ML20213G091
| ML20213G091 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1986 |
| From: | Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Schnell D UNION ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8611170320 | |
| Download: ML20213G091 (2) | |
Text
NOV 3 1986 Docket No. 50-483 Union Electric Company ATTN:
Mr. Donald F. Schnell Vice President - Nuclear Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400 St. Louis, M0 63166 Gentlemen:
We have received the enclosed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) letter dated October 7,1986, and associated final exercise evaluation on the offsite i
emergency preparedness exercise conducted on July 30, 1986, for the State of Missouri, and the Counties of Callaway, Gasconade, Montgomery and Osage. This final exercise evaluation lists two Deficiencies regarding the offsite emergency response plans for the areas around the Callaway Nuclear Power Plant.
The two Deficiencies concerned the timeliness of public instructions broadcasted through the Emergency Broadcast System and the timeliness of alerting on the Missouri River. These Deficiencies are not expected to impact adversely on the July 9,1985 Callaway approval under 44 CFR 350 since they have been scheduled for early remedial action.
We fully recognize that the recommendations to be implemented may involve actions by other parties and political institutions which are not under your direct control.
Nonetheless, we would expect the subject of offsite preparedness for the area around the Callaway Nuclear Power Plant to be addressed by you as well as others.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
Sincerely, CI"31'cicnod h~:Lc, g W. D. Shafer, Chief i
Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch See Attached Distribution i
RIII RIII RIII RL WM h uAS ton-
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F611170320 861103 s
PDR ADOCK 05000483 F
Union Electric Company 2
NO\\/3 1986 Distribution cc w/ enclosure:
A. P. Neuhalfen, Manager Quality
. Assurance 3' E. Miltenberger, General Manager, Nuclear Operations DCS/RSB(RIDS)
Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Region IV Resident Inspector, Wolf Creek K. Drey Chris R. Rogers, P.E.
Utility Division, Missouri Public Service Commission SNUPPS cc w/o enclosure:
D. Matthew, EPB, OIE W. Weaver, FEMA, Region V M. Carroll, FEMA, Region VII 1
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[' E f Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 3
OCT 7 1986
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MEMORANDlM EUR: 83 ward L. Jordan of Director, Division of Dnergency
$N k Preparedness and Engineering Response MMj Office of Inspection and Enforcement D%-
U.S. Nuclear latory ission n-Y f5?i FROM:
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Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Prograns SURIECT:
Exercise Report of the July 30, 1986, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Bnergency Preparedness Plans for the Callaway Nuclear Power Plant.
Attached is a copy of the Exercise Report of the July 30,1986, joint exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Callaway Nuclear Power Plant, near Ebiton, Callaway County, Missouri. 'Ihis was a joint, full participation exercise for the State of Missouri and Callaway, Gasconade, Pbntgonery, and Osaje Counties. 'Ihese counties are within the plume exposure 10-mile Dnergency Planning Zone (EPZ). 'Ihe report, dated September 30, 1986, was prepared by the Federal Dnergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region VII.
'Ihere were 2 deficiencies in the July 30, 1986, exercise. Both deficiencies were in the Alert and Notification Systen and have been accepted by the State for corrective action. 'Ihey were to be rectified at a renedial exercise on Septanber 30, 1986; however, this remedial exercise has been rescheduled by Missouri for October 22, 1986. Region VII expects to submit a full report on the Deficiencies by November 24, 1986. One deficiency concerned a failure of the State anergency Operations Center (SECC) to distribute instructions to the public through the Dnergency Broadcast Systen (EBS) in a timely manner at the General Bnergency. 'Ihe second deficiency was concerned with the State Water Patrol requiring one hour and 38 minutes to conplete primary alertiry on the Missouri river. 011y 45 minutes is allowed for such alerting.
Since these Deficiencies are scheduled for early renedial action they are not expected to adversely impact the July 9,1985, Callaway approval under 44 CFR 350.
If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2861.
h Og '31 Attachnents As Stated Q '( b b IM 8#
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EXERCISE O
EVALUATION JULY 30,1986',
Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the State of Missouri, and the Counties of Callaway, O
Gasconade, Montgomery, and Osage for the Union Electric Company's l
CALLAWAY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT near Fulton, Callaway County, Missouri September 30,1986 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY Region Vil J.D. Overstreet 911 Walnut Street Regional Director Kansas City, MO 64106
$'boOe3 PDR V
EXERCISE EVALUATION
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1 JULY 30,1986',
Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the State of Missouri, and the Counties of Callaway, Gasconade, Montgomery, and Osage
(
for the Union Electric Company's CALLAWAY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT near Fulton, Callaway County, Missouri September 30,1986 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY l
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Region Vil J.D. Overstreet 911 Walnut Street I
Regional Director Kansas City, MO 84106 k
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'd EXERCISE EVALUATION OF THE IMPIJ3ERTATION OF STATE
~AND LOCAL RADIOIOGICAL B ERGENCY RESPONSE }%^JS CONDUCTED JULY 30, 1986 for the CALLAWAY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT -
Fulton', Callaway County, Misset.ri Union Electric Company, Licensee 1
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7 I
PARTICIPANTS:
State of Missouri
)
County,of Callaway County of Entgomery County of Gascor.nde Count,7 of.Osege j
(All jurisdictions participated) t s
September 30, 1986 o
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, prepared by Federal kr6ency Management Agency RegionVII Kansas City, MO o
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ABINtEVIATIONS AND ACRONYE.......................................... iv EIERCISE SUledARY.................................................... vi 1
IETRODUCTI05.....................................................
1 1.1 Exercise Background.........................................
1 1,2 Exercise Evaluators.........................................
1 1.3 Evaluation Criteria.........................................
2 1.h Exercise 0bjectives.........................................
2 1.5 Exercise Scenario..........................................
15 1.6 State and Local Resources..................................
15 2 EIERCISE EVALUATION.............................................
17 2.1 Missouri Operations........................................
17 2.1.1 State Fr.ergency Operations Center................... 17 2.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility.......................
21 2.1.2.1 State Forward Co mand Post.................
21 2.1.2.2 Dose Assessment and Field Teart Coordination. 24 2.1.3 Badiological Monitoring Teams.......................
25 2.1.4 Radiological Laboratory.............................
28 2.1.5 Joint Public Information Center..................... 28 2.1.6 State We.ter Patro1..................................
29 2.2 County Operations.....................
.................... 31
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2.2.1 Callaway County /Fulton E0C..........................
31 2.2.2 Gasconade County E0C................................
3h 2.2.3 Montgomery County E0C...............................
35 2.2.h Osage County E0C....................................
37 3
SCENARIO........................................................
39 h SIDedARY OF DEFICIENCIES AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS................... h0
(
ABIEEVIATIOES AND ACRORY3E ANL Argonne National Laboratory BRH Missouri Division of Health, Bureau of Radiological Health CCEOC Callaway County /Fulton Emergency Operations Center CNPP Callaway Nuclear Power Plant DOT Department of Transportation EBS Emergency Broadcast System ECC Emergency Communication Center ECCS Emergency Core Coolant System EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPD Emergency Preparedness Director EPZ Emergency Planning Zone FAA Federal Aviation Administration FDfA Federal Emergency Management Agency FCP Forward Command Post FHA Federal Highway Administration GCEOC Gasconade County Emergency Operations Center GOIC Union Electric Company's General Office Information Center INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory JPIC Joint Public Information Center KI Potassium Iodide LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident MCEOC Montgomery County Emergency Operations Center i
NUREG-065h Criteria for preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-065h/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1) i iv
]
OCE00 Osage County E=ergency Operations Center PAG Protective Action Guide PAR Protective Action Recommendation PIO Public Infor=ation Officer PHS Public Health Service RAC Regional Assistance Committee RCS Reactor Coolant System RHR Residual Heat Removal SEMA Missouri Department of Public
- Safety, State Emergency Management Agency SEOC State Emergency Operations Center TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter UE Union Electric Company USDA United States Department of Agriculture 4
EIERCISE SUM 4ARY
(
(N.s)
The purpose of an exercise is to determine the ability of appropriate off-site agencies to respond to an emergency covered by state and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans.
The evaluation of such an effort vill, of necessity, tend to focus on the negative aspects of the exercise, on inadequacies in planning, preparedness and perfor=ance.
This focus of attention on the negative should not be taken to mean that there vere not a great many positive accomplishments as well.
- Indeed, there were.
However, in the interest of brevity, and in the spirit of constructive critiquing, most of the report vill deal with the inadequacies observed.
