ML20212P288
| ML20212P288 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 08/15/1986 |
| From: | Holmesray P, Ignatonis A, Paulk G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212P270 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-86-20, 50-366-86-20, NUDOCS 8609030063 | |
| Download: ML20212P288 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000321/1986020
Text
.
/ P Fr rg'o
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[
-
n
REGION 11
g
,j
1G1 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
's
ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
%,...../
Report Numbers: 50-321/85-20 and 50-366/85-20-
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P.O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
Docket Numbers: 50-321 and 50-366
License Numbers: DPR-57 and NPF-5
Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2
Inspection Dates: July 1 - July 31,1986
Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia
8 // 84
Inspectors:
-
Peter Holmes-Ray, Senior)Hisident Inspector
Ddte S'igned
6 1. c8_ _ WL,
R llthd
G. L. Pgdlk, S'epfor' Resident Inspector
Date/ Signed
Approved by:
C'Y d . M -n yk
8[/5/f(
A. J. Igrfatonis,/fection Chief
Date Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Operational Safety Verification,
Maintenance Observation, Plant Modification and Surveillance Observation and
Reportable Occurrences.
Results: One violation was identified - Unit I hydraulic control units were
found installed not in accordance with the design drawing.
8609030063 860020
ADOCK 05000321
G
'l
_ _ _ _ _
.
.
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- H. C. Nix, Site General Manager
- T.
Greene, Deputy Site General Manager
- H. L. Sumner, Operations Manager
- T. Seitz, Maintenance Manager
- T. R. Powers, Engineering Manager
R. W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
- 0. M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager (Acting)
C. T. Moore, Training Manager
- S. B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 3 and August 1,
1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did
not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by
the inspectors during this inspection.
One violation was identified. The
licensee acknowledged the findings and took no exception.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-321/86-20-01 - Evaluation of the seismic
adequacy of the Unit 1 HCUs in the as found configuration. (pa agraph 4).
(0 pen) Violation 50-321/86-20-02 - Control rod drive HCUs were not installed
in the design support mounting configuration as required by design drawing
919D615. (paragraph 4).
(0 pen) URI 50-366/86-20-03 - Evaluation of the seismic adequacy of the as
found configuration of the Unit 2 diesel generator batteries. (paragraph 4)
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-321, 366/86-20-04 - Cable pulling
procedures not in conformance with latest industry standards. (paragraph 5).
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(Closed) Violation 50-366/85-24-02 - Modification to Unit 2 drywell
pneumatic system prior to submittal and approval by the NRC as required by
10CFR50.59(a) (1). GPC letter of October 21, 1985 and NRC response of
November 12, 1985, were reviewed. The licensee's actions that have been
taken were determined to be acceptable by the inspector verifying the
licensee's response.
No discrepancies were noted.
,
-
.
2
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall
plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the
plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control
room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings,
status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment, controls and
switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for coera-
tion, temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data sheet
entries, control room manning, and access controls.
This inspection
activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their
supervisors.
Weekly, when on site, selected Engineering Safety Feature
(ESF) systems were confirmed operable.
The confirmation was made by
verifying the following: accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply
breaker and fuse status, instrumentation, major component leakage, lubrica-
tion, cooling, and general condition.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions
of the Control Building, Turbine Building, Reactor Building and outside
areas were visited.
Observations included safety related tagout verifica-
tions, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant
conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress,
radiation protection controls, physical security, problem identification
systems, and containment isolation.
In the course of the monthly activities, the Resident Inspectors included a
review of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of
various shif ts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily
activities to include: protected ar.d vital access controls, searching of
personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of
visitors, patrols and compensatory posts.
In addition, the Resident
Inspectors observed protected area lighting, protected and vital areas
barrier integrity and verified an interface between the security organiza-
tion and operations or maintenance.
On July 2,
1986, the inspectors
observed that an apparent lack of compensatory security had taken place when
the intake structure was opened for pump removal. This item was turned over
to Region II security inspectors for followup.
