ML20214P080
| ML20214P080 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1986 |
| From: | Harbour J, Luebke E, Wolfe S Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| References | |
| CON-#386-712 82-471-02-OL, 82-471-2-OL, LBP-86-30, LPB-86-30, OL-1, NUDOCS 8609170252 | |
| Download: ML20214P080 (23) | |
Text
_
\\
Y)L UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:
OfflC fr u c m, s Sheldon J. Wolfe, Chairman
, *# 'j.[y'
" C Emmeth A. Luebke Jerry Harbour SEWED SEP 16 W
)
Docket Nos. 50-443-OL-1 In the Matter of 50-444-0L-1 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (On-Site Emergency Planning 0F NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.
and Safety Issues)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
September 15, 1986 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Denying In Part And Granting In Part Applicants' Motion For Sumary Disposition Of SAPL's Supplemental Contention 6)
MEMORANDUM I.
Background
In the Memorandum and Order (M&O) of September 13, 1982, LBP-87-76, 16 NRC 1029, 1040-41, the Board had admitted the State of New Hampshire (NH) Contention 10, and, inasmuch as the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) had joined in and adopted as its own NH Contention 10 and the basis therefor, at page 1083 the Hoyt Board permitted SAPL to participate as a joint intervenor.
In the M&O of July 21, 1986, LBP-86-22, 24 NRC _, the Wolfe Board granted NH's motion to withdraw its Contention 10 but ordered that that contention was converted to and 8609170252 86091D PDR ADOCK 05000443 0
PDR D S O 2.
L
. 1 II. Discussion SAPL's Supplemental Contention 6 reads as follows:
I As a threshold matter, SAPL argued'in its response of August 4, 1986 that Applicants' motion should be denied as being untimely filed because the Hoyt Board's M&O of September 13, 1982 at page 1095 prescribed a due date of February 12, 1983 for the filing of motions for sumary disposition. However, the short of the matter is that, as of February 12, 1983, NH 10 was not ripe for summary disposition.
In responses to the Applicants' and the Staff's interrogatories simultaneously filed on January 17, 1983, NH noted that the Applicants hat. neither performed a detailed Control Room Design Review as required by 1.D.1 of NUREG-0737 nor designed a Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) as required.by 1.D.2 of NUREG-0737. Even as of April 10, 1984, in supplementing its response to Applicants' interrogatories, NH stated that the DCRDR had not beer completed and that, with respect to the SPDS, in the complete al.ance of any documentation of compliance, Applicants had not complied with 1.D.2 of NUREG-0737. Moreover, as explicated in the M&O of August 14,1986 (unpublished), as of September 9,1985 when the Board (the Wolfe Board) was appointed to preside over all on-site emergency planning and safety issues, as a successor on such issues and as an independent Board, we could reconsider upon our own motion rulings by the previous Board. Since NH 10, a safety issue, was not ripe for sumary disposition, we now rule that Applicants did not have to file a motion for summary disposition by February 12, 1983, and thus their instant motion is not untimely.
Indeed, since we did not fix a time for the filing of motions for summary disposition in our M&O of July 25, 1986 (LBP-86-24,24 NRC _), at any time thereafter any party could file such a motion, subject to the condition in 10 C.F.R. 62.749(a).
Since SAPL did not complain that it would be required to divert substantial resources from the hearing in order to respond adequately to Applicants' motion and, in fact, did respond to the motion, we are not called upon to consider whether to summarily dismiss the motion.
In its answer of August 28, although noting that the Staff's response of August 18 failed to address the timeliness issue, SAPL proceeded to advance arguments beyond those presented in its response of August 4.
The presentation of additional arguments was improper and we will not consider such additional arguments because
$2.749(a) only permits a response to new facts and arguments presented in any statement filed in support of a motion for summary disposition.
i
, The Seabrook Station control room design does not comply with general criteria 19 through 22 and 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, and NUREG-0737, item 1.D.1 and 1.D.2.
The basis of this contention is to assure that displays and controls added to the control room after the Detailed Control Room Design Review do not increase the potential for operator error.
