ML20212P466

Forwards Response to Concerns Resulting from Control Room Habitability Survey on 870112-16,including Justification for as-installed Design,Addl Control Room HVAC Flow Data & Info on Equipment Used to Perform Flow Measurements

ML20212P466
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	03/09/1987
From:	Nauman D SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8703160119
Download: ML20212P466 (17)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:e-O th Carolina Electric & Gas Company Dn n Co umb. 29218 Nuclear Operations i SCE&G March 9, 1987 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Docket No. 50/395 Operating License No. NPF-12 Control Room Habitability

Dear Mr. Denton:

A Control Room Habitability Survey was conducted at the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station by an NRC team during the week of January 12-16, 1987. As a result of this survey, several questions were raised by the team. The purpose of this letter and its attachments is to provide responses to the concerns which were identified during the survey. Attachment I contains a summary of the as-installed configuration details of the Control Room Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System. Attachment II describes the design concerns which were identified by the NRC and provides the supporting justification for the as-installed design. Attachment III provides additional SCE&G Control Room HVAC flow data and information on the equipment SCE&G utilizes to perform the flow measurements. If you should have any questions, please advise. V y tr y h rs, \\ . 'Muma i AMM: DAN:bjh Attachment c:

0. W. Dixon, Jr./T. C. Nichols, Jr.

R. M. Campbell, Jr. l E. C. Roberts K. E. Nodland J. G. Connelly, Jr. R. A. Stough D. R. Moore G. O. Percival W. A. Williams, Jr. R. L. Prevatte J. Nelson Grace J. B. Knotts, Jr. Group Managers NPCF g)

0. S. Bradham PSRC C. A. Price File

! l C. L. Ligon (NSRC) OCK 5 P

r PAGE 10F 1 c ATTACHMENT I The as-installed design for the Control Room HVAC system consists of: Zone isolation with recirculated air and positive pressure (1/8" wg). Normally open redundant outside air intake valves (corresponding to the running HVAC train) with one valve blocked to a pre-set airflow volume (1000 cfm) in each train. One control room air handling unit isolation damper per train (XDP-22A,B-AH). Blank-off plates installed on relief ductwork (located next to XDP-21A,B-AH). Original outside air intakes (on roof) to control room air handling units are also blanked off. Majority of toilet room exhaust ductwork is non-seismically supported. Toilet room exhaust fan and charcoal filter are non-safety related components. Redundant, fail close, relief head isolation dampers discharging to the roof (XDP-133A, B-AH and 234A, B-AH). Chlorine cylinders are non-seismically supported and stored in a non-seismically qualified shed located in excess of 150 meters from the Control Room outside air intakes. l l

PAGE10F6 ATTACHMENT II Concerns Due to Design Differences Between As-Installed and Licensed Condition Potential for loss of control room pressure due to loss of non-seismically supported toilet room exhaust ductwork. Potential for unfiltered inleakage greater than 10 cfm due to ductwork configuration, system operation and single active failure of either damper XDP-22A or 8-AH. Control room dose rate analysis must be performed to assure the following allowables are not exceeded: Whole body 5 rem Thyroid 30 rem Per Standard Review Plan (SRP) 6.4 Beta Skindose 30 rem Capability to manually isolate control room from chlorine will affect control room HVAC system operation. Control room isolation occurs with the manual closure of outside air intake valves XVB-3A,B; 4A,8-AH. Closure of these valves de-energizes their respective operating train of control room HVAC equipment. Without operation of the HVAC equipment, the control room air temperature would rise. l l l l l l l l l l 1