FB4A classifies exercise inadequacies as deficiencies or areas requiring corrective actions.
Deficiencies are demonstrated and cbserved inadequacies that vould cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of a radiological emergency.
Areas requiring corrective actions are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of State and local government performance, and although their correction is required, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely
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impact public health and safety.
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In addition, FEMA identifies areas recommended for improvement, which are problem e.reas observed during an exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety.
While not required, correction of these vould enhance an organization's level of preparedness.
It should be noted that there is a distinction between failure to fully demonstrate an objective and the declaration of an inadequacy.
Limitations imposed by an exercise scenario, or the choice of one response option over another could preclude a full demonstration, yet not constitute an inadaquacy.
MISSOURI OPERATIONS Stde Dnergency Operations Center (EOC)
Of ten planned objectives, three vere not fully demonstrated.
Failure
'o demonstrate Objective Number 14, " Dissemination of an instructional message timely manner", resulted in the declaration of a deficiency, as it i t.
a toc? h8 minutes to air the General Emergency Protective Action Recom=endations over the EBS.
Faillre to demonstrate Objective Number 3 resulted in the citation of two areas for required corrective action; both related to handling of out going messages: one to the JPIC, and one to FEMA Region VII.
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State Forward Crammand Post
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Of eleven planned objectives, four vere not fully demonstrated. Failure to demonstrate Objective Number 25, coordination of information by the PIO prior to release, resulted in a required corrective action.
There is also a requirement to clarify the role of the utility and the State in the notification process after the FCP has been activated.
Dose Assessment and Field Team Coordination Of ten planned objectives, only Objectives Number 2 and 35 were not fully demonstrated. No areas requiring corrective action were observed.
Radiological Monitoring Teams Of the eight planned objectives, four vere not fully demonstrated.
Failure to fully demonstrate Objectives Number 7 and 8,
equipment and procedures, resulted in a required corrective action.
Radiological Laboratory The absence of written procedures for sanple analysis to determine the presence of Sr-89 and Sr-90 to the required levels resulted in a required corrective action.
Joint Public Information Center This facility was activated as a training exercise, and by prior agreement with FEMA, was not subject to evaluation.
However, there are numerous observations in the body of the report for the benefit of the trainees.
State Water Patrol (SWP)
The SWP has the responsibility to provide primary alerting on the Missouri River.
They are required to accomplish this within h5 minutes.
Failure to accomplish this resulted in declaration of a deficiency.
Callaway County /Fulton IDC Of the 13 objectives planned for demonstration, only three were not fully demonstrated.
Objective Number 14, Distribution of appropriate instructions to the public in a timely manner, was not accomplished.
This was due to the State EBS Coordinator's failure to get the County's message aired in a reasonable time.
Objective Number 35. Recovery and Reentry, was not adequately provided for in the scenario.
The three areas requiring corrective action were:
mobilization, use of landmark descriptions in EBS messages, and clarification of school evacuation procedures.
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O Gasconade County EDC Of the eleven planned objectives, only two were not demonstrated.
Failure to demonstrate Objective Number 3,
message handling, resulted in a required corrective action.
Montacmery County EDC Of the twelve objectives planned, only Objective Number 14 was not fully demonstrated, and this was the fault of the SEOC.
No areas requiring corrective action were observed.
I Osage County EDC Of the 13 objectives planned, Objectives Number ik, Timely Notification, and 35. Recovery and Reentry, were not fully demonstrated.
1 l
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viii 1
1 INTPODUCTION O
1.1 EXERCISE BACEGROUND The first joint radiological emergency preparedness exercise for the CNPP was conducted on March 21, 198h, resulting in the need for a remedial exercise of the Alert and Notification System.
During the March 21, 1984, exercise, the State failed to demonstrate the ability to promptly alert the public, and to effectively coordinate the development and release of protective action recommendations.
Also, Callaway County did not demonstrate the capability to adequately and effectively sound sirens in the EPZ.
These failures necessitated a remedial exercise which was successfully conducted on April 19, 1984.
The second full scale exercise was conducted on June 5, 1985.
The exercise of 1986 was conducted on July 30, between the hours of 0800 and 1630.
It was classified as Full Scale with all State and local jurisdictions participating.
1.2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS Twelve Federal agency personnel and eight FD4A contract staff evaluated the off-site emergency response functions.
These individuals and their i
exercise assignments are given below:
OBSERVER AGENCY ASSIGNMBIT Bob Bissell FEMA State EOC Bill Brinck EPA EOF-Dose Assessment Marlee Carroll FEMA Callaway Co. EOC K.C. Chun ANL Field Monitoring Dee Demmitt ANL Osage Co. EOC Anna Hart USDA State EOC Joe Hayes FEMA Gasconade Co. EOC Carolyn Herzenberg ANL Field Monitoring Dewey Johnson FEMA EOF-PIC Joe Keller INEL RAD LAB & EOF-FCP Rich Leonard FEMA Overviev Mark Lickers USCG State Water Patrol - A&N Tony Rhea DOE Callavay Co. E0C Chris Saricks ANL Osage Co. EOC Tim Seidel FD4A JPIC Dick Sumpter FEMA Overview Ed Tanzman ANL Gasconade Co. EOC John Tatar ANL Montgomery Co. EOC Dianne Wilson FEMA Montgomery Co. EOC
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1 1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The evaluation criteria for this exercise were:
1.
NUREG-065h/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (All applicable requirements).
1.a.
The thirty-five standardized objectives developed as a su==ary of observable elements contained in NUREG-065h, and submitted by the Missouri State E=ergency Management Agency indicating the locations for demonstration (s).
(See = atrix, pages 3 to 1h.)
2.
Missouri Nuclear Accident Plan - Callavay, 1986.
3.
Callaway County /Fulton Radiological Emergency
Response
Plan, 1986.
Callavay County /Fulton Implementing Procedure Responsibilities, 1986.
4.
Gasconade County Radiological E=ergency Response Plan, 1986.
Gasconade County Implementing Procedure Responsibilities, 1986.
5.
Montgomery County Radiological E=ergency Response Plan, 1986.
Montgomery County Implementing Procedure Responsibilities, 1986.
6.
Osage County Radiological Emergency Response Plan, 1966.
Osage County Implementing Procedure Responsibilities, 1986.
1.4 EXERCISE OIkinrnvm On April 11, 1986, the State of Missouri submitted for=al objectives for State and local jurisdictions for this exercise arrayed in the following
=atrices, showing which objectives applied to which facilities or functions.
The objectives are numbered 1 through 35, and vill be refered to by number throughout this evaluation report.
4 4
l i STATE OBJECTIVES 1986
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!EOC lFCP -:PIO
- Dose Assm lFM lJPIC l Medical 1.
Demonstrate ability to o
mobilize staff and
!YES YES lYES YES lYES : YES activate facilities promptly.
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2.
Demonstrate ability to !
o fully staff facilities YES ! YES YES : YES YES : YES and maintain staffing l
around the clock.
3.
Demonstrate ability to o
make decisions and to
!YES :YES lYES
- YES
- YES coordinate emergency l
activities.
i__
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4.
Demonstrate adequacy o
of facilities and lYES !YES
- YES : YES lYES : YES displays to support emergency operations.
_!_____l l
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i 5.
Demonstrate ability to :
I communicate with all YES lYES
- YES YES lYES : YES
, 'i appropriate locations, !
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organizations, and field personnel.
I 6.
Demonstrate ability to !
mobilize and deploy YES lYES :
field monitoring teams !
1 in a timely fashion.
i 7.
Demonstrate appropri-l l
O ate equipment and
!YES :
procedures for deter-l mining ambient radi-l l
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l ation levels.
8.
Demonstrate appropri-l ate equipment and procedures for measur-l l
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lYES :
i ment of airborne l
l radiciodine concentra-l l
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tions as low as 10-7 uCi/CC presence of noble l
gases.
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- Core Objectives l
lEOC lFCP
- PIO
- DbSE ASSM.:FM lJPIb l MEDICAL' 9.
Demonstrate appropri-
~!
ate equipment and procedures for collec-l l
tion, transoort and
!YES :
analysis of samples i
i of soil, vegetation, snow, water and milk.
___ l l
I
- 10. Demonstrate ability 0
to project dosage to the public via
!YES YES plume exposure, based on plant and field I
data, and to determine !
I appropriate protective measures, based on PAG's, available shelter, evacuation time estimates, and other appropriate factors.
