ML20214E547
| ML20214E547 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 05/11/1987 |
| From: | Owen W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Lieberman J NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE) |
| References | |
| EA-86-087, EA-86-87, NUDOCS 8705220139 | |
| Download: ML20214E547 (5) | |
Text
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e bd DUKE POWER GOMPANY POWEH UUIMING, DOx 03180, GIIAHLOTTE, N. G. useau WH OWEN (7041 373-4120 tattuvowt vatt Persect=7 i 5thttmeleG,COctsfpuCTMHe & PMCAh,Those GACUP May 11, 1987 Mr. James Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Subject:
Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Docket No. 50-414 Response to Order Imposing a Civil Monetary Penalty EA 86-147
Dear Mr. Lieberman:
In accordance with 10 C.F.R. 2.205, Duke Power Company (Duke) hereby files its response to the " Order Imposing a Civil Monetary Penalty" (Order) issued by the NRC on April 14, 1987.
Duke is remitting herewith its check in the amount of $50,000 in payment of the civil penalty, but by so doing, does not agree that the enforcement action taken by the NRC on November 12, 1986, and imposed in the Order is correct.
Duke continues to maintain that categorization of the event as Severity Level III is inappropriate and either that a Civil Penalty should not be imposed or it should be mitigated.
The reasons for that position were set out in Duke's Answer of December 12, 1986, and will not be repeated herein. However, Duke has concluded, after reviewing the situation in its entirety, that payment of the civil penalty is the most cost-effective way to conclude this matter.
Duke would like to point out one aspect of the NRC's April 14, 1987, Order which it finds disturbing.
That is, after reviewing Duke's December 12 Answer challenging Violation B.2, the NRC Staff apparently concluded that Duke was correct.
The Staff therefore withdrew Violation B.2 as set out in its Order, but then restated the Violation and concluded that Duke was guilty of the restated Violation.
Duke questions the regulatory basis for the Staff's restating, reissuing and imposing a violation and its associated Civil Penalty.
In Duke's view that Staff action is not only beyond the bounds of the Enforcement Policy, but also, perhaps, other requirements of law.
Under 10 C.F.R. S2.205(a), the Staff is required, prior to imposing any civil penalty, to serve a written notice of violation (NOV) upon the person charged.
The NOV "shall specify", among other things, h
i "the nature of the alleged act or omission with which the f
person is charged, and shall identify specifically the p.
particular provision or provisions of the law, rule, I g regulation, license, permit... involved in the alleged i
87052dN$9N0511
/
PR ADOCK 05000414 W l-
4 Mr. Licb ;rman May 11,-1987 Page The. regulations further provide that the person charged may, within twenty (20) days, answer the NOV (10 C.F.R. S2.205(b)). The answer "shall state any facts, explanations, and arguments, denying the charges of violation, or demonstrating any extenuating circumstances, error in the [NOV], or other reason why the penalty should not be imposed and rray request remission or mitigation of the penalty." (10 C.F.R. S2.205(b))
Following that, the Staff "upon censideration' of the answer, will issue an order dismissing the proceeding or imposino, mitigating, or remitting the civil penalty." (10 C.F.R. S 2.205(d))
Plainly, then, the process contemplates that a utility is to be informed, with specificity and particularity, of the charges against it and is to be provided an opportunity to defend itself against those specific charges. The Director is then to reach a decision based on the information contained in the charoe and the answer.
That process has not been followed in this instance.
In the NOV of November 12, 1986, the Staff proposed a civil penalty based in part on Violation B.2, which read:
i B.
10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V,
Instructions, Procedures,. and Drawings, requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these inst' ructions, procedures, or drawings.
Contrary to the above, as of June 27, 1986, certain procedures affecting quality were inadequate or not properly implemented and contributed to the depressurization event of June 27, 1986.
Specifically:
2.
Test Procedure TP/2/A/2650/03, Loss of Control Room Functional Test, was inadequate in that the procedur(
lacked specific criteria for termination of the test if the plant was determined to be in an uncontrolled or uncontrollable condition with control transferred to the remote shutdown panels.
Duke responded to Violation B.2 by pointing out that it was not able to i-identify any NRC requirement for test procedure termination criteria, and that in its view its test procedure was written in a manner which appropriately provided for termination of the test in question. (Duke Response, Attachment 2, p. 6) The Staff, evaluating the NOV in light of Duke's Response, apparently
Mr. Litberman May 11, 1987 Page agreed with Duke with respect to Violation B.2 relating to termination criteria, and, within the terms or tb? regulation, dismissed that Violation as it appeared in the November 12, b86, NOV.
(See 10 C.F.R. S2.205(d)).
That did not, however, end the Staff's consideration of Violation B.2.
