ML20213E365

Approves Util Requested Deviation to Use 150 Ft of Fire Hose at All Hose Stations in Reactor Bldg.Acceptable Level of Fire Safety Would Be Achieved.Safety Evaluation Encl

ML20213E365
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	03/17/1983
From:	Johnson W, Johnston W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-WNP-0572, CON-WNP-572 NUDOCS 8303220492
Download: ML20213E365 (8)

Text

o

}

~

f f? / i.,

f jQ C' w

CA LQ MAR 17 1983 MEMORAN'3UM FOR: Thomas Novak, Assistant Director fcr Licensing Division of Licensing FROM: William V. Johnston, Assistant Director Materials, Chemical & Environmental Technology Division of Engineering i

SUBJECT:

FIRE PROTECTION SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT -

l WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 Plant Name: WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2 l Docket Number: 50-397 Licensing Stage: OL Responsible Branch: LB #2 Project Manager, R. Auluck Chemical Engineering Branch Reviewer: D. Kubicki Requested Completion Date: ASAP Review Status: Complete In our Safety Evaluation Report (SER), we reported that manual hose stations in the plant were origihally provided with 150 feet of 1h inch hose. At our request, the applicant agreed by letter dated January 28, 1982 to modify 3ng the standpipe hose system to provide sufficient hose statire so that effective base streams can reach any area of the plant with a .waximum of 100 feet of 1- in. hose at each hose station, in accordance with Section C.6.c of BIP CMEB 9.5-1.

By letter of March 4, 1983, the applicant requested a deviation from our guioelines to permit 150 feet of hose to be used in the Reactor Buildin0 The applicant justified this deviation on the basis of hydraulics, the capability of the plant fire brigade, cre-fire planning, cost, and potential repercussions of a fire on safety related equipment.

Based on our evaluation of these considerations, we conclude that an acceptable level of fire safety would be achieved. Therefore, the use of 150 ft. cf hose at all hose stations in the Reactor Building is an acceptaDie deviation from our fire protection guidelines.

Enclosed are the revisions of Section 9.5.1.6(3), " Sprinkler and Stand-pipe Systems," 9.5.1,8, " Summary of Deviations frem CMEB 9.5-1," and 9.5.9.9, " Conclusions" of the SER which incorporates the results of our evaluation of this information.

CFFICtg ................ .:7....,.........y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

===' 3220492 s30317 . . . . . . . . . .......-

W ADOCK05000397$?.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~

na = . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

0 Thomas Novak Based on our evaluation, we conclude that the fire protection program meets the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and GDC 3, and is therefore acceptable.

The staff plans to visit the site in March 1983.

William V. Johnston, Assistant Director Materials, Chemical & Environmental Technology Division of Engineering

Enclosure:

As stated

Contact:

D. Kubicki X24564 cc: R. Vollmer D. Eisenhut A. Schwencer

0. Parr M. Srinivasan V. Benaroya R. Ferguson -

R. Auluck T. Sullivan J. Taylor J. O'Reilly S. Pawlicki D. Kubicki S. Ebneter, Region I T. Conlon, Region II C. Norelius, Region III G. Madsen, Region IV P. Sternberg, Region V AEOD d

DE/CMEB - DE/ i DE/CMEBt DE/MCETl omee p ...g.g.g.,.,..... .g .7 ., .g.6 su m me) . . ...

3 h T'En d'7 E tiUOliiinBM-"

""".""""""~"

.g.......

...). 3..

J" > ---

-:-------------"-- ---------r---------------------

Chemical Engineering Branch / Fire Protection Section Supplementary Safety Evaluation Report WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2 Docket No. 50-397 Introduction In our safety evaluation report, we stated that the applicant proposed to equip all manual hose stations in the plant with 150 feet of hose.

At our request, by letter dated January 28, 1982, the applicant agreed to modify the standpipe hose system to provide sufficient hose stations so that effective water streams can reach any area of the plant with a maximum of 100 feet of 1 inch hose in accordance with Section C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. By letter of March 4, 1983, the applicant proposed .

to deviate from our guidelines by equipping hose stations in the reactor building with 150 feet of hose. This deviation was justified on the basis of water distribution system hydraulics; the capabilities of the plant fire brigade; cost and potential repercussions of a fire on safety related equipment.

SER Sections 9.5.1.6(3), 9.5.1.8 and 9.5.1.9 have been revised to reflect the results of our evaluation of this information.

We have nct yet made a fire protection review site visit because the construction of the plant has not progressed to the level when ,such a -

visit would be meaningful. We expect to have our site visit in March 1983.

9.5.1 Fire Protection Program 9.5.1.6 Fire Detection and Suppression (3) Sorinkler and Standoipe Systems The wet pipe sprinkler system and standpipe hose system are connected to common risers from the underground water supply loop. Looped interior headers are provided. This design is in compliance with BTP CMEB G.5-1

. Section C.S.c, and is, therefore, acceptable.

