ML20215D876
| ML20215D876 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/25/1986 |
| From: | Mcnutt G, Nesbitt P TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215D785 | List: |
| References | |
| 240.0-(B), 240.0-(B)-R, 240.0-(B)-R00, NUDOCS 8612170076 | |
| Download: ML20215D876 (24) | |
Text
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 240.0(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM 1.
REPORT TYPE:
-SEQUOYAH ELEMENT REVISION NUM3ER: 0 TITLE:
CABLE AMPACITY Cable Derating (Design) and Cable Coating Derating PAGE 1 0F 19 REASON FOR REVISION:
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SIGNATURE DATE REVIEWS REV W COMITTEE f
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SIGNATURE
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CONCURRENCES _
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SIGNATURE DATE SIGNATURE DATE D
8612170076 861210 5.f j?)
PDR ADOCK 05000327 APPROVED BfT P PDR ECSP MANAGER DATE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)
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SPECIAL PROGRAM TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PEPORT NUMBER: 240.0(B) t REVISION NUMBER: 0 s
I PAGE 2 0F 19 N
1.-
CHARACTERIZATION OF ISSUES:-
' Concerns:
Issues:
[
i WI-85-100-009
(
XX-85-122-027, -028, -029 a.
Cable ampacity and cable derating "Sequoyah: _ Cable ampacity-
-was not properly considered (e.g.,
problems where cable derating overcrowding of cables, penetration was not properly considered."
and conduit sealing were not considered in cable derating).
IN-85-272-004-WBN' Overfilled conduits may cause
"'Valcoat,' used in fireproof induction / heat problems.
electrical cables in both units may cause cables to overheat b.
-Bundling of cables and fireproof causing degradation of the coating applied to cables may cause cable insulation."
cable overheating and insulation degradation.
IN-85-289-006-WBk "Vermasco was applied to cables c.
Overheating of cables makes prematurely. Penetrations and instrument readings indeterminate.
I'])
conduits were sealed. 'Vermasco was determined to keep heat in d.
Potential cable damage could result k'
and deteriorated the insulation.
from cable pulling in overfilled
~This application was discontinued conduits, and insulation is damaged 1-1/2 years ago but.the Vermasco by fishtapes.
(Addressed in Sequoyah already' applied has not been Element Report 238.1(B).)
iemoved."
IN-86-254-005
" Electrical cables are bundled together and then covered with
~Vamasco. The thick coating of Yamasto'potentially causes heat build up which may cause failure.
This is a generic condition E
throughout Units I and II.
It effects low, medium, and high voltage cables."
r Il IN-86-262-002
" Units 1 and 2, the overcrowding I
of cables and the application of C
a fire retardant to the cables
[
causes an overheating condition.
I Therefore making the instrument
[
readings indeterminate."
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-TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 240.0(B)
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SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0 PAGE 3 0F 19 r.%
t' Concerns:
IN-86-036-001.
" Electrical conduits in Units 1 and 2 are overfilled. This may cause induction / heat problems.
Some cables may also have been damaged by pulling in these tight conditions, and by using excessive force in installing fish tape in the conduits."
2.
HAVE ISSUES BEEN IDENTIFIED IN ANOTHER SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS? YES X NO Documentation Identifiers:
o Identified by Black & Veatch Finding Report G901 Date 11/02/82 o
Identified by Nuclear Safety Review Staff Report I-85-569-WBN, " Cable Overheating and Fire Retardant" Date 11/20/85 o
Identified by Nuclear Safety Review Staff Report I-85-705-WBN, " Cable Overheating Due to Fire Retardant" Date 11/19/85
~
a o
Identified by Nuclear Safety Review Staff Report 1-85-299-WBN, " Cable Overheating Due to Fire Retardant" r-Date 12/10/85 o
Identified by Nuclear Safety Review Staff Report I-85-766-SQN, " Proper Cable Derating" Date 03/07/86
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 240.0(B)
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SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: O PAGE 4 0F 19
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DOCUMENT NOS., TAG NOS., LOCATIONS OR OTHER SPECIFIC DESCRIPTIVE i
-IDENTIFICATIONS STATED IN ELEMENT:
-Valcoat, Vermasco and Vamasco for WBNP.
