ML20215M115

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Final Conformance to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.2.2-Vendor Interface Programs for All Other Safety-Related Components, Mcguire Units 1 & 2, Informal Rept
ML20215M115
Person / Time
Site: Mcguire, McGuire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/30/1987
From: Udy A
EG&G IDAHO, INC., IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING & ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML20215M096 List:
References
CON-FIN-D-6001 EGG-NTA-7605, GL-83-28, TAC-53687, TAC-53688, NUDOCS 8706260280
Download: ML20215M115 (16)


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i CONFORMANCE TO GENERIC LETTER 83-28 ITEM 2.2.2--

1 Engineering;.' ** 1 VENDOR INTERFACE PROGRAMS FOR ALL OTHER SAFETY-

' Labo~ratoryl RELATED COMP 0NENTS: McGUIRE-1 AND -2

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i DISCLAIMER This book was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Govemment. Neither the United States Guvernment nor any agency thereof, j nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or ugrfulness of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infrirw;s privately owned _ rights. Heferences herein to any specific commercial I product, process, or service by trade 6inme, trertemark, manufacturer, or otherwise, 1 does not necessanly constitute or imply .6ts endorsement, recommendation, or f avoring i by the United Stat L Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.

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1 TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT _ I J

CONFORMANCE TO GENERIC LETTER 83-28,' ITEM 2.2.2--

VENDOR INTERFACE PROGRAMS FOR ALL OTHER SAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS:

MCGUIRE-1 AND I Docket Nos. 50-369-50-370 Alan C. Udy i

'I Published April 1987 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory j EG&G Idaho, Inc. . _1 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83?15  ;

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Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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.Under'U0E Contract'No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 FIN No. 06001'

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'ABSTRAbT,  !

I This EG&G Idaho, Inc., report provides a rev'iew of the submittals from I I

the Duke Power Company regarding conformance to Generic Letter 83-28, i Item 2.2.2, for the McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit Nos. I and 2.

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g FOREWORDL This report is supplied as part of the program for evaluating licensee / applicant conformance'to Generic' Letter 83-28, " Required Actions-

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Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events."' This work is being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of PWR Licensing-A, by EG&GLIdaho, Inc., NRR -

and I&E Support Branch.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded this work under the.

authorization B&R No. 20-19-10-11-3, FIN No. D6001'.

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. Docket Nos. 50-369/50-370 )

TAC Nos. 53687/53688 l

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CONTENTS.

ABSTRACT ..................................................... ........ 11 FOREWORD .............................................................. iii 1.- INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 1.

. 2. ' REVIEW CONTENT AND FORMAT ........................................ 2

- 3. ITEM 2.2.2 - PROGRAM DESCRIPTION ................................. 3 3.1 Guideline ................................................... 3 3.2 Evaluation ................ ................................ 3 3.3 Conclusion ................................................. 4

4. PROGRAM WHERE VENDOR INTERFACE CANNOT PRACTICABLY BE ESTABLISHED ...................................................... 5 4.1 Guideline .................................................. '5 4.2 Evaluation ................................................. 5 4.3 Conclusion ................................................. 6
5. RESPONSIBILITIES OF LICENSEE / APPLICANT AND VENDORS THAT PROVIDE SERVICE 0N SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT .............................. 7 5.1 Guideline .................................................. 7 5.2 Evaluation ................................................. 7 5,3 Conclusion ................................................. 7
6. CONCLUSION ....................................................... 8 -
7. REFERENCES ....................................................... 9

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CONFORMANCE TO GENERIC LE'TER 83-28, ITEM 2.2.2--

VENDOR INTERFACE PROGRAMS FOR ALL OTHER SAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS:

MCGUIRE-1 AND -2 I l

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1. INTRODUCTION  !

1 On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of l the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip

. signal from the reactor protection system. This incident was terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the j automatic trip signal. The failure of the circuit breakers was determined l

to be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior l

to this incident, on February 22, 1983., at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear

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Power Plant, an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam j generator low-low level during plant startup. In this case, the reactor l was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the l automatic trip. j Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive j Director for Operations (EDO), directed the NRC staff to investigate and j report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant. The results of the staff's inquiry into the j generic implications of the Salem unit incidents are reported in l:

NUREG-1000, " Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear I

Power Plant." As a result of this investigation, the Commission (NRC)  !

