ML20214P970
| ML20214P970 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1987 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8706040186 | |
| Download: ML20214P970 (5) | |
Text
,
b e
Deus POWER COMPANY P.O. DOX 33189 CHARL&rrE, N.C. 98948 HALB. TUCKER vns m unoen vaca passement (7o4) 37t>4sGt mesmaan rooooevion
.May 29,.1987
' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coinnission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555
Subject:
McGuire Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-369, -370 NRC/0IE Inspection Report Nos.
50-369/87-04 and 50-370/87-04 Gentienen:-
Pursuant to 10CFR 2.201,'please find attached the response to the violation.
identified in the above referenced inspection report.
Very truly yours,
.Hal B. Tucker SEL/62/jan Attachsent xc: ' Dr. J. Nelson Grace
. Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta St., NW,~ Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323 Mr.' Darl Hood U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. W.T. Orders NRC Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station h
bo 9
60 G-I I
i
r-DUKE POWER COMPANY McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION VIOLATION RESPONSE Violation 50-369/87-04-01 and 50-370/87-04-01 A..
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that current written approved procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering reactor startup and safety related equipment operation.
Operations Management Procedure 2.5, section 6.6, requires that the operator ensure redundant equipment is operable prior to removing equipment from service.
Contrary to the above, on December 30, 1986, train "B" of containment spray and train "A" of the solid state protection system (SSPS) were removed from service simultaneously. Thus, both trains of containment spray were removed from service simultaneously.
This is a Severity Level IV (Supplement I) Violation and applies to Unit 1 only. This violation-is similar to a violation cited in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-369/86-08 and 50-370/86-08.
RESPONSE
1.
Admission or denial of violation:
Duke admits the violation occurred as stated.
2.
-Reason for the violation if admitted:
The violation occurred as the result of several contributing factors:
a)
There was insufficient administrative controls to ensure that performance personnel contacted the control room (CR) senior reactor operator (SRO) prior to beginning the test.
b)
There was insufficient communication between the Unit i reactor operator (RO), the IAE technician, and the CR SRO concerning the SSPS testing. Also, there was insufficient communication between the Unit 1 RO, the Performance technician, and the CR SRO concerning the NS testing.
c)
The CR SRO was a shift supervisor who had been on loan to the Technical Training Center for approximately one year as a simniator instructor. He was fulfilling his license requirement to spend one 12-hour shift per quarter in a licensed capacity. Because he had baen away from the plant for approximately nine months, he relied more heavily on the veteran control room RO.
d)
The operating schedule had not been adhered to during this incident.
Normally, "A" and "B" train systems are not tested on the same day.
m s.
Page 2 3.
- Corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved:
SSPS train "B" was returned to operable upon completion of the surveillance testing and NS train "A" was returned to operable upon completion of performance testing.
'4.
Corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations:
a)
The performance Unit 1 and Unit 2 periodic test procedures were changed to require an operations SRO sign-off prior to beginning the test.
b)
The incident is beleg covered in licensed operator training emphasizing communication / authority with all licensed op,rators, both RDs and SR0s.
c)
Training and staff licensed personnel are no longer permitted to make an operability determination independently. Operability determinations by training instructors and staff SR0s must be made with the concurrence of a regular shift SRO.
d)
To ensure that the operating schedule will be followed, Planning vill take the lend in identifying items on IAE schedules that are operating schedule items, e)
In a management staff meeting it was specified that station supervisors who deviate from the operating schedule are to notify the shif t engineer on duty.
f)
The.new Nuclear Production Department " Operability Directive" will be covered in licen6sd operator training.
g)
Licensed operator training is being conducted on the engineered safecy feature (ESP) valve study.
h)
Licensed operator training on selected " case studies" of applicable industry and station incident reports involving tech spec violations will be conducted.
1)
" Selected Guides for Inoperability" that address relationahips between LCOs are being developed and are partially imp 1..ented.
Full implementation will be complete by July,1987.
j)
Station management met with all line and staff management to reemphasize the importance of an in-depth evaluation of tech spec items pote +' 11y affecting operability. A separate session was held with -
iperations shift supervisors to further emphasize the importance
- v. this issue.
~Page 3 5.
The date-when full compliance will be achieved,:
McGuire was or will be in full compliance on:
a) 01/29/87 b)
.08/01/87 c) 03/01/87 d) 03/12/87 e) 03/24/87 f) 10/01/87-g) 06/01/87 h) 10/01/87 i) 07/01/87 j) 03/27/87 B.
Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that current written approved procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.
RG 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978 recossends that general plant operating procedures Le developed to govern preparation for refueling and refueling equipment operation. Procedures for the startup, operation, and shutdown of containment systems are also recommended.
~
Contrary to the above, the general plant / containment system operating procedures proved to be inadequate, in that they failed to establish administrative controls to govern the removal and reinstallation of curbing sections designed to minimize the influx of water into the containment air return fans during a loss of coolant accident requiring the actuation of the containment spray system. The removable curb sections had been taken out of both units' containment buildings during a previous refueling ' outage and were discovered missing on January 30, 1987.
This it a Severity Level IV (Supplement I) Violation.
RESPONSE
1.
Admission or denial of violation:
Duke admits the violation occurred as stated.
2.
Reason for the violation if admitted:
. Originally, procedure PT/0/A/4200/04 did not include sections for removal of water curbs and replacement of water curbs.
- 3. -
Corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved:
Procedure PT/0/A/4200/04 has been rewritten to include sections for removal of water curbs and replacement of water curbs.
Page 4 4.
Corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further viciations:
Future violations should not occur with the implementation of this revised procedure.
5.
The date when full compliance will be achieved:
The procadure was rewritten and approved on 04/07/87.
i l
l 4
l l
t