ML20212M172

Requests Commission Approval to Revise NRC Enforcement Policy to Address Several Changes,Including New Approach for Assessing Significance of Violations.Approach Consistent with Commission 990615 SRM

ML20212M172
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/30/1999
From:	Travers W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
References
SECY-99-219, SECY-99-219-01, SECY-99-219-R, NUDOCS 9910080199
Download: ML20212M172 (85)

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POLICY ISSUE Auaust 30.1999 SECY-99-219 EQB: The Commissioners FROM: William D. Travers Executive Director for Operations SUBJEC_I: PROPOSED REVISION TO THE ENFORCEMENT POLICY TO ADDRESS THE PROCESS FOR ASSESSING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VIOLATIONS PURPOSE:

To obtain Commission approval to revise the NRC Enforcement Policy to address several changes, including a new approach for assessing the significance of violations. This approach is consistent with the Commission's June 15,1999, Staff Requirement Memorandum (SRM). It eliminates the concept of " regulatory significance" and makes the Enforcement Policy more risk-informed.

BACKGROUND:

In SECY-99-087, dated March 24,1999, the staff recommended a new approach to assess the significance of violations. The staff proposed an approach that identifies four specific issues to consider: (1) actual safety consequences; (2) potential safety consequences, including the consideration of risk information; (3) potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function; and (4) any willful aspects of the violation.

This is a change from current practice that assesses significance by weighing (1) actual consequences, (2) potential consequences, and (3) the regulatory significance of a violation.

Although not specifically defined by the Policy, regulatory significance had historically included issues such as, but not limited to, aggregation of violations', repetitive violations, willful violations l

Contact:

Ren6e Pedersen, OE,415-2742 y j goe a y _ C u o 3.'m

'Section IV.A of the current policy states that a group of Severity Level IV violations can be U&M

, evaluated in the aggregate and assigned a single, increased severity level, thereby resulting in a l Severity Level ill problem, if the violations had the same underlying cause or programmatic deficiencies.

l 9910000199 990830 PDR SECY 99-219 R PDR

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1. .o The Commissioners - 2-

and reporting violations. The staff recommended eliminating the use of the term regulatory h significance in the context of assessing the significance of violations, but retaining some of the underlying concepts. The staff elaborated the discussion on potential consequences to emphasize that the NRC would consider the realistic likelihood of affecting safety, i.e., the existence of credible scenarios with potentially significant consequences. The staff ,

recommended that the Policy specifically state that the use of risk information could be used to I either increase or decrease the severity level of a violation. In addition to the potential safety consequences associated with as-found conditions, the staff recommended that the NRC ,

consider other conditions with potential impact. Specifically, the staff recommended that the NRC continue to consider those cases where the cumulative effect of a number of less significant related or recurring violations appear to present a greater risk than the individual violations treated separately. The staff emphasized that there must be a sufficient nexus to safety, safeguards, or the environment to conclude that Severity Level lli categorization is appropriate. With this approach, the staff recommended that the current examples in the Supplements of the Enforcement Policy based on aggregation (e.g., example C.7 of Supplement I and VI) be revised to focus on the potential consequences associated with the related or recurring violations.

In its June 15,1999, SRM, the Commission approved the staff's recommendation to base the significance of a violation on: (1) actual cafety consequences; (2) potential safety consequences, including the consideration of risk information; (3) potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function; and (4) any willful aspects of the violation. The Commission disapproved the concept of aggregating less significant violations into one of higher

. significance and the use of repetitive violations to increase the severity of a given violation. The j

. Commission stated that if the NRC has concems about a I;censee's performance as a result of a large number of less significant violations, or repetitive violations based on ineffective corrective i actions, the current and future assessment processes provide the regulatory tools necessary to address these performance concems. In SECY-99-087, the staff took the positi?n that evaluating violations in the aggregate may be appropriate for materials licensees because they are inspected infrequently. However, the Commission stated that if the staffis concemed with material licensees receiving less frequent inspections than reactor facilities, then it may be

. appropriate for the staff to increase inspection activities of those specific licensees of concem in order to determine the adequacy of their actions, rather than maintaining an infrequent inspection schedule and using aggregation or repetition to artificially raise the level of concem.

The Commission directed that examples in the Supplements of the Enforcement Policy based on aggregation (e.g., example C.7 of Supplement I and VI) be deleted.

' With respect to assessing potential safety consequences, the Commissior, stated in the SRM that the staff should ensure that the process is disciplined so that only credible scenarios with

' potential consequences are considered. The Commission directed the staff to develop criteria ,

for assessing the credibility of postulated scenarios for management's use in monitoring the  !

implementation of the revised Enforcement Policy for agency-wide consistency. l 1

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g-4The Commissioners '

DISCUSSION:

1The staff has modified the Enforcement Policy in accordance with the Commission's directives in

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' the June 15,1999, SRM. Specifically, the revised Policy states that the process of assessing significance will consider: (1) actual safety consequences; (2) potential safety consequences, l , including the consideration of risk information; (3) potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function; and (4) any willful aspects of the violation. The Policy specifically states that risk information will be used wherever possible and may be used to either increase or

, decrease the severity level of a violation. The term regulatory significance hac been eliminated from the Enforcement Policy. The process of escalating the severity level of violations based on aggregation and repetitiveness has also been eliminated from the Policy and its Supplements.

- Additionally, the use of the related term programmatic has been minimized in the Policy and its ,

E Supplements. The significance of violations that are related to deficient programs will be evaluated in terms of their actual and potential consequences in lieu of the programmatic aspect of the violation being the determining factor m assessirig severity level.8 i

. -. I The staff recognizes the importance of ensuring discipline in the process of assessing potential j l

safety consequences. This can best be' accomplished through a risk-informed approach to  !

evaluating violations and associated enforcement actions. The reactor oversight program's significance determination process (SDP) provides a risk-informed methodology and is being evaluated during the ongoing pilot program. For issues not covered by the SDP, the staff will - I assess significance in accordance with the Enforcement Policy using risk considerations as i addressed in SECY-99-087c The staff will apply lessons-leamed from the reactor oversight pilot i , program as it continues its work in this area. Therefore, the staff recommends that it apply the concepts of the SDP and risk assessment as discussed in SECY-99-087 in ensuring discipline in assessing potential safety consequences. As discussed in SECY-99-087, this approach is more practical at this time rather than attempting to define potential consequences in terms of  ;

supplement examples. The staff recognizes that significance determinations in this area as well ms the other areas require the exercise of judgement that must be closely monitored for agency-

, wide consistency. The staff intends to continue this oversight. )

? l t_ in addition to the changes associated with this new approach for assessing the significance of violations, the staff has changed the Policy as summarized below.

7 i- .15 Examples of violations in Supplement I-Reactor Operations have been modified to  !

l conform to the Commission-approved revisions to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, I

" Changes, tests, and experiments" (SRM-99-130). The final rulemaking notice is

_ expected to be published in the FederalRegisterin late August or early September. The

' staff will modify the revised Enforcement Policy Federal Register notice to reflect the final 8-The term " programmatic," has been retained in Supplement VI where the examples generally refer to violations of 10 CFR Part 35, " Medical Use of Byproduct Material." This was considered an appropriate interim measure given the rulemaking ongoing in this area. These examples will be reevaluated when that rulemaking effort is completed.

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The Commissioners ' rulemaking notice. The staff will also issue interim guidance addressing use of enforcement discretion under Section Vll.B.6 for situations that violate the "old" requirements, but that would not be violations had the evaluation been performed under the revised rule.

2. Section ill, " Responsibilities," has been updated to reflect the August 9,1999, reorganization of the Office of the Executive Director for Operations (EDO). The Deputy Executive Director for Reactor Programs and the Deputy Executive Director for Materials,~ Research and State Programs replace the Deputy Executive Director for

. Regulatory Effectiveness as the principal enforcement officers of the NRC. The Deputy Executive Director for Reactor Programs is responsible to the EDO for the enforcement program.

3. Paragraph (h) of Section Vll.A.1, " Civil Penalties," has been modified to reflect the correct schedule the NRC will use when it considers whether it should exercise escalated enforcement discretion for violations associated with departures from the FSAR. The previous schedule stated, "after two years from October 18,1996." The correct schedule identifies March 30, 2000, for risk-significant items as defined by the

- licensee's maintenance rule program and March 30,2001, for all other issues. This change corrects an error in the policy and conforms to the schedule established by the Commission in an SRM dated June 30,1998. Paragraph (a) of Section Vil.B.3,

" Violations involving Old Design issues," has also been corrected to reflect the Commission-approved schedule for considering enforcement discretion.

4. Section Vll.B.1, "Non-Cited Violations," has been renamed and modified by consolidating all of the guidance on dispositioning Severity Level IV violations as either Notices of Violation or Non-Cited Violations. The guidance for dispositioning power reactor Severity Level IV violations previously included as Appendix C has been relocated to Vll.B.1.a. ,

Sections Vll.B.1.b - g are reserved for future applications. (The staff is currently

- developing an approach for fuel facilities similar to power reactors.) Section Vll.B.1.h, i "All Other Licensees," includes the guidance previously included under Section Vll.B.1. I These changes are designed to improve the organization of the information consistent  !

with the plain language initiatives.

5.Section I, " Introduction and Purpose," has been modified by relocating the Commission-approved safety and compliance discussion that was previously included as Appendix A to this policy statement to the introduction. Moving this discussion from the back of the policy to the front improves the logical flow of information and helps ensure that it will not ,

be overlooked.

6. The Enforcement Policy has been modified to reflect the changes to the Enforcement Policy since its last publication as NUREG-1600 (May 1998). (This includes the recent interim enforcement policy for the power reactor pilot program).

7. The Policy has been edited to assure consistency with recent policy changes. For example,Section VI.B.2.d has been rewritten to state that the NRC may exercise discretion by either escalating or mitigating the amount of a civil penalty after the normal

' The Commissioners assessment process to ensure that the proposed civil penalty reflects alt relevant circumstances of the particular case. The phrases " reflects the NRC's level of concem" ,

and

• conveys the appropriate message to the licensee" have been eliminated. Like l regulatory significance, these phrases have been criticized as allowing the regulator to i arbitrarily issue sanctions without a sufficient nexus to safety. ' This new language is

! consistent with the agency's other policy changes and its plain language initiatives.

Similar changes are made throughout the Policy.

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8. The Policy has been restructured to facilitate maintenance of the living policy statement and avoid possible staff confusion. Namely, lettered appendices at the end of the Policy will no longer be used. Permanent policy issues will be incorporated in the main body of the Policy, violation examples will be located under the heading, " Supplements -

Violation Examples," and interim policy issues will be located in the order they are issued under the heading, " Interim Enforcement Policies." As a living policy statement, changes are routinely issued in the Federal Register, This approach eliminates the need to administratively reorganize the appendices when guidance in one of the appendices is either permanently adopted or eliminated (e.g., revising Appendices D through F after Appendix C becomes a permanent policy issue). In addition, confusion is eliminated when interim policies are simply referred to by their subject matter rather than a specific

appendix designation.' _

The staff recognizes that additional changes may be considered as a result of ongoing efforts to j

make improvements to the inspection and performance assessment processes for power reactors. In addition, changes are anticipated in the materials areas that will conform to the move toward risk-informed performance based inspections in this area. Notwithstanding future revisions, the staff recommends that the revised Enforcement Policy be republished as NUREG-1600. Consolidated guidance will aid the staff in following the Commission's Enforcement Policy.  ;

RECOMMENDATION.

The staff recommends that the Commission approve publication of the revised Enforcement Policy in the attached Federal Register notice.

RESOURCES-  ;

1 The resources required to implement the revised Enforcement Policy are available within the l Fiscal Year 2000 budget. No additional resources are required.

COORDINATION

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The Office of the' General Counsel has no legal objection to this paper. The Office of the Chief l S Financial Officer has reviewed this paper for resource implications and has no objections. The l Office of the Chief information Officer has reviewed this paper for information technology and '

information management implications and concurs in it.

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r-The Commissioners Notes:

1. The revision of the Enforcement Policy will be published in the Federa/ Register and will become effective upon publication. Comments on this revision will be accepted for 30 days after publication and will be considered prior to the next revision to the Enforcement Policy-

2. The revision to the Enforcement Policy will be sent to all licensees as the third complete publication of NUREG-1600.

3. The appropriate Congressional Committees will be notified.

4. The change to the Policy Statement does not impact information collections that are subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act.

5. The staff has determined that this is not a " major" rule as defined in the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996,5 U.S.C. 804(2).

6. The Office of Enforcement's Web site will be updated. Necessary changes to the Enforcement Manual and inspection Manual will also be made. _

t k)h = W William D. Travers Executive Director for Operations

Enclosure:

Federal Register notice with revised Enforcement Policy Commissioners' completed vote sheets / comments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by COB Thursday, September.16, 1999.

Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT September 9,1999, with an 'information copy to the Office of'the Secretary. If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.

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. Regions SECY

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7590-01-P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

[NUREG - 1600]

l Revision of NRC Enforcement Policy I

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

I ACTION:. Policy Statement: Amendment.

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SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is publishing a complete revision of the agency's Enforcement Policy (NUREG-1600, " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions"). This i: the third complete revision of the Enforcement Policy since it was first published as a NUREG document in 1995 (60 FR 34380). The NRC publishes l

the policy statement as a NUREG to foster its widespread dissemination. As a living policy statement, revisions are noticed in the Federal Register. The NRC's Office of Enforcement maintains the cunent policy statement on its homepage on the Intemet at www.nre.nov/OE/.

This revision: (1) revises the approach for assessing the significance of violations, (2) changes guidance to conform to recent revisions to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, " Changes, tests, I

- and experiments"(xx FR xxxxx;' August / September x,1999), (3) updates the policy to reflect the Deputy Executive Director for Reactor Programs and the Deputy Executive Director for

' Materials ' Research and State Programs as the principal enforcement officers of the NRC (4) corrects the schedule for exercising enforcement discretion for findings involving the

' completeness and accuracy oflicensee Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSAR), (5) consolidates

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the guidance on dispositioning Severity Level IV violations as either Notices of Violation or Non-Cite'd Violations, (6) reorganizes existing guidance on the relationship between safety and compliance to improve clarity,'(7) consolidates changes to the Enforcement Policy since

May 1998, and (8) edits and restructures existing guidance to assure consistency with recent policy changes and to facilitate mamtenance of the living policy statement.

. DATES: This action is effective (the date of publication in the Federal Register). Comments on this revision should be submitted on'or before (30 days ofits publication in the Federal Register) and will be considered by the NRC prior to the next Enforcement Policy revision.

ADDRESSES: Submit written comments to: David L. Meyer, Chief, Rul6s and Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, Mail Stop: T6D59, U. S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. Hand deliver comments to: 11545 Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m., Federal workdays. Copies of comments

received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room 2120 L Street, NW, (Lower

. Level), Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bill Borchardt, Director, Office of Enforcement, or Rende Pedersen, Senior Enforcement Specialist, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear

~ Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, (301) 415-2741.

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SUPPLEMENTARYINFORMATION:

The NRC Enforcement Policy was first issued as a formal policy statement on September 4,1980. Since that time, the Enforcement Policy has been revised on a number of occasions. In 1995, the Enforcement Policy was completely revised as a result of the

! recommendations of a high-level review team who assessed the enforcement program and solicited input from stakeholders and other governmen agencies (NUREG-1525, " Assessment of 1

the NRC Enforcement Program.") On May 13,1998, the Enforcement Policy was completely republished (63 FR 26630) based on a review of the experience with the revised policy and consideration of public comment (NUREG-1600,"NRC Enforcement Policy Review; July 1995-July 1997."). Most recently, the policy was modified by revising the treahnent of Severity Level IV violations at power reactors (64 FR 6388) to help reduce unnecessary regulatory burden. The NRC is constantly refining and improving its policy and processes to ensure that I

enforcement actions are appropriate and contribute to safety. l l

In developing this policy revision, the NRC considered comments of various internal and extemal stakeholders. Consideration was given to written comments submitted in response to the May 13,1998, revision to the Enforcement Policy; Congressional concerns; information provided during numerous meetings with representatives of the industry and puHic interest groups; and several written submittals.! The main stakeholder involvement has been with the

. Nuclear $nergy Institute (NEI), various power reactor licensees, the Union of Concerned

' See, NEI letters to James Lieberman, dated December 14,1998, and to William Travers, dated October 23,1998, and UCS letter to James Lieberman dated November 11,1998.

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l Scientists (UCS), and Public Citizen. The intent of this policy revision is to move towards a E ~more risk-informed and performance based approach.

The NRC recognizes that additional changes may be considered as a result of ongoing effons to make improvements to the inspection and performance assessment processes for power reactors. . In addition, changes are anticipated in the materials areas that will conform to the move toward risk-informed performance based inspections in this area.

l The more significant changes to the Enforcement Policy (in the order that they appear in the policy) are described below:

I. Introduction and Purpose This section has been modified by adding a discussion of the relationship between safety and compliance. This discussion captures the essence of the Commission-approved discussion that was previously included as Appendix A to this policy statement. Moving this discussion from the back of the policy to the front improves the logical flow ofinformation and helps ensure that it will not be overlooked.

III. Responsibilities

. This section has been modified to reflect the August 9,1999, reorganization of the office of the Executive Director for Operations. The Deputy Executive Director for Reactor Programs L

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and the Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Research and State Programs replace the Deputy Executive Director for Regulatory Effectiveness as the prbeipal enforcement officers of the NRC. The Deputy Executive Director for Reactor Programs is respansible to the Executive Director for Operations for NRC enforcement programs.

IV. Significance of Violations This section has been renamed and significantly modified to reflect the agency's new approach on how it will assess the significance of violations.

Because regulatory requirements have varying degrees of safety, sifeguards, or environmental . significance, the NRC's Enforcement Policy uses a graded approach in dealing with noncompliances both in terms of assessing significance and developing enforcement sanctions. This section provides that assessing the relative importance or significance of the violation is the first step in the enforcement process. The NRC is revising its approach for assessing significance that identifies four specific issues to consider: (1) actual safety consequences; (2) potential safety consequences, including the consideration of risk information; (3) potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function; and (4) any willful aspects of the violation.

3 This is 'a change from previous practice that assessed significance by weighing (1) actual consequences, (2) potential consequences, and (3) the regulatory significance of a violation.

Although not specifically defined by the Policy, " regulatory significance" historically included

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f issues such as, but not limited to, programmatic breakdowns (i.e., aggregation of violations2 ),

repetitive violations, willful violations and reporting violations. The NRC is eliminating the use of this term in the context of assessing the significance of violations. The agency believes this is 1

warranted Riven the nature of stakeholder concerns, which included the term's lack of sufficient definition, its subjective nature, and its lack of a clear nexus to safety. There is also a concem

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that use of regulatory significance (under the practice of aggregation) is a form of assessment that should be performed outside the enforcement process. Under the revised Policy, if the NRC has -

concerns about a licensee's performance as a result of a large number ofless significant l-violations, or repetitive violations based on ineffective corrective actions, the current and future 1

assessment processes provide the regulatory tools necessery to address these performance concems.

