Safety Evaluation Accepting B&W Methodology in Special Rept JHT/86-011A, Creep Collapse Analysis for B&W Fuel, for Cladding Collapse If Calculated Cladding Temps Do Not Exceed Upper Limit Defined in Rev 2 to BAW-10084P-AML20215A516 |
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ML20215A466 |
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NUDOCS 8612110309 |
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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML17313A7791999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Rev to Emergency Plan That Would Result in Two Less Radiation Protection Positions Immediatelu Available During Emergencies ML15261A4681998-09-0404 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 232,232 & 231 to Licenses DPR-38,DPR-47 & DPR-55,respectively ML20217Q7971998-05-0404 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 227 & 201 to Licenses DPR-53 & DPR-69,respectively ML20128P4381996-10-0909 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Review of Cracked Weld Operability Calculations & Staff Response to NRC Task Interference Agreement ML20107F5611996-04-17017 April 1996 Safety Evaluation Providing Guidance on Submitting plant- Specific Info W/Respect to IST Program Alternatives Request ML14183A6951995-09-18018 September 1995 Safety Evaluation Approving Relocation of Technical Support Ctr ML20236L5971994-12-29029 December 1994 SER in Response to 940314 TIA 94-012 Requesting NRR Staff to Determine Specific Mod to Keowee Emergency Power Supply Logic Must Be Reviewed by Staff Prior to Implementation of Mod ML20149H0671994-11-0404 November 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 27 to Amended License R-103 ML20149F4151994-08-0404 August 1994 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Unit 1 Can Be Safely Operated During Next Operating Cycle (Cycle 14) ML20149E8831994-08-0202 August 1994 Safety Evaluation Accepting Interim Relief Request IRR-03 Re Drywell Isolation Check Valves in Equipment Drain Lines & Reactor Equipment Closed Cooling Water Sys ML20248C5731994-07-19019 July 1994 SER Step 1 Review of Individual Plant Exam of External Fire Events for Millstone Unit 3 ML20059J4591994-01-25025 January 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Request for Relief from ASME Code Re Inservice Testing Requirements to Measure Vibration Amplitude Displacement ML20059H4991994-01-24024 January 1994 Safety Evaluation Accepting Revised Responses to IEB-80-04 Re MSLB Reanalysis ML20059J2491994-01-14014 January 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 159 to License DPR-40 ML20059J1831994-01-14014 January 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 160 to License DPR-40 ML20059F3921994-01-0707 January 1994 Safety Evaluation Approving Request for Relief from ASME Code Repair Requirements for Class 3 Piping,Per 10CFR50.55a (g)(6)(i) & GL 90-05 ML20059E0331994-01-0404 January 1994 Safety Evaluation Re Alternate Miniflow Sys Design & Operation Reassessment of Emergency Core Cooling Sys & High Pressure Injection ML20059D0931993-12-30030 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Conformance to RG 1.97 Rev 2 ML20059E2871993-12-30030 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 57,57,45,45,93,77,152 & 140 to Licenses NPF-37,NPF-66,NPF-72,NPF-77,NPF-11,NPF-18, DPR-39 & DPR-48 Respectively ML20059C3751993-12-29029 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting Exemption & Approving Alternative DAC Values for Use in Place of Generic Value for Radionuclides Specified in App B to 10CFR20.1001 - 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Denies Pump Relief Request 14 ML20058G5171993-11-29029 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 60 to License NPF-57 ML20058G2781993-11-29029 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting IST Program Relief Per 10CFR50.55a(f)(6)(i) & Approving Alternatives Per 10CFR50.55a(f)(4)(iv) ML20058G0561993-11-29029 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from Installation Requirements of Section Iii,Article 9 of 1968 Edition of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code for Plant ML20058G2141993-11-29029 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Category 3 Qualification in Lieu of Category 2 Qualification for post-accident Monitoring of SIT Volume & Pressure ML20058F7921993-11-29029 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 10 to License R-59 ML20058G2981993-11-29029 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 151 & 139 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48 ML20058F6661993-11-24024 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Use of New DG as Alternate AC Power