It is critical at Seabrook that the accident monitoring and control room be the optimum because of the difficulties inherent in carrying out protective actions for the population in the immediate vicinity of the plant.
In their motion for summary disposition, supported by a statement of material facts not in dispute and by the the affidavit of Edward A.
Sawyer,2 Applicants asserted that the following material facts are not I
in dispute:3 i
2 l
Mr. Sawyer is the program manager of the Seabrook Station of the l
Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR), had been the Management Team Chairman of the Yankee Atomic Power Station DCRDR, and had been a management team member of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear l
Power Station DCRDR.
3 We note that NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action j
9equirements," was issued October 31, 1980.
Supplement 1 thereto was issued on December 17, 1982 to provide additional clarification l
regarding, inter alia, the Safety Parameter Display Systems and l
Detailed Control Room Design Reviews. The NRC's generic letter of issuance stated that:
...The enclosure [ Supplement 1] does not specify a schedule for completing the requirements.
It has become l
apparent, through discussions with owners' groups and individual licensees, that our previous schedules did l
l not adequately consider the integration of these l
related activities.
In recognition of this and the difficulty in implementing generic-deadlines, the i
(Footnote Continued) j l
i
i O 1.
NUREG-0737, Item I.D.1 states that all licensees and applicants for operating licenses will De required to conduct a detailed control room design review (DCRDR) to identify and correct design deficiencies.
It lists guideline documents issued or to be issued by the NRC, and discusses the NRR review of the Licensee's submittal.
(Footnote Continued)
Commission has adopted a plan to establish realistic plant-specific schedules that take-into account the unique aspects of the work at each plant. By this plan, each licensee is to develop and submit its own plant-specific schedule which will be reviewed by the assigned NRC Project Manager. The NRC Project Manager and licensee will reach an agreement on the final schedule and in this manner provide for prompt implementation of these important improvements while optimizing the.use of utility and NRC resources.
Supplement 1. stated at 1, 2 and 9, that:
The requirements for emergency response capabilities and facilities are being transmitted to licensees by this supplement and are being promulgated to NRC staff. The letter which forwards this supplement requests that licensees submit a proposed schedule for completing actions to comply with the requirements. Each licensee's proposed schedule will then be reviewed by the assigned NRC Project 4
Manager, who will discuss the subject with the licensee and mutually agree on schedules and completion dates. The implementation dates will then be formalized into an enforceable document.
...The proposal to formalize implementation dates in an enforceable document reflects the level of importance which the NRC staff attributes to these requirements.
XXX Prompt implementation of an SPDS is a design goal and of primary importance....
i
. 2.
NUREG-0737 Item I.D.2 states that each applicant and each licensee shall install a safety parameter display system (SPDS).
3.
Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 (generic letter 82-33) was issued to present a distillation of the requirements and provide additional clarification for five items on NUREG-0737, including the DCRDR and SPDS. Therefore, Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, not the NUREG itself, presents the requirements that have to be met to provide an acceptable Detailed Control Room Design Review program.
4.
For this reason, PSNH designed its program to meet the requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.
-5.
A multi-disciplined team, consisting of Program Manager, Human Factors consultant, Instrumentation and Control Engineer, and a. Plant Shift Superintendent, was formed. This team was expanded as necessary to include other plant operators and other engineering disciplines for specific reviews.
6.
An extensive and comprehensive function and task analysis was performed to determine Instrumentation and Control requirements. This subject was discussed extensively in SBN-701, dated July 30, 1984, in a meeting held on October 30, 1984, and in SBN-748, dated January 7,1985.
7.
The I & C requirements developed as a result of this function and task analysis were compared against the actual Control Room instrumentation and controls. A control room
t
. survey and review was performed to identify deviations of the control room instrumentation and controls from accepted human factors principles.
The potential Human Engineering Deficiencies (HEDs) were assessed and prioritized. These activities included survey, review, assessment and prioritization of all displays, including SPDS displays. The results of these efforts were also
~
submitted to the NRC in various letters dated April 14, 1983, August 10, 1983, July 30, 1984, January 7,1985, July 17,1985, December 27, 1985, and February 20, 1986.
