ML20212R568

Partially Withheld Ltr Transmitting Confidential Info. Investigation Shows No Evidence That Security Compromised by Subjs of Investigation at Time of Employment or Since

ML20212R568
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold, 05000000
Issue date:	04/07/1983
From:	Leslie Liu IES UTILITIES INC., (FORMERLY IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT
To:	Hind J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20212R483	List: ML20212R481 ML20212R525 ML20212R546 ML20212R568
References
FOIA-84-827 NUDOCS 8702020713
Download: ML20212R568 (7)

Text

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company LEE UU PAJA OL%T April 7, 1983 .

w Mr. J. A. Hind, Director' Division of Radiological and Material Safety Programs NPC Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Dear Mr. Hind:

I am transmitting to you the attached confidential information. Our investigation shows no evidence that security was compromised at the DAEC site by the subjects of this inves-tigation either at the time of their employment or since.

sion.

I believe this should bring this matter to a conclu-developedYoubyare ourinvited investigationto scrutinize team. the materials in our file Should you have further questions, please contact this office or Dr. S. J. Tuthill.

Sincerely -

ee Liu President LL:D 8702020713 870129 PDR FOIA HEATH 94-827 PDR

• 1882 A CENTURY OF SERVICE 1982

• TA ceneral opce

20. Box ass cedar napids, towa suos assrassmss hhY

suuRBER 6 April 1983 Mr. Lee Liu President and COO General Offices

Dear Lee,

The enclosed copy of a report to me from Mr. E. G. Matthews, Manager, Cor-rorate Quality Assurance, summarizes the results of ir.vestigations super-vised by me to determine the' nature of the sworn anonymous allegation that was forwarded to you by Mr. Hind of the Region III NEC on 10 February 1983 (Docket No. 50-331).

I believe that Mr. Matthews' report closes this matter. I recommend that you forward Matthews' report to Mr. J. A. Hind or, if you wish, instruct me to do so.

In final summary, we found the persons cited to have: (a) worked here, (b) not to have had any disecverable record of drug abuse or reputation for such while employed at the DAEC, and (c) to have had access to the Security Plan that was then current. The Plan has been so modified subsequently that this exposure regardless of the subjects' condition or predisposition toward the security of the DAEC is not a matter to warrant concern. No evidence and no events indicate that the DAEC security was compromised by the subjects of this investigation at the time of their employment or since.

There are further investigations of the adequacies of vendor's security-clearance programs that are going forward. These are not directly connected to the NRC inquiry, although they derive from this investigation, and no re-port of them is made here. '

I recommend that you invite NRC to feel free to scrutinize the materials de-veloped by our investigation as they wish.

The investigation of this allegation occupied the following estimated time by the positions indicated:

Corporate Pres'ident 0.50 man-days Corporate Sr. Vice President 2.25 Manager, Corporate Q. A. 5.25 Manager Corporate Security 6.50 Ass't. Vice Pres.-Nuclear Gen. 0.50 Director Nuclear Generation 0.50 Various DAEC Exec. (3) 1.00 Q. A. Engineers 9.75 Total: 26.25 man-days h%f .-

S.J.TutNill cl.-l

l ll lowa Electric Light and Power Cornpany April 5, 1983 QA-83-153 Or S. J uthill

Subject:

Inquiry /DAEC Security File: Q-23

Dear Dr. Tuthill:

An examination of, and -

records has been cCTplete3. The examination included an investigation of the nature, scope and the sensitivity to the security of the DAEC and its personnel of the work that was performed by these individuals.

