ML20215C409

Amends 14 & 13 to Licenses DPR-80 & DPR-82,respectively, Revising Tech Specs to Accommodate Cycle 2 & Later Operation of Unit 2 & Cycle 3 & Later Operation of Unit 1

ML20215C409
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	06/12/1987
From:	Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20215C413	List: ML20215C409 ML20215C434
References
TAC-65011, TAC-65012, NUDOCS 8706180110
Download: ML20215C409 (20)

Text

.

[f

- e 9, -

. UNITED STATES 7,, - -)gg(,p, ;

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION gaj WASHINGTON, D, C,20555

' % %r 4 [

...a

.l PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-275 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE i

Amendment No.14 License No. DPR-80 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Pacific' Gas & Electric Company l

(thelicensee),datedMarch 25, 1987, as supplemented May 26, 1987 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

8706180110 870612 PDR ADOCK 05000275 P

PDR

. 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical-i Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-80 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications l

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection plan contained in Appendix B, as revised

'through Amendment No. 14, are hereby incorporated _in the license.

Pacific Gas & Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3.

This. license amendment becomes effective at the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION d567 adh dl George. Knigh

, Director Project Directorate V Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V

& Special Projects

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications i

Date of Issuance:

June 12, 1987 I

1

Mf o

UNITED STATES g

8 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n

i h

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

\\,

/

,,o j

l l

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-323 l

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.13 1

License No. DPR-82 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Pacific Gas & Electric Company (thelicensee),datedMarch 25, 1987, as supplemented May 26, 1987 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules'and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's' regulations and all epplicable requirements have been satisfied.

a r

i r

, 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment,andparagraph2.C.(2)'ofFacilityOperatingLicense No. DPR-82 is hereby amended to read as follows:

1 (2) Technical Specifications J

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan-contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 13., are hereby incorporated in the license. '

Pacific. Gas & Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific'licer.se.

conditions.

3.

This license amendraent becomes effective at the date of its issuance.

i FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

A$f%d y

George

Knighton, rector Project f rectorate' V Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V

& Special Projects-

Attachment:

Chances to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

June 12,1987 i

m-

l ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS.14 AND 13 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-80 AND DPR-82 1

DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323

]

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indic6 ting the area of change.

Remove Insert 2-2a 2-2a 2-7 2-7 2-8 2-8 B 2-1 B 2-1 l

3/4 1-12 3/4 1-12 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-13 3/4 2-6 3/4 2-6 3/4 2-9 3/4 2-9 3/4 2-11 3/4 2-11 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-11 3/4 5-11 B3/4 1-2 B3/4 1-2 B3/4 1-3 B3/4 1-3 B3/4 5-3 B3/4 5-3 B3/4 6-3 B3/4 6-3 i

I j

i

;,r m -

n

. .O'

~,

,(,

;f.

r i

e 1

7

(

g f070 3

I 1

Y 660<

N 2 4 0 0 P SI'A UNACCEPTAB LE I N N CPERAT ON 3

g

'i '=

650 N

N

{

s 2 2 5 0_P SI A \\

i [ggm.

640 I

' N

\\

,c i

ls..,-

e

%N j

j i g g

630

-=

W 2N 2dOO PSIA N

I h

\\

620 NN N

e NN T

i NN

\\

et610 1954.7 PSI A NN h

F M

l'\\

{

600

\\

ACCEPTABLE OP E R ATIO N' 590 g

580 l

\\

570 O

20 40 60 80 100' 120 PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER

}

FIGURE 2.1-1b REACTOR CORE SAFETY LIMIT (UNIT 2) i DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 2-2a Amendment Nos. 14 and 13

7 7;,

~

4 s

03

=

t l

a I

9

'g 9

v S

T' a

T

^

T N

e T

I c

r

'r o

O n

P e

)

o f

T r

e f

E e

r r

S f

u r

e e

s e

l

)

