ML20212P288

Insp Repts 50-321/86-20 & 50-366/86-20 on 860701-31. Violation Noted:Unit 1 CRD Hydraulic Control Units Not Installed Per Design Drawings

ML20212P288
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	08/15/1986
From:	Holmesray P, Ignatonis A, Paulk G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212P270	List: ML20212P267 ML20212P277 ML20212P288
References
50-321-86-20, 50-366-86-20, NUDOCS 8609030063
Download: ML20212P288 (7)

See also: IR 05000321/1986020

Text

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UNITED STATES

/ P Fr rg'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ -

n REGION 11

g ,j 1G1 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

• 's ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

%,...../

Report Numbers: 50-321/85-20 and 50-366/85-20-

Licensee: Georgia Power Company

P.O. Box 4545

Atlanta, GA 30302

Docket Numbers: 50-321 and 50-366

License Numbers: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2

Inspection Dates: July 1 - July 31,1986

Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia

Inspectors: -

8 // 84

Peter Holmes-Ray, Senior)Hisident Inspector Ddte S'igned

6 1. c8_ _ WL, R llthd

G. L. Pgdlk, S'epfor' Resident Inspector Date/ Signed

Approved by: C'Y d . M -n yk 8[/5/f(

A. J. Igrfatonis,/fection Chief Date Signed

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Operational Safety Verification,

Maintenance Observation, Plant Modification and Surveillance Observation and

Reportable Occurrences.

Results: One violation was identified - Unit I hydraulic control units were

found installed not in accordance with the design drawing.

8609030063 860020

PDR ADOCK 05000321

G PDR 'l

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

• H. C. Nix, Site General Manager

• T. Greene, Deputy Site General Manager

• H. L. Sumner, Operations Manager

• T. Seitz, Maintenance Manager

• T. R. Powers, Engineering Manager

R. W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

• 0. M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager (Acting)

C. T. Moore, Training Manager

• S. B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,

mechanics, security force members and office personnel.

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 3 and August 1,

1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did

not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by

the inspectors during this inspection. One violation was identified. The

licensee acknowledged the findings and took no exception.

(0 pen) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-321/86-20-01 - Evaluation of the seismic

adequacy of the Unit 1 HCUs in the as found configuration. (pa agraph 4).

(0 pen) Violation 50-321/86-20-02 - Control rod drive HCUs were not installed

in the design support mounting configuration as required by design drawing

919D615. (paragraph 4).

(0 pen) URI 50-366/86-20-03 - Evaluation of the seismic adequacy of the as

found configuration of the Unit 2 diesel generator batteries. (paragraph 4)

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-321, 366/86-20-04 - Cable pulling

procedures not in conformance with latest industry standards. (paragraph 5).

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Violation 50-366/85-24-02 - Modification to Unit 2 drywell

pneumatic system prior to submittal and approval by the NRC as required by

10CFR50.59(a) (1). GPC letter of October 21, 1985 and NRC response of

November 12, 1985, were reviewed. The licensee's actions that have been

taken were determined to be acceptable by the inspector verifying the

licensee's response. No discrepancies were noted.

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4. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall

plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.

Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the

plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control

room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings,

status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment, controls and

switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for coera-

tion, temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data sheet

entries, control room manning, and access controls. This inspection

activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their

supervisors. Weekly, when on site, selected Engineering Safety Feature

(ESF) systems were confirmed operable. The confirmation was made by

verifying the following: accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply

breaker and fuse status, instrumentation, major component leakage, lubrica-

tion, cooling, and general condition.

General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions

of the Control Building, Turbine Building, Reactor Building and outside

areas were visited. Observations included safety related tagout verifica-

tions, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant

conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress,

radiation protection controls, physical security, problem identification

systems, and containment isolation.

In the course of the monthly activities, the Resident Inspectors included a

review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of

various shif ts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily

activities to include: protected ar.d vital access controls, searching of

personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of

visitors, patrols and compensatory posts. In addition, the Resident

Inspectors observed protected area lighting, protected and vital areas

barrier integrity and verified an interface between the security organiza-

tion and operations or maintenance. On July 2, 1986, the inspectors

observed that an apparent lack of compensatory security had taken place when

the intake structure was opened for pump removal. This item was turned over

to Region II security inspectors for followup.