Source for Coping W/Sbo Subject ML20058F1151993-11-23023 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 170,69,169 & 86 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20058F5951993-11-22022 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 157 to License DPR-40 ML20058F3441993-11-22022 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Concurring W/Contractor Findings Presented in Technical Evaluation Rept EGG-RTAP-10816, Evaluation of Utility Responses to Suppl 1 to NRC Bulletin 90-01;Big Rock Point ML20058B1241993-11-19019 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposal to Leak Rate Test SI Tank Outlet Check Valves by Using Leak Test Method Described in OM-10,Paragraph 4.2.2.3(c) ML20058A3041993-11-19019 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Re Accumulator Pressure & Vol Instrumentation of Reg Guide 1.97 Environ Qualification Requirements,Per Generic Ltr 82-33.Category 3 Qualification of Instrumentation Acceptable ML20058F5641993-11-19019 November 1993 SE Accepting Util 930305 Response to NRC Bulletin 90-01, Suppl 1, Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount ML20058C7491993-11-18018 November 1993 Safety Evaluation,Authorizing Alternative,On One Time Basis Only,W/Conditions That Licensee Perform Volumetric Exam of nozzle-to-vessel Welds During First Refueling Outage of Third 10-yr Insp Interval ML20058A3661993-11-17017 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Allowing Accumulator Level & Pressure Monitoring Instrumentation to Be Relaxed from Category 2 to Category 3 & Allowing Commercial Grade Instruments to Be Used,In Ref to GL 82-33 & Reg Guide 1.97 1999-02-05
[Table view]Some use of "" in your query was not closed by a matching "". Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20216G0111999-09-30030 September 1999 Year 2000 Readiness in U.S. Nuclear Power Plants ML20206N2191999-04-30030 April 1999 Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors ML20205A5291999-03-31031 March 1999 Licensee Contractor and Vendor Inspection Status Report. Quarterly Report,October-December 1998.(White Book) ML20211K2851999-03-31031 March 1999 Standard Review Plan on Power Reactor Licensee Financial Qualifications and Decommissioning Funding Assurance ML20205A5991999-03-31031 March 1999 Licensee Contractor and Vendor Inspection Status Report. Quarterly Report,July-September 1998.(White Book) ML17313A7791999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Rev to Emergency Plan That Would Result in Two Less Radiation Protection Positions Immediatelu Available During Emergencies ML20203D0541999-01-31031 January 1999 Fire Barrier Penetration Seals in Nuclear Power Plants ML20155A9281998-10-31031 October 1998 Licensee Contractor and Vendor Inspection Status Report. Quarterly Report,April-June 1998.(White Book) ML20154C2081998-09-30030 September 1998 Licensee Contractor and Vendor Inspection Status Report. Quarterly Report,January-March 1998.(White Book) ML15261A4681998-09-0404 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 232,232 & 231 to Licenses DPR-38,DPR-47 & DPR-55,respectively ML20203A1521998-07-31031 July 1998 Assessment of the Use of Potassium Iodide (Ki) as a Public Protective Action During Severe Reactor Accidents.Draft Report for Comment ML20153D3371998-07-31031 July 1998 Assessment of the Use of Potassium Iodide (Ki) as a Public Protective Action During Severe Reactor Accidents.Draft Report for Comment ML20236S9771998-06-30030 June 1998 Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for Nuclear Power Plant Operators.Pressurized Water Reactors ML20236S9681998-06-30030 June 1998 Evaluation of AP600 Containment THERMAL-HYDRAULIC Performance ML20236S9591998-06-30030 June 1998 Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for Nuclear Power Plant Operators.Boiling Water Reactors ML20217Q7971998-05-0404 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 227 & 201 to Licenses DPR-53 & DPR-69,respectively ML20247E3951998-04-30030 April 1998 Licensee Contractor and Vendor Inspection Status Report. Quarterly Report,October-December 1997.(White Book) ML20217F3801998-03-31031 March 1998 Risk Assessment of Severe ACCIDENT-INDUCED Steam Generator Tube Rupture ML20202J3051997-11-30030 November 1997 Licensee Contractor and Vendor Inspection Status Report. Quarterly Report,July-September 1997.(White Book) ML20197B0431997-11-30030 November 1997 Licensee Contractor and Vendor Inspection Status Report. Quarterly Report,April-June 1997.(White Book) ML20211L2931997-09-30030 September 1997 Aging Management of Nuclear Power Plant Containments for License Renewal ML20210K7801997-08-31031 August 1997 Topical Report Review Status ML20149G9431997-07-31031 July 1997 Licensee Contractor and Vendor Inspection Status Report. Quarterly Report,January-March 1997.