ML20213G386
| ML20213G386 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1986 |
| From: | Cutter A CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| IEB-86-003, IEB-86-3, NLS-86-408, NUDOCS 8611180073 | |
| Download: ML20213G386 (3) | |
Text
r CD&L Carolina Power & Light Company SERIAL: NLS-86-408 V
5 rs86 SS !!0V 10 All : 95 Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, GA 30303 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-325 & 50-324/ LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 & DPR-62 RESPONSE TO IE COMPLIANCE BULLETIN 86-03; POTENTIAL FAILURE OF MULTIPLE ECCS PUMPS DUE TO SINGLE FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE IN MINIMUM FLOW RECIRCULATION LINE
Dear Dr. Grace:
Per the requirements of IE Compliance Bulletin 86-03, Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) hereby submits the required information concernin the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit Nos. I and 2 Emergency Core Cooling ystem (ECCS). The sub ect bulletin required that it be determined whether a licensee facility has a single-fa lure vulnerability in the minimum flow recirculation line of any ECCS pump which could result in the failure of more than one ECCS train. Should this problem exist, corrective actions are to be developed and implemented to bring the facility into compliance with GDC 35. A written report providing the results of the review, a justification for continued operation, and a description of the short-term corrective actions are to be submitted within 30 days of receiving the bulletin. In addition, a report detailing the long-term corrective actions is to be submitted within 90 days of receipt of the bulletin.
This submittal provides the results of CP&L's review of the BSEP ECCS per Action 1 of the bulletin. The attached information is formatted such that the specific sub-headings correspond to the bulletin action items.
Per our review, CP&L has determined that BSEP is not susceptible to the disablement of multiple ECCS pumps due to a minimum flow line single failure. Carolina Power & Light Company, therefore, believes that the bulletin requirements have been completed and no further action needs to be taken.
Should you have any questions with regard to this submittal, please contact Mr. Arnold Schmich at (919) 836-8759.
Yo very t t,
bl(' n ABC/AWS/kts (5042AWS)
. B. Cutter - Vice Pr sident Attachment Nuclear Engineering & Licensing cc:
Mr. W. H. Ruland (NRC-BNP)
Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC-RII)
Mr. E. Sylvester (NRC)
US NRC Document Control Desk A. B. Cutter, having been first duly sworn, did depose and say that the information contained herein is true and correct to the best of his information, knowledce and belief; and the sources of his information are of ficers, employees, contractors, an8 agents of Carolina Power & Light Company.
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RESPONSE TO NRC IE COMPLIANCE BULLETIN 86-03 The following sections provide specific detail for each of the IE Compliance Bulletin 86-03 action items.
NRC Action 1:
Pramptly determine whether or not your facility has a single-failure vulnerability in the minimum flow recirculation line of any ECCS pumps that could cause a failure of more than one ECCS train.
CP&L Response:
A review was conducted of the applicable plant drawings for the Core Spray (CS)
System (Loops A and B), the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System (Loops A and B),
the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System, and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System flow lines. Per this review, the following information was determined:
a.
The minimum flow valve for each CS toop ties in downstream of its respective full flow test line isolation valve. No other valves are located between this connection and the torus. The failure of a minimum flow valve would, therefore, potentially only disable its respective CS loop pump.
b.
The minimum flow valve for each RHR 1000 ties in downstream of its respective full flow test line isolation valve. No other valves are located between tilis connection and the torus. The failure of a minimum flow valve would, therefore, potentially only disable its respective RHR loop pump.
c.
The minimum flow valve for the HPCI ties in downstream of the RHR Loop B full flow test line isolation valve. No other valves are located between this connection and the torus. The failure of the minimum flow valve would, therefore, potentially only disable the HPCI pump.
d.
The minimum flow valve for the RCIC ties in downstream of the RHR Loop B full flow test line isolation valve. No other valves are located between this connection and the torus. The failure of the minimum flow valve would, therefore, potentially only disable the RCIC pump.
The CS, RHR, HPCI, and RCIC minimum flow valves are powered from separate Motor Control Center (MCC) compartments in separate MCCs. Although the RHR Loop B, HPCI, and RCIC minimum flow lines all connect downstream of the RHR Loop B full flow test line isolation valve, the lines are independent up to this point.
CP&L, therefore, concludes that BSEP is not susceptible to the disablement of multiple ECCS pumps due to a single failure of a minimum flow recirculation line valve.
(5042AWs/k ts )
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NRC Action 2:
If the problem exists: (a) promptly instruct all operating shif ts of the problem and measures to recognize and mitigate the problem;(b) promptly develop and implement corrective actions which bring your facility into compliance with GDC 35.
CP&L Response:
This action is not necessary since the problem described in the bulletin does not apply to BSEP.
NRC Action 3:
Within 30 days of receipt of this bulletin: (a) provide a written report to the NRC which identifies whether or not this problem exists at your facility;(b)if the problem exists (or existed), include in the report the justification for continued operation and identify the short-term modifications to plant operating procedures or hardware that have been or are being implemented to ensure safe plant operations.
CP&L Response:
IE Compliance Bulletin 86-03 was received by CP&L on October 13, 1986, therefore, this information is being submitted within the time frame required. Since this problem is not existent at BSEP, a justification for continued operation and a description of short-term corrective modifications is not necessary.
NRC Action 4:
If the problem exists (or existed), provide a written report within 90 days of receipt of this bulletin informing the NRC of the schedule for long-term resolution of this and/or any other significant problems that are identified as a result of this bulletin.
CP&L Response:
Since the problem described in this bulletin does not exist at BSEP, this action is not necessary.
(5042AWS/kts)
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