8.
During the assessment process, the Review Team verified
-that the selected design improvements provided necessary corrections. A review performed by the Review Team after the majority of HED corrections were made verified that the improve-ments did not create new HEDs.
9.
The NRC Staff, in Supplement 4 to the Seabrook SER, has concluded that "PSNH has conducted a DCRDR for Seabrook Station that satisfactorily meets the requirements of Supplement I to.NUREG-0737."
In light of the above-set-forth undisputed material facts.
Applicants urged that the DCRDR, including the review of human factors perspective of displays and of safety parameter display system displays, has been undertaken and the displays and controls added, or to be added, to the control room as a result of the DCRDR do not increase the potential for operator error. Therefore, Applicants requested that the Board grant.the motion for summary disposition.
s
. In its response of August 4, while stating that it is not prepared to accept the Applicants' above-set-forth material facts as undisputed, SAPL did not present any reasons for disputing them. Accordingly, we find that the displays and controls added, or to be added, to the control room as a result of the DCRDR do not increase the potential for operator error, and grant the moticn for sumary disposition, as supported by the Staff, with respect to this issue.
SAPL did argue, however, in its response of August 4 that Applicants had selectively dealt with only one sentence in the basis for the contention -- i.e. Applicants had not discussed and shown that there is no disputed material fact with respect to the issue of whether the control room design and displays are at the optimum to protect the population in the immediate vicinity of the plant. SAPL asserted that there are four disputed issues of material fact:
(1)whetheradditional
(
parameter displays should appear on the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS),4 (2) whether the color coding of the Video Alarm System (VAS) should be made' consistent with oth'er control room CRT's prior to any operation, (3)~ whether a preliminary evaluation of the. control room environment ought to be accomplished prior to fuel loading and (4) 4 With respect to the SPDS, SAPL is concerned that modifications thereto providing for additional displays for RHR flow, containment isolation, containment hydrogen concentration, steam generator radiation and for stack monitoring, are not required by the Draft License to be effected until prior to restart following the first refueling outage. The Staff sent the Draft License No. NPF-56 to l
the parties on June 20, 1986.
(See n. 8, infra).
l
L 9-whether certain Human Engineering' Discrepancies involving control room furnishings and equipment storage should be evaluated prior to fuel loading.5 Accordingly, SAPL urges that there is no proper justification for allcwing the Seabrook Station to operate at any power level prior to the completion of items needed to bring the facility into full compliance with the Comission's regulations.
In its response of August 18 supporting Applicants' motion for summary disposition,0 the Staff relied upon a statement of material facts as to which there is no genuine issue in dispute and upon the affidavit of Mr. Richard J. Eckenrode.7 With respect to the DCRDR, noting that Section 18 of Supplement 4 to the SER concluded that 5
With respect to the DCRDR, SAPL is concerned in that Section 18 of Supplement 4 to the SER provides that any changes to the color coding scheme, to control room furnishings, and to equipment storage may be resolved prior to startup from the first refueling outage, and in that final evaluation of the control room environment will be completed and reported to the NRC for confirmatory review within one year after commercial operation.
6 In passing, we note that the Staff argues that the issue of the timing for the completion of various items associated with the DCRDR and SPDS had not been raised in -the original contention, and that, not having filed an amendment or a new contention, SAPL should not be allowed now to expand the contention. We agree with SAPL and conclude that the timing issue was implicitly raised in the contention, i.e., the contention in alleging noncompliance can be and is read to mean that operation should not be allowed until corrective actions are taken.
7 Mr. Eckenrode is a Human Factors Engineer in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and had the lead responsibility for the NRC l
l review of the Seabrook Station's compliance with NUREG-0737, Items j
I.D.1 and I.D.2.
He was the principal author of Section 18 in l
Supplements 3 and 4 of the SER.
