ML20214V792

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Responds to IE Bulletin 86-003, Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-Operated Valve in Min Flow Recirculation Line. Cited Problem Does Not Exist at Facilities
ML20214V792
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 11/24/1986
From: Haynes J
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To: Martin J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
ANPP-39137-JGH, IEB-86-003, IEB-86-3, NUDOCS 8612090833
Download: ML20214V792 (7)


Text

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Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.o. box 52034 e PHoEdlX, ARIZONA 85072-2034 November 24, 1986 ANPP-39137-JGH/JBK/98.05 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 $iaria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368 Attentir,n' Mr. J. B. Martin Regional Administrator, Region V

Subject:

NRC IE Bulletin 86-03: Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-Operated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line File: 86-055-026

Dear Mr. Martin:

This letter refers to the request for action and information, as identified in the subject bulletin, that was received by ANPP on October 14, 1986. Attached please fini the responses to those items directed to licensees and plaats under construction.

If you have any questions or need additional information, do not hesitate to call.

Very truly yours, k

J. G. Haynes Vice President Nuclear Production JGH/JBK/ dim Attachments cc:

0. M. DeMichele E. E. Van Brunt, Jr. (all w/a)

R. P. Zimmerman E. A. Licitra A. C. Gehr U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Original)

Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 8612090833 8h000 b /

112 PDR ADOCK O Iff E

PDR JE-Il

STATE OF ARIZONA )

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COUNTY OF MARICOPA)

I, Jerry G. Haynes, represent that I am Vice President of Nuclear Production of Arizona Nuclear Power Project, that the foregoing document has been signed by me on behalf of Arizona Public Service Company with full authority to do so, that I have read such document and know its contents, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the statements made therein are true and correct.

AtrH Jerry /G. Haynes/

Sworn to before me this

[) Y day of dtr

, 1986.

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Notary Public My Commission Expires:

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ATTACHMENT NRC QUESTION 4

I 1.

Promptly determine whether or not your facility has a single-failure vulnerability in the minimum flow recirculation line of any ECCS pumps 4

that could cause a failure of more than one ECCS train.

1 PVNGS RESPONSE A single-failure of any ECCS minimum flow recirculation line valve at i

PVNGS will not cause a failure of more than one ECCS train.

i ECCS train "A" and train "B" consist of a containment spray (CS) pump, low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump, and high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump (Figure I).

Each pump's miniflow recirculation line incorporates a check valve in series with a normally open motor-operated globe valve which fails as-is upon loss of power.

The three miniflow lines combine into a common train header that utilizes a pressure relief safety valve blowing down to the equipment drain tank, and a solenoid-operated globe valve which fails closed upon loss of power.

Finally, the two train headers combine into a header leading to the refueling water tank (RW). No valves are used in the line leading to the RW.

Moreover, valve control and position indication is available on the main control board for all the ECCS miniflow valves.

All miniflow valves are supplied power from train-oriented class 1E primary power and backup

power, including the emergency diesel generators.

Therefore, a single-failure in the electrical system will not cause a loss of both ECCS trains.

i A recirculation actuation signal (RAS) closes all motor-operated miniflow valves, stops the LPSI pump, and opens the containment sump isolation valves.

The plant protection system (PPS) utilizes a separate RAS channel for each ECCS train. Therefore, a single failure in the PPS will not cause the loss of both ECCS trains.

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NRC QUESTION 2.

If the problem exists:

(a) promptly instruct all operating shifts of the problem and measures to recognize and mitigate the problem; (b) promptly develop and implement corrective actions which bring your facility into compliance with GDC 35.

PVNGS RESPONSE he subject problem does not exist at PVNGS, therefore, no action is i

NRC QUESTION 3.

Within 30 days of receipt of this bulletin, (a) provides a written report to the NRC which identifies whether or not this problem exists at your facility, (b) if the problem exists (or existed), include in the report the justification for continued operation and identify the short-term modifications to plant operating procedures or hardware that have been or are being implemented to ensure safe plant operations.

PVNGS RESPONSE This letter indicates the subject problem does not exist at PVNGS.

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NRC QUESTION 4.

If the problem exists (or existed), provide a written report within 90 days of receipt of this bulletin informing the NRC of the schedule for long-term resolution of this and/or. any other significant problems that are identified as a result of this bulletin.

PVNGS RESPONSE Since the subject problem does not exist at PVNGS, this letter is considered as the final report.

i V424 SIA-UV666 HPSI "A" xR c

V451 SIA-UV669 LPSI "A" F.C.

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' V486 SIA-UV664 SIA-UV660 m..A.,

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1 V487 SIB-UV665 SIB-UV659 G "B" C

n' V448 SIB-UV668 LPSI "B" m

V426 SIB-UV667 HPSI "B" FIGURE I:

PVNGS ECCS MINIFLOW VALVES

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