ML20214V108
| ML20214V108 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/03/1986 |
| From: | Merschoff E, Trottier E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214V069 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900334 NUDOCS 8612090527 | |
| Download: ML20214V108 (12) | |
Text
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i ORGANIZATION: TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INC.
)
ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION OAYLAND, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION INSPECTION NO.: 99900334/86-01 DATE: 9/8-12/86 ON-SITE HOURS:
22 CORRESPONDENFE ADDRESS: Transamerica Delaval, Inc.
Engine and Compressor Division ATTN: Mr. C. S. Mathews, Vice President and General Manager 55 85th Avenue Oakland, California 94261 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTACT: Bruce C. Guntrum, Manager 0A TELEPHONE NUMBER:
(415) 577-7422 NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ACTIVITY: No diesel engines are currently being manufactured for the nuclear industry. Activity consists of replacement parts and service.
ASSIGNED INSPECTOR:
fh/8(
E. H. Trottier, Reactive Inspection Section (RIS)
Date OTHER INSPECTOR (S):
W. P. Haass, Program C in ion Section (PCS)
I r4 APPROVED BY:
EITis W. Merschoff, Chief S, Vendor Program Branch Date INSPECTION BASES AND SCOPE:
A.
BASES:
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B and 10 CFR Part 21.
B.
SCOPE: This inspection was performed to review the circumstances surrounding a recent notification that the material composition of two connecting rods in the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) standby diesel generator did not conform to specifications.
In addition, l
(continued on next page)
PLANT SITE APPLICABILITY:
Grand Gulf 1/2 (50-416/417); San Onofre 1 (50-206);
Rancho Seco (50-312); River Bend 1/2 (50-458/459); Shearon Harris 1/2 (50-400/
401); Bellefonte 1/2 (50-438/439); WPPSS 1 (50-460); Comanche Peak 1/2 (50-445/
446); Midland 1/2 (50-329/330).
i
ORGANIZATION: TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INC.
ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION 0AKLAND, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900334/86-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 2 of 7 B.
SCOPE (continued):
this inspection sought to review progress and actions taken by TDI and Woodward Governor in response to the engine overspeed event that occurred at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station in November,1985.
A.
VIOLATIONS:
There were no violations identified as a result of this inspection.
B.
NONCONFORMANCES:
There were no nonconformances identified as a result of this inspection.
C.
UNRESOLVED ITEMS:
There were no unresolved items resulting from this inspection.
D.
STATUS OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS:
1.
Inspection 85-02 Unresolved Item)
The inspection was conducted to establish the circumstances and contribution TDI may have had in the engine overspeed event at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station in November,1985.
A contributing factor to the severity of the damage sustained by the overspeeding Grand Gulf engine was found to be the time delay of the mechanical overspeed trip system. This was identified as an unresolved item.
Subsequent to that event, TDI redesigned the trip system and made the modifications available to their customers. The redesigned mechanical overspeed system modifies both the hydraulic actuation circuit and its resulting output. Actuation time is reduced to less than one second, with the output going to the strangulation butterfly valve. The TDI l
Owners Group has been notified, both as a group and by individual letter, that the modified trip system is available for installation.
This closes the identified unresolved item.
I E.
OTHER FINDINGS AND COMMENTS:
1.
Woodward Governor Company The inspectors reviewed technical manuals recently revised by Woodward Governor.
Of the four manuals and specification documents reviewed, only one was fcund to need further revision for content and clarity.
The Woodward staff made editorial changes to Woodward manual
)
l l
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ORGANIZATION: TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INC.
ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900334/86-05 RESULTS:
PAGE 3 of 7
- 54066A, "EGB-10CEGB-13C, EGB-35C, and EGB-50C Governor / Actuator Installation." The suggested revision, presented as a note between procedural steps, follows:
NOTE:
If the booster, servo, and cooler require filling, the EGB will need approximately 2-1 quarts of oil.
Air must be bled from the booster and cooler oil lines prior to starting the engine. Continue to refill the EGB until all air has been bled from the booster and cooler lines. See Manual numbers 36684 and 36641.
After filling the EGB with oil, actuate the start sequence a few times to further bleed the system. Do not allow the engine to start.
Repeat until oil remains at the midpoint of the oil sight gage.
The revised manuals, when returned from printing, will be available to customers who request them.
