR ELECT RICAL PDWER CABLES 3D TH
- 7 HAT Il WILL NDT At LOW RE3137 AT TD MS$1PATE.
.., " ~. -
THIS WILL-CAUSE TM 77 E EL ECT RICAl INSULATIDH T D BRE N AND f AIL.
C1 MAS 'ND FURTH!R INFDR a itATION COCTRUCTIDW DEPARTF!E RN ND. FDL L OW UP.. EE QUI PJb
- k!I 00-D13 ID,. 3090D H.-NH I.Y T/ Y ' y REPDRT NSL CABLE Bf NDING' RADIti PRDBLEA
> #D FUR 1HERc1NF DRMATION CDHCERN VI A LETT ER..
ANDNTMDU$
4 D08-003 CD 1D9CD. N BLN
- f Y Y Y..
T St i-BLN -
55 J1t30075'
(-FORM' JT' BELL EFDNTE ' WO MEC# A#3E
- 5Eb AS.#AAWWA5 USEb lb MLL CABLES, M TMRErotCE htAY ' MEN 45 THEY WANTEb T
,~^
T'Et&Tpu WA5 EvCE6DED THIS OtfAARED: but3G MCIWTE T' 9
URLINE EuILDirn CF uCIT 3 & R.
- CO/09cg__..s. g4 2 7
$ k.;e....
..~+
k-r7'AC HMFAIT - k
'T
.;...'.4., + M.;.'.
- 7. G
.;4.
~~-v
- s-
,.T
]-'
j
- .;- XX 094.pD4
- D JDfD0 N BLH YYYY I-3 5-M 9-bL N NS t*6 138130..,
g.pDgn SELLIFDN1E THE MAJDRJ1Y OF CABLE 5 3 E E li PULLED DIFORE 1HE USE DF r1 TAPE FUSE L JNC DR MDillTDRING DEVJ 3 NIRE REDVIRED; THERE FDRE T'HE max POLL TEN 51 DM MAS #DT HONIT OREb.
C STRUCTION DEPT. CDuCERN. CI - HA5 uf
,1 F UR1 HE R INFDRMATIDN.
ft0 FOLLDM.UP EDUARED.
CD 30900 N BLH YYYY 2-Z5-53D-2LN H3 BEL L EFDNT Ei AN ***I L L EGd* FI S H HD
- yy.g3.p94-DD3
.I5D150
' REPORT YPE TODL WA5-FREDUENTLY USEP iD RE u.
VI 1HE FDAN DN 1 ERMINATIDN5 3D tIDR -
CABLE CDULD BE PULLED.
THIS ILLEG TCDL CAUSED AN.INDETERMINATI ANDUt DF'DAMADE.
AN NCR. (# UNENDWM) MA5 E N!!! ATE D JN M10-l')64 TD ADDRESS THe CONDITJDN BUT MAY MAVE BEEN INADE(
' ATE TD V!RIFY ALL DAMADED CABLE HA9 EEEN 2DENTJFIED AND.CDRRECTED. CDN T RUCTJ DH DEPT. CDMCERN. C1 HA5 HD,
URTHER INFDRMATIDN. ND FDLLOW UP :
DUI RED.
.~
" "* ?.
t 1
- 2H'-86-314 DC3 CD.3DFDD 3 HDH TTYY N3 CABLE SPL3CIND 3H MANY C'3E3.HA3 3E 75DCL3 MP 7 D6 03 FIPORT H IMPRDPER AND NDT DDCUMENTED CDRRER TLY.
(E.D. A CDHDUCTDR HAD A HDLEk 4.
~'
.u N THE DUTER' J NSUL ATIDN, A SUPERVI57 WA5 CALLED TD LCDK AT IT ARD HE 5 )
.D, "i APE IT DYER AND PULL IT IN", I
.f, 23.)
ADDITIDNAL INPDRMATIDH KNOWN J..
D DTC. HITHHELD TD f1AINTAIN CDNFIDE TIALITT. HD AD;ITIDNAL IWFDRMAT3 DN.
MAY DE RELEASED. CDK3TRUCT7DH DEFT
~
. qW.
r--
CDNCERN HD F DL L DH-UP RE QV2 RED.
' :n -.
(3. ^
~*
\\
~
IN I6-259 -DD4 5 CD 109D0 N WEN YYYY I-35-318-WSW" 25 CABLE 3 HAVE BEEN PULLED AT MATT 5 BAFA
. a T5D147 REPDF.T BY U3)NE A CDME-ALDNE WI NCh.
DOOR 5!
,4.
. E'ERI MELD SHVT TD PREVENT GC CE.5ERM ATIDA. COM5TRUCTIDid PEPT ' CONCERM.
~
(DETAIL 5 TD THIS SPECIFIC CASE ARE G
~
NDWd TD CTC. MD 1,7ITHHELD TD MAINTAIM CDMFIDE N1 CAL ITT?. CT HAS ND WRT HE R IWFDRMATIOM. MD 'FDLLOW-Vf' RED,0LREi 3.
4 HS 1. IMPROPER ELECTRICAL TERM 3-15-IDI-WbNi.
Co
'L D 500 WE.H yyvY
' P05T CHNI DGE. E. CRIMP ON-TYf'E LUCS WERE t 5ED F')R TERMINATIDH OF DISCRETE ELG TRICAL CCMPDHENT5 MITH.3DLID WIRE kG 1,.
AD5 pH -ES-cc3-N32.2 CD 2D960 WEN YYYY N5 NRC TDENTIFIED THE FDL1DMING CONCERN
~
T2 PORT FCM THEIR REVIEW OF THE STC TILE 5 ei i_ n,
CRI MP DW LUCS $PECITIED FOR STRAMD!
I
~
ED SIRE ARE USE) DN 3DLID WIRE AGAld
-- L,. * ~
i p
l 5
l i
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e
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.