I
. Applicants had conducted that' review which satisfactorily met the requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 except in the following limited areas, the Staff asserted that these areas involve low priority items from the standpoint of control room design.
First, as to control room furnishing (desks, chairs, tables, files, etc.), since the installation of these furnishings in the control room is planned to be substantially identical to the installation previously reviewed in the control room simulator, the Staff asserted that any discrepancies that might be uncovered as to this low priority item would be minor and thus any corrective action need not be completed until the first refueling outage.
SAPL barrenly argued, in its answer of August 28, without the support of an expert's affidavit, that, since telephones in the control room are not in the same location as those in the simulator, the phones were not in the optimum location from a human factors standpoint. The Staff did not state that all the furnishings in the control room had to be installed in locations that were identical to those in the simulator and SAPL does not explain why the current location' of the phones would adversely impact upon the emergency notification scheme.
In any event, 2
SAPL stated that it was satisfied with Applicants' August 22, 1986 response to SAPL's interrogatories, wherein Applicants stated that resolutions-for such " minor" HED's would be implemented before initial criticali ty. Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact here.
Second, as to operator protective and emergency equipment storage facilities, the Staff asserted that since these facilities have already
t been reviewed and judged adequate by the Applicants and since they will be installed and the adequacy thereof will be reviewed by the Staff and by the Applicants prior to fuel loading, only minor (if any) discrepancies are expected to be found, and thus any corrective action need not be completed until the first refueling outage.
SAPL argued in its answer of August 28 that there is an apparent inconsistency in Applicants' August 22 response to SAPL's interrogatories - i.e., in one response Applicants stated that resolutions of HEDs related'to operator protective equipment and
- equipment storage would be resolved prior to initial criticality, but in another response Applicants asserted that there is not going to be any operator protective equipment because the ventilation system maintains control room habitability under all conditions. This alleged inconsistency presents no genuine issue of material fact because SAPL does not tell us what significant safety problems might arise if Applicants proceed one way or the other.
Third, as to the control room environment, the Staff asserted that, using a subjective basis of personal comfort, it has preliminarily.
evaluated the control room environment to determine if the potential exists for gross inadequacies (i.e., too much noise, uncomfortably. hot temperatures). However, the Staff will not conduct and complete a final review (using objective measurements provided by NUREG-0700) until after the plant has been operating at full power, because the preoperational conditions may change during operation (i.e., the heat load during operation may raise the temperature, operating systems may raise the
. ambient noise level, etc.).
Since the Staff does not expect any discrepancies to be major ones, it agreed to a schedule whereby, within one year of commercial operation, environmental measurements will be conducted and resolutions of deficiencies must be proposed.
We note that, in its answer of August 28, SAPL makes no effort whatsoever to address control room environnent.
In a broad-brushed, conclusional and speculative manner it merely argues that it believes that reviews of the control room environment, as well as of the storage of operator protective equipment and of control room furnishings may raise safety issues. Again, here, there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Fourth, as to the change in color coding on the Video Alarm System (VAS), the Staff stated that the Applicants have committed to revise the color scheme before commercial operation, which involves changing the color coding on the VAS to make that coding more consistent with the color coding on other computer monitors.
The Staff asserted that since operators are trained to use the present color scheme, the use of the VAS prior to commercial operation should not present a problem,.and
~
that, after'the revision is made, additional training should be minimal because the operators are already familiar with the color scheme used on the other-monitors.
The Staff concluded that, with respect to the DCRDR, the Applicants have fulfilled the requirements of item I.D.1 of NUREG-0737 except for the narrow areas discussed above, and that those areas will be completed before the end of the first refueling outage.
V
, -In-its answer of-August 28, SAPL indicated it was satisfied with Applicants' response to SAPL's int'errogatories, wherein Applicants indicated that they intended to correct the color-related HED's in the VAS prior to initial criticality. Thus, there is no issue of material fact. SAPL continued, however, to urge that there is no acceptable justification for deferring improvements that will aid plant operators in monitoring plant conditions - i.e., in committing to banding indicators only by.the end of the first refueling outage. We conclude, however, that SAPL has not indicated how banding of the indicators prior to operation at full power would enhance the ability of control room operators to prevent or cope with accidents, much less indicate how this banding is related to the VAS. Again, there is no genuine issue of material fact.