CONTROL R0D DRIVE HYDRAULIC CONTROL UNIT INSTALLATION
The inspector reviewed the installation mounting criteria and configuration
for Unit 1 and 2 to determine if design specifications were met for the
Control Rod Drive System Hydraulic Control Unit.
The Control Rod Drive
System is designed to withstand earthquake loads per specific plant require-
ments.
-
.
3
An inspection of the HCU's mounting supports revealed that none of the Unit
1 HCU's were supported as required by General Electric design drawing
9190615. The design specifications require that the mounting configuration
consisting of a .50-13X3.00lg, bolt conforming to ASTM A307 Grade A.
American Standard Medium Section Bolt Carbon Steel Spring Lockwasher and
American Standard Type B Common Steel Plain Punched Washer, Reg. series,
shall be provided between the bolt heads and the control unit frame. The
inspector found that none of the floor support attachment configurations for
the HCUs had the plain punched washer installed as required. Space could be
seen between the bolt head through the HCU rack to the unistrut base
attachment.
The inspector questioned the licensee as to the seismic
qualification of the installed HCus. The licensee requested and obtained a
General Electric evaluation of the concern.
The inspector reviewed the
evaluation, and determined that it does not adequately address the plant
specific findings (GE letter G-GPC-6-266 of July 22, 1986).
Specifically,
if all plain washers are missing from the Unit 1 HCU's, it has not been
determined that the reactor can be safely shutdown during a seismic event.
The evaluation assumptions may not be valid for the Hatch specific problem.
This item will be left unresolved for further NRC followup. (321/86-20-01).
The failure of the HCUs to be installed as required by design drawing
9190615 is a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V.
(321/86-20-02).
DIESEL GENERATOR BATTERIES
The inspector conducted a routine inspection of the diesel generator 125-V
diesel batteries. A separate 125-V diesel battery building is furnished for
each diesel generator and its associated 4-KV bus. Each battery has its own
static-type battery charger, circuit breaker, and bus with a spare battery
charger for each battery to permit servicing or sparing any charger.
Control power for each diesel, its generator breaker, and the associated
4-KV switchgear bus power feeder circuit breakers is supplied by its
respective battery. The batteries and battery racks are Class 1E equipment
to assure contir.uous operation of the equipment under maximum seismic
condition.
Deficiencies noted are listed below.
(1) Unit 2 diesel batteries (2A & 2C) had excessive spacing between
individual cells and the side and end stringer supports. The installa-
tion was not in accordance with design drawing 061918C which shows no
end spacer. Additionally, the design drawing was in error in that it
indicated side spacing between the rack and the battery cell of greater
than 1/8 inch.
The drawing should indicate less than 1/8 inch
according to iicensee representatives as discussed with the vendor.
(2) Various support clamps on Unit 1 and 2 diesel batteries were not in
j
accordance with design specifications in that the U-nut on the unistrut
i
to frame clamp tie-downs were not fully engaged on the battery rack
'
configurations.
!
!
I
'
.
__
-
.
4
(3) The battery rooms for Unit 1 and 2 indicated poor housekeeping with
excessive corrosion on the battery rack frames, excessive spills of
electrolyte and additive on battery cells, much dust and dirt in
battery rack area, and battery dust caps left off after surveillances.
(4) The battery surveillances (52SV-R42-001-1S) for taking battery cell
temperature and specific gravity was not adequate in that it did not
address the replacement of dust caps on the battery cells after use or
the removal / installation of the thermometer in the cells.
Some
batteries had dust caps off with a thermometer laying on a cell top
nearby, and some had thermometers still installed in the battery cells.
This item will be left unresolved pending resolution of the rack / battery
qualification and followup vendor report stating whether the batteries for
Unit 2 diesel generator were seismically qualified as found. (366/86-20-03).
5.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance
activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for
adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to Technical
Specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the
actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and
adherence to the appropriate quality controls.
CABLE PULLING PROCEDURE
The inspector reviewed the plant's cable pulling procedures used for
safety-related circuits. The instruction reviewed was 52GM-MEL-003-0 (Cable
and Cable Ways Installation).
The procedure was found to be general in
nature and not in keeping with current industry practice.
