Text

Proposed Tech Specs,Revising RCS low-temp Overpressurization Protection Sys Set Point heat-up Curve to 22 EFPYs to Provide Larger Interval Over Which Sys Must Be Put in Operation
	ML20214S389
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	06/01/1987
From:	Mroczka E; CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20214S371	List: B12532, Application for Amend to License DPR-61,revising Tech Specs Re RCS low-temp Overpressurization Protection Sys Set Point. Change Will Revise heat-up Curve for 22 Efpys.Fee Paid; ML20214S389;
References
	NUDOCS 8706090252
	Download: ML20214S389 (7)
	v • d • e

. - _ _ _ _ - _.

~;

Docket No. 50-213 B12532 Attachment I Haddam Neck Plant Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications 8706090252 870601

~

PDR ADOCK 05000213 P

PDR June 1987 j

(

i l

b.

With one or more block valve (s) inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the block valve (s) to OPERABLE status or close the block valve (s) and remove power from the block valve (s); otherwise, be in at least 80T STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUT 1DWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

(7) The pressuriser shall be operable with'at least 150 KW of pressurizer heater capacity. The pressurizer. level shall be within + 5% of its programed value during periods of~ normal operation.

a.

With the pressuriser inoperable due to

~

the inoperability of both emergency power supplies to the'pressuriser heaters either restore the inoperable emergency power supply within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in NOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . With the pressuriser otherwise inoperable, be in at least Her STANDBY with the reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in the NOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b.

Duringtransientoperations(startup, power level changes trips,etc.)the pressurizer level ma,y be outside the 5%

i 4xi band for periods not to exceed one hour.

e D 'E 8 E$

% %

C "n g g.g j g g d g.o D.

Each steam generator in a non-isolated reactor

,,jg g*3 coolant loop shall be restored to operable status

o. g

pggy,

,g.g prior to increasing Tave above 200'F. When starting

., y g,,g g y 5*u a reactor coolant pump, and the reactor coolant cold

{

).g 5, u a y etg leg temperature in any non-isolated loop is at or g g gomug "8&

below 315 'F, the secondary water temperature of j

, t.o g $,g g y**

each non-isolated steam generator shall not be more m"*

3Ti than 200F higher than the water temperature of each g.g a g o '8 3

33 of the non-isolated reactor coolant cold legs.

I m.E $

i ;E *. m

5

,g joe $g d g.o E.

The RCS Overpressure Protection System (OPS) shall be

.c w a g g,5 gb@

in operation when the RCS temperature is below 4mJj,,g y.e* e 315 'F unless the RCS is vented through a minimum

!..a j 5 2 g.. g ".

Opening of three (3) inches (nominal diameter) or yg*,waj'q82 its equivalent. If one or more of the relief trains o y g g g 3 g y

g$

is taken out of service and the RCS is not vented.

m y t O., g g,, O *,

the following actions shall be taken

> # 8 8 8 3 8 E'd o E" oUNE

,3 a&64 e

3 3-4

~

Basis:

Each of the pressurizer code safety valves is designed to relieve 240,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point. They are described more fully in FDSA Section 5.2.2.

Below 3750F and 350 psig in the reactor coolant system, the residual heat removal system can remove decay heat and thereby control system temperature and pressure. If no decay heat were removed by any of the means available, the amount of steam which could be generated at safety valve relief pressure would be less than half the valves' capacity.

One valve, theref:re, provides adequate defense against overpressurization.

When the boron concentration of the reactor coolant system is to be changed, the process must be uniform to prevent sudden reactivity change in the reactor. Mixing of the reactor coolant will be sufficient to maintain a uniform boron concentration if at least one reactor coolant pump or one residual heat removal pump is running while the change is taking place. The residual heat removal pump will circulate the primary system volume in approximately one-half hour.

All pressurizer code safety valves are to be in service prior to criticality to permit the design relieving flow to occur if required.