With respect to the SPDS, the Staff asserted that it is not considered a safety system, and that no operator actions are taken at the SPDS.
Instead the SPDS is used to direct operators to various other displays in the control room where corrective actions are to be taken if needed, and, in the absence of that system, operators can acquire the necessary information from these other displays.
Further, the Staff asserted that, while it did not identify any serious safety questions in its review, it did conclude in Section 18 of Supplement 4 to the SER that the Seabrook Station SPDS had not yet fully satisfied the i
applicable requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 and that it would condition the license to require that final compliance be demonstrated
J
. before restart following the first refueling outage.8 The Staff concluded that while the SPDS does not yet comply with NUREG-0737, 8
Draft License No. NPF-56 at C.9 provides:
Prior to restart following the first refueling outage, PSNH shall have operational a Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) as described in PSNH's submittals dated January 6,1986 and April 2,1986, that shall include the following modifications:
1.
Continuous display of the top level critical safety function summary at the. assigned SPDS control room
- location, 2.
Addition of, 'or satisfactory justification for, not adding RHR flow and hydrogen concentration parameters to appropriate SPDS screens, 3.
Addition of a containment isolation status screen on SPDS, or improvement to the current containment isolation display to be satisfactorily recognizable from the assigned SPDS location in the control room, 4.
Addition of a radiation monitoring screen to display l
at least steam generator (or steam line) and stack l
radiation, 5.
Improvement of the Heat Sink screen for consistency in labeling, and the Subcriticality screen for mode dependency so as not to mislead operators, and 6.
Addition of approved isolation devices between the the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS) and SPDS.
In passing, the Board notes that, in response to its letter of inquiry of August 21, 1986, the Staff advised on September 2 that a later draft license had been transmitted to the parties on August 20.
Since the Staff's response to the Applicants' motion for summary disposition adverts only to the draft license sent to the parties on June 20, 1986, we only consider that earlier draft license.
I 1
6
. _ Supplement 1, and that indeed five additional items will be listed in Supplement 6 to the SER, it does not believe that this noncompliance presents a serious safety problem at Seabrook.
It urged that the motion for summary disposition should be granted since SAPL has never identified any safety problems that might arise in deferring improvements until the first refueling outage with respect to the SPDS.
While it is the movant, not the opposing party, which has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact,9 if the motion for summary disposition is properly supported, the opposition may not rest upon " mere allegations or denials;" rather, the answer must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact.10 Here, the Applicants' motion (as supported by the Staff's response) was properly supported with respect to.the DCRDR and shows the absence of a genuine-issue as to any material fact. Other than raising the specter of the TMI-2 accident, other than citing NUREG-0660 for the argument that there are some items in the "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident" (such as control room design) that need to be implemented as quickly as they can be done correctly, and other than reasserting its contention that the displays and controls in the control room must be at the optimum, SAPL has not 9
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 753 (1977).
10 Virginia Electric and Power Company (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-584, 11 NRC 451, 453 (1980).
. demonstrated the existence of a gr:nuine issue of material fact with respect to the DCRDR. We herewith do grant the motion and dismiss the DCRDR issue because the movant, as supported by the Staff, has shown that there is no genuine issue of fact -- i.e., has sustained the burden of showing that, with respect to the DCRDR, there are no safety concerns and thus that corrective action, with respect to the limited areas discussed above, need not be completed until the first refueling outage.