(White Book) ML20210R2131997-05-31031 May 1997 Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Certification of the System 80+ Design.Docket No. 52-002.(Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering) ML20140F0801997-05-31031 May 1997 Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Certification of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor Design.Supplement No. 1.Docket No. 52-001.(General Electric Nuclear Energy) ML20140J4301997-05-31031 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Department of Energy'S Proposal for the Irradiation of Lead Test Assemblies Containing TRITIUM-PRODUCING Burnable Absorber Rods in Commercial LIGHT-WATER Reactors ML20141J9391997-04-30030 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Renewal of the Operating License for the Research Reactor at North Carolina State University ML20141C2411997-04-30030 April 1997 Circumferential Cracking of Steam Generator Tubes ML20141A5791997-04-30030 April 1997 Proposed Regulatory Guidance Related to Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59 (Changes, Tests, or Experiments).Draft Report for Comment ML20137A2191997-03-31031 March 1997 Licensee Contractor and Vendor Inspection Status Report. Quarterly Report,October-December 1996.(White Book) ML20134L3601997-01-31031 January 1997 Standard Review Plan on Antitrust.Draft Report for Comment ML20134L3631997-01-31031 January 1997 Standard Review Plan on Power Reactor Licensee Financial Qualifications and Decommissioning Funding Assurance.Draft Report for Comment ML20138J2461997-01-31031 January 1997 Licensee Contractor and Vendor Inspection Status Report. Quarterly Report,July-September 1996.(White Book) ML20135D5711997-01-31031 January 1997 Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors ML20133E9161996-12-31031 December 1996 License Renewal Demonstration Program: NRC Observations and Lessons Learned ML20149L8261996-10-31031 October 1996 Reactor Pressure Vessel Status Report ML20135A4981996-10-31031 October 1996 Historical Data Summary of the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance ML20128P4381996-10-0909 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Review of Cracked Weld Operability Calculations & Staff Response to NRC Task Interference Agreement ML20107F5611996-04-17017 April 1996 Safety Evaluation Providing Guidance on Submitting plant- Specific Info W/Respect to IST Program Alternatives Request ML14183A6951995-09-18018 September 1995 Safety Evaluation Approving Relocation of Technical Support Ctr ML20236L5971994-12-29029 December 1994 SER in Response to 940314 TIA 94-012 Requesting NRR Staff to Determine Specific Mod to Keowee Emergency Power Supply Logic Must Be Reviewed by Staff Prior to Implementation of Mod ML20128Q0761994-11-0404 November 1994 Coordinating Group Evaluation,Conclusions & Recommendations ML20149H0671994-11-0404 November 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 27 to Amended License R-103 ML20149G4281994-09-28028 September 1994 NRC Perspectives on Accident Mgt, Presented at 940928 Severe Accident Mgt Implementation Workshop in Alexandria, VA ML20149F7581994-08-25025 August 1994 Topical Rept Evaluation of WCAP-13864,Rev 1, Rod Control Sys Evaluation Program ML20149F4151994-08-0404 August 1994 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Unit 1 Can Be Safely Operated During Next Operating Cycle (Cycle 14) ML20149E8831994-08-0202 August 1994 Safety Evaluation Accepting Interim Relief Request IRR-03 Re Drywell Isolation Check Valves in Equipment Drain Lines & Reactor Equipment Closed Cooling Water Sys ML20248C5731994-07-19019 July 1994 SER Step 1 Review of Individual Plant Exam of External Fire Events for Millstone Unit 3 ML20059J4591994-01-25025 January 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Request for Relief from ASME Code Re Inservice Testing Requirements to Measure Vibration Amplitude Displacement ML20059H4991994-01-24024 January 1994 Safety Evaluation Accepting Revised Responses to IEB-80-04 Re MSLB Reanalysis 1999-09-30
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Text
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ENCLOSU;E SAFETY EVALUATION OF SPECIAL REPORT Jilt /86-011A,
" CREEP COLLAPSE ANALYSIS FOR B&W FUEL"
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Creep collapse of fuel rod cladding depends on the existence of two events occurring in a fuel rod: 1) The formation of an axial gap of sufficient size, i.e., greater than 0.5 inches, and 2) sufficient cladding creepdown that will permit the cladding to collapse into the axial gap.