The automatic sprinkler systems (wet pipe sprinkler systems, pre-action sprinkler system, and deluge water spray systems) are designed to the provisions of NFPA Standards 13, " Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems," and 15, " Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems."

The areas that are being equipped with automatic water suppression systems are listed in Amendment 24.

By letter dated January 21, 1982, the applicant stated that 15 fire areas contain cables associated with redundant shutdown systems. To ensure post-fire shutdown capability, these cables need to be protected. In amendment ,

24, and in a letter dated October 4, 1982, the applicant revised this number from fifteen to ten. The reduced number reflects the establishment .

of redundant shutdown capabilities in separate fire areas from those plant locations originally identified as containing redundant safety divisions.

The following three areas will be completely protected by an automatic sprinkler system:

1. Cable Spreading Room (RC-21)

2. Cable Chase (RC-111)

3. Corridor (TG-1)

In the following seven areas, the applicant proposes to deviate from our guidelines to the extent that they require automatic fire suppression systems:

1. Remote Shutdown Room (RC-IX)

2. Switchgear Room #2 (RC-XIV)

3. General Floor Area (R-1) - Elevation 471'-0"

4. General Floor Area (R-1) - Elevation 501'-0"

5. General Floor Area (R-1) - Elevation 522'-0"

6. General Floor Area (R-1) - Elevation 548'-0"

7. General Floor Area (R-1) - Elevation 572'-0" h

In lieu of an automatic sprinkler system, the applicant proposes to completely protect one safety division with a subliming and insulating coating that is capable of withstanding a 3-hour-fire exposure as defined in ASTM-119. The material has been demonstrated to protect the cable from visible fire damage and to maintain circuit integrity during fire exposure. The material is npt adversely affected by a water hose stream and is capable of limiting temperature rise on the unexposed side to not more than 250 F above ambient, which is well below the temperature at which similar IEEE qualified cabling began to fail in tests conducted independently for NRC at Underwriter's Laboratories.

We conclude that this protection, coupled with the smoke detection systems in these areas, provide an equivalent level of fire safety to

, that achieved by the installation of a sprinkler system. -

We find the deletion of automatic sprinkler systems in the proposed areas to be an acceptable deviation from Section C.6.c. of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.

Therefore, the fire protection provided for these rooms is acceptable.

Manual hose stations are provided in stairwell enclosures throughout the plant except in containment. With the exception of the Reactor Building, all hose stations are equipped with 100 feet of 1h inch hose.

in accordance with Section C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. By letter dated March 4, 1983, the applicant proposed to deviate from our guidelines by utilizing 150 feet of hose to protect all areas of the reactor building. One hundred feet of hose will be pre-connected to the hose outlets. The remaining 50 feet of hose will only be connected if required to suppress a fire in a remote area.

The configuration of the reactor building is such that it is possible to protect most of the floor area by 100 feet of hose. The remaining areas which necessitate the use of the additional 50 feet of hose con-

~

tain the following systems:

Elevation 606'-10h" No safety related equipment Elevation 572' "A" train systems associated with the Emergency Core Cooling System and the RHR heat exchanger. ,

Elevation 548' "A" train systems associated with the RHR heat exchanger and three motor operated valves.

Elevation 522' Power supply for the RHR, RCIC, and reactor water cleanup systems and -

the main steam drain valve.

Elevation 501' Main steam isolation valve.

Elevation 471' RHR piping valves and the DC power supply to motor operated valves.

l: Elevation 441' and 444' i

"A" train systems associated with the RCIC and severe water systems and DC operated valves.  !

Elevation 422'3" 4

No safety related equipment. .

In the event a fire damages any of the above listed equipment, an alter-

, nate capability exists in a separate fire area or compensating actions could be taken, such as manual operation of valves. As a consequence, there is no safety significance to the proposed deviation.

1

The plant water distribution system is capable of supplying hose streams in the Reactor Building with the required quantity of water and pressure (125 GPM, 65 PSI) tnrough 150 feet of hose. In aodition, the plant fire brigade is capable of deploying the hose line's in sufficient time to suppress postulated fires.

Based on the above evaluation, we conclude that the use of 150 feet of hose in the reactor building represents an acceptable deviation from Section C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.

The applicant has not identified the seismic design of standpipe systems, which is recommended in BTP CHEB 9.5-1, Section C.6.c.(1). For plants for which construction permits issued prior to July 30, 1976, the guide- .

lines in Appendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1 have no requirement for seismic design for standpipe systems. Therefore, this is an acceptable deviation frcm the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.6.c.(1).

9.5.1.8 Summary of Deviations from CMEB 9.5-1 Four deviations from the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 have been identified.

