ML20215F951
| ML20215F951 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Washington Public Power Supply System |
| Issue date: | 12/12/1986 |
| From: | Holmberg B WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| GO1-86-0161, GO1-86-161, NUDOCS 8612240130 | |
| Download: ML20215F951 (4) | |
Text
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8A WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM @4 g c
(/pg-P.O. Box 968
- 3000 George Washington Way
- Richland Washington SG.152 lC
Qp 4 V &
December 12, 1986 G01-86-0161 4
Docket Number 50-460 s,
Mr. John B. Martin Regional Administrator, Region V U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
' Walnut Creek, California 94596
Subject:
NUCLEAR PROJECT N0. 1 REPORTABLE CONDITION 10CFR50.55(e) (P0TENTIAL)
GSB FLOODING
Reference:
- 1) Telecon, dated July 2, 1986, C.R. Edwards, Supply System to
. W. Ang, Region V, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- 2) G01-86-0112, dated August 1, 1986, B.A. Holmberg to John B.
Martin, same subject In Reference 1), the Supply System informed your office of a potentially
' reportable deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e). Reference 2) provided you with the Supply System's Interim Report. We have now completed our investigation and our Final Report is attached herewith.
If you have any questions or desire further information, please advise.
. g B. A. Holmberg,TNP-1 Program Director (MD 821)
BAH:TED:pd Attachment cc: E.C. Haren, UE8C (395)
NRC Document Control Desk, Washington D.C.
FDCC E. Revell, BPA (399)
N. Reynolds, BLCPR G612240130 861212 0 DR ADOCK 0500 D'-2 7
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ATTACHMENT A Doc'Ket No. 50-460 Reportable Condition 10CFR50.55(e) (Potential)
Flooding of the General Services Building Final Report BACKGROUND Early on the morning of July 2,1986 water leaked from the temporary construction Fire Protection System. The permanent plant fire protection system was not complete prior to the time of construction shutdown.
The flooding initially started in Stairwell No. 13 of the General Services Building (GSB) at floor elevation 479 feet. A six inch Victaulic coupling on the vertical standpipe of the temporary construction fire protection system allowed joint separation and an estimated 340,000 gallons of water was discharged.
An intermittent fire pump signal at the Security Gate 1-1 was brought to the attention of the Supply System employee responsible for the plant fire protection system when he reported to work at 6:30 A.M. Water to the fire protection system was secured to terminate further flooding prior to 7 A.M.
An examination of the lower elevation areas of the GSB at 7 A.M. revealed that the flooding was contained within portions of the 395 foot floor elevation between column lines F to W and 4 to 10, and the maximum water level initially appeared to be approximately 3 feet 1 inch.
DESCRIPTIt;n 0F P0TENTIAL DEFICIENCY During the flooding, numerous items, such as pipe spools, valves, pumps, and motors were submerged in water. The initial concern al. the time of flooding was the effect of the water chemistry on the submerged items, and what specific items were affected.
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS The concern was whether a Halogen problem existed which could cause intergranular stress corrosion cracking at some future date on the stainless steel componeats.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN Water samples were taken from three different flood locations on July 2,1986 and three samples were taken from sumps on July 3,1986. A test for water pH was made at five (5) different locations on July 2,1986, and all showed a pH of 7.
. L Attachment A Page Two CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN (con't)
Halogen swipe surveys were performed on sixteen (16) randomly selected stainless steel items (pipe spools, a tank and a filter). The surveys were completed on July 11, 1986.
Subsequent testing of the water samples and the swipe tests disclosed a halogen level lower than established Project criteria; therefore, halogen contamination is not a concern.
Walkdowns of the flooded area have been performed by Supply System and UE&C personnel, for the purpose of identifying the specific equipment affected by the flood. These walkdowns have confirmed that the only Quality Class I (safety related) items involved in the flood are partially fabricated pipe spools, pipe fittings and empty conduits.
A listing of the items affected has been compiled and is being included as part of the nonconformance reports which are noted below.
The following is a summary of the actions which have been completed:
e Remove water from affected area. Complete 7/3/86.
e Perform Halogen swipe survey and obtain results for swipe survey and water samples - Complete 7/11/86.
e Identify specific Quality Class I items that were flooded - Complete 8/15/86. Identified on Supply System nonconformance reports as follows:
a) 1-SNCR-257-01: Stainless Steel Pipe Spools b) 1-SNCR-257-02: Carbon Steel Pipe Spools c) 1-SNCR-218-01: Electrical Conduits e Verify tightness of fire protection piping Victaulic couplings in the GSB and Containment - Complete 8/30/86.
ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE The temporary construction fire protection system inside the plant has been thoroughly inspected and all Victaulic couplings on fire mains have been re-tightened. The vertical fire protection standpipe in Stairwell No. 13 has also been realigned. These actions were completed on 8/30/86.
The associated fire water storage levels, pump run, pressure control valves setpoints and stroke times have been verified for reliability and operability, with various components replaced as required; this will insure reliability of the alarms and a more reliable fire protection system. These actions were completed on ' 04/86.
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Attachment A Page Three ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE (con't)
A program of systematic inspection of fire protection piping couplings in a particular floor elevation of each power block building, with a different floor inspected each subsequent year, is being -- established and will be implemented during -the extended construction delay period. This program will assist in identifying coupling degradation due to normal pressure changes in the temporary construction fire protection piping system. This program will be in place by-January 16, 1987.
The Security- Checklist has been modified to include and require immediate notification to Designated Site Authority on fire pump alarms. The Designated Site Authority will direct the required corrective actions to minimize damage.
This action was completed on 7/15/86.
To further assist in earlier water leakage detection, the following actions are planned:
a) For the purpose of a quick response to a fire water alarm during those times when the WNP-1 Site Security Force is occupied with tasks away from the alarm panel vicinity, the pump run and water storage tank-level alarms will be incorporated with the Supply System Emergency Operation Facility (E0F) Control. This will ensure a more prompt notification to the Designated Site Authority. This action will be completed by 1/30/87.
b) Install float limit switches in all sumps located in the lower level of the GSB to provide for early detection of water leaks. Alarm panels and horns will be strategically located to permit rapid notification of
, alarm and location of affected sump. Installation will be completed by 4/01/87.
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