PAGE2OF6 Analysis Justifying Design Differences One Train Running with Loss of Toilet Room Exhaust Ductwork Given the as installed condition and the potential of a single failure of damper XDP-22A, or B-AH, loss of the toilet room exhaust ductwork, chlorine release, and radiation release occurring at the same time, the following accident scenarios were analyzed to confirm that a significant safety hazard does not exist: CASE 1. The initiating event is an earthquake coincident with in a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) coupled with a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP). Given the initiating event, the analysis assumes: Radiation release Chlorine cylinder rupture Toilet exhaust ductwork falls down The single failure assumed in this analysis is the failure of one (1) diesel generator to start. This results in only one (1) control room HVAC emergency ventilation system available for operation. This scenario provides the condition for the lowest control room pressure. Failure (open) of damper XDP-22A or B-AH is not considered in this scenario since that would constitute two failures (diesel + damper). CASE 2. The initiating event is an earthquake coincident with a LOCA. In this event a LOOP is not postulated to occur. Given this scenario the analysis assumes: Radiation release Chlorine cylinder rupture Toilet exhaust ductwork falls down Both Control Room HVAC emergency ventilation systems are running. One (1) train will be shutdown after thirty (30) minutes. The single failure taken in this scenario is the failure of either XDP-22A or B-AH. This scenario provides the condition for the maximum amount of outside air capable of being brought into the control room -- both filtered and unfiltered. The train that will be shutdown will be the one with the failed open damper. This assumption is based primarily on operation of the limit switches which provide indication of the damper position. Failure scenarios of the damper / limit switch / actuator combination provide assurance that either an open damper or open-closed damper (dim light indication on main control board) will be indicated as a damper malfunction. In accordance with Emergency Operating Procedure (E.0.P.) 1.0, " Reactor Trip / Safety Injection Actuation," the operator is required to verify that all safety injection phase A isolation status lights are bright. This action will alert the operator to a failure of either damper XDP-22A or B-AH and to close if required. E.0.P. 2.0, " Loss of Reactor or

PAGE 3 OF 6 Secondary Coolant," directs the operator to stop one train of the control room emergency ventilation system within 30 minutes. This action will provide isolation of the control room emergency ventilation system associated with the identified failed damper XDP-22A or B-AH. In both cases (1 and 2) partial credit was taken for the height above grade (-48') of the lowest control room air intake for chlorine analysis. Additionally, credit was not taken for the charcoal adsorbing the chlorine. Ten (10) cfm of unfiltered air was used for ingress and egress per SRP 6.4. Damper leakage, whether through the closed blades or through the damper shafts, was taken as 20 cfm based on leakage data of similarly constructed dampers at the operating pressure differential. The toilet exhaust ductwork failure was taken as a double guillotine failure with full duct area available for an air leakage path. The control room system operational characteristics utilized in this analysis consisted of the emergency filter plenum filters at a Technical Specification (3/4.7.6) limit of six inches water gauge across the roughing and HEPA Filters and Charcoal bank. Also, a control room pressure of 1/8 inch water gauge with an outside air makeup flow rate of 1000 cfm was utilized as a starting condition. In accordance with Regulatory Guic'e 1.78, the maximum concentration duration accident was determined for the rupture of one (1) chlorine bottle. The duration of the chlorine release and its effect on the control room operators was calculated to be 19 minutes. The basis for taking only a single cylinder rupture was based on the fact that each cylinder has its own isolation valve and it is normally closed. Only one isolation valve on one chlorine cylinder is required to be open to perform system function. Review of electrical elementaries indicated that if the outside air intake valves (XVB-3A, B; 4A, B-AH) were closed, the respective emergency control room HVAC train would be de-energized. This would leave the control room without ventilation and a potential for control room temperature rise and loss of pressurization could exist. The analysis considered the outside air intake valves to remain open during the chlorine accident. This assures that proper cooling and pressurization to the control room is provided. l Data evaluated for each case consisted of: 1 1 Control Room Pressure Radiation Dose to Operators (30 days) [ i Chlorine Exposure to Operators Outside Air Make-up Flowrate Unfiltered Inleakage Filtered Airflow

