ML20213E398
| ML20213E398 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Salem |
| Issue date: | 04/12/1983 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Gilinsky V NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20213E339 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-152 NUDOCS 8304190234 | |
| Download: ML20213E398 (7) | |
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.5 APR 121983 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Commissioner Gilinsky FROM:
William J. Dircks
' Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS AT sal.EM The, add'itional information requested,via memorandum dated
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M$rch30,1983 regarding maintenance of the reactor. trip breakers at Salem is attached.
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Executive Director for Operations Attachment <
As stated cc:. Chairman Palladino Commissioner Ahearne
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Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine SECY DISTRIBUTION HDenton Dircks s
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Responses to Questions by Connissioner Gilinsky (March-30, 1983) Regarding Salem Event Question.1_
'Did the Tas'k Force interview Mr. Esposito, the' Westinghouse field service representative, who disassembl%d and inspected the breakers in January, 1983? Did the Task Force review his field reports? Could I please have a copy of all the reports and the results of any such review.
Response 1_
-The NRC Region I Fact Finding Task Force did. not interview Mr. Esposito
'since he was not onsite during the inspection period, nor was he requested to be available.
All documented reports of Mr. Esposito's activities are l
provided in pages 30 through 36 of the NRC Fact Finding Task Force Report (NUREG-0977), Appendix F.
This information consists of the licensee's work orders, purchase orders and individual's time cards. The only description
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of'the work completed under Mr. Esposito's direction that the Task Force f has is' provided on WO 925774 (page F-30). ' Based on. NRC Region I staff y
interviews with licensee personnel who did the work, Mr. Esposito
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directed licensee personnel on how to inspect, clean and do general "
preventive maintenance on at least the two Unit 1 trip breakers.
(See also response 3).
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By cover letter dated March 24, 1983 from E.P. Rahe, Westinghouse Electric-Corporation to Richard H. Vollmer, NRR, (copy attached) the Apparatus Service Report prepared by A.M. Esposito was trans-mitted to the U.S. NRC.
Mr. Esposito was contacted by telephone by NRC.Re.gion I staff on April 12, 1983 at which time he stated that he assisted in the maintenance / repair work on only one reactor trip breaker as indicated in the a'.)ove referenced service report.
I He also indicated that he worked c n one Unit 1 Motor Generator Set (MG-1) breaker (also a 08-50 circuit breaker).
The MG-1 breaker is physically located. adjacent to the rack which houses the reactor j
trip breaker on which he assisted in maintenance and repair.
i Question 2
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Why were the Unit 1 breakers inspected when the previous failures were on Unit 27 i
Response 2_
l As stated in the Fact Finding Task Force Report (NUREG-0977),,on January 6,1983 the faul,ty Unit 2 tireaker was removed and installed in Unit 1 which was shutdown for refueling at that time.
Unit 2 was scheduled to shutdown l
for refueling on January 21, 1983 and Unit I was scheduled to startup in i
early February, 1983.
At;the time of the Unit 2 breaker failure on January 6,1983, the licensee's apparent immediate concern was to replace the faulty l
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1 2-Unit 2 breaker "witn one known' to be operable to support continued operation of Unit 2.
Based on the second reactor trip breaker failure in less than six months, the licensee took the initiative (based on what they knew then regarding breaker maintenance) to contact the vendor representative to service the breakers and to obtain a~dvice/ consultation on assuring better performance.
'Mr. Esposit'o recommended that the breakers be included in a preventive maintenance (PM) program and committed to provide i
the licensee with a suggested preventive maintenance plan.
The Unit 1 breakers were worked on first since (1) it had the known problem breaker from the January 6 failure; (2) Unit 1 was shutdown and scheduled to start operation for the next cycle; (3) Unit.2.was now operating but scheduled to shutdown shortly.
-Additigna.1 preventive maintenance was planned for Unit 2 by the li'censee during the upcoming shutdown.
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Question 3_
Was-the IB Bypass breaker disassembled and inspected by Mr. Esposito?
f Resoonse 3 j
A lt was indicated to the Rigion I Fact Finding Task Force in interviews
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with licensee maintenance personnel that the. Unit 1 main and bypass
@g breakers were included in the inspection and preventive maintenance conducted under Mr. Esposito's direction.