CONTROL R0D DRIVE HYDRAULIC CONTROL UNIT INSTALLATION

The inspector reviewed the installation mounting criteria and configuration

for Unit 1 and 2 to determine if design specifications were met for the

Control Rod Drive System Hydraulic Control Unit. The Control Rod Drive

System is designed to withstand earthquake loads per specific plant require-

ments.

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An inspection of the HCU's mounting supports revealed that none of the Unit

1 HCU's were supported as required by General Electric design drawing

9190615. The design specifications require that the mounting configuration

consisting of a .50-13X3.00lg, bolt conforming to ASTM A307 Grade A.

American Standard Medium Section Bolt Carbon Steel Spring Lockwasher and

American Standard Type B Common Steel Plain Punched Washer, Reg. series,

shall be provided between the bolt heads and the control unit frame. The

inspector found that none of the floor support attachment configurations for

the HCUs had the plain punched washer installed as required. Space could be

seen between the bolt head through the HCU rack to the unistrut base

attachment. The inspector questioned the licensee as to the seismic

qualification of the installed HCus. The licensee requested and obtained a

General Electric evaluation of the concern. The inspector reviewed the

evaluation, and determined that it does not adequately address the plant

specific findings (GE letter G-GPC-6-266 of July 22, 1986). Specifically,

if all plain washers are missing from the Unit 1 HCU's, it has not been

determined that the reactor can be safely shutdown during a seismic event.

The evaluation assumptions may not be valid for the Hatch specific problem.

This item will be left unresolved for further NRC followup. (321/86-20-01).

The failure of the HCUs to be installed as required by design drawing

9190615 is a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V. (321/86-20-02).

DIESEL GENERATOR BATTERIES

The inspector conducted a routine inspection of the diesel generator 125-V

diesel batteries. A separate 125-V diesel battery building is furnished for

each diesel generator and its associated 4-KV bus. Each battery has its own

static-type battery charger, circuit breaker, and bus with a spare battery

charger for each battery to permit servicing or sparing any charger.

Control power for each diesel, its generator breaker, and the associated

4-KV switchgear bus power feeder circuit breakers is supplied by its

respective battery. The batteries and battery racks are Class 1E equipment

to assure contir.uous operation of the equipment under maximum seismic

condition. Deficiencies noted are listed below.

(1) Unit 2 diesel batteries (2A & 2C) had excessive spacing between

individual cells and the side and end stringer supports. The installa-

tion was not in accordance with design drawing 061918C which shows no

end spacer. Additionally, the design drawing was in error in that it

indicated side spacing between the rack and the battery cell of greater

than 1/8 inch. The drawing should indicate less than 1/8 inch

according to iicensee representatives as discussed with the vendor.

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(2) Various support clamps on Unit 1 and 2 diesel batteries were not in

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accordance with design specifications in that the U-nut on the unistrut

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to frame clamp tie-downs were not fully engaged on the battery rack

configurations.

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(3) The battery rooms for Unit 1 and 2 indicated poor housekeeping with

excessive corrosion on the battery rack frames, excessive spills of

electrolyte and additive on battery cells, much dust and dirt in

battery rack area, and battery dust caps left off after surveillances.

(4) The battery surveillances (52SV-R42-001-1S) for taking battery cell

temperature and specific gravity was not adequate in that it did not

address the replacement of dust caps on the battery cells after use or

the removal / installation of the thermometer in the cells. Some

batteries had dust caps off with a thermometer laying on a cell top

nearby, and some had thermometers still installed in the battery cells.

This item will be left unresolved pending resolution of the rack / battery

qualification and followup vendor report stating whether the batteries for

Unit 2 diesel generator were seismically qualified as found. (366/86-20-03).

5. Maintenance Observation (62703)

During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance

activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for

adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to Technical

Specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the

actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and

adherence to the appropriate quality controls.