PAGE4OF6 The results for Case 1 are as follows: Previous 30 Days Commitment Analysis Control Room Pressure (in, wg) 0.04 >0 N/A Radiation dose Thyroid (rem) 19.3 <30 30 Whole Body (rem) 2 <5 2.3 Chlorine Concentration (mg/m3) 27.6 <45 N/A Unfiltered Inleakage (cfm) 30* N/A 10 Filtered Airflow (cfm) 1200** N/A 2750 20 cfm damper inleakage + 10 cfm ingress, egress i The results for Case 2 are as follows: First Previous 30 min. 30 Days Commitment Analysis Control. Room Pressure (in, wg) 0.09 0.04 >0 N/A i Radiation Dose ] Thyroid (rem) N/A 23.8 <30 30 Whole Body (rem) N/A 2 <5 2.3 i Chlorine Concentration (mg/m3) 39.8 N/A <4E N/A Outside Air Make-up (cfm) 1900 1200 N/A N/A Unfiltered Inleakage (cfm) 1000* 30 N/A 10 Filtered Airflow (cfm) 900 1200 N/A 2750 950 cfm outside air intake ** i 40 cfm (20 cfm per damper XDP-22-A, B-AH) 10 cfm - ingress, egress 1000 cfm -e w. y, w.,----r ,,,.----w----2 m, --.y------- - ~.-y ,-,-wre---w we r r------ w i r e v-- w- - -

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PAGE50F6 The maximum outside air (0. A.) make up flowrates are analytically determined values based on the available negative pressure at the 0. A. intake ductwork. This negative pressure is influenced by the following factors: Status of the filter banks (clean / dirty) Status of damper XDP-22A or B-AH (open/ closed) Control Room pressurization level Single or dual emergency train operation The available pressure, based on combinations of the factors indicated above, is determined at the 0.A. intake duct. This negative pressure is then related to the normal mode (1,000 cfm 0. A.) available negative pressure by use of standard aerodynamic relationships to determine the

0. A. make-up flowrate (Emergency Mode).

The 0. A. make-up flowrate of 1200 cfm is based on the following system configuration: Both the normal supply and the emergency recirculation filter banks are clean. Dampers XDP-22A-AH and XDP-228-AH are closed. Reduced Control Room Pressurization level (toilet room exhaust duct broken). One emergency train in operation. The 0. A. intake flowrate of 950 cfm is based on the following system configuration: Both the normal supply and the emergency recirculation filter banks are clean. Either damper XDP-22A-AH or XDP-22B-AH has failed open and the other damer is closed. Reduced Control Room pressurization level (toilet room exhaust duct broken). Both emergency trains are in operation. j

PAGE6OF6

== Conclusions:== Dose rate values are.below the allowable values. Chlorine concentration values are below toxicity limits. The requirement for positive pressurization has been met. The result of lower control room pressure brought on by the failure of the toilet room exhaust duct also increases the amount of outside air makeup. Additionally, the single failure of damper XDP-22A or B-AH has the effect of introducing unfiltered outside air into the control room. The values previously evaluated were 2750 cfm filtered and 10 cfm unfiltered (30 rem Thyroid, 2.3 rem Whole Body) (ref FSAR Tables 15.4-17 and 18). Dose rate to the control room operators over 30 days utilizing the calculated infiltration figures (filtered and unfiltered) of Case 2, worst case for radiation evaluation, has shown a thyroid dose of 23.8 rem and a whole body dose of two rem. These values are below the allowable figures of 30 rem and five rem respectively (SRP 6.4). Therefore a substantial safety hazard to the control room operators does not exist due to radiation. Credit had been taken for the capability of manual isolation of the control room upon detection of a chlorine leak. Due to the detrimental effect of the manual isolation of the control room through closure of the outside air intake valves, exposure of the control room operators to chlorine was calculated using the total inleakage values (1900 cfm) from Case 2. The resultant concentration (39.8 mg/m3) is less than the allowable value of 45mg/m3 (Regulatory Guide 1.78). The effect of chlorine on charcoal adsorbent material has been estimated at a reduction in efficiency of 0.05% to 0.10%. Adherence to plant procedures which require periodic testing of charcoal adsorbent in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 position C.6a, requires change out of charcoal should the efficiency of the charcoal's ability to capture radioactive iodine fall below 99%. The effect of chlorine on charcoal l 1s to lower its potential efficiency to between 98.90% and 98.95%. Since control room dose rate analysis took credit for a charcoal I efficiency of only 95% (FSAR Table 15.4-17), adequate safety margin exists. Therefore, the Control Room HVAC design meets the intent of j Regulatory Guides 1.78 and 1.95 through adequate design features that mitigate hazards to control room operators from postulated accidental chlorine releases. The calculated control room pressure, radiation dose rates and chlorine concentrations, utilizing the worst case failure scenarios, have been shown to be within plant design basis criteria and do not have a detrimental effect on equipment important to safety nor to personnel in the control room. It is concluded that a single failure of either a diesel generator or of damper XDP-22A or B-AH, coupled with the total loss of the toilet room exhaust duct and the rupture of a chlorine cylinder, does not create a substantial safety hazard. i L-..---..~.-.

