ML20214D729
| ML20214D729 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1986 |
| From: | Gridley R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NCR-3011, NUDOCS 8603050450 | |
| Download: ML20214D729 (3) | |
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N TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 4
SN 157B Lookout Place 4
t February 12, 1986 BLRD-50-438/84-32 BLRD-50-439/84-30 S$
i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:
Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator no 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
Dear Dr. Grace:
BELL *:FONTE NUCLEAR PLANTS UNITS 1 AND 2 - ALTERATIONS OF FIRE DOORS AND FRAMES - BLRD-50-438/84-32, BLRD-50-439/84 FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector Ed Ford on April 12, 1984 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 3011. This was followed by our interim reports dated May 9 and December 11, 1984.
Enclosed is our final report.
i If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, i
i TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY R.
. Grid 1 y Manager of icensing Enclosure Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure) cc:
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4
Washington, D.C.
20555 Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 B603050450 860212 PDR ADOCK 05000430 g
PDR L
An Equal Opportunity Employer gy
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1 ENCLOSURE BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 j
ALTERATIONS OF FIRE DOORS AND FRAMES BLRD-50-438/84-32, BLRD-50-439/84-30 NCR 3011 10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency A number of fire-rated doors and frames at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN) have been altered after certification. Some alterations were made without prior approval by TVA's Office of Engineering (OE).
Other modifications were made to accomplish NRC-mandated security requirements or to maintain pressur-ization required for radiation protection or upgrade door leakage performance found deficient in preoperational tests. Modifications also were made in order to repair material damaged during construction.
Alterations included, but may not be limited to, signs and tags pop-riveted to doors, lock strike covera pop-riveted to doorfaces, holes drill.'d in doorfaces for temporary lock installations, electrical box screwed to doceframe, electrical magnetic switches screwed to doorface and doorframe. holes in doorframes for electrical defeat switch, doors drilled for electric lock solenoid and handle anchorage, doorbottom seals screwed to doorface, weather stripping screwed to doorframe, door actragals screwed to doorface, doorelosers through-bolted to doors, and interior metal siding pop-riveted to doorframe.
The cause for these deficiencies was a lack of understanding on the part of TVA personnel regarding the consequences of making modifications to fire doors, which could violate the door integrity.
Also, the cumulative design requirements *n criteria for security, fire protection, and personnel safety implied a design for some of the doors that could not meet National Fire protection Association (NFPA) 101 regulations.
Similar occurrences at TVA's Watts Bar Nuclear Plant have been reported under NCR 4443R (WBRD-50-390/83-69. WBRD-50-391/83-64).
Safety Implicationa Many of these alterations constitute conditions that, if not corrected, could adversely affect the safe shutdown capability of the plant during a fire.
In each case, the damage or modification could possibly prevent the coor or frame from functioning to limit the spread of a fire.
A fire that is allowed to 1
propagate through a fire barrier could cause unacceptable damage to redundant I
safe shutdown equipment that could exceed the limits established in 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
This could adversely affect the safe operation of the plant.
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' t Corrective Action In order to resolve the identified deficiencies with firedcors, TVA contracted Underwriters Laboratories, Incorporated (UL) to inspect and make recommenda-tions on all firedoors at BLN.
Corrective action f alls into four general categories:
1.
Thirty-eight doors will be used as-is because it has been determined that they are not required for compartmentation (nonsafety-related).
2.
Seven doors were modified by using UL acceptable materials and practices; therefore, these doors will be used as-is (through-bolting 4
of doorelosers and door astragals screwed to doorface).
1 3.
Repair or modification of fourteen doors will be made using materials and methods acceptable to UL.
I 4.
Forty-one new UL approved replacement doors and/or frames will be i
purchased and installed.
All action to correct this deficiency will be completed by six months before fuel load of the respective unit.
I In order to prevent recurrence of this deficiency, notes have been added to design drawings which require coordination before any door modification is made that is not specifically detailed on design drawings.
In addition, a design input memorandum (DIM) will be issued by May 30, 1986, which will denote required revisions to the design criteria for fire doors. The revisions will clearly identify nuclear safety requirements for design.
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