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- 11. Demonstrate ability to project dosage YES to the public via ingestion pathway exposure, based on field data, and to l
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determine appropriate protective measures based on PAG's and an other relevant factors (NUREG-0654, l
I.10, J.11).
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- 12. Demonstrate abiity to implement protective
!YES lYES YES action for ingestion pathway hazards (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.11).
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- 13. Demonstrate abiliy to o
alert the public with-YES YES in the 10-mile EPZ, i
disseminate an initial :
instructional message within 15 minutes
- Core Objectives 4
lEDC lFCP
- PIO
- DOSE ASSM lFM lJPIC l MEDICAL:
6 0
- G G
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e e____.
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- 14. Demonstrate ability to i o
formulate and distri-YES !YES bute apprpriate in-l l
I structions to the public in a timely fashion.
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- 15. Demonstrate the organi-i I
o zational ability and I
resources necessary to !YES lYES I
l manage an orderly 1
1 1
evacuation of all or 1
i i
part of the plume EPZ l
i (NUREG-0654, J.9, I
J.10.g).
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- 16. Demonstrate the organi-l zational ability and resources necessary to i i
i deal with impediments i
to evacuation, as I
i inclement weather or i
i traffic obstructions.
I s
(NUREG-0654, J.10.k).
l
- 17. Demonstate the organi-l l
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zational ability and resources necessary to l l
i control access to an evacuated area (NUREG- !
I 0654, J.10.j).
i
- 18. Demonstrate the organi-zational ability and resources neccessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-i impaired individuals within the plume EPZ (NUREG-0654, J.10.d).
- Core Objectives e
i lEOC lFCP
- PIO
- DOSE ASSM !FM
!JPIC
! MEDICA
- 19. Demonstrate the organi-!
zational ability and resources necessary to !
effect an orderly evacuation of schools I
within the plume EPZ (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.10.g).
i
- 20. Demonstrate the ability:
o to continously monitor !
!YES
!YES
! YES
!YES :
and control emergency worker exposure.
__ l l
i
- 21. Demonstrate the ability:
to make the decision, based on predetermined !
criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency werkers and/or the general population.
- 22. Demonstrate the ability!
to supply and adminster KI, once the decision has been made to do so.:
I
- 23. Demonstrate the ability:
to effect an orderly evacuation of onsite personnel (NUREG-0654, l i
J.2).
- 24. Demonstrate ability to l o
brief the media in a
!YES clear, accurate and timely manner.
- Core Objectives I
lEDC lFCP
- PIO
- DOS 5 ASSM IFM lJPIC l Medical:
l_ _ __ ! _
I
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- 25. Demonstrate ability to l o
provide advance co-lYES !YES YES
!YES ordination of inform-l l
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ation released.
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- 26. Demonstrate ability to :
establish and operate i
rumce control in a co-l l
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ardinated fashion.
____ l
- 27. Demos. strate adequacy of procedures for reg- !
i istration and radio-l l
1 logical monitoring of evacuees (NUREG-i i
0654, J.12).
- 28. Demons
- rate adequacy of facility for mass care of evacuees (NUREG-0654, J.lO.h) l _.
i
- 29. Demonstrate adequate equipment and pro-
-s cedures for decon-tamination of emer-l gency workers, equip-ment and vehicles (NUREG-0654, K.5.a,b) l _
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- 30. Demonstrate adequacy of ambulance facilities:
and procedures for handling conta.ninated individuals.
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- 31. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities :
and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.
- Core Objectives i
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!NOC !FCP
- PIO
- DOSE ASSM lFM
!JPIC~
! MEDICAL' i_
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- 32. Demonstrate ability to !
identify need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.
- 33. Demonstrate ability to relocate to and operate!
the alternate EOF /EOC (NUREG-0654, H.2, H.3).:____!
i
- 34. Demonstrate ability to !
estimate total pop-YES ulation exposure i
(NUREG-0654, M.4)
- 35. Demonstrate ability to l determine and imple-
!YES !YES YES ment appropriate measures for controlled!
recovery and reentry.
4 p)
LOCAL OBJECTIVES 1986 tv
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Callaway: Montgomery : Osage
- Gasconade:
1.
Demonstrate ability to o
mobilize staff and acti- ! YES
- YES
- YES YES vate facilities promptly :
2.
Demonstrate ability to o
fully staff facilities YES
- YES
- YES YES and maintain staffing l
l around the clock.
3.
Demonstrate ability to YES
! YES
- YES YES o
make decisions and to i
coordinate emergency l
activities.
4.
Demonstrate adequacy of o
facilities and displays YES YES YES YES i
to support emergency.
operations.
5.
Demonstrate ability to communicate with all YES YES YES YES appropriate locations, organizations, and field :
personnel.
6.
Demonstrate ability to l
l l
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mobilize and deploy field:
monitoring teams in a timely fashion.
l 7.
Demonstrate appropriate o
equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels.
8.
Demonstrate appropriate o
equipment and procedures for measurement of air-l l
l l
borne radiciodine con-l i
centrations as low as 10-7 uCi/CC in the presense of noble l
gases.
l
- Core Objectives J
1 l
l
__ l Callaway : Montgomery Osage
- Gasconade:
l __
l 9.
Demonstrate approprate equipment and procedues i
for collection, trans-port and analysi s. of samples of soil, vege-tation, snow, water and milk.
- 10. Demonstrate ability to o
project dosage to the public via plume exposure based on plant and field :
I data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAG's, available shelter, evacu-!
I ation time estimates, and all other appropri-I ate factors.
- 11. Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via ingestion pathway exposure, based on field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAG's and other !
relevant factors.
(NUREG-0654, I.10, J.11).:
l
- 12. Demonstrate ability to implement protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards. (NUREG- !
- 0654, J.9, J.11).
- 13. Demonstrate ability to l
o alert the public within i
the 10-mile EPZ, and YES YES
- YES
- YES l
disseminate an initial instructional message I
within 15 minutes.
- Core Objectives l
1 4
! Callaway : Montgomery Osage
- GasconadeI l
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- 14. Demonstrate ability to o
formulate and distribute :
YES i
YES
- YES
- YES appropriate instructions :
to the public in a timely!
fashion.
l 1
- 15. Demonstrate the organi-l l
l o
zational ability and YES YES YES
- YES resources necessary to manage an orderly evacu-l ation of all or part of plume EPZ (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.lO.g).
- 16. Demonstrate the organi-l l
zational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, as incle-l l
ment weather or traffic obstructions (NUREG-0654,!
J.lO.k).
f sp7. Demonstrate the organi-l l
l
( j zational ability and YES YES
! YES YES resources necessary to l
control access to an evacuated area. (NUREG-0654, J.lO.j)
- 18. Demonstrate the organi-
[
zational ability and re- !
sources necessary to effect an orderly evacu- !
ation of mobility-impair-ed individuals within the!
plume EPZ (NUREG-0654, J.lO.d).
4
)
! Callaway : Montgomery Osage
- Gasconade
- 19. Demonstrate the organi-l l
l l
l zational ability and re- ! YES YES sources necessary to effect an orderly,evacu-l l
l l
ation of schools within the plume EPZ (NUREG-l l
0654, J.9, J.lO.g).
- 20. Demonstrate the ability YES YES YES
- YES o
to continously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
- 21. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria whether to issue KI to emergency I
workers and/or the general population.
i
- 22. Demonstrate the ability to administer KI, once YES YES the decison has been made i
to do so.
- 23. Demonstrate the ability to effect an orderly evacuation of onsite per-sonnel (NUREG-0654, J.2):
- 24. Demonstrate ability to o
brief the media in a YES i
clear, accurate and timely manner.
l __
__ l l
l l
l l
- 25. Demonstrate the ability o
to provide advance co-YES YES YES YES ordination of informa-l l
l tion releases.
- Core Objectives 4
l Callaway ! Montgomery : Osage
- Gasconade:
PJ
~
Demonstrate ability to 26.
establish and operate rumor control in a co-l ordinated fashion.
i
- 27. Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for regis-l l
tration and radiological :
monitoring of evacuees.
(NUREG-0654, J.12).
l
- 28. Demonstrate adequacy of i
facility mass care of evacuees (NUREG-0654, I
i J.10.h).
I
- 29. Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures :
I i
for decontamination of emergency workers, equip-I I
ment and vehicles.
(NUREG-0654, K.5.
a,b).
l I
- 30. Demonstrate adequacy s
/
of ambulance facilities and procedures for hand-l l
ling contaminated indi-l l
l viduals.