P R

s l

l 2

I e

l o

R 2

r o

r

)

t

)

T p

r t

2 i

d t

t.

n n

e N

i g

n o

t U

u O

n n

o c

i n

I S

U i

c

)

n i

T N

t g

2 U

r t

A O

r a

g a

e n

T I

o r

a l

t t

o N

T f

e l

i r

f C

E A

R p

d n

e a

(

M T

E F

o d

a U

t U

O W

a e

f d

1 R

N O

6 l

e l

a n

T P

a l

1 r

a 2

S E

]

7 n

e e

d

)

N L

)

L 7

i e

h s

t n 2 3 2

I B

I' A

5 m

h t

f

a A

A M

a) e e

o t

E M

T

(

R g n n

r 2 3 l

l L

E 3

E i

y i

o d

c c B

T f'

H d

s S;

b t

n e e y y A

S T

F n

p C d

a ; a l

l C C T

Y

)

a R

d e

r

)

c c S

D e;

z e 2 3 y y1 1 P

E 1;

e d tn i

p C C P

T e

R r e ao l

o e e t t I

P A

r tE u t ri i

l l

1 l'

i i R

(

R u

iW s a et t

m c c -

n n T

3 t

nO s c na u

r y y t t U U_

K t

a UP e i es o C C i i

( (

R

+

a r

r d gn s

f n n O

)

e rL p n e

t s 1 1 U U g g T

T p

oA i

np n

n

( ( i i C

T A

m fM r

(

om a

a t t s s A

e R

e i o t

r i i F F p p E

T d

t FE z g tc s;

t n n

/ /

R

(

e H

i i c

ns

- U U / / 5 2 r s nc o

e

( ( 8 9 8 0 t

e

6. T a

g u p ui c4 c

5 4 6 5 5

S c

a 6D s

f m a 4 6 3 1 0 0 m=

e l

7 6 1 1 0 0 1

2 i

r 7E s 5 a

T I

d e

5T e 3 en 1 1 0 0 0 0 m

p

+ +

n v

A r 2 hy i 2 a

T 1

1 I

A

<R P 2 Td TT l 1 1 0 0 0 0 m

A

=

=

=

=

=

= = = = =

E 2

R K

g T P '

5 5

2 5

1 1

2 2 a 3 U

T T

P 1

2 T

K K K K K K T

i A

T I

A K

+ +

R

[

1 1

E 1

P g

T M

T E

A T

e R

r E

e V

T h

O A

W 1

E TO N

oj

>Qz

.d s O t

g&eg z T % *g G o

n

=. 7 1

~

~

i 4_

na ht e -

rom y

b t

n s

i r

m n o

o d o i t

p t e 9

t 1a t

c r

+

t R e

e u o E te S

t s d

b W iu e a n

O nl 1

p d

e' a

d P Ua i

m n

( v

% et r

m a L 2

0 his T

o n 2

A 3 %s 1 t.U i nt t

o.

3 p M 1t d

t o R 1i

+

)(

e 2

f t

o d'

t E b e d

H s 2f s

%o u

S s

n e T d

o d t5 p

T d a a

h e y e

m i 4.)2 N

n b t

l e b) e n

o I

a

)

a c

2 c U1 c

O d

2 n t x d x

t P

p e i o e et e

, yi s

T o t e

t ci rbn t

E t c l

R

)

un

)

e U

i S

e c 0 E s bdU btd i

4 e af e,

d n

l y

W yP P

e e C

O r,

acr e

I

)

e s'

b r

~

ue e

R d_

w 1

)

4 ye ddt c

)

T e

t e:

I L tlt tnef x

d u

e bt t A A +-

(

aa

(

q lf q ara e

e N

n b

a i

( M u

O i

oh n

R t

c 3 yd t

n I

t e tt U

1E q f id f

l n o

i T

n c

( f H o tn o el a n

t A

o n sh T d aa l a n

T C

e nc n

e m e cc3 l

o N

(

r i u 0

) D a d o3 d

yi l

C E

e as 1 2 E u t u Cte a

(

M S

f g -

+ t A y) i al i 1mc s

T t ue t

al h

U N

f s

1 R

O i ht i R l

R n

c n

oy T

I d ts d n e E g ey g ttC t.