Part C of the specification requires that a sufficient number of reactor coolant pumps be operating to provide core cooling in the event loss of flow occurs. The flow provided in each case will keep DNB well above 1.30 as discussed in FDSA Section 10.3.2. Therefore, cladding damage release of fission products to the reactor coolant cannot occur.

By limiting the temperature differential between the primary and secondary sides to twenty (20) degrees in Part D, the resulting pressure transient will be prevented by the RCS OPS (See Reference 1) from exceeding the limits in Specifications 3.4.

The RCS Low-Temperature Overpressurization Protection System (LTOPS),

in con} unction with Administrative Controls, prevents exceeding the ASME Code Section 111, Appendix G pressure temperature limits.

The limiting condition for which the LTOPS is designed to prevent is an inadvertent HPSI pump actuation when the RCS temperature is below 3500F, Since the HPSI pump shutoff head is 1500 psi and the most restrictive operating curve for 22 EFPY is the heat-up curve, the temperature below which the LTOPS l

must be operable is 3150F.

Reference (1) D. C. Switzer letter to A. Schwencer, dated September 7,1977.

3-4c

r Figure 3.4-8

~

~CONNECTI'UTIANKEbREACkORIC0'LANT'SY$

ll.

C D

HE'T'U ~

A

=

c LIN. IThTI'0fi5'V0N. ~2'2!0"EF_ ERROR 7 60 PS

[.

t FEC;TIVE"FIJLi. ~p0f ERiVEAR'S.

{-

t

.-( ERROR. =.10YF.:

(

't.~

i:

-1:.

c:

t

.f:

];

h '

jf:[

~[

f

....j

.. [.

.j.

.t.

l

...: j. -'

j.

l I

i

-i j-

.:):

1 I

i 1'

]f I

.i Y

1 i

l

_2600 r

j.

't.

t:

.t.

.. j -

j:_

240fl

.j

-l' 1

1-j:

.j:

.j.

i

-~ t 2-

.i

-i' i

+

i j

-i

[

... g _:

i

.t u

n.

.l:

! ' ~

~.

_20.

t:

.}

.j.

i,

{-

.:ll.

.j

i'

'j.

1. 1:

.c

r

.c

r

1.:

.j..

.(

.}.

r-n

.l.

.[.

p.

E0r)

~r ti r

a.

t

.c i

r.

.I 1.:

i t

r

.-i-.

1 m

.L 1:

i t

I;-

_1800 t

I

= t ~

t

~;

2-

~t

.i

.l

.i.

-li___2 f i) i 1 --

i__..

1i OPERATING ~ ZONE.

]~

p._ :._ q M J600 t

1 t

I O.

1 1

I I

1 w

j i

i l

if

.i t

1 T

t Eil400 m

n m

i I

t 1

w

%J200-2 t

t c:

i

-_d' HEATUP.J1 ATE...0F_!509F/HR 0

M UP T0 200 F AND 60 F/HR

. _ _ j__

. _2_._ j _ _ :..

550 F ~b{-~'T-

[

.b~ UP :!TO 0

ti 8_.1000

/

2 t

Ff l

/:

I i-i l

l f.:. _

._ +:_..__.:.._.... *._ {

l' q

r i

I 4

I' Z8

-QQQ Wa

/'

g g-e.

,r 4.

J' -

l' 7

1.

/

i L

-f t

1 L

N2:

H-- 600 i

3, g_

,I

.C. RIT._ICAL_.I.TY. i L. I,M_IT_,:

7...

7

.r.

0 o

' i

.T=245 F)!

5 - 400 r- ;

m 4

. _..;f.__.,

I l

~

1 u'.. -

..;1.... __. 4. _

l

, l

.}

_2QQ,,

.t

_g i

't' i

l r

j

.. _. _ g

..7....

i.

.. t 1

' l.

