ML20214S764
| ML20214S764 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1987 |
| From: | DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214S747 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8706090406 | |
| Download: ML20214S764 (5) | |
Text
-
ATTACHMENT A
Revise the Technical Specifications as follows:
Remove Page Insert Page 3/4 4-5 3/4 4-5 3/4 4-6 3/4 4-6 l
l j
l l
0706090406 870602 l
PDR ADOCK 05000334 i
P PDR l.
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SAFETY VALVES - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.2 A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting
- of 2485 PSIG +1% -3%.**
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 4 AND 5.
ACTION:
a.
With no pressurizer code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and place an OPERABLE RHR loop into operation in the shutdown cooling mode.
b.
With a
pressurizer code safety valve having discharged liquid water from a water solid pressurizer to mitigate an overpressure
- event, borate to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1%
AK/K at 200*F within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Inspect that valve for potential damage, initiate corrective action to return the valve to operable status prior to increasing RCS temperature and document the inspection results in the Annual Report pursuant to-Specification 6.9.1.5.b.
I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l
4.4.2 No additional requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.
i l
The Lift Setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.
- Within 11% following pressurizer code safety valve testing.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 4-5 PROPOSED WORDING l
L
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SAFETY VALVES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
- _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
3.4.3 All pressurizer code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting
- of 2485 PSIG +1%
-3%.**
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2 and 3.
I ACTION:
a.
With one pressurizer code safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
b.
With a
pressurizer code safety valve having discharged liquid water from a water solid pressurizer to mitigate an overpressure
- event, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6
- hours, and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.3 No additional requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.
i The Lift Setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.
- Within i 1% following pressurizer code safety valve testing.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 4-6 PROPOSED WORDING
,m,.37 r---_----,w.-_--
,e,-.
2-r,,--_
r-i
ATTACHMENT B
Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 109, Revision 1 No Significant Hazard Evaluation Description of amendment request:
The pressurizer code safety valve specifications 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 have been revised by adding an additional Action statement.
The additional action statement requires valve inspection for potential damage following liquid water discharge.
This reflects the commitment specified in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report on safety / relief valves, dated November 10, 1986.
Basis for no significant hazard determination:
Based on the criteria for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as setforth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), plant operation in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
1.
Involve a
significant increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident previously evaluated because:
The additional action statements incorporate valve inspection requirements following a
discharge of liquid water through the valve.
During the EPRI safety valve test program, a target rock model 69C safety
- valve, identical to those used at BV-1, was tested under the full range of conditions expected for FSAR transients.
Based on the FSAR analyses, the feedwater line break was the only event during which the safety valves would be required to pass water.
During the EPRI
- tests, the valve fluttered during liquid discharge, the valve was then disassembled and inspected which revealed bowing of the main disk shaft and scoring of the piston ring.
However, with this damage the valve still operated successfully and rescated with no post-discharge leakage.
Duquesne Light has agreed to revise the technical specifications to include the valve inspection requirements after a liquid water discharge through the valve has occurred.
The valves will only be disassembled and inspected when the plant is
- shutdown, therefore, the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated will not be affected.
2.
Create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because:
The feedwater line break is the only event postulated with the potential for liquid water discharge through the valve.
The proposed action statements require a
valve inspection only if it has been determined that a
transient had occurred and liquid water was discharged through the valve.
The plant would then be shutdown for valve disassembly and inspection.
Therefore, the additional action statements will not affect the operation of the plant and will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
3.
Involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety because:
The technical specifications provide limitations on safety valve operability requirements and the proposed action statements
Attcchm:nt B Pcga 2 provide additional requirements to account for a
special transient event which has the potential to degrade the valve functional capability.
Entry into this action statement will result only when liquid water has been discharged through the valve.
In the event damage is found during the valve inspection, the valve can then be repaired or replaced to ensure the continued pressure relief capability is available to protect the plant.
Therefore, the proposed action statements will ensure the plant margin of safety is not reduced.
Conclusion The proposed changes do not involve any physical change to plant safety related
- systems, components or structures, will not increase the likelihood of a malfunction of safety related equipment, increase the consequences of an accident previously analyzed, nor create the possibility of a
malfunction different than previously evaluated.
The function and operation of the pressurizer safety valves remain unchanged.
The additional action statements require valve inspection for potential damage following liquid water discharge.
These changes incorporate the valve inspection commitment addressed in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report on safety / relief valves, dated November 10, 1986.
Therefore, based on the above, it is proposed to characterize the change as involving no significant hazard.