Cladding collapse was initially observed in the early 1970s in commercial PWR fuel rods that were unpressurized during fabrication, i.e., only one atmosphere of internal fill gas. Fuel pellet hang-up and densification were found to be the causative factor for axial gap formation. Once the axial gaps were formed, the substantial pressure differential between primary system pressure and internal rod pressure subsequently led to
. cladding creep collapse into this gap.
The technical fixes used by industry to remedy cladding collapse have consisted of reducing the amount of fuel densification by changes in fuel fabrication and pre pressurizing PWR fuel rods. Since the implementation of these fixes over ten years ago, and other refinements, there have been no further evidence of cladding collapse in U.S. commercial fuel rods.
8612110309 861205 PDR TOPRP EMVBW C PDR
During the early 1970s, the regulatory staff introduced an analysis approach (Ref.1) to be used by industry to insure that future fuel designs would not experience cladding collapse. This analysis approach assumed that axial gaps existed in all fuel rods in a core such that the fuel rod was calcu-lated as a free standing tube of infinite length with no fuel pellets to prevent its collapse. In addition, the regulatory staff required each fuel vendor to utilize conservative creep models and analysis methods in the evaluation of creep collapse. Obviously, this is a very conservative approach, but was initiated by the AEC regulatory staff at a time when fuel densification, pellet hang-up and creep collapse were not very well under-stood.
Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) has proposed a new method and criterion for pre-venting creep collapse. This approach relies on the fact that a:dal gaps of sufficient size to allow collapse, i.e., gaps greater than 0.5 inches, have not been observed in commercial fuel rods since the implementation of pre pressurized rods and fuel with low densification characteristics over.
ten years ago. A discussion and evaluation of this new method and criterion for evaluating creep collapse is presented in the following sections.
2.0 EVALUATION
- a. B&W's Current and Proposed Approach for Evaluatino Creep Collapse Currently, B&W performs a cycle-by-cycle analysis for creep collapse l on each fuel design. This analysis is based on the conservative i
assumption that the fuel rod is a free standing tube of infinite length without fuel pellets to prevent its collapse. The analysis must show that creen collapse is not possible in a free standing tube up to the last cycle of operation.
B&W has proposed (Ref. 2) that in place of the above approach, they use a fuel manufacturing and operating envelope in which cladding creep collapse is not expected to occur based on past experience.
The B&W envelope proposes nominal values for cladding wall thickness, initial ovality, pellet density, pellet densification, and initial fill gas pressure with lower limits for these nominal design values.
These are the important input parameters used in the creep collapse analysis. The lower limits of this envelope correspond to the 2a fabrication tolerances of their current Mark B 15x15 design, with.the exception of the lower limit for initial fill gas pressure, which falls below the lower tolerance limits of the current design. In addition, there is a limit on burnup such that the maximum rod average
- burnup must remain below 55 mwd /kgM. Consequently, B&W proposes that,-
as long as their design remains within this fabrication and operating envelope, creep collapse will not occur and thus, a cycle-by-cycle analysis of creep collapse is not required. If the design falls outside of this envelope, B&W will perform a creep collapse analysis for this particular instance.
?
la order to support the conclusion (and criterion) that creep collapse will not occur within their proposed fabrication and operating envelope, B&W has presented observations of past experience (Refs. 3, 4 and 5) that show no fuel failures have occurred due to creep collapse in any B&W fuel designs and that no significant axial gaps exist in their current Mark B 15x15 design. B&W has irradiated more than 800,000 fuel rods from their 15x15 designs without any evidence of creep collapse. In addition, forty fuel rods of the current 15x15 fuel design have been gamma scanned with only very small axial gaps detected, i.e., no gaps greater than 0.1 inches, and no axial gaps were observed in rods with burnups of approximately 50 mwd /kgM.
- b. Evaluation of B&W's Proposed Creep Collapse Approach The principal areas of concern in evaluating creep collapse are:
- 1) do axial gaps of sufficient size for creep collapse exist, and 2) if a gap exists, can cladding collapse occur within the proposed i operating envelope? The latter question will be addressed first because if creep collapse is not possible in a free standing tube of infinite length, the concern about axial gap formation does not need to be addressed. B&W has performed a conservative collapse analysis l
of their current Mark B 15x15 design utilizing the lower fabrication
~
and prepressure limits from their manufacturing envelope and found that cladding collapse is possible at a burnup of 32 mwd /kgM and
greater. Consequently, it must be determined if axial gaps large enough to allow collapse are possib?e at or above the burnup, i.e.,
greater than 32 mwd /kgM, at which cladding collapse is possible in the Mark B 15x15 design using the lower limits of their envelope.