Although the NRC believes it is appropriate to eliminate the term regulatory significance j from this policy statement, some ofits underlying concepts are appropriate to maintain. The l

NRC should continue to consider violations that impact or have the potential to imp'act NRC's ability to carry out its statutory missior). Examples of cases in this category would include l violations of 10 CFR 30.9, 50.9, etc. (completeness and accuracy ofinformation), 30.34(f),

50.54(a), 50.59,76.68, etc. (need for NRC approval of changes), and Subpart M of Part 20, l

j 30.50,50.72-73, etc. (reporting requirements). Even inadvenent reporting failures are important  ;

because many of the surveillance, quality control, and auditing systems $n which both the NRC l

2 The previous policy stated that a group of Severity Level IV violations could be evaluated in the aggregate  ;

and assigned a single, increased severity level, thereby resulting in a Severity Level III problem, if the violations i had the same underlying cause or programmatic deficiencies.

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and its licensees rely in o'rder to monitor compliance with safety standards are based primarily on complete, accurate and timely recordkeeping and reporting. The NRC should continue to

. consider willful violations involving licensees and their employees, including the ability to maintain a safety conscious work environment. Examples of cases in this category would include violations of 10 CFR 30.10,50.5, etc. (deliberate misconduct), and willful violations of requirements including 30.7, 50.7, etc. (discrimination), 30.9, 50.9, etc. (completeness and accuracy ofinformation), and reporting requirements. Willful violations are by definition of particular concern to the Commission because its regulatory program is based on licensees and 5

their contractors, employees, and agents acting with integrity and communicating with candor.

This section also elaborates on the concept of potential consequences as a consideration in the significance assessment process. It emphasizes that the NRC will consider the realistic likelihood of affecting safety, i.e., the existence of credible scenarios with potentially significant consequences. It also states that risk information will be used wherever possible and clarifies I

that use of risk information may increase or decrease the severity level of a violation.

This overall approach to assessing significance preserves the ability to evaluate violations based on those concepts the NRC believes important, while minimizing the controversy that surrounds the use~of the term regulatory significance.

VI.B.2.d Exercise of Discretion j l

The guidance in this section has been rewritten to state that the NRC may exercise i

d discretion by either escalating or mitigating the amount of a civil penalty after the normal assessment process to ensure that the proposed civil penalty reflects all relevant circumstances of the particular case. The phrases " reflects the NRC's level of concern" and " conveys the appropriate message to the licensee" have been eliminated. Like regulatory significance, these phrases have been criticized as allowing the regulator to arbitrarily issue sanctions without a

. sufficient nexus to safety. This new language is consistent with the agency's other policy changes and its plain language initiatives. Similar changes are made throughout the Policy.

VII.A.1 Civil Penalties Paragraph (h) of this s'ection has been modified to include the corrbet schedule the NRC will use when it considers whether it should exercise escalating enforcement discretion for violations associated with departures from the FSAR. The previous schedule stated,"after two years from October 18,1996." The correct schedule identifies March 30,2000, for risk-significant items as defined by the licensee's maintenance rule program and March 30,2001, for all other issues. This change corrects an error in the policy and conforms to the schedule established by the Commission in an staff requirements memorandum dated June 30,1998.

VII.B.1 Non-Cited Violations This section has been renamed and consolidates the guidance on dispositioning Severity Level IV violations as either Notices of Violation or Non-Cited Violations. The definition of a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) is simplified to state that it is a Severity Level IV violation for

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which the NRC chooses to exercise discretion and refrain from issuing a formal Notice of Violation. It makes it clear that this discretion is not meant to eliminate the NRC's emphasis on <

1 compliance nor the importance of maintaining safety.Section VII.B.l.a includes the essence of i 1

. the ' guidance on dispositioning power reactor Severity Level IV violations that was previously 1

included in Appendix C. Sections VII.B.I.b - g are reserved for future applications.

Section VII.B.I.h includes guidance for dispositioning all other types oflicensees. This

. subsection captures the guidance that was previously included under VII.B.l.

VII.B.3 Violations Involving Old Design Issues Paragraph (a) of this section has been modified to include the corrdet schedule the NRC j will use when it considers whether it should exercise mitigating enforcement discretion for violations associated with departures from the FSAR. The previous schedule stated,"within two j years after October 18,1996." The correct schedule identifies March 30,2000, for risk-significant items as' defined by the licensee's maintenance rule program and March 30,2001, for all other issues. Like the schedule in Section VII.A.I.h, this Commission-approved schedule inadvertently failed to be reflected in a revision to the policy statement.

~ VII.C Notice of Enforcement Discretion for Power Reactors and Gaseous Diffusion Plants i

This section has been renam?d to more clearly reflect that this type of discretion applies

-.to both power reactors and gaseous diffusion plants.

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L Supplements--Violation Examples Each of the eight supplements was modified by removing exaqus of violations based on the concept of aggregating less significant violations into one of higher significance and the

.use of repetitive violations to increase the severity of a given violation, i.e., "a number of violations that are related (or, ifisolated, that are recurring violations) that collectively represent a potentially significant lack of attention or carelessness toward licensed responsibilities."

Supplement I--Reactor Operations Example B.4 was eliminated because it was unnecessary given that it is highly unlikely that 50.59 violations will rise to Severity Level II and if operability of equipment is actually affected, then the severity level of the system inoperability will be based on the actual and potential consequences of that inoperability.

Example C.2. (b) was eliminated because basing severity level on any necessary analyses is inconsistent with determining severity level based on actual and potential consequences.

Example C.9 replaces previous examples C.10 and C.11 (which are no longer consistent with recent revisions of 10 CFR 50.59). This example provides that violations of 10 CFR 50.59 will be characterized at Severity Level III only if the change, which would require Commission approval prior to implementation, would not have been found acceptable to the Commission.

Example C.10 replaces previous example C.13 and reflects that Severity Level Ill characterization may be appropriate for violations of 10 CFR 50.71(e) in those situation where the erroneous information contained in the FSAR resulted in a change to the facility, 1

implemented without prior Commission approval, that would not be acceptable.

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Example C.11 replaces previous example C.14. Given that unreviewed safety questions and conflicts with technical specifications will not necessarily be Severity Level III violations under the revised enforcement guidance pertaining to 10 CFR 50.59, this example simply reflects that the failure to make required reports associated with any Severity Level III violations may be characterized at Severity Level III.

Example D.5 replaces previous examples D.5 and D.6 (which are no longer consistent with recent revisions of 10 CFR 50.59). This example provides that Severity Level IV categorization is appropriate for violations of 10 CFR 50.59 that do not involve circumstances in which a change that required prior Commission approval would not be found acceptable had the

. approval been sought. Any reference to programmatic failures is unnecessary.

Example D.6 replaces previous examples D.7 and D.8 (which are no longer consistent with recent revisions of 10 CFR 50.59). This example provides that Severity Level IV characterization may be appropriate for violations of 10 CFR 50.71(e) in those situation where the erroneous information contained in the FSAR is not used to make an unacceptable change to

< the facility or procedures.

Paperwork Reduction Act This final policy statement does not contain a new cr amended information collection requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0136.'

Public Protection Notification If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has determined that this action is not a " major" rule and has verified this determination with $e Office ofInformation and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget.

Accordingly, the NRC Enforcement Policy is revised to read as follows:

[ NOTE: revised Enforcement Policy (double spaced) will be inserted here) i Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this day of 1999, i i

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Annette L. Vietti-Cook, Secretary of the Commission.

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CENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR NRC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS Table of Contents Preface I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE l

II. STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK A. Statutory Authority B. Procedural Framework I l

l III. RESPONSIBILITIES l IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF VIOLATIONS A. . Assessing Significance

1. Actual Safety Consequence

2. Potential Safety Conseqence

3. Impacting the Regulatory ' . acess

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4. Willful Violations B. Assigning Severity Level V. PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES 1

VI. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS A. Notice of Violation  ;

B. Civil Penalty l

1. Base Civil Penalty

2. Civil Penalty Assessment i

a. Initial Escalated Action

b. Credit for Actions Related to Identification

c. Credit for Prompt and Comprehensive Corrective Action

d. . Exercise of Discretion  :

C. Orders  :

D. Related Administrative Actions I

. VII. EXERCISE OF DISCRETION i A. Escalat' ,,1 f Enforcement Sanctions

1. Civil Penalties

2. Orders

3. Daily Civil Penalties B. Mitigation of Enforcement Sanctions

1. Non-Cited Violations wA.

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a. Power Reactor Licensees

b. - g. [ Reserved]

l h. All Other Licensees

2. Violations Identified During Extended Shutdowns or Work Stoppages

3. Violations Involving Old Design Issues

4. Violations Identified Due to Previous Enforcement Action

5. Violations Involving Discrimination

6. ' Violations Involving Special Circumstances j C. Notice of Enforcement Discretion for Power Reactors and Geseous Diffusion Plants  !

VIII. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS I

IX. INACCURATE AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION j X. ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST NON-LICENSEES l

XI. REFERRALS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE XII. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS XIII. REOPENING CLOSED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS SUPPLEMENTS - VIOLATION EXAMPLES INTERIM ENFORCEMENT POLICIES Interim Enforcement Policy for Generally Licensed Devices Containing Byproduct Material (10 CFR 31.5)

Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Nuclear Power Plants During the Year 2000 Transition Interim Enforcement Policy for Use During the NRC Power Reactor Oversight Process Pilot Plant Study l

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l P.REFACE The following policy statement describes the enforcement policy and procedures that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) and its staffintends to follow in

! initiating and reviewing enforcement actions in response to violations of NRC requirements.

This statement of general policy and procedure is published as NUREG-1600 to foster its widespread dissemination. However, this is a policy statement and not a regulation. The Commission may deviate from this statement of policy as appropriate under the circumstances of a particular case.

L INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, establishes " adequate protection" as the l standard of safety on which NRC "gulations are based. In the context of NRC regulations, i

safety means avoiding unduc hsk or, stated another way, providing reasonable assurance of adequate protection of workers and the public in connection with the use of source, byproduct and special nuclear materials.

While safety is the fundamental regulatory objective, compliance with NRC requirements plays an important role in giving the NRC confidence that safety is being maintained. NRC requirements, including technical specifications, other license conditions, orders, and regulations, have been designed to ensure adequate protection - which corresponds to "no undue risk to public health and safety" - through acceptable design, construction, operation, maintenance, L . modification, and quality assurance measures. In the context of risk-informed regulation, compliance plays a very important role in ensuring that key assumptions used in underlying risk and engineering analyses remain valid.

i- 1 l While adequate protection is presumptively assared by comphance with NRC requirements, circumstances may arise where new information reveals that an unforeseen hazard exists or that there is a substantially greater potential for a known hazard to occur. In such  !

situations, the NRC has the statutory authority to require licensee action above and beyond existing regulations to maintain the level of protection necessary to avoid undue risk to public health and safety.

The NRC also has the authority to exercise discretion to permit continued operations -

despite the existence of a noncompliance -- where the noncompliance is not significant from a risk perspective and does not, in the particular circumstances, pose an undue risk to public health and safety. When noncompliance occurs, the NRC must evaluate the degree of risk posed by that noncompliance to determine if specific immediate action is required. Where needed to ensure i adequate protection of public health and safety, the NRC may demand immediate licensee action, l

.up to and including a shutdown or cessation oflicensed activitie:,. ]

1 Based on the NRC's evaluation of noncompliance, the appropriate action could include

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refraining from taking any action, taking specific enforcement action, issuing orders, or 1

. providing input to other regulatory actions or. assessments, such as increased oversight (e.g., ,

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increased inspection). Since some requirements are more important to safety than others, the NRC endeavors to use a risk-informed approach when applying NRC resources to the oversight oflicensed activities, including enforcement activities.

The primary purpose of the NRC's Enforcement Policy is to support the NRC's overall safety mission in protecting the public health and safety and the environment. Consistent with

. that purpose, the policy endeavors to:

e Deter noncompliance by emphasizing the importance o'f compliance with NRC requirements, and -

1 e Encourage prompt identification and prompt, comprehensive correction of violations of J NRC requirements.

Therefore, licensees,' contractors,2 and their employees who do not achieve the high standard of compliance which the NRC expects will be subject to enforcement sanctions. Each enforcement action is dependent on the circumstances of the case. However, in no case will i licensees who cannot achieve and maintain adequate levels of safety be permitted to continue to I conduct licensed activities. I IL STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK A. Statutory Authority The NRC's enforcementjurisdiction is drawn from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974, as amended.

Section 161 of the Atomic Energy Act authorizes the NRC to conduct inspections and I I

investigations and to issue orders as may be necessary or desirable to promote the common defense and security or to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property. Section 186 authorizes the NRC to revoke licenses under certain circumstances (e.g., for material false j statements, in response to conditions that would have warranted refusal of a license on an original application, for a licensee's failure to build or operate a facility in accordance with the terms of the permit or license, and for violation of an NRC regulation). Section 234 authorizes the NRC to impose civil penalties not to exceed $100,000 per violation per day for the violation  ;

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'This policy primarily addresses the activities of NRC licensees and applicants for NRC licenses. However, this policy provides for taking enforcement action against non-licensees and individuals in certain cases. These non-licensees include contractors and subcontractors, holders of, or applicants for, NRC approvals, e.g., certificates of compliance, early site permits, or standard design certificates, and the employees of these non-licensees. Specific guidance regarding enforcement action against individuals and non-licensees is addressed in Sections VIII and X, respectively.

I 2The term " contractor" as used in this policy includes vendors who supply products or services to be used in an NRC-licensed facility or activity.-

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l of certain specified licensing provisions of the Act, rules, orders, and license terms implementing these provisions, and for violations for which licenses can be revoked. In addition to the enumerated provisions in section 234, sections 84 and 147 authorize the imposition of civil penalties for violations of regulations implementing those provisions. Section 232 authorizes the

' NRC to seek injunctive or other equitable relief for violation of regulatory requirements.

Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act authorizes the NRC to impose civil

. penalties for knowing and conscious failures to provide certain safety information to the NRC.

Notwithstanding the $100,000 limit stated in the Atomic Energy Act, the Commission ,

may impose higher civil penalties as provided by the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996. j

. Under the Act, the Commission is required to modify civil monetary penalties to reflect inf' ' tion.

The adjusted maximum civil penalty amount is reflected in 10 CFR 2.205 and this Policy

. Statement.  !

Chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act provides for varying levels of criminal penalties (i.e., monetary fines and imprisonment) for willful violations of the Act and regulations or orders issued under sections 65,161(b),161(i), or 161(o) of the Act. Section 223 provides that criminal penalties may be imposed on certain individuals employed by firms constructing or supplying basic components of any utilization facility if the individual knowingly and willfully violates NRC requirements such that a basic component could be significantly impaired. Section 235 ,

provides that criminal penalties may be imposed on persons who interfere with inspectors. j Section 236 provides_ that criminal penalties may be imposed on persons who attempt to or cause i sabotage at a nuclear facility or to nuclear fuel. ' Alleged or suspected criminal violations of the Atomic Energy Act are referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.

B. ProceduralFramework Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 2 ofNRC's regulations sets forth the procedures the NRC uses in exercising its enforcement authority.10 CFR 2.201 sets forth the procedures for issuing Notices of Violation.

The procedure to be used in assessing civil penalties is set forth in 10 CFR 2.205. This regulation provides that the civil penalty process is initiated by issuing a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty. The licensee or other person is provided an opportunity i to contest in writing the proposed imposition of a civil penalty. After evaluation of the response, the civil penalty may be mitigated, remitted, or imposed. An opportunity is provided for a

' hearing if a civil penalty is imposed. If a civil penalty is not paid following a hearing or if a hearing is not requested, the matter may be referred to the U.S. Department of Justice to institute

. a civil action in District Court.

The procedure for issuing an order to institute a proceeding to modify, suspend, or revoke a license or to take other action against a licensee or other person subject to the jurisdiction of the

' Commission is set forth in 10 CFR 2.202.' The licensee or any other person adversely affected by the order may request a hearing. The NRC is authorized to make orders immediately effective if

required to protect the public health, safety, or interest, or if the violation is willful. Section 2.204 sets out the procedures for issuing a Demand for Information (Demand) to a licensee or other

person subject to the Commission'sjurisdiction for the purpose of determining whether an order ]

or other enforcement action should be issued. The Demand does not provide hearing rights, as only information is being sought. A licensee must answer a Demand. An unlicensed person may j answer a Demand by either providing the requested information or explaining why the Demand i I

should 'not have been issued.

III. RESPONSIBILITIES L

The Executive Director for Operations (EDO) and the principal enforcement officers of the NRC, the Deputy Executive Director for Reactor Programs (DEDR)and the Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Research and State Programs Regulatory Effectiveness 1 (DEDMRS) have been delegated the authority to approve or issue all escalated enforcement actions.$ The DEDR is responsible to the EDO for NRC enforcement programs. The Office of )

Enforcement (OE) exercises oversight of and implements the NRC enforcement program. The Director, OE, acts for the Deputy Executive Director in enforcement matters in his absence or as delegated.

Subject to the oversight and direction of OE, and with the approval of the Deputy Executive Director, where necessary, the regional offices normally issue Notices of Violation and proposed civil penalties. However, subject to the same oversight as the regional offices, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) may also issue Notices of Violation and proposed civil penalties for certain activities. Enforcement orders are normally issued by the Deputy Executive Director or the ]-

Director, OE. However, orders may also be issued by the EDO, especially those involving the more significant matters. The Directors of NRR and NMSS have also been delegated authority to issue orders, but it is expected that normal use of this authority by NRR and NMSS will be confined to actions not associated with compliance issues. The Chief Financial Officer has been delegated the authority to issue orders where licensees violate Commission regulations by nonpayment oflicense and inspection fees.

In recognition that the regulation of nuclear activities in many cases does not lend itself to a mechanistic treatment, judgment and discretion must be exercised in determining the severity levels of the violations and the appropriate caforcement sanctions, including the decision to issue a Notice of Violation, or to propose or impose a civil penalty and the amount of this penalty,

' after considering the general principles of this statement of policy and the significance of the

- violations and the surrounding circumstances.

'The term " escalated enforcement action" as used in this policy means a Notice of Violation or civil penalty for any Severity Level 1, II, or til violation (or problem) or any order based upon a violation. 1 i

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. f Unless Commission consultation or notification is required by this policy, the NRC staff may depart, where warranted in the public's interest, from this policy as provided in Section VII,

" Exercise of Enforcement Discretion."

The Commission will be provided written notification for the following situations:

(1) All enforcement actions involving civil penalties or orders; (2) The first time that discretion is exercised for a plant that meets the criteria of Section VII.B.2; (3) - (Where appropriate, based on the uniqueness or significance of the issue) when discretion is exercised for violations that meet the criteria of Section VII.B.6; and (4) All Notices of Enforcement Discretion (NOEDs) issued involving natural events, such as severe weather conditions.

The Commission will be consulted prior to taking action in the following situations (unless the urgency of the situation dictates immediate action):

(1) An action affecting a licensee's operation that requires balahcing the public health i and safety or common defense and security implications of not operating against the potential radiological or other hazards associated with continued operation (cases involving severe weather or other natural phenomena may be addressed by the staff without prior Commission consultation in accordance with Section VII.C);

(2) Proposals to impose a civil penalty for a single violation or problem that is greater than 3 times the Severity Level I value shown in Table 1 A for that class oflicensee; 1 (3) Any proposed enforcement action that involves a Severity Level I violation;

_(4) Any action the EDO believes warrants Commission involvement; -

(5) Any proposed enforcement case involving an Office ofInvestigations (01) report where the NRC staff (other than the OI staff) does not arrive at the same conclusions as those in the OI report concerning issues ofintent if the Director of OI concludes that Commission consultation is warranted; and (6) Any proposed enforcement action on which the Commission asks to be consulted.

