ML20215H334

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Discusses Procurement & QA Insp on 860915-19 & 0929-1003 to Review Util Corrective Action to Nuclear Safety Review Staff Repts R-84-17-NPS,I-83-13-NPS & R-85-07-NPS.Possible Degradation of Qualified Equipment Noted.Related Info Encl
ML20215H334
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 10/21/1986
From: Taylor J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To: White S
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
Shared Package
ML20214Q673 List:
References
NUDOCS 8610230116
Download: ML20215H334 (5)


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.\ 5'i....- a' October 21, 1985 Docke t nos.: 50-327 and .50-328 . . -

Tennessee Valley Authority -

ATTH: Mr. Steven A. White Manager of Nuclear Power -

5H.38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Place

- Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801 Gentlemen:

. . "A procurement and quality assurance records inspection at Secuoyah Nuclear Plant, Units I and 2, by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement The ourpose was con-of ducted September 15-19 and September 29-October 3, 1985.

this inspection was to review Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) correc ive at:1on to Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) Reports R-Si-17-NFS, I-53-13-NPS and R-E5-07-NPS. .The inspection included a review of contracts for original and replacement ecuipment, maintenance recuests, quality assurance program .

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repu1rements, cocumentation.

site procurement procedures and practices, a Abercrombie and other members of your staff to discuss the inscection findings and observations tg date. A summary of the more sionificant items identified and discussed du' ring this p.eeting is enclosed.

Your attention is directed to the . team's concern regarding the possible decre-dation of the seismic and environmental qualification of previously cualified '

equipment. Two. mechanisms through' which this degradation can occur were ~

observed during the inspection: (1) replacement of previously qualified

" devices" with devices procured commercial grade without adequate dedication. .

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by TVA prior to placing the device in service (see Ex fied devices without evaluating the effec: of the piece part on the cualification 2, 3 4,

  • of the device or adecuately dedicating the piece part (see Examples _1, The team is also concerned with TVA's inability to 5, and 7 of Enclosure A). retrieve quality assurance records (see Ex
  • The results of the inspection indicated that prior to the March 1955 revision '

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. of 50A 45, " Quality Con:r:1 of Material, Part,s, and Service

- piece par:s for safety-related applications,The particularly team noted when seismic and that Secuoyah 3 environmental qualifica:1on was recuired. so- w-* --

)p personnel had started a review of Class IE replacement devicoeAs CE3 V ED I s'.N:ZA- ANCC" A "cW- j i

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  • - ( i Acu.c N: G October 21, 1985 Tennessee Valley Authority ..

k completed that review nor investigated the effect ofInpiece licht part of these replacement '. .

on seismically or environmentally qualified ecuipment. lled ecuip-finding to verify that the seismic and environmental cualification of instaYo.u ment has not been degraded.

packages for commercial grade replacement devices alreacy identified and the impicmenta tion of- the procuremen^-program described in the M revision of SQA 45 will be reviewed before plant startup. --

Additional detail on the enclosed procurement findin "

be issued in the near future.

. Sincerely,

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fG n'f James M. Tayla , Director O'fice of Ins"pection and Enforcemen:

Enclosure:

Procurement Inspection

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SEQUDYAH HUCLEAR POWER PLANT

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Ut!ITS 1 AND 2

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PROCUREMENT INSPECTION SEPTEMBER 15-19, 1986 SEPTEMBER 29-0CTCBER 3, 1935 A. Procurement Findinos "

. 1. Steam Generator Level Solenoid Valve (2-LSV-003-017al:

was issued on 12/2/E5 to replace Maintenance Recuest (MR) A593379 l the coils in this ASCO solenoid valve, which provides a controThe MR wa

~~ function for the fiain Steam Isolation Valves.The valve was a seismically and located "QMOS" and "10 CFR 50.49 Device." environmentally c in a harsh environment, 'the West Valve Room.