For the B&W-designed fuel rod, there are two possible mechanisms for axial gap formation. The first is fuel densification, and the second is collapse of the bottom plenum spring.
As noted earlier in the INTRODUCTION, gap formation due to fuel den-sification was a problem in earlier fuel designs, but examination of several current vendor designs have shown (Ref. 3) no significant axial gaps since the introduction of high density, i.e., greater than 94%
theoretical' density (TD), low densification fuel. The current Mark B 15x15 fuel design utilizes a high density, i.e. , 95% TD, low densifying fuel, thus, axial gaps due to fuel densification are not anticipated for this design.
Axial gaps up to 0.3 inches were observed (Ref. 3) in an earlier Mark B 15x15 design from Oconee-2, in which the fabricated fuel density was 92.5% TD. B&W has stated that they believe the higher fuel density _of the current Mark B 15x15 design, i.e., 95% TD, is the reason for the smaller axial gaps observed in the current fuel versus those observed in the earlier lower density fuel in Oconee-2. The staff concurs with this evaluation.
w The B&W-designed fuel rod is unique to other vendo; designs in that it utilizes a bottom plenum and plenum spring. The bottom plenum spring function is to hold the fuel stack in place. The concern in this review is relaxation of the plenum spring as a result of irradiation and thermal creep of these springs. If pellet hang-up were to occur prior to relaxation and collapse of the bottom plenum spring, it is possible that an axial gap could form in the fuel column. The question of plenum spring relaxation and axial gap formation was presented to B&W (Ref. 6). B&W responded (Refs. 4 and 5) that a total of 40 fuel rods of the current Mark B 15x15 design have been examined by gamma scanning with no axial gaps larger than 0.1 inches. Of these 40 rods, eight rods were examined from ANO-1 after one cycle of irradiation with no measurable gaps. A group of twenty fuel rods from five assemblies in Oconee-1 were examined at the end of four cycles of irradiation (average burnup about 38 mwd /kgM) with no gaps larger than 0.1 inches observed. Four of these twenty rods were examined at the end of five cycles of irradiation along with twelve other rods from the same assembly not examined previously.
The average burnup of these rods was about 50 mwd /kgM with no observable gaps (the detectable limit was 0.05 increi). All of the four rods examined at the end of five cycles of irradiation had displayed small axial gaps at the end of four cycles, indicating that the gaps had closed ep during the fifth cycle. A likely mechanism for the closure of the axial gaps is fuel swelling. This confirms that axial gaps, due to either bottom i
plenum spring relaxation or fuel densification in the current Mark B 15x15 design, are not of sufficient size, i.e., greater than 0.5 inches, to allow cladding collapse.
1 As a check on the bottom spring relaxation at extended burnups, B&W l has also examined the bottom position of the fuel stack from the gamma scans of the thirty-two fuel rods irradiated for four and five cycles. The rod average burnups of these thirty-two rods varied between 36 and 51 mwd /kgM. B&W has stated (Ref. 5) that from their measurement of the bottom position of the fuel stack, there is no evidence that the bottom plenum spring has relaxed. In addition, B&W has indicated that the diameter of the bottom plenum spring of their t
l
\
current design was increased to prevent any spring relaxation due to irradiation.
A statistical probability of finding an axial gap of a particular size l
i in the current Mark B 15x15 design can be calculated from the gamma scan data if some conservative assumptions are made on the mean gap size and standard deviation of this data. The actual gap sizes ob-served were not recorded for the forty rods examined, but it was noted that they were less than or equal to the maximum gap of 0.1 inches.
Therefore, the actual gaps observed in these rods were between the minimum detectable limit of 0.05 inches and the maximum gap size observed of 0.1 inches. If one conservatively assumes that the mean
gap size, x, observed was 0.1 inches with a standard deviation, o, of 0.1 inches, the axial gap size is calculated from a one-sided student t statistic, at a 0.05% level, and a sample size of 40 to be x + t(o) = 0.1 + 3.55(0.1) = 0.455 inches.