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k d IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF VIOLATIONS Regulatory requirements

• have varying degrees of safety, safeguards, or environmental  ;

significance. Therefore, the relative importance or significance'of each violation is assessed as the first step in the enforcement process. Following this assessment, a commensurate severity level may be assigned to help determine and develop the appropriate enforcement sanction.

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A. AssessingSignipcance In assessing the significance of a noncompliance, the NRC considers four specific issues:

(1) actual safety consequences; (2) potential safety consequences, including the consideration of risk information; (3) potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function; and (4) any _ willful aspects of the violation.-

1. ActualSafety Consequences. In evaluating actual safety consequences, the NRC considers issues such as actual onsite or offsite releases of radiation, onsite or offsite radiation exposures, accidental criticalities, core damage, loss of significant safety barriers, loss of control of radioactive material or radiological emergencies.

2. Pdtential Safety Consequences. In evaluating potential safety consequences, the NRC

. considers the realistic likelihood of affecting safety, i.e., the existence of credible scenarios with potentially significant actual consequences. The NRC will use risk information wherever possible in assessing significance and assigning severity levels. A higher severity may be warranted for violations that have greater risk significance and a lower severity level may be .

appropriate for issues that have low risk significance. Duration is an appropriate consideration in

assessing the significance of violations.

3. Impacting the Regulatory Process. The NRC considers the safety implications of noncompliances which may impact the NRC's ability to carry out it statutory mission.

Noncompliances may be significant because they may challenge the regulatory envelope'upon which certain activities were licensed. These type of violations include failures such as: failures to provide complete and accurate infonnation, failures to receive prior NRC approval for changes

- in licensed activities, failures to' notify NRC of changes in licensed activities, failure to perform

- 10 CFR 50.59 analysis, reporting failures, etc., Even inadvertent reporting failures are important because many of the surveillance, quality control, and auditing systems on which both the NRC

- and its licensees rely in order to monitor compliance with safety standards are based primarily on

_. complete, accurate and timely recordkeeping and reporting. The existence of a regulatory process Lviolation does not automatically mean that the issue is safety significant. In determining the significance of a violation; the NRC will consider appropriate factors for the particular regulatory process violation.- These factors may include: the significance of the underlying issue, whether the failure actually impeded or influenced regulatory action, the level ofindividuals involved in L'The tenn " requirement"_ as used in this policy means a legally binding requirement such as a statute, regulation, license condition, technical specification, or order.

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-the failure and the reasonableness of the failure given their position and training, and whether the

failure invalidates the licensing basis. Factors to consider for failures to provide complete and accurate information are addressed in Section IX of this policy.

Unless otherwise categorized in the Supplements to this policy statement, the severity level of a violation involving the failure to make a required report to the NRC will be based upon the significance of and the circumstances surrounding the matter that should have been reported. j However, the severity level of an untimely report, in contrast to no report, may be reduced depending on the circumstances surrounding the matter. A licensee will not normally be cited

- for a failure to report a condition or event unless the licensee was actually aware of the condition or event that it failed to report.: A licensee will, on the other hand, normally be cited for a failure to report a condition or event if the licensee knew of the information to be reported, but did not recognize that it was required to make a report.

' 4. Willful Violations. Willful violations are by definition of particular concern to the

' Commission because its regulatory program is based on licensees and their contractors, employees, and agents acting with integrity and communicating with candor. Willful violations cannot be tolerated by either the Commission or a licensee. Therefore, a violation may be l considered more significant than the underlying noncompliance ifit includes indications of j willfulness. The term " willfulness" as used in this policy embraces a spectrum of violations

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- ranging from deliberate intent to violate or falsify to and including careless disregard for requirements. Willfulness does not include acts which do not rise to the level of careless p disregard, e.g., negligence, inadvertent clerical errors in a document submitted to the NRC. In ,

l determining the significance of a violation involving willfulness, consideration will be given to

(- . such factors as the position and responsibilities of the person involved in the violation (e.g.,

licensee official 5.or non-supervisory employee), the significance of any underlying violation, the intent of the violator (i.e., careless disregard or deliberateness), and the economic or other advantage, if any, gained as a result of the violation. The relative weight given to each of these factors in arriving at the significance assessment will be' dependent on the circumstances of the -

n - violation? However, if a licensee refuses to correct a minor violation within a reasonable time such that it willfully continues, the violation should be considered at least more than minor.

Licensees are expected to take significant remedial action in responding to willful violations l

, commensurate with the circumstances such that it demonstrates the seriousness of the violation i L = thereby creating a deterrent effect within the licensee's organization.

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SThe term " licensee official" as used in this policy statement means a first-line supervisor or above, a licensed individual, a radiation safety officer, or an authorized user oflicensed material whether or not listed on a license.

Notwithstanding an individual's job title, severity level categorization for willful acts involving individuals who can be considered licensee officials will consider several factors, including the position of the individual relative to the licensee's organizational structure and the individual's responsibilities relative to the oversight oflicensed activities and to the use oflicensed material.

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s B. Assigning Severity Level For purposes of formal enforcement action, violations are normally categorized in terms of four levels of severity to show their relative importance or significance within each of the following eight activity areas:

I. Reactor Operations; II. Facility Construction; III. ' Safeguards; IV. Health Physics; LV. Transportation;

. VI.  : Fuel Cycle and Materials Operations; {

VII.' Miscellaneous Matters; and VIII. Emergency Preparedness.

Licensed activities will be placed in the activity area most suitable in light of the particular violation involved including activities not directly covered by one of the above listed areas, e.g., export license activities. Within each activity area, Severity Level I has been assigned to violations that are the most significant and Severity Level IV violations are the least sig~nificant. Severity I evel I and II violations are of very significant regulatory concem6 . In general, violations that are included in these severity categories involve ritual or high potential consequences on public health and safety. Severity Level III violations are cause for significant .!

regulatory concern. Severity Level IV violations are less serious but are of more than minor i concem. Violations at Severity Level IV involve noncompliance with NRC requirements that are not considered significant based on risk. This should not be misunderstood to imply that

Severity Level IV issues have no risk significance.  ;

i The Commission recognizes that there are other violations of minor safety or environmental concern which are below the level of significance of Severity Level IV violations.

These minor violations are not the subject of formal enforcement action and are not usually j described in inspection reports. To the extent such violations are described, they will be noted as violations'of minor significance that are not subject to formal enforcement action.  ;

1 Comparisons of significance between activity areas are inappropriate. For example, the immediacy of any hazard to the public associated with Severity Level I violations in Reactor Operations is not directly comparable to that associated with Severity Level I violations in Facility Construction.  !

Supplements I through VIII provide examples and serve as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations in each of the eight activity areas. However, the j

> Regulatory concem pertains to primary NRC regulatory responsibilities, i.e., safety, safeguards, and the environment.

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examples are neither exhaustive nor controlling. In addition, these examples do not create new requirements. Each is designed to illustrate the significance that the NRC places on a particular

type of violation ofNRC requirements. Each of the examples in the supplements is predicated on a violation of a regulatory requirement.

The NRC reviews 'each case being considered for enforcement action on its own merits to ensure that the severity of a violation is characterized at the level best suited to the significance  !

. of the particular violation.  !

V. PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES

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. Whenever the NRC has learned of the existence of a potential violation for which'- j escalated enforcement action appears to be warranted, or recurring nonconformance on the part i of a contractor, the NRC may provide an opportunity for a predecisional enforcement conference ' '

with the licensee, contractor, or other person before taking enforcement action. The purpose of the conference is to obtain information that will assist the NRC in determining the appropriate enforcement action, such as: (1) a common understanding of facts, root causes and missed opportunities associated with the apparent violations, (2) a common understanding of corrective actions taken or planned, and (3) a common understanding of the~ significance ofissues and the need for lasting comprehensive corrective action.

If the NRC concludes that it has sufficient information to make an informed enforcement decision, a conference will not normally be held. ' However, an opportunity for a conference will I

normally be provided before issuing an order based on a violation of the mie on Deliberate Misconduct or a civil penalty to an unlicensed person. If a conference is not held, the licensee

'may be requested to provide a wricten response to an inspection report, ifissued, as to the -

1 licensee's' views on the apparent violations and their root causes and a description of planned or implemented corrective actions. However, if the NRC has sufficient information to conclude

that a civil penalty is not warranted, it may proceed to issue an enforcement action without first -

obtaining the licensee's response to the inspection report.

During the predecisional enforcement conference, the licensee, contractor, or other persons will be given an opportunity to provide information consistent with the purpose of the conference, including an explanation to the NRC of the immediate corrective actions (if any) that

-were taken following identification of the potential violation or nonconformance and the  ;

~ long-term comprehensive actions that were taken or will be taken to prevent recurrence.  !

Licensees, contractors, or other persons will be told when a meeting is a predecisional  !

enforcement confemnce.

A predecisional enforcement conference is a meeting between the NRC and the licensee.

Conferences are normally held in the regional offices and are normally open to public

-. observation. Conferences will not normally be open to the public if the enforcement action being  !

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. (!) Would be taken against an individual, or if the action, though not taken against an

' individual, tums on whether an individual has committed wrongdoing; L (2) Involves significant personnel failures.where the NRC has requested that the individual (s) involved be present at the conference; (3) Is based on'the findings of an NRC Office ofInvestigations report that has not been publicly disclosed; or (4) Involves safeguards information, Privacy Act information, or information which could be considered proprietary; In addition, conferences will not normally be open to the public if:

(5) The conference involves medical misadministrations or overexposures and the conference cannot be conducted without disclosing the exposed individual's name; or (6) The conference will be conducted by telephone or the conference will be conducted at

. a relatively small licensee's facility.

Notwithstanding meeting any of these criteria, a conference may still be open if the conference involves issues related to an_ ongoing adjudicatory proceeding with one or more

' interveners or where the evidentiary basis for the conference is a matter of public record, such as  !

an adjudicatory decision by the Department of Labor. In addition, notwithstanding the above g

. normal criteria for opening or closing conferences, with the approval of the Executive Director -

for Operations, conferences may either be open or closed to the public after balancing the benefit of the public's observation against the potential impact on the agency's decision-making process in a particular case.

' The NRC will notify the licensee that the conference will be open to public observation.

Consistent with the agency's policy on open meetings, " Staff Meetings Open to Public,"

published September 20,1994 (59 FR 48340), the NRC intends to announce open conferences normally at least 10 working days in advance of conferences through (1) notices posted in the Public Document Room, (2) a toll-free telephone recording at 800-952-9674, (3) a toll-free -

electronic bulletin board at 800-952-%76, and on the World Wide Web at the NRC Office of Enforcement homepage (www.nrc. gov /OE). In addition, the NRC will normally issue a press

. release and notify appropriate State liaison officers that a predecisional enforcement conference

has been scheduled and that it is open to public observation.

' The public attending open conferences may observe but may not participate in the

- conference. It is noted that the purpose of conducting open conferences is not to maximize public attendance, but rather to provide the public with opportunities to be informed of NRC  ;

activities consistent with the NRC's ability to' exercise its regulatory and safety responsibilities. I Therefore,' members of the public will be allowed access to the NRC regional offices to attend open enforcement conferences in accordance with the " Standard Operating Procedures For i

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Providing Security Support For NRC Hearings and Meetings," published November 1,1991

.(56 FR 56251). These procedures provide that visitors may be subject to personnel screening, that signs, banners, posters, etc., not larger than 18" be permitted, and that disruptive persons may be removed. The open conference will be terminated if disruption interferes with a successful conference. NRC's Predecisional Enforcement Conferences (whether open or closed)

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normally will be held at the NRC's regional offices or in NRC Headquarters Offices and not in the vicinity of the licensee's facility.

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For a case in which an NRC Office ofInvestigations (OI) report finds that discrimination as defined under 10 CFR 50.7 (or similar provisions in Parts 30,40,60,70, or 72) has occurred, the OI report may be made public, subject to withholding certain information (i.e., after appropriate redaction), in which case the associated predecisional enforcement conference will normally be open to public observation. In a conference where a particular individual is being

! considered potentially responsible for the discrimination, the conference will remain closed. In either case (i.e., whether the conference is open or clos:d), the employee or former employee who was the subject of the alleged discrimination (hereafter referred to as " complainant") will normally be provided an opportunity to participate in the predecisional enforcement conference with the licensee / employer. This participation will normally be in the form of a complainant statement and comment on the licensee's presentation, followed in turn by an opportunity for the ,

licensee to respond to the complainant's presentation. In cases where the complainant is unable to attend in person, arrangements will_be made for the complainant's participation by telephone or an opportunity given for the complainant to submit a written response to the licensee's presentation. If the licensee chooses to forego an enforcement conference and, instead, responds to the NRC's findings in writing, the complainant will be provided the opportunity to submit written comments on the licensee's response. For cases involving potential discrimination by a -

contractor, any associated predecisional enforcement conference with the contractor would be handled similarly. These arrangements for complainant participation in the predecisional- '

enforcement conference are not to be conducted or viewed in any respect as an adjudicatory. j hearing. The purpose of the complainant's participation is to provide information to the NRC to I assist it in its enforcement deliberations.

A predecisional enforcement conference may not need to be held in cases where there is a ful1 adjudicatory record before the Department of Labor. If a conference is held in such cases, generally the conference will focus on the licensee's corrective action. As with discrimination

~ cases based on OI investigations, the complainant may be allowed to participate.  ;

. Members of the public attending open conferences will be reminded that (1) the apparent violations discussed at predecisional enforcement conferences are subject to further review and ,

may be' subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action and (2) the statements of view'sor expressions of opinion made by NRC employees at predecisional enforcement conferences, or the lack thereof, are not intended to represent final determinations or beliefs.

When needed to protect the public health and safety or common defense and security, escalafed enforcement action, such as the issuance of an immediately effective order, will be

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taken before the conference. In these cases, a conference may be held after the escalated enforcement action is taken.

VI. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS This section describes the enforcement sanctions available to the NRC and specifies the conditions under which each may be used. The basic enforcement sanctions are Notices of Violation, civil penalties, and orders of various types. As discussed further in Section VI.D, l related administrative actions such as Notices ofNonconformance, Notices of Deviation, l- Confirmatory Action Letters, Letters of Reprimand, and Demands for Information are used to supplement the enforcement program. In selecting the enforcement sanctions or administrative actions, the NRC will consider enforcement actions taken by other Federal or State regulatory

. bodies having concurrent jurisdiction, such as in transportation matters.

Usually, whenever a violation of NRC requirements of more than a minor concem is identified, enforcement action is taken. The nature and extent of the enforcement action is intended to reflect the seriousness of the violation involved. For the vast majority of violations, a l Notice of Violation or a Notice of Nonconformance is the normal action.

l How'ever, circumstances regarding the violation findings may warrant discretion being .

exercised such taat the NRC refrains from issuing a Notice of Violation of other enforcement action. (See Section VII.B, " Mitigation of Enforcement Sanctions.")

l A. Notice of Violation A Notice of Violation is a written notice setting forth one or more violations of a legally binding requirement. The Notice of Violation normally requires the recipient to provide a written statement describing (1) the reasons for the violation or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation; (2) corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; j (3) corrective steps that will be taken to prevent recurrence; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved.' The NRC may waive all or portions of a written response to the extent relevant information has already been provided to the NRC in writing or documented in an NRC inspection report. The NRC may require responses to Notices of Violation to be under l: oath. Normally, responses under oath will be required only in connection with Severity Level I, II, or III violations or orders.

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- The NRC uses the Notice of Violation as the usual method for formalizing the existence

. of a violation. Issuance of a Notice of Violation is normally the only enforcement action taken, except in cases where the criteria for issuance of civil penalties and orders, as set forth in l Sections VI.B and VI.C, respectively, are met.

B. CivilPenalty A civil penalty is a monetary penalty that may be imposed for violation of(1) certain specified licensing provisions of the Atomic Energy Act or supplementary NRC rules or orders;

r (2) any requirement for which a license may be revoked; or (3) reporting requirements under section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act. Civil penalties are designed to deter future violations both by the involved licensee as well as by other licensees conducting similar activities and to emphasize the need for licensees to identify violations and take prompt comprehensive corrective action.

~ Civil penalties are considered for Severity Level III violations. In addition, civil penalties will normally be assessed for Severity Level I and II violations and knowing and conscious violations of the reporting requirements of section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act.

Civil penalties are used to encourage prompt identification and prompt and comprehensive correction of violations, to emphasize compliance in a manner that deters future violations, and to serve to focus licensees' attention on significant violations.

Although management involvement, direct or indirect, in a violation may lead to an increase in the civil penalty, the lack of management involvement may not be used to mitigate a civil penalty. Allowing mitigation in the latter case could encourage the lack of management involvement in licensed activities and a decrease in protection of the public health and safety.

L Base CivilPenalty The NRC imposes different levels of penalties for different severity level violations and different classes oflicensees, contractors, and other persons. Tables I A and IB show the base civil penalties for various reactor, fuel cycle, and materials programs. (Civil penalties issued to individuals are determined on a case-by-case basis.) The structure of these tables generally takes into account the gravity of the violation as a primary consideration and the ability to pay as a secondary consideration. Generally, operations involving greater nuclear material inventories and greater potential consequences to the public and licensee einployees receive higher civil penalties. Regarding the secondary factor of ability of various classes oflicensees to pay the civil penalties, it is not the NRC's intention that the economic impact of a civil penalty be so severe that it puts a licensee out of business (orders, rather than civil penalties, are used when the intent is to suspend or terminate licensed activities) or adversely affects a licensee's ability to safely conduct licensed activities. The deterrent effect of civil penalties is best served when the amounts of the penalties take into account a licensee's ability to pay. In determining the amount of civil penalties for licensees for whom the tables do not reflect the ability to pay or the gravity

' of the violation, the NRC will consider as necessary an increase or decrease on a case-by-case basis. Normally, if a licensee can demonstrate' financial hardship, the NRC will consider payments over time, including interest, rather than reducing the amount of the civil penalty.

However, where a licensee claims financial hardship, the licensee will normally be required to address why it has sufficient resources to safely conduct licensed activities and pay license and inspection fees.

l l TABLE 1A-BASE CIVIL PENALTIES

a. Power reactors and gaseous diffusion plants.......$110,000 l

b. Fuel fabricators authorized to possess Category'l or II quantities of SNM.. ........ ... . ...... .......... ................$5 5,000

c. Fuel fabricators, industrial processors,'

and independent spent fuel and monitored tetrievable storage installations...... .. . ...... .....$27,500

d. Test reactors, mills and uranium conversion facilities, contractors, waste disposal licensees, industrial radiographers, and other large material users............. ...... ........ . .............$ 1 1,000

e. Research reactors, academic, medical, or other small material users2 .... .. . . .. . ...........$5,500

'Large firms engaged in manufacturing or distribution of byproduct, source, or special nuclear material.

2This applies to nonprofit institutions not otherwise categorized in this tr.ble, mobile nuclear services, nuclear pharmacies, and physician offices.