CABLE PULLING PROCEDURE

The inspector reviewed the plant's cable pulling procedures used for

safety-related circuits. The instruction reviewed was 52GM-MEL-003-0 (Cable

and Cable Ways Installation). The procedure was found to be general in

nature and not in keeping with current industry practice. The similar

procedure at Vogtle Plant (ED-T-07) is more in keeping with current industry

practice in addressing maximum pull tensions, sidewall pressures, tension

measuring devices, etc.. The licensee stated at the exit that their

intention was to use the current procedure and not incorporated the current

industry standards. This item has been turned over to the electrical

section of the Region II office as an open item for further followup.

(321/366/86-20-04).

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Plant Modification and Surveillance Testing Observations (37700 & 61726)

The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillances and plant

modification Design Change Requests (DCRs). The observation included a

review of the procedure and/or DCR for technical adequacy, conformance to

Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument calibration,

observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal from service

and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of

the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria.

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FSAR CHANGES

The inspector reviewed the licensee program for making FSAR update change to

assure regulatory requirements are met. The licensee implements the program

by use of the document change request (DCR) procedure (ENG-0015). Each

FSAR update change included a safety evaluation addressing 10 CFR 50.59

requirements. During the review several minor documentation deficiencies

were noted as listed below.

(1) Request No. 86-15 (Unit 2 FSAR change) was missing the required signoff

for PRB (plant review board) initial review on the DCR cover sheet.

This signoff was also found missing on DCR 85-41 and DCR 85-30.

(2) The Plant Review Board Meeting Minutes for Meeting number 85-201 which

included a review of FSAR change DCR 85-37 was missing a signoff by the

PRB Chairman or G.M. letter no. as required on the cover sheet.

The Assistant Plant Manager stated in the exit that these minor deficiencies

would be corrected and more careful attention to required signoffs would be

addressed during future similar reviews.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The inspectors routinely conduct partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve and

, breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions are randomly verified both

locally and in the control room to verify that the lineups were in accord-

ance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material

conditions were satisfactory. During the inspection period the inspectors

conducted a complete walkdown, in the accessible areas, of Unit-1 Plant

Service Water (PSW) System.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

8. Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)

The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential

generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective

actions appeared appropriate and are closed. Events which were reported

immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical

Specifications were being met and the public health and safety were of

utmost consideration.

Unit-1: 85-20, 85-23*, 85-35, 85-38, 85-39, 85-40, 85-41, 85-46 and 86-26*.

Unit-2: 85-30, 85-32, 85-34, 85-36 and 85-37.

• In-depth review performed.

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LER 50-321-85-23 - FAILURE TO CONTINU0USLY MONITOR REACTOR WATER

CONDUCTIVITY - On June 16, 1985 with the unit at 95% power the licensee

determined that the reactor water continuous conductivity monitor was

inoperable since it was isolated for replacement of a gauge. The operations

person who authorized the gauge replacement did not realize that removal of

the gauge would render the system inoperable. The gauge removal took place

on June 14, 1985. Failure to obtain four hour grab samples from 10:00 a.m.,

June 14, 1985 to about 8:00 a.m. , June 16, 1985, was a licensee identified

violation (LIV) of Technical Specifications section 4. 6. F. 2. a .1. (LIV

50-321/86-20-05). Because the NRC supports licensee initiative for

self-identification and correction of problems and that the violation met

the tests addressed in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, a notice of violation will

not be issued.

LER 50-321-86-26 - DEFECTIVE PROCEDURE CAUSES NON-COMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL

SPECIFICATIONS - The procedure REACTOR WATER LEVEL (RPS) FT&C, number

57SV-B21-002-1, was deleted and replaced by four procedures on December 18,

1985. On June 4, 1986 the licensee found that the TS requirement to perturb

the reactor water level and observe instrument tracking had been omitted

when the four procedures were written. The functional test and calibration

of these four level instruments is an every 31 days requirement. Unit I was

in cold refueling / shutdown condition when this error was discovered. .The

perturbation requirement was not performed for the April or May FT & C. The

procedures were corrected and the meters performed correctly on June 15,

1986. This is a licensee identified violation (LIV 50-321/86-20-06).

Because the NRC supports licensee initiative for self-identification and

correction of problems and that the violation met the tests addressed in 10

CFR Part 2, Appendix C, a notice of violation will not be issued.