1 requested (by Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8,1983 ) all licensees of l l

operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of 4 I

construction permits to respond to the generic issues raised by the -

1 analyses of these two ATWS events. 1 l

1 This report is an evaluation of the responses submitted by the Duke j

, Power Company, the licensee for the McGuire Nuclear Station, for Item 2.2.2 i of Generic Letter 83-28. The documents reviewed as a part of this  ;

evaluation are listed in the references at the end of this report. )4

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'2. REVIES CONTENT AND FORMAT Item 2.2.2 of Generic Letter 83-28 requests the licensee or applicant  !

to submit, for the staff review, a description of their programs for interfacing with the vendors of all safety-related components including supporting information, in considerable detail, as indicated in the guideline section for each case within this report. -

These guidelines treat cases where direct vendor contact programs are pursued, treat cases where such contact cannot practically be established, and establish responsibilities of licensees / applicants and vendors that provide service on safety-related components or equipment, j As previously indicated, the cases of Item 2.2.2 are evaluated in i separate section in which the guideline is presented; an evaluation of the l licensee's/ applicant's response is made; and conclusions about the programs of the licensee or applicant for their vendor interface program for I safety-related components and equipment are drawn.

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3. 1 TEM 2.2.2 - PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 3.1 Guideline The licensee or applicant response should describe their program for establishing and maintaining interfaces with vendors of safety-related j components which ensures that vendors are contacted on a periodic basis and j that receipt of vendor equipment technical information (ETI) is acknowledged

. or otherwise verified.

This program description should establish that such interfaces are established with their NSSS vendor, as well as with the vendors of key safety-related components such as diesel generators, electrical switchgear, auxiliary feed pumps, emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps, batteries, !

battery chargers, and valve operators, to facilitate the exchange of current l technical information. The description should verify that controlled procedures exist for handling this vendor technical information which ensure I

that it is kept current and complete and that it is incorporated into plant operating, maintenance and test procedures as is appropriate.

3.2 Evaluation The licensee for the McGuire Nuclear Station responded to these requirements with submittals dated November 4, 1983,2 May 7, 1984.

These submittals include information that describes their past and current vendor interface programs. In the review of the licensee's response to this item, it was assumed that the information and documentation supporting this program is available for audit upon request. We have reviewed this information and note the following.

The licensee's response states that they actively participate in the

, Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee (NUTAC) program. The Vendor Equipment Technical Information Program (VETIP) was developed by NUTAC, VETIP

- includes interaction with the NSSS vendor and with other electric utilities. This is.in addition to the licensee's continuing interface 3

program with the NSSS vendor (Westinghouse) which consists of Techni' cal Bulletins and technical recommendations letters. The licensee describes how this information, as well as information from other vendors of safety-related equipment, is incorporated into plant procedures and instructions. The licensee states that this process is controlled by administrative procedures and internal programs that were reviewed and found acceptable to implement the NUTAC/VETIP guidelines. .

3.3 Conclusion -

i We conclude that the licensee's response regarding program description is complete and, therefore, acceptable. t i

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4. PROGRAM WHERE VENDOR INTERFACE CANNOT PRACTICABLY BE ESTABLISHED 4.1 Guideline The licensee / applicant response should describe their program for

, compensating for the lack of a formal vendor interface where such an interface cannot be practicably established. This program may reference the NUTAC/VETIP program, as described in INPO 84-010, issued in March 1984. If the NUTAC/VETIP program is referenced, the response should describe how procedures were revised to properly control and implement this program and to incorporate the program enhancements described in Section 3.2 of the NUTAC/VETIP report. It should also be noted that the lack of either a formal interface with each vendor of safety-related equipment or a program to periodically contact each vendor of j safety-related equipment will not relieve the licensee / applicant of his I responsibility to obtain appropriate vendor instructions and information ,

whn e necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system or  !

component will perform satisfactorily in service and to ensure adequate l quality assurance in accordance with Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.

l 4.2 Evaluation The licensee provided a brief description of the vendor interface program. Their description references the NUTAC/VETIP program. The licensee states that plant instructions and procedures are currently in place to assure that the VETIP program is properly controlled and implemented.

VETIP is comprised of two basic e'ements related to vendor equipment problems; the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) and the

. Significant Event Evaluation and Information Network (SEE-IN) programs.

VETIP is designed to ensure that vendor equipment problems are recognized, evaluated and corrective action taken.

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Through participatio.n in;the NPRDS progrem, the licensee submits engineering information, failure reports and operating histories for review under the SEE-IN program. Through the SEE-IN program, the Institute'of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) reviews nuclear plant events that have been reported through the NPRDS programs and Nuclear Network and NRC reports.