. worked at the DAEC from refuel floor, spent fuel pool, drywell, auxiliary building, radwaste and the nuclear laundry.

work activities included waste handling, decontamination, operation of the nuclear laundry, radiation surveys and determining half-life values. had possible access to security-sensitive data (DAEC Security Plan) during tenure. The Plan has since been revised.

worked at the DAEC from l . drywell, auxiliary building, refuel floor, radwaste and the nuclear laundry. work activities included radiation surveys, determining half-life values, control point work, operation of the electro-polishing unit, decontamination, packing of t.SA boxes, training of personnel in drycleaner, maintenance of machines and training on how to check bags for dose rates and contamination levels. had possible access to the DAEC The records indicate that is at current supervisor is c,.......,,,c.,.,.,,,,. , , , . , . _ , . . . , , r,- . ,.. - . . .

Dr. S. J. Tuthill April 5,1983 QA-83-153 Discussions with DAEC management personnel indicate that both and had possible access to security-sensitive operations and/or equipment during their tenure at the DAEC. Nonetheless, the security of the DAEC was never compromised by these individuals.

Should you have further questions, please contact me.

. Very truly yours, .

E. G. Matthews, Manager Corporate Quality Assurance 11 cc: Ken Vanous 2

1. Iluumum

Ca n . - . ,

h-lt

,p'* "%, .

k I December 21, 1983 ** .,,,.*

SECY-83-517 Discussion: An important element in protecting against the insider threat at nuclear power reactors is the background investigation (BI) conducted on individuals requiring unescorted access to protected and vital areas.

Background investigations provide an indication of employee reliability, stability, and trustworthiness.

l An individual's criminal history record is a crucial component of a BI. A 1981 Department of Justice report

• indicates that only ten states provide authority for printe employer access to the national criminal history files maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; another seven states provide a mechanism for approval / disapproval of private requests for 1

i l

• Criminal Justice Information Policy-Privacy and the Private Employer, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice,1981.

l PC

.E The Comissioners this information. Most of such checks by nuclear power reactor licensees are limited to state or local files which do not include an individual's past criminal record in other areas of the country.

The proposed legis1ation (Enclosure A), if enacted, would allow all nuclear power reactor licensees access to the FBI criminal history files. Through access to these national files a licensee can obtain more complete criminal histories. Local criminal history data is susceptible to omission of infor-mation generated in other jurisdictions. This information can be a crucial factor in the determi-nation to grant or deny an individual's unescorted facility access.

Alternatives to legislation have been investiga-ted by the staff. Such alternatives have included

1) arrangement for an interagency memorandum of understanding (MOV) between the NRC and FBI allowing licensee access to the FBI files, and 2) provision for the NRC Division of Security to handle the requests and processing of the criminal history data on behalf of the licensees. These alternatives were rejected for the following reasons: 1) The FBI would not agree to a MOU, stating that authorizin'g legis-lation was necessary to gain accoss to criminal files, and 2) involvement of the NRC's Division of Security raised questions of legality under the Privacy Act in transmittal and evaluation of criminal history data.

I It should be noted that the FBI data in question is in a noticed and published FBI system of records.

As such, that information is protected by the Privacy Act of 1974. Therefore, if the NRC receives informa-tion from that data base, then the same" Privacy Act protection and limits on disclosure will apply. This

, could be an administrative and resource burden on the i NRC. Additionally, under the Atomic Energy Act, the Division of Security's authority to evaluate data would derive from 5 1611(2) which is not appropriate for this purpose, (See Authority for Access to or Control Over SpeciaTTuclear Material, CLI-80-37, 12 NRC 528, p. 536, 1980).

The staff has recently received the endorsement of the Department of Justice (D0J) for enactment of l

_ . _ _ _ . _ ~ _ . . _ _ __. . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1

. 4 The Comissioners legislation authorizing licensee access to criminal history information (see Enclosure B). Such access has been obtained in the past for the securities and comodity industries through congressional enactment of authorizing federal law. As noted in the Depart-ment of Justice letter, in comparison to access for the securities industry, access for NRC licensees is eminently justified. It should be noted that 00J had previously objected to an industry-sponsored bill that also dealt with criminal history access (S.1589).

That bill did not pass in the 98th Congress. 00J 's concerns at that time were mainly directed at pro-visions which are not contained in the newly proposed legislation.

The FBI will require that criminal history check requests from licensees be funneled through an inter-mediary organization to minimize the number of points of contact with the Bureau, and to simplify billing of licensees. The staff is working with industry and professional groups to establish an appropriate mechanism to accomplish this. -

The CRGR was briefed on this legislation on June 1, 1983 as part of the Insider Safeguards Rules briefing.

The impact of this legislation on the FBI is judged to be minimal. The estimated increase in the number of record checks per year resulting from the legis-lation is 11,000; this represents a 0.18% increase in the number of criminal history record checks currently conducted by that agency.

The staff has prepared the appropriate congressional correspondence along with an analysis of the legis-lation for submittal to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. This is included as Enclosure B.

WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION 1705 N STREET, N. W.

WASHINGTON D. C. 2Oo36 202-857-0240 October 23, 1984

.ulton Jfice EBf_EDOM OF ltdOhMAll0N Ced States Nucleaf Regulatory Commission ACI REQUES1 6 A

. Washington, D.C. 20555 rd7)b'n '[ u'~

T Re: FOI Request GDd /M'M4f

Dear Mr. Felton:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC B552 et seq.,

I hereby request the following documents:

(1) all documents, internal guidelines, regulations, policy manuals, or any written materials regarding or relating to agency procedure or policy for the detection and control of alcohol and illegal drug use by all persons engaged in the actual building or construction of nuclear reactors or facilities; (2) all such documents described above regarding or relating to agency procedure and policy for the detection and control or alcohol and illegal drug use by all persons engaged in the operating of nuclear reactors or facilities; (3) all reports or written documents or disciplinary measures, personnel actions or investigations of persons engaged in the con-struction, operation, or maintenance of nuclear reactors or facilities.

I write on behalf of the Washington Legal Foundation, a non-profit public interest law firm with 85,000 members nationwide. The purpose of this request is to assist and facilitate the general public safety by learning the extent of drug or alcohol abuse in nuclear facilities, and to encourage that remedial measures be taken, if necessary.

Accordingly, we request a waiver of any and all fees that would be assessed for the researching and copying of the requested documents.

We expect that a prompt response within 10 days will be forth-coming. If you have any questions about this FOI request, please feel free to call me at 857-0240.

Thank you for your attention and consideration.

Sincerely, Steven J. Heath SJH:lw WefG256&f2%

t TVASIIINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION 1705 N STREET N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 2OO36 202 857-0240 October 23, 1984 Joseph Felton FOIA Office United States Nuclear EREEDOW OF INFUhMAIKX4

. ACI REQUESI ,

Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 [CM '/ ["M)

Re: FOI Request k /d Md **

Dear Mr. Felton:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC B552 et seq.,

I hereby request the following documents:

(1) all documents, internal guidelines, regulations, policy manuals, or any written materials regarding or relating to agency procedure or policy for the detection and control of alcohol and illegal drug use by all persons engaged in the actual building or construction of nuclear reactors or facilities; (2) all such documents described above regarding or relating to agency procedure and policy for the detection and control or alcohol and illegal drug use by all persons engaged in the operating of nuclear reactors or facilities; (3) all reports or written documents or disciplinary measures, personnel actions or investigations of persons engaged in the con-struction, operation, or maintenance of nuclear reactors or facilities.

I write on behalf of the Washington Legal Foundation, a non-profit public interest law firm with 85,000 members nationwide. The purpose of this request is to assist and facilitate the general public safety by learning the extent of drug or alcohol abuse in nuclear facilities, and to encourage that remedial measures be taken, if necessary.

Accordingly, we request a waiver of any and all fees that would be accecced for the rencarching and copying of the requested documents.

We expect that a prompt response within 10 days will be forth-coming. If you have any questions about this FOI request, please feel free to call me at 857-0240.

Thank you for your attention and consideration.

Sincerely,

.. N Steven J. Heath SJH:lw

1. 6G2SGWFP%

- - _ - - - - - - - - -