ML20212K681
| ML20212K681 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/1986 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212K557 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8608220350 | |
| Download: ML20212K681 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES p
~ 't NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
,i WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 w
e/
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 95 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-29 AND AMENDMENT N0. 91 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-30 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY AND IOWA-ILLINOIS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY OUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-254/265
1.0 INTRODUCTION
i By letter dated March 22, 1985, Comonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) submitted a proposed Technical Specification (TS) change to reflect the recent installation of the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW)
Sump Pumps in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) vault rooms. The proposed cl.anges incorporate surveillance requirements associated with the RHR vault flood protection systems.
2.0 EVALUATION The Technical Specification changes proposed by the licensee delete flood protection surveillance requirements for the RHR vault room floor drains and bed plate drains as these drain paths have been permanently capped and are no longer used. Surveillance requirements associated with the addition of the RHRSW sump pump and associated piping are added to TS Section 3.5/4.5 H.
Surveillance acceptance criteria are specified in the associated bases. The staff finds the proposed changes acceptable as discussed below.
2.1 Condensate Pump Room Flood Protection (TS Section 3.5/4.5 H.I.a, 3.5/4.5 H.I.b, 3.5/4.5 H.I.c)
Until recently, accumulated leakage in the RHR vault rooms was directed via drains to the turbine building equipment drain sump located in the condensate pump room. The RHR vault rooms were physically separated j
from the condensate pump rooms by watertight bulkhead doors and the 8608220350 860911 PDR ADOCK 05000254 P
PDR g
August 11,'1986 t
- i drain lines from the RHR vault rooms consisted of a pipe penetrating each vault which required manual action to drain a vault floor.
In order to decrease the potential for inadvertently flooding the RHR vault rooms by backflow from the turbine building equiprent drain line through the Diesel Generator Cooling Water (DGCW) bed plate and. RHR vault floor drains, a plant modification permanently capped the floor-drain lines which penetrate the RHR vault rooms and installed sump pumps in each of the three RHR vault rooms to pump any collected leakage from the RHR vault rooms to the service water discharge lines.
As a result of the permanent capping of the drain lines, leak testing
.of both the DGCW bed plate and PHR vault floor drains is no longer:
necessary. The TS is revised to delete surveillance requirements for the RHR vault floor drains and the RHR Service Water pump and DGCW pump bed plate drains. Requirements to verify the operability of flood protection level switches in both the condensate pump rooms and RHR vault rooms.are added.
In addition, check valves installed in the RHRSW sump pump discharge piping which connects the pump with the service water discharge line are verified by positive means to pre--
vent backflow from the condensate pump room to the RHR vault rooms.
Verification of the integrity of the flood protection level' switches t
and the check valves is performed at least once per operating cycle.
Leak tests of the doors connecting the RHR vault rooms with the con-densate pump room are also specified and described.
4 To accommodate the surveillance requirement addicions and changes to the text, a new TS page, 3.5/4.5-9a, was created.
The staff has reviewed the above TS changes and find they adequately describe the new sump pump system and the surveillances necessary to l
assure operability and the changes are therefore acceptable.
2.2 Surveillance Requirements Bases'(TS Section 4.5)
TS Section 4.5 is revised to delete the bases associated with the leak testing of the floor drains discussed in item 2.1 above, address the bases for leak testing the submarine doors installed as part of the plant modification, and to clarify the method used to leak test the watertight bulkhead doors and the submarine doors, both of which provide access between the condensate pump room and each of the-three RHR vault rooms. Leak detection methods' include leak testino-both doors, and monitoring the composite sampler and radiation monitor installed downstream of the sump pump inlet in the service water discharge piping. The 6 inch water level alarm which alerts the operators to the presence of water in each of the RHR vault rooms-is also discussed.
i
t Y The current TS defines both the 1 foot switch'and the 3 foot switch alarms as indicative of high water level. Definition of both alarms as indicating high water level was confusing. The function of the 1 foot switch is redefined as, " alarm, low water level," in lieu of
" alarm, panel high water," for clarity.
The staff has review the proposed Basis changes and find they adequately describe the new system; therefore, they are acceptable.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
These amendments involve a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, and changes to the surveillance require-ments. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase.in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22fc)(9)'. Pursuant to10CFR51.22(b),noenvironmentalimpact.statementnorenvironmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amend-ments.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor: Patricia Eng Dated: August 11, 1986
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