2 S

T i e n U t v W a bC a i u R

n N

A d wt a

n i O m

m na1E i

2 I

T e

, e t P l1 U

W o

O t

p

% r c c e

l e

( etO p

E M

N a su 2 e r e L h et h

biP t

L E

c rt 3 t e p A t hi t %

n e

B T

E i er f

p s M sn 9lUL S

A S

L d ba a

e R t

U t

l(A T

Y B

n mt e r E a t(

a da M

p S

A i as n d r H

h n R

h nh%R i

T h

e n a e T t i%E t as4E r

P e ct e a r

o2W 5H T

I h

n w

bo D t

p 0. P

)t4.T O

tn 2n m

R t na t 3 q c E n

t T

ol e

T e e2 e

i1D u

f ip b e d e A c S L

c eo E

m R

o l

n h R r

dA r

l pdT i

O rg bc a t e pnM e ct nA x

T n an 4 y f

p iaR p year a

C o ei C

tf o r

E CS m

A i

l r q o h T)H h

)t E

t cu 1

t c

2T c 1 p2 a s

R c ud t

e s n a T a

i n n q t r e e e AeD e tree l

u e

i e v c lE iTl u e

)

f es r n h l

r r ecT r n cl n

d gn o U w a e o h yA o UTya n

e a no f

( ( h p f tCR f (ACv a

u ap h

n s rs c

i i - e

)

)

)

t rr i

i i

e n

)

e

(

i i

h o

I wt

(

i T

C A on

(

(

(

pe m 1

yeu 2

f hr E

tt E

T d

s T

O n fn O

N a oi N

o%

>5E Z[ [

E@gae or Z Ea

'g-e

' 2.1 SAFETY LIMITS

' BASES 2.1.1 REACTOR CORE The. restrictions of this Scfety Limit prevent overheating of the fuel and possible cladding perforation which would result in the release of fission-products to the reactor coolant.

Ovcrheating of the fuel cladding is prevented

- by restricting fuel operation to within the nucleate boiling regime where the heat transfer coefficient is large and the cladding surface temperature is slightly above the coolant saturation temperature.

Operation above the upper boundary of the nucleate boiling regime could-

result in excessive cladding temperatures because of the onset of departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) and the resultant sharp. reduction in heat transfer coefficient.

DNB'is not a directly measurable parameter during operation and therefore THERMAL POWER and reactor coolant temperature.and pressure have been related to DNB through the R-Grid correlation.

The R-Grid DNB correlation has been developed to predict the DNB flux and the location.of DNB for axially uniform and non-uniform heat flux distributions.

The local DNE heat fSux ratio (DNBR) is defined as the ratio of the heat flux that would cause DNB at a l

particular core location to the local heat flux and is indicative of the margin

- to DNB.

i The minimum value of the DNBR during steady-state operation, normal

. operational transients, and anticipated transients is limited to 1.30.

This a

value corresponds to a 95% probability at a 95% confidence levet that DNB will

]

not occur and is chosen as an appropriate margin to DNB for all operating q

- conditions.

l The curves of Figure 2.1-1 show the loci of points of THERMAL POWER, Reactor Coolant System pressure and-average temperature for which the minimum DNBR is no less than 1.30, or the average enthalpy at the vessel exit is equal to the enthalpy of saturated liquid.

Thecurvesarebasedonanenthalpyhotchannelfactor,FfH f 1.55 and i

a reference cosine with a peak of 1.55 for axial power shape.