The similar
procedure at Vogtle Plant (ED-T-07) is more in keeping with current industry
practice in addressing maximum pull tensions, sidewall pressures, tension
measuring devices, etc..
The licensee stated at the exit that their
intention was to use the current procedure and not incorporated the current
industry standards.
This item has been turned over to the electrical
section of the Region II office as an open item for further followup.
(321/366/86-20-04).
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Plant Modification and Surveillance Testing Observations (37700 & 61726)
The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillances and plant
modification Design Change Requests (DCRs).
The observation included a
review of the procedure and/or DCR for technical adequacy, conformance to
Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument calibration,
observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal from service
and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of
the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria.
.. -
-
.
5
FSAR CHANGES
The inspector reviewed the licensee program for making FSAR update change to
assure regulatory requirements are met. The licensee implements the program
by use of the document change request (DCR) procedure (ENG-0015).
Each
FSAR update change included a safety evaluation addressing 10 CFR 50.59
requirements.
During the review several minor documentation deficiencies
were noted as listed below.
(1) Request No. 86-15 (Unit 2 FSAR change) was missing the required signoff
for PRB (plant review board) initial review on the DCR cover sheet.
This signoff was also found missing on DCR 85-41 and DCR 85-30.
(2) The Plant Review Board Meeting Minutes for Meeting number 85-201 which
included a review of FSAR change DCR 85-37 was missing a signoff by the
PRB Chairman or G.M. letter no. as required on the cover sheet.
The Assistant Plant Manager stated in the exit that these minor deficiencies
would be corrected and more careful attention to required signoffs would be
addressed during future similar reviews.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
ESF System Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors routinely conduct partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve and
breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions are randomly verified both
,
locally and in the control room to verify that the lineups were in accord-
ance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material
conditions were satisfactory. During the inspection period the inspectors
conducted a complete walkdown, in the accessible areas, of Unit-1 Plant
Service Water (PSW) System.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)
The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential
generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective
actions appeared appropriate and are closed.
Events which were reported
immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical
Specifications were being met and the public health and safety were of
utmost consideration.
Unit-1:
85-20, 85-23*, 85-35, 85-38, 85-39, 85-40, 85-41, 85-46 and 86-26*.
Unit-2:
85-30, 85-32, 85-34, 85-36 and 85-37.
- In-depth review performed.
.
- - - - - . - - , -
-
, - - - , _
,
.
.-
6
LER 50-321-85-23 - FAILURE TO CONTINU0USLY MONITOR REACTOR WATER
CONDUCTIVITY - On June 16, 1985 with the unit at 95% power the licensee
determined that the reactor water continuous conductivity monitor was
inoperable since it was isolated for replacement of a gauge. The operations
person who authorized the gauge replacement did not realize that removal of
the gauge would render the system inoperable. The gauge removal took place
on June 14, 1985. Failure to obtain four hour grab samples from 10:00 a.m.,
June 14, 1985 to about 8:00 a.m. , June 16, 1985, was a licensee identified
violation (LIV) of Technical Specifications section
4. 6. F. 2. a .1.
(LIV
50-321/86-20-05).
Because the NRC supports licensee initiative for
self-identification and correction of problems and that the violation met
the tests addressed in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, a notice of violation will
not be issued.
LER 50-321-86-26 - DEFECTIVE PROCEDURE CAUSES NON-COMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL
The procedure REACTOR WATER LEVEL (RPS) FT&C, number
SPECIFICATIONS
-
57SV-B21-002-1, was deleted and replaced by four procedures on December 18,
1985. On June 4, 1986 the licensee found that the TS requirement to perturb
the reactor water level and observe instrument tracking had been omitted
when the four procedures were written. The functional test and calibration
of these four level instruments is an every 31 days requirement. Unit I was
in cold refueling / shutdown condition when this error was discovered. .The
perturbation requirement was not performed for the April or May FT & C.
The
procedures were corrected and the meters performed correctly on June 15,
1986.
This is a licensee identified violation (LIV 50-321/86-20-06).
Because the NRC supports licensee initiative for self-identification and
correction of problems and that the violation met the tests addressed in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, a notice of violation will not be issued.
.. ..