However, while we agree with the Staff that SAPL has never identified any safety problems that might arise _in deferring corrective actions with respect to the SPDS until the first refueling outage, neither the Applicants nor the Staff, in support, has sustained the basic, primary burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. The Applicants have not attempted to'do so. The~ Staff barrenly asserted that the current noncompliance with NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, does not present a serious safety problem at Seabrook but does not explain its reasons. The Staff simply relied on the fact that NUREG-0737, Supplement I does not require implementation of ~the SPDS before full-power operation but, rather, permits implementation to be determined by a schedule that has been negotiated with the Staff (Staff's Response at 13, n. 5; also see, supra, n. 3).11 The schedule 11 Staff does not argue, and we are unaware, that any scheduling agreement arrived at by the Staff and an Applicant purst Ant to Supplement 1 is not properly subject to challenge and to judicial review.
N r
4
. reflected 'in Draft License No. NPF-56 at C.9 illustrates the low level of importance that the Staff attaches to the timely completion of the SPDS. Such a position, however, is not in accord with specific guidance in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, Section 4.1.d which states:
Prompt implementation of an SPDS can provide an important contribution to plant safety. The selection of specific information that should be provided for a particular plant shall be based on engineering judgement of individual plant licensees, taking into account the importance of prompt implementation.
With respect to the safety significance of the deficiencies in the SFDS, which the Staff asserted pose "no significant safety question" (Staff's Response at 12), the Staff did not even present a general
~
explanation for this conclusion. Yet as to the first deficiency listed, the Staff provided a parenthetical note that isolation devices between the SPDS and Reactor Vessel Level Instrument System (RVLIS) are to protect the safety-related RVLIS. The Board is left to g'uess why the undetermined status, or availability, of the RVLIS does not present a safety issue, and why it need not be corrected prior.to operation at full power. We are also left to speculate as to how operators can rely on acquiring RVLIS data from either the display at the SPDS or that on the control room console if availability of the RVLIS itself cannot be l
relied upon. The lack of explanation applies to all 11 items of noncompliance with Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.
Supplement I also was cited by the Staff as not requiring i
implementation of the SPCS before full power operation (Staff's response at 13, n. 5), without reference to where in that document such delay in l
1
a 4 implementation was permitted. While perhaps language somewhere in that.
document might support the Staff's interpretation,1de refuse to do the.
homework for any party.12 OPDER 1.
The Board partially grants the motion for summary disposition in the following respects:
a.
The displays and controls added, or to be added, to the control room as a result of the DCRDR do not increase the potential for operator error, b.
While all items addressed in the DCRDR are not-currently at an optimum, i.e., incomplete, and corrective action is to be deferred until the next i
refueling outage, there is reasonable assurance that the safety of the population in the immediate vicinity of the plant will be protected.
2.
The Board partially denies the motion for summary disposition in the following respect:
since the SPDS is not currently at an optimum, i.e... incomplete, in light of the deficiencies which are listed I.
in Draft License No. NPF-56 at C-9 and in light of five additional 12 Parties are reminded that p dings submitted to this Board must be complete and that the Board 1 not, and cannot be expected to search for information incompi.tely given, or referenced, by any party.
t 4 deficiencies which will be listed in Supplement 6 to the SER, there is no reasonable assurance that, in deferring improvements to the SPDS until the first refueling outage, the safety of the population in' the immediate vicinity of the plant will be protected.
3.
.With respect to paragraph 2, above, SAPL may and the Staff and/or Applicants shall present written explanatory testimony upon the issue of whether or not, in light of the fact that the SPDS is not currently at an optimum, i.e., incomplete, because of the aforementioned deficiencies, there is reasonable assurance that, in deferring improvements to the SPDS until the-first refueling outage, the safety of the population in the immediate vicinity of the plant will be protected.13 THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD SAM \\ 0d Shelc on J. Wp1]fe, Chairman ADMINISTRATIN JUDGE N
Wrry frarbour ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 15th day of September, 1986, 13 During the course of a conference call on September 10, 1986, the Board advised counsel as to the contents of this Order, and, upon inquiry by _ counsel for Mass., the Board ruled that, as an interested State, Mass. may present written testimony upon this issue.
L a
& t PARTIAL DISSENT I concur with the majority of the Board to grant the motion for summary disposition regarding the DCRDR.
I disagree with the majority in granting the motion for sumary disposition only in part regarding the SPDS.. I would have granted the entire motion for summary disposition.
