ML20212P968
| ML20212P968 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1986 |
| From: | DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212P946 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8609030352 | |
| Download: ML20212P968 (6) | |
Text
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ATTACHMENT A
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Revise the Technical Specifications as follows:
Remove Pace Insert Pace 3/4 6-19g 3/4 6-19g 1
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1 8609030352 060022 DR ADOCK 05000334 PDR
o TABLE 3.6-1 CONTAllMENT PENETRATIONS m
E MAXIMUM MAXIMUM PENT.
INSIDE STROKE OUTSIDE STROKE s
NO.-AREA IDENTIFICATION / DESCRIPTION VALVE TIME *(SEC)
VALVE TIME *(SEC)
E
'2 78-5g0 FW Loop IC Closed System N/A (2)MOV-1FW-156C 75 e5 FW Loop IC Closed System N/A (2)FCV-1FW-498 10 FW Loop IC Closed System N/A (6)MOV-1FW-158C N/A Auxiliary Feedwater Loop IC Closed System N/A (2)MOV-1FW-151A N/A Auxiliary Feedwater Loop IC Closed System N/A (2)MOV-1FW-1518 N/A 79-5g0 RW to 1A RSP Hx Closed System N/A (2)MOV-1RW-104A N/A 83-590 RW to IC RSP Hx Closed System N/A (1)MOV-1RW-104C N/A 81-590 RW to IB RSP Hx Closed System N/A (2)MOV-1RW-1048 N/A
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82-SgD RW to ID RSP Hx Closed System N/A (2)MOV-1RW-104D N/A h
83-SgD RW from 1A RSP Hx Closed System N/A (2)MOV-1RW-105A N/A y
84-SgD RW from IC RSP Hx Closed System N/A (2)MOV-1RW-105C N/A 85-5g0 RW from IB RSP Hx Closed System N/A (2)MOV-1RW-1058 N/A 86-SgD RW from 10 RSP Hx Closed System N/A (2)MOV-1RW-105D N/A 87-590 H2 Discharge to CMIT 1HY-111 N/A 1HY-197 88-SgD H2 Discharge to CMtT 1HY-110 N/A 4
j 89-SgD Main Condenser Ejector Vent 1AS-278 N/A (B)TV-1SV-100A 20 90-SgD CNMT Purge Exhaust VS-D-5-33 (5)8 VS-D-5-3A (5)8 91-590 CNMT Purge Supply VS-D-5-53 (5)11 VS-D-5-5A (5)8 4
VS-D-5-6 N/A
ATTACHMENT B
Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 130 No Significant Hazard Consideration Description of Plant Equipment:
The hydrogen recombiners were modified during the fifth refueling outage to upgrade the electrical components to more current standards.
Part of the modification included replacing the positive displacement blowers in the recombiners with centrifugal type blowers.
When testing the recombiners, it was determined that the required Technical Specification flow through the recombiners could not be obtained with the containment at normal operating vacuum.
The resultant investigation determined that the weight loaded 2-inch swing check valves installed inside containment on both the recembiner suction and discharge lines offered too high a resistance to flow for the new blower.
Subsequent testing conducted with these check valves held open resulted in acceptable test results demonstrating the operability of the hydrogen recombiners.
In order to achieve this piping and valve configuration to support recombiner operation, a plant modification was required.
The inside containment check valves on the recombiner suction lines do not function as containment isolation valves but rather function to prevent air in-leakage to containment in the event of failure of the containment vacuum pumps which maintain the containment subatmospheric.
The internals of those suction valves will be removed and new check valves will be installed downstream of the 2 outside containment isolation valves and upstream of the containment vacuum pumps to prevent air in-leakage to containment.
New ball valves will be installed on the recombiner discharge piping to serve as new containment isolation valves.
These valves will be installed as close to the existing outside containment isolation valves as possible and still permit leak testability.
The inside containment isolation valves (weighted swing check valves) will have their internals removed following acceptance testing of the new isolation valves.
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would revise the containment isolation valves listed for Table 3.6-1 penetrations 87 and 88 (hydrogen recombiner dischargo to containment).
The proposed changes would support the modification of the valvo configuration for the hydrogen recombinar dischargo piping.
The following technical specification changes are proposed:
1.
remove the insido containment isolation valvos 1HY-120 and 1HY-119 from the Tabic at ponotrations 87 and 88 respectively.
2.
add the outsido containment isolation valves 1HY-197 and 1HY-196 to the Table at penetrations 87 and 88 respectively.
ATTACHMENT B l
Page 2 l
l Basis for no significant hazard determination:
The proposed changes do not involve a significant hazard consideration because operation of the plant in accordance with these changes would not:
(1) Involve a
significant increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated becauset The new manual isolation valves (1HY-196 and 1HY-197) will be administratively controlled in the locked shut position consistent with the control provided for the present isolation i
valves (HY-110 and HY-111) located outside containment.
l The new design satisfies the 1971 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 54 criteria with respect to Piping Systems Penetrating Containment and meets the intent of GDC 56 for Primary Containment Isolation i
by providing the following defined " basis for demonstrating containment isolation.
UFSAR Section 5.3 will require revision to describe the method of satisfying GDC 56 such that two administratively controlled locked closed valves outside containment are acceptable for containment isolation.
In
- addition, UFSAR Figures 5.4-3 and 6.5-1 require revision to incorporate the valving design changes.
System leakage in the piping between the containment penetration and the manual isolation valves (HY-110 and HY-111) prior to a Design Basis Accident is identifiable and self monitoring since the inloakage would increase the containment pressure and alert the operator.
Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 requires that if containment vacuum is lost and not rostored within one hour, the plant must be in at least Hot Standby within i hours and in Cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
High energy line breaks which could cause failure of the hydrogen recombiner piping at HY-110 and HY-111 would not croato a containment environment requiring the operation of the hydrogen recombiners or cause a release of activity in excess of 10 CFR 100 limits. The piping from the containment to the containment isolation valves meets the stress requirements of the break / crack exclusion critoria sotforth in Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1 " Postulated Rupturo Locations in Fluid System Piping Insido and Outside Containment",
Section B.2.b.
Thorofore, since the now design performs the same containment isolation function as the current design, the now design will not affect the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously ovaluated.
(2) Create the possibility of a now or a different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because:
The now valvo configuration will perform the same function as the existing design.
The recombinor system would be placed in operatien following a
DBA and after the containment has boon returned to subatmophoric conditions.
Additionally, during each refueling the penetration piping through to the containment isolation valves is pressure testod to 40.3 psig as part of our Typo C testing program.
The recombinor piping outboard of the isolation valvos
r ATTACHMENT B Page 3 is also leak tested at 4 psig which is above the normal operating pressure for these units.
These tests demonstrate system integrity.
The piping from containment to the isolation valves is rated at 150 psig.
Since this piping would be expected to see a
peak LOCA pressure of 38.3 psig and has been tested to 65 psig following this modification, there is adequate safety margin between the piping design pressure and the pressure the piping would see during accident conditions.
Therefore, since there is l
sufficient margin between the pressure at which the system has been proven to withstand and the expected accident conditions the new valving configuration is safe and will not create the possibility of a
new or a different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
(3) Involve a
significant reduction in the margin of safety because:
The design pressure rating of the piping including the valves and the testing perforn.ed on the system and components has provided adequate assurance that the system will be available to perform the required function under all accident conditions.
Therefore, the margin of safety will be maintained since the new design will ensure the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment.
conclusion l
The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident, do l
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident and do not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The modified valving arrangement provides redundant containment penetration isolation capability similar to that provided by the current design and the new manual isolation valves (NY-196 and HY-197) will be administrative 1y controlled in the 1ccked shut position consistent with the control provided for the present isolation valves (HY-110 and HY-111).
The check valve added l
downstream of the containment vacuum pump suction isolation valves will perform the same function as the present check valve located inside containment on the suction piping to prevent air in-leakage to containment in the event of failure of the containment vacuum pumps.
l Therefore, the present check valve located inside containment will no longer to required.
Since the new design performs the same function as the current valve configuration and the piping from the containment to the containment isolation valves meets the stress l
requirements of the break / crack exclusion criteria setforth in Branch l
Tochinical Position MEB 3-1 it is proposed to cha:acterize the change as involving no significant hazards consideration.
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