- 31. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities I
and procedures for hand-l l
l ling contaminated indi-l l
l
?
l viduals.
l
- 32. Demonstrate ability to identify need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.
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l Callaway : Montgomery i Osage
- Gasconade
- 33. Demonstrate ability to relocate to and operate the alternate EOF /EOC (NUREG-0654, H.2, H.3) l __
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- 34. Demonstrate ability to estimate total popula-I tion exposure (NUREG-l l
l 0654, M.4).
- 35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement YES YES
- YES
- YES appropriate measures for :
i controlled recovery and reentry.
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0 1.5 EIERCISE SCERARIO This scenario is based upon a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). A large-leak in the Reactor Coolant System is combined with extensive fuel damage and a breech of containment integrity through the personnel hatch.
The loss of all three fission product barriers resulted in a significant release of radioactive materials to the environment.
Planned Actual Time Event Time 0755 Unusual Event 0740 0830 Alert 0827 0920 Site Area Emergency 0915 1117 General Emergency 1104 1150 Release Occurs 1105 1h00 Release Terminated 1h05 1430 Time Jump (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) 1h33 1630 Exercise Terminated 1625 1.6 STATE AED IDCAL RESOURCES Listed below are organizations which planned to participate:
State of Missouri 4
1.
Department of Public Safety, State Emergency Management Agency 2.
Division of Health, Bureau of Radiological Health 3.
Department of Social Services, Division of Family Services 4.
Department of Public Safety, Missouri State Highway Patrol 5.
Department of Public Safety, Missouri National Guard 6.
Missouri Highway and Transportation Department 7.
Missouri State Water Patrol 8.
Missouri Department of Agriculture 9
Department of Natural Resources 10.
Department of Conservation Missouri Counties 1.
Callaway County /Fulton:
(a) County Court / Mayor (b) Emergency Management Director (c) County Sheriff (d) Fulton Police Chief (e) Fulton PIO (f) Transportation Officer (g) County Health Officer (h) City Health Officer (1) County Road & Bridge Superintendent L
2.
Gasconade, Montgomery and Osage Counties:
(a) Presiding Judge (b) Emergency Management Director (c) County Sheriff (d) Public Information Officer (e) Transportation Officer (f) County Health Officer (g) County Road & Bridge Superintendent 4
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,b 2 EIERCISE EVALUATION 2.1 MISSOURI OPERATIONS 2.1.1 State Ehmergency Operations Center (SEOC)
The following objectives were planned for demonstration at this facility:
1, 2, 3, h, 5, 12, 13, 1h, 25, and 35.
The notification of Unusual Event was received from the licensee at OTh0.
The duty officer then contacted the other State agencies and FEMA.
The licensee called again at 0831 announcing that an Alert had been declared at 0827 Full activation of the SE0C began immediately.
By 08h0 all State agencies had been requested to report to the SE00.
At 08h5 they notified FEMA of the Alert status.
At 0922 the plant called to announce that a Site Area Emergency had been declared at 0915. At 092h the EBS coordinator instructed the EBS station to broadcast Message #2 at 0930.
At 0925 the counties were advised of the message and told to sound their sirens.
By 0925 staffing was essentially completed.
However, full staffing (Objective Number 2) was not fully demonstrated due to the absence of the State Water Patrol, Attorney General's office, and the Division of Insurance.
Q At 0932 the State Water Patrol was contacted to begin route alerting and closure of the Missouri River.
At 09h5 the Fovard Co==and Post at the EOF was declared operational.
Double staffing was demonstrated by SEMA, State Highway Patrol, Department of Transportation and the National Guard.
Rosters were used by the Public Service Commission, Department of Agriculture, Division of Family Services and Department of Natural Resources.
The use of rosters, combined with the absence of the three aforementioned agencies precluded a full demonstration of 2h hour staffing.
Decision-making and coordination were effective, with frequent update briefings and consultation, as appropriate.
However, message handling was faulty in that EBS messages at the General Emergency were not telefaxed to the JPIC in a timely manner.
Objective Number 3 was not fully demonstrated.
Facilities and displays were adequate and provided a full demonstration of Objective Number k.
All primary and back-up co==unications were demonstrated.
This also included hard ccpy.
C Objective Number 5 was fully demonstrated.
(
At 1028 the State Agriculture agent contacted the Callaway County ASCS Director and recommended that dairy cattle be sheltered and placed on stored feed and water within 2 miles of the plant and for 5 miles in sections F, G, and H.
At 1116 the FCP notified all parties, via the blue phone (dedicated conference line), that a General Emergency had been declared at 110h.
The counties were immediately notified by the FCP that the SE0C was to release EBS message 3A to be broadcast at 1118.
This message accurately announced the General Emergency, but ambiguously advised the listener that
" Local Government Officials have already taken actions designed to protect the Public".
At this time no protective action decisions had yet been made by the counties regarding the population.
At 1122 Montgomery County became the first of the counties to phone the EBS coordinator at the SEOC with their protective action decisions.
They used EBS Message #8, inserting landmark descriptions of areas to be evacuated.
However, before the coordinator could call the EBS station, at 1131 Callaway County began to dictate its protective action decisions.
They too used Message #8, but failed to include landmark descriptions, using only sector designations.
At 1134 Montogmery County asked for release of Message #9 (announcing pick-up points for persons needing transportation).
At 1150 Osage County called with its protective actions (Message #8 and
- 9).
Due to this back-log, the first EBS message was not called into the station until 1210.
This was an elapsed time of 48 minutes from the time that Montgomery County had requested the EBS coordinator to release its first message.
While Objective Number 13 was fully demonstrated, in that an initial notification was made within the required 15 minutes at the Site Area Emergency, the SEOC failed to demonstrate Objective Number lh, which requires distribution of instructions to the public in a timely manner at the General Emergency.
Outgoing information was coordinated and verified, when necessary.
Objective Number 25 was fully demonstrated.
At 1h33 controllers announced a four hour time ju=p to 1833.
At this time the plume had dispersed.
At 1838 the State Agricultural agent recom= ended preventive PARS and extended the area for sheltering dairy cows out to 18 miles and called for the washing,
- peeling, and canning of produce in sectors F and G.
Additionally, emergency protective actions were called for within a 2 mile radius of Morrison.
The State Agricultural agent was in continuous communication with his counterparts in the affected counties.
Within the limits of the scenario and guidelines provided by FEMA, Objective Number 12 was fully demonstrated.
b/
By 185h the plant had returned to Alert status and environmental and air samples were showing background readings in all sectors out to 10 miles.
All appropriate State agencies participated in discussion of reentry issues such as relaxation of PARS, removal of access control, return of evacuees, etc.
At 1855 Gasconade County asked to have Message #12 (termination of sheltering) released to the EBS station.
At 2006 Montgomery County also requested relaxation of protective actions.
At 1625 (real time) the exercise was terminated.
Objective Number 35 was fully demonstrated.
Post-exercise review of logs indicated that the SEOC did not contact FEMA Region VII after 0930 (Site Area Emergency) until the exercise terminated at 1625 A review of the procedures revealed a lack of any indication that FEMA should have been called regularly.
Sum =ary: Objectives not fully demonstrated:
2, 3, and Ih.
Deficiencies That Would Lead To A Negative Fin,un,
1.
It required h8 minutes to broadcast Montgomery County's General
[jT Emergency protective action EBS messages after the county contacted
(
the SEOC.
It required h0 minutes to get Callaway County's message relayed from the SEOC to the EBS station.
This is a failure to adequately demonstrate elements E.5 and E.6 of NUREG-065h, FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1.
On August 1, 1986, the Missouri State Emergency Management Agency was notified of this deficiency and given 60 days to accomplish an appropriate remedial action.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action 1.
The long delays in telefaxing the EBS messages to the JPIC at the i
General Emergency are unacceptable and must be rectified.
2.
There was no contact with FEMA after the Site Area Emergency until FEMA itself initiated an inquiry at 1605 This was due to a failure of the procedures to reflect the necessity for subsequent contacts.
Procedures must be revised to clearly indicate who should be called at each escalating and deescalating emergency action level.
Areas Reco e nded For Improvement 1.
The preformatted EBS Message 3A, used to announce the General
(
Emergency, also states that counties have already taken protective actions.
The counties had mobilized staff and activated facilities, 1
l but had not issued protective action instructions to the public.
This message for=at sould be revised so as to prevent the broadcast of ambiguous information.