It will be useful to provide some backgroun'd information. The safety parameter display system (SPDS) is used to provide operators with a concise display of information on some critical plant variables. The Staff-asserts that it does not consider it to be a safety system and that no operator actions are to be taken at the SPDS.
It is used to direct operator's attention to other displays in the control room where corrective actions are to be taken.
(Eckenrode Affidavit, paragraph.11)
The specific requirements for the SPDS are given in NUREG-0737, Supplement.1, 54.1 Applicants have now installed an interim SPDS.
In reviewing the documentation with Applicants regarding the interim SPDS, Staff did not.
identify any serious safety questions but did conclude that the SPDS is not yet complete. The operators need to acquire some information from other displays. The Staff has concluded that the present SPDS in the Seabrook plant can be used to provide operators with adequate information about the status of the plant and will be acceptable as an interim measure. The SPDS in its current design will not increase the potential for operator error in the event of an abnormal occurrence at l
i
. Seabrook. NUREG-0737, Supplement i does not require that the SPDS be completely implemented before full power operation.
The incomplete items are listed in paragraph 15 of Staff's August 18 response to Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition. Staff reviewed the matter of implementation with Applicants and agreed that the incomplete items must be implemented by the end of first refueling outage. This scheduling procedure is in compliance with the requirements stated in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1.
Some additional open items were noted by Staff in $15 of their August 18 response. These are to be discussed in Supplement 6 of the SER. The Staff will require that the Applicants must either satisfactorily resolve these open items or demonstrate to the Staff's satisfaction, before the end of the first refueling outage, that the open items will not degrade the performance of the SPDS.
SAPL states in its August 4 response to Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition, at p. 3, that the genuine issues of material fact in dispute with regard to this contention are:
(1) whether additional parameter displays should appear on the
~
Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS),
(2) whether the color ~ coding of the Video Alarm System (VAS) should be made consistent with other control room CRTs prior to any operation, (3) whether a preliminary evaluation of the control environment ought to be accomplished prior to fuel loading, and
/
1 4 (4) whether certain Human Engineering Discrepancies involving control room furnishings and equipment storage should be evaluated and resolved prior to fuel loading.
SAPL states at p. 4 that there is no dispute that these things need to be done to comply with NUREG-0737 items I.D.1 and I.D.2.
The NRC Staff is requiring that the missing items be either accomplish'ed, or that sufficient justification for not taking action be provided, prior to restart after the first refueling outage. Contrary to NUREG-0737 and Supplement 1, SAPL, at p. 5, believes that there is no proper justification for allowing the Seabrook Station to operate at any power level prior to completion of items needed to bring the facility into full compliance with the Commission's regulations.
In its response to Applicants and Staff, SAPL has not identified any safety problem associated with deferring the improvements until the end of the first refueling outage.
It is noted that NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, does not explicitly require the SPDS to be optimal.
After thorough consideration of Applicants' motion for sumary disposition of contention SAPL Supplement 6 (formerly NH-10), and the responses thereto by Staff and SAPL, I would grant the entire motion for
(
summary disposition including the SPDS.
In reaching this conclusion notice is taken of the Commission's Statement of Policy: "Further Commission Guidance for Power Reactor Operating Licenses," 45 Fed. Reg. 85236 (December 24,1980) which explains that NUREG-0737 now represents the core of the substantive requirements of the post-TMI 2 Action Plan, i
l L
1
, This was followed by NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, for purposes of clarification.
It reflects that some requirements, especially the implementation of schedules, were made more flexible. Section 3.5 states that:
~ Specific implementation plans and reasonable, achievable schedules-for improvements that will satisfy the require-ments.will be established by agreement between the NRC Project Manager and each individual licensee.
In the absence 'of the State of Massachusetts' Seabrook Radiological Emergency Plan, the Applicants may find it to be practical and sensible to complete the SPDS during the Massachusetts interval of delay instead of prior to rest' art after the first refueling outage.
Eiftneth A. Luebke ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE I