ML20214J087
| ML20214J087 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1986 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214J037 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8612010146 | |
| Download: ML20214J087 (11) | |
Text
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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
At least once per 6 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, the inboard 4.6.1.9.3 and outboard valves with resilient material in each sealed closed containment purge supply and exhaust penetration for the lower compartment and the upper compartment, or instrument room, or Hydrogen Purge System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that the measured leakage rate is less than 0.05 L,wnen pressurized to P,.
0"r 1 *^r6s th/ enntdinme/t Air Ial^"# bpd Adit' #
"t lee &d en;dient'::thi2! Kbl5 M3?i dCdGdMtr ed8E.Sb C[. 1 [.^.4 J'
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- ping tnat -ins measuHr ieakage ret.e 1saessen'tr;&l-L '
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P CATAWBA - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-17
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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
The combined bypass leakage rate shall be determined to be less than e.
by applicable Type B and C tests at least once per 24 months 0.07 L,for penetrations which are not individually testable; penetra-except tions not individually testable shall be determined to have no detect-able leakage when tested with saap bubbles while the containment is pressurized to P,, 14.68 psig, or (Unit 1) P, 7.34 psig, during each t
Type A test; Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material f.
seals shall be tested and dew,onstrated OPERABLE by the requirements of Specification 4.6.1.9.3 c 1.C.1.^.',
. _,. ::.. h,
Air locks shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE by the requirements g.
of Specification 4.6.1.3; The space between each dual ply bellows assembly on containment h.
penetrations between the containment building and the annulus shall be vented to the annulus during Type A tests.
At least once per 24 months, the space between each dual ply bellows assembly shall be subjected to a low pressure test at 3 to 5 psig to verify no detect-able leakage or the dual ply bellows assemoly shall be subjected to a leak test with the pressure on the contairment side of the dual ply bellows assembly at P,14.68 psig, to verify the leakage to be within a
the limits of Specification 4.6.1.2e.; and The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.
i.
1 Amendment No. 8(Unit 1)
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CATAWBA - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 6-4 Amendment No. 1(Unit 2) 7/1/86
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Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices l
ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION The proposed changes would add two Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices to Technical Specification Table 3.8-1A and two to Table 3.8-1B.
These four devices were recently installed in Units 1 and 2.
The. respective Tables are to be revised to reflect these recent changes.
These changes are considered to be administrative in nature, in that Tables 3.8-1A and 3.8-1B are to be updated to reflect changes made at Catawba.
4 10 CFR 50.92 (c) states that "a proposed amendment... involves no significant hazards considerations, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety".
This amendment request would not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The probability of previously evaluated accidents is not affected since the proposed changes will not affect the normal operation of the plant. The consequences of a previously evaluated accident will not be significantly increased since the four additional overcurrent protective devices will be required operable via the Technical Specifications.
This proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated since the design and operation of the plant will not be affected, (other than the addition of four more overcurrent protective devices).
The requested change would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The addition of four more overcurrent protective devices is insignificant with respect to the total number of devices at Catawba (over 200 per unit).
I a
J
TABLE 3.8-1A (Continued)
UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICE 5 SYSTEM POWERED DEVICE NUMBER & LOCATION 2.
600 VAC MCC (Continued)
INXR-F018 Incore Instrument Room Ventila-Primary Skr tion Unit 18 Fan Motor Backup Fuse INXR-F028 Primary Bkr Control Rod Drive Vent Backup Fuse Fan Motor 10 1MXR-F03A Primary Skr Lower Containment Ventilation Sackup Fuse Unit 10 Fan Motor IMXR-F04C Primary Bkr Upper Containment Ventilation
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Backup Fuse Unit'1D Fan Motor' 1MXY-F02A Primary Bkr NC Pump 1A Oil Lift Pump Motor 1 Backup Fuse.
1MXY-F028 Primary Bkr NC Pump 10 Oil Lift Pump Motor 1 Backup Fuse 1MXY-F02C Reactor Building Lower Containment Primary Skr Backup Fuse Wee < bhinened E4'b Welding Machine Receptacle IRCPL0185 b
- 3 1MXY-F03A Primary Bkr iN 06 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Pump Motor 1A Backup Fuse 1MXY-F030 Ice Condenser Refrigeration Primary Skr Floor Cool Pump Motor 1A Backup Fuse 1MXY-FOSA Primary Bkr Lighting Transformer 1LR8 Backup Fuse 1MXY-F058
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Lighting Transformer Primary Bkr ILR11 Backup Fuse
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CATAWBA - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 8-35
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TABLE 3.8-1A (Continued)
UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTE SYSTEM POWERED DEVICE NUMBER & LOCATION 2.
600 VAC MCC (Continued)
INXI:F03A Reactor Coolant Drain Tank
- Frimary 8kr Backuo Fuse Pump Motor 18 1MXZ-F048 Lighting Transformer 1LR1 Primary Bkr Backup Fuse 1MXZ-F04C Lighting Transformer ILR2 Primary Bkr Backup Fuse 1MXZ-F040 Primary Bkr,'
Lighting Transformer ILR3 Backup Fuse 1MXI-F05A Reactor.:oolant Pump Jib Primary Skc-Hoist No. R019 TH R022 Backup Fuse 1MXZ-F05C Lower Containment Auxiliary Primary Skr Charcoal Filter Unit Fan Mritor 18 Backup Fuse 1MXZ-F06A Incore Drive Assembly Motor 18 Primary Skr Sackup Fuse 1MXZ-F068 Incore C-fve Assembly Motor 10 Primary Bkr Backup Fuse 1MXZ-F06C Incore Drive Assembly Motor IF Primary Skr
, ggg p v fo @,
Backup Fuse M y b38 D j Dc8 8 'k w
Se %
g,g
@ 9ss 1MXZ-F078 1,ap t oM Lighting Transformer ILR4 Primary Bkr Backup Fuse 1MXZ-F07C 5 Ton Jib Crane in Containment Primary 8kr Crane No. R005 Backup Fuse CATAWBA - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 8-37
TABLE 3.S-18 (Continued)
UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT DROTECTIVE DEVICE 5 DEVICE NUMBER & LOCATION SYSTEM POWERED 2.