4 4
. _ _ _ _ N I
2.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility 2.1.2.1 State Forward Cm - nd Post (FCP)
The objectives to be demonstrated were:
1, 2,
3, h, 5, 10, 13, 1h.
20, 25, and 35.
The FCP is the main coordinative arm of the response effort, linking the actions and communications of virtually all the State and local resources.
Located at the EOF, they have direct contact with the licensee, SEMA's information authentication function (called PIO), and the Dose Assessment Field Team Coordination effort of the State Bureau of Radiological Health.
By dedicated conference line (the " blue phone") they are in contact with the State EOC and all county EOC's.
Though not a member of the FCP staff, there was also a liaison from the City of Fulton present.
The FCP staff deployed from the SE00 at the Alert, getting underway at approximately 0840.
They were in radio contact with the SEOC all the time they were enroute.
The State liaison arrived at 0910 and the FCP was declared operational and fully staffed at 09h5.
This fully demonstrated Objective Number 1, and that portion of Objective Number 2 which calls for full staffing.
However, the portion of Objective Number 2 relating to 2h hour capability was not fully demonstrated in that those personnel designated as backup to the three key positions did not actually participate in the exercise, though they did arrive on site later in the day as observers.
v The FCP effectively exchanged information with the SE00 and the BRH, rectifying a problem cited last year.
The physical facility was adequate for the job.
Objectives Number 3 and h were fully demonstrated.
Primary and backup communication systems were all operated, fully demonstrating Objective Number 5 The FCP was only responsible for a portion of Objective Number 10.
They received the PARS from BRH and looked at the evacuation times and numbers of people involved where evacuation was called for.
Having done this, they passed the information on to the SEOC and the JPIC via telefax, and the counties via the blue phone.
In this limited way Objective Number 10 was fully demonstrated.
The PIO was instructed to be sure to indicate to the JPIC that the protective actions being telefaxed were only recommendations.
The recommendations had not yet been adopted by the individual counties and broadcast as decisions.
)
However, the PIO failed to do this, and the JPIC gave at least one erroneous press release indicating that evacuation had been decided by J
Gasconade County Officials, when in fact, it had not.
f tV 1
,. It was also obs(rved that while the PIO perceived part of his job as rumor control, he did nbt stay current on the contentof incoming and outgoing messages which vere available to him, nor did be engage in coordination of information prior to its release to sufficiently demonstrate Objective Number 25 The Site Area Emergency was declared at 0915, before the FCP was fully functioning.
The SE00, therefore, gave the order to the counties to activate their sirens and also released the initial EBS message which aired (simulated)-
at 0930.
Therefore, Objective Number 13 could not be demonstrated by the FCP
.because it ves not, ss yet, operational at the Site Area Escrgency.
At 1002 a i.ov Lyel radioactive release began, but ne protective actions were required.
When all three fission product barriers failed at 110h, a General Em'ergency was declared.
The FCP received notification at 1106.
Anticipating the declaration, BRH had prepared protective action recommendations and given them to SDIA.
However, at this time, there yas still ac announcement of General Emer'gency cver the blue phone.
Apparently the licecsee did notf want to make this notification to the counties until they had appropriate PARS to accompany it.
Jus", ' as they were preparing to make the annoucement, plant conditions worsened, necessitating a new and more conservative set of PARS. By this tir.c it'yas 1113, and SEMA decided to notify'the counties of the declaration of General Emergency.
Since the licensee and the counties all perceived this announcement to have bypassed the licensee, there was some initial reluctance by the counties to accept the declaration.
SBM informed the counties that, nevertheless, Message 3A veuld air vn EBS at 1118.
SBR made this unilateral decision to assure a timely notification of the public, sipce they apparently felt that Union Electric vas censuming,too much time in revising its PARS.
Contcined within message'-3A was the statement:
" Local government officials have already taken actions designed to protect the public.
Please do not-take any ac; ions.on your own, as you may do the wrong thing and make the ait9 tion vorce for yourself and otbers".
The' evaluator felt that this could be misinternreted to mean " Protective
~
' Action instructions for the public have already been issued", ' and cause the public to vonder whether or not they had missed a netice to shelter or evacuate. A change in wording is recommended t9 reflect gbvernment actions taken, without connoting trat 7,he public has already been issued instructions.
Objective Number lh was fully demonstrated.
The FCP is 16.cated in the EOF, near the plant and well within the 10 mile EPZ.
The facility has a recirculating air filtration system and has a system to monitor for the presence of radioactivity.
All' SB& personnel had appropriate personal dostnetry fully demonstrating Objective Number 20, and rectifying a problem from the last exercise.
O V
The scenario terminated before Objective Number 35 cculd be fully demonstrated.
Summary: Objectives not fully demonstrated are 2, 13, 25, and 35 Areas Requiring Corrective Actions 3.
The State Plan states that after the FCP becomes operational, utility notification to off-site authorities is to be to the FCP.
The FCP vill then notify the counties.
This is not sufficiently clear in the County Plans and Procedures, and the counties and the utility are unaware of the shift of responsibility after activation of the FCP.
The plans must be clarified and/or the counties and utilities formally advised of and trained in the official procedure.
4.
The SEMA PIO did not transmit to the JPIC all parts of critical information, though on several occasions he was directed to do so.
Specifically, PARS were not labeled as " Recommendations" and were mistakenly thought by the JPIC to have already been enacted by the counties.
3 The specific role and responsiblities of the PIO must be delineated and included in the procedures for operation of the FCP. Subsequent j
to the development of the procedures, training in their use must
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be provided.
Areas Recommsended For Improvement 2.
The message containing ingestion pathway reco=mendations was not labeled as " Recommendations".
The State Agricultural Agent, at first, thought the decisions had already been made.
It should have been addressed to the Department of Natural Resources, also, since it contained recommendations regarding public drinking water.
3 The message announcing a General Emergency should be revised to eliminate the implication that Protective Action Instructions have already been issued to the public.
I
-2h-2.1.2.2 Dose Assessment and Field Team Coordination This function is perfomed at the EOF in a room near the FCP by the Missouri Division of Health, Bureau of Radiological Health (BRH).
The objectives to be demonstrated were:
1, 2,
3, h,
5, 6, 10, 11, 20, and 35.
BRH team members received the call to mobilize at 08hl.
They were at their normal work stations in Jefferson City.
The call came from SH4A and contained plant and meteorological data.
The team left for the plant at 0855 While enroute, at 0935, they received a radio message informing them of the Site Area Emergency. They immediately recommended placing animals on stored feed out to 2 miles.
Three team members are required for fall staffing, and BRH had four.
This was not sufficient for double staffing, and so did not fully demonstrate Objective Number 2.
Objectives Number 1 and 6 vere fully demonstrated, rectifying a problem cited at the last exercise.
All staff members were kept fully informed of developments throughout the exercise.
Message handling was much improved over last year, fully demonstrating Objective Number 3.
At 1006 BRH vas advised that a release was in progress, having begun at 1002.
At 1106 a General Emergency was announced.
Anticipating this, BRH had PARS ready to be transmitted. However, plant staff did not agree because plant conditions were worsening quickly and they wanted to redraft PARS to reflect more conservative parameters.
Consequently, transmittal of appropriate PARS to the counties was delayed.
At 1128 total evacuation out to five miles, and to 10 miles in the four downwind sectors was recommended.
This seemed more conservative than the conditions called for, and was based totally on plant data.
However, vith plant conditions deteriorating rapidly, it quickly became an appropriate PAR.
There was good communication with field teams, as they effectively defined the plume in a timely manner.
Primary and backup co==unictions were demonstrated.
Objectives Number 5 and 10 were fully de=onstrated.
Facilities and displays were adequate, fully demonstrating Objective Number k.
Though scenario data was limited, ERH effectively used field data to calculate projected ingestion dosages. They correctly determined appropriate preventive and emergency action for milk, grain, water, etc.
Objective Number 11 was fully de=onstrated.
4
~25-NOTE: The collection and transmission of ingestion pathway field data was done on July 29, 1986, in a mini-exercise.
At this same time, the laboratory at the University of Missouri Research Reactor was demonstrating its analytic capabilities.
This will be treated later in the report.
The field team coordinator was fully cognizant of the field team dose limits and continuously monitored exposure, fully demonstrating Objective Number 20.
At 1h30 a four hour time jump was interjected into the exercise. There was some confusion over what should be done, due to the fact that this portion of the exercise had been conducted on the previous day as a " mini" exercise.
At about 1450 the classification was deescalated to Alert.
BRH appropriately relaxed protective actions based on new field data.