An allowance is includedforanincreaseinFfH at reduced power based on the expression:

FfH=1.55[1+0.3(1-P)]

where P is the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER These limiting heat flux conditions are higher than those calculated for the range of all control rods fully withdrawn to the maximum allowable control j

rod insertion assuming the axial power imbalance is within the limits of the i

ft (AI) function of the Overtemperature trip. When the axial power imbalance is not within the tolerance, the axial power imbalance effect on the Over-temperature AT trip will reduce the Setpoints to provide protection consistent with core Safety Limits.

]

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 2-1 Amendment Nos. 14 and 13

j REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATEDJATERSOURCE-SHUTOOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION I

3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE; A Boric Acid Storage System and at least one associated heat tracing a.

channel with:

1)

A minimum contained borated water volume of 835 gallons, i

2)

A boron concentration between 20,000 and 22,500 ppm, and 3)

A minimum solution temperature of 145 F.

b.

The Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) with:

1)

A minimum contained borated water volume of 50,000 gallons, 2)

A minimum boron concentration of 2000 ppm (Unit 1 Cycle 2),

A minimum boron concentration of 2300 ppm (Unit 1 Cycle 3 and after, Unit 2), and j

3)

A minimum solution temperature of 35'F.

]

. APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1)

Verifying the boron concentration of the water, 2)

Verifying the contained borated water volume, and 3)

Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWST temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside ambient air temperature is less than 35 F.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 1-12 Amendment Nos.14 and 13

1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS l

B0 RATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1

3.1.2.6 Each of the following borated water source (s) shall be OPERABLE:

A Boric Acid Storage System and at least one associated heat tracing a.

channel with:

1)

A minimum contained borated water volume of 5106 gallons, 2)

A boron concentration between 20,000 and 22,500 ppm, and 4

1 3)

A minimum solution temperature of 145 F.

b.

The Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) with:

i 1)

A contained borated water volume of greater than or equal to 400,000 gallons, 2)

A boron concentration between 2000 and 2200 ppm (Unit 1 Cycle 2),

A boron concentration between 2300 and 2500 ppm, (Unit 1 Cycle 3 and after, Unit 2), and 3)

A minimum solution temperature of 35 F.

l APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

i ACTION:

j j

a.

With the Boric Acid Storage System inoperable, restore the system l

to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent j

to at least 1% Ak/k at 200 F; restore the Boric Acid Storage System j

to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN

)

within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, b.

With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

I l

\\

)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 1-13 Amendment Nos. 14 and 13

i l

l l

I i

l-

+

J.

=-

=

.m M "di E i:;..82

~~C !!E -10

"- E~ ~!k 7:E is E

~"

F-

'l-i

==..:.

'n-:=;:::

n:

=

-i

.-=n:

- r. :=

=-

.=.:. -=

i

- - -.-= :-

=

1y :;p:=....

...-2 ei

= :.._ :~- -

q:- +

~jTs 'E iE: 25 55 5 555

1. -s5

- -r i

' ' ~

~

L.'

"l~

l

( 6.0, 1.0 )

iik 5 p

-eW =I is s 5 =

i g

u-.

,.g

i.q ::.q,;,

.i j,.

-l

,l

.n.

-l:

'l-

.j j;

f.:.

l 9

=

.

r..ip r?,

... s~

,3 5

' *Q :*?.~.: ;

'..L:T.: 1 *". " * * '

'} l*

M

...*::1.:..~~: '

. ".)

Q

'- 4

- +

il 12.0, 0.9 2 4)d !

0 0.8 -

3.:.

9 u.

. =-

g.

