CLI-80-37, Submits Review of CLI-80-37 Re Authority for Control Over or Access to Snm.Order Should Be Served on Facility & Could Be Used in NRC Brief
| ML16340B267 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 12/01/1980 |
| From: | Swartz L NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Olmstead W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| References | |
| CLI-80-37, NUDOCS 8012170313 | |
| Download: ML16340B267 (8) | |
Text
'ecember 1,
1980 Note to llilliam Olmstead, Assistant Chief Hearing Counsel USE OF CLI-80-37 IN DIABLO CANYON SECURITY PROCEEDING You asked me to review CLI-80-37 (Authority for Access to or Control Over Special Nuclear Material, RH 50-7) dated November 17, 1980 for the purpose of determining whether (1) it should be served on the parties in Diablo Canyon and (2) it could be used in the Staff's proposed findings in the security proceeding.
As you know, the decision deals primarily with access to special nuclear material at fuel reprocessing plants or in transportation.
Access to SNf1 at nuclear plants 'licensed pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 is largely ignored.
- However, because the Commission does differentiate between fuel reprocessing plants and power reactors and imposes more stringent security screening requirements on the former, the decision is useful in the Diablo Canyon security hearing.
It should be served on the parties and could be used in the Staff's brief.
Power reactors licensed pursuant to Part 50, under the new rule, will not be required to have programs based on "traditional government clearances."
(Decision at 5.)
These requirements differ from those imposed on fuel reprocessing facilities and are less severe because of "the absence of a threat related to theft of weapons grade material..."
(Decision at 11).
As opposed to fuel reprocessing plant which will be required to utilize full background investigations and national security agency checks, plants licensed under Part 50 will be required to use limited background investi-gations (employment history and criminal history), psychological screening, and a program of continuous observation.
(Decision at 11.)
Thus, after a modified legislative type public hearing conducted by a hearing board, the Commission decided not to" require full background investigatioe or NSA checks for plants licensed under Part 50.
This decision clearly can be used for the proposition that PG&E cannot be required to institute full background investigations of applicants for its security force.
The rulemaking proceeding is over and the parties to the Diablo Canyon proceeding cannot now argue that licenses under Part 50 must do full security checks.
One question,
- however, does come to mind.
The Commission's November l7 Decision deals with access to and control over SNM. It could be argued that security force personnel doesnot require access to SNM and thus that the Commission did not consider such personnel in its Decision.
Although protecting SHM from sabotage is similar to protecting a nuclear power plant from sabotage, without reviewing the testimony presented to the hearing board I am unable to determine whether security 'force personnel was considered by the hearing board or the Commission or whether the Commission intended that security force personnel at nuclear power plants need not be subject to full background investigations.
Lucinda Low Swartz
- Attorney, OELD
+ III,1 f~JP@
" December 1, 1980
\\
WC,>
Pl I7)'g
- WS
-C)
Note to William Olmstead, Assistant Chief Hearing Counsel USE OF CLI-80-37 IN DIABLO CANYON SECURITY PROCEEDING J
You asked me to review CLI-80-37 (Authority for Access to or Control Over Special Nuclear tlaterial, RH 50>>7) dated November 17, 1980 for the purpose of determining whether (1) it should be served on the parties in Diablo Canyon and (2) it could be used in the Staff's proposed findings in the security proceeding.
As you know, the decision deals primarily with access to special nuclear material at fuel reprocessing plants or in transportation.
Access to SNN at nuclear plants licensed pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 is largely ignored.
- However, because the Commission does differentiate between fuel
. reproceesing plants and power reactors and imposes more stringent security screening requirements on the former, the-decision is useful in the Diablo Canyon security hearing.
It should be served on the parties and could be used in the Staff's brief.
Power reactors licensed pursuant to Part 50, under the new fule, will not
'e required to have programs based on "traditional government clearances."
(Decision at 5.)
These requirements differ from those imposed on fuel reprocessing facilities and are less severe because of "the absence of a threat related to theft of weapons grade material..."
(Decision at 11).
As opposed to fuel reprocessing plant which will be required to utilize full background investigations and national security agency checks, plants licensed under Part 60 will be, required to use limited background investi-gations (employment history and criminal history), psychological screening, and a p'rogt am of continuous observation.
(Decision at 11.)
Thus, after a modified legislative type public hearing conducted by a hearing board, the Commission decided not to require full background investigation, or NSA checks for plants Ticensed under Part 50.
This decision clearly can be used for the proposition that PGt'E cannot be required to institute full background investigations of applicahts for its security force.
The rulemaking proceeding is over and the parties to the Diablo Canyon proceeding cannot now argue that licenses under Patt 50 must do full security checks.
SO3L81 ~~~
OFFICE P i SURNAME DATE).
NRC FORM 318 (9.76) NRCM 0240
'6 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979.289'369
1
)I, h
t)g CL )
t<<c
- .. ~ -1
)4
~
~
'14 l ~
4 r
(
~
~
4).
E I
~
14>>
1
~ -<<
I 1
4
~
"1 ~
I
~
lt,>>
I I
~
~
~
k 1
~
II
~
tt
"'I 4
I
~
~
~
I 4,
~
El
~
44
~ ~
~ w
~
I I
I 4
I' 4
)
<<hw>>
il 1
1 Il 1
1
~
I It 4>>
4 VE
~
lt 1 ~
c,!L, II r)>>>>
~
1
~t:
I It
)
4
~ ~ 4
- 1 f I.
~
III 1
I I
ll
~
l>>
h
)1 g
4 wt
'I
~
r
~
I<<
tt I
fi >, ~
~
I 0
~
s 4
One question,
- however, does come to mind.
The Commission's November 17 Decision deals with access to and control over SHN. It could be argued that security force personnel do not require access to SNth and thus that the Conmission did not consider such personnel in its Decision.
Although protecting SHE from sabotage is similar to protecting a nuclear power plant from sabotage without reviewing the testimony presented to the hearing board. I am unable to determine whether security force personnel was considered by the hearing board or the Cottmission intended that security force personnel at power plants need not be subject to full background investigations.
Lucinda Low Swartz Counsel for NRC Staff DISTRIBUTION<:.
Docket Room LPDR FF (2)
Shapar/EngeLhardt/
Christenbury TourteLLotte Ketchen Swartz Chron.
OFFICE $
SURNAME DATE$ i2 / '/80
~
~
NRC FORM 318 (9-78) NRCM 0240 4 U.S. GOYERNMEN7 aRINTING OFFICE: 1979.289-369
pe