In subsequent interviews by the Resident Inspectors with the licensee maintenance personnel directly involved in performing the work, they indicate that Mr. Esposito was present for th's preventive maintenance on at least the two Unit 1 trip breakers.
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Although the IB Bypass breaker was not listed in Work Order 925775 under
" description of work performed," a subsequent discussion by NRC Region I staff with 'the licensee person performing the work indjcates that l
. this breaker was also subject to the same preventive maintenance (disassembly, cleaning,' inspection and.seassembly).
Licensee personnel stated that. it was not listed on the work order because the licensee decided not to do megger testing on this breaker (as was done on the other three Unit 1 breakers).
As noted.in the response to Question 1, this information differs from l7 Mr. Esposito's and Westinghouse's position with regard to which breakers 1
were serviced.
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Question 4 Why weren't all eight breakers at both units inspected by Westinghouse" Response 4.
Since Unit 1 was shutdown at t6e time and preparing to restart following the refueling outage, preventive maintenance was first performed for its breakers.
Additionally, Unit 1 now had the Unit 2 breaker t. hat had failed.
At the time that the Westinghouse representative was on-site (January 13, 14,17 and 18,1983), Unit 2 was operating, but was scheduled to start a refueling outage within a' few days.
Preventive maintenance for the Tperating-Un'it 2 breakers was deferred by th,e licensee u'ntil that refueling shutdown.
Further, NRC Region I staff were informed by the licensee that Mr. Esposito suggested that work on the Unit 2 breakers be deferred until he was able to return to his home office to document a recommended preventive maintenance program for the breakers that would allow licensee personnel to complete the preventive maintenance without,.
his assistance.
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_.-Question 5 Following the above maintenance on the Unit 1 breakers, what specific operability' tests were performed on each breaker after each was reinserted in the breaker cubicle?
(In particular, were the.UV coils tested'in place by the solid stated protection system?)
Response 5_
Response 'to be provided at a later date.
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4-Ouestion 6 For each Unit 1 breaker (including bypass breakers) in place during the February 22 and 25 events, please trace the history of the breaker (or UV coil, if applicable) giving dates, locations, maintenance, and failures since August 19, 1982:
Response 6 See Attachment 1 for a tabulation of reactor trip breaker movement from and to various locations between Units 1 and 2, reconstructed by HRC Region L staff froa licensee records included in NUREG-0977.
.s Except for the preventive maintenance program started in January,1983 as discussed in the responses to Questions 2, 3 and 4, the only other, maintenance performed was corrective maintenance on a Unit 2 breaker following its failure during. surveillance testing on August 20, 1982 Reactor trip breaker failures occurred on 8/20/82, 1/6/83, 2/22/83 and ~2/25/83 as tabulated'in Attachment 1.
Question 7,
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Was the Unit 2 reactor taken critical prior to investigating the cause for breaker failure on August 20, and January 6,.'19837 Response 7 On August 20,.?the reactor was returned to full power and on January 7 the reactor started up after replacing the failed breaker with a.known operable breaker without completing investigation of the breaker failure mechanism, e--
According to the licensee the immediate a'ctions taken at the time of the failures were to determine through checks / testing that the problems were with the breakers in that they were " binding" or "hangjng up".
Operability for the replacement breaker was determined by the licensee by reliance on i
the normal Technical Specification surveillanet testing before declaring the replacement breaker operable.
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Question 8 l
Does the commercial division of Westinghouse use Calfonex 78A lubricant on non-safety grade UV coils?
Response 8 Westinghouse has stated that the commercial division of Westinghouse uses Calfonex 78A lubricant, or its equivalent, when maintenance is performed i on this ty'pe of breaker with an undervoltage trip attachment. Westing-house personnel state that the use of Calfonex 78A is independent of type of service (nuclear or non-nuclear) or classification (safety.,
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grade, or non-safety: grade).
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5-Question 9 Since the UV coils worked without lubrication for nearly 7 years, why does the staff feel that the above lubricant contributed to. failure i
i v th n a month?
Response 9 Initially the NRC was informed that CRC-2-26, a lubricant and cleaner /
solvent, was used in servicing the breaker (see page 6-2 of NUREG-0977).
The use of CRC-2-26 would be expected to remove residual lubrica'nt on the ondehoTtage trip attachment and contribute to the cause of failure.