Instead, the Staff concluded that the focus of Violation B.2 should be shifted, and stated:
"Therefore, Violation B.2 is modified to read as follows:
2.
Test Procedure TP/2/A/2650/03, Loss of Central P.an Functional Test, was not properly % Mr,ted in that control was not transferred back to t*:
tontrol ro7m ehr,
a situation arose that could not be adequately control' from the auxiliary shutdown panels.
The violation, as rewritten, focuses on the lictnsea's f ailore us r
implement the procedure to assure that personnel adeqJately understood the steps of the procedure and would be able to promptly l
transfer control back to the control room should the situation I
warrant it, as opposed to the inadequacy of the procedure to provide test termination criteria.
The NRC Staff has concluded that this violation. as rewritten. occurred. (emphasis added).
(NRC Order, Appendix, pp. 4-3) l Therefore, the Staff in this instance has effectively found in Duke's l
favor Violation B.2 as presented to Duke in the November 12, 1986, NOV, and l
to which Duke responded. That Violation focussed on whether the NRC requires l
termination criteria in a test procedure.
However, the Staff concluded that l
the focus of Violation B.2 should change from that stated in tha November 12 NOV to one which addresses a different area entirely.
Despite the language in the Order, this is more than a mere change in focus.
It is instead a dif ferent Violation; one Duke was not on notice of when it" filed its Response, l
and one which it has had no opportunity to address.
l As nearly as Duke can tell, there is no provision in the regulations for the Staff's action.
That action has removed from Duke the protection in tha i
regulations which guarantees to it the right to respond to a clearly stated and specific NOV.
Under the regulations Duke now has no opportunity to respond to this new charge prior to imposition of the Civil Penalty.
The procedure followed by the Staff is improper and Duke protests.
l The new NOV focuses on the timely transfer of control and is clearly l
contrary to the facts. As the AIT Reporc at page 8 and the November 12, 1986 NOV acknowledge, control was transferred back to the control room after i
approximately 6 minutes.
Throughout this period, control room operators and l
supervision were fully aware of plant conditions.
Consistent with NRC guidance (IE Reports, 50-413/84-40 and -66), cor. trol rcom personnel were i
determined to give the operators at the auxiliary panels an opportunity to ascertain the problem and to take corrective action. When it became apparent that the operators at the auxiliary panels could not correct the situation, l
the control room personnel took corrective actions.
Consequently, it is Duke's view that the rewritten violation is withoth nerit.
,z s:
Mr. Lieb:rman-
.May 11, 1987 Page Duke also continues to believe that the NRC should have mitigated the civil penalty in its entirety. Duke earlier. explained its view why the cited past deficiencies in testing do not serve as' support for. not mitigating the present civil penalty -- the root causes of the events cited by the Staff were different.
The NRC Staff does not agree.
.However, the Order improperly i
raises an additional incident (again without giving Duke an opportunity to respond prior to imposition of the Civil Penalty), referring to tha October 6, -1986 occurrence cited in Inspection Report No.
50-412/86-43.
As cited in the Inspection Report, an inadequate procedure was the root cause of the spill of borated water. The specific deff.iency was a failure to specify the order for positioning valves in prersr tion rce com1 cting a performance test on a residual heat removal. pump. It shoald be read 1;i apparent that the Loss of Control-Rotm test, the over pressurization events and the spill of borated water had quita different root causes.
1 In any event, Duke would like to emphasize that it has recently taken measures to strengthen its testing program.
The station staff is in the process of reviewing all test procedures with impact on plant performance, reliability or nuclear safety.
A graded approach is being taken, with the i
most significant (safety related) procedures being revised first.
All procedure writers have been trained on the Nuclear Production Department's Procedure Writer's Guide. This approach provides for a structured review for technical verification and pre-approval validation of each procedure.
The review will assure that test procedures do not result in undue component or system damage or challenges.
However, Duke does not believe that simply revising : procedures is sufficient.
New training programs also will be put in place.
For example, infrequently scheduled procedures which are run by technicians will be addressed under the Training and Qualification guides in the Employee _ Training and Qualifications System Manual. Additional, and continuing, training will be provided through table top discussion, classroom, or other formal training as deemed necessary by the responsible supervisor.
Other infrequently scheduled procedures which are run by engineering personnel are assigned to those personnel considered System Experts for the particular system being i
tested.
In short, as a result of these activities, Duke is confident that the likelihood that events of a simil--
- ture will be repeated is substantially reduced.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements set forth herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Very truly yours, lll0lY W. H. Osar
/cir i
Enclosure
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- Mr.. Lieberman May'11,L1987-Page,
cc: Dr. J.. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-Region II _
101 Marietta. Street, N.S., Suite 2900:
Atlanta, Georgia' 30323 Mr. P. K. Van Doorn i
NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station i.
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