Based on the significanceaof the event, as determined by.the screening review, INP0 issues a report to all utilities outlining the cause of the .

event'and related problems and provides recommendations for practical corrective actions. These reports are issued in Significant Event Reports, in Significant Operating Experience Reports and as Operations and -l Maintenance Reminders. Upon' receipt of these documents, the licensee

-evaluates the information to determine applicability to the facility. This evaluation is documented and corrective actions are taken as determined necessa ry.

The licensee's response states that procedures now exist to review and evaluate' incoming equipment technical information and to incorporate it into existing procedures.

4.3 Conclusion We find that the licensee's response to this concern is adequate and acceptable. This finding is based on the understanding that the licensee's commitment to implement the-VETIP program includes the implementation of the enhancements described in Section 3.2 of the NUTAC/VETIP program to the extent that the. licensee can control or influence the implementation' of .

these recommendations.

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5. RESPONSIBILITIES OF LICENSEE / APPLICANT AND VENDOR THAT PROVIDE SERVICE ON SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT 5.1 Guideline l

The licensee / applicant response should verify that the l

, responsibilities of the licensee or applicant and vendors that provide service on safety-related equipment are defined such that control of applicable instructions for maintenance work on safety-related equipment are provided. -l l

5.2 Evaluation i

The licensee's response commits to implement the NUTAC/VETIP program.

They further state that their present and revised programs and procedures adequately implement this program. The VETIP guidelines include implementation procedures for the internal handling of vendor services.

The licensee states that they have specific procedures to provide the proper quality assurance control over vendor-supplied service on safety-related equipment.

i 5.3 Conclusion I We find that the information contained in the licensee's submittals is sufficient for us to conclude that the licensee's and vendor's responsibilities are defined and controlled appropriately. Therefore, the information provided by the licensee for this item is acceptable.

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6. CONCLUS10N Based on our review of the licensee's response to the specific requirements of item 2.2.2 for McGuire-1/-2, we find that the licensee's interface program with its NSSS supplier and with verdors of other safety-related equipment, along with the licensee's commitment to implement the NUTAC/VETIP program, is acceptable. This is based on the understanding - l that the licensee's commitment to implement the NUTAC/VETIP program includes the objective for " Internal. Handling of Vendor Services" described on page 23 of the March 1984 report and includes the enhancements described in Section 3.2 of the report to the extent that the licensee can control or '

influence such enhancements.

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.7. REFERENCES

1. ' Letter, NRC-(D. G. Eisenhut), to 'all . Licensees' of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating License, and Holders of Construction Permits,

" Required Actions Based on Generic. Implications of Salem ATWS Events (Generic Letter 83-28)," July 8, 1983.

2. Letter, Duke Power Company (H. B. Tucker) to NRC (D. G. Eisenhut),

November 4, 1983.

3. Letter,-Duke Power Company (H. B. Tucker) to NRC (D. G. Eisenhut),

May 7, 1984.

4. Vendor Equipment Technical Information Program, Nuclear Utility Task-Action Committee on Generic Letter 83-28, Section 2.2.2, March 1984,

'INP0 84-010.

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'A',"JAl'- BIBuOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET EGG-NTA-7605 ,

54 8 IN57muCTsONS ON Tut atvtast 2 76f Lt AN0 5ut f *T LE J LE Avt SL ANK CONFORMANCE TO GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEM 2.2.2--

VENDOR INTERFACE PROGRAMS FOR ALL OTHER SAFETY-a o Afi apOaT COMaut*Q RELATED COMP 0NENTS: McGUIRE-1 AND -2 MONTM vtAR t

. Auf O il, April 1987 Alan C. Udy G OAftatPORTe55utD MONTH VEAR

+ April 1987 7 f( AP OmMiNG OmGANi2ATION NAME AND MasLING ADOnt$5.'taca v a le Ceems 8 PROJECT TA5KiWORK WNef NUMBER EG&G Idaho, Inc.

P. O. Box 1625 . .iN Oa oa Amr ~uM.ta Idaho Falls, 10 83415 D6001 to seONSORiNG ORGANI2 Af TON NAMi AND MAILING ADDRESS tractueele Caves its TYP8 07 REPORT Division of PWR Licensing - A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission * *ea'a coviano "* '* **'

Washington, DC 20555 12 SuP#LEMENT AR Y NOTES I

I 13 A457R ACT (N0 wersa er 'end This EG&G Idaho, Inc., report provides a review of the submittals from the i

Duke Power Company regarding conformance to Generic Letter 83-28, Item 2.2.2, for McGuire-1 and -2.

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