Those items have been approved, and they are:

1. Control room vent closure

2. Seismic design of standpipe systems .

3. Floor drains in day tank room A. The deletion of a fire suppression system in the following seven plant areas:

Remote Shutdown Room (RC-1X)

Switchgear Room #1 (RC-XIV)

General Floor Area (R-1) - Elevation 471'-0" General Floor Area (R-1) - Elevation 501'-0" General Floor Area (R-1) - Elevation 522*-O

General Floor Area (R-1) - Elevation 548'-0" General Floor Area (R-1) - Elevation 572'-0"

6-

5. The use of 150 feet 'of hose at hose stations in the reactor building.

9.5.1.9 Conclusion Based on our evaluation, we conclude that the Fire Protection Program with the accepted deviations listed in Section 9.5.1.8, meets the guide-lines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and GDC 3 and is, therefore, acceptable.

The site visit is scheduled for March 1983.

e G

e 4

.. ..t DISTRIBUTION:

flAR 17 1983 See attached page Docket No. 50-397 MEMORANDUM FOR: A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing FROM: R. Auluck, Project Mar.ager Licensing Branch No. 2, DL

SUBJECT:

FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH WASHINGTOM PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM (WPPSS)

DATE & TIME: April 5 & 6,1983 LOCATION: WNP-2 Site Richland, WA PURPOSE: Discussion of Electrical Cable Separation Issue and Site Audit PAP,TICIPANTS: NRC WPPSS J. Elin R. Nelson &

S. Rhow Support Staff R. Auluck Original signed by R. Auluck, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing

cc

See next page i

l l

o$

1 ^

l

, g/

6 c DL:LB#2 omcep . . . . . /..PM. . . . . . . . [. ....

.DL,d(27..E

. ....... .................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , .....................(................ l 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

r SURNOME1 .R. A.. u..l.u..c..k...':.k..G. ..' l ..A..S., .5. ..1,w........................................i,....................i........................

e..n..c.e r....

ocu y ..M,.1./.8. 3. . ... , .M. . . /./{..8. ,3........

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............,l......................(,...................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

WNP-2 Mr., R. L. Ferguson __.

Managing Di~ rector Washington Public Power Supply System P. O. Box 958 3000 Gecrge Washington Way Richlar.d, Washington 99352

. . cc: Nicholas Reynolds,. Esquire ~ . . .

Debevoise & Liberman ...

1200 Seventeenth Street, N. W.

- - L'ashington, D. C: 2'0036

'-~ ~

- ' ' ~

. Mr.: G.Ec Doupe', Esquire . - -

Washington Public Power Supply Sys. tem

~

P.O. Box 968 -

3000 George Washin9 ton Way -

Richland, Washington 99352 _

Nicholas Lewis, Chairman Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council '

-:Me.il Stop PY-11 ,

Olympia l Washington 98504 ,

.s.oger Nelson, Licensing Manager x

Washir.gtdn Public Pcwer Supply System .

.. s P.O. Box 968 '

• Richl and, ',.'ashington 99352 Mr. W.G. Conn, Sr. N/M Group Supervi sor Burns and Roe, Incorporated 601 Williams Boulevard Ri chl and, ' Wa shin 9to n 59352 -- .

I'r. Richard Feil '

U.S. NRC Resident Inspecgor .

K?PSS-2 NPS .

P.O. Box 69

'Richland, Washington 99352 3 l Dr. G.01 Bouchey Deputy Director, Safety & Security...; ' '

Washington Public Power Supply System' ._ ,

P.O. Box 968, to 650 -

Richland, Washington 99352 i

, - 8 4-T *.-

+ < _

4 (

..e .

MER 17 ?SS3 MEET!"G NOTICE DISTRIBUTION: Date:

e-Doci, .mnMbnatmP d NRC PDR L PDR NSIC PRC '

LB!2 Reading --

NRC PARTICIPANTS:

E. Hylton --

, , Project Manager R. Auluck J. Elin -

H. Denton/E. Case "

. S. Rhow -

'~

,,_. .. D. Eisenhut/R. Purple [.. -

R. Auluck .

. T. M. Novak*

B. Youngblood ,

. A. Schwencer ' ' '

' ~

G. Knighton E. Adensam G. Lainas 6 F. Miraglia .

J. P. Knight -

-f W. Johnston -

. D. Muller - --

T. Speis _

R. Houston -

L. Rubenstein ,.

F. Schroeder

. M. Ernst _ ..

J. Kramer -

NRR Division Directors

• DELD Attorney W. Paton E. L. Jordan, DEQA:IE ~ ~

J. M. Taylor, DRP:IE Phillips Building Eeceptionist*'

ACRS (16)

Recien y Resident Inspector cc: Service List

• 0nly if participant in neeting

• • 0nly if meeting held in Bethesda 4

- , _ , , . _ . - - _ . _ . _ _ , - - . . . . . _ , - - . . . - , , _ . . , _ , _ . , __ . . . .