(Vimasco is the correct name of the cable coating compound was used at WBNP.)
4.
INTERVIEW FILES REVIEWED:
The following files were reviewed and no additional information for Sequoyah was identified for the concerns addressed in this report.
IN-85-122 IN-86-254 WI-85-100 IN-85-272 IN-86-262 IN-85-289 IN-86-236 File IN-86-036 contains additional information for concern IN-86-036-001 regarding conduit numbers. This information, however, is specific to WBN.
If kh 5.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED RELATED TO THE ELEMENT:
-Mi'
[
See Appendix A.
f 6.
WHAT REGULATIONS, LICENSING COMMITMENTS, DESIGN REQUIREMENTS, OR OTHER APPLY OR CONTROL IN THIS AREA?
See Appendix A.
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7.
LIST REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, MEETINGS, TELEPHONE CALLS, AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO ELEMENT.
See Appendix A.
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e TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
240.0(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0 "r"
PAGE 5 0F 19 8.
EVALUATION PROCESS:
a.
Reviewed a uilable transcripts of NRC investigative interviews ror additional information on the concerns.
g b.
Reviewed FS to establish commitments for cable installation and fill rei trements.
c.
Reviewed engineering design standards and design criteria for cable sizing to assess their adequacy.
d.
Reviewed existing INPO, NSRS, and other TVA reports (e.g.,
I-85-766-SQN) and findings on cable derating to determine the j
extent to which they satisfy the concerns and whether y
corrective actions have been identified.
I
[
e.
Reviewed existing TVA Construction, QA/QC, Operations, and j
Material Control Reports for the Employee Concern Evaluation 3
Program for applicability to the concerns discussed in this j@
report.
- !4 f.
Reviewed derating test reports on cable coating compound and firestop sealing material (silicone foam) and their effect on cable ampacities.
g.
Reviewed design drawings and TVA Construction procedures and
[
specifications to detern.tne requirements for installation of cable tray penetration firestops and cable coating compound.
h.
Assessed overall adequacy of the cable derating practices and installation and identified areas that require further investigation.
i.
Performed SQN walkdown to assess adequacy of installation to l
design.
9.
DISCUSSION FINDINGS. AND CONCLUSIONS:
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Discussion:
1.
I Problems regarding cable derating and cable coating derating 1
(issues "a" through "c") are discussed in this report.
Issue "d"
[
dealing with conduit overfill and cable damage is addressed in Element Report 238.1(B).
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: '240.0(8)
'SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0 g
,8 PAGE 6 0F 19 The sizing and-derating of cables installed in raceway is the responsibility of the design engineer. Failure to properly size cables could result in excessive heat buildup in the raceway and eventual cable f ailure or fire.
In general, the employee cor.cerns question the adequacy of cable sizing with and without application
.of-fire-retardant cable coating compound.
- a.
Cable Ampacity and Cable Derating Cables in Firestops. TVA conducted an ampacity test for firestop penetrations from October 5 to 23, 1976 (App. A, 5.g9). This test concluded that no cable derating was required for penetrations using 12 inches of silicone foam (Dow-Corning number 3-6548). The fire test was conducted because Electrical Design Standard DS-E12.1.2, (App. A, 5.rr, 09/28/76) Rev. 0,-did not address the additional derating requirements for cables transitioning firestop penetrations (App.A,5.hh,02/10/77). A TVA memo from Chandler to Pierce (App. A, 5.11, 01/17/77) on the ampacity test results
,g indicated that the optimum depth of the firestop sealant ng, (silicone foam) material was one foot, and a revision to l
Mr design depths was required to seal cable penetrations. This memo transmitted recommended design information for firestop details to be used for installation in cable tray penetrations on the SQN and W8N projects.
The evaluator compared the TVA test procedures and results with tests performed by Detroit Edison and published November 1981 in IEEE Transaction of Power Apparatus and System (App. A, 5.kk). The results of these tests were similar and supported TVA's conclusion that no additional derating is required.
Conduits are sealed for smoke and hot gases in accordance with SQN drawing 45W880-26, Firestop(Penetrations.