Consequently, there is a 99.95% probability that a gap of 0.455 inches i or smaller will be observed in the current Mark B 15x15 design.
If only those gamma scan data from the thirty-two rods at burnups greater than 32 mwd /kgM are utilized, where axial gaps due to spring relaxation and cladding collapse is of concern, the sample size is i
reduced to 32. If one once again conservatively assumes the mean and standard deviation of the gaps in these rods are 0.1 inches, the gap size at the 0.05% level becomes 0.1 + 3.64(0.1) = 0.464 inches.
This result is not significantly different than that obtained for the 40 rods.
An additional concern specific to the B&W approach is whether the proposed B&W envelope for preventing creep collapse contains and bounds the important parameters for creep collapse. There is one i
important parameter to creep collapse that is not included in the B&W operating envelope, and this parameter is cladding temperature. A question as to why cladding temperature was not included in their operating envelope was presented to B&W (Ref. 6). B&W responded (Ref. 4) that the current approach for creep collapse analysis utilizes- l J
w-C-we,=- i w-vvve-'w -w e- mer kewe +r -wm +- n t -v -v9 **7-WWe-
a conservative cladding temperature (Ref. 7) calculated from the maximum linear heat generation rate (LHGR) allowed by the technical specifications; and that this bounds all possible cladding temperatures for current B&W designs. The staff agrees with this conclusion, but if the maximum calculated cladding temperatures should increase utilizing the calculational methods in Reference 7, the issue of creep collapse would need additional review. The staff concludes that the remaining parameters and bounding conditions for the B&W envelope are acceptable because they are based on bounding conditions of their et* rent manufacturing tolerances and operating data of the current Mark B 15x15 design.
3.0 CONCLUSION
S B&W has presented gamma scan data from current Mark B 15x15 fuel rods irradiated up to rod average burnups of 51 mwd /kgM that show no axial i
gaps greater than 0.1 inches have formed. A conservative statistical l analys'is o,f this data has shown that there is a very small probability l
that a gap of sufficient size to allow cladding collapse will form due l
l to e'tner fuel densification or bottom plenum spring relaxation in the l
! current Mark B 15x15 design. The new B&W manufacturing envelope for evaluating creep collapse is based on the lower two-sigma fabrication l tolerances of the current design from which the most recent axial gap i data were obtained.
l
. In summary, the staff finds that the above B&W methodology for cladding collapse is acceptable with the following condition: that the calculated cladding temperatures do not exceed the upper limit for cladding temperatures as defined in BAW-10084P-A, Rev. 2 (Ref. 7).
4.0 REFERENCES
- 1) " Technical Report on Densification of Light Water Reactor Fuels,"
WASH-1236, Regulatory Staff USAEC, November 14, 1972.
- 2) Letter, J. H. Taylor (B&W) to C. O. Thomas (NRC),
Subject:
Creep Collapse Analysis for B&W Fuel, JHT/86-011A, dated January 31, 1986.
- 3) W. M. Adams, et al., "CEPAN Method of Analyzing Creep Collapse of Oval J
Cladding, Vol. 5: Evaluation of Interpellet Gap Formation and Clad Collapse in Modern PWR Fuel Rods," EPRI NP-3699-CCM Volume 5, Project 2061-6, April 1985.
t
- 4) Letter, J. H. Taylor (B&W) to D. M. Crutchfield (NRC),
Subject:
Creep 1
Collapse Analysis for B&W Fuel (JHT/86-011A), JHT/86-180, dated l
August 4, 1986.
l l 5) Letter, J. H. Taylor (B&W) to D. M. Crutchfield (NRC),
Subject:
Creep 1 Collapse Analysis for B&W Fuel (JHT/86-011A), JHT/86-230, dated l September 17, 1986.
i
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1, .
, 3
.
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~
- 6) Letter, D. M. Crutchfield (H;RC) to J.\ H. Taylor (B&W),'
Subject:
Cre'ep g 5 Collapse Analyses for B&W Fuel'(JHT/86-011A), dated June 26, 1986.
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i
- 7) A. F. J. Eckert, et al., " Program to Determine In-Reactor Performance of B&W Fuels - Cladding Creep Collapse," BAW 10084P-A, Rev 2, October 1978.
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