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Tn pursu.ing this contributor to the cause' of, failure the licensing staff.
orally asked Westinghouse for the details of the service performed on the breaker at Salem. The written response from Westinghouse was that the lubricant used was Calfonex 78A, not CRC-2-26. (See appended Apparatus Service Report).
The licensing staff has no bases to conclude that the Calfonex 78A lubricant per se is a centributor to the cause of failure of the.UV trip attachment.
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ATTACHMENT 1 Unit 1 Unit 2 RTB A BYA RTB B BYB RTB A BYA RTB B BYB
- 1) 1979 original ITA 1YA ITB 1YB 2TA 2YA 2TB 2YB locations
- 2) 2/6/79 Unit 2 1TA 1YA ITB 1YB 2TA 2YA 2TB 2YB 2YB failure 4
3)'8/25/80 Unit 1 iTA 1YA ITB 1YB 2TA 2YA 2TB 2YB TOR on 1YA or 1YB
- 4) 5/5/&1. Unit 2.
ITA 1YA ITB 1YB 2TA
.2YA 2TB 2YB 2YB dropped -
- 5) 8/20/82 Unit 2 ITA 1YA ITB 1YB 2TA
- 2TB *2YA 2,YB 2TB failed --
1 2YA,
- 6) 1/6/83 Unit 2
- 2TA 1YA ITB 1YB
- 1TA 2TB 2YA 2YBf 2TA failed --
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- 7) 2/22/83 Unit 1 2TA 1YA *1YB
- 1TB 1TA 2TB 2YA 2YB ITB short -
1YB 8)2/22/83ATNS, 2TA 1YA 1YB IT3.
1TA 2TB 2YA 2YB
- 9) 2/25/83 ATVS -
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Unit 2 Unit 1 i
RTB SN 424Y7268B - ITA RTB A SN 1-24Y72698 - 2TA RTB B SN 224Y72688 - 1TB RTB B SN 2-24Y72698 - 2T8 BYB A SN 124Y7268B - 1YA BYB.A SN.4-24Y72698,2YA BYB B SN 324Y7268B - 1YB BYB B SN 3-24Y72698 - 2YB l
. TOR-TiheDelayReliy l
- Indicate breaker location change.
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(> F 2 March 24,1983 I
. Richard H. Vollmer, Di rector Division of Engineering Office cf Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. !;uclear Regulatory Cennission Phillips Building J'- 7920'llogfolk 'Av'e'ns Bethesda, MD
.20014
Dear Mr. Yo11mer:
e This letter fs intended to provide you with the Thfomati.on you i
pquested on March 23, 1933 concerning work perfomed by the 4
.restinghcuse Field Service Engir:eer (FSE) at thr$alem Unit 1 site in January 1383.
PSE13 contacted the Hillside, N.J. office of the k'estirshouse Apparatus Service Division to provide technical assistence i
to Salem ;ersenne,1 -on the disassembly, inspe: tion, maintenance, and reasse.-bly of the type 03-50 breakers..
.The Westinjhouse. engineer was at the Salem site from January 13, 1953, until dantary 18, ic33.
During this parted, he worked with Salem personrel ort the. 13,14,17, and 18th. No work was perfomed by the 3
l Westingheuse engineer over the weekend (January 15 and 16th).
During i
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this period the Westinghouse FSE assisted in work'on only two breakers; l
ene reacter trip breaker and one motor eenerator set breaker.*
In perforning the rea.: tor trip breaker r sfntecance,.the Westinghouse FS!
4 cleaned the tr.oving core of the UV trip attachnent. and lubricated the core and linkage wi.th Calfonex 78-A. No other adjusttents or modifications were perfomed or recczanded to the Salem personnel for
. the UV atticine.nt.
This breaker was then minsta11ed.
The can of Calforex 78-A was.left with the PSE13 personnel.
If you Enve ary questiens, please contact me.
r Very truly yours, NAfW}M.
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- A copy of the FSE's Apparatus Service Report yuclear
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1 1)r Type D3-50 A'.: C'.rcuit 3:eder-Y:a=4 1600, 600 fAC, so i24T72593, Pure.ha.se'd I en;G.'O. i:u25974-50 !775505
~2) 7.a servi.:a app:cxi=.acely 4 to S years.