However, the scenario was moving too quickly towards termination and the relaxation of PARS may not have been communicated to all appropriate parties.
In fact the scenario was very poorly designed to permit recovery and reentry activity, and Objective Number 35 was not fully demonstrated.
It should be noted that there was not sufficient data in the scenario to even engage BRH staff in any significant recovery and reentry activity.
Summary: Objectives not fully demonstrated were 2 and 35 2.1.3 Radiological Monitoring Teams Two field teams were deployed for this exercise.
Each team was composed of a BRH person and a Unicn Electric person.
Team 1 used a Union Electric vehicle, and team 2 used a State vehicle.
Objectives to be demonstrated were:
1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 20.
Team Number 1 deployed from Jefferson City at 0907 after having been alerted at 08h2.
They arrived at the EOF at 1000 and were given a briefing.
It was noted that the briefing did not include current meteorological conditions.
They left the EOF at 1022 and arrived at their first field location at 10hh.
No shift change or double staffing was demonstrated.
Objectives Number 1 and 6 were fully demonstrated; Objective Number 2 was not fully dtmonstrated.
The team was not able to fully demonstrate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels due to the fact they did not have any cartridges for the air sampler used to determine existence of radioiodine; nor did they have a supply of filter papers for particulate monitoring.
Other equipment was according to the plan and recently calibrated.
O
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - Objectives Number 7 and 8 vere not fully demonstrated.
They demonstrated equipment and procedures for the collection of samples
~
of soil, vegetation and water, demonstrating that portion of Objective Number 9 for which they were accountable.
Packaging and transport of samples had been previously demonstrated at the Cooper exercise of 1985.
Sample analysis by the laboratory will be covered in another section of the report.
Mobile communications and backup systems were de=onstrated, as well as the use of a repeater.
Some breakup was experienced, but it did not
{
prohibit the team from doing its job.
Objective Number 5 was fully demonstrated.
The Union Electric team member had only one low range dosimeter and no per=anent record device. Therefore, Objective Number 20, exposure control, was not fully demonstrated.
k Team Number 2 deployed from Jefferson City at 0912 and vent directly to their first field assignment, arriving at 1005 Since no shift change or double staffing occurred, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> capability portion of Objective Number 2 was not fully demonstrated.
The equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels were adequate to fully demonstrate Objective Number T.
However, the evaluator recommended that the silver zeolite or silica gel cartridges be kept in the same place as the equipment.
They also demonstrated equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations down to 10~I uC1/ce, fully accounting for Objective Number 8.
However, they only sirmlated the collection of samples of vegetation, earth, water, etc.
Therefore, the applicable portion of Objective Number 9 was not fully demonstrated.
Primary and backup communication equipment were utilized, fully demonstrating Objective Number 5 However, on a few occasions, communication broke up even when there vere no apparent geographic obstacles.
It is recommended that the cause of this be investigated and corrected.
Exposure control was in conformity with the plan and practiced throughout the exercise, fully demonstrating Objective Number 20.
Sum =ary: Objectives not fully demonstrated were 2, 7, 8, and 9.
l Areas Requiring Corrective Action 5
Between the two teams, the following equipment was missing:
silver zeolite or silica gel cartridges, filter papers for particulate
l
. monitoring, a high range personal dosimeter, and permanent record device for one of the Union Electric team members.
All of the 2
above are to be utilized at the next exercise.
Areas W ad For Impro m t h.
Investigate and remedy the cause of the radio signal breakup 1
experienced by both teams.
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2.1. I4 Radiological Laboratory (RAD LAB)
While the major portion of the exercise took place on July 30, 1986, there was a sub-scenario on July 29, 1986, that exercised the capabilities of the Neutron Activation Program Laboratories of the University of Missouri Research Reactor.
The Laboratory is required, according to Objective Number 9,
to demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for analysis of samples of soil, vegetation, water, etc. for the detection of various nuclides down to levels specified by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.
The evaluator found the laboratory to be amply equipped to perform the types of analysis required by the regulations.
The number of staff observed could adequately handle a single shift, and a sufficient number of trained personnel are available in an emergency to guarantee 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> staffing capability.
During the exercise they demonstrated analysis of air sample cartridges, soil, vegetation, water, and milk.
Several computer based gamma analysis systems were available; most analysis systems were GeLi detectors.
Dectection limits for the gam =a emitting nuclides were well below those needed to develop protective actions for the ingestion pathway. The analysis for beta emitting nuclides, Sr-89 and Sr-90 was not adequately demonstrated.
This is a requirement, since detection of Sr-89 and Sr-90 is required to generate appropriate PARS for the ingestion pathway.
Hard copy data communication to the EOF was demonstrated, as were adequate measures to control worker exposure.
Sum =ary: Objective Number 9 was not fully demonstrated.
Area Requiring Corrective Action 6.
The lab must develop adequate procedures to perform analysis of samples to determine the presence of Sr-89 and Sr-90 to at least the limits expressed in the FDA guidance set forth in the Federal Register, Vol. 47, No. 205, October 22, 1982, pp. h7073-47083.
2.1.5 Joint Public Infomation Center (JPIC)
At the time of for=al submission of the exercise objectives, S BIA requested and FEMA agreed that the JPIC would exercise as a training activity and would not be subject to for=al evaluation.
With this circumstance in mind, the following observations are given.
The JPIC is located in Jefferson City in the National Guard Armory, and is staffed by public infor=ation staff employed by SEMA and Union Electric.
Both organizations mobilize at the Alert stage and activate the facility at the Site Area Emergency.
Personnel from SD!A and Union Electric arrived at 08h5.
. Since the time the Armcry was first selected as the site for the JPIC, quite a bit of previously available space has become occupied by National Guard staff and used for regular activities.
While the main floor of the Armory remains adequate for press briefings, and use of media representatives, the PI0s no longer have sufficient space to perform their functions.
The available space is approximately 18' x 18' and contains 10 to 12 staff people, copiers, telefax machines, typewriters and miscellaneous furniture.
All primary communication links were demonstrated; the only backup demonstrated was the link to the EOF.
Eight media briefings were held, approximately one every h5 minutes.
They were jointly handled by SEMA and Union Electric and were effective with the following exception.
The SEMA PIO, when referring to various portions of the EPZ used the sector designations A through R.
These designations are used by the response personnel for radiological monitoring. They are not meaningful to the general public.
The public information brochure provides subarea identifiers.
These should be used in all media communications.
At one point a serious problem arose when the SEMA PIO could not obtain verification of decisions resulting from a BRH recommendation regarding evacuation.
The JPIC received a telefax copy of the message from BRH to the FCP at 11h0, and the PIO quoted it to the media at a 1200 briefing as (A) for Gasconade County.
The actual message from BRH recommended evacuation a Protective Action Recommendation from the State, recommending evacuation V
out to 5 miles in all sectors and out to 10 miles in Sectors E, F, G, and H.
(This did include Gasconade County.)
In reality, & conade County Officials decided against evacuation and imposed shelteri.%.
However, this decision was never communicated to the PIO.
In the PIO's defense, it should be noted that in an effort to confirm the information he called the SEOC and was told that they could "neither confirm nor deny" the protective action decisions of Gasconade County.
To fulfill his role, the PIO must receive prompt notification of a Protective Action Decision once it has been made.
The PIO did not announce the rumor control number to the media at any briefing, as is called for in the State Plan.
2.1.6 State Water Patrol (SWP)
Objectives to be demonstrated: Number 13.
The State EOC received notification of the Site Area Emergency at 0922.
At 0932 they notified the State Water Patrol of the emergency condition.
The p'.an calls for the SWP to immediately dispatch two water craft to the Mokane access to the Missouri River.
The larger, faster craft (reportedly capable of achieving 50 mph) would proceed downstream to the edge of the EPZ (approximately 1h.5 miles) performing route alerting along O
the way, and then establishing access control at the eastern edge of the EPZ.
The smaller craft would do the same, going upstream to the vestern edge of the EPZ (approximately 1.5 miles).
The evaluator was stationed at the Mokane river access and so could not verify the time at which the SWP deployed from their Jefferson City facility.
However, they did not arrive at the Mokane access until 1030.
It was later learned that the truck transporting equipment broke down while enroute.
The evaluator rode in the larger craft covering the 1h.5 mile segment.
The boats were in the water at 1035 with the longer run being completed at 1100.
Since this is a primary alert component of the Alert and Notification System, the longer run should have been completed by 1007.
Failure to demonstrate primary alert within h5 minutes of the off-site notification of Site Area Emergency is a deficiency.