(NRC Information Notice 86-07, dated February 3,1986, informs all licensees that revised Woodward manuals are available and provides the information necessary to obtain them.)
Woodward Governor has established a computer assisted retrieval (CAR) system for maintaining records on their customers. While the system permits entry of technical information and distribution data, it does not at this time provide identification of customers by governor model purchased.
The system is therefore not suitable for targeting Technical Bulletins or revised manuals to licensees having a parti-cular governor. Woodward Governor maintains and with some justifi-cation, that technical information on compone,nts of the diesel generator should be routed through the diesel generator manufacturer.
Toward that end, Woodward Governor and Transamerica Delaval have established formal links for the exchange of updated technical information. This, combined with the above referenced information notice, and Woodward's long standing practice of providing manuals on 1
request and with governors returned after service, should provide adequate assurance that licensees have sufficient avenues to obtain current technical information on Woodward Governors.
~
ORGANIZATION: TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INC.
ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION 0AKLAND, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900334/86-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 4 of 7 Woodward has identified one governor problem that has arisen in a nuclear plant since the Grand Gulf event of November,1985.
The problem involved a loose friction clutch in a hydro-mechanical speed setting governor motor on a diesel engine at the St. Lucie Nuclear Station.
This speed control system is unique to St. Lucie and the event was reported in a safety evaluation report (SER 22-86) published by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) on June 19, 1986.
2.
Transamerica Delaval, Inc.
a.
Distribution of Updated Manuals Subsequent to the Grand Gulf diesel overspeed event of November, 1985, Transamerica Delaval requested that Woodward Governor provide a list of the current revision for each manual appli-cable to every Woodward component previously purchased by TDI for use on their diesel engines at nuclear power plants.
TDI has forwarded this information to the appropriate utilities with the advice that copies of the listed manuals applicable to their equipment can be obtained from Woodward Governor.
In addition, TDI has revised its Engine Instruction Manual to include instructions for venting air from a governor system being refilled with oil.
The inspectors reviewed the revised instructions and found them acceptable.
The revised TDI manual has been sent to each licensee owning a TDI engine.
As a result of this inspection, it was concluded that TDI has performed adef uate corrective and preventive actions in this l
matter by revising the portion of their engine manual dealing with governor maintenance, b.
Apparent Nonconforming Material Content of Connecting Rods By letter dated May 19, 1986, Southern California Edison (SCE) reported that two connecting rods in a standby diesel generator were made of apparently nonconforming material.
The material discrepancy was discovered as the utility sought to comply with the recommendations of the TDI owners group contained in the San Onofre Unit 1 Design Review and Quality Revalidation (DR/
QR) report of February, 1985.
One of the recommendations of the DR/QR report was to ensure that all connecting rods (master and link) were made to ASTM A237F, 668L or AISI 4142 material
ORGANIZATION: TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INC.
ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION 0AKLAND, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900334/86-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 5 of 7 speci fica tion. Two round link rods were found to be made from ASTM 235E, 668D or AISI 1042 steel, yet were stamped with i
a number indicating the material was made to AISI 4142 material specification. These connecting rods were replaced with connecting rods having the proper material content.
In reviewing the circumstances surrounding the two mismarked connecting rods, the inspectors noted that TDI changed the material specification for their connecting rods between March and June of 1974 The specification change accomplished several objectives:
It permitted a change in connecting rod shape (from round to "I," with an attendant reduction in machining cost); improved the strength of round connecting rods for a given engine rating; and gave a common material specification to TDI suppliers of connecting rod forgings.
However, round connecting rods of two different material specifications therefore were available after the specification change and before stock of the "old" specification connecting rods was used up.
TDI received connecting rod forgings from Canton Drop Forging and Manufacturing Co. in June,1974 (shipping notice 43879 of June 3). The forgings were accompanied by material certifi-cation indicating steel of AISI 1042 specification, and were machined into round connecting rods for " vee" or in-line type TDI engines.
In September,1975 TDI received another shipment of connecting rod forgings from Canton Drop Forging and Manufacturing Co. (shipping notice 48450 dated September 12).