600 VAC MCC (Continued) 2MXR-F01B Primary Bkr Incore Instrument Room Ventila-Backup Fuse tion Unit 28 Fan Motor l
2MXR-F02B Primary Bkr Control Rod Drive Vent Backup Fuse Fan Motor 20 2MXR-F03A Primary Bkr Lower Containment Ventilation Backup Fuse Unit 2D Fan Motor 2MXR-F04C Primary Skr Upper Containment Ventilation Backup Fuse Unit 20 Fan Motor 2MXY-F02A Primary Bkr NC Pump 2A Oil Lift Pump Motor 1 Backup Fuse 2MXY-F028 Primary Skr NC Pump 20 Oil Lift Pump Motor 1 i
Backup Fuse 2MXY-F02C W.fo?.D Primary Bkr Q ; m 4-b c b Reactor Building Lower Containment Backup Fuse g
g Welding Machine Receptacle 2RCPL0135 9,
g, f
- 1. fttJ1. o N Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Pump Primary Bkr Motor 2A Backup Fuse 2MXY-F030 Ice Condenser Refrigeration Primary Bkr Floor Cool Pump Motor 2A Backup Fuse 2MXY-F05A l
Primary Bkr Lighting Transformer Backup Fuse 2LR8 2MXY-F05B Primary Bkr Lighting Transformer 2LRll Backuo Fuse CATAWBA - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 8-58
TABLE 3.B-1BA (Continued)
UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTCR OVERCURRENT DROTECTIV SY5 TEM POWERED DEVICE NUMBER & LOCATION 2.
600 VAC MCC (Continued) 2MXZ-F02B NC Pump 20 Oil Lift Pump Primary Bkr Motor 2 Backup Fuse 2MXZ-F03A Reactor Coolant Orain Tank Primary Bkr Backup Fuse Pump Motor 29 2MXZ-F04B Primary Bkr Lighting Transformer 2LR1 Backup Fuse 2MXI-F04C Primary Skr Lighting Transformer 2LR2 Backup Fuse 2MXZ-F04D Lightin; Transformer 2LR3 Primary Bkr Backup Fuse 2MXZ-F05A Reactor Coolant Pump Jib Primary Bkr Hoist No. R023 TH R026 Backup Fuse 2MXZ-F05C Lower Containment Auxiliary Primary Skr Charcoal Filtar Unit Fan Motor 29 Backuo Fuse 2MXZ-F06A Incore Drive Assembly Motor 2B Primary Bkr Backup Fuse 2MXZ-F068 Incore Drive Assembly Motor 20 Primary Bkr Backup Fuse b
2MXZ-F06C Incore Drive Assembly Motor 2F Primary Skr Backup Fuse 2MXZ-F078 Lighting Transformer 2LR4 Primary Bkr Backuo Fuse W u b hamerd E**cb 3-2MXE-Fo4D gggi,3 y,,y, 7gept oiq g
6 m
CATAWBA - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 8-60
Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Withdrawal Schedule l
l
ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION This proposed change to Table 4.4-5 is needed to show that Surveillance Capsule
'Z' was pulled at the first refueling and that Surveillance Capsule 'U' will be used as a atendby.
During the Unit 1 First Refueling Outage, an attempt was made to remove Surveillance Capsule 'U' in accordance with the withdrawal schedule of Technical Specification Table 4.4-5.
During the withdrawal attempt it was discovered that the tools could not reach capsule
'U'.
Conversations with Westinghouse concluded that Capsule
'Z' had an identical Lead Factor, identical composition and had been exposed to a similar neutron flux profile.
It was concluded that Capsule
'Z' would produce similar results when examined, Given this information, the decision was made to withdraw Capsule 'Z' and leave Capsule 'U' in the vessel. Modifications to the tools will allow capsule 'U' to be withdrawn at a later refueling, if necessary.
Therefore the proposed amendment to Table 4.4-5 is needed to show this change.
10 CFR 50.92 (c) states that "a proposed amendment... involves no significant hazards considerations, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility cf a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety".
This amendment request would not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The probability of previously evaluated accidents is not affected since the proposed changes will not affect the i
(
normal operation of the plant.
The consequences of a previously evaluated accident will not be significantly increased since the accident analysis are not affected.
Capsule 'Z' will produce similar results as capsule 'U' when analyzed.
This proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated since the design and operation of the plant will not be affected.
The requested change would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of l
safety. The characteristics of Capsule 'Z' are identical to Capsule 'U'.
Therefore, there will be no reduction in the margin of safety.
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IABLE 4.4-5 O
REAC10R VLSSEL HAIERIAL SURVElll ANCE PROGRAM - WITil0RAWAL SCilEDULE E
LEAD CAPSULE VESSEL WilllDRAWAL TIME (EFPY)
NUMBLR LOCATION FACIOR g
J '- "- ' t Standby 58.5*
4 3
U 61" 3.69 9
e V
e.
121.5*
4 Standby to W
X 238.5 4
Standby 241*
3.69 6
Y
-S t asedl4P b ' 5I b " * !I
- j 301.5*
4 Z
+
12
,