This drawing requires a depth of sealant RTV silicone) from 1/2 inch to a maximum depth of 2 inches. The maximum depth of 2 inches is less than the 12 inches tested for the silicone foam and, therefore, would not require any additional derating.
The TVA test used a test configuration of 30 percent tray fill through the penetration. However, the TVA tests do not consider the effect of tray overfill on ampacity. A TVA memo from Raughley to Those Listed (App. A, 5.s,10/07/86) a requests all nuclear plants to conduct a sampling program to W
evaluate actual installation and to determine effects on Y
cable ampacity. Completion of this program should address overfill in penetrations.
03670 (11/21/86)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS
. REPORT NUMBER: 240.0(B)
L-SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0 PAGE 7 0F 19 xp Cables in Raceway. The Black and Veatch Finding Report, Finding No. G901, on the review at Watts Bar (App. A, 5.a, 11/02/82) identified areas of the plant that did not meet an
'FSAR commitment for 6.9 kV physical cable separation, and noted that these cables were coated with a " fire resistive compound" (Vimasco).
(The cable coating naterial used at SQN is Flamemastic.)
The TVA Task Force for Review of Black & Veatch Findings, Category 39; Evaluation Sheet (App. A, 5.b, 11/08/83) for Sequoyah, indicated that the FSAR commitment for separation of 6.9 kV cables was intended to reduce the electromotive force (EMF) between phases under load and to provide a more conservative design for heat dissipation. However, the Task Force concluded that no credit for this separation was taken for cable derating. The task force also addressed the issue dealing with the cable coating, which is discussed in "b" below.
A field walkdown (App. A, 7.b) at SQN revealed that the 6.9 kV cable installation in trays was in compliance with the J@S G-38 Specification (App. A, 5.uu). Cables 2/0 and smaller were randomly laid whereas larger cables were in groups of three. No cable bundles were noted.
The NSRS Report No. I-85-766-SQN (App. A, 5.g, 03/07/86) cited the Bellefonte Electrical Evaluation Report, Finding E-3 (App. A, 5.pp, 01/85):
"No documentation was found to justify the cable ampacity and derating factors in the application of voltage-level F (control level) cables in 60 percent filled trays;" Finding E-5: " Electrical Design Standards for all current carrying ampacities are not correct for all voltage levels;" and INP0 review of the Bellefonte Project Report, Finding DC3-1 ( App. A, 5.qq, 03/84):
"Some electrical calculations were not performed and others did not address all design conditions," e.g.,
low voltage cable sizing adequacy, and inclusion of the effect of conduit grouping on cable ampacity.
The NSRS report indicated that since the design standards and process for cable sizing are basically the same for all of TVA's nuclear plants the findings were applicable for SQN.
As a result, the Office of Engineering (OE) performed an evaluation of SQN to document the basis for the design standard used for cable sizing, the adequacy of the existing design, and the need for additional studies. OE issued t?
calculation B43 860117 924 (App. A, 5.y, 01/16/86) in Tj response to the Bellefonte Review Team finding and concluded 0367D (11/21/86)
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
240.0(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM o
s REVISION NUMBER:
0
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PAGE 8 0F 19 that the ampacities presented in TVA Electrical Design Standards DS-E12.1.1,12.1.2,12.1.3, and 12.1.4 are acceptable for all previous designs.
The cable ampacity issue is further complicated by the uncertainties regarding actual raceway fills.
This has been addressed by TVA in the following documents:
e o
SCR SQNECB8601 R0 (App. A, 5.k, 06/27/86) indicated that the cable tray fill design criteria were exceeded.
Engineering Report SCR SQNECB8601 R0, (App. A, 5.m) indicated that there were no known violations of tray fill criteria, o
SCR SQNEEB8620 R1 ( App. A, 5.q, 04/10/86) indicated that abandoned cables in cable trays were not tracked.
Engineering Report SCR SQNEEB8620 R1 (App. A, S.r, 05/20/86) indicated that unlabeled and untracked aLandoned cables existed and tray fill criteria were n;(h y4 violated.
m#
o SCR SQN EEB8601 R0 (App. A, 5.n, 01/07/86) indicated that verified cable weights and outside diameters were not available.
Engineering Report SCR SQNEEB8601 R0 (App. A, 5.p, 04/16/86) agreed with the SCR and included a list of verified cable data that was used in issuance of new design standards for cable DS-E12.1.13 and DS-E12.1.14.
Although the extent of raceway overfill problem is discussed in detail in Element Reports 238.1(B), 238.3(B), and 239.0(B), the effect of the overfill on ampacity is addressed in this report.
Office of Engineering calculation B43 860117 924 (App. A, 5.y, 01/16/86) was issued to justify the ampacity tables in Design Standards DS-E12.1.1 through E12.1.4.
As a result of on-going Employee Concern Task Group investigations of ampacity concerns, calculation B43 860117 924 was reevaluated, and a men.o f rom Raughley to Those Listed ( App.
A, 5.1, 08/06/86) was issued to distribute a Problem Identification Report (PIR) GENEEB8605 to all nuclear plants.
This PIR indicated that the design standards are incomplete, lack the definition and information required for proper application, and are supported by incorrect calculations.
The proposed corrective action in the PIR was
/g 7' to revise the design standard criteria to reflect the minimum
'2 )
requirements necessary to properly size cables for all applications.
03670 (11/21/86)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 240.0(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0 3
PAGE 9 0F 19
- =.
TVA issued a new Electrical Design Standard DS E12.6.3, (App.A,5.h,09/02/89 applicable to all TVA plants. This design standard supersedes DS-E12.1.1, 12.1.2, 12.1.3, and 12.1.4 and establishes new requirements for sizing control and power Cables for installation in Conduits and cable trays.
It also gives details on additional derating for cable coating compounds and conduit arranagement (duct banks and exposed).
Review of this design standard by the evaluation team
' determined that although it identifies tray covers and fire wrapping material, it does not actually provide standards for derating. Also, design standard DS-E12.6.3 indicates that the worst-case configuration of conduits of six wide horizontally and one deep vertically was used to establish the tables for V4-V5 (480 V - 6.9 kV) cables. No justification was given as to why this configuration was chosen since the other configurations in the table in Section 3 show more conservative values.
d}g TVA memo Raughley to Those Listed (App. A, 5.s,10/07/86) was t;d%
issued to all nuclear plants to provide direction and guidance in the performance of corrective action for cable ampacity, and to establish a sampling program to determine the adequacy of installed cables with respect to their ampacity rating. The memo supplements DS-E12.6.3 and addresses the derating of cables installed in cable trays with solid top and bottom covers and in trays covered or enclosed in Appendix R fire wrap materials. As stated in this memo, the information regarding covers and fire wrap will be incorporated in the next revision of Design Standard DS-E12.6.3.
This memo does not specifically address the sampling or evaluation of overfilled raceway.
Although this memo provides instructions for additional derating resulting from the fire wrap materials, a test conducted by Thermal Science, Inc. at Underwriters Laboratory (UL)onSeptember 28-29, 1986 (Ref. mailgram App. A, 5.tt) i determined that the fire protection material Thermo-Lag 330 may require derating figures greater than those indicated by a previous test. Thermo-Lag 330 is used at SQN, and the revised derating for a 1-hr rating was shown to increase from 12.5 percent to 28 percent and for a 3-hr rating from 20.5 percent to 31 percent. When the official UL report is issued, Thermal Science Inc. will evaluate this report and revise Thermo-Lag 330 derating values as required.
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-TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 240.0(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM EEVISION NUMBER: 0 PAGE 10 0F-19 b.
Bundling of Cables and Fireproof Coating NSRS Reports I-85-299-WB 12/10/85, I-85-705-WBN 11/19/85, and I-85-569-WBN 11/20/85 addressed application of the cable coating compound used at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. Reports I-85-299-WBN (App A, 5.f) and I-85-705-WBN (App A, 5.e) reference Report I-85-569-WBN ( App A, 5.c), which covers the bunching of cables and application of the fire-retardant coating for WBN.
Report I-85-569-WBN concluded that Voltage Level V1, V2, and V3 trays (Control and Instrumentation) were bunched together for ease in application of the fire-retardant coating, and this configuration was approved for cable installation in VI, V2, and V3 trays for WBN (App. A, 5.nn, 04/27/81), but not in V4 (480 V) and V5 (6.9 kV) trays (App. A, 5.mm).
Installation requirements for General Construction Specification G-38, Section 3.2.1.8 ( App. A, 5.uu, 03/17/86) state that cable shall be placed in trays "in a neat and orderly fashion." However, no design or installation N
criteria regarding cable bundling at SQN were identified.
h)
The evaluation team observed during the SQN plant walkdown (App. A, 7.a 10/09/86) that one 480 V (V4) tray (GG-A, Node 103-104) had all of the cable bundled in the middle of the tray and coated with Flamemastic. This bundling of cable L
creates a cable depth greater than the depths established in ICEA P-54-440 standard and Design Standard DS-E12.6.3. The established depths are based upon a depth of cables randomly routed in the cable tray, not bundled in the middle.
Regarding cable coating, NSRS Report I-85-569-WBN noted that even though there was no evidence to conclude that application of cable coating would cause overheating, the effect of the coating on ampacity was not specifically documented for all applications.
This supported the WBN pre-INPO Finding PDC 3-4.F (App. A. 5.00, 11/06/85) that necessary documentation has not always been developed to support design criteria and to qualify designs.
The NSRS report recommended a review of present cables with the application of the coating compound to determine or document that no problems exist.
SQN Report GCA-03-49 (App A, 5.w, 06/06/86) addresses the effect of the coating compound (Flamemastic 77) used at SQN on cable derating. This report referenced two Joslyn pn Research Tests (App. A, 5.cc, 09/09/77 and 5.dd, 02/24/86) it-conducted on Flamemastic for coating thickness up to 0367D-(11/21/86) l r
k TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 240.0(B)
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SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0
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PAGE 11 0F 19 2 inches. The results of these tests indicated a maximum derating of 5.80 percent for Flamemastic 77, and 9.16 percent for Flamemastic 71A'for a 2-inch. thickness. The Joslyn 02/24/86 Test Report ( App. A, 5 dd) revised the derating of 1/4 inch of Flamemastic 77 upward from 1.41 percent to 2.2 percent. Cables installed in the_ plant were covered with
-Flamemastic 77 cable coating compound, at a thickness of 3/16 inch + 1/16. inch. However, additional cables were added to these' trays after the initial application of coatings.
The new cables were then coated, creating coating thicknesses greater than originally tested (1/4-inch).
The Joslyn test (App A, 5.dd) did not address coating applied on top of existing coated cables when additional cables were installed.
In this configuration, the existing TVA standard 3/16-inch coat is combined with a new coat of 3/16-inch, so the total thickness could exceed 3/8 inch. A TVA memo from Killian to Chandler (App A, 5.gg,11/09/76) indicated that "any buildup of Flamemastic also causes a significant increase in temperatures," when used on cable firestop penetrations and " extreme care is required during application f
to reduce the number of these hot spots."
Cable ampacity tests conducted in 1986 (App. A, 5.dd) with a coating depth of 2 inches exceed any probable thickness the coating could reach during plant construction since this would require the application of at least 10 coats of material to equal the 2-inch thickness tested. The derating presently indicated in Design Standard 05-E12.6.3 has been revised upward to better reflect the probable present thickness of greater than 3/16 inch that may be installed in the plant. Also, these derating values tables for thickness from 1/8 to 2 inches are more conservative than those indicated in the Joslyn test.
c.
Instrument Readings The NSRS I-85-569-WBN (App. A, 5.c) report also indicated that the concern related to indeterminate instrument readings resulting from cable overheating could not be substantiated because the instrumentation system is low current and, therefore, does not result in overheating of instrument cables or cause indeterminate readings. The evaluating team agrees with NSRS conclusion regarding instrument readings.
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.TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPDRT NUMBER: 240.0(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM
-f REVISION NUMBER: 0 e
PAGE 12 0F 19 Findings:
a.
Although TVA has indicated by test that no additional cable derating is required for cables transitioning firestops, no evaluation or test has been conducted on overfilled cable trays in firestops. TVA has now initiated a sampling program to determine the extent and effect of tray covers and fire wrap on raceway ampacity. The memo does not specifically require the sampling program to include evaluation of overfilled raceways.
The originally issued Design Standards DS-E12.1.1, E12.1.2, E12.1.3, and E12.1.4 did not furnish the definition and information necessary for proper application of the ampacity tables.
In September 1986, TVA issued Design Standard o
DS-E12.6.3 which voided these existing design standards. The new standard reflects the new QA cable data shown in Design Standards DS-E12.1.13 and DS-E12.1.14 as well as application for derating cables for tray covers, coating compound, and Appendix R fire wrap (App. A, 5.s). The new design standard, bg&y however, does not justify why a conduit configuration of six wide horizontally and one deep (480 V and 6.9 kV) cables.
vertically was established for ampacity tables for V4 and VS b.
The use of Flamemastic cable coating compound on cables has been tested by an independent laboratory, and cable derating values have been established. TVA has incorporated the derating values into Design Standard DS-E12.6.3 to be used for cable sizing. Since the values used in the design standard are more conservative (greater) than the values established by test, the implementation of the design standard values represents acceptable practice.
Therefore, cables coated wits Flamemastic will not be degraded by overheating.
As noted during a field walkdown at the SQN plant, some V4 (480 V) cables were bundled in the center of the tray and coated with Flamemastic.
Therefore, the adequacy of the bundled V4 (480 V) cables cannot be determined.
c.
Because they have low current levels, instrument cables are not overheated. Therefore, no effect is imposed on instrument readings by cable heating.
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PAGE 13 0F 19
==
Conclusion:==
The issues expressed in the employee concerns are valid to the extent that the cable derating and sizing did not properly address the cable tray fill, cable coating compound, cable bundling,,
overfilled trays in firestops, tray covers, and Appendix R fire wrap at the time the concerns were-expressed. TVA has since recognized the problem areas and has initiated corrective actions, except for derating for overfilled raceway, cable bundling, and overfilled raceway in firestops.
Satisfactory completion of current corrective actions and establishment of corrective actions for the outstanding items, will adequately address the cable derating problem. Proper application of Design Standard DS-E12.6.3 should prevent recurrence of similar problems.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 240.0(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM i
REVISION NUMBER: 0 PAGE 14 0F 19 4
APPENDIX A 5.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED RELATED TO THE ELEMENT:
a.
Black and Veatch Finding Report G901, (11/02/82) b.
TVA Task Force for Review of Black and Veatch Findings - Task Force Category 39 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Rev. 1, (11/08/83) c.
Nuclear Safety Review Staff Report I-85-569-WBN, " Cable Overheating and Fire Retardant Coating," (11/20/85) d.
TVA memo from Cottle to Whitt, " Response to NSRS Report I-85-569-WBN," (01/30/86) e.
Nuclear Safety Review Staff Report I-85-705-WBN, " Cable Overheating Due to Fire Retardant," (11/19/85) f.
Nuclear Safety Review Staff Report I-85-299-WBN, " Cable
-(]N Overheating Due to Fire Retardant," (12/10/85) iN g.
Nuclear Safety Review Staff Report I-85-766-SQN, " Proper Cable Derating," (03/07/86) h.
Electrical Design Standard DS-E12.6.3, R0 (805 860905 501),
" Cable, Ampacity Tables For Auxiliary and Control Power Cables (0-15,000V)," (09/02/86) 1.
TVA memo from Raughley to Those Listed, (B42 860808 908),
"All Nuclear Plants - Problem Identification Report PIR GENEEB8605," (08/06/86) j.
TVA memo from Raughley to Those Listed (No RIMS), "Ampacity of Power Cables in Duct Bank," (05/30/86) k.
Significant Condition Report SCP, SQNECB8601 R0, (842 860707 014), " Cable Tray Fill Design Criteria Exceeded,"
(06/27/86) m.
EngineeringReportSQNECB8601R0,(S56860804820)," Cable Tray Design Criteria Exceeded," (08/04/86)
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 240.0(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0 h
PAGE 15 0F 19 APPENDIX A (cont'd) n.
Significant Condition Report SCR SQNEEB8601 R0, (843 860117 919), " Cable Weights and Outside Diameters Not Available from a QA Source," (01/17/86) p.
TVA memo from Wilson to Brimer, (B25 860416 007), "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Engineering Report for CAQ Report No. SCR SQNEEB8601 R0, Rev.1," (04/16/86) q.
Significant Condition Report - SCR SQNEEB8620 R1, (843 860410 910), " Cable Tray Loading" (No method of tracking s'
or identifying abandoned cables in cable trays), (04/10/86) r.
TVA memo frcm Wilson to Brimer, (825 860520 002),
" Engineering Report - SCR SQNEEB8620R1, Rev. O, " Cable Tray Loading" (No method of tracking or identifying abandoned cables in cable trays)," (05/20/86) s.
TVA memo Raughley to those listed, (843 861008 909), "All
,O Nuclear Plants - Corrective action and Sampling Program For (V)
Electrical Cable Ampacity," (10/07/86) t.
Letter from Mills, TVA, to Denton, NRC, (L44 841018 800)," Fire Retardant Coating - Vimasco &
Flamemastic," (10/18/84) u.
Sequoyah Generic Concern Task Force Report GCA-01-46, (No RIMS), "0verfill of Cable Trays and Conduits," (05/20/86) v.
Sequoyah Report GCA-03-48, (No RIMS), " Plant Procedures on Overfill of Cable Trays," (04/25/86) 9 w.
Sequoyah Report GCA-03-49, (No RIMS), " Thickness of Fire Protection Coating on Cables," (06/06/86) x.
Sequoyah Report GCA-04-50, (No RIMS), " Cable Tray Fill Criteri a" y.
Office of Engineering Calculation 843 860117 924,
" Justification For Use of TVA's Ampacity Tables," (01/16/86) z.
Office of Engineering Calculation 843 860331 928,
" Determination of Class 1E Electrical Cable Weight / Foot and Outside Diameter," (03/31/86) aa.
Electrical Desi n Standard DS-E12.1.13, (805 860423 501),
pG
" Cable, Class 1 Cable ODs and Weights," (04/15/86) 03670 (11/21/86)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 240.0(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0 PAGE 16 0F 19 APPENDIX A (cont'd) bb.
Electrical Design Standard DS-E12.1.14, R0, (805 860429 505),
" Cable, Class NC Cable ODs and Weights," (04/15/86) cc.
Joslyn Research Center, " Test Report - The Effect of Flamemastic 77 Fire Protective Coating on the Ampacity of A Grouped Power and Control Cable Assembly Tested for the Flamemaster Corporation, Sun Valley, California, Test Number 77-098," (09/09/77) dd.
Joslyn Corporation, " Test Report of The Effect of Flamemastic 71A and Flamemastic 77 Fire Protective Coatings on the Ampacity of a Grouped Power and Control Cable Assembly Tested for the Tennessee Valley Authority, Knoxville, Tennessee, Test Number 85-033," (02/24/86) ee.
TVA memo from Beasley to Vineyard, (805 860214 001),
"Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - QA Review of Operational i
Readiness - NSRS Open Items - Surveillance Report No. S86-10" Y
ff.
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant FSAR, Section 8.3.1.4.1, " Cable V
Derating and Cable Tray Fill"
' gg.
TVA memo from Killian to Chandler, (WBN 761111013), " Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 -
Cable Sleeve Penetration Tests," (11/09/76) hh.
TVA memo from Sudduth to Electrical Engineering Files, (EEB 770211 908), "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 -
Evaluation of Test Results of Cable Ampacity Tests for Completed Fire Stop Penetrations," (02/10/77) a 11.
TVA memo from Chandler to Pierce, (EEB 770118 910), "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Design of Electrical Fire Stop Penetrations," (01/17/77) jj.
IEEE Transaction on Power Apparatus and Systems, Volume 90/1971, (IEEE paper 70 TP557 PWR), "Ampacity For Cables in Randomly Filled Trays By J. Stolpe", (January-June 1971) i 03670 (11/21/86) l
s-TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 240.0(B)
SPECIAL PROGRA.M REVISION NUMBER: 0 PAGE 17 0F 19-APPENDIX A (cont'd) kk.