Su==ary: Objective Number 13 was not demonstrated.
Deficiencies That Would Lead To A Negative Finding 2.
It required one hour and thirty-eight minutes to complete primary alerting on the Missouri River. Only h5 minutes is allowed.
A remedial action within 60 days of the date of the exercise is required.
9 4
. O 2.2 COUNTY OPERATIONS U
2.2.1
('all-y County /Fulton EOC (CCEOC)
The following objectives were to be demonstrated:
1, 2,
3 h, 5, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 2h, 25, and 35 At 0832 the dispatcher received word that the plant was at Alert status.
The call was verified and staff mobilization commenced.
However, the dispatcher failed to notify the County Commissioners and ask that they report.
This oversight was due to the fact that they had already been notified of the Unusual Event, and the dispatcher mistakenly thought this was the only notification required.
The error was detected prior to the Site Area Emergency, and the commissioners were summoned to the EOC at 0914.
While there were no negative effects from this oversight, it did preclude a full demonstration of Objective Number 1.
Once staffing had been accomplished, twenty-four hour capability was demonstrated via shift change at all positions.
Objective 2 was fully demonstrated.
The County Director was clearly in charge throughout, and effectively worked with the County Commissioners, whose involvement in decision-=aking and management was excellent.
Briefings were conducted at 0900, 1021, 1120, and 11h0.
This, along
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with effective message handling, was responsible for well organized activity at a low noise level.
Objective Number 3 was fully demonstrated.
Facilities and displays were adequate and sufficient to fully demonstrate Objective Number k.
However, the evaluator recommends that population figures should be posted on the map by subarea, and the information relayed to the relocation centers.
All primary and backup communication links were impressively utilized, fully demonstrating Objective Number 5 The notification of Site Area Emergency was received at 0922.
Sirens vere activated and at 0930 tone alert radios and EBS vere activated, fully l
demonstrating Objective Number 13.
At 1116 the FCP notified the counties via the blue phone that a General Emergency had been declared.
i At 1131 the PIO called the EBS coordinator at the SEOC and requested l
release of message #8. However, the message used subarea designations rather i
than the prescripted landmark descriptions.
When the EBS coordinator requested that the Callaway County PIO provide the landmark descriptions, the request was refused.
The County PIO felt u
i that the EBS Coordinator was responsible for landmark descriptions.
But Procedure #3 in the Callaway County Procedures Manual calls for the PIO to fill in the landmark descriptions.
As noted in Section 2.1.1, SEOC above, the message did not air until 1212.
This was apparently the result of a cumbersome coordination procedure at the SEOC, and caused Objective Number 14 not to be fully demonstrated.
Once the recommendation to evacuate had been made, local law enforcement persons were dispatched to establish access control points. When protective areas were changed, personnel vere reassigned accordingly.
Oojective Number 17 was fully demonstrated.
Though it was not a planned objective, there was a very good demonstration of the organizational ability required to provide for the evacuation of mobility-impaired, in that the lists were current and consulted.
However, since there was no real or simulated contact of the resources necessary to effect evacuation, Objective Number 18 was only partially demonstrated.
Though there were no schools in the sectors where evacuation was recommended, to accommodate Objective Number 19, the appropriate staff at the County EOC called for the evacuation of the South Callaway School.
The notification called for in the county procedures vaa performed.
However, the message generated internally at the County EOC said that the students would be bussed to the Relocation Center at Lincoln University.
This is in conflict with the South Callaway R-2 School Evacuation Plan, which says that the students vill be evacuated to the school at Ashland, Missouri.
The transportation officer who generated the message was unaware that the South Callaway School had a relocation site different than that determined for the general population.
The error was caught, but since no EBS message had been generated, no correction was necessary.
Objective Number 19 was not fully demonstrated.
Staff within the EOC vere well acquainted with the procedures and instructions, and continuously monitored their exposure every 30 minutes.
Dispatchers using 30 minute timers effectively notified all field personnel to read and record their dosimeters.
Objective Number 20 was fully demonstrated.
The PIO simulated a press briefing in a clear and complete manner.
Advance coordination of information released was performed as ve J as timely referral of media to the JPIC.
Objectives Number 2h and 25 vere fully demonstrated.
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. CD T,e scena,1, was n,t su,,1cient1,c,m,1e,e and eeta11ed t, e,1ve,ec,ve,y and reentry activities in any meaningful way.
There were no discussions by EOC staff relating to reentry of special need persons.
There were messages prepared to permit reentry of the evacuated general pub 11c.
However, this did not deal with the county resources potentially needed to accommodate the other elements of recovery and reentry.
Objectives Number ik, 19, and 35 vere not fully demonstrated.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action 7.
The activation call-up procedures and list should be revised to c1 ear 1y reflect the fact that the County Commissioners are to be notified at both the Unusual Event and the Alert.
Changes vill be made prior to the next exercise.
8.
Procedures must be clarified to unequivocally assign responsibility for the attachment of landmark description to EBS messages.
Changes will be made prior to the next exercise.
9 Procedures of the transportation coordinator will be clarified to reflect the differences that exist between county and school evacuation plans and procedures.
Changes will be made prior to the next exercise.
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Areas Recommended For Improvement 5
It is recommended that population figures be posted on the map by subarea, so the infor=ation could be given to the appropriate re1ocation center.
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2.2.2 Gasconade County EOC Objectives to be demonstrated were:
1, 2,
3, h, 5, 13, 14, 17, 20, 25, and 35 The call activating the E0C vas received at 0838 when the plant vent to Alert status.
The call was verified and mobilization commenced.
Full staffing was accomplished by 0920, fully demonstrating Objective Number 1.
Twenty-four hour capability was accounted for via a shift change which 3
was accompanied by a full briefing of inecming staff.
Objective Number 2 was fully demonstrated.
Though decision-making and coordination vere effective, there was one problem with message handling.
At the beginning of the exercise messages that came into the Sheriff's Office were not immediately delivered to the EOC.
However, this situation was remedied when the dispatcher diverted the phone calls directly to the EOC.
Since several messages accumulated in the Sheriff's Office before the problem was discovered, Objective Number 3 was not fully demonstrated.
Facilities and displays were adequate and maintained in a timely fashion, fully demonstrating Objective Number k.
The primary and backup communication links to all appropriate facilities were demonstrated, fully achieving Objective Number 5 However, the blue phone was not always operational, and the backup was required.
The problem seemed to be with the telephone instrument itself rather than the system. Repair is needed.
Gasconade County Officials were notified of the Site Area Emergency at 0925 and instructed to sound their sirens, which they did imediately.
Message #2 was broadcast (simulated) at 0930.
Objective Number 13 was fully demonstrated.
At 1116 they learned, via the blue phone, that a General Emergency had been declared.
At 1122 they contacted the State EBS coordinator and requested broadcast of message
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- However, due to the cumbersome coordinative procedures used by the SEOC (detailed in Section 2.1.1) the message did not air until 1212.
Thus, through no fault of their own, the County Officials did not fully demonstrate Objective Number ik.
It should be noted that the PIO was able to determine that the rumor centrol number in the plan was not being manned.
He obtained a working number and broadcast it via EBS.
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. The Sheriff's Deputy was sent to establish the proper access control, which he had done by 10h5 The personnel vere all appropriately equipped with dosimetry, understood its use, and read it periodically.
Records were also kept.
They fully demonstrated Objectives Number 17 and 20.
1 There was consistent advance coordination of information among all counties via the blue phone, providing a full demonstration of Objective Number 25 As already noted in the report, the scenario did not provide sufficient data or time to carry out a complete demonstration of recovery and reentry activities.
Since Gasconade County had no evacuation, reentry was not an issue.
They did, however, call for the EBS Station to Broadcast message 12 terminating sheltering.
Objective Number 35 was fully demonstrated within the limits of the scenario.
Summary: Objectives not fully demonstrated were: 3 and 1h.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action 10.
Amend procedures to clearly reflect the Sheriff's message handling V
responsibilities prior to and after activation of the EOC.
Area Recommended For Improvement 6.
Repair the cause of the blue phone malfunction.
2.2.3 Montgomery County EOC The objectives to be demonstrated were:
1, 2,
3, h, 5, 13, 1h, 17, 20, 22, 25, and 35.
At 0821 the Sheriff's dispatcher received the call activating the EOC.
By 0945 the facility was fully staffed with the exception of the Red Cross representative who arrived at 1155 Twenty-four hour capability was demonstrated by shift changes.