.jj j

O w

.-J. -

'i j1 N

~)-

0*6 s

J

,)

2

.=:-

CE O

l' Z 0.4 -

i I

i i

~!

i i

r

^

l' 1

l' i

i i

i l N

i, i

1 i

wg 0,2 I

N'-

l

.)-

.I I-l-

i i

i l

l

-t I.

u 4

-r-2 4

6 8

10 12 14 1

1 CORE HEIGHT -(FT) i i

I l

}

4 t

i l

l 1

FIGURE 3.2-2 K(Z) - NORMALIZED F (Z) AS A FUNCTION OF CORE HEIGHT q

I DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 2-6 Amendment Nos.14 and 13

]

w

1 1

l c

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 1

.5/4.2.3 RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 4

)

3.2.3 The combination of indicated Reactor Coolant System (RCS) total flow i

rate and R shall be maintained within the region of allowable operation shown on Figure 3.2-3a for Unit 1 and Figur 3.2-3b for Unit 2 for four loop operation.

Where:

N AH R

1.49 [1.0 + 0.3 (1.0 -P)]

a.

THERMAL POWER

, and b.

P._~ RATED THERMAL POWER g=MeasuredvaluesofFfH btained by using the novable incore c.

F detectors to obtain a power distribution map. The naasured valuesofFfgshallbeusedtocalculateRsinceFigure3.2-3a for Unit 1 and Figure 3.2-3b for Unit 2 include messurement uncertainties of 3.5% for flow and 4% for incore measurement ofFfH' APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1.

ACTION:-

With the combination of RCS total flow rate and R outside the region of acceptable operation shown on Figure 3.2-3a for Unit 1 and Figure 3.2-3b for Unit 2:

a.

Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> either:

1.

Restore the combination of RCS total flow rate and R to within the above limits, or 2.

Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux - High Trip Setpoint to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

i DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 2-9 Amendment Nos.14 and 13

6;.b..

.: l =.

.. c.. :::..c... ; l..c

..f4.. h,.,..,a

. ::i:i i.E

n F;-

' MEASUREMENT il+...i. f.

y

. UNCERTAINTIES 5"

~

g:

0F 3.5% POR PLOW 48 AND 4% POR INCORE :

i MEASUREM6NT OF g AREINCLUDED

~

i:

I THIS GiOURE. -

it

..u:

i ::*

O *.;

L.

t J'

i 1

44

.t.

P.,

j

.g i.

.: i.

. ~

p

Hi ii- ;

W e< 42

'" ACCEPTABLE!

._... i UNACCEPTABLE....

9..

E 1

2. OPERATION i..

..m-RE0lON u :-

OPERATION aie."in

.~

i RE0lON T E

• iE :.5GEiu...:. His in! i-r 7

T ii.E ;6 auf M r.

Q.4.' !

Mi: HWdi :!.

3i :.:s iH:,E

• i ii-! H4 h-:

(

iH :-

!;)*;*

?

.; ::1.,

,'.' y...

;ll

?

' ' '.:jt M

r.$

I

n.;

r-

.: ;:n n- :: :

-,.m.:n m ::n. ;r:

E

=.

a..: :.-

g.-..

.a;_3....g...- ;-<..

... - -.=..

... ;.;j, g3:. i.=..

. --.3..;

.; a. :".. : *4 ;**:?O

.; a.,:.:l

% ;f!!;.

.; u;

L.

• *

? !;.'

7."L'

.

*J "O.~.J.::-

1 :.;;:',:::.0 M '3*. ":: ::.;4=l'. :11 ifO

" "T.*

.? =

.:==.- (1, W.8) n_..e. ;.... u.

.o..

s.

...=....: r

=

.: =.=...=...= -.=... -.. =... =w.=.h..=..

n.....

N w..:

-=.:. :r=

. : ::r. :u.--

-==

=

_w

.~.n=

- := :- =

..=_._. _

=._.

. =

.;.u:. u.:-

=

=_=_

=

== -;

.x...

.u..:-

a.= =

=.=..=-

- =:. === =.=

w

..; u

=.; ::

- n.

=

=

f(t fij 'i!~ lMi i

s.90 0.e5 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.16 N

i g _..[w L49[1.0 + 0.3(1.0-P)]

i FIGURE 3.2-3b RCS TOTAL FLOWRATE VERSUS R (UNIT 2)

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 2-11 Amendment Nos. 14 and 13

E n

o q

L

/

3/4.5 EMEkGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

(

ie

!3/4.5.1 ACCOMULATORS n

'LIMI' TING CON _DITI'ON FOR ODERATION i

-3.5.1. Each Reactor Coolant System accumulator shall be'0PERABLE with:

a.