.p 7._

i i,

f

-500

~

l 100:

. 200 l 300 !.._ -.! 400 j

-.. +[.

- u...x

.=.:-..

~.. -

l l

6 l

1 l

g t

I i

._i_

.J_

. i.... _._.!

REACTORdOOLANITEt1PERATURdfE) [._..

.d_

_.b i

i 1

i n

l I

I'

'j f

i l

-..'t..

l t

l 1

1 I:

r

't I

i

~!

I t

i

3.'5 CMMICAL AND VOUME C0!rrROL SYSTEM Applicability:

Applies to the operational status of the chemical and volume control system.

Objective:

To specify those limiting conditions for operation of the

{

chemical and volume control system which must be met in order to ensure safe reactor operation.

Specification 7 A.

The reactor shall not be critical unless the following chemical and volume control system conditions are met:

(1) Either two charging pumps or the metering pump and one charging pump operable.

(2) 'No boric acid pumps or one boric acid pump and gravity fill line to metering pump operable.

(3) The boric acid tank shall contain at least 12,000 gallons of solution whose concentration shall be at least 8 l

Percent boric acid, but not greater than 13% boric acid.

The temperature sh111 be 140 F or higher.

(4) Maintenance, which requires draining of the boric acid i

six tank, shall be allowed only when the plant is shut down and the reactor coolant system borated to 8%Ak shutdown.

(5) Systen piping and valves operable to the extent required to establish two flow paths for boric acid injection to the reactor coolant systen.

(6) Valve BA-V-399 shall be locked open and shall not be closed except when the plant is shutdown and the reactor coolant system borated to a K,gg of 0.92 or less.

B. A maximum of one centrifugal charging pump shall be operable whenever the temperature of one og more non-isolated RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 315 F and the RCS is not vented 4

J by a minimum opening of a 3-inch diameter.

Ul8 gge;3u The chemical and volume control system provides control of the

, c.,

oo g.g c g g u! o o reactor coolant system boron inventory.

Either a 360 spa

,,.g g' 2 g.g charging pump or a 30 gym metering pump is capable of injection

o. g x e o ee w

eu MYEEu 5UU concentrated boric acid directly into the coolant system.

"5"5El oto Approximately 10,000 gallons of the 82 solution boric acide are "Ewfe "ES required to meet cold shutdown requirmeents.

'Ihus, a minimum E

% e "

of 12,000 gallons in the mix tank is speeff fed. An upper El Nf "Tl concentration Ifmit of 13% boric acid in the mix tank is 3Loem 00M specified to maintain solution solubility at the specified low temperature limit of 140'F. Limits on draining the tank are ec M " E 2 e5$

specified to afford opportunity for scheduled maintenance.

"n.**e" iEm The eight percent Ak shutdown is specified before boric acid mix jf Sh YE o"E tank maintenance is undertaken to preclude a return to criticality aa""

Ede

- - 15 a].

under any circumstances, even fuel movement.

5 8".

==E eas 28:

R.! a t a =

d

C

.saao-

- " " t '* ! e. e.

it t o a ~

UU"~"a et i 8 g

a&64 3_,

y 3

.. =

VALVE NO.

1.OCATION ACTION RH-MOV-22 Containment Valve locked in open Sump position, circuit breaker Suction locked out during post-LOCA long term cooling phase.

SI-MOV-24 RWST line Valve locked in open position, circuit breaker locked out whenever reactor critical.*

SI-FCV-875 HPSI mini-Valve blocked and locked flow line in open position whenever reactor critical.

RH-MOV-874 RHR Valve locked in closed recirculation position and circuit breaker locked open whenever reactor is critical and reactor coolant temperature is above 3300F.*

'Except as permitted by Technical Specification 4.3.

C.

The following actions shall be taken to disable the High Pressure Safety injection Pumps whenever the RCS temperature is below315 0F and the RCS is not vented b minimum opening of three (3) inches (nominal diameter) y a equivalent.

or its 1.