Objectives Number 1 and 2 were fully demonstrated.
l Direction and control vere demonstrated, as were coordination and message j
handling. Objective Number 3 was fully demonstrated.
i It was noted by the evaluator that the facilities were barely adequate, particularly regarding space and ventilation.
However, the staff did a commendable job of working around these difficulties.
Objective Number 4 was fully demonstrated.
i The primary communication link was the blue phone; backup was commercial phone, with radio being a third alternative to some sites.
Objective Number 5 was funy demonstrated.
At 0922 they received notification from the plant over the blue phone that a Site Area Emergency had been declared.
The State EBS coordinator advised that message #2 would air at 0930, and sirens were sounded immediately.
At 1117 the State FCP announced over the blue phone that a Gen?ral Emergency had been declared and that message #3A vould air immediately.
At 1122 the PIO informed the EBS coordinator that Montgomery County wanted to broadcast message #8.
Due to conditions outlined in Section 2.1.1, the message did not air until 1212.
Objective Number 13 was fully demonstrated.
Objective Number lh was not fully demonstrated due to the inability of the EBS coordinator to get the message aired in a timely manner.
Vnen evacuation was recommended an e. protective action, access control points were immediately established.
The Sheriff's deputies were given KI and instructed in its use.
When ingestion pathway recommendations were made, other access control points were established.
Dosimetry and its proper use were displayed throughout, fully demonstrating Objectives Number 17, 20, and 22.
The PIO prepared appropriate EBS messages as well as conducting a simulated briefing. Prior coordination of information was also demonstrated.
Objectives Number 24 and 25 were fully demonstrated.
At 19h5 (a h hour time jump had been declared earlier) they aired an EBS message to residents of Montgomery County regarding the handling of possibly contaminated food stuffs and animal feed.
At 2006 message #10 (Reentry Notification) was aired.
Additional access control was established and bus drivers were recalled to transport special needs persons back to their homes.
The exercise ended before additional reentry activities could be performed.
Within the limits of the scenario, Objective Number 35 ves fully demonstrated.
Summary: Only Objective Number lh was not fully demonstrated.
Areas Recommended For Improvement 7.
It is recommended that the county explore possible means of expanding the space available for the EOC.
. 2.2.4 Osmae County EDC Objectives to be demonstrated were:
1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 22, 25, and 35 At 0831 the plant notified the county via the blue phone that an Alert had been declared.
Mobilization began at once, and was completed by 0915 All key decision-making positions exhibited a successful shift change, with other positions using double staffing.
The alternate double staffing positions were included in discussion and decisions, thereby, permitting full participation by both shifts.
Objectives Number 1 and 2 were fully demonstrated.
Periodic briefings were held throughout the exercise, with all agencies giving status reports.
Messages were appropriately distributed.
- However, it is recommended that all participating agencies ke.ep message logs.
Objective Number 3 was fully demonstrated.
It was noted at the last exercise that there were not sufficient phone lines available.
This has been corrected.
Other facilities and displays were adequate.
Objective Number k was fully demonstrated.
The blue phone (dedicated line) was the primary communication link to most facilities, with commercial phone as backup.
Objective Number 5 was funy demonstrated.
When notification of a Site Area Emergency was received, the sirens were sounded as directed, with the EBS message being aired within the 15 minutes required.
Objective Number 13 was funy demonstrated.
At the General Emergency, the authorities of Osage County continuously formulated appropriate EBS messages to the public.
However, as detailed in 2.1.1, the EBS coordinator at the SE00 became backlogged and did not get the messages aired in timely fashion.
Objective Number 14 was not fully demonstrated.
When evacuation of the Osage County portion of the EPZ was directed, access control points were properly established.
Workers were equipped with the proper dosimetry and were knowledgeable of its use and frequency for reading and recording.
Objective Number 17 was fully demonstrated, rectifying a problem from the last exercise.
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. When evacuation was called for, a call to the schools was simulated, since they were not in session.
The procedure for contacting bus drivers was also discussed as well as the availability of buses and the location of the registration centers where children were to be bussed.
The evaluator also reviewed a draft of school evacuation procedures prepared by the school board.
Said procedures vill be made a part of the Osage County operating procedures.
The organizational ability and resources necessary to conduct school evacuation were shown, fully demonstrating Objective #19 Staff were equipped with proper dosimetry and trained in its use.
They were also aware of procedures and location for decontamination.
Emergency workers were supplied with KI and instruction on its use.
Supervisors were cognizant of the decision chain for recommending its use.
Objectives Number 20 and 22 were fully demonstrated.
The PIO was aware of the necessity to coordinate and confirm information prior to release in any message form.
This was done for EBS messages; no press briefings were held or releases issued.
Objective Number 25 was fully demonstrated.
Recovery and reentry responsibilities of agencies are spelled out in great detail in SOPS, however, the scenario permitted only brief discussions.
No messages relaxing protective actions were formulated for EBS broadcast.
Objective Number 35 was not fully demonstrated.
Su==ary: Objectives not fully demonstrated were lh and 35 Area Reconsnended For Improvement 8.
All agencies participating at the County EOC should keep message logs.
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3 SCEEARIO j
The Scenario for this exercise did not provide sufficient data for j
a comprehensive demonstration of recovery and reentry decision-making.
Also, due to the fact that a " mini" scenario for the collection of I
field samples was conducted on July 29, 1986, there was some " dead" time during the actual exercise when the field teams had nothing to do.
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. h SUMERY OF DEFICIENCIES & CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Deficiencies That Would Lead To A Negative Finding MISSOURI OPERATIONS State bergency Operations Center (SEOC) 1.
It required h8 minutes to broadcast Montgomery County's General Emergency protective action EBS messages after the county contacted the SEOC, It required h0 minutes to get Callaway County's message relayed from the SE00 to the EBS station.
This is a failure to adequately demonstrate elements E.5 and E.6 of NUR M-065h, FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1.
On August 1, 1986, the Missouri State Emergency Management Agency was notified of this deficiency and given 60 days to accomplish an appropriate remedial action.
State Water Patrol (SWP) 2.
It required one hour and thirty-eight minutes to complete primary alerting on the Missouri River. Only h5 minutes is allowed.
A remedial action within 60 days of the date of the exercise is required.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action MISSOURI OPERATIONS State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) 1.
The long delays in telefaxing the EBS messages to the JPIC at the General Emergency are unacceptable and must be rectified.
2.
There vr.s no contact with FEMA after the Site Area Emergency until FEMA itself initiated an inquiry at 1605 This was due to a failure of the procedures to reflect the necessity for subsequent contacts.
Procedures must be reviewed to clearly indicate who should be called at each escalating and deescalating emergency action level.
hergency Operation Facility State Forward Command Post 3
The State Plan states that after the FCP becomes operational, utility notification to off-site authorities is to be to the FCP.
The FCP vill then notify the counties.
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The SEMA PIO did not transmit to the JPIC all parts of critical information, though on several occasions he was directed to do so.
Specifically, PARc were not labeled as " Recommendations" and vere mistakenly thought by the JPIC to have already been enacted by the counties.
The specific role and responsibilities of the PIO must be delineated and included in the procedures for operation of the FCP. Subsequent to the development of the procedures, training in their use must be provided.
Radiological Monitoring Teams 5
Between the two teams, the following equipment was missing:
silver zeolite or silica gel cartridges, filter papers for particulate monitoring, a high range personal dosimeter, and permanent record device for one of the Union Electric team members.
All of the above are to be utilized at the next exercise.
Radioloigical Iaboratory (RAD LAB) 6.
The lab must develop adequate procedures to perform analysis of samples to determine the presence of Sr-89 and Sr-90 to at least the limits expressed in the FDA guidance set forth in the Federal Register, Vol. k7, No. 205, October 22, 1982, pp. 47073-h7083.
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COUFff OPERATIONS Callaway County /Fulton EOC (CCEOC) 7.
The activation call-up procedures and list should be revised to clearly reflect the fact that the County Commissioners are to be notified at both the Unusual Event and the Alert.
Changes will be made prior to the next exercise.
8.
Procedures must be clarified to unequivocally assign responsibility for the attachment of landmark description to EBS messages. Changes vill be made prior to the next exercise.
9 Procedures of the transportation coordinator vill be clarified to reflect the differences that exist between county and school evacuation plans and procedures.
Changes will be made prior to the next exercise.
Gasconade County EOC 10.
Amend procedures to clearly reflect the Sheriff's message handling responsibilities prior to and after activation of the EOC.
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