ATTACHMENT III SCE&G utilizes a pitot tube and either a manometer or microtector to measure flow in the Control Room HVAC ductwork at the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS). These instruments are sensitive to flow in one direction only and have an accuracy for field use of 15%. The NRC survey team utilized a hot wire anemometer for obtaining flow data. According to various industry handbooks, the hot wire anemometer is accurate in the field to 10% and is recommended for use in measuring very low flows. For the flow conditions which exist in the Control Room HVAC ductwork at the VCSNS, SCE&G is confident that the equipment currently being utilized accurately measures flow and provides precise flow data. However, as a result of the discrepancy between the SCE&G and NRC air flow measurements which occurred during the NRC survey, SCE&G collected additional flow data in an attempt to verify the accuracy of previous measurements. To ensure the accuracy of the data from a human factors standpoint, Maintenance Special Instruction (MSI) 87T0032 was generated (Enclosure I, also see Note 1). To provide an additional verification as to the accuracy of the test equipment being utilized, two separate sets of equipment were used to measure flow in the high flow regions of ductwork and two setups were used in the low flow regions. At each measurement point, flow data was obtained by both equipment sets. Since VCSNS possesses only one microtector (equipment used to measure low flows), SCE&G borrowed another utility's microtector in order to have the ability to provide a comparison of low flow data. The results of the additional flow measurements are provided in Enclosure II. As shown in this table, at each measurement point the percent difference in flow measurement readings between the two different equipment setups is no greater than 3.1%. Based on the above discussion and measurement results, SCE&G has concluded that current test equipment provides acceptable and accurate flow rate data. NOTE 1 - System ductwork drawings have been attached to this MSI; however, these drawings are not a portion of the MSI and are included for the NRC's information only. PAGE 1 0F 1

ENCLOSURE I MAINTENANCE SERVICES MAINTENANCE SPECIALINSTRUCTION ~ MASTER CONTRO_ C0).Y. / MSI-87T0032 Verify Control Room HVAC Flow Rates REVISION O SAFETY RELATED + h k ) / en1 DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR $t/ .uur 2-6-f7 o.1E.,,RevEo govm< u1 oR,1v 't 7,- r,,-

~- ENCLOSURE I PAGE 2 OF 5 I. PURPOSE: The purpose of this MSI is to provide instructions for obtaining accurate flow rate measurements with the instruments listed below. Since the physical principal of hydro static balance employed by the manometer is as reliable as gravity, this procedure will focus on the human factors that can affect the accuracy of the data gathered. DWYER - Microtector point gage used in conjunction with a pitot tube. DWYER - 10" inclined / vertical manometer used in conjunction with a pitot tube. II.

REFERENCES:

A. Dwyer Catalog B. Ashrae Handbook of Fundamentals C. SMACNA .HVAC Systems Testing, Adjusting and Balancing D. Burgess, Jennings - The Thermal Environment E. MMP-460.024 III. PREREQUISITES: Equipment Check: A. Microtector 1. Verify that water with fluorescein green concentrate wetting agent is being used at the ratio of 3/4 oz to a quart of distilled water. I 2. Verify that the inch scale, furnished with this instrument is i j for use with water. l B. 10" Incli,ned/ Vertical Manometer 1. Verify that Dwyer-826 Sp. Gr. oil is being used in gauge. 2. Verify that the inch scale furnished is the adjusted scale for use with.826 Sp. Gr. oil. f C. Pitot Tube. l NOTE: Dwyer pitot tubes comply with AMCA and Ashrae specifications and have a unity calibration factor. I I l PAGE 1 of 3