TABLE IB-BASE CIVIL PENALTIES Severity Level Base Civil Penalty Amount (Percent of amount listed in Table 1 A)

I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100%

I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . 8 0%

I I I . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 5 0%

2. CivilPenalty Assessment In an effort to (1) emphasize the importance of adherence to requirements and (2) reinforce prompt self-identification of problems and root causes and prompt and comprehensive correction of violations, the NRC reviews each proposed civil penalty or its own merits and, after considering all relevant circumstances, may adjust the base civil penalties shown in Table 1 A and 1 B for Severity Level I, II, and III violations as described below.

The civil penalty assessment process considers four decisional points: (a) whether the licensee has had any previous escalated enforcement action (regardless of the activity area) during the past 2 years or past 2 inspections, whichever is longer; (b) whether the licensee should be given credit for actions related to identification; (c) whether the licensee's corrective actions are prompt and comprehensive; and (d) whether, in view of all the circumstances, the matter in question requires the exercise of discretion. Although each of these decisional points may have several associated considerations for any given case, the outcome of the assessment process for l

each violation or problem, absent the exercise of discretion, is limited to one of the following three results: no civil penalty, a base civil penalty, or a base civil penalty escalated by 100%.

The flow chart presented below is a graphic representation of the civil penalty assessment process.

Oo a=ac. a' YES T ,

veianon YES Cree for 0 Civil a

YES e  ?

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ESCAL.ATED PROCESS E , y M,ld,(" sIEn *y**a nD Yal YES Y m  %

NO Creefor OD Notce ol Acwa y  ;

vioiman s

2 X Base Civil Pensity h D6screann

a. InitialEscalatedAction When the NRC determines that a non-willful Severity Level III vioiation or problem has occurred, and the licensee has not had any previous escalated actions (regirdless of the activity area) during the past 2 years or 2 inspections, whichever is longer, the NRC will consider whether the licensee's corrective action for the present violation or problem is reasonably prompt and comprehensive (see the discussion under Section VI.B.2.c, below). Using 2 years as the basis for assessment is expected to cover most situations, but considering a slightly longer or shorter period might be warranted based on the circumstances of a particular case. The starting point of this period should be considered the date when the licensee was put on notice of the need to take corrective action. For a licensee-identified violation or an event, this would be when the licensee is aware that a problem or violation exists requiring corrective action. For an NRC-identified violation, the starting point would be when the NRC puts the licensee on notice, which could be during the inspection, at the inspection exit meeting, or as part of post-inspection communication.

If the corrective action is judged to be prompt and comprehensive, a Notice of Violation normally should be issued with no associated civil penalty. If the corrective action isjudged to be less than prompt and comprehensive, the Notice of Violation normally should be issued with a base civil penalty.

b. Creditfor Actions Related to Identification (1) If a Severity Level I or II violation or a willful Severity Level III violation has occurred--or if, during the past 2 years or 2 inspections, whichever is longer, the licensee has been issued at least one other escalated action--the civil penalty assessment should normally consider the factor ofidentification in addition to corrective action (see the discussion under i-

l 1

l Section VI.B.2.c, below). As to identification, the NRC should consider whether the licensee should be given credit for actions related to identification.

In each case, the decision should be focused on identification of the problem requiring j corrective action. In other words, although giving credit for Identification and Corrective Action should be separate decisions, the concept ofIdentrylcation presumes that the identifier recognizes the existence of a problem, and understands that corrective action is needed. The decision on Identrylcation requires consi6: ring all the circumstances ofidentification including:

(i) Whether the problem requiring corrective action was NRC-identified, licensee-identified, or revealed through an event';

(ii) Whether prior opportunities existed to identify the problem requiring corrective action, and if so, the age and number of those opportunities; (iii) Whether the problem was revealed as the result of a licensee self-monitoring effort, such as conducting an audit, a test, a surveillance, a design review, or troubleshooting; (iv) For a problem revealed through an event, the ease of discovery, and the degree of licensee inithtive in identifying the root cause of the problem and any associated violations; (v) For NRC-identified issues, whether the licensee would likely have identified the issue in the same time-period if the NRC had not been involved; I (vi) For NRC-identified issues, whether the licensee should have identified the issue (and taken action) earlier; and i

(vii) For cases in which the NRC identifies the overall problem requiring corrective j action (e.g., a programmatic issue), the dr. gree oflicensee initiative or lack ofinitiative in identifying the problem or problems reouiring corrective action.

(2) Although some cases may consider all of the ebove factors, the importance of each j factor will vary based on the type of case as discussed in the following general guidance:

'An " event," as used here, means (1) an event characterized by an active adverse impact on equipment or personnel, readily obvious by human observation or instrumentation, or (2) a radiological impact on personnel or l l

the environment in excess of regulatory limits, such as an overexposure, a release of radioactive material above NRC limits, or a loss of radioactive material. For example, an equipment failure discovered through a spill of liquid, a loud noise, the failure to have a system respond properly, or an annunciator alarm would be considered an event; a system discovered to be inoperable through a document review would not. Similarly, if a licensee l discovered, through quarterly dosimetry readings, that employees had been inadequately monitored for radiation, l I

the issue would normally be considered licensee-identified; however, if the same dosimetry readings disclosed an

, overexposure, the issue would be considered an event.

l l \

l i i

1

.. ./ 1

~

(i) Licensee-Identified. When a problem requiring corrective action is licensee-identified (i.e., identified before the problem has resulted in an event), the NRC should normally give the licensee credit for actions related to identification, regardless of whether prior opportunities existed to identify the problem.

(ii) Identified Through an Event. When a problem requiring corrective action is identified through an event, the decision on whether to give the licensee credit for actions related to identification nonnally should consider the ease of discovery, whether the event occuned as the result of a licensee self-monitoring effort (i.e., whether the licensee was "looking for the problem"), the degree oflicensee initiative in identifying the problem or problems requiring corrective action, and whether prior opponunities existed to identify the problem.

Any of these considerations may be overriding if particularly noteworthy or particularly egregious. For example, if the event occurred as the result of conducting a surveillance or similar self-monitoring effort (i.e., the licensee was looking for the problem), the licensee should normally be given credit for identification. As a second instance, even if the problem was easily discovered (e.g., revealed by a large spill ofliquid), the NRC may choose to give credit because i noteworthy licensee efTort was exerted in ferreting out the root cause and assceiated violations, or simply because no prior opportunities (e.g., procedural cautions, post-maintenance testing, quality control failures, readily observable parameter trends, or repeated or locked-in annunciator

~

wamings) existed to identify the problem.

-(iii) NRC-Identified. When a problem requiring corrective action is NRC-identified, the decision on whether to give the licensee credit for actions related to ldentification should normally be based on an additional question: should the licensee have reasonably identified the problem (and taken action) earlier?

In most cases, this reasoning may be based simply on the ease of the NRC inspector's discovery (e.g., conducting a walkdown, observing in the control room, performing a confimiatory NRC radiation survey, hearing a cavitating pump, or finding a valve obviously out of position). In some cases, the licensee's missed opportunities to identify the problem might include a similar previous violation, NRC or industry notices, intemal audits, or readily observable trends.

If the NRC identifies the violation but concludes that, under the circumstances, the licensee's actions related to ldentification were not unreasonable, the matter would be treated as licensee-identified for purposes of assessing the civil penalty. In such cases, the question of Identification credit shifts to whether the licensee should be penalized for NRC's identification of the problem.

(iv) Mixed Identification. For " mixed" identification situations (i.e., where multiple violations exist, some NRC-identified, some licensee-identified, or where the NRC prompted the licensee to take action that resulted in the identification of the violation), the NRC's evaluation should normally determine whether the licensee could reasonably have been expected to identify the violation in the NRC's absence. This determination should consider, among other things, the c

m j ,

b ( .

I timing of the NRC's discovery, the information available to the licensee that caused the NRC

~

l concem, the specificity of the NRC's concern, the scope of the licensee's efforts, the level of

! . licensee resources given to the investigation, and whether the NRC's path of analysis had been  !

. dismissed or was being pursued in parallel by the licensee.

In some cases, the licensee may have addressed the isolated symptoms of each violation (and may have identified the violations), but failed to recognize the common root cause and taken the necessary comprehensive action. Where this is true, the decision on whether to give licensee credit for actions related to Identification should focus on identification of the problem requiring corrective action (e.g., the programmatic breakdown). As such, depending on the chronology of the various violations, the earliest of the individual violations might be considered missed opportunities for the licensee to have identified the larger problem.

((v) Missed Opportunities to Identify. Missed opportunities include prior notifications or missed opportunities to identify or prevent violations such as (1) through normal surveillances, audits, or quality assurance (QA) activities; (2) through prior notice, i.e., specific )

NRC or industry notification; or (3) through other reasonable indication of a potential problem or violation, such as observations of employees and contractors, and failure to take effective corrective steps. It may include findings of the NRC, the licensee, or industry made at other  ;

facilities operated by the licensee where it is reasonable to expect the licensee to take action to 1 identify or prevent similar problems at the facility subject to the enforcem^ent action at issue. In assessing this factor, consideration will be given to, among other things, the opportunities available'to discover the violation, the case of discovery, the similarity between the violation and the notification, the period of time between when the vid-%n occurred and when the  !

notification was issued, the action taken (or planned) , .:ensee in response to the j notification, and the level of management review that the notification received (or should have i received).

The evaluation of missed opportunities should normally depend on whether the  !

information available to the licensee should reasonably have caused action that would have prevented the violation. Missed opportunities is normally not applied where the licensee i appropriately reviewed the opportunity for application to its activities and reasonable action was either taken or planned to be taken within a reasonable time.  ;

In some situations the missed opportunity is a violation in itself. In these cases, unless the missed opportunity is a Severity Level III violation in itself, the missed opportunity violation may be grouped with the other violations into a single Severity Level III " problem." However, if the missed opportunity is the only violation, then it should not normally be counted twice (i.e.,

both as the violation and as a missed opportunity " double counting") unless the number of opportunities missed was particularly significant.  !

, ' The timing of the missed opportunity should also be considered While a rigid time-frame

- is unnecessary, a 2-year period should generally be considered for consistency in

', implememation, as the period reflecting relatively current performance.

a 4

i- (3) When the NRC determines that the licensee should receive credit for actions related to Identification, the civil penalty assessment should normally result in either no civil penalty or a base civil penalty, based on whether Corrective Action is judged to be reasonably prompt and comprehensive. When the licensee is not given credit for actions related to Identification, the civil penalty assessment should normally result in a Notice of Violation with either a base civil penalty or a base civil penalty escalated by 100%, depending on the quality of Corrective Action, because the licensee's performance is clearly not acceptable.

c. Creditfor Prompt and Comprehensive Corrective Action The purpose of the Corrective Action factor is to encourage licensees to (1) take the immediate actions necessary upon discovery of a violation that will restore safety and .

compliance with the license, regulation (s), or other requirement (s); and (2) develop and implement (in a timely manner) the lasting actions that will not only prevent recurrence of the violation at issue, but will be appropriately comprehensive, given the significance and complexity of the violation, to prevent occurrence of violations with similar root causes.

Regardless of other circumstances (e.g., past enforcement history, identification), the

- licensee's corrective actions should always be evaluated as part of the civil penalty assessment process. As a reflection of the importance given to this factor, an NRC judgment that the licensee's corrective action has not been prompt and comprehensive will always result in issuing at least a base civil penalty.

In assessing this factor, consideration will be given to the timeliness of the corrective action (including the promptness in developing the schedule for long term corrective action), the adequacy of the licensee's root cause analysis for the violation, and, given the significance and complexity of the issue, the comprehensiveness of the corrective action (i.e., whether the action-is focused narrowly to the specific violation or broadly to the general area of concern). Even in cases when the NRC, at the time of the enforcement conference, identifies additional peripheral or minor corrective action still to be taken, the licensee may be given credit in this area, as long as the licensee's actions addressed the underlying root cause and are considered sufficient to prevent recurrence of the violation and similar violations.

Normally, the judgment of the adequacy of corrective actions will hinge on whether the NRC had to take action to focus the licensee's evaluative and corrective process in order to obtain comprehensive corrective action. This will normally bejudged at the time of the predecisional enforcement conference (e.g., by outlining substantive additional areas where conective action is needed). Earlier informal disct.ssions between the licensee and NRC inspectors or management may result in improved corrective action, but should not normally be a basis to deny credit for Corrective Action. For cases in which the licensee does not get credit for actions related to Identification because the NRC identified the problem, the assessment of the licensee's corrective action should begin from the time when the NRC put the licensee on notice of the problem.

Notwith :tanding eventual good comprehensive conective action, ifimmediate corrective action was not taken to restore safety and compliance once the violation was identified, corrective action would not be considered prompt and comprehensive.

o

Corrective action for violations involving discrimination should normally only be considered comprehensive if the licensee takes prompt. comprehensive corrective action that

~ (1) addresses the broader environment for raising safety concerns in the workplace, and (2) provides a remedy for the particular discrimination at issue.-

In response to violations of 10 CFR 50.59, corrective action should normally be considered prompt and comprehensive only if the licensee (i) Makes a prompt decision on operability; and either (ii)~Makes'a prompt evaluation under 10 CFR 50.59 if the licensee intends to maintain the facility or procedure in the as found condition; or .

(iii) Promptly initiates corrective action consistent with Criterion XVI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, ifit intends to restore the facility or procedure to the FSAR description.

d. . Exercise ofDiscretion As provided in Section VII, " Exercise of Discretion," discretion may be exercised by either escalating or mitigating the amount of the civil penalty determined after applying the civil penalty adjustment factors to ensure that the proposed civil penalty reflecfs all relevant circumstances _of the particular case. However, in no instance will a civil penalty for any one violation exceed $110,000 per day.

C. Orders An order is a written NRC directive to modify, suspend, or revoke a license; to cease and J

desist from a given practice or activity; or to take such other action as may be proper (see 10 j CFR 2.202). Orders may also be issued in lieu of, or in addition to, civil penalties, as appropriate j for Severity Level I, II, or III violations. Orders may be issued as follows:

1. License Modification orders are issued when some change in licensee ecaipment, procedures, personnel, or management controls is necessary.

2. Suspension Orders may be used:

i l

(a)- ' To remove a threat to the public health and safety, common defense and security, )

Lor the environment; l l

(b) To stop facility construction when, (i) Further work could preclude or significantly hinder the identification or correction of an improperly constructed safety-related system or component; or

e w

(ii)' The licensee's quality assurance program implementation is not adequate to provide confidence that construction activities are being properly carried out;

' (cl When the licensee has not responded adequately to other enforcement action;

'(d) When the licensee interferes with the conduct of an inspection or investigation; or (e) For any reason not mentioned above for which license revocation is legally authorized.

Suspensions may apply to all'or part of the licensed activity. Ordinarily, a licensed activity is not suspended (nor is a suspension prolonged) for failure to comply with requirements where such failure is not willful and adequate corrective action has been taken.

3. Revocation Orders may be used:

(a) When a licensee is unable or unwilling to comply with NRC requirements; (b) When a licensee refuses to correct a violation;

.(c) When licensee does not respond to a Notice of Violation where a response was required; (d) When a licensee refuses to pay an applicable fee under the Commission's regulations; or (e) For any other reason for which revocation is authorized under section 186 of the

~ Atomic Energy Act (e.g., any condition which would warrant refusal of a license on an original application).

4. Cease and Desist Orders may be used to stop an unauthorized activity that has continued after notification by the NRC that the activity is unauthorized.

5. Orders to non-licensees, including contractors and subcontractors, holders of NRC approvals, e.g., certificates of compliance, early site permits, standard design certificates, or applicants for any of them, and to employees of any of the foregoing, are used when the NRC has identified deliberate misconduct that may cause a licensee to be in violation of an NRC requirement or where incomplete or inace trate information is deliberately submitted or where the NRC loses its reasonable assurance that the licensee will meet NRC requirements with that

- person involved in licensed activities.

Unless a separate response is warranted pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, a Notice of Violation need not be issued where an order is based on violations described in the order. The violations described in an order need not be categorized by severity level.

m-i' m

v o ,

Orders are made effective immediately, without prior opportunity for hearing, whenever it is determined that the public health, interest, or safety so requires, or when the order is responding to a violation involving willfulness. Otherwise, a prior opportunity for a hearing on

. the order is afforded. For cases in which the NRC believes a basis could reasonably exist for not

' taking the action as proposed, the licensee will ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to show why the order should not be issued in the proposed manner by way of a Demand for Information.

(See 10 CFR 2.204)-

, D. RelatedAdministrative Actions In addition to the formal enforcement actions, Notices of Violation, civil penalties, and orders, the NRC also uses administrative actions, such as Notices of Deviation, Notices of

Nonconformance, Confirmatory Action Letters, Letters of Reprimand, and Demands for Information to supplement its enforcement program. The NRC expects licensees and contractors to adhere to any obligations and commitments resulting from these actions and will not hesitate to issue appropriate orders to ensure that these obligations and commitments are met.

1. Notices of Deviation are written notices describing a licensee's failure to satisfy a commitment where the commitment involved has not been made a legally binding requirement.

A Notice of Devntion requests a licensee to provide a written explanation or statement describing corrective steps taken (or planned), the results achieved, and th~e date when corrective action will be completed.

2. - Notices of Nonconformance are written notices describing contractors' failures to meet commitments which have not been made legally binding requirements by NRC. An example is a commitment made in a procurement contract with a licensee as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. Notices of Nonconformances request non-licensees to provide written explanations

- or statements describing corrective steps (taken or planned), the results achieved, the dates when corrective actions will be completed, and measures taken to preclude recurrence.

3. Confirmatory Action Letters are letters confirming a licensee's or contractor's

' agreement to take certain actions to remove significant concerns about health and safety, safeguards, or the environment.

4. Letters of Reprimand are letters addressed to individuals subject to Commission

. jurisdiction identifying a significant deficiency in their performance oflicensed activities.

5. _ _ Demands for Information are d:mands for information from licensees or other persons for the purpose of enabling the NRC to determine whether an order or other enforcement action should be issued.-

J i

p.

, x

. VII. EXERCISE OF DISCRETION Notwithstanding the normal guidance contained in this policy, as provided in Section III,

" Responsibilities," the NRC may choose to exercise discretion and either escalate or mitigate enforcement sanctions within the Commission's statutory authority to ensure that the resulting

enforcement action takes into consideration all of the relevant circumstances of the particular case.

A. Escalation ofEnforcement Sanctions I'

- The NRC considers violations categorized at Severity Level I, II, or III to be of significant regulatory concern. If the application of the normal guidance in this policy does not I

result in an appropriate sanction, with the approval of the Deputy Executive Director and consultation with the EDO and Commission, as warranted, the NRC may apply its full enforcement authority.where the action is warranted. NRC action may include (1) escalating civil penalties, (2) issuing appropriate orders, and (3) assessing civil penalties for continuing violations on a per day basis, up to the statutory limit of $110,000 per violation, per day.

1. CivilPenalties Notwithstanding the outcome of the normal civil penalty assessmeht process addressed in

.Section VI.B, the NRC may exercise discretion by either proposing a civil penalty where application of the factors would otherwise result in zero penalty or by escalating the amount of

. the resulting civil penalty (i.e., base or twice the base civil penalty) to ensure that the proposed civil. penalty reflects the significance of the circumstances. The Commission will be notified if the deviation'in the amount of the civil penalty proposed under this discretion from the amount

, of the civil penalty assessed under the normal process is more than two times the base civil penalty shown in Tables l A and IB. Examples when this discretion should be considered include, but are not limited to the following: )

1 (a) . Problems categorized at Severity Level I or II; l j

-(b) Overexposures, or releases of radiological material in excess of NRC

. requirements; ,

. . l

'(c) Situatior.s involving particularly poor licensee performance, or involving

. willfulness;

(d) Situations when the licensee's previous enforcement history has been particularly i poor, or when the current violation is directly repetitive of an earlier violation; 1

' (e).- . Situations when the violation results in a substantial increase in risk, including

? cases in which the duration of the violation has contributed to the substantial increase; P

I a

Y ',a f

1

s ,

J I

' (f)- _ . Situations when the licensee made a conscious decision to be in noncompliance in

. order to obtain an economic benefit; -

. (g)- ' Cases involving the loss of a source. In addition, unless the licensee self-identifies and reports the loss to the NRC, these cases should normally result in a civil penalty in an amount at least in the order of the cost of an authorized disposal of the material or of the

. transfer of the material to an authorized recipient; or <

(h)- Severity Level II'or III violations associated with departures from the Final Safety J Analysis Report identified after March 30,2000, for risk-significant items as defined by the licensee's maintenance rule program and March 30,2001, for all other issues. Such a violation .

or problem would consider the number and nature of the violations, the severity of the violations, whether the violations were continuing, and who identified the violations (and if the licensee

. identified the violation, whether exercise of Section VII.B.3 enforcement discretion is warranted.) .

2. Orders The NRC may, where necessary or desirable, issues orders in conjunction with or in lieu of civil penalties to achieve or formalize corrective actions' and to deter further recurrence of

. serious violations.

3. Daily civilpenalties In order to recognize the added significance for those cases where a very strong message is warranted for a significant violation that continues for more than one day, the NRC may exercise discretion and assess a separate violation and attendant civil penalty up to the statutory limit of $110,000 for each day the violation continues. The NRC may exercise this discretion if a licensee was aware or clearly should have been aware of a violation, or if the licensee had an opportunity to identify and correct the violation but failed to do so.

'B. Mitigation ofEnforcement Sanctions The NRC may exercise discretion and refrain from issuing a civil penalty and/or a Notice of Violation after considering the general principles of this statement of policy and the sunounding circumstances. The approval of the Director, Office of Enforcement, with consultation with the Deputy Executive Director as warranted, is required for exercising

. discretion of the type described in Sections Vll.B.I.a and VII.B.I.h where a willful violation is

' involved, and of the types described in Sections VII.B.2 through VII.B.6. The circumstances under which mitigation discretion should be considered include, but are not limited to the -

following:

L r

E j

o ly F '

/ L Non-Cited Violations (NCVs)

A Non-Cited Violation (NCV) is defined as a Severity Level IV violation for which the staff chooses to exercise discretion in accoidance with the Enforcement Policy and refrain from

. issuing a Notice of Violation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.20).

- Severity Level'IV. violations are defined in the Enforcement Policy as violations of more than minor concern. Violations at Severity Level IV involve noncompliance with NRC requirements that are not considered significant based on risk. This should not be misunderstood to imply that Severity Level IV issues have no risk significance.

Exercising this type of discretion for Severity Level IV violations does not eliminate the

. NRC's emphasis on compliance with requirements nor the importance of maintaining safety. l NRC inspectors will continue to identify and document Severity Level IV violations associated with matters they inspect. Doing so prompts licensees to take corrective actions and assures the

. public that violations are not ignored. This type'of discretion is merely an option for -

dispositioning Severity Level IV violations; it does not change the threshold for Severity Level IV violations. This approach will allow licensees to dispute violations described as NCVs.

]

The r;pecific criteria for exercising NCV discretion is described in the sections below.

a. Power Reactor Licensees . b Severity Level IV viola'tions at power reactors will normally be dispositioned as NCVs.  ;

' Notwithstanding that this is the normal policy, the disposition of a Severity Level IV violation as an NCV is still an exercise of discretion, in that the agency is making a conscious decision not to i issue a legal citation (Notice of Violation) for a violation of the requirements. ' Severity Level IV violations will be described in inspection reports, although the NRC will close these violations based on their being entered into the licensee's corrective action program. At the time a

. violation is closed in an inspection report, the licensee may not have completed its corrective actions or begun the process to identify the root cause and develop action to prevent recurrence.

Licensee actions'will be taken commensurate with the established priorities and processes of the

' licensee's corrective action program. The NRC inspection program will provide an assessment of the effectiveness of the corrective action program. In addition to documentation in inspection reports, violations will be entered into the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM) that the NRC maintains for each facility to assist in identifying declining performance and determining repetitiveness.

Because the NRC will not normally obtain a written response from licensees describing L actions taken to restore compliance and prevent recurrence of Severity Level IV violations, this enforcement approach places greater NRC reliance on licensee corrective action programs.

l Therefore, notwithstanding the normal approach of treating most Severity Level IV violations as o . NCVs, the NRC has identified four circumstances in which a written response to a Severity

. Level IV violation may be important. Any one of the following circumstances will result in l

consideration of a Notice of Violation (NOV) requiring a formal written response from a L licensee. ,

I l .-

1 E. :

~ 1. The licensee failed to restore compliance within a reasonable time after a violation was

- identified.

2. The licensee did not place the violation into a corrective action program to address recurrence.

3. The violation is repetitive as a result ofinadequate corrective action, and was identified

by the NRC.

4. The violation was willful. Notwithstanding willfulness, an NCV may still be -

. appropriate if:

(i)) - The licensee identified the violation and the information concerning the violation,

, , if not required to be reported, was promptly provided to appropriate NRC personnel, such as a

' resident inspector or regional section or branch chief;

-(ii). The violation involved the acts of a low-level individual (and not a licensee -

official as defined in Section IV.A);

(iii) The violation appears to be the isolated action of the employee without

. management involvement and the violation was not caused by lack of ma6agement oversight as evidenced by either a history ofisolated willful violations or a lack of adequate audits or supervision of employees; and

.(iv) Significant remedial action commensurate with the circumstances was taken by the licensee such that it demonstrated the seriousness of the violation to other employees and contractors, thereby creating a deterrent effect within the licensee's organization.

b. - g. [ Reserved]

h. All Other Licensees

. The NRC, with the approval of the Regional Administrator or his or her designee, may refrain from issuing an NOV for a Severity Level IV violation that is documented in an inspection report (or official field notes for some material cases) and described therein as an NCV provided that the inspection report includes a brief description of the corrective action and

. that the violation meets all of the following criteria:

i

1. It was identified by the licensee;'

biscretion is not warranted when a licensee identifies a violation as a result of an event where the root cau the event is obvious or the licensee had prior opportunity to identify the problem but failed to take action that would have prevented the event. Discretion may be warranted if the licensee demonstrated initiative in identifying the violation's root cause.

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_ 2. It was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violation or a previous licensee finding that occurred within the past 2 years of the inspection at issue, or the period within the last two inspections, whichever is longer;

3. It was or will be corrected within a reasonable time, by specific corrective action committed to by the licensee by the end of the inspection, including immediate corrective action and comprehensive corrective action to prevent recurrence; and

4. It was not a willful violation or ifit was a willful violation; (i) The information concerning the violation, if not required to be reported, was )

promptly provided to appropriate NRC personnel, such as a resident inspector or regional section l or branch chief; -

.(ii) The violation involved the acts of a low-level individual (and 'not a licensee official as def'med in Section IV.A);

(iii) The violation appears to be the isolated action of the employee without management involvement and the violation was not caused by lack of management oversight as evidenced by either a history ofisolated willful violations or a lack of adequate audits or supervision of employees; and (iv) Significant remedial action commensurate with the circumstances was taken by the licensee such that it demonstrated the seriousness of the violation to other employees and

. contractors, thereby creating a deterrent effect within the licensee's organization, j i

2. Violations identified During ExtendedShutdowns or Work Stoppages i The NRC may refrain from issuing a Notice of Violation or a proposed civil penalty for a

' violation that is identified after (i) the NRC has taken significant enforcement action based upon j a major safety event contributing to an extended shutdown of an operating reactor or a material

- licensee (or a work stoppage at a construction site), or (ii) the licensee enters an extended

shutdown or work stoppage related to generally poor performance over a long period of time, {

provided that the violation it documented in an inspection report (or official field notes for some material cases) and that it meets all of the following criteria:

i (a)- It was either licensee-identified as a result of a comprehensive program for problem identification and correction that was developed in response to the shutdown or  :

identified as a result of an employee allegation to the licensee; (If the NRC identifies the violation and all of the other criteria are met, the NRC should determine whether enforcement action is necessary to achieve remedial action, or if discretion may still be approprie.te.)

(b) It is based upon activities of the licensee prior to the events leading to the shutdown; i

I

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(c) It would not be categorized at Severity Level I; (d) It was not willful; and -

(e) The licensee's' decision to restart the plant requires NRC concurrence. I

3. Violations involving Old Design issues The NRC may refrain from proposing a civil penalty for a Severity Level II or III vic aon involving a past problem, such as in engineering, design, or installation, provided that ,

th. violation is documented in an inspection report (or official field notes for some material cases) that includes a description of the corrective action and that it meets all of the following l criteria.

1

-(a) It was a licensee-identified as a result ofits voluntary initiative; i

.(b) I' t was or will be corrected, including immediate corrective action and long term

. comprehensive corrective action to prevent recurrence, within a reasonable time following identification (this action should involve expanding the initiative, as necessary, to identify other failures caused by similar root cause:); ar,d (c) It was not likely to be identified (after the violation occurred) by routine licensee 1

efforts such as normal surveillance or quality assurance (QA) activities.

In addition, the NRC may refrain from issuing a Notice of Violation for a Severity I Level II, III, or IV violation that meets the above criteria provided the violation was caused by conduct that is not reasonably linked to present performance (normally, violations that are at least 3 years old or violations occurring during plant construction) and there had not been prior notice so that the licensee should have reasonably identified the violation earlier. This exercise j of discretion is to place a premium on licensees initiating efforts to identify and correct subtle violations that are not likely to be identified by routine efforts before degraded safety systems are l called upon to work.

Section VII.B.3 discretion would not normally be applied to departutes from the FSAR if:

(a)- The NRC identifies the violation, unless it was likely in the staff's view that the i licensee would have identified the violation in light of the defined scope, thoroughness, and  ;

i schedule of the licensee's initiative provided the schedule provides for completion of the licensee's initiative by March 30,2000, for risk-significant items as defined by the licensee's maintenance rule program and by March 30,2001, for all other issues; (b). ' The licensee identifies the violation as a result of an event or surveillance or other required testing where required corrective action identifies the FSAR issue;

l

-(c) The licensee identifies the violation but had prior opportunities to do so (was aware of the departure from the FSAR) and failed to correct it earlier; (d) There is willfulness associated with the violation; (e) The licensee fails to make a report required by the identification of the departure from the FSAR; or (f) ' The licensee either fails to take comprehensive corrective action or fails to appropriately expand the corrective action program. The corrective action should be broad with a defined 5. cope and schedule. J

4. Violations Identiped Due to Previous Enforcement Action i

The NRC may refrain from issuing a Notice of Violation or a proposed civil penalty for a violation that is identified after the NRC has taken enforcement action, provided that the violation is documented in an inspection report (or official field notes for some material cases) that includes a description of the corrective action and that it meets all of the following criteria:

(a) It was licensee-identified as part of the corrective action for the previous enforcement action; ,

i

-(b) It has the same or similar root cause as the violation for which enforcement action i was issued; l '

(c) It does not substantially change the safety significance or the character of the regulatory concern arising out of the initial violation; and (d) It was p wJl be corrected, including immediate corrective action and long term comprehensive correctiw action to prevent recurrence, within a reasonable time following identification.

(e) It wcald not be categorized at Severity Level 1;

5. Violations involving Certain Discrimination Issues

- Enforcement discretion may be exercised for discrimination cases when a licensee who, without the need for government intervention, identifies an issue of discrimination and takes

. prompt, comprehensive, and effective corrective action to address both the particular situation -

and the overall work environment for raising safety concerns. Similarly, enforcement may not be warranted where a complaint is filed with the Department of Labor (DOL) under Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, but the licensee settles the matter before tlie DOL' makes an initial finding of discrimination and addresses the overall work environment.

Alternatively, if a finding of discrNination is made, the licensee may choose to settle the case

' before the evidentiary hearing begins. In such cases, the NRC may exercise its discretion not to

y take enforcement action when the licensee has addressed the overall work environment for raising safety concerns and has publicized that a complaint of discrimination for engaging in

protected activity was'made to the DOL that the matter was settled to the satisfaction of the

employee'(the terms of the specific settlement agreement need not be posted), and that, if the DOL' Area Office found discrimination, the licensee has taken action to positively reemphasize that discrimination will not be tolerated. - Similarly, the NRC mt;e;efrain from taking enforcement action if a licensee settles a matter promptly after a person comes to the NRC Lwithout going to the DOLJ Such discretion would normally not be exercised in cases in which the licensee does not appropriately address the overall work environment (e.g., by using trainitng, postings, revised policies or procedures, any necessary disciplinary action, etc., to communicate its policy lagainst discrimination) or in cases that involve:' allegations of discrimination as a result of providing information directly to the NRC, allegations of discrimination caused by a manager above first-line supervisor (consistent with current Enforcement Policy classification of Severity Level I or II violations), allegations of discrimination where a history of findings of

- discrimination (by the DOL or the NRC) or settlements suggests a programmatic rather than an isolated discrimination problem, or allegations of discrimination which appear particularly blatant or egregious,

6. Violations Involving Special Circumstances Notwithstanding the outcome of the norrc3 enforcement process addressed in Section VI.A or the normal civil penalty assessumnt process addressed in Section VI.B, the NRC may reduce or refrain from issuing a civil penalty or a Notice of Violation for a Severity Level II, III,

~

or IV violation based on the merits of the case after considering the guidance in this statement of policy and such factors as the age of the violation, the significance of the violation, the clarity of the requirement, the appropriateness of the requirement, the overall sustained performance of the licensee has been particularly good, and other relevant circumstances, including any that may have changed since the violation. This discretion is expected to be exercised only where application of the normal guidance in the policy is unwarranted. In addition, the NRC may refrain from issuing enforcement action for violations resulting from matters not within a licensee's control, such as equipment failures that were not avoidable by reasonable licensee quality assurance measures or management controls. Generally, however, licensees are held responsible for the acts of their employees and contractors. . Accordingly, this policy should not be construed to ' excuse personnel or contractor errors. j i

i C. Notice ofEnforcement Discretionfor Power Reactors and Gaseous Difusion Plants On occasion, circumstances may arise where a power reactor's compliance with a Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation or with other license conditions l would involve an unnecessary plant transient or performance of testing, inspection, or system realignment that is inappropriate with the specific plant conditions, or unnecessary delays in

plant startup without a corresponding health and safety benefit. Similarly, for a gaseous

- diffusion plant (GDP), circumstances may arise where compliance with a Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) or technical specification or other certificate condition would unnecessarily call for a total plant shutdown or, notwithstanding that a safety, safeguards or security feature

V:

was degraded or inoperable, compliance would unnecessarily place the plant in a transient or

, condition where those features could be required.

In these circumstances, the NRC staff may choose not to enforce the applicable TS, TSR, or other license or certificate conditio'n. This enforcement discretion, designated as a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED), will only be exercised if the NRC staffis clearly satisfied that the action is consistent with protecting the public health and safety. The staff may also grant enforcement discretion in cases involving severe weather or other natural phenomena, based upon balancing the public health and safety or common defense and security of not operating, against the potential radiological or other hazards associated with continued operation, and a determination that safety will not be impacted unacceptably by exercising this discretion. The

Commission is to be informed expeditiously following the granting of an NOED in such situations. A licensee or cenificate holder seeking the issuance of a NOED must provide a written justification, or in circumstances where good cause is shown, oral justification followed as soon as possible by written justification, which documents the safety basis for the request and

. provides whatever other information the NRC staff deems necessary in making a decision on whether to issue a NOED.

The appropriate Regional Administrator, or his or her designee, may issue a NOED where the noncompliance is temporary and nonrecurring when an amendment is not practical.

The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation or Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and

' Safeguards, as appropriate, or his or her designee, may issue a NOED if the expected noncompliance will occur during the brief period of time it requires the NRC staff to process an emergency or exigent license amendment under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5) or (6) or a certificate amendment under 10 CFR 76.45. The person exercising enforcement discretion will document the decision.

For an operating reactor, this exercise of ;nforcement discretion is intended to minimize the potential safety consequences of unnecessar, . ' ant transients with the accompanying operational risks and impacts or to eliminate testing, inspection, or system realignment which is inappropriate for the particular plant conditions. For plants in a shutdown condition, exercising

enforcement discretion is intended to reduce shutdown risk by, again, avoiding testing, inspection or system realignment which is inappropriate for the particular plant conditions, in that, it does not provide a safety benefit or may, in fact, be detrimental to safety in the particular plant condition. Exercising enforcement discretion for plants attempting to startup is less likely than exercising it for an operating plant, as simply delaying startup does not usually leave the plant in a condition in which it could experience undesirable transients. In such cases, the f Commission would expect that discretion would be exercised with respect to equipment or systems only'when it has at least concluded that, notwithstanding the conditions of the license:

- (1) The equipment or system does not perform a safety function in the mode in which operation

~ is to occur; (2) the safety function performed by the equipment or system is of only marginal safety benefit, provided remaining in the current mode increases the likelihood of an unnecessary plant transient; or (3) the TS or other license condition requires a test, inspection or system realignment that is inappropriate for the particular plam conditions, in that it does not provide a )

safety benefit,'or may, in fact, be detrimental to safety in the parti ~.ilar plant condition.

v 7

• For GDPs, the exercise of enforcement discretion would be used where compliance with '

a certiMesle condition would involve an unnecessary plant shutdown or, notwithstanding that a

. safety, sfeguards or security feature was degraded or inoperabb, compliance would unnecasarily place the plant in a transient or condition where those fe.atures could be required.

Such k gulatory flexibility is needed because a total plant shutdown is not necessarily the best response to a plant condition. GDPs are designed to operate continuously and have never been shut down. Although portions can be shut down for maintenance, the staff has been informed by .

the certificate holder that restart from a total plant shutdown may not be practical and the staff

- agrees that the design of a GDP does not make restart practical. Hence, the decision to place

either GDP in plant-wit shedown condition would be made only after determining that there is

! inadequate safety, c.afey.ards, or security and considering the total impact of the shutdown on safety, the environment, safeguards, and security. A NOED would not be used for noncompliances with other than certificate requirements, or for situations where -he certificate

- holder cannot demonstrate adequate safety, safeguards, or security.

The decision to exercise enforcement discretion does not change the fact that a violation will occur nor_does it imply that enforcement discretion is being exercised for any violation that may hr ve led to the violation at issue. In each case where the NRC staff has chosen to issue a

_ NOED, enforcement action will normally be taken for the root causes, to the extent violations were involved, that led to the noncompliance for which enforcement discretion was used. The enforcement action is intended to emphasize that licensees and certificate holders should not rely on the NRC's authority to exercise enforcement discretion as a routine substitute for compliance or for requesting a license or cenificate amendment.

Finally, it is expected that the NRC staff will exercise enforcement discretion in this area

. infrequently. Although a plant must shut down, refueling activities may be suspended, or plant startup may be delayed, absent the exercise of enforcement discretion, the NRC staffis under no obligation to take such a step merely because it has been requested. The decision to forego

- enforcement is discretionary. When enforcement discretion is to be exercised, it is to be exercised only if the NRC staffis clearly satisfied that such action is warranted from a health and safety perspective.

VIII. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS Enforcement actions involving individuals, including licensed operators, are significant

< personnel actions, which will be closely controlled and judiciously applied. An enforcement action involving an individual will normally be taken only when the NRC is satisfied that the individual fully understood, or should have understood, his or her responsibility; knew, or should have known, the required actions; and knowingly, or with' careless disregard (i.e., with more than mere negligence) failed to take required actions cchich have actual or potential safety

- significance. Most transgressions ofindividuals at the ' vel of Severity Level III or IV violations

, will be handled by citing only the facility licensee.

More serious violations, including those involving the integrity of an individual (e.g.,

lying to the NRC) concerning matters within the scope of the individual's responsibilities, will be

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' considered for enforcement action against the individual as well as against the facility licensee.

Action against the individual, however, will not be taken if the improper action by the individual

was caused by management failures.~ The following examples of situations illustrate this concept:

t e' Inadvertent individual mistakes resulting from inadequate training or guidance

. provided by the facility licensee. ,

• • Inadvertently missing an insignificant procedural requirement when the action is

. routine, fairly uncomplicated, and there is no unusual circumstance indicating that the procedures should be referred to and followed step-by-step.

~e . Compliance with an express direction of management, such as the Shift

- Supervisor or Plant Manager, resulted in a violation unless the individual did not express his or her concern or objection to the direction.

'e. _

Individual error directly resulting from following the technical advice of an expert unless the advise was clearly unreasonable and the licensed individual should have recognized it as such.

e Violktions resulting from inadequate procedures unless the individual used a faulty procedure knowing it wais faulty and had not attempted to get the procedure corrected.

Listed below are examples of situations which could result in enforcement actions involving individuals, licensed or unlicensed. If the actions described in these examples are taken by a licensed operator or taken deliberately by an unlicensed individual, enforcement I action may be taken directly against the individual. However, vioh.tions involving willful conduct not amounting to deliberate action by an unlicensed individual in these situations may result in enforcement action against a licensee that may impact an individual. The situations include, but are not limited to, violations that involve:

e Willfully causing a licensee to be in violation of NRC requirements.

e Willfully taking action that would have caused a licensee to be in violation of NRC requirements but the action did not do'so because it was detected and corrective action was taken.

• Recogmzmg a violation of procedural requirements and willfully not taking corrective action.

e : Willfully defeating alarms which have safety significance.

• Unauthorized abandoning of reactor controls, o Derelictionofduty.- )

e Falsifying records required by NRC regulations or by the facility heense.

Le Willfully providing, or causing a licensee to provide, an NRC inspector or investigator with inaccurate or incomplete information on a matter material to the NRC..

e . Willfully withholding safety significant information rather than making such information known to appropriate supervisory or technical personnel in the licensee's organization.

.i 9

e .

e Submitting false information and as a result gaining unescorted access to a nuclear power plant.

e. . Willfully providing false data to a licensee by a contractor or other person who

. provides test or other services, when the data affects the licensee's compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, or other regulatory requirement.

e . Willfully providing false certification that components meet the requirements of their intended use, such as ASME Code.

' e Willfully supplying, by contractors of equipment for transportation of radioactive

- material, casks that do not comply with their certificates of compliance.

< e Willfully performing unauthorized bypassing of required reactor or other facility safety systems.. 1 o Willfully taking actions that violate Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or other license conditions (enforcement action for a willful violation will not be taken if that violation is the result of action taken following the NRC's decision to forego enforcement of the Technical Specification or other license condition or if the operator meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (x), (i.e., unless the operator acted unreasonably considering all L the relevant circumstances surrounding the emergency.)

Normally, some enforcement action is taken against a licensee for violations caused by significant acts of wrongdoing by its employees, contractors, or contractors' employees. In deciding whether to issue an enforcement action to an unlicensed person as well as to the licensee, the NRC recognizes thatjudgments will have to be made on a case by case basis. In making these decisions, the NRC will consider factors such as the following:

1. The level of the individual within the organization.

2. The individual's training and experience as well as knowledge of the potential consequences of the wrongdoing.

3. The safety consequences of the misconduct.

4. The benefit to the wrongdoer, e.g., personal or corporate gain.

5. The degree of supervision of the individual, i.e.. how closely is the individual monitored or audited, and the likelihood of detection (such as a radiographer working independently in the field as contrasted with a team activity at a power plant).

6.-- The employer's response, e.g., disciplinary action taken.

7. - The attitude of the wrongdoer, e.g., admission of wrongdoing, acceptance of 4 responsibility.' )

l 8.- . The degree of management responsibility or culpability. I

9. - Who identified the misconduct.

'f.

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Any proposed enforcement action involving individuals must be issued with the concurrence of the Deputy Executive Director. The particular sanction to be used should be determined on a case-by-case basis.' Notices of Violation and Orders are examples of enforcement actions that may be appropriate against individuals. The administrative action of a Letter of Reprimand may also be considered. In addition, the NRC may issue Demands for

< Information to gather information to enable it to determine whether an order or other  !

enforcement action should be issued.

L Orders to NRC-licensed reactor operators may involve suspension for a specified period,  ;

modification, or revocation of their individual licenses. Orders to unlicensed individuals might J include provisions that would:

• ; Prohibit involvement in NRC licensed activities for a specified period of time  !

(normally the period of suspension would not exceed 5 years) or until certain conditions are  ;

satisfied, e.g., completing specified training or meeting certain qualifications.

e' Require notification t'othe NRC before resuming work in licensed activities.

e Require the person to tell a prospective employer or customer engaged in licensed

- activities that the person has been subject to an NRC order.  !

Ir . case of a licensed operator's fail'ure to meet applicable fitness-for-duty l requirems 4 (10 CFR 55.53(j)), the NRC may issue a Notice of Violation or a civil penalty to - 4 the Part 55 licensee, or an order to suspend, modify, or revoke the Part 55 license. These actions .

~may be taken the first time a licensed operator fails a drug or alcohol test, that is, receives a

- confirmed positive test that exceeds the cutofflevels of 10 CFR Part 26 or the facility licensee's  !

cutofflevels, iflower. However, normally only.a Notice of Violation will be issued for the first

- confirmed positive test in the absence of aggravating circumstances such as errors in the  :

- performance'oflicensed duties or evidence of prolonged use. In addition, the NRC intends to ,

issue an order to suspend the Part 55 license for up to 3 years the second time a licensed operator l

. exceeds those cutofflevels. In the event there are less than 3 years remaining in the term of the i individual's license, the NRC may consider not renewing the individual's license or not issuing a new license after the three year period is completed. The NRC intends to issue an order to  ;

revoke the Part 55 license the third time a licensed operator exceeds those cutofflevels. A licensed operator or applicant who refuses to participate in the drug and alcohol testing programs established by the facility licensee or who is involved in the sale, use, or possession of an illegal q drug is also subject to license suspension, revocation, or denial.

' Txcept foiindividuals subject to civil penalties under section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, NRC will n' ot normally impose a civil penalty against an individual. However, section 234 of the Atomic

- Energy At;t (AEA) gives the Commis's ion authority to impose civil penalties on "any person." " Person" is broadly

, defined in Section 1is of the AEA to include individuals, a variety of organizations, and any representatives or  ;

agents. This gives the Commission authority to impose civil penalties on employees oflicensees or on separate l entities when a violation of a requirement directly imposed on them is committed. l I

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In addition, the NRC may take enforcement action against a licensee that may impact an individual,~where the conduct of the individual places in question the NRC's reasonable

- assurance that licensed activities will be properly conducted. The NRC may take enforcement action for reasons that would warrant refusal to issue a license on an original application.

Accordingly appropriate enforcement actions may be taken regarding matters that raise issues of integrity, competence, fitness-for-duty, or other matters that may not necessarily be a violation of a specific Commission requirements.

' In the case of an unlicensed person, whether a firm or an individual, an order modifying the facility license may be issued to require (1) the removal of the person from all licensed

- activities for a specified period of time or indefinitely, (2) prior notice to the NRC before '

utilizing the person in licensed activities, or (3) the licensee to provide notice of the issuance of such an order to other persons involved in licensed activities making reference inquiries. In addition, orders to employers might require retraining, additional oversight, or independent verification of activities performed by the person, if the person is to be involved in licensed

- activities.

IX. INACCURATE AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION A violation of the regulations involving submittal ofincomplete and/or inaccurate information, whether or not considered a material false statement, can ressit in the full range of enforcement sanctions. The labeling of a communication failure as a material false statement will be made on a case-by-case basis and will be reserved for egregious violations. Violations 1

- involving inaccurtte or incomplete information or the failure to provide significant information )

identified by a licensee normally will be categorized based on the guidance herein, in Section IV,

" Significance of Violations," and in Supplement VII.

2

' The Commission recognizes that oral information may in some situations be inherently less reliable than written submittals because of the absence of an opportunity for reflection and management review.~ However, the Commission must be able to rely on oral communications from licensee officials conceming significant information. Therefore, in determining whether to take enforcement action for an oral statement, consideration may be given to factors such as (1) the degree of knowledge that the communicator should have had, regarding the matter, in view of his or her position, training, and experience; (2) the opportunity and time available prior

. to the communication to assure the accuracy or completeness of the information; (3) the degree ofintent or negligence, if any, involved; (4) the formality of the communication; (5) the reasonableness of NRC reliance on the information; (6) the importance of the information which was wrong or not provided; and (7) the reasonableness of the explanation for not providing

- complete and accurate information.

l

. Absent at least careless disregard, an incomplete or inaccurate unswom oral statement j

- normally will not be subject to enforcement action unless it involves significant information provided by a licensee official. However, enforcement action may be taken for an unintentionally incomplete or inaccurate oral statement provided to the NRC by a licensee official or others on behalf of a licensee, if a record was made of the oral information and l

)

}. -

l

!' provided to the licensee thereby permitting an opportunity to correct the oral information, such as if a transcript of the communication or meeting . summary containing the error was made available to the licensee and was not subsequently corrected in a timely manner.

- When a licensee has conected inaccurate or incomplete infonnation, the decision to issue a Notice of Violation for the initial inaccurate or incomplete information normally will be ,

? dependent on the circumstances, including the ease of detection of the error, the timeliness of the l l  ; correction, whether the NRC or the licensee identified the problem with the communication, and j l

whether the NRC relied on the information prior'to the correction. Generally, if the matter was

. promptly identified and corrected by the licensee prior to reliance by the NRC, or before the l

NRC raised a question about the information, no enforcement action will be taken for the initial inaccurate or incomplete information. On the other hand, if the misinformation is identified after l the NRC relies on it, or after some question is raised regarding the accuracy of the information,  !

l then some enforcement action normally will be taken even ifit is in fact corrected. However, if the initial submittal was accurate when made but later tums out to be erroneous because of newly  !

' discovered information or advance in technology, a citation normally would not be appropriate l if, when the new information became available or the advancement in technology was made, the l 1 initial submittal was corrected.

The failure to correct inaccurate or incomplete information which the licensee does not identify as significant normally will not constitute a separate violation. Irowever, the circumstances surrounding the failure to correct may be considered relevant to the determination j of enforcement action for the initial inaccurate or incomplete statement. For example, an I unintentionally inaccurate or incomplete submission may be treated as a more severe matter if the licensee later determines that the initial submittal was in error and does not correct it or if there were clear opportunities to identify the error. Ifinformation not corrected was recognized by a licensee as significant, a separate citation may be made for the failure to provide significant information. In any event, in serious cases where the licensee's actions N act correcting or providing information raise questions about its commitment to safety or W fundamental trustworthiness', the Commission may exercise its authority to issue orders modifying, suspending, or revoking the license. The Commission recognizes that enforcement determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the issues described in this section.

X. ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST NON-LICENSEES The Commission's enforcement policy is also applicable to non-licensees, including contractors and subcontractors, holders of NRC approvals, e.g.,' certificates of compliance, early site permits, standard design certificates, quality assurance program approvals, or applicants for any of them, and to employees of any of the foregoing, who knowingly provide components, equipment, or other goods or services that relate to a licensee's activities subject to NRC

regulation. The prohibitions and sanctions for any of these persons who engage in deliberate misconduct or knowing submission ofincomplete or inaccurate information are provided in the e rule on delibereie misconduct, e.g.,10 CFR 30.10 and 50.5.

o

* , 1 Contractors who supply products or services provided for use in nuclear activities are subject to certain requirements designed to ensure that the products or services supplied that could affect safety are of high quality. Through procurement contracts with licensees, suppliers may be required to have quality assurance programs that meet applicable requirements, e.g.,

10 CFR itet 50, Appendix B, and 10 CFR Part 71, Subpart H. Contractors supplying certain products or services to licensees are subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 regarding reporting' of defects in basic components.

' When inspections determine that violations of NRC requirements have occurred, or that contractors have failed to fulfill contractual commitments (e.g.,10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B) i that could adversely affect the quality of a safety significant product or service, enforcement 1 action will be taken.' Notices of Violation and civil penalties will be used, as appropriate, for licensee failures to ensure that their contractors have programs that meet applicable requirements.

Notices of Violation will be issued for contractors who violate 10 CFR Part 21. Civil penalties

' will be imposed against individual directors or responsible officers of a contractor organization who knowingly and consciously fail to provide the notice required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(1).

Notices of Nonconformance will be used for contractors who fail to meet commitments related to NRC activities.

XI. REFERRALS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ,

Alleged or suspected criminal violations of the Atomic Energy Act (and of other relevant Federal laws) are referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for investigation. Referral to the DOJ does not preclude the NRC from taking other enforcement action under this policy.

However, enforcement actions will be coordinated with the DOJ in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and the DOJ,53 FR 50317 (December 14, 1988).

XIL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS Enforcement actions and licensees' responses, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790, are publicly available for inspection. In addition, press releases are generally issued for orders and civil penalties and are issued at the same time the order or proposed imposition of the civil penalty is issued. In addition, press releases are usually issued when a proposed civil penalty is withdrawn or substantially mitigated by some amount. Press releases are not normally issued for

' Notices of Violation that are not accompanied by orders or proposed civil penalties.

XIIL REOPENING CLOSED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS If significant new information is received or obtained by NRC which indicates that an 3 enforcement sanction was incorrectly applied, consideration may be given, dependent on the circumstances, to mopening a closed enforcement action to increase or decrease the severity of a  !

. sanction or to correct the record. Reopening decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, are expected to occur r.ealy, and require the specific approval of the Deputy Executive Director.

(( J '

SUPPLEMENTS - VIOLATION EXAMPLES I This section provides examples of violations in each of four severity levels as guidance in l determining the appropriate severity level for violations in each of eight activity areas (reactor l operations, Part 50 facility construction, safeguards, health physics, transportation, fuel cycle and materials operations, miscellaneous matters, and emergency' preparedness).

SUPPLEMENT I-REACTOR OPERATIONS This supplement provides' examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations in the area of reactor

l.  ;

operations. 1 A. Severity Levell- Violations involving for example:

1. A Safety Limit, as defined in 10 CFR 50.36 and the Technical Specifications being exceeded;

~ ~ 2. A system" designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being able to perform its intended safety function" when actually called upon to work;

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3. An accidental criticality; or l

4.- . A licensed operator at the controls of a nuclear reactor, or a senior operator - I directing licensed activities, involved in procedural errors which result in, or exacerbate the consequence's of, an alert or higher level emergency and who, as a result of subsequent testing, receives a confirmed positive test result for drugs or alcohol.

.B. Severity LevelII- Violations involving for example:

1. A system designed to prevent or mitigate serious safety events not being able to perform its intended safety function;  ;

.. i

12. A licensed operator involved in the use, sale, or possession ofillegal drugs or the j

- consumption of alcoholic beverages, within the protected area; or _

3. .

.- A licensed operator at the control of a nuclear reactor, or a senior operator directing licensed activities, involved in procedural errors and who, as a result of subsequent  ;

- testing, receives a confirmed positive test usult for drugs or alcohol. 1

'"The term " system" as used in'these supplements, includes administrative and managerial control systems, as .

I

. well as physical systems.

"" Intended safety function" means the total safety function, and is not directed toward a loss of redundancy. A lots of one subsystem does not defeat the intended safety function as long as the other subsystem is operable.

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E C. . Severity Level 1II- Violations involving for example:

k

1. A significant failure to comply with the Action Statement for a Technical

. Specification Limiting Condition for Operation where the appropriate action was not tr. ken within the required time, such as:

(a) ' In a pressurized water reactor, in the applicable modes, having one high-pressure i safety injection pump inoperable for a period in excess of that allowed by the action statement; or 1

)

1 (b) In a boiling water reactor, one primary containment isolation valve inoperable for a period in excess of that allowed by the action statement. j l

2. A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being able to perform its intended function under certain conditions (e.g., safety system not operable unless offsite power is available; materials or components not environmentally qualified).

3. Inattentiveness to duty on the part oflicensed personnel; )

4. Changes in reactor parameters that cause unanticipated reductions in margins of

- safety;

5. A non-willful compromise of an application, test, or examination required by 10 CFR Part 55 that:  ;

J (a) In the case ofinitial operator licensing, contributes to an individual being granted an operator or a senior operator license, or

-(b); In the case of requalification, contributes to an individual being permitted to perform the functions of an operator or a senior operator.

6. A licensee failure to conduct adequate oversight of contractors resulting in the use of products or services that are of defective or indeterminate quality and that have safety significance;

7. ~A licensed operator's confirmed positive test for drugs or alcohol that does not result in a Severity Level I or II violation;

- 8. - Equipment failures caused by inadequate or improper maintenance that

.substantially complicates recovery from a plant transient;

9. A failure to obtain prior Commission approval required by 10 CFR 50.59 for changes that would not be found acceptable by the Commission;

10. The failure to update the FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(c) where the unupdated FSAR was used in performing a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for a change to the facility i

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t )

- 1 l

or procedures, implemented without prior Commission approval, that would not be found I acceptable had approval been sought; or  !

I

~ l 1. . . The failure to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73 associated with l any Severity LevelIII violation.-

D. Severity Level IV- Violations involving for example:

1. A less significant failure to comply with the Action Statement for a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation where the appropriate action was not taken within the required time, such as:

(a) In a pressurized water reactor, a 5% deficiency in the required vohune of the condensate storage tank; or (b) In a boiling water reactor, one subsystem of the two independent MSIV leakage control subsystems inoperable; I

2.- . A non-willful compromise of an application, test, or examination required by 10 CFR Part 55 that: 1 1

f(a) . In the case ofinitial operator licensing, is discovered and reported to the NRC  ;

before an individual is granted an operator or a senior operator license, or i

^(b) In the case of requalification, is discovered and reported to the NRC before an -

individual is permitted to perform the functions of an operator or a senior operator, or (c) Constitutes more than minor concem.

3. A failure to meet regulatory requirements that have more than minor safety or eneonmental significance; 1

4. A failure to make a required Licensee Event Report;  !

5. Violations of 10 CFR 50.59 that do not involve circumstances in which a change that required prior Commission approval would not be found acceptable had the approval been sought; or

6. . A failure to update the FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) in cases where the erroneous information is not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures.

E. Minor Violations-

' A failure to meet 10 CFR 50.59 requirements that involves a change to the FSAR description or procedure, or involves a test or experiment not described in the FSAR, where there  ;

e

1 I

e , .

was not a reasonable likelihood that the change to the facility or procedure or the conduct of the

test or experiment would ever be an unreviewed safety question. In the case of a 10 CFR 50.71(e) violation, where a failure to update the FSAR would not have a material impact on safety or

= licensed activities. The focus of the minor violation is not on the actual change, test, or experiment, but on the potential safety role of the system,' equipment, etc., that is being changed, 1 tested, or experimented on. l SUPPLEMENT Il-PART 50 FACILITY CONSTRUCTION This supplement provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in detennining the appropriate severity level for violations in the area of Part 50 facility

construction. )

l A. _ Severity LevelI- Violations involving structures or systems that are completed 9 j in such a manner that they would not have satisfied their intended safety related purpose.

BJ Severity LevelII- Violations involving for example:

i

1. .. A breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) program as exemplified by

deficiencies in construction QA related to more than one work activity (e.g., structural, piping, electrical, foundations). These deficiencies normally involve the licensee"s failure to conduct

- adequate audits or to take prompt corrective action on the bcsis of such audits and normally

. involve multiple examples of deficient construction or construction of unknown quality due to inadequate program implementation; or

-2. _ A structure or system that is completed in such a manner that it could have an adverse effect on the safety of operations.

C. Severity LevelIII- Violations' involving for example:

1. A deficiency in a licensee QA program for construction related to a single work

' activity (e.g., structural, piping, electrical or foundations). This significant deficiency normally involves the licensee's failure to conduct adequate audits or to take prompt corrective action on

the basis of such audits, and normally involves multiple examples of deficient construction or i

. construction of unknown quality, due to inadequate program implementation;

2. _

. A failure to confirm the design safety requirements of a structure or system as a result ofinadequate preoperational test program implementation; or

!3. A failure to make a required 10 CFR 50.55(e) report.

L 12The term " completed" as used in this supplement means completion of construction including review and

~

' acceptance by the construction QA organization.

l 4

l e.

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D. Severity LevelIV- Violations involving failure to meet regulatory requirements including one or more Quality Assurance Criterion not amounting to Severity Level I, II, or III violations that have more than minor safety or environmental significance.

SUPPLEMENT III-SAFEGUARDS This supplement provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations in the area of safeguards. l A. Severity LevelI- Violations involving for example:

1. An act of radiological sabotage in which the security system did not function as required and, as a result of the failure, there was a significant event, such as:

(a) A Safety Limit, as defined in 10 CFR 50.36 and the Technical Specifications, was )

exceeded; ,

I (b) A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event was not able to j perform its intended safety fimetion when actually alled upon to work; or (c) An accidental criticality occurred;

2. The theft, loss, or diversion of a formula quantity" of special nuclear material (SNM); or

3. Actual unauthorized production of a formula quantity of SNM B. Severity LevelII- Violations involving for example:

1. The entry of an unauthorized individual" who represents a threat into a vital area" from outside the protected area;

2. The theft, loss or diversion of SNM of moderate strategic significance" in which the security system did not function as required; or

3. Actual unauthorized production of SNM.

'2See 10 CFR 73.2 for the definition of" formula quantity."

"The term " unauthorized individual" as used in this supplement means someone who was not authorized for entrance into the area in question, or not authorized to enter in the manner entered.

"The phrase " vital area" as used in this supplement includes vital areas and material access areas.

See 10 CFR 73.2 for the definition of"special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance."

A s C. Severity LevelIII- Violations involving for example:

1. . A failure or inability to control access through established systems or procedures, such that an unauthorized individual (i.e., not authorized unescorted access to protected area)

- could easily gain undetected access 3.7 into a vital area from outside the protected area; 2.' . A failure to conduct any search at the access control point or conducting an inadequate search that resulted in the introduction to the protected area of firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices and reasonable facsimiles thereof that could significantly assist radiological sabotage or theft of strategic SNM; 1

3. A failure, degradation, or other deficiency of the protected area intrusion detection or alarm assessment systems such that an unauthorized individual who represents a threat could predictably circumvent the system or defeat a specific zone with a high degree of confidence without insider knowledge, or other significant degradation of overall system capability;

4. A significant failure of the safeguards systems designed or used to prevent or

- detect the theft, loss, or diversion of strategic SNM;

5. A failure to protect or control classified or safeguards information considered to  ;

be significant while the information is outside the~ protected area and acceisible to those not j authorized access to the protected area; l l

6. A significant failure to respond to an event either in sufficient time to provide protection to vital equipment or strategic SNM, or with an adequate response force; or

. 7'. A failure to perform an appropriate evaluation or background investigation so that j information relevant to the access determination was not obtained or considered and as a result a person, who would likely not have been granted access by the licensee, if the required i investigation or evaluation had been performed, was granted access.

D. Severity LevelIV- Violations involving for example:

1. A failure or inability to control access such that an unauthorized individual (i.e., 4 authorized to protected area but not to vital area) could easily gain undetected access into a vital

. area from inside the protected area or into a controlled access area; l

2. A failure to respond to a suspected event in either a timely manner or with an adequate response force; 4 l

"In detennining whether access can be easily gained, factors such as predictability, identifiability, and ease of passage should be considered.

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3. A failure to implement '10 CFR Pans 25 and 95 with respect to the information addressed under Section 142 of the Act, and the NRC approved security plan relevant to those

. parts;

'4. A failure to conduct a proper search at the access control point;

5. . . A failure to properly secure or protect classified or safeguards information inside

/ the protected area which could assist an individual in an act of radiological sabotage or theft of strategic SNM where the information was not removedfrom the protected area;

6. A failure to control access such that an opportunity exists that could allow unauthorized and undetected access into the pmtected area but which'was neither easily or likely to be exploitable;

7. A failure to conduct an adequate search at the exit from a material access area;

8. A theft or loss of SNM oflow strategic significance that was not detected within the time period specified in the security plan, other relevant document, or regulation; or

9. Other violations that have more than minor safeguards significance.

SUPPLEMENT IV-HEALTH PHYSICS (10 CFR PART 20)

This supplement provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations in the area of health physics, 10 CFR Part 20.'8 A. Severity Levell- Violations involving for example:

1. A radiation exposure during any year of a worker in excess of 25 rems total effective dose equivalent,75 rems to the lens of the eye, or 250 rads to the skin of the whole j body, or to the feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to any othcr organ or itssue;  ;

I

2. ' ~ A radiation exposure over the gesiation period of the embryo / fetus of a declared pregnant woman in excess of 2.5 rems total effective dose equivalent;  ;

i

3. A radiation exposure during any year of a minor in excess of 2.5 rems total l

effective dose equivalent, 7.5 rems to the lens of the eye, or 25 rems to the skin of the whole  ;

' body, or to ' the feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue; l

l

.. " Personnel overexposures and associated violations incurred during a life-saving or other emergency response effwt will be treated on a case-by case basis.

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! = ,

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4. An annual exposure of a member of the public in excess of 1.0 rem total effective l dose equivalent; i

5. A release of radioactive material to an unrestricted area at concentrations in 1 excess of 50 times the limits for members of the public u described in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i);

or l

6. Disposal oflicensed material in quantities or concentrations in excess of 10 times the limits of 10 CFR 20.2003.

B. Severity LevelII- Violations involving for example:

(. 1. A radiation exposure during any year of a worker in excess of 10 rems total

! effective dose equivalent,30 rems to the lens of the eye, or 100 rems to the skin of the whole i body, or to the feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue;

2. A radiation exposure over the gestation period of the embryo / fetus of a declared pregnant woman in excess of 1.0 rem total effective dose equivalent;

3. A radiation exposure during any year of a minor in excess of I rem total effective  !

dose equivalent; 3.0 rems to the lens of the eye, or 10 rems to the skin of the whole body, or to I the feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue; ,

l l 4. An annual exposure of a member of the public in excess of 0.5 rem total effective  ;

dose equivalent; j

5. A release of radioactive material to an unrestricted area at concentrations in excess of 10 times the limits for members of the public as described in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i) l (except when operation up to 0.5 rem a year has been approved by the Commission under l Section 20.1301(c)); i i

6. Disposal oflicensed material in quantities or concentrations in excess of five l times the limits of 10 CFR 20.2003; or  !

. 7. A failure to make an immediate notification as required by 10 CFR 20.2202 (a)(1) or (a)(2).

C. Severity LevelIII- Violations involving for example:

1. A radiation exposure during any year of a worker in excess of 5 rems total effective dose equivalent,15 rems to the lens of the eye, or 50 rems to the skin of the whole body or to the feet, enkles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue; i

i.

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c. . ,

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2. . A radiation exposure over the gestation period of the embryo / fetus of a declared pregnant woman in excess of 0.5 rem total effective dose equivalent (except when doses are in

. accordance with the provisions of Section 20.1208(d));

i

3. A radiation exposure during any year of a minor in excess of 0.5 rem total effective dose equivalent; 1.5 rems to the lens of the eye, or 5 rems to the skin of the whole body,

. or to the feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue;

4. - An annual' exposure of a member of the public in excess of 0.1 rem total effective dose equivalent (except when operation up to 0.5 rem a year has been approved by the Commission under Section 20.1301(c));  !

1

5. A release of radioactive material to an unrestricted area at concentrations in ,

excess of two times the effluent concentration limits referenced in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i)

- (except when operation up to 0.5 rem a year has been approved by the Commission under

' Section 20.1301(c));

6.- A failure to make a 24-hour notification required by 10 CFR 20.2202(b) or an  ;

immediate notification required by 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i); i

7. A substantial potential for exposures or releases in excess 6f the applicable limits in 10 CFR Part 20 Sections 20.1001-20.2401 whether or not an exposure or release occurs-  !

l C. Disposal oflicensed material not covered in Severity Levels I or II; I

' 9. A release for unrestricted use of contaminated or radioactive material or l equipment that poses a realistic potential for exposure of the public to levels or doses exceeding i

the annual dose limits for members of the pubhc;  ;

l

' 10. Conduct oflicensee activities by a technically unualified person; or l 1

11. A .significant failure to control licensed m&terial.

D. . Severity LevelIV- Violations involving for example:

1. Exposures in excess of the limits of10 CFR 20.1201,20.1207, or 20.1208 not l

. constituting Severity Level I, II, or III violatiens; ,

2: A release of radioactive material to an unrestricted area at concentrations in excess of the limits for members of the public as referenced in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i) (except when operation up to 0.5 rem a year has been approved by the Commission under Section . l 20.1301(c)); -

3. A radiation dose rate in an unrestricted or controlled area in excess of 0.002 rem in any 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (2 millirem / hour) or 56 millirems in a year; t

Vy.

4. Failure to maintain and implement radiation programs to keep radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable;

5. Doses to a member of the public in excess of any EPA generally applicable environmental radiation standards, such as 40 CFR Part 190;

6. A failure to make the 30-day notification required by 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) or 20.2203(a);

7. A failure to make a timely written report as required by 10 CFR 20.2201(b),

20.2204, or 20.2206;

8. A failure to report an exceedance of the dose constraint established in 10 CFR 20.1101(d) or a failure to take corrective action for an exceedance, as required by 10 CFR 20.1101(d); or -

9. Any other matter that has more than a minor safety, health, or environmental significance.

SUPPLEMENT V-TRANSPORTATION This supplement provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations in the area of NRC transportation requirements".

A. Severity LevelI- Violations involving for example:

1. Failure to meet transportation requirements that resulted in loss of control of radioactive material with a breach in package integrity such that the material caused a radiation j exposure to a member of the public and there was clear potential for the public to receive more j than.1 rem to the whole body;

2. Surface contamination in excess of 50 times the NRC limit; or  ;

3. Extemal radiation levels in excess of 10 times the NRC limit.

B. Severity Level H - Violations involving for example:

"Some transportation requirements are applied to mo-c than one licensee involved in the same activity such as a 3 shipper and a carrier. When a violation of such a requirement occurs, enforcement action will be directed against the j responsible licensee which, under the circumstances of the case, may be one or more of the licensees involved. j I

1. Failure to meet transportation requirements that resulted in loss of control of radioactive material with a breach in package integrity such that there was a clear potential for

- the member of the public to receive more than .1 rem to the whole body;

2. Surface contamination in excess of 10, but not more than 50 times the NRC limit;

3. External radiation levels in excess of five, but not more than 10 times the NRC limit; or

4. A failure to make required initial notifications associated with Severity Level I or 11 violations.

C. Severity LevelIII- Violations involving for example:

1. . Surface contamination in excess of five but not more than 10 times the NRC limit;

2. External radiation in excess of one but not more than five times the NRC limit;

3. Any noncompliance with labeling, placarding, shipping paper, packaging, loading, or other requirements that could reasonably result in the following:

(a) A significant failure to identify the type, quantity, or form of material; (b) A faihire of the carrier or recipient to exercise adequate controls; or (c) A substantial potential for either personnel exposure or contamination above j regulatory limits or improper transfer of material; or

4. A failure to make required initial notification associated with Severity Level III l violations. '

~D. Severity levelIV- Violations involving for example:

1. A breach of package integrity without extemal radiation levels exceeding the NRC limit or without contamination levels exceeding five times the NRC limits;

' 2. Surface contamination in excess of but not more than five times the NRC limit;

3. A failure to register as an authorized user of an NRC-Certified Transport package;

4. A noncompliance with shipping papers, marking, labeling, placarding, packaging

' or loading not amounting to a Severity Level I, II, or III violation;

5. A failure to demonstrate that packages for special form radioactive material meets applicable regulatory requirements;

p 1

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6. A failure to demonstrate that packages meet DOT Specifications for 7A Type A

packages; or -

7. .Other violations that have more than minor safety or environmental significancp.

L SUPPLEMENT VI-FUEL CYCLE AND MATERIALS OPERATIONS This supplement provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as l: guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations in the area of fuel cycle and materials operations.

'A; . Severity LevelI- Violations involving for example:

'l. Radiation levels, contamination !evels, or releases that exceed 10 times the limits specified in the license;

2. ' A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being operable when actually required to perform its design function;

3. A' nuclear criticality accident;

4. A failure to follow the procedures of the quality management program, required by 10 CFR 35.32, that results in a death or serious injury (e.g., substantial organ impairment) to a patient-i

5. A safety limit, as defined in 10 CFR 76.4, the Technical Safety Requirements, or the application being exceeded; or

6. Significant injury or loss oflife due to a loss of control over licensed or certified activities, including chemical processes that are integral to the licensed or certified activity, '

whether radioactive material is released or not.

l B.- Severity Level 11- Violations involving for example:

1. Radiation levels, contamination levels, or releases that exceed five times the limits specified in the license;

. 2. . A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event being inoperable;

3. A substantial programmatic failure in the implementation of the quality management program required by 10 CFR 35.32 that results in'a misadministration;

4. A failure to establish, implement, or maintain all criticality controls (or control

- systems) for a single nuclear criticality scenario when a critical mass of fissile material was '

present or reasonably available, such that a nuclear criticality accident was possible; or i

?

4

5. The potential for a significant injury or loss oflife due to a loss of control over licensed or certified activities, including chemical processes that are integral to the licensed or certiSed activity, v>hether radioactive material is released or not (e.g., movement ofliquid UF6 cylinder by unapproved methods).

C. Severity Levellf/ - Violations involving for example:

1. A failure, to control access to licensed materials for radiation protection nurposes as specified by NRC requirements;

2. Possession or use of unauthorized equipment or materials in the conduct of licensee activities which degrades safety;

3. Use of radioactive material on humans where such use is not authorized;

4. Conduct oflicensed activities by a technically unqudified or uncertified person;

5. A substantial potential for exposures, radiation levels, contamination levels, or releases, including release.s of toxic material caused by a failure to comply with NRC regulations, from licensed or certified activities in excess of regulatory lim.ts;

6. Substantial failure to implement the quality management program as required by 10 CFR 35.32 that does not result in a misadministration; failure to report a misadministration; or programmatic weakness in the implementation of the quality management program that results in a misadministration;

7. A failure, during radiographic operations, to have present at least two qualified individuals or to use radiographic equipment, radiation survey instruments, and/or personnel monitoring devices as required by 10 CFR Part 34;

8. A failure to submit an NRC Fonn 241 as required by 10 CFR 150.20;

9. A failure to receive required NRC approval prior to the implementation of a change in licensed activities that has radiological or programmatic significance, such as, a change in ownership; lack of an RSO or replacement of an RSO with an unqualified individual; a change in the location where licensed activities are being conducted, or where licensed material is being stored where the new facilities do not meet the safety guidelines; or a change in the quantity or type of radioactive material being processed or used that has radialogical significance; 10.~ A significant failure to meet decommissioning requirements including a failure to notify the NRC as required by regulation or license condition, substantial failure to meet decommissioning standards, failure to conduct and/or complete decommissioning activities in

- accordance with regulation or license condition. or failure to meet required schedules without adequatejustification; l

r ,. . . . . . . .

~

I1. A 'significant failure to comply with the action statement for a Technical Safety-

. Requirement Limiting Condition for Operation where the appropriate action was not taken within the required time, such as:

(a) In an autaclave, where a containment isolation valve is inoperable for a period in excess of that allowed by the action statement; or

- (b) Cranes 'or_other lifting devices engaged in the movement of cylinders having inoperable safety components, such as redundant braking systems, or other safety devices for a

. period in excess of that allowed by the action statement;

12. : A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event: -I (a) Not being able to perform its intended function under certain conditions ,(e.g., safety system not operable unless utilities available, materials or components not according to specifications);.or j (b) Being degraded to the extent that a detailed evaluation would be required to determine its operability;

13. Changes in parameters that cause unanticipated reductions in inargins of safety; _

14.-- A significant failure to meet the requuements of 10 CFR 76.68, including a failure such that a required certificate amendment was not sought;

15. A failure of the certificate holder to conduct adequate oversight of contractors resulting in the use of products or services that are of defective or indeterminate quality and that have safety significance; 1

~ 16. Equipment failures caused by inadequate or improper maintenance that substantially complicates recovery from a plant transient;

17. A failure to establish, maintain, or implement all but one criticality control (or control systems) for a single nuclear criticality scenario when a critical mass of fissile material ,

was present or reasonably available, such that a nuclear criticality accident was possible; or i

18. - A failure, during radiographic operations, to stop work after a pocket dosimeter is found to have gone off-scale, or after an electronic dosimeter reads greater than 200 mrem, and j

' before a determination is made of the individual's actual radiation exposure.

. D. . Severity LevelIV- Violations involving for example:

i

1. A failure to maintain patients hospitalized who have cobalt-60. cesium-137, or iridium-192 implants or to conduct required leakage or contamination tests, or to use properly i calibrated equipment;

• • t.