Replacement coils, because they do not have a'unicue plant fication number, are considered " piece parts" by Tennessee Va Authority (TVA) and are purchased OA Level II, no documentatio '

) required. Replatino the coils in this valve would have degraded n

-- the previous cualification toilsofpurchased this valvecommercial since TVA hadwould grade no cocume -

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tation or assurance tha: continue to function during or af ter a seis exposure t'o a harsh environment:

Only the f act that craftsmen could not remove the toil sub -

with the tools supplied for the job and therefor

- instiTied qualified equipment. -

2. Reactor Trio Bvoass Breaker B (2-sKRC-099-KH/319-G TVA ordered tIndervoltage trip attachments On contract S4P54-343921 (U'/TAs) for the reactor trip21bypass breakerThis not applicable. as QA wasLevel just II, no documentation recuired, Par:af ter Generic Letter E3-28 was i Fortunately, ,

to be considered safety-related,1E equipment.

Mestinghouse self-imposed an Appendix B cuality assurance li- progr which provided the controls necessary to maintain Class IE oua fication and provided documentation of that qualifica: ion.

' TVA installed a UVTA (5/N DEYN212-64

'. On 5/24/85, under MRA-101112,However, UVTA (5/N 02YN212-64) is n on this breaker.

the Certification mentioned of Oualification above, which was referenced received en TVA's underFormthe 575cont d

ass with this maintenance request.

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3. Reactor Vent Board 23-B (2-500-201-J-0-B):

The original contrac: for the reactor vent board motor control cen:ers ~

required manuf acturing under an Appendix B quality assurance prog and seismic qualification. for an overload trip unit on the normal feed breaker, a IE breaker,~

The overload--crip units had been purchased as this vent board.

piece parts, QA Level II, no documentation required. _

4, 6.9 KV tocic Relav Panel (2-FitLB-202-SC A1:

. The original contract for the 6.9 KV logic relay panels recuired manuf acturing under an Appendix B quality assurance program and seismic qualification. The panel and the relays were cualified separately. On MR A-019533, completed The relay was 5/6/52, TVA replaced purchased as a piecean

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auxiliary relay on the panel.

part, OA Level II, no documentation required, under contrac:

78P15-245756. *

5. Boric Acid Transfer Pumo Motor (2 MTRE-62-230A1: .

The boric acid trcnsf er pump motor was originally s On MR A-OS0011,

- NESS con:ract.

Westinghouse su plied a Certificate of Qualification y-82P64-323717. Because a no documentation required, under contrat:

TVA comple'ted SQMP Al-11, Attachment 10, However, Form," to document the review of the motor de Applicable" and no additional documentation indicating whether a mo detaiJed review was performed could be located. . .

5. ' Diesel Generators: -

On the ' original contract for the diesel generators to Bruce-GM, contrac f51-92652, the specifica icn requires that all e uipment be designed to withstand and operate af ter a seismic event and ictesed an On RD-5794S9, -

Appendix B quality assurance program on the vendo

. These motors have been QA Level II, no documentation re uired.

g reolaced many times under numerous MRs.

7. ' Shutdown Board 2A-A Looic Relav Panel (2-BDA-202-CD A1:
  • As part of the inspection the team selected a number of items in the plant and tried to trace those items back through the pro:uremen:

_,* process. Two of the items selected were Agastat relays, model loca ted in shut-f7012PD, serial numbers (5/N) 81031110 and 50362242, These relays are in the con rol logi circuits f or

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- t the essential raw cooling water and the component cooling wa er ,.

systems, respectively, which are IE saf ety-related functions.

Although recuested during the first week ofdocuments the inspection for TV was not able to identify or produce the procurement these relays. It should be noted that Amerace, the relay manu-f acturer, indicates 1E qualification of their product by precee l were .

the model number withend an "E" that the relays in the paneAf ter compl -

not marked as such. 61031110 and 80362 -

contacted Amerate and confirmed rthat relays E during the third These were manufactured.as commercial 9,ade, not I , i ly. bers, week of 1981 and the thirty-sixth required. . week of 198

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were probably procured QA Level II, no documentat on

.. E. RHR lsolation valve (2-FCV-7!--11: f MR A-10737, dated 8/20/53, for the fabric h procedure perf ormed on 8/20/E3 (Report (R-0586) in accordance w p-yT-I, Rhvision 4. course of the inspe : ion but TVA was not e,

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