IEEE Transaction of Power Apparatus and System, Volume PAS-100, No. 11, 4680-5, "Ampacity Test of a Silicone Foam Firestop in a Cable Tray," Detroit Edison Co., (Nov 1981) mm. -
TVA Design Information Request - Wilkins to Cantrell (WBN 810729 162) "4 Voltage Level Cable Grouped - Designed Information Request (DIR) - No. E-56" (07/29/81). Response to DIR (SWP 81 0902 028) nn.
TVA Design Information Request - (WBN 810427 101) " Cable Grouped in Tra Request (DIR) y and Coated with Vimasco - Design Information
- No. E-55," (04/27/81).
oo.
TVA memo from Lyons to Coan (B49 851106 001), " Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Pre-INP0 Design Evaluation," and attached Pre-INPO report, (11/06/85) pp.
Bellefonte Electrical Evaluation - January 1985 C/
qq.
Bellefonte Nuclear Plants, Units 1 & 2, Tennessee Valley Authority - March 1934 rr.
Electrical Design Standard DS-E12-1.2, R0, " Cable - Conductor Current Carrying Capacity Cross-Linked Polyethylene Insulated Cable (0 - 15,000 V), (09/28/76) ss.
Insulated Cable Engineers Association ICEA Pub. No. P-54-440, "Ampacity, Cables in Open-Top Cable Trays, August 1979" tt.
Mailgram Rubin Feldman to Bechtel Power Corp. Re: Thermo-Lag 330, dated 10/02/86 uu.
General Construction Specification, G-38, Rev. 8, " Installing Insulated Cables Rated up to 15,000 volts" (03/17/86) vv.
TVA SQN Drawing 45W880-26 (Sheet 26) Rev. 19, " Conduit and Grounding - Cable Trays - Fire Stop Penetrations Detail Sheet 13."(07/18/85) ww.
Electrical Design Standard DS-E13.5.1, R0, " Raceways, Electrical Penetration Firestops and Pressure Seals" (12/05/77) 03670 (11/21/86)
s..
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 240.0(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0 PAGE 18 0F 19 APPENDIXA(cont'dl 6.
WHAT REGULATIONS, LICENSING COMMITMENTS, DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OR OTHER APPLY OR CONTROL IN THIS AREA?
a.
FSAR 8.3.1.4.1 - Cable Derating and Cable Tray Fill b.
Engineering Design Standard - DS-E12.1.13, Rev.1, (01/13/86) c.
Engineering Design Standard - DS-E12.1.14 Rev. 1, (01/13/86) d.
Engineering Design Standard - DS-E12.6.3, Rev. O, (09/02/86) e.
SNP Inspection Instruction No. A4, Rev. 9, (06/16/83) f.
SNP Construction Procedure No. E-10, Rev. 2, (09/06/79) 7.
LIST REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, MEETINGS, TELEPHONE CALLS, AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO ELLMtNI.
O a.
Field Walkdown at Sequoyah site conducted by Jack Wheeler (Bechtel),andGeorgeBell(TVA) 10/09/86.
b.
Field Walkdown at Sequoyah site conducted by David Knudsen (Bechtel) (11/21/86)
W 03670 (11/21/86)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT. NUMBER: 240.0(B)
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMER: 0 PAGE-19 0F 19 CATD LIS_T_
The following CATD forms are inci rled as part of this report:
240.00-SQN-01
-240.00-SQN-02 240.00-SQN-03 240.00-SQN-04
.(
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II's sjd {y 03670'(11/21/86)
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ECSP CORRECTIVE Action Traciting Document (C&TD)
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Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily implemented.
SIGNATURE IITLE DATE
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ECTG C.3 Attachment A
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Page 1 of 1 Revision 2 - A ECSP CORRECTIVE Action Tractina Docunont (CATD)
INITIATION 1.
Isumediate Corrective Action Required: 3 Yes O No 2.
Stop Wort Reconumended: 0 Yes e No 3.
CATD No. 2'iO. oO - S og -0~4 4
INITIATION DATE II/17 8d 5.
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INITIATION 1.
Insnediate Corrective Action Required: 3 Yes O No 2.
Stop Wort Recommended: O Yes a No INIllt.TIONDATElI/n/BG 3.
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