De-energize the HPSI pumps by racking out the breakers p,

g, and locking the cabinets.

e-a: - a 8e8.Mf 903 2.

Close and lock the HPSI pump discharge valves (SI-V-855A E "

.m

EE

& B).

"% t." 8

,p g g ;@ g y

,8 E

3.

The following actions shall be takenio disable one centrifugal o'

Tg86"80 charging pump whenever the RCS temperature is below315 0F

'.y U $ m 4 a*SE goygQgpButg and the RCS is not vented by a minimum opening of three (3) b$"EECE'80E inches (nominal diameter) or its equivalent.

ggyeimayo8 1.

mgwog"om-w Place the control switch in the trip pullout position.

l y<

,N

]gh 2.

Red tag the switch "DO NOT OPERATE".

1.E % % E E U O UN e " 2 B 5 "! a B.l3 t i!

E 358So

t "e~

e s E w =.; e. :

h"

@k is8 hg d"tn:

3-10a J

e3 a

c

BASIS This specification assures that adequate emergency core cooling capacity is available whenever the reactor is critical. Based on the loss of coolant analysis, melting of the cladding is prevented with only one high pressure safety injection pump and one low pressure safety injection (core deluge) pump in operation. Additionally, during the post-LOCA recirculation phase, sufficient cooling exists with only one charging, one NPSI, and one RHR available. Each of the two trains of emergency core cooling equipment includes these three pumps. With the pumps associated with both trains of emergency core cooling equipment operable, substantial margin exists whenever normal power supplies or both diesel generators are available. With only one diesel generator operating and the pumps associated with that diesel operable as required in Item (2) of Specification 3.12, the high pressure safety injection pump and the low pressure safety injection pump would be started automatically. When the safety injection pumps are operating on off-site power, the charging pump would be started automatically. The RHR and charging pumps would be available for manual start for long-term recirculation cooling.

As described in Reference 3, the RCS OPS, in conjunction with administrative controls, prevents exceeding the temperature and pressure limits in Specification 3.4 while RCS temperature is under 315'F or the RCS is not vented. Part C establishing limiting condition for operation regarding the disabling of the HPSI pumps to further assure that a pressure transient is not initiated. Part D establishes requirements regarding the disabling of a charging pump to assure that a pressure transient is not initiated while retaining the flexibility to establish, under strict administrative controls, a redundant emergency boration path should such action be necessary.

FCV-796 is required to be throttled open within the range specified in and far the reasons sited within References (6) and (7). That throttled

, is been determined by separate analyses to insure acceptable py a,

3,, y g 5 g mance during post-LOCA recirculation.

g E

dE (2) FDSA Section 5.2.8.

" U '6 J t " $

Je

,g g g o g N e yg3 (3)

D. C. Switzer (CYAPCO) letter to D. L. Ziemann (NRC),

,, { A.g h a u g,g dated May 22, 1978.

ykch

.c'f (4)

D. C. Switzer (CYAPCO) letter to D. L. Ziemann (NRC),

g e o.,g g 3ya dated May 24, 1978.

, g'E E 5 " E E "oN g

n g O.g - u,

(5)

D. C. Switzer (CYAPCO) letter to A. Schwencer (NRC),

cm

,y p y,c.gjgc dated September 7, 1977.

i ar4 NW as e C A O N Oe4

)SO g y { h [c.y Y j (6)

E. J. Mroczka (CYAPCO) letter to C. I. Grimes (NRC),

dated December Ic97, 1986.

3 3 g o w a m a: c g,

Nom

h dd]"))g u

. ww l

d (7)

E. J. Mroczka (CYAPCO) letter to C. I. Grimes (NRC),

dated December 19, 1936.

!o.g g gjggwmg l0 $ { ae. "I E$ h 5 0

48.

see-te r

lj jEd 3-10b ie O

<

ML20214S389

Text

Navigation menu

Search