5 ENCLOSURE I( PAGE 3 OF 5 1. Verify that tubs op:;ningo and passage ways era frea of any d:bris. 2. Verify that tube.is not bent or' damaged. D. All instruments have been calibrated in the past 6 months. E. All scales are clear and clean. IV. PRECAUTIONS: A.. Velocity pressure readings must be made with the viewers line of sight perpendicular to the fluid column to eliminate errors caused by the parallax effect. This is accomplished by aligning the fluid meniscus with its reflection on the polished aluminum scale. B. Care must be exercised to align the pitot tube tip parallel with and directly into the air stream. Use the static connection on bottom of pitot tube as guide for directing the tip. To further ensure accurate measurement of flow, leveling the static tube to same degree as the ductwork as well as maintaining it parallel to the sides of the ductwork shall be accomplished using levels, framing squres or plumb bobs, as necessary. Slightly vary the alignment of the tube tip in the air stream after positioning and, record data at the position where peak readings are observed. NOTE: Dwyer states accurate reading can be obtained when tip is directed within 15* of air flow direction. However, every effort should be made to determine peak flow position. C. Instruments must be maintained at a level position at all times during data collection. Check leveling indicator prior to each reading. D. The bottom of the fluid meniscus should be used to determine velocity pressure readings. IV. INITIAL CONDITIONS: A. The HVAC train in service to be aligned in the emergency mode. B. Verify AP of 1/8" W.G. across Control Room boundary. 4 PAGE 2 of 3

~ ENCLOSURE I PAGE 4 OF 5 VI. PROCEDURE: A. Notify Operations of start of test. B. Set up two 10" inclined / vertical manometers per instructions of MMP-460.024, Section 7.3 (see attached procedure). C. Take flow measurements at the following points per the attached flow diagram of Control Room HVAC. A Train In Service B Train In Service PT. #4 PT. #18 PT. #14 PT. #28 PT. #8 PT. #22 PT. #6 PT. #20 NOTE: Use existing traverse hole pattern in duct. The measurements are to be taken twice at each point, once with each manometer and pitot tube. D. Set up two Dwyer microtectors per instructions of MMP-460.024, Section 7.2 (see attached procedure). E. Take flow measurements at the following points per the attached flow diagram of Control Room HVAC only. A Train In Service B Train In Service i PT. #13 PT #27 NOTE: Use existing traverse hole pattern in duct. The measurements are to be taken twice at each point, once with each microtector and pitot tube. F. Verify system lineup has not changed. G. Notify Operations of test completion. H. Calculate flow rates per MMP-460.024. l t l l PAGE3of3 o

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ENCLOSURE II MSI TEST-87T0032 % DIFFERENCE COMPARISON INST. NO INST. NO. 1-5-87 1-5-87 FS-1983 FS-2558 (NOTE 1) PT.#4 21,627 22,161 24,865 22,058 2.4% PT.#14 21,974 21,979 25,666 22,224 <1.0% PT.#8 21,674 21,451 22,779 21,830 1.0% PT.#6 21,289 21,278 25,325 21,384 <1.0% MSI TEST-87T0032 % DIFFERENCE COMPARISON

• f INST. NO INST. NO.

1-5-87 1-5-87 FS-2143 (NOTE 1) PT.#13 930 940 1243 967 1.1% MSI TEST-67T0032 % DIFFERENCE COMPARISON I!JST. NO INST. NO. 1-5-87 1-5-87 en FS-1983 FS-2558 (NOTE 1) PT.#18 21,643 21,713 24,585 20,652 < 1.0 % PT.#28 22,685 22,791 27,375 21,026 <1.0% PT.#22 20,891 21,177 22,515 21.091 1.4% PT.#20 20,746 20,832 22,336 21,004 <1.0% MSI TEST-87T0032 % DIFFERENCE COMPARISON INST. NO INST. NO. 1-5-87 1-5-87 en FS-2143 (NOTE 1) PT.#27 869 896 1034 925 3.1 %

• Instrument borrowed from another utility.

NOTE 1: % Calculated using following method - (Point 1 - Point 2) (Point 1 + Point 2) 2 l PAGE 1 0F 1 .}}