ITsed in the reactor : d circuits.
- 2) Purp=sa of visit vaa' to ;;;vida technical assista::e oa :ha dis.assa=bly, i=>pae:ics, sai=
a-* ce ' ' re.a.ss.c=bly of tha type D3-50 breake:.
Q 3reda: vas :c:scvad f::= 1:s ce_1.1.
na:e 5.=ts a great sr.cu== of dus: ever all eci:s of tha breaker a=d c=.
Cus:c=e: clai:si "cradar did not trip i.t.as voltage was rei:5cvad frem v:>iarroltage u=1:.
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tese on the breder, edle bra:ker was es the v :k be=ch showed the u de:4oltage u=it vould "hs:s-up" a: ti=es, that is the breder va.s =a=na117 =lesed, a=d should have tripped i==ciiately si=ce the '- dervoltage unic vs.s =ot amargi:ad, however. the breaker ra=a.i:ad caesad.
A lish: :sp es the frs=a of tha breaka: vas su '..tcient to u:bi=d' the '.=darroltage==it, a=d trip tha b:aaker. -The back plate of the i
c:de-c1: age unit was re=cvad, a=d the = art =g cara vas cleaned'.. Core and li=ha5.*
ve:a lubrica:ed e.dth Calfemax 781.
3:amier vas. c'est =pera:ad an.da11.y2.=d ' '...
7 ale::=ien117 =asy ef=wts the:aadter vi:heut a failure,.
The braaler was ce= pin aly casihad as was the respective cell. Wa in,specied :hg c= ta::s for ham:ing or hur=.ing.
They were cleaned and dressed where' neces:aty.
- Te also checked aligh==est, travel, and fs11cv through of the contac:s while clesing :he breaker.
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The cachanis= vas checked for loose or vorn parts or hardware. A =1crohm rash sece reading of each ; ole unic was :ake;: and :he prieary and secondary c: :ae:s vara =eggerad.
3:eaker was thes retu :ed to its respectire cell'and without a:tensica rails,
- =k :i=s and perse: vere =ce.
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
C. J. Heltemes, Di rector Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data FROM:
Hamid Denton, Director l
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
DOCUENTATION ON THE REVIEW OF LICENSEE REPORTS ON REACTOR TRIP BREAKER FAILURES Your memorandum of March 29, 1983 requested that NRR search its files for all documentation and reports on reactor trip breaker failures between January 1,1980 and February 22, 1983. We understand that the reasons for this request are to determine:
1.
The extent to which operational experien'e on RPS circuit breaker c
failures was known and used within AEOD and NRC; 2.
Whether the existing event and failure reporting systems are adequate; and 3.
Whether trends and pattern analyses can predict potential problems such as the Salem Event using our current data gathering practices.
i The predominant source of information is an LER search of electrical and mechanical failure rates for reactor protection systems at operating
.reacto rs.
This LER search is documented in the attached Kendall to j-Pyatt memorandum dated November 1,1982.
Another source of information has been the Operating Reactors Assessment Branch's review of daily operating experience.
Their primary sources of information are the daily regional reports and the NRC's Duty Officer's l
log.
I The ORAB files cover all of 1982 and the majority of 1981.
According to l
the.Kendall memorandum, there were four reactor trip breaker failures in 1981 and four more in 1982. A search of the ORAB files indicates that none of these events were reported to the NRC's Duty Officer while only two (the Salem 2 event of 8/20/82 and the Robinson 2 event of 12/20/82) were reported via the daily regional reports.
Of these two reported events, the Salem event was reported during the September 8,1982 operating reactor events briefing for upper NRR management.
Copies of the above documentation are attached.
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I C. J. Hel temes Finally, we have learned through the IE Bulletin responses to the reactor trip breaker concern that a large number of trip breaker failures go unreported to the NRC. Apparently, this is because failures 1
are largely unreported when they occur during op.: rating modes when their operability is not required by the plant's technical specifications.
I Both San Onofre and Rancho Seco reported this practice. We have no reason to doubt that this practice is also used at other facilities.
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w Harold Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure :
As Stated cc w/o enci-D. Etsenhut(w/ enclosure)
R. Mattson (w/ enclosure)
F. Miraglia T. Ippolito W. Lanning G. Holahan R. Xendall D. Pickett e
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