These forgings used the new AISI 4142 specification steel and were intended for rawer " vee" type TDI engines. As the connecting rod forgings were machined at TDI and stamped with identifying numbers traceable to the " heat" of material from which they were produced, two forgings already in stock and having the older AISI 1042 steel were stamped with numbers traceable to the newer AISI 4142 steel. These identifying numbers,114U and 11451, were found on the two subject connecting rods in the SONGS-1 diesel engine.
It should also be noted that while these two connecting rods were mismarked as to their material content, they fully satisfied strength reouirements for application in TDI " vee" engines at the time the SONGS-1 engine was constructed (1974).
The specification change from AISI 1042 to AISI 4142 steel occurred between March and June 1974.
m
ORGANIZATION: TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INC.
i 1
ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900334/86-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 6 of 7 Additional corrective action perfonned by TDI consisted of research into the history and current location of all round connecting rods in nuclear service. All " vee" engines were found to contain "I" shaped rods, with AISI 4142 material, except for SONGS-1. As examination by SCE showed, 8 of 10 SONGS-1 connecting rod assemblies contained AISI 4142 steel.
The "I" rods that replaced the two subject round master rods contain AISI 4142 material. No other TDI " vee" engines contain round connecting rods of either steel specification.. Actions taken to prevent recurrence of this incident included improved tracking of heat and serial numbers by entering both numbers on material travelers (route sheets). Operators performing the final machining operation will then transfer the appropriate number to the connecting rod. The route sheet form has been changed to require this method of tracing connecting rods. The method also is currently used by TDI in the production of combustion cylinder heads.
A complete review of all connecting rod material from all heats supplied to nuclear customers was performed by TDI. Of a total of 683 connecting rods, records showed the following four readings out of specification: Two Brinnel hardness test results, one sulfur content and one elongation. Specifically, the elon-gation specification requires 20%, but the subject sample yielded 18%. The customer accepted the material with this test result.
The maximum sulfur content specification is 0.025 percent, with one connecting rod yielding 0.026 percent. The difference was determined to be insignificant.
Two connecting rods had Brinnel hardness tests that were out of specification.
Upon review, TDI engineering determined that with all other material tests in the acceptable range, the importance of Brinnel hardness diminishes to the role of a confirmatory test or inspection method.
It was decided that in this case, the Brinnel hardness results were too far away from the expected value to be considered anything but erroneous.
The formal engineering analysis of these four connecting rods was performed on March 31, 1986. The engineering analysis report was reviewed by the inspectors.
Lube Oil Sump Foot Valve Liner Material (Clearflow Valves, Inc.)
c.
On March 10, 1986, TDI notified the NRC that a potential defect existed in the liner (seal) material used in lube oil sump foot type check valves.
(The number of affected plants was reduced to five in the TDI letter to the NRC dated May 8, 1986.)
e
ORGANIZATION: TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INC.
ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION 0AKLAND, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900334/86-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 7 of 7 The problem was brought to TDI's attention by a utility that noted reduced lube oil pressure during certain conditions.
The problem was investigated and found to be caused by incompatibility between the foot valve liner material (Neoprene) and hot (190 to 200 F) lube oil. The cognizant TDI Test Engineer discovered that when Neoprene rubber was exposed to such an environment and pressurized - as is the case in a TDI engine lube oil sump - the Neoprene would extrude itself between the valve seat and the cast iron follower tha.t is designed to provide rigidity. The result is a hot lube oil bypass path that effectively short circuits the luhe oil cooler and engine supply header. Testing witnessed by the inspectors showed that Viton maintained its resiliency much better under such operating conditions. Evidence of improved performance of Viton over Neoprene for such an application was given by Durometer gauge readings of material resiliency. The resiliency of Neoprene decreased 21% af ter 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of testing (lube oil at 190 to 200'F and 100 psig), while Viton resiliency decreased 2.6%.
The TDI test was conducted over two weeks (simulating 1000 engine operating hours), with results and recommendations issued to all TDI nuclear customers and the NRC on November 13, 1986.
d.
Lube Oil System Check Valve Liner Seat Material (Centerline Valves, Inc.)
On September 17, 1985, TDI notified the NRC that valve liner material used on the seating surfaces of some 2 and 4-inch lube oil system check valves was found to be deteriorating.
Review by TDI found that the liner material, ethylene propylene (EPDM) rubber is not compatible with petroleum-based (natural) lube oils. All eight check valves (four at Rancho Seco and four at River Bend) were replaced by TDI.
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