,. 2. Other violations that have more than min 6r safety or environmental significance; h 3. Failure to follow the quality management (QM) program, including procedures, l  : whether or not a misadministration occurs, provided the failures are isolated, do not demonstrate f a programmatic. weakness in the implementation of the QM program, and have limited l  : consequences if a misadministration is involved; failure to conduct the required program review; I' or failure to take corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 35.32; ,

l

4. A failure to keep the records required by 10 CFR 35.32 or 35.33;

5. A less significant failure to comply with the. Action Statement for a Tec!mical Safety

. Requirement Limiting Condition for Operation when the appropriate action was not taken within l the required time; l

6. A failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 76.68 that does not result in a Severity  ;

Level 1,II, orIII violation;

7. A failure to make a required written event report, as required by 10 CFR 76.120(d)(2);

or-

8. A failure to establish, implement, or maintain a criticality control (or control system) for a single nuclear criticality scenario when the amount of fissile material available was not, but could have been sufficient to result in a nuclear criticality.

SUPPLEMENT VII-MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS

! j This supplement provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as j~

guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations involving miscellaneous matters.- l 4

i A. Severity LevelI. Violations involving for example:

I

1. Inaccurate or incomplete information2 that is provided to the NRC (a)

deliberately with the knowledge of a licensee official that the information is incomplete or l

inaccurate, or (b) if the information, had it been complete and accurate at the time provided, likely would have resulted in regulatory action such as an immediate order required by the public

-health and safety-L-

2. J Incomplete or inaccurate information that the NRC requires be kept by a licensee that is (a) incomplete or inaccurate because of falsification by or with the knowledge of a l;

2oln applying the examples in this supplement regarding inaccurate or incomplete information and records, reference should also be made to the guidance in Section IX " Inaccurate and Incomplete Information," and to the definition of" licensee official" contained in Section IV.C.

1 g- ,

licensee official, or (b) if the information, had it been complete and accurate when reviewed by the NRC, likely would have resulted in regulatory action such as an immediate order required by public health and safety considerations;

3. Information that the licensee has identified as having significant implications for public health and safety or the common defense and security ("significant information identified

' by a licensee") and is deliberately withheld from the Commission; I

4.' Action by senior corporate management in violation of 10 CFR 50.7 or similar regulations against an employee;

' 5. A knowing and intentional failure to provide the notice required by 10 CFR Part 21; or

6. A failure to substantially implement the required fitness-foi-duty program.2i B. Severity LevelII- Violations involving for example:

1. Inaccurate or incomplete information that is provided to the NRC (a) by a licensee official becaiise of careless disregard for the completeness or accuracy of the information, or (b) if the information, had it been complete and accurate at the time provided, likely would have resulted in regulatory action such as a show cause order or a different regulatory position,

2. Incomplete or inaccurate information that the NRC requires be kept by a licensee which is (a) incomplete or inaccurate because of careless disregard for the accuracy of the information on the part of a licensee official, or (b) if the information, had it been complete and accurate when reviewed by the NRC, likely would have resulted in regulatory action such as a

. show cause order or a different regulatory position;

3. "Significant information identified by a licensee" and not provided to the  ;

Commission because of carele::s disregard on the part of a licensee official; ,

)

4. An action by plant management or mid-level management in violation ef 10 CFR 50.7 or similar regulations against an employee; l I

5. A failure to provide the notice required by 10 CFR Part 21;

6. A failure to remove an individual from unescorted access who has been involved in the sale, use, or possession ofillegal drugs within the protected area or take action for on duty misuse of alcohol, prescription drugs, or over-the-counter drugs; i

2'The example for violations for fitness-for-duty relate to violations of 10 CFR Part 26.

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' 7.' A failure to take reasonable action when observed behavior within the protected area or credible infonnation concerning activities within the protected area indicates possible unfitness for duty based on drug or alcohol use;

8. A' deliberate failure of the licensee's Employee Assistance Program (EAP) to notify licensee's management when EAP's staffis aware that an individual's condition may adversely affect safety related activities; or

9. The failure oflicensee management to take effective action in correcting a hostile i work environment.

, C. Severity LevelIH- Violations involving for example: i 1.' Incomplete or inaccurate information that is provided to the NRC (a) because of  ;

inadequate actions on the part oflicensee officials but not amounting to a Severity Level I or II )

violation, or (b) if the information, had it been complete and accurate at the time provided, likely  !

would have resulted in a reconsideration of a regulatory position or substantial further inquiry such as an additional inspection or a formal request for information; 1

2. Incomplete or inaccurate information that the NRC requires be kept by a licensee that is (a) incomplete or inaccurate because ofinadequate actions on the phrt oflicensee officials but not amounting to a Severity Level I'or II violation, or (b) if the information, had it been complete and accurate when reviewed by the NRC, likely would have resulted in a reconsideration of a regulatory position or substantial further inquiry such as an additional 1

- inspection or a formal request for information; ,

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3. - A failure to provide "significant information identified by a licensee" to the Commission and not amounting to a Severity Level I or II violation; i

4. An action by first-line supervision or other low-level management in violation of  :

10 CFR 50.7 or similar regulations against an employee;

5. An inadequate review or failure to review such that, if an appropriate review had been made as required, a 10 CFR Part 21 report would have been made;

6. , A failure to complete a suitable inquiry on the basis of 10 CFR Part 26, keep records concepning the denial of access, or respond to inquiries conceming denials of access so -

that, as'a result of the failure, a person previously denied access for fitness-for-duty reasons was improperly granted access;

'7. A failure to take the required action for a person confirmed to have been tested positive for illegal drug use or take action for onsite alcohol use; not amounting to a Severity r

LevelII violation; .

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8. A failure to assure, as required, that contractors have an effective fitness-for-duty program; or

9. Threats of discrimination or restrictive agreements which are violations under NRC regulations such as 10 CFR 50.7(f).

D. Severity LevelIV- Violations involving for example:

t 1.. Incomplete or inaccurate information of more than minor significance that is provided to the NRC but not amounting to a Severity Level I, II, or III violation;

- 2. Information that the NRC requires be kept by a licensee and that is incomplete or inaccurate and of more than minor significance but not amounting to a Severity Level I, II, or III violation;

, 3. An inadequate review or failure to review under 10 CFR Part 21 or other procedural violations associated with 10 CFR Part 21 with more than minor safety significance;

4. Violations of the requirements of Part 26 of more than minor significance;

5. A failure to report acts oflicensed operators or supervisors ~ pursuant to 10 CFR 26.73; or

6. Discrnnhation cases which, in themselves, do not warrant a Severity Level III categorization.

'SUMLEMENT VIII-EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS This supplement provides examples of violations in each of the four severity levels as guidance in determining the appropriate severity level for violations in the area of emergency preparedness. It should be not d that citations are not normally made for violations involving i emergency preparedness occurring during emergency exercises. However, where exercises reveal (i) training, procedural, or repetitive failures for which corrective actions have not been taken, (ii) an overall concern regarding the licensee's ability to implement its plan in a manner j that adequately notects public health and safety, or (iii) poor self critiques of the licensee's exercises, enforcement action may be appropriate.

A. Severity LevelI- Violations involving for example:  ;

. In a general emergency, licensee failure to promptly (1) correctly classify the event, (2) make required notifications to responsible Federal, State, and local agencies, or (3) respond to the event (e.g., assess actual or potential offsite consequences, activate emergency response

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facilities, and augment shift staff.) i B. Severity Level II . Violations involving for example:

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1. In a site emergency, licensee failure to promptly (1) correctly classify the event, (2) make required notifications to responsible Federal, State, and local agencies, or (3) respond to the event (e.g., assess actual or potential offsite consequences, activate emergency response facilities, and augment shift staff); or L 2. A licensee failure to meet or implement more than one emergency planning standard involving assessment or notification.

C. Severity LevelIII- Violations involving for example:

1. In an alert, licensee failure to promptly (1) correctly classify the event, (2) make required notifications to responsible Federal, State, and local agencies, or (3) respond to the event (e.g., assess actual or p9tential offsite consequences, activate emergency response facilities, and augment shift staff); or

2. A licensee failure to meet or implement one emergency planning standard involving assessment or notification.

D. Severity LevelIV- Violations involving for example:

A licensee failure to meet or implement any emergency planning standard or requirement not directly related to assessment and notification.

INTERIM ENFORCEMENT POLICIES Interina Enforcement Policy for Generally Licensed Devices Containing Byproduct Material (10 CFR 31.5)

This section sets forth the interim enforcement policy that the NRC will follow to exercise enforcement discretion for certain violations of requirements in 10 CFR Part 31 for ,

generally licensed devices containing byproduct material. It addresses violations that persons i licensed pursuant to 10 CFR 31.5 identify and correct now, as well as during the initial cycle of the notice and response program contemplated by the proposed new requirements published in the Federal Register on December 2,1998 (63 FR 66492), entitled " Requirements for Those Who' Possess Certain Industrial Devices Containing Byproduct Material to Provide Requested Information".

Exercise of Enforcement Discretion Under this interim enforcement policy, enforcement action normally will not be taken for violations of 10 CFR 31.5 if they are identified by the general licensee, and reported to the NRC if reporting is required, provided that the general licensee takes appropriate corrective action to address the specific violations and prevent recurrence of similar problems.

Exceptions

4 Enforcement action may be taken where there is: (a) failure to take appropriate corrective l action to prevent recurrence of similar violations; (b) failure to respond and provide the information required by the notice and response program (ifit becomes a final rule); (c) failure to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC; or (d) a willful violation, such as willfully . disposing of generally licensed material in an unauthorized manner. Enforcement sanctions in these cases may include civil penalties as well as Orders to modify or revoke the authority to possess radioactive sources under the general license.

Interim Enforeement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Nuclear Power Plants During the Year 2000 Transition This section sets forth the interim enforcement policy that will govern the exercise of enforcement discretion by the NRC staff when licensees of operating nuclear power plants find it necessary to deviate from license conditions, including technical specifications (TSs), in those cases in which year 2000 (Y2K) related complications would otherwise require a plant shutdown that could adversely affect the stability and reliability of the electrical power grid. This policy does not extend to situations in which a licensee may be unable to communicate with the NRC.

The policy is effective 'August 30,1999, and will remain in effect through January 1, 2001. This pclicy only applies during Y2K transition or rollover periods (December 31,1999, through January 3,2000; February 28,2000, through March 1,2000; andDecember 30,2000, through January 1,2001). During these periods, a licensee may contact the NRC Headquarters Operations Center and seek NRC enforcement discretion with regard to the potential noncompliance with license conditions, including TSs, if the licensee has determined that:

(a) Complying with license conditions, including TSs, in a Y2K-related situation would require a plant shutdown; (b) Continued plant operation is needed to help maintain a reliable and stable grid; and-(c)- Any decrease in safety as a result of continued plant operation is small (considering both risk and deterministic aspects), and reasonable assurance of public health and safety, the environment, and security is maintained with the enforcement discretion.

Licensees are expected to follow the existing guidance as stated in NRC Inspection ,

i Manual Part 9900 for Notices of Enforcement Discretion to the maximum extent practicable,

particularly regarding a safety determination and notification of NRC. A licensee seeking NRC enforcement discretion must provide a written justification, or in circumstances in which good cause is shown, an oraljustification followed as soon as possible by writtenjustification. The justification must document the need and safety basis for the request and provide whatever other ,

information the NRC staff needs to make a decision regarding whether the exercise of discretion l l

' is appropriate, The NRC staff may grant enforcement discretion on the basis of balancing the I public health and safety.or common defense and security of not operating against potential

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radiological or other hazards associated with continued operation, and a determination that safety will not be unacceptably affected by exercising the discretion. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or designee, will advise the licensee whether the NRC has approved the licensce's request and, if so, will subsequently confirm the exercise of discretion in writing.

Enforcement discretion will only be exercised if the NRC staffis clearly satisfied that the action is consistent with protecting public health and safety and is warranted in the circumstances presented by the licensee.

. . If the volume of requests to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center is such that the NRC staff cannot review and approve all licensee requests in a timely fashion, the NRC staff will l obtain the safety-significant information from the licensee to enable the NRC staff to make a l prompt initial assessment. Unless the assessment is unfavorable, the licensee would be permitted to proceed with its planned course of action. The NRC staff will complete these assessments as time permits and the licensee will be advised of the results orally, if possible, and then in writing.

If the NRC staffs prompt initial assessment or subsequent assessment determines that a licensee's actions raise safety concems, the licensee would be so informed. The licensee would then be required to follow its license conditions, including TSs.

If there are communications difficulties between the licensee and the NRC, the licensee is i encouraged to interact with the NRC inspector onsite who will have a dedicated satellite telephone. The inspector should be able to facilitate communication with the NRC Headquaners Operations Center and/or the NRC Regional Incident Response Centers (IRCs). If con.munication with the NRC Headquarters Operations Center is not possible, then the licensee should contact the IRC in NRC Region IV to discuss enforcement discretion. Similarly, if the Region IV IRC cannot be reached, then the licensee should attempt to contact the Region I, II and III IRCs. 'Although it is considered highly unlikely, if communication with NRC is not possible, the licensee should follow the plant license conditions, including technical -

. specifications.

In' conducting its assessments, the licensee should follow, to the extent practicable, the guidance in NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 for Notices of Enforcement Discretion. Contrary to Part 9900 Section B.3 guidance, it is not necessary for an emergency to be declared by a govemment entity. Licensees are encouraged to contact NRC early in their evaluation process, particularly if time is of the essence, even though complete information as specified in Part 9900 may not be available.

The decision to exercise enforcement discretion does not change the fact that the licensee

- will be in noncompliance nor does it imply that enforcement discretion is being exercised for any noncompliance that may have led to the noncompliance at issue. To the extent noncompliance was involved, the NRC staff will normally take enforcement action for the root causes that led to the noncompliance for which enforcement discretion was granted. Enforcement action will also be considered in those cases in which incorrect or incomplete information was provided to the NRC staff by a licensee in its justification. The NRC recognizes that a licensee will need to

exercise judgement in making a determination under this discretion provision. Consistent with

' the NRC's position involving 10 CFR 50.54(x), enforcement action for a violation of a license

condition, including a TS, will not be taken unless a licensee's action was clearly unreasonable considering all the relevant circumstances. Enforcement action could include assessment of civil penalties and the issuance of orders.

Interim Enforcement Policy for Use During the NRC Power Reactor Oversight Process Pilot Plant Study This section sets forth the interim enforcement policy that the NRC will use to address violations of the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and associated license conditions at nine power reactor sites participating in the NRC reactor oversight process pilot plant study beginning in June 1999. This policy approaches enforcement for the plants participating in the pilot plant study by dividing identified violations into two groups.

I. Violations Evaluated by the Significance Determination Process i l

The first group consists of those violations that the Reactor Oversight Program's Significance Determination Process (SDP) can evaluate. For these violations, the SDP will determine the significance of the violation and the Agency Action Matrix will determine the appropriate agency response. These violations will be cited or non-cited. Normally, no severity I levels and civil penalties will be used to characterize these violations.

A. Violations of Low Significance l l

Violations that the SDP evaluates as not being risk significant (i.e., green) will be described in inspection reports as Non-Cited Violation (NCVs) and be categorized by the assessment process within the licensee response band. However, a Notice of Violation (NOV) will be issued if:

l (1) The licensee fails to restore compliance within a reasonable time after they identified  ;

the violation; ]

(2) The licensee fails to place the violation into the corrective action program; or (3) The violation was willful. An NCV may be appropriate if the violation meets the criteria in Section VII.B.I.a.4 of the Enforcement Policy.

The three exceptions are consistent with items (1), (2), and (4) of Section VII.B.I .a.

B. Significant Violations Violations that the SDP evaluates as risk significant (i.e., white, yellow, or red) will be assigned a color band related to its significance for use by the assessment process. Because of being risk significant, an NOV will be issued requiring a formal written response unless sufficient information is already on the docket. The Commission reserves the use of discretion

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' for particularly significant violations (e.g. an accidental criticality) to assess civil penalties in accordance with Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

II. Violations Not Evaluated by the SDP and Those Having Actual Consequences In the second group of violations, the Enforcement Policy will be retained, along with severity levels and the potential for the imposition of civil penalties or other appropriate enforcement action. Three categories of violations are within this group:

(A) Violations that involve willfulness including discrimination, (B) Violations that may impact the NRC's ability for oversight oflicensee activities such as those associated with reporting issues, failure to obtain NRC approvals such as for changes to the facility as required by 10 CFR 50.59,10 CFR 50.54(a),10 CFR 50.54 (p), and failure to provide the NRC with complete and accurate information or to maintain accurate records, and (C) Violations that involve actual consequences such as an overexposure to the public or plant personnel, failure to make the required notifications that impact the ability of federal, state and local agencies to respond to an actual emergency preparedness or transportation event, or a substantial release of radioactive material.

To 'the extent the above does not modify the NRC Enforcement Policy, the NRC Enforcement Policy remains applicable to power reactor licensees.

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,. *e DRAFT NRC REVISES ENFORCEMENTPOLICY FOR ASSESSING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VIOLATIONS i

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has revised its enforcement policy to reflect changes in its approach for assessing the significance of violations.

it is the third major revision of NRC's enforcement policy since 1995, continuing the NRC's efforts to use enforcement as a means of focusing licensee attention on identifying and correcting problems that are the most safety significant.

In the past, the NRC evaluated the potential and actual safety consequences of a -

violation, and its regulatory significance. Although never specifically defined, the term "

regulatory significance" traditionally included, but was not limited to, repetitive violations, willful violations, reporting violations and aggregating less significant violations into one of higher significance.

The revised enforcement policy eliminates the term " regulatory significance" and with it the practice of escalating the severity level of a violation based on aggregation or repetitiveness.

Concerns about a licensee's performance as a result of a large number of less significant violations, or repetitive violations based on ineffective corrective actions, will be addressed through other regulatory tools, such as NRC's new oversight and assessment process, rather

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a than enforcement.

I Under the revised enforcement policy, the NRC will consider the potential and actual safety consequences of a violation, whether it was willful, and its potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. The latter term encompasses a variety of

. reporting failures such as the failure to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC, or the failure to notify the NRC of changes in licensed activities. In considering potential safety consequences, the revised policy specifically states that risk information will be used whenever possible to increase or decrease the severity level of a violation.

The new policy makes additional changes, including changes to conform to recent revisions to the requirements of Part 50.59 of the Commission's regulations, " Changes, tests and experiments," as well as editorial corrections and language clarification to assure consistency with recent policy changes.

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The NRC enforcement policy was first issued as a formal policy statement in 1980. In 1995, it was completely revised as a result of the recommendations of a team of senior managers who studied the program and solicited input from stakeholders and other government agencies. In May 1998, further changes were made based on a review of the experience with the revised policy ard consideration of public comment. The agency recognizes that additional changes may be considered as a result of current efforts to improve the inspection and performance assessment processes for its licensees.

The revised enforcement policy (NUREG-1600) will be published in an upcoming edition of the Federal Register. Copies will be sent to all NRC licensees and will be posted to the NRC's homepage at: http://www.nrc. gov /OE

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$g__Ken Hart _5fiFf il.IEO~~~~~~

Page 3 j g', . a Copies will be available for inspection and copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room,2120 L Street, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, Copies may also be purchased from the Government Printing Office by calling (202) 512-1800.

Interested persons may submit written comments to David L. Meyer, Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, Mail Stop T6D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555. Comments may be hand-delivered between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays to 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Md. Comments will be accepted for 30 days after Federa/ Register publication.

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