The isolation valve open'and power removed, b.

A contained borated water volume of between 836 and 864 cut,ic feet

(

of borated water, c.

'A boron concentration of between 1900 and 2200 ppm (Unit 1 Cycle 2),

A boron concentration'of between 2200 and 2500 ppm (Unit 1 Cycle.3 and after,.. Unit 2), and I

d.

A nitrogen cover pressure of between 595.5 and 647.5 psig.

. APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2.and'3.*

ACTION:

i a.

With one accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed

' isolation valve, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next

~

6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> e.nd in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6. hours.

b.

With one accumulator inoperable due to the. isolation. valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve.or be in HOT l

STANDBY.yithin 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTD0WN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

1 SURVEILL'ANCE REQUIREMENTS I

4.5.1.1 Each accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

1 a.

At least once per 12 h6urs by:

1)

Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover pressure in the tanks, and

'2)

Verifying that each accumulator isolation valve is open.

4 l

• Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.

j l

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 5-1 Amendment Nos.14 and 13

\\

m

~~~~~

7 i

3,

,m t

gg 'ql,'

l I

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS.

.i l

4 -

3/4.5'.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK-

.3 y

k LIMITING CONDITION'FOR OPERATION 1

3.5.5 'The Refueling Water Sterage Tank (RWST) shairbe OPERABLE with:

..a.

'A minimum contained borated > water volume.of'400,000 gallons,

]

b.

A boron concentration of between 2000 and 2200 ppm (Unit 1 Cycle 2),

?

A beran concentration of between 2300 and 2500 ppin (Unit 1 Cycle 3

.and after, Unit.2), and c.

A minimum solution. temperature of 35 F.

APPLICABILITY: ' MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:-

With the RWST inoperable,' restore the tank to OPERABLE status'within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or' l

be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />'and in COLD SHUTDOWN within-the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

l

)l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS r

4.5.5 The' RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1)

Verifying the contained borated water volume in the ta'nk, and 2)

Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside ambient air temperature is less than 35"F.

i DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 5-11 Amendment Nos.14 and 13

[.

-j

\\

T REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS s

l BASES l

3/4.1.1.4 MINIMLN TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolv t $ystem average temperature less than 541*F. This i

limitation is required to ensure:

(1) the moderator temperature coefficient is 1

'withia its analyzed temperature range, (2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) the pressurizer is capable of being in.

an OPERABLE statut with a stesm bubble, and (4) the reactor vessel is above its minimum RT temperature.

NDT 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS The' boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each' mode pf facility operation.

The components required to (1) borated water sources, (2) charging pumps, p(erform this function include:3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid transfer pumps, (5 l

tracing systems, and (6) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel genera-tors.

With the RCS average temperature above 200 f, a minimum of two boron-i injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable.

The '

boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide'a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.6% Ak/k'af ter xenon decay and l

cooldown to 200 F.

The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full pcwer equilibrium xenon ponditions and requires 5106 gallons.

of 20,000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 75,000 gallons of.2000 ppm (Unit 1 Cycle 2) and 2300-ppm (Unit 1 Cycle 3 and after, Unit 24 l

borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

With the RCS temperature below 200'F, one Boron Injection System is acceptable wit.hout single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the ningle injec-tion system becomes inoperable.

The boron capability required below 200 F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200 F to 140 F.

7 This condition requires either 835 gallons of 20,000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 9690 gallons of 2000 ppm (Unit 1 Cycle 2) and 2300 ppm (Unit 1 Cycle 3 and after, Unit 2) borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 8.0 and 9.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA.

This pH band minimizes the evolution of i

iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on i

mechanical systems and components.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 1-2 Amendment Nos.14 and 13 i

r ur'.___

I

'REACTIVITYCCNTROLSYTEMSf'

-BASES I

'B0 RATION ~ SYSTEMS (Continued) 1 i

The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not 'availab'le because.of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The OPERABILITY of one Boron Injection System during REFUELING ensures

'j that this system.is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6. -

Tbe limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be.0PERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all centrifugal charging pumps >except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 323 F provides ass'urance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that:

(1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is main-4 I

' tained,' and (3) the' potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited.

OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with' the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

Group demand position can be determined from:

(1) the group step counters, or (2) the plant computer, or (3) for control rods, the P to A converter et the rod control cabinet.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria cre met' Continued operation of the Rod Control sys-tem is allowed with multiple immovable rods, that are still trippable and within alignment, for periods up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to allow maintenance and/or. testing of the Rod Control system (additional information is included in Attachment C of the Westinghouse letter to the_NRC on Movable Assemblies, December 21,1984.)

Misalignment of'a rod requires measurement of peaking factors and a restriction

{

in THERMAL POWER. -These restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity j

during continued operation.

In addition, those accident analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain talid during future operation.

l i

'The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod

)

drop time used in the safety analyses.

Measurement with T greater than 1

avg or equal to 541*F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a Reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod positinn indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable.

These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable j

LCO's are satisfied.

j DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment Nos.14 and 13 1

b

y t

t t

4 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING' SYSTEMS.

BASES' L

3/415.5 REFUELING WATER' STORAGE TANK'

.The OPERABILITY of the' Refueling Water Storage Tar;k (RWST) as part of the-LECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injec-tion by the ECCS in the event-of either a LOCA or a steamline break.

The-limits on RWST minimum volurae and boron concentration ensure that:

(1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core; (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold 1

condition (68 tc 212 degrees-F) following a sma.11 break LOCA assuming complete mixing of the RWST, RCS, spray additive tank, containment spray system piping

- and ECCS water. volumes with all control rods' inserted except the most reactive control rod assembly (ARI-1);-(3) the reactor will remain subcritical 'in the cold condition following a large break LOCA (break flow area greater thhn-2 3 ft ) assuming complete mixing of,the RWST, RCS, ECCS water and other sources

- of water that may eventually' reside in the sump post-LOCA with all control N

rods assumed to be out (AR0); and (4) long term subcriticality following a:

_steamline break assuming ARI-1 and preclude fuel failure.

The maximum' allowable value for the RWST boron concentration forms the I

basis for datermining the time (post-LOCA) at which operator action is' required to. switch over the ECCS to hot leg recirculation in order to avoid' precipitation of tha soluble boron.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge ~line location or other physical characteristics.

k 1

)

I 1

J i

DII.BLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 8 3/4 5-3 Amendment Nos. 14 and 13

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES l

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING fYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System ensures that containment l

i depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are LOCA.

consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

J The Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System are redundant to each other in providing post accident cooling of the containment However, the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism atmosphere.

for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere and therefore the time requirements for restoring an inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.

3/4.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Spray Additive System ensures that sufficient Na0H The litaits on NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA.

minimum volume and concentration ensure a pH value of between 8.0 and 9.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA.

This pH band mini-mizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank dis-charge line location or othat physical characteristics. These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the safcty analyses.

3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the containment fan cooler units ensures that: (1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, (2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post LOCA conditions, and (3) adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA to t

prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit.

i The Containment Cooling System and the Containment Spray System are redundant to each other in providing post accident cooling of the containment As a result of this redundancy in cooling capability, the allowable i

atmosphere.

out of service time requirements for the Containment Cooling System have been I

However, the allowable out of service time requirements

)

appropriately adjusted.

for the Containment Spray System have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment since the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere.

DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 6-3 Amendment Nos.14 and 13

_ _ _ _ _ _